Shalkowski, S.A. (1994) The Ontological Ground of the Alethic Modality. The Philosophical Review, 103 (4). pp. 669-688. ISSN 0031-8108Full text available as:
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This paper is concerned with the wholly metaphysical question of whether necessity and possibility rest on nonmodal foundations—whether the truth conditions for modal statements are, in the final analysis, nonmodal. It is argued that Lewis’s modal realism is either arbitrary and stipulative or else it is circular. Even if there were Lewisean possible worlds, they could not provide the grounds for modality. D. M. Armstrong’s combinatorial approach to possibility suffers from similar defects. Since more traditional reductions to cognitive or linguistic facts suffer similar fates, the conclusion that the alethic modality is primitive and incapable of reduction is offered.
|Copyright, Publisher and Additional Information:||© 1994 The Philosophical Review. This is an author produced electronic version of an article accepted for publication in The Philosophical Review.|
|Institution:||The University of Leeds|
|Academic Units:||The University of Leeds > Faculty of Arts (Leeds) > School of Humanities (Leeds) > School of Philosophy (Leeds)|
|Depositing User:||Repository Officer|
|Date Deposited:||12 Jan 2005|
|Last Modified:||04 Jun 2014 22:51|
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