Miraldo, M., Goddard, M. and Smith, P.C. (2006) The incentive effects of payment by results. Research Report. CHE Research Paper (19). Centre for Health Economics , York, UK.
Recently the English NHS has introduced an activity-based payment scheme for secondary care - the Payment by Results (PbR) policy. In this paper we discuss, from an economic perspective, the main intended and unintended incentives created by this policy. We also outline the role of different NHS institutions in monitoring and analysing the impact of PbR and consider the information and data requirements for such tasks.
|Copyright, Publisher and Additional Information:||© 2006 the authors. The full text of this report can be viewed free of charge from the Centre for Health Economics web site at: http://www.york.ac.uk/inst/che/pdf/rp19.pdf|
|Keywords:||Payment by results, Prospective Payment System, Incentives|
|Institution:||The University of York|
|Academic Units:||The University of York > Centre for Health Economics (York)|
|Depositing User:||Repository Officer|
|Date Deposited:||21 Feb 2007|
|Last Modified:||04 Oct 2010 16:53|
|Publisher:||Centre for Health Economics|
|Series Name:||CHE Research Paper|