Does debt concentration depend on the risk-taking incentives in CEO compensation?

Castro, P, Keasey, K orcid.org/0000-0001-7645-3274, Amor-Tapia, B et al. (2 more authors) (2020) Does debt concentration depend on the risk-taking incentives in CEO compensation? Journal of Corporate Finance, 64. 101684. ISSN 0929-1199

Abstract

Metadata

Authors/Creators:
Copyright, Publisher and Additional Information: © 2020, Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved. This is an author produced version of an article published in Journal of Corporate Finance. Uploaded in accordance with the publisher's self-archiving policy.
Keywords: Debt concentration; Executive compensation; Corporate governance
Dates:
  • Published: October 2020
  • Accepted: 23 June 2020
  • Published (online): 27 June 2020
Institution: The University of Leeds
Academic Units: The University of Leeds > Faculty of Business (Leeds) > Accounting & Finance Division (LUBS) (Leeds)
Depositing User: Symplectic Publications
Date Deposited: 09 Jul 2020 14:31
Last Modified: 09 Jul 2020 14:31
Status: Published
Publisher: Elsevier
Identification Number: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2020.101684

Download

Accepted Version


Embargoed until: 27 December 2021

Filename: Does Debt Concentration_June2020_final_checked.pdf

Licence: CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0

Request a copy

Share / Export

Statistics