Optimal Security Design under Asymmetric Information and Profit Manipulation

Koufopoulos, Konstantinos, Kozhan, Roman and Trigilia, Giulio (2019) Optimal Security Design under Asymmetric Information and Profit Manipulation. Review of Corporate Finance Studies. 146–173.

Abstract

Metadata

Authors/Creators:
  • Koufopoulos, Konstantinos (kostas.koufopoulos@york.ac.uk)
  • Kozhan, Roman
  • Trigilia, Giulio
Copyright, Publisher and Additional Information: © The Author(s) 2018. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The Society for Financial Studies. All rights reserved. This is an author-produced version of the published paper. Uploaded in accordance with the publisher’s self-archiving policy. Further copying may not be permitted; contact the publisher for details.
Keywords: security design,capital structure,asymmetric information,profit manipulation,window dressing
Dates:
  • Published: 1 March 2019
Institution: The University of York
Academic Units: The University of York > Faculty of Social Sciences (York) > Economics and Related Studies (York)
Depositing User: Pure (York)
Date Deposited: 20 Aug 2019 14:40
Last Modified: 05 Jan 2020 07:58
Published Version: https://doi.org/10.1093/rcfs/cfy008
Status: Published
Refereed: Yes
Identification Number: https://doi.org/10.1093/rcfs/cfy008

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