Decoupling management inefficiency: Myopia, hyperopia and takeover likelihood

Tunyi, A. orcid.org/0000-0002-5761-931X, Ntim, C. and Danbolt, J. (2019) Decoupling management inefficiency: Myopia, hyperopia and takeover likelihood. International Review of Financial Analysis. ISSN 1057-5219

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Authors/Creators:
Copyright, Publisher and Additional Information: © 2019 Elsevier. This is an author produced version of a paper subsequently published in International Review of Financial Analysis. Uploaded in accordance with the publisher's self-archiving policy. Article available under the terms of the CC-BY-NC-ND licence (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
Keywords: Hyperopia; Inefficient management hypothesis; Management performance; Myopia; Takeovers
Dates:
  • Accepted: 7 January 2019
  • Published (online): 10 January 2019
Institution: The University of Sheffield
Academic Units: The University of Sheffield > Faculty of Social Sciences (Sheffield) > Sheffield University Management School
Depositing User: Symplectic Sheffield
Date Deposited: 21 Jan 2019 09:36
Last Modified: 21 Jan 2019 09:36
Published Version: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.irfa.2019.01.004
Status: Published online
Publisher: Elsevier
Refereed: Yes
Identification Number: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.irfa.2019.01.004

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Filename: Decoupling management inefficiency_Final.pdf

Licence: CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0

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