Initial compensation contracts for new executives and financial distress risk: An empirical investigation of UK firms

Chen, J orcid.org/0000-0002-4076-7121, De Cesari, A, Hill, P et al. (1 more author) (2018) Initial compensation contracts for new executives and financial distress risk: An empirical investigation of UK firms. Journal of Corporate Finance, 48. pp. 292-313. ISSN 0929-1199

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Copyright, Publisher and Additional Information: Crown Copyright © 2017, Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an author produced version of a paper published in Journal of Corporate Finance. Uploaded in accordance with the publisher's self-archiving policy.
Keywords: Executive compensation; Financial distress risk; Creditor monitoring
Dates:
  • Published: February 2018
  • Accepted: 8 November 2017
  • Published (online): 11 November 2017
Institution: The University of Leeds
Academic Units: The University of Leeds > Faculty of Business (Leeds) > Accounting & Finance Division (LUBS) (Leeds)
Depositing User: Symplectic Publications
Date Deposited: 14 Aug 2018 09:53
Last Modified: 11 May 2019 00:44
Status: Published
Publisher: Elsevier
Identification Number: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2017.11.002

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