When Should the Chicken Cross the Road? - Game Theory for Autonomous Vehicle - Human Interactions

Autonomous vehicle localization, mapping and planning in un-reactive environments are well-understood, but the human factors of complex interactions with other road users are not yet developed. This study presents an initial model for negotiation between an autonomous vehicle and another vehicle at an unsigned intersections or (equivalently) with a pedestrian at an unsigned road-crossing (jaywalking), using discrete sequential game theory. The model is intended as a basic framework for more realistic and data-driven future extensions. The model shows that when only vehicle position is used to signal intent, the optimal behaviors for both agents must include a non-zero probability of allowing a collision to occur. This suggests extensions to reduce this probability in future, such as other forms of signaling and control. Unlike most Game Theory applications in Economics, active vehicle control requires real-time selection from multiple equilibria with no history, and we present and argue for a novel solution concept, meta-strategy convergence, suited to this task.