Shemmer, Y. (2016) II—Objectivity and Idolatry. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume, 90 (1). pp. 191-216. ISSN 0309-7013
Abstract
The attempt to vindicate the objectivity of morality tops the list of philosophical obsessions. In this paper I consider the rationality of searching for such a vindication. I argue that the only justification of our efforts lies in our belief in moral objectivity; that this belief can be as well, if not better, explained by wishful thinking and other cognitive biases; that as a research community we have failed to take precautions against such biases; and that as a result we have been making disproportionate, and therefore irrational, efforts to establish moral objectivity.
Metadata
Item Type: | Article |
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Authors/Creators: |
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Copyright, Publisher and Additional Information: | © 2016 The Aristotelian Society. This is an author produced version of a paper subsequently published in Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume. Uploaded in accordance with the publisher's self-archiving policy. |
Dates: |
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Institution: | The University of Sheffield |
Academic Units: | The University of Sheffield > Faculty of Arts and Humanities (Sheffield) > Department of Philosophy (Sheffield) |
Depositing User: | Symplectic Sheffield |
Date Deposited: | 23 Nov 2017 11:45 |
Last Modified: | 28 Jun 2018 00:39 |
Published Version: | https://doi.org/10.1093/arisup/akw010 |
Status: | Published |
Publisher: | Oxford University Press |
Refereed: | Yes |
Identification Number: | 10.1093/arisup/akw010 |
Open Archives Initiative ID (OAI ID): | oai:eprints.whiterose.ac.uk:124346 |