Bex-Priestley, G. and Shemmer, Y. (2017) A normative theory of disagreement. Journal of the American Philosophical Association, 3 (2). pp. 189-208. ISSN 2053-4477
Abstract
Expressivists have trouble accounting for disagreement. If ethical or other normative judgments are desire-like rather than belief-like, it is puzzling why we think people often disagree in those domains. While previous expressivists have proposed only straightforwardly descriptive conditions under which disagreement occurs, we argue that disagreement itself should be understood normatively: two or more people disagree just in case their diverging attitudes imply, given a common project of theirs, that at least one of them has reason to change his or her mind.
Metadata
Item Type: | Article |
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Authors/Creators: |
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Copyright, Publisher and Additional Information: | © 2017 American Philosophical Association. This is an author produced version of a paper subsequently published in Journal of the American Philosophical Association. Article available under the terms of the CC-BY-NC-ND license (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/). |
Keywords: | metaethics; disagreement; expressivism; noncognitivism |
Dates: |
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Institution: | The University of Sheffield |
Academic Units: | The University of Sheffield > Faculty of Arts and Humanities (Sheffield) > Department of Philosophy (Sheffield) |
Depositing User: | Symplectic Sheffield |
Date Deposited: | 23 Nov 2017 11:38 |
Last Modified: | 10 Nov 2023 16:23 |
Status: | Published |
Publisher: | Cambridge University Press |
Refereed: | Yes |
Identification Number: | 10.1017/apa.2017.17 |
Open Archives Initiative ID (OAI ID): | oai:eprints.whiterose.ac.uk:124345 |
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