Olson, E.T. (2002) What does functionalism tell us about personal identity? Nous, 36 (4). pp. 682-698. ISSN 0029-4624
Sydney Shoemaker argues that the functionalist theory of mind entails a psychological-continuity view of personal identity, as well as providing a defense of that view against a crucial objection. I show that his view has surprising consequences, e.g. that no organism could have mental properties and that a thing's mental properties fail to supervene even weakly on its microstructure and surroundings. I then argue that the view founders on "fission" cases and rules out our being material things. Functionalism tells us little if anything about personal identity.
|Copyright, Publisher and Additional Information:||Copyright © 2002 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. This is an author produced version of a paper published in Nous. The definitive version is available from http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/links/doi/10.1111/1468-0068.00407|
|Institution:||The University of Sheffield|
|Academic Units:||The University of Sheffield > Faculty of Arts and Humanities (Sheffield) > Department of Philosophy (Sheffield)|
|Depositing User:||Repository Officer|
|Date Deposited:||24 May 2006|
|Last Modified:||05 Jun 2014 06:01|