Personal identity and the radiation argument

Olson, E.T. (2001) Personal identity and the radiation argument. Analysis, 61 (269). pp. 38-44. ISSN 1467-8284

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Abstract

Sydney Shoemaker has argued that, because we can imagine a people who take themselves to survive a 'brain-state-transfer' procedure, cerebrum transplant, or the like, we ought to conclude that we could survive such a thing. I claim that the argument faces two objections, and can be defended only by depriving it any real interest.

Item Type:	Article
Copyright, Publisher and Additional Information:	Copyright © 2001 Eric T. Olson. This is an author produced version of a paper published in Analysis.
Academic Units:	The University of Sheffield > Faculty of Arts and Humanities (Sheffield) > Department of Philosophy (Sheffield)
Depositing User:	Repository Officer
Date Deposited:	24 May 2006
Last Modified:	08 Feb 2013 16:49
Published Version:	http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/1...
Status:	Published
Publisher:	Blackwell Publishing - Published on behalf of the Analysis Trust
Refereed:	Yes
Identification Number:	10.1111/1467-8284.00267
Related URLs:	http://www.shef.ac.uk/philosophy/staff/p...
URI:	http://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/id/eprint/1219

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