Webber, J. (2002) Doing without representation: coping with Dreyfus. Philosophical Explorations, 5 (1). pp. 82-88. ISSN 1741-5918
Hubert Dreyfus argues that the traditional and currently dominant conception of an action, as an event initiated or governed by a mental representation of a possible state of affairs that the agent is trying to realise, is inadequate. If Dreyfus is right, then we need a new conception of action. I argue, however, that the considerations that Dreyfus adduces show only that an action need not be initiated or governed by a conceptual representation, but since a representation need not be conceptually structured, do not show that we need a conception of action that does not involve representation.
|Copyright, Publisher and Additional Information:||© 2002 Taylor & Francis Ltd. This is an author produced version of a paper published in Philosophical Explorations.|
|Institution:||The University of Sheffield|
|Academic Units:||The University of Sheffield > Faculty of Arts and Humanities (Sheffield) > Department of Philosophy (Sheffield)|
|Depositing User:||Repository Officer|
|Date Deposited:||23 May 2006|
|Last Modified:||08 Jun 2014 06:45|