Owens, D. (2003) Does belief have an aim? Philosophical Studies, 115 (3). 283 -305. ISSN 1573-0883Full text available as:
The hypothesis that belief aims at the truth has been used to explain three features of belief: (1) the fact that correct beliefs are true beliefs, (2) the fact that rational beliefs are supported by the evidence and (3) the fact that we cannot form beliefs `at will. I argue that the truth-aim hypothesis cannot explain any of these facts. In this respect believing differs from guessing since the hypothesis that guessing aims at the truth can explain the three analogous features of guessing. I conclude that, unlike guessing, believing is not purposive in any interesting sense.
|Copyright, Publisher and Additional Information:||© 2003 Kluwer Academic Publishers. This is an author produced version of a paper published in Philosophical Studies. The published copy is available from SpringerLink at http://www.springerlink.com/openurl.asp?genre=article&id=doi:10.1023/A:1025157101089|
|Institution:||The University of Sheffield|
|Academic Units:||The University of Sheffield > Faculty of Arts and Humanities (Sheffield) > Department of Philosophy (Sheffield)|
|Depositing User:||Repository Officer|
|Date Deposited:||23 May 2006|
|Last Modified:||05 Jun 2014 21:46|