Economic Sanctions, Transnational Terrorism, and the Incentive to Misrepresent

Bapat, NA, De la Calle, L, Hinkkainen, KH orcid.org/0000-0002-7552-0882 et al. (1 more author) (2016) Economic Sanctions, Transnational Terrorism, and the Incentive to Misrepresent. Journal of Politics, 78 (1). pp. 249-264. ISSN 0022-3816

Abstract

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Authors/Creators:
Copyright, Publisher and Additional Information: © 2015 by the Southern Political Science Association. Reproduced in accordance with the publisher's self-archiving policy.
Keywords: terrorism, economic sanctions, state sponsorship, bargaining.
Dates:
  • Published: 1 January 2016
  • Accepted: 12 July 2015
  • Published (online): 30 September 2015
Institution: The University of Leeds
Academic Units: The University of Leeds > Faculty of Education, Social Sciences and Law (Leeds) > School of Politics & International Studies (POLIS) (Leeds)
Depositing User: Symplectic Publications
Date Deposited: 23 Aug 2017 11:19
Last Modified: 07 Jun 2018 12:26
Status: Published
Publisher: University of Chicago Press
Identification Number: https://doi.org/10.1086/683257
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