Wenar, Leif (1997) The concept of property and the takings clause. Columbia Law Review, 97 (6). pp. 1923-1946. ISSN 0010-1958
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Abstract
Leif Wenar examines the impact on takings scholarship of the redefinition of "property" early in the twentieth century. He argues that the Hohfeldian characterization of property as rights (instead of as tangible things) forced major scholars such as Michelman, Sax, and Epstein into extreme interpretations of the Takings Clause. This extremism is unnecessary, however, since the original objections to the idea that "property is things" are mistaken.
| Item Type: | Article |
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| Copyright, Publisher and Additional Information: | Copyright © 1997 Columbia Law Review. Reproduced with permission. |
| Academic Units: | The University of Sheffield > Faculty of Arts and Humanities (Sheffield) > Department of Philosophy (Sheffield) |
| Depositing User: | Leif Wenar |
| Date Deposited: | 12 Apr 2006 |
| Last Modified: | 08 Feb 2013 16:48 |
| Status: | Published |
| Refereed: | No |
| URI: | http://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/id/eprint/1022 |
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