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I

BODIES

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In educational circles examination is seen as the exemplary case of an abstract oppressor. This allows a conception of 'good education' to be contrasted with 'bad influences' that are said to pollute the educational project with their noxious effects. This is misleading. Examination does not oppress education simply because at their formation modern educational institutions, such as schools, adopted its principles and procedures and have depended upon them ever since. Examinations have come to form modern subjectivities and, hence, their negative attributes cannot be simply removed from education and from the citizens they create. A radical critique of examinations must begin elsewhere, by objecting to what we became under their influence.

Part I from *Benign Violence: Education in and Beyond the Age of Reason* by Ansgar Allen published by Palgrave Macmillan in 2014 – pre-copyedited version.

On Progress

I work in a building once occupied by architects. I am told they designed radio telescopes for receiving messages from outer space. It goes without saying that today our concerns are more immediate.

*

At its inception more than a century ago, the Department of Education that now employs me could boast the following equipment:

> The Department is equipped with the apparatus of a small pedagogical research laboratory, including a Hipp Chronoscope, Macdougall's Attention Machine, Rauschberg's Association and Memory Apparatus, Netschajef's Reaction Time Apparatus, Ebbinghaus Memory Apparatus, Jacquet's Sphymograph, Romer's Voice Key, Minnemann's Card Changing Apparatus, Wundt's Tachistoscope, Wundt's Control Hammer, Kymograph, &c., &c.[1]

In a school on the outskirts of the city similar devices reappear. A small girl stands about to be photographed, positioned on a weighing machine for the shot.[2] She peers at the camera whilst her teacher attends to the balances. Her head cocked to one side, and her face entirely blank, this photographic record tells us little of what was going on inside.

*

Measuring the child in 1911 was a physical activity by which features such as weight and height were collected and noted down. Examination of the mind in abstraction from the body was rare. As a technique, the mental test was still in its infancy and generally depended upon physical tricks, such as tests of reaction time, that were later found to correlate poorly with subjective impressions of intelligence. This would soon change. Within a mere decade another type of test became common, one that would not depend on this circus of tricks. It became known as the intelligence or IQ test. A hundred years on this form of mental assessment is now so old that its use has become unremarkable. Today all young minds are routinely extracted, quantified and subjected to the language of statistical estimation. This form of extraction, a process by which the child is dissected and then reconstructed, has become entirely banal.

*

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Children are today surrounded by the chatter of statistical work, a language informed by practices of assessment that are laced throughout schooling and its surrounding activities. Convention dictates that such extractions are part of a neutral process or, at least, that they should aspire to technical neutrality. This is the first denial of power.

Accordingly, knowledge of the child must be separated from the effects of bias; it must be objective, correct and reliable. If an assessment bias of some sort is discovered, it must be removed. This scientific procedure is governed by an explicit set of principles that have been rationally agreed. It is the product of a vast industry of professionals and their expert pronouncements. Examination must have an even and regular appearance; it should be without blemish. There is a sense of fairness and decency that comes with carefully designed, carefully administered assessment, or so we are encouraged to feel. This resides in its scientific, non-arbitrary, incorruptible technique.

Those critics who rightly claim that bias remains, who doggedly persist in searching it out, do not escape from the conceptual frame they appear to challenge. However shrill they become in their objections and denunciations, their objections still issue from within the terms of this debate: they speak in the language of bias and fairness. The framework of examination thereby remains intact, and is perhaps also a little reinforced.

*

Some educators seek to reject scientific measurement in its entirety. They hope to escape its assumptions concerning the nature of the learner or the nature and purpose of education more generally. As if their will to escape were enough!

Others try, more humbly, to diminish its effects. They promote our recognition of the whole child, of a human presence that must be respected, that must remain uncut, un-extracted. The individual learner ought to be accommodated in terms of his or her own unique completeness. We do violence to the child, they say, if we pare things down to the narrow language of a statistical judiciary. Believing that more humane forms of assessment are possible, that they are already on the horizon if only we were prepared to travel, those of this persuasion have developed other, rival techniques for appreciating the child. These practical innovations are, though, issued from a position of rivalry that is more apparent than real.

*

For those who reject the dominion of scientific measurement, grades and ranks are diligently avoided in favour of individual recommendations and constructive advice. The child is encouraged to avoid comparison with others and to focus on the process of learning. The key, it seems, is to avoid looking elsewhere for guidance or for reason to blame. One must focus on the self in order to celebrate the self and the unique developmental stage this self has reached. There are no generalisations, no universals against which the learner can be compared, and then ranked and judged. Each moment is its own. As such the ownership of each moment cannot be disputed, it is the learner's to possess. The learner must learn to take responsibility for that temporal slice, to diagnose it, and to deliver him or herself from it towards the next incomparable step of learning. This leads to a perverse situation where 'there is no longer anything the self can hold on to, other than itself'.[3] Despite the surrounding warmth of feeling, the child is rendered alone. Examination becomes a process of extreme personalisation that functions *almost* 'like an amputation'.[4]

*

Extreme personalisation does not create selves that are perfectly atomised. These selves are not entirely cut off from one another. It remains true that 'no self is an island; each exists in a fabric of relations'.[5] What *has* changed, however, is that the self in question increasingly sits within a fabric of relations designed to *fold back* on the self, to refer back to each self in carefully individuated terms. This disguises the operations of a malevolent power, obscuring a set of relations that forms the wider structure of feeling.

*

The framework within which the individual is constructed remains hidden from view. In this way, social amputation operates as an insidious divider. From the perspective of its supporters this tradition of humanised assessment looks very different, of course. It has all but divorced itself from the deleterious effects of power, they feel. Their methods have been designed, quite deliberately to operate without bias and certainly without violence. Their pedagogy is presented as self-evident and neutral ('it is just the way we all learn'). And the experience of assessment and learning that it promotes is certainly intended to feel nothing like amputation! The child must be kept

whole, that is their basic tenet; the whole child is their aim and object. After all, these educators hold to higher principles; their activities are geared towards the flourishing of all. As with their rival (the statistical tradition) there is repeated here an insistence on neutrality, on the absence of power. This is the second denial.

*

There is a third denial of power that is associated with the examination of human worth. One stumbles across it frequently. I encountered it when overhearing an educator in conversation with a cynic. Actually I was part of the discussion, though I was experiencing one of those 'little touches of solitude' to which I am susceptible.[6]

The teacher was describing a scheme he had in mind to improve the prospects of state school pupils. The situation the teacher wished to confront is a familiar one: children of those parents who are able and willing to afford them a private education have a greater chance of making it to the country's elite universities. In these high-blown institutions, state school pupils are still, as a group, under-represented. The scheme he described was based on a simple hypothesis: children of the state are disadvantaged, he said, because they perform less well at interview. The proposed intervention follows naturally enough: to offer state school pupils mock interviews as a form of preparation.

The cynic poured scorn on the entire plan as you might expect: the system is already rigged, he said. It is hopeless to believe that a little interview technique could overturn an entire social edifice that is marred by injustices and systemic biases. If you are born poor you die poor; if you are born rich you die rich: the elites have ways and means of maintaining their advantage. The teacher agreed wholeheartedly but then disavowed what he had just admitted. 'You are right,' he said, '*but I just can't allow it*'. That, for me, was the crux of the matter: in all practical concerns the teacher was compelled to hold on to the illusion of duly awarded merit, otherwise where would that leave his scheme, and indeed his profession?

The details of the plan were also significant in their own way. The idea was to invite carefully selected 'strangers' to the school. This was based on the assumption that the true interview (the interview without bias) is an encounter with strangers. Leaving aside the elementary point that some strangers are

stranger than others (the private school pupil may find the strangers on the interview panel more familiar than the state school pupil), there was something deeply ironic about this situation. Schools commence by telling their pupils: 'Never speak to strangers!' and finish with the concern that their pupils have lost the ability to do so.

*

Though there is plenty of cause for cynicism (it's all rigged and so on), we do nevertheless reassure ourselves that privilege is no longer *publicly* supportable. In the liberal West, to bring attention to someone's privilege is to offer that person an insult. The implication, clearly enough, is that the person in question would have been unable to succeed on merit alone and does not deserve our recognition. Noble birth may continue to bring its hidden advantages, but these conveyances are said to be on the wane. Nepotism – the practice whereby those with power or influence favour relatives and friends – is no longer publicly defensible. It follows the fate of its precursor, the arrangement of judicious marriages, which has long been a topic of ridicule.[7] Though we admit that covert systems, systems that convey undue advantage, are still very much in existence – where the middle-classes are perhaps now the most adept game players in town – most people gaming the system today would be embarrassed to admit foul play. The cynicism that afflicts us is not quite that well set.[8] If we cynically 'buy' our way to a qualification or position, we still feel compelled to conceal what we have done. The felt need for concealment here can be taken as a mark of progress, progressives believe. This sense of shame rather proves the point from the perspective of the social optimist: meritocracy has become an unquestionable good.

*

It is commonly believed that we live in a meritocracy. The advocates of this faith remind themselves that power was once a brazen, openly patriarchal, and unashamedly naked force. They flatter themselves with the idea that the blatant interventions of patronage have been largely replaced by scientific measurement and democratic correction, by tools providing better estimates of capability than birth, blood or noble origin ever could. Though some critics still complain of a continued class, gender or race bias in assessment, I would argue that their complaints are in a sense superficial. Their criticisms issue

from, circulate through, and are deposited back within the same system of meritocratic assumptions.

More baldly put, one might say that this entire debate finds itself located within a narrative of Western advance. According to this narrative, progress in the production of knowledge – including knowledge gained from examination – translates more or less directly into advances of justice, fairness and liberty. From this perspective, examination and the knowledge it produces, needs only further refinement and better implementation as we work towards greater equality of opportunity through more perfected meritocratic techniques. Education systems are viewed as having become more transparent and more accountable through the production of knowledge about and within them. This transparency will, it is believed, overthrow those systems of power that are said to multiply when knowledge is thin and human existence undisclosing. In such an educational context, with the effects of power largely 'removed', ability has for the first time in history a genuine chance to triumph over background and hence over power. Ability takes precedence over the influence of one's connections, of strings pulled in the shadows. Those who accept this progressive narrative flatter themselves that even though imperfections remain; the aspiration to achieve perfected meritocratic order is firmly embedded.

*

As a regulating idea, meritocracy serves to structure and condition perception. In providing the framework upon which judgements are made, it functions as if it were timeless. Meritocracy is one of those moral touchstones many believe can be invoked without reasonable objection to judge social existence. The meritocratic ideal fulfils an essential role in those societies that have endured the combined onslaught of modernity and secularism, those societies that are marked by the defeat of religious authority, and as a result, no longer order their perception according to the metaphysical logic of a divine order. More earthly principles are now depended upon to regulate lived experience. It is here that the principle of meritocracy – a delicate but enduring concoction – has become the primary operator for a secular order.

*

In his commentary on Nietzsche,[9] Henry Staten contrasts the Christian order of discourse – which attempts 'to recuperate the suffering of history by

projecting a divine plan that assigns it a reason now and a recompense later' – to the secularised narrative of a latter-day liberal humanism. Unable to cope with the possibility that there is no single explanation for the accumulated disorder of history – only the brute fact of that 'overwhelming spectacle of cruelty, stupidity and suffering' – Left liberals and humanists find a secular replacement for the Christian precursor.[10] According to their revised understanding, 'all those lives ground up in the machine of history are assigned an intelligible role as victims of oppression and injustice'. This is the 'implicit teleology' of modern self-understanding which 'gives form and meaning to the rest of history'. From their elevated perspective extends an 'invisible line of rectitude' used to judge human existence, a line of rectitude that would presumably continue to traverse history 'even though [its originating] community of belief my cease to exist'.[11] It is a position of self-professed pre-eminence that allows those who identify with it to stand outside history and act as supreme arbitrators, like gods, judging all societies alike according to their universal criteria. These defenders of our common humanity 'cannot accept,' as John Gray argues, 'that a world in which their liberal ideals are constantly mocked does not secretly revere them'.[12] Like me, they sleep a little higher, and yet they refuse to wake up. Perhaps they should be permitted this temporal respite, as a prisoner might be allowed to rest on the way to the gallows. Eventually, though, liberals and humanists alike must leave this dream state and learn to admit the fragile foundations of their self-professed superiority.

The principle of meritocracy can be found within the ailing foundations of their humanistic tradition. It is remarkable, in fact, that such a fragile idea has been and still is used in this way, functioning as a key line of rectitude or 'sliver of light',[13] which somehow entitles those who possess it to illuminate and appraise the past, present, and future alike. According to this singular line, a just society will be, amongst other things, a meritocratic one, where meritocracy provides the scale against which social progress is judged. More advanced societies are deemed to be those that are more meritocratic. They make fewer decisions based on prejudice and extend opportunity further. Meritocracy is also used as a measure of corruption, where corrupt societies or corrupt institutions are thought to be those that violate the formula: merit = ability + effort. Meritocratic societies are open and fair, non-meritocratic ones

are obscure and underhand. The conclusion is familiar; meritocracies are places where power is in retreat.

*

As a myth, meritocracy acts to support and legitimate unequal societies.[14] Whilst meritocracy is a comparatively recent social invention with no claim to universality, it performs an important and seemingly indestructible ideological function. It absorbs displeasure – a bitterness that is the product of inequality – by diffusing it and individuating it within a system that sanctions differential rewards, a system that assigns individuals to unequal economic positions according to their own 'effort' and 'merit'. It sets to work any remaining vexations issuing from those who retain a social conscience by diverting these desires for a different, more equal social order into the pursuit of system neutrality. This sublimation of desire is expressed through the fight against patronage or unfair influence, and through the development and distribution of accounting techniques and traditions of 'unbiased' measurement. It should be noted that, in the context of these earnest campaigns for more justly distributed inequalities, cases of residual nepotism are not as disruptive to the meritocratic ideal as they may at first appear. When individuals or groups are singled out for their unfair privilege, they serve an important function, reinforcing the principle of meritocracy amongst those who depend upon it to animate their contempt.

*

The ubiquity of meritocracy in liberal societies seems unassailable. If circumstances were different, perhaps we could let this spectre alone and allow it to continue as a ponderous, but harmless preoccupation. But this continued faith in the eternal form of the meritocratic ideal has become embroiled in a scandal of perception, and this scandal has had its victims. Even though as a collective ideal meritocracy clearly still exists, as *a practical administrative project* it has long since been dismissed from the scene of government. It no longer persists in that corporeal form. We nevertheless remain *psychologically attached* to the idea of meritocracy, so much so that we are unable to fully perceive its departure, nor take the measure of the system that replaced it. We cannot recognise our period as one in which *disorder* and the *impossibility of fairness* are principles that have been elevated above their opposites and incorporated within governmental technique. The period within which we live is one that

exists *after fairness* and *beyond justice*, following a transition that took place largely unremarked. This transition occurred as the children of the late twentieth century learned how to live a life without fairness, as they were prepared for an existence where hope is more instrumental to their lives than the guarantee of justice, as they were schooled in a range of personal strategies and dispositions necessary for a docile and productive existence within a deliberately unsystematic social order.

Meritocracy, today, bears little resemblance to its former self, even though many resolutely hold on to its earlier definition; it has been transformed in spite of the fact that many are still preoccupied with its accompanying mission to eradicate power by removing the effects of unfair influence. A fissure has opened up between an abstract principle of justice and a social project within which reason has been suspended. This void now engulfs all well-meaning efforts oriented towards inclusion, fair opportunity and just desert. Within this space that remains hidden from view (as does a quarry beyond the crest of a hill) machinations of government have been able to extend and multiply, adjusting and furthering their capacity to quell dissent.

*

False assumptions concerning the absence of power in scientific assessment, the benign intent of its rival anti-numerical approach and the universalism of the meritocratic ideal, were culpable in a wider transformation through which we entered this life beyond fairness. We cannot even complain that fairness is absent for this complaint has been emptied of meaning. A belief in progress and an abstract faith in the institutions of liberalism and democracy also served to obscure the many 'dark sides' of power. Profoundly misguided in our commitments and in our estimates of the chief concerns of the day, many of us arrived at our current predicament staring intently in the wrong direction.

*

For those who maintain that it is time to inaugurate a resistance, perhaps even a collective refusal, the first step is to insist that power is *never* in retreat. Violence continues without interruption.

Modern Examination

To speak of the *history of examination* makes little sense. As a concept, examination is neither bland nor universal enough for such a history to be written. It cannot stretch across time gathering together all related events as their collecting term. Like the history it confronts this is an unstable concept. It is, moreover, insufficiently distinct from close associates such as 'assessment'.

At times the words *assessment* and *examination* can be used almost synonymously. At others they drift apart. Whilst examination is often used to refer to the formal process by which candidates are judged for a particular qualification or post, assessment has a more general meaning and can refer to informal as well as formal activities.

There are other differences: In medieval alchemy, examination refers to the attempt to test or assay a precious metal in order to determine its purity. It is also associated with close scrutiny or investigation by inspection in order to establish the truth or qualities of an object, statement or calculation. Finally, examination refers to the interrogation of a person in order to determine his or her state of mind, knowledge or capacity. Assessment, by contrast has been associated with the determination of a fine, charge or tax. It is also linked to the valuation of property. Whilst examination in its various uses is about inspection and truth – assessment adds to this the idea of distribution, remuneration and desert. Depending on my focus, I will switch terms. This chapter refers chiefly to examination, dealing as it does with the history of a device used to generate truth through inspection. Later chapters are concerned more directly with assessment: they investigate the valuation and distribution of human worth. This switch from examination to assessment is not without consequence, reflecting as it does a diminishing concern for truth.

*

In the West, two distinct traditions of examination can be identified, these being, modern examination and its medieval precursor. Both were brought into being as institutional devices, assisting those institutions in games of subjugation.

Arriving during the twelfth and thirteenth centuries in Europe, medieval examination beat the Bubonic Plague by a century. This is not to boast on

behalf of examination; it merely sets a scene. The pandemic was certainly a fearsome episode in human history, and yet there was a far more dangerous sickness already endemic in 1348 that is to be feared precisely because we do not experience it as such.

The plague arrived, so they say, on merchant ships upon which Oriental rats and their fleas hitched a ride. Examination has similar intercontinental connections, but we will remain in the West along with the fleas. Here we commonly perceive those who existed before medieval examination and certainly those who existed before modern examination, as comparatively healthy. The ancients were particularly so; at least, this is how the story goes where the hardy ancestor *par excellence* would be Socrates.

The medievalist Charles Haskins once quipped; a 'great teacher like Socrates gave no diplomas; if a modern student sat at his feet for three months, he would demand a certificate, something tangible and external to show for it'.[1] Unlike Socrates' companions who were the victims of Socratic dialogue, modern students are the victims of institutional life, having been so formed that they cannot but share the expectations of organised education. 'Only in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries', Haskins continues, 'do there emerge in the world those features of organised education with which we are most familiar, all that machinery of instruction represented by faculties and colleges and courses of study, examinations and commencements and academic degrees'.[2]

*

Almost 900 years ago, the first medieval universities were established, their early development being closely associated with a certain pre-modern ritual of examination. Formal medieval education was a minority privilege. The favoured few entered a system that we may struggle to understand in retrospect because it failed to employ many of those features that we associate with formal education today. There were few graduated steps in the subjects taught. These subjects were not broken down into discrete units and then ordered into a hierarchy of difficulty from the most elementary components to the most difficult concepts. Also absent was the significance we now ascribe to age. A variety of ages were taught together.[3] So, whilst the life of a medieval student can be divided into three main phases, these divisions did not contain a graded hierarchy of steps and they are not best represented by age.

Roughly then, the elite students of the first phase were called *scholars*. Four or more years were spent listening to lectures. These were delivered from a list of prescribed texts, with each text having defined for it the number of times it should be heard: 'Hard, close drill on a few well-thumbed books was the rule'.[4] But the required books were rare and so the education was largely an oral one, divided between ordinary lectures that were delivered by masters, and cursory lectures that were given by bachelors. The former expounded the text, whilst the latter offered little more than a running commentary on it. Lectures were augmented by disputations, in which the master would resolve any difficulties raised with respect to an authoritative text. A scholar would attend the disputations of his master for two years or so, during which period he would respond to questions posed by the master and receive training in textual reconciliation.

The second phase in the student's career was that of *bachelor*, a status that had been borrowed from the terminology of the Guilds, i.e. a candidate for Mastership. The transition from scholar to bachelor was known as the determination, and eligibility for this step was ascertained through a series of preliminary examinations, called 'responsions'. The candidate and his master were then asked to swear an oath that the former had fulfilled the requirements, including attendance at the prescribed lectures. Determination itself involved the candidate holding a series of public disputations during Lent. Having successfully determined, the bachelor resumed attendance at his master's lectures. He was required to take part in further disputations over the next year and take on some teaching responsibilities by delivering a course of cursory lectures.

The next objective was to become a *master*. After several more years of study and teaching the bachelor of promise reached the process of inception, through which admission could be gained to the master's guild. The candidate would hold an inaugural lecture together with a disputation, following which there was a banquet held at the inceptor's expense.

*

All these examinations, commencements and academic degrees may sound rather tedious.[5] On those occasions when I find myself subjected to some ceremony or other, either participating in the ritual or standing by, I like to think that we would all rather be elsewhere. Those who find themselves fired

up by such events exhibit, for me, the surface traits of a more troubling inclination.

It is with little pleasure that I spend effort recounting long dead rituals, such as those detailed above. It would be far more entertaining, perhaps, to explore what medieval students got up to in their spare time. But the ceremonial particulars are important, and we should not allow our gaze to follow that of the wayward student. These events served a wider, moral purpose. At the very least candidates could be rejected for inappropriate behaviour. Gambling or taking part in a knife-fight with local tailors, were both recorded as reasons for rejection. Paying undue attention to the solemnity of the event itself was another reason for dismissal. In fifteenth century Vienna one candidate made the unforgivable mistake of nipping out to see an execution during the examination – an irresistible spectacle, one assumes.[6] The threat of rejection for inappropriate behaviour was, nevertheless, only a blunt device for the regulation of personal conduct. The ceremonies themselves, these sites of medieval examination, were far more intricate in their effects as moral devices. To understand how they worked we must appreciate the regime of truth within which the medieval scholar was confined.

*

The medieval theologian and his student follower faced a basic difficulty: the various church canons contradicted one another. In this period a great deal of scholarly effort was expended to resolve these conflicts. Often since dismissed as 'mere scholasticism', this form of scriptural debate is so alien to our notions of rational discourse that we may indeed struggle to judge the scholastic agenda on its own merits. With an agenda that sets him at odds with our present, Alasdair MacIntyre provides a more sympathetic account. The key figure for MacIntyre was the influential theologian Thomas Aquinas (born 1225; levitated 1273; deceased 1274). Aquinas practiced a mode of scholasticism that coupled deep respect for authority with an effort to resolve contradiction and thereby reaffirm the pre-eminence of the church fathers. This was also the object of university disputations at which scriptural difficulties could be tidied up through dialectical argument. These carefully orchestrated disputes did provide a certain degree of creative space to develop counterarguments (for the sake of argument) before the final resolutions were

applied in summing up. This opportunity was, nevertheless, short-lived being cut short by the concluding remarks.

The medieval examination was an opportunity to demonstrate in discursive form the closeness and subtlety of one's understanding of and adherence to received tradition. 'Research' in the modern sense did not yet exist, with the 'research university' a thing of the distant future.[7] Knowledge of the truth did not emerge from an accumulation of facts; it was revealed following the correct reading of texts by someone who had developed those understandings that were valued by existing tradition. This is an affront to many ears today due to the enduring Enlightenment belief that rational thought must emancipate itself from the 'tutelage of authority'.[8] It is still often presumed that to be rational one must think for oneself. By contrast, scholastic rationalism was built on understandings that were largely tacit. These were absorbed gradually through, for example, attendance at and participation in the disputations that followed lectures. The bachelor would slowly learn through experience how to apply the acknowledged standards of his craft, and identify mistakes. The apprentice for mastership would also gradually learn to locate his efforts within the wider orbit of the scholastic universe, distinguishing between the 'kind of excellence which both others and he [for it would be a male] can expect of himself here and now, and that ultimate excellence which furnishes both apprentices and master-craftsmen with their *telos*', where the telos is their highest object or aim.[9]

Intellectual and moral virtues were deemed inseparable, where the effects of personal desires and inclinations were of particular concern when it came to textual interpretation. These tendencies were to be governed through an education in personal conduct. The apprentice would learn to self-regulate in working towards an ideal that was, in part, exemplified by the work of the craft-masters in whom the apprentice placed trust. Personal 'defects and limitations in habits of judgement and habits of evaluation' that were 'rooted in corruptions and inadequacies of desire, taste, habit and judgement' would become evident through training. Though the individual concerned would develop a thorough appreciation of those personal attributes that were to be managed, the process was not individualising, and it would be a mistake to read it as such. Increased self-knowledge did not separate the individual from his or her environment as an increasingly distinct self-referential unit. The

scholar was to become enmeshed, adopting the particular rationality or *Weltanschauung* of the craft. The apprentice would learn what it is about himself 'that has to be transformed, that is, what vices need to be eradicated, what intellectual and moral virtues need to be cultivated' if he was to become a master practitioner and so reside among like-minded peers.[10] The effects of medieval examination were deeply formative in this sense. This medieval ceremony was the culmination of a whole series of everyday personal reflections, inspections and petty ordeals. It was the medieval concentrate of a moral device that operated throughout the student experience.

*

The constraints of scholastic debate were not static; there was room for gradual transformation. Traditions adjusted over time, where the triumph of each successive stage came about under certain conditions. The superiority of a new interpretation was demonstrated if a later stage was 'able to transcend the limitations and failures of an earlier stage', according to 'the standards of rationality of that earlier stage itself'.[11] An earlier tradition could only be overthrown according to arguments that made sense to it, according to attacks that were advanced in its terms and according to its rituals of judgement. What this meant was that scholarship seeking the transformation of tradition demanded supreme efforts of self-cultivation in order to negotiate these complex transitions within a tradition. It would appear, then, that medieval change demanded an even deeper understanding of tradition than that was required when merely submitting to its existing mores. The rebel scholar would need to be the most ardent and skilful practitioner of his tradition. The rebel was marked by his alignment and acculturation, rather than his disaffiliation and militant disregard. Only the vanity of Enlightenment thinkers allowed them to believe that *radical* thought must be 'entirely deracinated' from formative authority in order to deserve that epithet.[12]

*

Histories are rhetorical deployments. For my purposes, medieval examination serves as a backcloth against which I hold its successor. This history is not a progressive one. Indeed, my juxtapositions are designed to create a disturbance in the present.[13]

*

As MacIntyre would have it, the scholastic order of discourse was largely replaced by a post-Cartesian, encyclopaedic worldview.[14] Having awoken from our 'medieval slumber', we moderns no longer appeal to external authorities. Guided by reason we are said to have developed independence from the tutelage of tradition.

*

That great mental sclerosis known as 'tradition' has been debunked, we say. A new freedom allows us to question without restraint and then verify our answers without prejudice. We love these answers dearly. We set them in typescript and file them away.

*

The cold and objective tools of modern examination would seem to epitomise the modern perspective. Examination, we believe, is no longer a device for cultivating a virtuous elite. It has become an impersonal, calculative tool. Examination today, has little to do with the embodiment of moral virtues, in the medieval sense. It would seem as though modern examination has displaced its pre-modern variant so completely that we could identify a total rupture in its history.

*

The logic of modern examination can be observed in a machine design once penned by the great utilitarian, Jeremy Bentham (who was born in 1748 and dissected at his behest for the purposes of science in 1832). As with the disputation, Bentham's modern examination was to be an oral and public ordeal. In all other respects however, it was entirely at odds with its medieval precursor. Bentham's examination was not designed to secure entry to an order of masters; rather, as part of a constitutional code intended 'for the use of all nations and all governments professing liberal opinions', it would regulate admission to government posts. Here is an extract from his *Constitutional Code:*

> SECTION 16: LOCABLE WHO, *Enactive*, ART.1. This section has for its object the providing, as soon as may be, and in so far as is necessary, - but no further, at the public expense, in relation to the business of all the several Subdepartments comprised in the Administration Department, a system of arrangements, whereby in the several official situations, appropriate aptitude in all its branches shall be

maximised, and at the same time expense minimized; say, a SYSTEM OF OFFICIAL LOCATION, or, for shortness, THE LOCATION SYSTEM.[15]

The abridged version is as follows: For each branch of art and science, a book would be provided in which 'the whole matter of it, or such portion as shall have been deemed necessary and sufficient, has been cast in the form of *questions, with correspondent answers*'.[16] The most advanced examinee would have the entire contents 'stowed in his memory' (for it would again be a male) and might be asked to respond to any question contained therein.[17] It would be 'impracticable' to examine the entire contents, and so only a selection of questions would be asked, these being selected by lot. This would ensure a 'maximization of the *inducement* afforded to *exertion* on the part of learners',[18] and would also prevent the examiner from having any 'power of favouring or disfavouring' individuals.[19]

All questions in the book would be numbered and accompanied by a corresponding set of square tickets. These would be arranged in numerical order, in the manner of squares on a chessboard, and enclosed in a square frame. This would 'suffice to render it manifest, to the requisite number of eyes, at one view, that for every question there is a ticket: and that for no questions there are tickets more than one'.[20]

The tickets would be placed in a cylindrical box and thoroughly shaken by a number of people in turn. For a cover, it would have a cloth, 'in which is a slit, long enough to admit a hand: - fittest hand, that of a child, not old enough to be exposed to the suspicion of having received instructions enabling it to act with discrimination'.[21] This would be a job for what Bentham describes as the non-discerning child. Finally, those who passed this test of aptitude would bid for the position advertised. In this way the overall machinery would maximise human resources at the minimum expense. He who passed, and was prepared to sell his services at the lowest price, would get the job.

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It would appear from the overwrought novelty of these designs that the logic of examination they were attempting to describe was highly original. Whilst medieval examination cultivated the self – involving comparisons between the self being worked upon and surrounding tradition as exemplified by the craft masters – for Bentham, comparisons would take a different form; they would operate between individual learners. This would allow for the efficient

distribution and employment of individuals, maximising aptitude and minimising expense. Whilst the medieval disputation involved a competition of ideas the aim of which was reconciliation and synthesis, the modern examination made a direct attempt to engender tensions between individuals, to stimulate their desires, instead of resolving tensions between their desires and the dictates of tradition. Modern examination appears to adopt a highly reductive logic, feeding from base inclinations to beat one's neighbour. With modernity, so the story goes, a sense of virtue is lost.

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A corrupted form of disputation survived well into the seventeenth century,[22] further degenerating during the eighteenth century into prepared arguments, memorized beforehand.[23] The graduate disputation at Cambridge finally disappeared in 1838, with students submitted to uniform written questions instead. The decline was gradual. But if we were after significant milestones, 1763 would be one to pick.[24] In this year the disputation became a mere preliminary method for matching examinees according to ability, following which differentiated *groups* of candidates would have questions dictated to them that they would answer together and in writing. Group dictation was eventually replaced in 1827 with printed questions, and from 1792, questions were individually marked generating increasingly fine divisions between examinees.

This has been identified as 'a most momentous step, perhaps the major single step towards a mathematized model of reality.'[25] Examinees were tested in batches, side by side with their competitors, alongside whom they would eventually be listed in order of attainment. A ranking procedure of 'unparalleled intensity and precision'[26] had been developed, and with it came the possibility of a new scientific reckoning that would take the individual as its prime target. At this point, only an elite minority were subjected to these dividing practices. It would take a century or more to extend examination to the general populace.

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For England the 1850s are sometimes viewed as the point of inflection after which modern examination really took off. In 1853, the India Act established a precedent. Examination was to be used in the public service, confined at first to the machinery of imperial rule. As the Whig politician Thomas



Macaulay argued in parliament, with '800 men charged with the happiness of 120,000,000 people' there could be no room for incapacity; the aptitude of every imperial employee must be assured.[27] In this respect, the trialling of examinations mirrored other imperial experiments, where the effects of newly invented techniques and devices including genocidal ones, were first tested overseas.[28] With respect to government examinations, appointment through patronage or personal recommendation was now illegal: All 'Powers, Rights or Privileges' to 'nominate persons to be admitted…shall cease'.[29]

Within two years, the first examinations for posts in India were taking place.[30] Meanwhile, William Gladstone, Chancellor of the Exchequer and future Prime Minister, commissioned an enquiry that would recommend examinations for the Home Civil Service.[31] The prototype examinations at this point were of university origin. Indeed the Indian Civil Service Commissioners hoped to call upon the expertise of recent 'moderators in the University of Cambridge' who knew 'by experience how to conduct the examination of large numbers of persons simultaneously'.[32] In the same decade, the Universities of Oxford and Cambridge began setting entrance examinations, marking one of the first incursions of qualifying examination into schooling.[33]

The rapid spread of modern examination generated a fear amongst some that selection by intellectual ability could not guarantee moral virtue (where such virtue was, of course, of a distinct breed in the context of imperialism). If

modern examinations were to be the new gatekeepers, they might allow intellectually proficient though morally deficient, inappropriate types into positions of influence. In correspondence with her chancellor, the future Empress of India, Queen Victoria gave vent to her fears:

> The Queen, although not without considerable misgivings, sanctions the proposed plan, trusting that Mr Gladstone will do what he can, in the arrangements of the details of it, to guard against the dangers... A check, for instance, would be necessary upon the admission of candidates […] securing that they should be *otherwise eligible*, besides the display of knowledge which they may exhibit under examination.
>
> *Queen Victoria to Mr Gladstone: Buckingham Palace 17th February 1854*[34]

> The Chancellor of the Exchequer presents his humble duty to your Majesty, and has the honour to acknowledge your Majesty's gracious letter.
>
> He takes blame himself for having caused your Majesty trouble by omitting to include in his short memorandum an explanation of the phrase "qualified persons". Experience at the universities and public schools of this country has shown that in a large majority of cases the test of open examination is also an effectual test of character; as, except in very remarkable cases, the previous industry and self-denial, which proficiency evinces, are rarely separated from the general habits of virtue.
>
> But he humbly assures your Majesty that the utmost pains will be taken to provide not only for the majority but for all cases, by the strictest enquiries of which the case will admit; and he has the most confident belief that the securities of character under the system, although they cannot be unerring, will be stronger and more trustworthy than any of which the present method of appointment is susceptible.
>
> *Mr Gladstone to Queen Victoria: Downing Street 17th February 1854*[35]

This plea for modern examination is repeated elsewhere. Assurance is given that that the moral character of persons selected by examination could indeed be guaranteed. Additional virtues said to be nurtured by examination include; 'a taste for pleasures not sensual' and a 'desire for honourable distinction'.[36] Testimonies confirmed that for the newly examined universities 'in more than nineteen cases out of twenty, men of attainments are also men of character'. The perseverance and self-discipline required for success in examination were 'a great security that a young man has not led a dissolute life'.[37] An intellectual test, so the argument went, was 'the best moral test that can be devised'.[38] Admittedly, these were mere defensive retorts. Nevertheless, they were also truer than their authors imagined.

*

Bentham's non-discerning child was just a convenient device, serving as a minor actor within the architectures of a larger machinery. It is with some irony then, that despite the small role it occupied, this child figure would eventually become the agent of a new moral order. With one hand extended into that cylindrical box – into an interior governed by number, lot and probabilities – childhood soon found itself subject to a new set of rules and regulated by a new order of discourse.

The instruments of moral formation were refashioned and massified for a new age. As a result, the soul of the child became the object of modern examination, instruction and enquiry. Subjected to a far more intense regime of petty ordeals than hitherto, this modern soul became so well regulated, and achieved such an elevated position that it eventually developed into a 'prison of the body'.[39] Here Foucault draws from Nietzsche who observed how the soul once 'looked contemptuously upon the body',[40] where all bodily diversions were suspected for their potential to corrupt the soul. With modernity this all changed; the problem today is its opposite. The soul has been so minutely prescribed indeed, that the body should now regard the soul with great suspicion. Of course, we no longer speak of this soul as a 'soul', as we once did. It goes by other names. The modern soul is otherwise known as 'your true self' or 'your inner being'.

The popular phrase, *be true to yourself,* serves as a violent constraint. Those who attempt to obey this command search in vain for their inner self (which must, of course, remain elusive). They satisfy themselves with imported ideas that provide a sense of depth. Their inner self arrives as a constructed and constraining illusion.

Educated Bodies

Critics of modern examination are often its most deceptive representatives. They falsely depict examination as a mechanistic and lowly tool. As a blunt instrument, examination is said to trample over human life and prevent human flourishing. If we fail to resist its onslaught, examination will overcome every aspect of education with its reductive logic. Their retrospective accounts tell the story of examination as if it were a history of repressions. Even those histories that have a tendency to mimic the archives from which they draw – leaving us over-burdened with facts, and light on analysis – tend to reinforce the view that examination has spread almost everywhere. The facts are said to speak for themselves. We believe ourselves crushed, our life force running away through the drainage channels that examination has foreseen to construct.

*

The good educator resists examination. Though few would remove examination entirely, many such educators seek to reduce its variously 'corrupting' effects. Here, resisting examination becomes a matter of allegiance to higher (rarely articulated) educational ideals. If only we could escape some of its influence, if only we could remove aspects of its imprint from the child. If only we could examine a little less and educate a little more… These sentiments are misconceived. The logic of examination constitutes modern schooling as its ontological condition.[1] Modern examination was not imposed on educational institutions as if from above: it is part of their very being. As such, it cannot be removed or meaningfully resisted without dismantling everything else.

*

The modern school arose through the accumulation of various dispersed techniques.[2] These techniques amassed between the late eighteenth century and the start of the twentieth, to form the distinctly functional architectures of modern schooling. This rise of mass schooling accompanied the formation of modern states that claimed to be serving the interests of their citizens. Newfound freedoms were established and old social ties (remnants of feudalism) broke down. It was important, under conditions such as these, that

citizens were educated to use their freedom correctly. States came to depend on sophisticated techniques that would enable them to construct the subjects they required. This momentous formative endeavour, involving the material formation of an entire citizenry, no less, was taken up in part by the modern school. Early techniques focused on the training and regulation of bodies, and through the manipulation of these bodies they constructed the modern soul. Whilst this soul has no vital or inextinguishable essence, it is no illusion either, being the product of its material reality. Unlike the soul of Christian theology, it was not born in sin, but was induced through various methods of punishment, supervision and constraint.

*

To those who defend the individual, here is a warning: Those modern men, women and children you endeavour to free are already the product of something much greater than themselves. Their souls, your quarry, are 'the effect and instrument of a political anatomy' that is larger in extent than the reach of your compassion.[3] You seek to protect the sanctity of the individual? You are defending a phantom!

*

The technocrats who devised modern schooling employed techniques that would shape individuality in such a way that those concerned were isolated from one another but open to the influence of government. Here, modern examination in its various forms operated as a meticulous divider. Later contributions added a focus on interpersonal examining techniques. These would construct the modern soul as a self-regulating consciousness.

The overall strategy, as Michel Foucault once observed, was to combine dividing practices and practices of exclusion (where 'the subject is either divided inside himself or divided from others'), with techniques that trained the child to 'turn him- or herself into a subject'.[4] These techniques enabled the individual to recognise externally defined traits within the self and then act upon them.

As a material reality, the modern soul depends on concepts and domains of analysis within which it can be determined. It relies on the carving out of categories ranging from more general ideas – 'psyche, subjectivity, personality, consciousness, etc.'[5] – to more child-specific notions – the troubled child, the child of promise, the borderline child, and so on. Examination performs a central role here in forming the frame of reference that informs the child, so that he or she may live within the scope it defines.

*

Together with schools, modern examinations evolved from practices that were developed at a number of sites and were influenced by a range of political, social, historical, and psychological narratives. These practices were not variations on a single theme. They should be viewed as acts of differential creation.[6]

I have to say this, really. It forms part of my methodological mantra – one I inherit from the *genealogist*, a creature born of Nietzsche[7] and nurtured by Foucault.[8] The genealogist may be defined by the position he or she takes with respect to the following three terms: *Origin:* A genealogist should not pursue origins, as if the essence of things might somehow be discovered. *Descent:* The denial of absolute origins is linked to the idea of descent; every historical beginning is simply a fabrication derived from that which preceded it. Beginnings are nothing but events that have acquired a certain artificial status in retrospect. Thus, we should not search for beginnings. Instead, we should look for the 'myriad events' that coordinate to form the heterogeneity of

descent.[9] *Emergence:* The emergence of historical events is to be understood as the product of confrontation. An historical event is the outcome of 'a particular state of forces'.[10] 'Consequently, no one is responsible for an emergence; no one can glory in it, since it always occurs in the interstice'.[11]

How the genealogist is able to function in this confrontational landscape will be explored in more detail later. For the moment it is sufficient to turn directly to Nietzsche for a description of the terrain:

> …there is…no more important principle for all types of history than the following one…that there is a world of difference between the reason for something coming into existence in the first place and the ultimate use to which it is put, its actual application and integration into a system of goals; that anything which exists, once it has somehow come into being, can be reinterpreted in the service of new intentions, repossessed, repeatedly modified to a new use by a power superior to it; that everything which happens in the organic world is part of a process of *overpowering, mastering,* and that, in turn, all overpowering and mastering is a reinterpretation, a manipulation, in the course of which the previous 'meaning' and 'aim' must necessarily be obscured or completely effaced… all aims, all uses are merely *signs* indicating that a will to power has mastered something less powerful than itself and impressed the meaning of a function upon it in accordance with its own interests. So the entire history of a 'thing', an organ, a custom may take the form of an extended chain of signs, of ever-new interpretations and manipulations, whose causes do not themselves necessarily stand in relation to one another, but merely follow and replace one another arbitrarily and according to circumstance. The 'development' of a thing, a custom, an organ does not in the least resemble a *progressus* towards a goal, and even less the logical and shortest *progressus*, the most economical in terms of expenditure of force and cost. Rather, this development assumes the form of the succession of the more or less far-reaching, more or less independent processes of overpowering which affect it -including also in each case the resistance marshalled against these processes, the changes of form attempted with a view to defence and reaction, and the results of these successful counteractions. The form is fluid, but the 'meaning' even more so.[12]

All this repels the fervent historian, who retreats to the archives in pursuit of historical truth. It implies a mode of historical enquiry that would be just as disordered as the history it perceives. The historian prefers calm, subscribing to the hope that insistent diligence and the factual accumulations scholarly endeavour affords, will generate a fairly cohesive account of the object in question. I hope you will be reassured: I have no such ambitions. There is no desire to 'fill in the blanks' here. Ignoring the convention where historical accounts are measured against the completeness of the picture they construct

and all limitations are openly confessed by way of an apology to the reader, I focus on just two institutional sites without expressing regret for the inevitable limitations of my analysis. These two institutions will be contextualised, but only to a degree.[13] And I will generalise without undue restraint. My principle objective is for a confrontation. It is to engage with my chosen target; the 'relations of power'[14] Foucault once spoke of.

*

The purpose of this history is largely rhetorical. It has been devised to cast doubt on the present. Even a quick survey of the development of modern examination can, in my view, lead us to suspect the direction of contemporary reform efforts, however well-intended they may be. A history such as this should break down the current tendency in education to adjudicate between 'good' and 'bad' examining practices, between those examining practices that are seen as oppressive, impersonal, and excessively mechanistic and those that are celebrated for their flexibility and attention to the needs of the child. Both traditions of assessment (mechanistic and humanistic) have as their object the construction of selves amenable to government. And so, the rejection of one tradition of examination in favour of another may do little to emancipate us from the effects of power. My claim is this: our entrapment on the horns of this false dilemma occurred at the emergence of modern examination. Indeed, the complex descent of the techniques that now afflict us, should be traced back to their constitution in the nineteenth century

The institutions within which these practices were collected and developed have long since disappeared. The early nineteenth century 'monitorial school' and the mid nineteenth century 'moral training school' were, nevertheless, highly influential. These two short-lived institutions deserve far greater attention than they generally receive, having taken part in the transformation of practices from which modern schooling and examination were built.

The examining practices they employed were never simply oppressive, even in their darkest moments. They were, indeed, highly productive in constructing biddable subjects for the benefit of the modern state. In other words – and to repeat myself – the advance of modern examination did not trample the interior of the child. Even those examining techniques that seek to listen to the child – techniques that are celebrated for their benign attention to the unique needs of the individual learner – are not innocent of power

interests and their effects. They are tied within a system of moral coercion that operates through carefully devised modes of examination, based on relationships that are often warm and kindly in manner.

*

My focus – a symptom of my place of birth – is the early development of the two schools in Britain. These two school types were global in their reach. Monitorial schools spread throughout Europe and across the Atlantic to the Americas,[15] followed by moral training schools, which can be traced to colonies such as Nova Scotia.[16] These institutions were devised for the wretched and dispossessed. Many feared that the urban poor, drawn to the cities in ever-larger numbers, were becoming ungovernable. When transplanted across the Atlantic to the Americas, these institutional techniques were applied to other 'difficult' groups including the natives of that continent

who were bereft, or so it was assumed, living as they did without the benefits of modernity.[17]

These new institutional sites were contrasted to the disordered instruction already available in the slum. Run by social inferiors, scratching together a living on the margins of society, the private adventure or dame schools were judged too irregular and nomadic to function. Even worse, they were potential breeding grounds of vice and immorality.[18] Sir James Kay-Shuttleworth, secretary to the embryo Ministry of Education, complained that a great number of schoolmasters still 'plying their trade' in 1841 undertook this work either because they were 'incapacitated by age or infirmity' or because they had 'failed in all other attempts to procure a livelihood'.[19] Twenty years later a government commission lamented that these establishments were still springing up like 'mushroom growth'.[20] Indeed, it was felt that these places revealed a lot about 'what kind of education finds favour with that particular class of parents'.[21]

For a flavour of their decrepit construction, picture this particularly 'miserable' establishment, located 'at the top of a very steep and broken staircase' where the 'chief text-book seemed to be a kitten'. Again we are told that those working in this environment selected their profession 'because they have failed in other pursuits, or because, as in the case of widows, they have been unexpectedly left in a state of destitution'.[22] As one commissioner famously declared: 'none are too old, too poor, too ignorant, too feeble, too sickly, too unqualified in any way or every way, to regard themselves, and to be regarded by others, as unfit for school-keeping'.[23] The implications are clear enough: the poor could not be trusted with overseeing their own instruction. Those institutions they did manage to establish were 'of the most temporary kind'[24] and were not fit for purpose. The depraved masses required something rather more systematic and worthy than they were able to achieve without assistance from above.

Gradually, the responsibility for public education was adopted by large philanthropic organisations, and following that, by the state. Having witnessed the birth of modern schooling, this period could be viewed as a triumph of educational inclusion. A chain of events unfolded here that would ultimately result in the guarantee that all children will have access to a formal education. 'Education for all!' – that is our great inheritance, this is our modern

educational achievement. And yet, from the outset the newly invented institutions of schooling were based on practices of division; they generated fresh inequalities. They were, moreover, instruments of government. Children were institutionalised. They were made available for inspection, rendered legible and open to governmental calculation. These schools functioned as vast educational laboratories. They were founded for the production of knowledge and the proliferation of governmental techniques.

Each mode of schooling – monitorial and moral training – developed its own unique cluster of examining practices. In the monitorial school, examination was integrated within a disciplinary and functional architecture. As such, it cannot be understood apart from the entire ensemble of practices that made up this institution. Examination in the moral training school adopted a very different approach; it was based on the construction of intimate relations, between teachers and pupils. And yet, it too relied on a larger functional organisation of space. The subsequent history of examination is a history of the relationship between these two basic approaches – one disciplinary, the other pastoral. They became entangled and generated derivatives, leading to the complex array of inscription devices and pastoral controls that constitute education today.

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Schools and prisons often resemble one another. They share common histories and techniques. These techniques swiftly become so banal that we are no longer arrested by their grotesque presence. To take a contemporary example: children who use fingerprint scanners to pay for lunch, no longer balk at the introduction of scanners elsewhere.

*

As the eighteenth century drew to a close there was a transformation in systems of punishment. Formerly public, and often brutal, the occasional display of retribution issued by the monarch and inflicted on the body of the condemned was withdrawn from open view. Punishment was dragged behind the prison gates so as to become an institutional and private concern. The new correctional order drew upon diffuse technologies distributed across prisons, hospitals, barracks and schools. Across these sites was developed a new mode

of power that Foucault labelled: *disciplinary*. Foucault describes its many components throughout *Discipline and Punish*[25] – in which he traces a transition from sporadic and vengeful punishments to regular and measured disciplinary techniques. These employed a far more advanced and better-calibrated economy of pain than the pillory was ever able to afford.

Certain formulations outlined *Discipline and Punish* have since become commonplace. Scholars have claimed to find 'disciplinary power' everywhere. It has been depicted as a ubiquitous feature of modernity that has plagued us ever since it was developed in the early nineteenth century. Its fossilised structures are said to still influence schooling today. From this perspective, anything mechanical or reductive in appearance can find itself labelled 'disciplinary'.[26] Disciplinary power is in danger of becoming a vague cypher for a form of subjection we are no longer able to identify precisely, because it has been applied to so many contexts in so many ways. It has become a promiscuous concept.

*

Jeremy Bentham's circular prison design, known as the 'panopticon,' is the metaphor typically used to represent disciplinary power.[27] As a metaphor, it has some value, demonstrating how a disciplinary architecture could support the automatic functioning of power, where inmates become the bearers of the system that subjects them. Unable to discover precisely when they are being observed, inmates act as if observation were constant.

By referring to this metaphor, by emphasising the 'panoptic gaze,' we avoid any reduction of disciplinary technique to notions of simple domination, for disciplinary power is said to operate through the dispositions and hence 'freedoms' of those it moulds. We should remember, however, that this prison design was no more than the 'diagram of a mechanism of power,' one that has been 'reduced to its ideal form,' and by virtue of this reduction, details are lost.[28] Moreover, it exaggerates the principle of visibility.[29] Disciplinary power is about much more than optical surveillance.

*

The power of discipline is one of analysis, based upon its ability to locate and separate that which is to be studied. As Foucault put it: 'one of the primary objects of discipline is to fix; it is an anti-nomadic technique'. It is for analytic purposes that discipline 'arrests or regulates movements,' clears up 'confusion,'

dissipates 'compact groupings of individuals wandering about the country in unpredictable ways,' and establishes 'calculated distributions'.[30] The production of knowledge is an intrinsic part of its technique.

*

Partitioned individuals, a prerequisite for disciplinary analysis, are generated by various means. These include the basic spatial distribution of bodies, which is physical but can also be represented conceptually such as through the distribution of inmates in cells or the register that records their arrival; a careful breakdown and coding of bodily movements, such as can be found in the sequential gestures of the military parade; the sequencing of activities through longer periods of time, which are made visible in documents such as a school curriculum; and efforts to coordinate the entire ensemble of bodies through a 'composition of forces'.[31] When combined, these techniques form the basic structure of a disciplinary examination. Whilst examination becomes through this ensemble the strategic hub of disciplinary power, it would be a mistake to treat disciplinary examination as if it were the hidden motor or essence of disciplinary technique.[32] Separated from its networks of associated techniques, examination has little specific gravity or strength of its own.

*

The monitorial school spread the simple, brute fact of confinement across its multiple, intersecting techniques. In Tennessee, when reviewing efforts to institutionalise children of the aboriginal population, it was claimed that monitorial teaching 'relieves that bitterness which otherwise those would feel, who have not been accustomed to confinement'.[33] This was in 1818.

Viewed as both economical and effective, the monitorial school promised to transform ungovernable groups into useful and productive subjects at minimal cost. As a modern achievement it was raised above vaccination by its proponents, for it was said to offer 'a remedy for the disorders of filth, idleness, ignorance, and vice' that were 'more fatal,' even, 'than the ravages of the Small-Pox'.[34] In the opinion of one colonial chaplain, this new system of education was nothing less than a form of '*mental vaccination*'.[35] It was the best means of 'arriving at *the cure* of those evils which at once disgrace society, and deprive it of many who might form its most active and useful members'.[36] It was able to 'correct those morbid humours which so corrupt the morals of society'.[37] Naturally, since both mental vaccination and social cure were now



possible, the 'greatest discoveries, heretofore made for the improvement of human life, sink into comparative insignificance'.[38]

These were the views of the professed first architect Dr Andrew Bell and his expanding band of enthusiasts. Initially devised for orphans at a military asylum in Madras (founded in 1789), the system was imported with the return of Bell to Britain in 1797. Issuing from a rival denomination, Joseph Lancaster devised a remarkably similar system and with the support of their respective philanthropic societies and religious orders,[39] these school systems spread throughout kingdom and empire.

The Madras school run by Bell aimed to rescue mixed-race children, orphans of British officers, from the 'habits of wretched depravity' in which they had been 'educated by their mothers'.[40]

> It has long been said, that the half-cast children of this country show an evident inferiority in the talents of the head, the qualities of the mind, and the virtues of the heart. I will not enter into the question, How far government, or climate, and perhaps complexion as connected with climate, influence the character of the human race. Whatever may be the opinion on these heads, I believe that the effect of education will not be denied… I think I see, in the very first maxims which the mothers of these children instil into their infant minds, the source of every corrupt practice, and an infallible mode of forming a degenerate race.[41]

As a devout educationalist Bell set out unperturbed to form his pupils in 'habits of diligence, industry, veracity, and honesty' as well as 'instructing them in useful knowledge'.[42] In 1839, following multiple experiments with the techniques he promoted, this educational optimism lives on in the teaching manuals of the monitorial school:

> However untoward a child may be found on first entering the school, no violence of temper, no perversity of disposition, no depravity of principle, no sluggishness of intellect, should discourage the hope of effecting a decided change, through the Divine blessing, on a patient and persevering application of the regulations prescribed.[43]

My contemporaries and peers maintain a similar commitment to education. They hold it to be a worthy, transformative, and potentially life-changing endeavour. We agents of subjection take great pride in calling ourselves educationalists.

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For want of proper assistants, who when drawn from the local population, were felt to be poor in quality, Bell was forced to design a system that he could operate alone. One solitary master would conduct the school, transforming 'stubborn, perverse, and obstinate' boys into an 'annual crop of good and useful subjects.' This would be achieved by conducting the school 'through the medium of the scholars themselves.'[44] Dependable students, appropriately trained, would monitor and supervise their peers. Supervision was devolved within a tight scheme, across concerted systems of observation; it was spun through a network that was supported by its own interlocking web. This economy of power was designed to cope with the lower orders of society which, it was presumed, required assistance in running their own affairs. These lower orders were to be an experimental population. Through the manipulation of their offspring they would become accustomed to a strategy of government that operated not from above but from below and within. The masses were to be instructed in procedures deemed appropriate for regulating and governing themselves.

Along with Lancaster who believed that 'coercion' is 'the most disgusting word in the British vocabulary,'[45] Bell asserted the mildness of his new technique. The moderation of force was adopted as a key principle; replacing a

costly, sporadic, uncalculated use of violence with a far more carefully applied, constantly felt economy of power (using 'means as much more effectual as they are more lenient than usual'[46]). The problem with 'a system of terror' and the 'fear of punishment' is that neither is 'so constant nor so certain an operation'.[47] If 'newly-invented racks or screws, or whips, or cords' had been placed into his hands, Bell declares, the 'experiment should have perished in embryo'. Instead he devised a minute 'division of labour' which left the master with the 'simple and easy charge of directing, regulating, and controlling his intellectual and moral machine'.[48] Lancaster agreed: school keeping should no longer be a 'toilsome employ' if the school is 'conducted by a regular system'.[49]

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In Nürnberg clocks have been striking the quarter hour since the sixteenth century.[50] With modernity, minutes became valuable. In the monitorial school time was to be maximised. The experience of time (its passing) was intensified by the maximal use of the slightest moment, 'as if time, in its very fragmentation, were inexhaustible'.[51]

A 'constant and perpetual attention' was desired of pupils. Usually this was limited by 'such a number of boys' as the master could 'at once have under his eye and within his reach'.[52] But the gaze of the teacher was only one of many devices. Constant activity was assured, or so we are told, by an 'uninterrupted succession of short and easy lessons', and through the 'perpetual presence and never-ceasing vigilance of its numerous overseers' the students themselves, who helped 'preclude idleness, ensure diligence, prevent ill behaviour of every sort, and almost supersede the necessity of punishment'.[53]

Discipline was the key to this 'simple, easy, pleasant, expeditious, and economical' system: *'as in an army*, discipline' was 'the first, second and third essential'.[54] We are told that a single master carrying out Bell's methods could 'without difficulty, conduct ten contiguous schools, each consisting of a thousand scholars' for the 'school teaches itself'.[55] Such machinery would not run in perpetuity without periodic maintenance: a 'scrutinising eye must pervade the whole machine.'[56] Its workings would be adjusted 'from time to time, so as to get the most out of it, with the least possible friction'. The 'smoothness, exactitude, and machine like regularity' of the school would then be assured.[57]

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The school assembles in a single large room or hall, with windows at least six feet from the floor to prevent distraction. At one end is the master's desk, occupying the middle are forms (benches) and desks fixed firmly into the ground.[58] Upon entry each pupil proceeds to his or her unique number printed on the school wall, where vacant spaces describe absences at a glance.[59] Once called to their seats, the hierarchy of classes and functionaries becomes manifest. Each allotted spot is a relative position within a route of progression that operates throughout the school, from the front, nearest the master's desk, to the rear. All monitors have their stations, a general monitor of order standing on a high stool at the lower end of the room, and the monitors of classes standing above the seated majority to the right of their respective subjects.[60] Through these arrangements in space, a disordered mass becomes a legible entity. The definition of each child, including his or her role within the school, is the direct result of his or her position within this conceptual and functional grid. A norm of progression is defined, constructing the terms in which pupils are to view themselves. Perched on the benches in front is their past, on the benches behind, their future.

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At the end of each bench is a standard (a kind of notice board). Here class marks are displayed, forming a conceptual grid that defines the class and each individual within it. There are smaller boards called 'telegraphs' that turn freely on a rod, the lower end of which is fixed into the top of the standard just referred to. Inscribed on one side is the number of the class, on the other the letters E. X. By displaying these letters class monitors inform the General Monitor when they have examined the slates. This procedure assures that testing is carried out on a regular basis.[61]

Even the precise movement of the child, seated with his or her companions along the regimented order of the bench, is defined according to a breakdown of bodily mechanics. Habits of 'prompt obedience' are to be 'universally established'. With children who are 'restless, volatile, and unused to restraint, mechanical motions of the body, as they are at once easily understood, and readily performed, afford the best means of inculcating these habits'. No teacher should rest until 'he has brought every child to sit, stand, speak, or be silent, on the instant of the command being given'.[62]



Positions of the Scholars, a popular illustration in monitorial school manuals, depicts a numbered frieze of bodily movements where each figure corresponds to an associated command. Upon arrival at the writing desk, each pupil 'places his finger on the slate screw, and stops without turning' (figure eleven). When all have 'quitted the aisles, the monitor of order says 'front' at which 'they all turn and face him' (figure eight). At the command 'in' they 'spring in' (figure one). This continues, through figures two, four, five, two again, six and so on, and on, until they are eventually instructed to quit their desks, put on their hats (figure ten), and depart.[63]

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These were idealised schemes. At times their claims to efficacy are almost mythological. Bell reports that the monitorial schoolmaster has at his disposal 'the hundred hands of Briareus, the hundred eyes of Argus, and the wings of Mercury'.[64] Surely this inflated statement renders suspect all others? The claims made on behalf of the monitorial school would appear to be wanton exaggerations. Even though failures are occasionally documented in the annual reports that were collated by the mother societies in Britain, their tone is generally pious: One school in Leith was an 'offence to the neighbourhood' when first established on account of 'the uncontrollable rudeness of the scholars out of doors, and the noise, insubordination, and misrule that reigned

within'.[65] After 5 years it was transformed into a paragon of good order. How this was achieved remains unclear. In a Sheffield school, the account of moral rescue for one female pupil (who was 'violent to the extreme' and 'addicted to fighting, swearing, and almost every thing that was bad') takes the form of a sudden religious conversion, following exposure to scripture.[66] Clearly, monitorial techniques were far from uniform and employed devices other than disciplinary ones. These examples do not point, however, to a fundamental error in Foucault's disciplinary theory. For Foucault, disciplinary institutions are just like any other regime of power that has failed to achieve totality: these institutions are always-already failing, they are leaking at the edges. To reject disciplinary institutions as figments, as little more than the organisational fantasies of their architects, to say they never existed in this perfect form, and to call for research that finds out what 'really happened', misses the point. Indeed, as a non-total system of power discipline draws strength from multiplication and dispersal, and not from isolated cases of perfection or conquest. The complex devices of the monitorial school were far more than the educational dreams of overzealous pedagogues, eulogised in teaching manuals. These contrivances reflect a logic of design that extended well beyond the monitorial school, becoming too widely dispersed to be ignored.

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Within the monitorial system and its arrangement of bodies, each scholar 'finds his own level, not only in his class, but in the ranks of the school, being promoted or degraded from place to place, or class to class, according to his proficiency'.[67] The steps were deliberately small. Even the differences between a class and its class monitor are modest. The monitors (who are pupils too) should know 'no more than what is level to the capacities of their pupils.' They will, as a result, 'lose no time in teaching what is beyond the comprehension of their scholars'.[68] Attention to the surface features of the pupil cohort, and not to its depths, was the epitome of good teaching.

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Any boy 'lame, or deformed' or limited in his faculties can be rejected if he will become a 'burden' to the overall machinery of the school.[69] Those admitted must perform their function as a component part, where the basic drive is to 'obtain pre-eminence' in the class and then 'to rise above it and be promoted to a superior; and especially not to sink below it, and degraded to an inferior

class'.[70] Promotion to a higher class only occurs when high rank has been held for some time, and is only permanent if the pupil can quickly rise to the middle of the new, higher class. Otherwise the pupil returns to the former group. Demotion occurs when a pupil fails to perform well. However, if high rank in the inferior class is maintained, the pupil is not 'doomed to permanent degradation'. A flavour of demotion is deemed sufficient to secure 'redoubled exertion'.[71]

Each class is itself divided into pairs of tutors and pupils (not to be confused with the monitors in overall charge[72]). The superior half of the class tutors the inferior half, and the seats taken along the bench reflect this: The lowest member of the class sits beside the highest, the next lowest beside the next highest, and so on all the way along. Achieving the status of tutor is an honour, but the tutor is responsible for a double fate. He must protect his pupil from demotion by teaching well, whilst retaining his higher rank by being proficient at what is taught, for 'what disgrace attaches to the boy who, by his negligence, is degraded into a pupil, and falls perhaps to be tutored by his late pupil, promoted to be a tutor'.[73] The overall effect of perpetual readjustment is that 'every boy in every class' finds himself fully occupied, his exertions maximised.[74]

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Ranking depends upon an archive of past efforts. It begins with the individual scholar who 'registers for himself all his daily operations in the last page of his copy, or ciphering book'. This is later compared with what he did the day before and what others of similar standing achieved. There are weekly, monthly, quarterly and annual reviews. The page, in which 'these registers are kept, is ruled into thirty-one parallel lines, so as to last a month, and into as many columns as there are daily entries to be made'. The teacher also compiles a more general daily record containing the 'number of lessons read; pages or lines gone over in these lessons; and hours thus employed'.[75] In Lancaster's system, the monitor employed as 'inspector-general of reading' examines samples of each class on a periodic basis, getting round to 'some hundreds' in a few days.[76] This documentary trail ensures that each pupil has a 'permanent testimony' to 'merit and demerit'. Even if a pupil is 'overlooked in passing,' the archive retains the relevant facts for later perusal.[77]

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The 'black book' is seen as 'the most powerful operator'. All misdemeanours (including the failure to report misdemeanours) are recorded here. The schoolmaster then decides if an 'immediate reprimand, or threat' is suitable, or whether the offence should become part of the weekly ritual of punishment. 'Abstract lectures are little attended to, and still less understood, by children. To reach their minds and touch their hearts, you must give a visible shape and tangible form to your doctrine'.[78] The reprimand passes through the body to the soul under construction.

Lancaster presents himself as a tireless innovator in this domain. Though he reputedly had 'a perfect horror' of the rod,[79] this came more from dislike of its tendency to arbitrary violence than its cruelty as such. He preferred a more regular economy of pain: modes of correction must be 'inflicted, so as to give as much uneasiness to the delinquents, without disturbing the mind or temper of the master'.[80]

Instruments of punishment include 'a wooden log' placed round the neck, which 'serves as a pillory.' The neck 'is *not pinched* or closely *confined* – it is chiefly burthensome by the manner in which it incumbers the neck, when the delinquent turns to the right or the left… Thus he is *confined* to *sit* in his *proper position*, and go on with his work.' 'When logs are unavailing, it is common to fasten the legs of offenders together with wooden shackles' and order them to walk round the hall until they are 'glad to sue for liberty'. If this fails, 'the left hand is tied behind the back, or wooden shackles fastened from elbow to elbow.' Sometimes 'the legs are tied together' preventing boys from wandering about. 'Occasionally boys are put in a sack, or in a basket, suspended to the roof of the school, in sight of all the pupils, who frequently smile at the birds in the cage.' This punishment 'is one of the most terrible' and is to be especially 'dreaded by the monitors.'

Frequent offenders are 'yoked together, sometimes by a piece of wood that fastens round all their necks' and forced to parade the school walking backwards', which makes them 'pay very great attention to their footsteps.' Others are 'dressed up with labels' describing the offence and are led round the school by two boys proclaiming the fault.[81] Dirty boys are cleaned before the whole school by a girl; truants are tied to a post; the most 'incorrigible' are 'tied up in a blanket, and left to sleep at night on the floor'.[82] In punishing by confinement after school, the master's attendance can be avoided 'by tying

them to the desks.' Those who adopt 'a singing tone in reading' are ridiculed with a special costume; others are made to wear the 'fools coat.' A lazy boy will have a pillow fetched 'and placed on the desk for him to lay his head on, as if asleep, in the face of the school'; a 'boy wandering from his seat may be placed under a hen coop' – idle boys are rocked in a cradle.[83] All devices are to be applied with a cool, calculated temper. Despite their severity these are carefully measured techniques. They are corrective in function as the desired behaviour can be deduced from the punishment chosen.

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A parallel 'system of encouragement' takes us away from these economies of bodily discomfort. Paper tickets are awarded for good work, and a monitor of tickets records these awards in a book. Accumulated tickets can be exchanged for prizes of varying value, from a separate monitor. There are several orders of merit, and those who reach a higher rank wear badges on a daily basis until forfeited by bad behaviour. We are told that pupils are 'more affected by their loss than coercion'.[84] Teachers and assistants also receive pecuniary and honorary awards, and 'silver medals' of varying size are 'distributed in the annual examination by the president'.[85] Many other duties have their respective officers and systems of encouragement. There is a 'sub-usher and usher' who 'watch over the whole', a monitor of slates, of cleanliness, of absences, and so on until every duty is discharged.[86]

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Perhaps these paper tickets, prizes and medals will not distract you from the image of pupils yoked together, or boys confined in a sack. If it all sounds rather oppressive and alien to your finer sensibilities, do not be fooled. Taken as a whole, these techniques were profoundly constructive. We are their heirs, you and I. New ways of being, new understandings of the self were being formed here.

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As an overall framework, disciplinary technique should not be misread as if it were the product of larger oppressions, such as the overbearing state, to name an obvious and frequently invoked example. Disciplinary technique evidently pre-dates state education in England. Of course state institutions such as the Elementary Schools of the late nineteenth century later adopted some of these

devices. But the state, of which we hear so much, is always limited by its dependence on techniques 'which it did not invent and whose consequences it cannot fully control'.[87]

In understanding the workings of power we must avoid the phantom of an abstract oppressor. As Ian Hunter observes, the 'problem of total determination' only arrives under 'fantasmatic theoretical circumstances' that generate the abstract categories from which such a 'problem' first emerges.[88] The modern governmental state arose 'not as a new face for the timeless struggle between power and self-determination' but 'as a circumstantially-specific amalgam of political instruments'. These political instruments were of diverse provenance, where each arrived with its own specific agenda. And so, rather than 'expressing the will of the absolutist state or its ruler', these instruments effectively 'colonized it in the name of a new range of political knowledges and imperatives'.[89]

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In educational circles, examination is the exemplary case of an abstract oppressor. It has become a specter in the eyes of its critics, one that stalks the corridors of the school, breathing its heavy stench into the classroom, obliterating all good intention, reducing teacher and student alike to shadows of their former selves.

The material presence of examination is far more diffuse, though, than its critics allow. In the monitorial school it was distributed widely, influencing bodily location and movement, rendering visible an otherwise obscured process of learning and effort. Examination was produced by the system of telegraphs that ensured it was taking place with coordinated regularity as part of every lesson; the keeping of records by pupils in the backs of their books at the end of each day and month, allowing comparisons between pupils and within pupils across time; the consequent distribution of scholars along the bench, pairing tutor and tutee in cooperative rivalry; the system that decided whether temporary demotion would become permanent; the records of overall class activity found both in a book and on public display; and finally, the monthly, quarterly and annual reviews as well as systems of recognition and remuneration. Examination was a constant and diffuse presence in the overall economy of the school. All practices depended on this ability to locate, describe, record and compare, to raise up what was formerly 'below the

threshold of description',[90] placing individuals within a 'network of writing' that would define them.[91]

Occasionally, Foucault encourages us to extend the reach of disciplinary power to the present when he remarks: 'It has always been *and still is* an intrinsic element of the disciplines.' Examination 'is *still* caught up in disciplinary technology'.[92] He does not, however, trace its development from the nineteenth century to the present as it appeared to him in 1975, leaving us with little more than these enigmatic claims. It is worth asking whether examination has indeed endured to the present day in the form above described. Does examination retain its disciplinary function in contemporary pedagogic practice? Or was examination in the monitorial school so specific to a particular organization of space and hierarchy that when the monitorial school dissolved, so did its disciplinary examination?

When considering these questions, it must be remembered that disciplinary institutions, in this case monitorial schools, were 'mixed spaces' that were both real and ideal in their constitution.[93] Examination, in its disciplinary form, can still endure in the latter rarefied form even if many details of a material structure have long since departed. As an early nineteenth century device, it also sits at the birth of the human sciences, at the dawn of partitioned, scientifically measurable, normalized humankind. In this sense disciplinary power is assured a continuing legacy. Its associated disciplinary knowledges along with the examining experts they produced, are still in place in one form or another. At a very basic level, examination still renders the invisible visible, and situates the governed subject in a relative scheme. It was though, only one technique amongst many. If disciplinary-examination does indeed extend to the present, this must surely be in a highly revised form.

Modern examination has at least one other major nineteenth century precursor. This antecedent technique produced a far more intimate regime of inspection, achieving a pastoral symbiosis that tied teacher to pupil in a pact of mutual salvation. It was at this point that school examination developed confessional attributes. The legacy of this pastoral symbiosis for the functioning of examination today is just as significant, if not more so, than the legacy one might attribute to its more easily identifiable, disciplinary companion.

A Child's Interior

The spectacle of street life in nineteenth century Glasgow inspired David Stow, son of a merchant, to confront the urban barbarities he witnessed whilst walking through the city. Stow decided that the fallen multitudes of the industrial age required his assistance. Charity, he viewed as a 'mere expedient', believing that the proper solution lay in moral training. To surmount the effects of their poverty the poor must develop the 'moral stamina' that would 'enable them to resist the viciousness of their surroundings'.[148] According to Stow, the problems faced by the urban poor were altogether new. Its predecessor, the Scottish peasant, had been far better cared for. This had little to do with the rural parish school and its claustrophobic interior: that institution 'was only one small portion of the machinery by which, under God, her peasantry were stamped with a high intellectual and moral character'.[149] In its wisdom the Scottish Church embedded itself in the rural community, providing 'a minister and a schoolmaster and a staff of elders for every small rural parish of perhaps 500 to 1000 souls.'[150] And it was the clergyman, we are told, who was the principle agent of moral rescue in this context. The close contact afforded by the realities of rural life enabled him to influence the family through its religious exercises, and thereby reach the child.

In the towns and cities where intimate pastoral links were comparatively scarce, Stow claims that the 'natural tendency… is to evil'. Unable to rely on the support of the wider social environment, the pedagogue must now lay claim to *'the entire child'*, taking his or her very being into care.[151] Educational techniques suited to rural life had no place in the urban context. They could not countervail *'the sympathy of numbers'* – a social force Stow associates with the education of the streets.[152]

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The spatial distribution of the moral training school, for which Stow was the acclaimed architect, would assist the schoolmaster in his efforts to lay hold of the entire child, to rescue it from a 'savage, brutalized existence'.[153] 'Pioneers

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of civilization' would be required when it came to work of this magnitude. These pioneers would run institutions that were able to effect a transformation in the child's interior. The obstacles faced by those engaged with this civilizing mission were prodigious. Sir James Kay-Shuttleworth, perhaps the most eminent nineteenth century proponent of moral schooling, recalls his experiences of the urban north, down upon which has 'floated a constant supply of an immigrant semi-savage population, bred on the moors of the Pennine Chain' and in other remote places. 'They probably have never lived but in a hovel; have never been in the street of a village town; are unacquainted with common usages of social life; perhaps never saw a book; are bewildered by the rapid motion of crowds; confused in an assemblage of scholars. They have to be taught to stand upright, –to walk without a slouching gait, –to sit without crouching like a sheep-dog.' Their parents 'are almost equally brutish. They have lived solitary lives in some wild region' but the 'pressing wants of a growing family have induced them to accept the offer of some agent from a mill'. These are the children schools must 'civilise and Christianise'.

According to Kay-Shuttleworth, as they descend from the moors and wolds they arrive upon a 'different kind of brutishness' already entrenched in the 'most degraded parts of great cities'. Here the urban child, the "Arab of the street", learns a 'great deal of evil' from an already sinking and sunken population. 'Such children have of late years been netted in shoals, –got into schools, –have been won, tamed, and, in some degree taught'. But these efforts were never likely to entirely 'get rid of the wild, untamed barbarism of such children' and 'graft' onto them the 'civilisation' they so dearly needed.[154] Driven from the country; degraded in the city; disciplined in school. Moral training must now follow.

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In its civilising mission the moral school introduced a unique configuration of architectural and interpersonal techniques to the educational landscape, systematising the work of pastoral care for the urban context. It devised strategies that accounted for life exterior to the school and developed for its

operations a metaphor of depth. It intensified the relationship between teacher and pupil, working upon the child's constructed interior.

This was a major revision to the monitorial approach that depended upon comparatively shallow interpersonal relations. In the monitorial school, teachers recruited from the student body were selected not only for their reliability, but also for their intellectual equivalence (they were to know 'no more than what is level to the capacities of their pupils'[155]). The schoolmaster in overall charge also operated at the surface, maintaining the school's complex machinery of bodily manipulation. In these institutions, access to detailed records, accumulated by dispersed examining techniques, provided comparatively little in the way of depth; knowledge of each pupil remained shallow. By contrast, the soul of the moral training school teacher was selected for its apparent depth. This teacher was expected to convey some kind of indication or impression of the unfathomable depths of the soul. Teachers were now expected to be morally profound beings that exhibited in their bearing the rich qualities their students were expected to develop.

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Monitorial schools were interior spaces. They opened to the pavement.[156] Whilst monitorial schools remained focused on their interiors, by gathering together large groups of children from the urban poor they nevertheless established the urban exterior as a problem space *in relation to* the school. The exterior now stood in direct contrast to the institutional order within, leading pedagogues to wonder how they might negotiate this relation between internal discipline and relative chaos without. This was a problem to which the moral training school provided its solution. It would counteract the effects of this exterior by relating it more explicitly to the work of the school. Strategies were devised with an explicit remit to counter the 'training of the streets'.[157] These strategies would mediate the relationship between exterior and interior through a simulacrum of the street, known as the playground. The objective was to *stimulate* the natural tendencies of children. This went against the monitorial philosophy, which as Lancaster explains, 'prevents the natural

vivacity of children'.[158] In the playground, by contrast, it was important to encourage the self-expression of children in order to derive moral lessons from their conduct. Through this use of space, children could be 'superintended in real life' where real life was a cipher for the life of the street. As a simulated urban exterior, the playground would supplement the '*unnatural* restraint of a covered school-room.' It would enable children to be 'freely at play' having 'free scope' and 'full vent' to display their true dispositions, revealing traits upon which the teacher would then operate.[159]

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Do not be deceived by the liberal use of 'freedom' and 'truth' in these descriptions. The moral training school devised a unique economy of power where these terms had specific and local meaning. The object of schooling was to cultivate the moral depth of teacher and child. In building a regime of instruction based on moral depth (or 'moral force' as it was later satirized[160]), this school relied on older, pastoral techniques redeveloped for its urban context. Here the moral training school formed part of a wider cultural shift where Christian governmental techniques were transformed for application in an increasingly secular context.

Relations were established between teacher and pupil that gave new life and fresh meaning to historic Christian devices – techniques seeking to relate the congregation or flock, to its pastor or shepherd. Nineteenth century schools drew heavily on religious discourses, where themes of salvation, redemption, and fear (relating to a potential fall from grace), were integrated within the discourses of modern schooling. In the American progressive tradition, to take just one example, Protestant themes were combined with the secular pursuit of reason, science and liberty.[161] An increasingly secular age was built on religious devices.

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According to Foucault's tentative genealogy,[162] this 'pastoral power' originated as a governing technique in early Christian institutions. An arrangement was established within the church where certain individuals could, based on their

religious eminence, serve others in order to achieve salvation in the next world. This governing regime would not issue commands from above with the expectation that obedience would be secured directly and through a unilateral relation. Rather, the exercise of power relied on the willingness of the pastor to develop a spirit of self-sacrifice that would guide his daily affairs. The pastor would deny himself not in the direct service of an all-powerful god, but through indirect means in the service of lower beings. These beings in whose service he would place his soul, were his moral subordinates, the flock. To reinforce the connection between pastor and flock, the pastor's ultimate salvation was constructed so that it depended on the success of this relationship.

His attention to the flock was divided between supervising the flock as a whole whilst also attending to the unique facets of each individual, however ignoble these particulars may be. This required intimate and confessional relationships to be established through which the pastor's knowledge of the individual's conscience and his ability to direct it could be assured. Pastoral care was not removed and distant, it was coextensive and continuous with life. It was linked to a production of truth, the truth of the individual self.

Even though with the rise of modernity the pastorate lost a great deal of its former authority and reach, the techniques it devised spread and multiplied outside the ecclesiastical dominion from which they originated. Its individualizing devices were to become successively integrated alongside disciplinary mechanisms within the secular Western state. In this profane context the idea of salvation took on different meanings with a series of worldly aims taking the place of the religious aims of the traditional pastorate. The officials of this newly liberated pastoral power increased, including within their orbit the nineteenth century schoolteacher. Teaching became a form of professional sacrifice for the present and future moral, social and educational well-being of the pupil.

Religious themes were not completely obliterated in this progressively secular context. They were still invoked, though in a form that was increasingly subordinate to the concerns of a bureaucratic state. Kay-

Shuttleworth declared that the schoolteacher would require 'no small support from Christian faith' to reverse 'the mental darkness, the stubborn tempers, the hopeless spirits, and the vicious habits' of the pauper child. This demanded a 'spirit of self-sacrifice and tender concern for well-being' based on a sober understanding of just 'how degenerate these children are'. The 'men who undertake this work should not set about it in the spirit of hirelings'; a moral tether should be established that would bind the subjectivity of the teacher to the pupil, establishing a relationship of mutual dependence.[163] This new relationship represented a 'significant shift from the view that the only interest a teacher might have in a school is the fear of losing his situation. The teacher now had to be imbued with an ethic of service'.[164] An ethic of this sort went far beyond the instrumental link established by devices such as the Revised Code of 1862 that set in place a system of personal and institutional incentives through what became known as Payment by Results. The pedagogue's newfound ethic of service would indeed survive the eventual repeal of this code, having created a teacher who would associate his or her own subjective well-being with the fulfillment or lack of fulfillment of his or her pupils. In other words, the teacher developed an *educational conscience*. This was a portentous step; a secular educational conscience had been constructed through institutional means.

A conscience of this kind is still in operation today. My colleagues and I frequently experience its constructed effects. This conscience takes different forms, admittedly, having been realigned for the problems of a different age. In itself, this conscience is not objectionable. It should, though, always be suspected for the governmental interests it serves.

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Alongside his pupils, the pastoral teacher also required moral training. The so-called 'normal schools' of nineteenth century Britain were devised for this purpose, preparing future teachers 'for a life of self denial'.[165] The newly ordained teacher would then be placed in a school such as Stow's moral training school in which the carefully designed architecture of that school

would serve to amplify his moral presence. As Ian Hunter has argued, within the more intimate spaces of such schools one finds 'the prototype of the modern classroom'. Organized as it was around the 'superintending eye and voice of the teacher', it replaced the 'molecular sub-divisions of the vast monitorial schoolroom' with the personal effects of moral force.[166] Pupils were arranged in the rising tiers of a gallery from which they would return the gaze of their moral exemplar, the schoolteacher. Direct supervision and an array of complex moral ties replaced, in part, the distributed supervision of the monitorial schoolroom.

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Anticipating, to some degree its progressive twentieth century successors, Stow's school embodied an educational philosophy of collaborative enquiry. Moral formation was to occur in a mutually formed and contextually responsive environment, one that was open to the carefully educated whims of its co-participants.

The process would begin in the playground where pupils were observed in their natural state. Upon their return to the gallery any case of good or bad conduct was reviewed by the master, who would encourage the 'whole gallery to join in' as they did in all other exercises.[167] The entire school was thereby recruited to an investigation that would conclude by 'applauding the good deed, or condemning the misdemeanor'.[168] Here the effect of peers (the 'power of the Sympathy of Numbers') was elevated as a 'principle of the highest importance'. Stow viewed this socially mediated power as an 'influence, mighty either for good or evil'. At present it was 'all on the side of evil' due to the adverse training of the streets. 'To lay hold of this principle', Stow argued, 'and turn it to good, is the great desideratum'.[169] The gallery was designed precisely to harness this power.

Take the boy who steals his playfellow's toy: The master takes no action in the playground, but 'when the children are again seated in the school gallery, as usual, he commences the process of examination.' Today the pupils will investigate the case of the boy who stole a toy. At this point the story is

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abstracted from the culprit, whom it is unnecessary to name, as his head will hang down: '*he is visible to all* by his downcast and reddened countenance'. The master reminds his subjects that although '*he* had not observed him, God assuredly had; or rather, he draws out this statement from the children themselves'.[170] Through yet more questions and answers the mode of punishment is discussed, negotiated and decided. Thus the whole group participates in moral correction.

As a school inspector explained in a manual describing various techniques for schooling the working classes; the teacher must 'be ready to seize every opportunity presented by passing events' for 'impressing on the child's heart some valuable lesson' from scripture.[171] Natural events occurring in and around the school, subjected to the collective judgment making processes of the gallery, would transform 'wild beings' into moral subjects.[172] This mode of schooling would instill 'habits of investigation' enabling those instructed in these habits to interrogate the mundane events of daily life and expose them to religious appraisal. The child's soul would be 'formed and transformed into wholesome channels, which will benefit the child to his life's end and beyond it'.[173]

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Even though the gallery school-hall, with its rising tiers of moral condemnation, may appear in retrospect to be the most striking feature of the moral training school, the mechanisms of examination were not exclusively concentrated here. They were distributed across the architectures and social relations of the school upon which the gallery depended. Throughout the school site, individuals learnt how to construct the moral truth of each moment, where each moment became a potential case for whole-school examination. Through play, during conversation, and following instruction, the child developed a unique and devolved capacity to judge personal and interpersonal conduct, even though the gallery would in all likelihood never be assembled for the glory of that particular moment to which it would attach a collective verdict.

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The pastoral teacher signified the moral template to which all would aspire. He would demonstrate those attributes his pupils were expected to develop.[174] Whilst his moral bearing and composure would, from the perspective of his pupils, initially represent a distant ideal, his engagement with each individual child would be intimate from the outset. This relationship would demand that he place himself 'on such terms with his pupils so that they can, without fear, make him their confidant, unburden their minds, and tell him of any little mischief they may have done'.[175] This confessional practice would build upon, but also go beyond, the playground-gallery system of observation and correction. It would extend a truth procedure outside this architectural system, developing an obligation to confess on behalf of the child that would cover a whole range of activities far greater than mere playground misdemeanors.

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The overall thrust of a confessional event, whether it occurs in a school, on a couch or in private, operates in a direction opposite to that which we might expect. The obligation to confess has become 'so deeply ingrained', Foucault argues, that we 'no longer perceive it as the effect of a power that constrains us; on the contrary, it seems to us that truth, lodged in our most secret nature, 'demands' only to surface; that if it fails to do so, this is because a constraint holds it in place, the violence of a power weighs it down'. Every confession comes 'at the price of a kind of liberation'.[176] Confession frees, or so we are led to believe, and power reduces one to silence.

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Be assured, confession will not liberate your inner truth. Your true self, your inner being is not awaiting its timely disclosure. We are materially constructed through confessional practices to produce truths about ourselves that reflect the discourses in which we have been schooled. If you were to resist these imperatives to expose your inner self, and become voluble about that which lies within you, perhaps silence would be your tactic. Can you not see how this injunction, this learned impulse to confess, renders your silence awkward? You would appear distinctly inhuman if you were to declare yourself empty, and affirm your superficial, socially distributed nature.

*

In the moral training school, pupils were expected to construct themselves according to an order of discourse they absorbed through the morally focused, morally saturated engagements of their environment. The idea was that every induced revelation concerning the child's inner being would generate intrinsic modifications in the child who uttered it. Inner truth was here a function of the larger framework of pastoral relations within which the child was

positioned. The overall objective of confession in the moral training school was to develop the child's capacity for reflecting on and governing the self. Considered from a distance, pastoral power would allow mechanisms of state to develop a certain degree of purchase on the subjectivity of the child. Pastoral technique would facilitate the formation of a governable self-regulating citizenry once moral training was extended to the entire population. Here was developed a mode of examination that was more personal than the disciplinary technology described above, for it was no longer preoccupied with the operations of a complex disciplinary machinery. This is not to suggest that pastoral examination operated without external artifice. It, too, relied on distributed techniques and architectures in order to function. And yet, its focus in constructing the interiority of those subjected to its practices, was more intensely developed, depending less on bodily manipulation, and more on interpersonal techniques of supervision and confession that were better able to endure outside any institutional confinements.

*

These two institutions – monitorial and moral training – employed relatively distinct methods of examination that were distributed within, rather than imposed upon, the relations that constituted the school. But these institutions also borrowed from one another, creating hybrid techniques. Those hybrids foreshadowed a more complete integration that occurred in the late nineteenth century state-sponsored elementary schools of Britain and elsewhere.

*

The monitorial school slowly shifted in its approaches to an increased dependence on simultaneous moral instruction. Some very early examples of this can be found in the archive. In 1819, according to a report from France, one monitorial institution was making use of a pastoral technique similar to that which Stow would later 'pioneer'.

> When a scholar has committed fraud, the teacher makes it known to the whole school, and asks the scholars, if they know any declaration of the Holy Spirit which is applicable to the case. [They] hasten to quote some passage of Holy Scripture

> [and offer other passages suggesting a route to correction]. Thus the teacher disappears before the Almighty…[the children now governed by the] Holy One who reveals himself to their tender minds, by means of their fellow scholars. Religious instruction becomes mutual.'[177]

The critics of monitorial schooling did not, though, view it as an intimate space where tender instruction, and moral discernment could be installed. They claimed that pupils were on the whole too numerous to benefit from the moral example of the master, and monitors were too ignorant. And so, those economies of instruction that were once a disciplinary selling point eventually came under sustained attack, and monitorial schools attempted to adjust their techniques in response. According to a monitorial school manual issued in 1856, the regimented hall should be overhauled and divided into three parts, with small groups sitting in semicircles at the front, standard fixed benches for classes in the middle, and larger groups assembled in a gallery at the back. With a heavy curtain partitioning off each section the monitorial school would become a more intimate environment. Playgrounds were also annexed, now 'regarded by good teachers' in the monitorial school 'as places in which the dispositions of boys are frequently most strikingly manifested', and upon which subsequent instruction should rest.[178] Nevertheless, the school was still to be run according to a disciplinary framework: classes were to move from one section to the next according to a rigid timetable and on a regular basis; there would be a signal upon which the children leave their seats and march according to a beat, 'one, two, three, four, to indicate the time to which they are to move'.[179] Various other commands would regulate the raising of curtains, distribution of books, cleaning of slates and so on. In addition, the school was still taught and run by the scholars themselves, and if trustworthy assistants could not be found the curtains would be raised returning the school to a less intimate disciplinary system.

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Moral training appears allergic at first sight to a similar influx of disciplinary devices. Its proponents believed that the 'social body cannot be constructed

like a machine, on abstract principles which merely include physical motions'. The social body also required 'the cultivation of religion and morality' and thereby necessitated the intimacies and methods of the moral training school.[180] Yet, disciplinary elements can still be identified in Stow's design: obedience must be 'instant' and children should move *'à la militaire'* with every motion of the class being 'as much as possible simultaneous' and according to precise verbal instructions.[181] The desired position and gait of the schoolmaster is minutely described,[182] and the school is referred to repeatedly as a 'machine'.[183] As with disciplinary power, any pastoral regime must be presumed to have its defects, and be seen as a system of only partial success. Alone, the pastoral teacher bore an impossible responsibility for the betterment of the lower classes and other socially marginalized groups. As it turned out, the success of pastoral technique depended on its integration with the activities of other actors and discourses. Fortunately for the pastoral schoolteacher, towards the end of the nineteenth century a rising concern for the health and hygiene of the population led to a proliferation of agencies concerned with the workings of the home. It was within this complex of agencies and 'tutelary agents' that the pastoral schoolteacher began to find support and adapt, supplementing a discourse of moral rescue with new discourses of hygiene and social health.[184] The confessional techniques of examination also expanded at an increasing rate, adapting in turn to new institutional sites, allowing the shaping of the private self to become a widespread activity.

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It is, nonetheless, worth returning to the moral training school in order to focus on the precise functioning of a technique before its proliferation. This provides a conceptual grounding that can help clarify the significance of later developments. We can already see within the moral training school more modern ideas, such as those of a ''child-centred' pedagogy, overseen by an unobtrusive yet vigilant teacher'.[185] It remains to be seen how more recent pedagogies maintained and modified a project once explicitly concerned with

the formation of souls. For our current purposes it is sufficient to note that during the nineteenth century this parallel tradition in examination was already in existence. It followed a path that was distinct from the disciplinary route. This alternative approach makes a virtue of pedagogies that pay attention to the natural environment and dispositions of the child. In a display of openness it recruits peers to the processes of assessment within a setting that has been carefully fabricated by the teacher and the school. The child is located very explicitly at the centre of examination for his or her own personal benefit. These clear affinities between Stow's nineteenth century pedagogy and more recent trends in education should alert us to the potential for a moral scheme behind all traditions that are resolutely anti-mechanistic, traditions that 'prioritize' and listen to the child.

*

If we broaden our contemporary definition of examination to include the wide range of pedagogic techniques that extend beyond the examination hall throughout and outside the school, techniques that seek to reveal the truth of the child and use that truth to inform the educational encounter, that is, if we interpret examination broadly and acknowledge its widely distributed effects, it should be clear that a history of examination must pay attention to pastoral developments as much as it does to disciplinary ones. In other words, a history of examination should pay as much attention to techniques that respond to the child, in the child's own terms taking into account his or her prior experience and wider nature, than it does to those more easily condemned techniques that seek to define the environment within which the child must exist and discipline the child according to its artificial terms. The line of distinction between these two techniques has, of course, been blurred. Extending our gaze back to a period when they can be more easily separated heightens sensitivity. It helps prevent our being blinded by a desire to challenge only the more conspicuous, heavy machinery of contemporary examination. It diverts our critical gaze either side of the manifest accountability techniques to which education appears increasingly subject.

More humane-appearing traditions of examination may be just as dangerous, if not more so, than their disciplinary analogues. Listening to the child – incorporating the child's experience into an examination procedure that has been lightened, and rendered formative – does not allow us to escape the grasp of power. It merely represents a switch in emphasis from one venerable tradition of power to another.

*

Today it is almost impossible to sense what it would be like to live an *unexamined* life. This is not simply due to the fact that examinations are everywhere, so much so that it would be difficult to pass through any modern system of schooling without being examined at one point or another. The problem is greater than objecting to the mere empirical spread of examinations which have come to: regulate and record educational progress, or lack of progress; inform the relation between child and parent, guardian, relative or friend; suffuse practices of teaching and management; inform practices of social care, therapy[186] and incarceration; back up or undermine policy; control access to further education; inform employers, condition employees and so on. The empirical spread of examination is certainly alarming, and yet the problem is greater than objecting to the extent of its reach. Expressing our profound disapproval of examination, as a ubiquitous rationality that defines our epoch and limits how we think, cannot in itself solve the difficulty we face. We must confront the examined life more radically than this. Perhaps we do live in 'an age of examination'; perhaps it is indeed difficult to imagine how we could live differently without this incessant requirement to test and to score. But this is not a matter for the imagination to solve alone. This is not simply about picturing how we could educate differently, either without examination or with less of it. To say that it is about picturing how we could *relate* to each other differently would be closer to the point. Still, the difficulty we face in an age of examination cannot be combatted by dreaming what it would be like to go without examination and whether by virtue of this vision there is any scope for adjusting what we do,

how we teach, how we learn, how we school. Examination cannot simply be removed and dreams cannot simply replace it.

Firstly, examination constitutes the school as its ontological condition. To confront examination, one must confront the school. Secondly, insofar as dreams are wishes of the heart (as any Disney film will tell you), they will be limited by the sensibilities of the modern soul. As I have endeavored to show, *this soul* may itself be the product of examination. Examination constitutes the soul of the child through a cluster of practices that make up the school. Since the nineteenth century, examination has produced the concepts or conceptual frame through which we have come to know ourselves. The monitorial school was an early laboratory in this effort, integrating a process that rendered an amorphous mass legible, with a procedure that taught the partitioned mass how to behave. The moral training school further developed this construction of the soul by teaching its subjects how they should relate to themselves, initially through an external set of architectures and interpersonal relations, and later through the absorption of these procedures to an inner conversation that constructed the self to be confessed. These two early nineteenth century sites established the frameworks of schooling from which later institutions were built. They developed examining strategies that would feed into the expansion of a far wider examining complex. Towards the end of the nineteenth century the specific labor of producing souls was multiplying across an increasingly dense grid of social agencies tasked with revealing and directing the truth of personal and social life.

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Any critique of examination and its deleterious effects should avoid the tendency we so often witness to high-minded indignation. It should avoid the temptation to denounce examination, that great institution, as a repressive influence against which the soul must fight in order to prevent its abridgement. The examining complex within which we were bred as infants now constitutes us as subjects; we owe our existence to it. A radical critique of examination must therefore begin by objecting to the subjects we have

become. Here we must follow *The Immoralist* who 'despised…the creature who was due to teaching, whom education had painted on the surface'.[187]

*

A radical critique of examination must, by definition, unsettle the soul. If you would prefer to avoid this experience, if you wish to remain secure from introspection and doubt, you must cultivate your attachment to historical constants. In particular, you should assert the uniform consistency of human experience throughout time. This consistency will enable you to connect in principle with all human life, as you share so much in common. Above all else, you must believe that there is an entity that endures through it all, 'something unchanging in all turmoil',[188] something that defines us as distinctively human. Then you must object to any theory claiming the contingency of the human form. Find reassurance by claiming to observe recurring human traits throughout time. Remain committed to these facts. With the facts pushed into view you, yourself, can retreat from view because 'the facts speak for themselves'.

[1] Green, J. A. The University of Sheffield. By J. A. Green, M.A. (Professor of Education at the University). In: Porter, editor. *Handbook & Guide to Sheffield: Prepared for the Members of the "British Association for the Advancement of Science," on the occasion of their visit to Sheffield*. Sheffield: J. W. Northend, 1910. p. 152.

[2] Turner. *Open Air School*. p. 75.

[3] Pongratz, Ludwig. Voluntary Self-Control: Education reform as a governmental strategy. In: Masschelein, Bröckling and Pongratz, editors. *The Learning Society from the Perspective of Governmentality*. Oxford: Blackwell, 2007. p. 63.

[4] InvisibleCommittee. *The Coming Insurrection*. Los Angeles: Semiotexte, 2009. p. 18.

[5] Lyotard, Jean-François. *The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge*. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2005 [1979]. p. 15.

[6] Barthes, Roland. *Camera Lucida: Reflections on Photography*. London: Vintage, 2000 [1980]. p. 3.

[7] To pick an example, Henrik Ibsen was giving it a tongue-lashing in 1869. See Ibsen, Henrik. The League of Youth. *A Doll's House and Other Plays*. London: Penguin, 2003 [1869].

[8] Sloterdijk, Peter. *Critique of Cynical Reason*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2001.

[9] Staten, Henry. *Nietzsche's Voice*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1990.

[10] There are always exceptions. Kurt Vonnegut once honorary president of the American Humanist Association would be one.

[11] Staten. *Nietzsche's Voice*. pp. 78-9.

[12] Gray, John. *Enlightenment's Wake*. London: Routledge, 2008. p. 26.

[13] Staten. *Nietzsche's Voice*. pp. 78-9.

[14] [This has not gone unnoticed: As Bowles and Gintis once observed, 'the educational system legitimates economic inequality by providing an open, [apparently] objective, and ostensibly meritocratic mechanism for assigning individuals to unequal economic positions'. (See Bowles, Samuel and Gintis, Herbert. *Schooling in Capitalist America*. Chicago: Haymarket Books, 2011 [1976]. p. 103.)]

The Modern Examination

[1] Haskins, Charles. *The Rise of Universities*. New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1923. pp. 3-4.

[2] Ibid.

[3] Ariès, Philippe. *Centuries of Childhood*. London: Penguin, 1973 [1960].

[4] Haskins. *Rise of Universities*. p. 46.

[5] For accounts of the medieval university career and accompanying systems of examination see Rashdall, Hastings. *The Universities of Europe in the Middle Ages: Volume I*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1895. pp. 433-62. Rashdall, Hastings. *The Universities of Europe in the Middle Ages: Volume II*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1895. pp. 44.446. Haskins. *Rise of Universities*. pp. 37-68. Leff, Gordon. *Paris and Oxford*

Universities in the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Centuries. London: John Wiley and Sons, 1968. pp. 146-60. Cobban, Alan. *The Medieval English Universities: Oxford and Cambridge to c. 1500*. Aldershot: Scholar Press, 1988. pp. 161-71.

[6] See Rashdall. *Universities of Europe I*. p. 462.

[7] Carr, Wilfred. Professing Education in a Postmodern Age. *Journal of Philosophy of Education* 1997; 31(2). Clark, William. *Academic Charisma and the Origins of the Research University*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2006.

[8] MacIntyre, Alasdair. *Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry*. London: Duckworth, 1990. p. 64.

[9] Ibid. p. 62.

[10] Ibid.

[11] Ibid. p. 181.

[12] Goddard, Roy and Payne, Mark. Criticality and the practice-based MA. *Journal of Education for Teaching* 2012; 39(1). p. 127.

[13] If you would prefer to read a more straightforward history of examination, I refer you to: Roach, John. *Public Examinations in England 1850-1900*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1971. Montgomery, Robert. *Examinations: An account of their evolution as administrative devices in England*. London: Longmans, 1965. Montgomery, Robert. *A New Examination of Examinations*. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1978.

[14] MacIntyre. *Versions of Moral Enquiry*.

[15] Bentham, Jeremy. *Constituional Code - Volume I*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1830 [1983]. p. 310.

[16] Ibid. p. 330.

[17] Ibid. p. 331.

[18] Ibid. p. 329.

[19] Ibid. p. 331.

[20] Ibid. p. 332.

[21] Ibid. p. 333.

[22] Costello, William. *The Scholastic Curriculum at Early Seventeenth-Century Cambridge*. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1958.

[23] Montgomery. *Examinations*. p. 6.

[24] Gascoigne, John. Mathematics and Meritocracy: The Emergence of the Cambridge Mathematical Tripos. *Social Studies of Science* 1984; 14.

[25] Hoskin, Keith. The Examination, Disciplinary Power and Rational Schooling. *History of Education* 1979; 8(2). p. 144. The significance attributed to 1792 has been questioned. It has been argued that a certain degree of 'impression marking' lasted until exams were finally stabilised in the 1840s. See Stray, Christopher. The Shift from Oral to Written Examination: Cambridge and Oxford 1700-1900. *Assessment in Education* 2001; 8(1). p. 41. For my purposes the precise dating of events matters little.

[26] Stray. *Oral to Written Examination*. p. 39.

[27] Macaulay, Thomas. Government of India Bill - Ajourned Debate (Second Night) Friday June 24. *Hansard's Parliamentary Debates Third Series CXXVIII*. London: Cornelius Buck, 1853. p. 756.

[28] Lindqvist, Sven. 'Exterminate All the Brutes'. *Saharan Journey*. London: Granta, 2012.

[29] India Act. An Act to provide for the Government of India - 20th August 1853. In *A Collection of the Public General Statutes passed in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Year of the Reign of Her Majesty Queen Victoria*. Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1853. p. 487.

[30] Preparations were made for an examination on 16 July 1855. Parliamentary Papers. *Reports, August 1855, to Coms. for Affairs of India by Examiners of Candidates for Civil Service of India; Correspondence relating to Appointment and Proceedings of Examiners*. (513) XL.135. House of Commons Papers, 1855.

[31] Parliamentary Papers. *Report on the Organisation of the Permanent Civil Service, together with a letter from the Rev. B. Jowett*. XXVII.1. House of Commons Papers, 1854.

[32] Parliamentary Papers. *Report, November 1854, from Committee on Examinations of Candidates for Civil Service of East India Company*. (34) XL.105. House of Commons Papers, 1854. p. 11.

[33] Roach. *Public Examinations*.

[34] Victoria, Alexandrina. In: Benson and Esher, editors. *The Letters of Queen Victoria: A Selection of Her Majesty's Correspondence Between the Years 1831 and 1861*. New York: Longmans, Green and Co, 1907. pp. 12-3 (emphasis mine).

[35] Ibid. pp. 13-4.

[36] Parliamentary Papers. 1854. (34) XL.105. p. 15.

[37] Parliamentary Papers. 1854. XXVII.1. p. 24.

[38] Parliamentary Papers. 1854. (34) XL.105. p. 15.

[39] Foucault, Michel. *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of The Prison*. London: Penguin, 1975 [1991]. p. 30.

[40] Nietzsche, Friedrich. *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*. London: Penguin, 1969 [1883]. p. 42.

Educated Bodies

[1] Peim, Nick. Education, Schooling, Derrida's Marx and Democracy: Some Fundamental Questions. *Studies in Philosophy and Education* 2013; 32(2).

[2] The argument that follows draws from: Allen, Ansgar. The Examined Life: On the Formation of Souls and Schooling. *American Educational Research Journal* 2013; 50(2).

[3] Foucault. *Discipline and Punish*. p. 30.

[4] Foucault, Michel. The Subject and Power. In: Dreyfus and Rabinow, editors. *Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics*. 2nd ed. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983. p. 208.

[5] Foucault. *Discipline and Punish*. p. 29.

[6] Tröhler, Daniel, Popkewitz, Thomas and Labaree, David. *Schooling and the Making of Citizens in the Long Nineteenth Century*. New York: Routledge, 2011. p. 20.

[7] Nietzsche. *On the Genealogy of Morals*.

[8] Foucault, Michel. Nietzsche, Genealogy, History. In: Faubion, editor. *Essential Works of Foucault 1954-1984. Volume 2*. London: Penguin, 2000 [1971].

[9] Ibid. p. 374.

[10] Ibid. p. 376.

[11] Ibid. p. 377.

[12] Nietzsche. *On the Genealogy of Morals*. pp. 57-8.

[13] [In adopting this institutional focus I am aware of the risks. As Foucault would argue, 'one must analyze institutions from the standpoint of power relations, rather than vice versa'. To adopt the latter position may give 'an exaggerated privilege' to 'functions that are essentially reproductive' as well as to coercive and legalistic frameworks of power. The danger is a neglect of those operations of power that are far more dispersed and productive, of relations that find anchorage outside the institutions concerned. (See: Foucault. *The Subject and Power II*. p. 222.)]

[14] Ibid.

[15] Caruso, Marcelo. Order through the Gaze: A Comparative Perspective of the Construction of Visibility in Monitorial Schooling. *Encounters in Education* 2008; 9. Miller, Pavla. *Transformations of Patriarchy in the West, 1500-1900*. Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1998. Upton, Dell. Lancasterian Schools, Republican Citizenship, and the Spatial Imagination in Early Nineteenth-Century America. *Journal of the Society of Architectural Historians* 1996; 55(3).

[16] Curtis, Bruce. *Building The Educational State: Canada West, 1836-1871*. London, Ontario: The Althouse Press, 1988. Perry, George. "The Grand Regulator": State Schooling and the Normal-School Idea in Nova Scotia, 1838-1855. *Acadiensis* 2003; 32(2).

[17] Rayman, Ronald. Joseph Lancaster's Monitorial System of Instruction and American Indian Education, 1815-1838. *History of Education Quarterly* 1981; 21(4).

[18] Jones, Dave. The genealogy of the urban schoolteacher. In: Ball, editor. *Foucault and Education: Disciplines and Knowledge*. London: Routledge, 1990.

[19] Kay-Shuttleworth, Sir James. *Four Periods of Public Education as reviewed in 1832-1839-1846-1862*. Brighton: Harvester, 1862 [1973]. p. 296.

[20] Parliamentary Papers. *Education Commission. Reports of the assistant commissioners appointed to inquire into the state of popular education in England. Vol. 1*. XXI Pt.I.1. House of Commons Papers, 1861. p. 94.

[21] Ibid. p. 91.

[22] Ibid. p. 92.

[23] Ibid. p. 93.

[24] Ibid. p. 94.

[25] Foucault. *Discipline and Punish*.

[26] See, for example: Miller, P J. Factories, monitorial schools and Jeremy Bentham: The origins of "the management syndrome" in popular education. *Journal of Educational Administration and History* 1973; 5(2). p. 10. Margolis, Eric and Fram, Sheila. Caught Napping: Images of Surveillance, Discipline and Punishment on the Body of the Schoolchild. *History of Education* 2007; 36(2). p. 198. Gore, Jennifer. Disciplining

Bodies: On the Continuity of Power Relations in Pedagogy. In: Popkewitz and Brennan, editors. *Foucault's Challenge: Discourse, Knowledge and Power in Education*. New York: Teachers College Press, 1998. p. 232.

[27] Bentham, Jeremy. Panopticon; or, the inspection-house. In: Bowring, editor. *The Works of Jeremy Bentham*. Edinburgh: William Tait, 1791 [1843].

[28] Foucault. *Discipline and Punish*. p. 205.

[29] ['The procedures of power resorted to in modern societies are far more numerous and diverse and rich. It would be false to say that the principle of visibility has dominated the whole technology of power since the 19th century'.(Foucault, Michel. The Eye of Power. In: Lotringer, editor. *Foucault Live: Collected Interviews, 1961-1984*. New York: Semiotext(e), 1996 [1977]. p. 227.)]

[30] Foucault. *Discipline and Punish*. pp. 218-19.

[31] Ibid. p. 167.

[32] Elsewhere, work has tended towards this position. See Hoskin, Keith. Foucault under examination: The crypto-educationalist unmasked. In: Ball, editor. *Foucault and Education: Disciplines and Knowledge*. London: Routledge, 1990.

[33] Rayman. *Lancaster and American Indian Education*. p. 399.

[34] Bell, Andrew. *The Madras School, or Elements of Tuition: Comprising the Analysis of an Experiment in Education, Made at the Male Asylum, Madras*. London: Murray, 1808. p. vii.

[35] BFSS. *Report of the British and Foreign School Society*. London: Taylor, 1814. p. 44.

[36] BFSS. *Report of the British and Foreign School Society. The general meeting. November 1815*. London: Taylor, 1815. pp. 3-4.

[37] Ibid. p. 43.

[38] Bell. *The Madras School*. p. viii.

[39] The National Society (after Bell) and British and Foreign School Society or BFSS (after Lancaster).

[40] Bell, Andrew. *The Report of the Military Male Orphan Asylum at Madras, a New Edition*. London: Murray, 1812. p. xx.

[41] Ibid. p. 20.

[42] Ibid. p. 19.

[43] BFSS. *Manual 1839*. p. 9.

[44] Bell. *The Report of the Asylum*. pp. 20-4.

[45] Lancaster, Joseph. *The British System of Education*. London: Royal Free School, 1810. p. 23.

[46] Bell. *The Madras School*. p. 5.

[47] Bell. *The Report of the Asylum*. p. 39.

[48] Bell. *The Madras School*. p. 3.

[49] Lancaster, Joseph. *Improvements in Education, as it Respects the Industrious Classes of the Community*. London: Darton & Harvey, 1803. pp. 17-8.

[50] Fromm, Erich. *The Fear of Freedom*. London: Routlege, 1942 [2001]. p. 50.

[51] Foucault. *Discipline and Punish*. p. 154.

[52] Bell. *The Report of the Asylum*. pp. 38-9.

[53] Bell. *The Madras School*. p. 3.
[54] Ibid. pp. 6, 11.
[55] Bell. *The Report of the Asylum*. p. 40.
[56] Bell. *The Madras School*. p. 16.
[57] Gladman, F J. *School Work: Control and Teaching, Organization and Principles of Education*. London: Jarrold & Sons, 1898. p. 368.
[58] Ibid. p. 373.
[59] Lancaster. *The British System*. p. 25.
[60] Gladman. *School Work*. p. 374.
[61] Ibid. p. 375.
[62] BFSS. *Manual 1839*. p. 10.
[63] Ibid. pp. 55-6.
[64] Bell. *The Madras School*. p. 32.
[65] BFSS. *Sixteenth report of the British and Foreign School Society*. London: Vogel, 1821. p. 49.
[66] BFSS. *Fourteenth report of the British and Foreign School Society*. London: Bensley and Son, 1819. p. 41.
[67] Bell. *The Madras School*. p. 15.
[68] Bell. *The Report of the Asylum*. p. 42.
[69] Ibid. p. 84.
[70] Bell. *The Madras School*. p. 19.
[71] Ibid. p. 20.
[72] [Though here too ingenious techniques were used. In one school at Edinburgh, the accusation of poor teaching by the respective class monitors could be raised at an appeal, and, if proven, those who registered the complaint took the place 'of those who have not observed the blunder, and the Monitor himself loses a place'. (BFSS. *Report 1814*. p. 59.)]
[73] Bell. *The Madras School*. p. 23.
[74] Ibid. p. 20.
[75] Ibid. pp. 46-7.
[76] Lancaster. *The British System*. pp. 27-8.
[77] Bell. *The Madras School*. p. 28.
[78] Ibid. p. 31.
[79] Salmon, David. *Joseph Lancaster*. London: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1904. p. 10.
[80] Lancaster. *The British System*. pp. 35-6.
[81] Ibid. pp. 34-5.
[82] Ibid. p. 26.
[83] Ibid. pp. 35-7.
[84] Lancaster. *Improvements in Education*. p. 50.
[85] Bell. *The Madras School*. p. 24.
[86] Ibid. p. 16.
[87] Hunter, Ian. Subjectivity and Government. *Economy and Society* 1993; 22(1). p. 130.
[88] Ibid.
[89] Ibid. p. 131.

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[90] Foucault. *Discipline and Punish*. p. 191.
[91] Ibid. p. 189.
[92] Ibid. pp. 226-7 (emphasis mine).
[93] Ibid. p. 148.

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[148] Cruickshank, Marjorie. David Stow, Scottish pioneer of teacher training in Britain. *British Journal of Educational Studies* 1966; 14(2). p. 206.
[149] Stow, David. *The Training System, Moral Training School, and Normal Seminary. Tenth Edition*. London: Longman, Brown, Green and Longmans, 1854. p. 61.
[150] Ibid. p. 60.
[151] Ibid. pp. 62-3.
[152] Ibid. p. 63.
[153] Cruickshank. *David Stow*. p. 206.
[154] Kay-Shuttleworth. *Four Periods of Public Education*. pp. 583-5.
[155] Bell. *The Report of the Asylum*. p. 42.
[156] Upton. *Lancasterian Schools*.
[157] Stow. *The Training System*. p. 153.
[158] Lancaster. *Improvements in Education*. p. 7.
[159] Stow. *The Training System*. pp. 6, 8.
[160] Shaw, George Bernard. *An Unsocial Socialist*. London: John Murray, 2012 [1884].
[161] Tröhler, Popkewitz and Labaree. *Schooling and the Making of Citizens*. p. 15.
[162] Foucault, Michel. "Omnes et Singulatim": Toward a Critique of Political Reason. In: Faubion, editor. *Essential Works of Foucault 1954-1984. Volume 3*. London: Penguin, 2002 [1979]. Foucault. *The Subject and Power II*.
[163] Kay-Shuttleworth. *Four Periods of Public Education*. pp. 295-6.
[164] Jones. *The urban schoolteacher*. p. 61.
[165] These "normal schools" were set up by pioneers such as Kay-Shuttleworth at Battersea and Stow at Glasgow. Kay-Shuttleworth. *Four Periods of Public Education*. p. 312.
[166] Hunter, Ian. *Culture and Government: The Emergence of Literary Education*. London: Macmillan, 1988. p. 59.
[167] Stow. *The Training System*. p. 203.
[168] Ibid. p. 156.
[169] Ibid. p. 153.
[170] Ibid. p. 206.
[171] Symons, Jelinger. *School Economy, A Practical Book on The Best Modes of Establishing and Teaching Schools, And of Making them Thoroughly Useful to the Working Classes by Means of Moral and Industrial Training*. London: Parker and Son, 1852. p. 121.
[172] Ibid. p. 120.
[173] Ibid. p. 116.
[174] 'The teacher must be what he wishes to make the children' ibid. p. 126.

[175] Stow. *The Training System*. p. 156.
[176] Foucault, Michel. *The Will to Knowledge*. London: Penguin, 1998 [1976]. p. 60.
[177] BFSS. *Report 1819*. p. 49-50.
[178] BFSS. *A handbook to the Borough Road schools*. London: BFSS, 1856. p. 146.
[179] Ibid. p. 128.
[180] Kay-Shuttleworth. *Four Periods of Public Education*. p. 38.
[181] Stow. *The Training System*. p. 339.
[182] Ibid. p. 322.
[183] Ibid. pp. iv-v.
[184] Jones. *The urban schoolteacher*. p. 73Turner. *Open Air School*.
[185] Hunter. *Culture and Government*. p. 34.
[186] Ecclestone, Kathryn and Hayes, Dennis. *The Dangerous Rise of Therapeutic Education*. London: Routledge, 2008.
[187] Gide, André. *The Immoralist*. London: Penguin, 1981 [1902].
[188] Nietzsche, Friedrich. *Human, All Too Human*. London: Penguin, 2004 [1878]. p. 14.