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Article:

MOTIVATED REASONING, POLITICAL SOPHISTICATION, AND ASSOCIATIONS BETWEEN PRESIDENT OBAMA AND ISLAM

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Abstract

Recent polls have suggested that between 20 and 25 percent of Americans erroneously indicate that President Obama is a Muslim. In this article, we test four models exploring explicit and implicit (i.e., automatic) associations that Americans have about the President and Islam. More specifically, we investigate how factors such as partisanship, ideology, candidate assessments, and political sophistication affect the likelihood of correctly identifying President Obama's Christian religious affiliation, as well as the probability of incorrectly indicating that he is likely a Muslim. We find that explicit associations between Obama and Islam are driven largely by political sophistication and candidate assessments, as well as implicit associations. Interestingly, while political sophistication does seem tohelp individuals make correct statements about the President's religion, knowledge does little toprotect them from holding faulty implicit associations.

Shortly before the 2010 midterm elections, several polls revealed that nearly 1 in 4 Americans believed that President Obama is secretly a Muslim, and roughly half of the electorate questioned whether he is Christian.[i] Not surprisingly, partisanship and ideology seemed to influence these results—as many as 1 in 3 conservative Republicans identified Obama's religion as Islam.[ii] Major media outlets offered various theories to explain the public's misperceptions, including partisanship, ignorance, and a general disdain for Obama. Whatever the reason, inaccurate associations surely undermine more sanguine appraisals of the American electorate (Popkin 1991; MacKuen, Erikson, and Stimson 1992) and favor ones that reflect information shortcomings and asymmetries (DelliCarpini and Keeter 1996). Moreover, there are likely electoral consequences of these associations, as they may threaten Obama'slegitimacy as presidentandweaken his ability to promote a successful policy agenda.

In this article, we address the following questions: First, do individuals truly associate Obama with Islam, or are they simply motivated reasoners who take the opportunity to express perceived negativity about the President? And second, how does political sophistication affect beliefs about Obama, given that it should both increase an individual's capacity to accurately evaluate information, yet also increase exposure to misinformation? We test thesequestions by comparing individuals' explicit responses on a survey about religion and politics with reaction time data from anImplicit Association Test (IAT), which measuresattitudes or beliefs that subjects may be unwilling or unable to explicitly reveal (Greenwald, McGhee, and Schwartz 1998).

Motivated Reasoning about Obama's Religion

Motivated reasoning (Ditto and Lopez 1992; Kunda 1990) offers one potential explanation for the misperceptions about Obama's religion found in recent polls (e.g., see Hollander 2010). When individuals engage in motivated reasoning, partisan goals trump accuracy goals; thus, individuals act as biased information processors who will vigorously defend their prior values,

identities, and attitudes at the expense of factual accuracy (Lodge and Taber 2000; Taber and Lodge 2006; Westen et al. 2006). In the case of Obama,partisans on the right may be motivated to believerumors about the President and reject factual information that does not bolster theirparticular worldview. Evidence of this *motivated believing*hypothesis would come from convergent results for partisans on an explicit questionnaire and an IAT designed to reveal how strongly associated concepts are in memory. These associations are often referred to as "implicit"associations because they come to mind automatically (i.e., without conscious effort) and may be outside of an individual'sawareness.[iii]For example, a person may unknowingly associate certain professions (e.g., doctors, lawyers, scientists, etc.) with males more than females because of gender stereotypes or participation rates; yet, when explicitly asked, this person would not necessarily say that these fields are linked to a particular gender. If motivated believing were occurring, conservativesshould be more likely than liberals to explicitly report that Obama is a Muslimbecause of their anti-Obama predispositions. Moreover, because these claims have already been accepted and stored into long-term memory, conservatives should also be more likely than liberals to reveal implicitassociationsbetween Obama and Islam on an IAT.

Motivated reasoning, however, can occur even if individuals do not actually *believe* information that suggests Obama is a Muslim. In other words, individuals may simply take the opportunity to express negativity when asked about the President's religion, regardless of their actual beliefs. Just consider the number of negative, yet simultaneously contradictory, names that Obama has been called by his detractors (e.g., labeling him a fascist and socialist in the same breath).[iv] And, let us not forget that until recently, liberal Democrats engaged in a similar practice of calling former President George W. Bush a litany of derogatory terms, many of which could not concurrently be true. Evidence for this phenomenon, which we call *motivated expressing,* would come from divergent patterns of explicit survey responses and implicit associations. According to this hypothesis, we

would still expect conservatives to explicitly state that Obama is a Muslim; however, because they construct this attitude on the spot and do not actually believe it to be true, conservatives would not exhibit stronger implicit associations than liberals between Obama and Islam on an IAT. While we cannot make any definitive conclusions about whether associations indicate beliefs, we build upon the notion thatassociations are a necessary condition for those who have beliefs.

Political Sophistication and Exposure to Misinformation

Another explanation for the public's misperceptions is a well-documented and widespread lack of political sophistication in the electorate (DelliCarpini and Keeter 1996), which should lead people to rely on other methods for determining Obama's religious affiliation. For example, some individuals may use mental shortcuts, or heuristics (Popkin 1991), to surmise that the name Barrack Hussein Obama must have some Islamic roots. Others may have heard statementsabout Obama's Kenyan father or upbringing in Indonesia and assume that he is a Muslim because of these experiences. Whatever the exact process (which is beyond the scope of the present research), we assume that, in general, political sophisticates should be more capable of evaluating information (Luskin 1990) about Obama than their low-information counterparts. Consequently, sophisticates should be more likely to correctly identity Obama as a Christian than unsophisticated citizens. We call this the *sophisticated processing*hypothesis.

Yet, we also know that politically sophisticated citizens are, by definition, more likely to be exposed to political information than unsophisticatedindividuals (DelliCarpini and Keeter 1992; Zaller 1992). As a result, sophisticates will likely endure repeated exposure to misinformation linking Obama to Islam. One poll taken just before the 2008 Presidential Election reported that as many as 92% of Americans had heard at least one factually inaccuratestatement about Obama,[v] and one can only imagine how many times sophisticates may have heard or read misleading information about the President, given their greater political attention. So widespread were these rumors that the

Obama campaign even created a website called "Fight the Smears" to refute false claims circulating the Internet. Given that cognitive psychologists believe memory is organized associatively (Collins and Loftus 1975)—that is, in node-link structures in which contextual triggers can affect a node's accessibility—we expect repeated exposure to information, no matter how questionable, will create implicit associations between Obama and Islam. In other words, sophisticates need not believe specific misinformation to exhibit implicit associations in memory. Evidence for this hypothesis, which we call *differential exposure,* wouldcome from stronger implicit associations linking Obama to Islamamong sophisticates than non-sophisticates.

In sum, we empirically test a number of different hypotheses concerning misperceptions about President Obama's religion. First, our *motivated believing* hypothesis suggests that partisans on the political right will be motivated to process negative misinformation about the President and commit it to long-term memory; thus, they should demonstrate stronger implicit associations (than those on the political left) between Obama and Islam. Second, our *motivated expressing* hypothesis suggests that conservatives will be more likely to explicitly state that Obama is a Muslim; however, because they do not necessarily believe it to be true, conservatives will demonstrate no differences compared to liberals on a task measuring implicit associations stored in memory. Third, our *sophisticated processing* hypothesis states that political sophisticates should be more capable of evaluating information about Obama than their low-information counterparts; hence, sophisticates will be more likely to explicitly identify Obama's religion correctly. And finally, with our *differential exposure*hypothesis we argue that because sophisticatesare more likelyexposed to information of all types—including repeated misinformation—they will exhibit stronger implicit associations linking Obama to Islam than politically unsophisticated citizens.

Experimental Design and Procedure

One week after the 2010 midterm elections, 356 undergraduates enrolled at a southeastern, public university participated in our study. Of this total, 52 percent were female, and nearly 90 percent of subjects listed their race as "White/Caucasian." Partisanship and ideology were fairly evenly distributed, albeit slightly skewed toward Republicans and conservatives (41% Republican, 30% Independent, and 29% Democrat; 38% conservative, 38% moderate, and 24% liberal). Although we make no claims about the representativeness of our sample relative to the American public, we do find the same proportion of individuals in our sample who state that President Obama is a Muslim (i.e., 1 in 5 participants) as reported in recent, nationally representative polls. Moreover, we suspect that any effects of partisanship, ideology, and political sophistication should be attenuated in anundergraduate sample; hence, our findings may actually be conservative estimates of the effects present in the general electorate. That is, older citizens tend to have more crystallized political attitudes and stronger partisan attachments than the typical college student(Sears 1986), and these experiences would likely exacerbate any observed effects linked to motivated reasoning.

The first portion of the study involved a computer-based Implicit Association Test (IAT), which is designed to measure the strength of automatic associations between concepts in memory (Greenwald et al. 1998). Automatic associations—that is, processes that "operate outside of conscious awareness and guidance" (Bargh&Chartrand 1999, 462)—are important because they have been shown to disproportionately influence judgments and behaviors (Fazio 1995). The benefit of the IAT is that it allows us to detect implicit associations that may be unknown or intentionally misstated by individuals. Moreover, Devine (1989) and other scholarshave demonstrated that both motivation and ability are necessary to override the biases resulting from automatic associations.

We presented subjects with words representing Christianity (Jesus, Christian, Gospel, and Church) and Islam (Muhammad, Muslim, Koran, and Mosque),[vi] as well as black-and-white images

of Barack Obama and John McCain,[vii] the major-party candidates from the 2008 Presidential Election,[viii] using a free, open-source program called *Free*IAT (see Figure 1).[ix] Subjects were instructed to quickly sort each word or image into paired categories consisting of a candidate and religion, while making as few mistakes as possible. For example, in one block of trials subjects would be asked to sort objects into the category representing Barack Obama and Islam or John McCain and Christianity.[x] In total, subjects completed 5 blocks of timed trials.[xi] We used each participant's reaction times to calculate an IAT effect measure, which is commonly known as the *D*-score and is similar to Cohen's *d* (Cohen 1977) in that it may be interpreted as a measure of effect size (Greenwald, Nosek, and Sriram 2006). Positive *D*-scores (where $-2 \leq D \leq +2$) indicate associations of Obama with Islam (and McCain with Christianity).[xii]

Following the Presidents-Religion IAT, subjects completed a brief questionnaire that measured their explicit feelings toward various political figures, parties, and religions. We used the difference in feeling thermometer ratings of Obama and McCain to create a relative evaluation of the candidates (preference for Obama=1).[xiii] We also asked participants whether they could correctly identify Obama's religion (Christian=1), as well as the likelihood that Obama is a Muslim on a 4-point scale (very likely=1). Finally, subjects completed an 8-item political sophistication test (high sophistication=1),[xiv] as well as demographic questions including gender (male=1), race (nonwhite=1), party identification (strong Republican=1; 5-point scale), and ideology (very conservative=1; 5-point scale).[xv]

Results

We begin by briefly reviewing some descriptive statistics from our survey and President's-Religion IAT (see Table 1). First, only a slight majority of respondents (57%) were able to correctly identify Obama as a Christian, while a sizeable portion of the sample (41%) stated that it is "very likely" or "somewhat likely" that Obama is a Muslim. Moreover, we find that there is an overall IAT

effect, $M_{D\text{-score}}$ = 0.21, such that subjects automatically associated Obama with Islam. To put this in perspective, a mean D-score of 0.21 translates to a "medium" effect size according to Cohen's classification of "small," "medium," and "large" effects used for Cohen's d (Cohen 1988). It is also worth noting that the correlations among our implicit IAT effect measure and two explicit measures, correct identification of Obama's religion and the likelihood that Obama is a Muslim, are modest at best, r = -0.26 and r = 0.30, respectively. Consistent with findings from a wide array of other IAT studies (e.g., see Lane, Banaji, Nosek, and Greenwald 2007), these relatively weak correlations among implicit-explicit measures suggest that our IAT taps a distinct dimension relative to the self-reported questions about Obama.

*** INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE ***

Not surprisingly, Republicans, conservatives, and those with favorable feelings towardMcCainwere more likely to explicitly identify Obama as a Muslim (and less likely to identify him as a Christian) than Democrats, liberals, and those with favorable feelings towardObama. A similar pattern emerges when we examine implicit associations according to the D-scores and mean IAT reaction times reported in Table 1. Partisans on the political right had D-scores and mean reaction times between four and five times larger than those on the political left. We interpret these large differences to mean that pairings between Obama and Islam were consistent with existing associations for conservatives and thus facilitated their reaction times (relative to pairings of McCain and Islam). Finally, in the explicit questionnaire politicalsophisticates were more likely to correctlyidentify Obama's religion than less knowledgeable individuals; however, sophisticates show no difference in implicit associations compared to unsophisticated citizens.

Now we turn to the results from our multivariate analyses, which allow us to test several different hypotheses (see Table 2). We regressed each of our three dependent variables—correctly identifying Obama's religion (logit model; column 1), the likelihood that Obama is Muslim (ordered

logit model; column 2), and our IAT effect *D*-score (OLS model; column 3)—on partisanship, ideology, political sophistication, gender, and race. The first two models test explicit associations, while the third model tests implicit ones. Recall that we proposed two competing motivated reasoning hypotheses to explain the consistent misidentification of Obama's religion. One possibility is that motivated believers, who are predisposed to accept and commit misinformation about Obama into long-term memory, should reveal strong associations on the President's-Religion IAT, as well as biases on explicit survey items. Another plausible alternative is that motivated expressers would take the opportunity to state negativity about President Obama without actually believing the rumors; hence, we should find no IAT effect to accompany the biases on the explicit survey questions.

*** INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE ***

Looking at the effects of ideology on our explicit and implicit measures, we find strong support for our motivated believing hypothesis, which also means that we find little evidence of motivated expressing in the data. In each of our three models, ideology is correctly signed and a statistically significant predictor of beliefs about Obama's religion. For instance, the probability that a strong liberal will correctly identify Obama as a Christian is 0.72, while the likelihood that a strong conservative will get this question correct is only 0.37 (holding all other variables at their mean values or reference categories). Likewise, the probability that a strong conservative will state Obama is "very likely" or "somewhat likely" a Muslim is 0.60 compared to only 0.19 for strong liberals. More importantly, the IAT effect,which measures associations between Obama and Islam, increases by 0.27 when moving from very liberal to very conservative on the scale. Substantively speaking, this means thatliberals demonstrate a weak association between Obama and Islam (i.e., a small effect size of 0.07), while conservatives exhibit a substantially strong association (i.e., a large effect size of 0.34).

Interestingly, the effects of partisanship are attenuated after accounting for ideology. Party identification only reaches conventional levels of statistical significance for one of the explicit dependent variables, where the probability that a strong Republican will identify Obama as a Muslim is 0.55 compared to 0.23 for a strong Democrat. In addition, partisanship is a marginally significant predictor ($p < 0.10$) of an individual's D-score, such that moving from a strong Democrat to a strong Republican increases the IAT effect by 0.18, controlling for other factors. As noted, the weaker effects of partisanship in our models are largely attributed to the high correlation with ideology ($r = 0.75$), which seems to be a stronger predictor of motivated believing than party identification.

Next, we test our sophisticated processingand differential exposure hypotheses. We expected that political sophisticates should be more capable of evaluating the veracity of information about Obama and thus more likely to correctly identify his religion than their low-information counterparts. We also hypothesized that because sophisticates are exposed to more political information than unsophisticated individuals, and by extension, more misinformation, sophisticates should demonstrate stronger associations linking Obama to Islam on the Presidents-Religion IAT.

Looking at Table 2, we see that political sophistication significantly predicts both of our explicit dependent variables.[xvi] We interpret these results as strong evidence for our sophisticated processing hypothesis, such that an increase in political sophistication reduces the likelihood that respondents explicitly misidentify Obama's religion. Substantively, the probability that a politically sophisticated individual will correctly identify Obama's religion is 0.75; for unsophisticated respondents that probability is only 0.25. Moreover, the probability that someone who scores high on our measure of political sophistication will perceive Obama as a Muslim is only 0.20, while it is 0.69 for those scoring low.

Contrary to our differential exposure hypothesis, political sophistication has virtually no effect ($b = 0.01$, $s.e. = 0.06$, $p > 0.90$) on our implicit D-score. This means that although political

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sophisticates are able to explicitly correctly identify the President's religion, they are neither more nor less likely than unsophisticated individuals to automatically associate Obama with Islam. One way to interpret these null results is that political sophistication does not appear to inoculate citizens from the constant barrage of rumors, as those at high and low levels of sophistication exhibit the same 0.21 *D*-score linking Obama to Islam. This finding is also interesting because it suggests that even minimal exposure to misinformationfor unsophisticated individuals appears to create long-term associations in memory. It also means that, at least for subjects in our sample, the investment of political learning did little to overcome implicit associations, as even knowledgeable, sophisticated individuals linked Obama with Islam.

Modeling Simultaneous Relationships between Obama and Islam

Single-equation, linear models do not accurately depict the complex relationships captured by our data, so we have also estimated a structural equation model (see Figure 2). The best fitting model ($\chi^2(39)$ =58.49, *p* < .05, RMSEA=0.034, CFI=0.978, TLI=0.975, WRMR=0.972) indicates that exogenous factors like party identification, ideology, and race, do not directly influence beliefs about Obama's religion, as we have previously modeled, but are instead mediated by feelings toward the President. These feelings, in turn, influence both implicit and explicit associations. Thus, we still find strong support for our motivated believing hypothesis, but we are now able to demonstrate that predispositions affect an individual's evaluation of Obama, which in turn, significantly influences the likelihood of accepting misinformation and incorrectly identifying the President's religion. In fact, moving from those who strongly dislike Obama to those that strongly favor him decreases an individual's *D*-score by a whopping 0.56 (recall that the effects of ideology and partisanship were 0.27 and 0.18, respectively).

*** INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE ***

In addition to the process that mediates motivated believing, our structural equation model allows us to explore the consequences of automatic associations on self-reports about Obama's religion. Consistent with research that demonstrates automatic associations influence judgments and behavior (Fazio 1995), we find that our implicit measure linking Obama and Islam significantly predicts the likelihood of correctly identifying his religion (b =-0.79, $s.e.$ =0.22, p< 0.01), as well as the likelihood of stating that he is a Muslim (b =0.57, $s.e.$=0.18, p< 0.01), both in the expected direction. That is, implicit associations, which are automatically activated and may be outside of an individual's conscious awareness, increase the probability of (mis)identifying the President's religion.

In sum, we find strong support for our motivated believing and sophisticated processing hypotheses but little evidence of motivated expressing or differential exposure in the data. We also demonstrate how this process works structurally. Predispositions such as ideology, partisanship, and race affect how citizens feel about Obama. This evaluation, in turn, motivates individuals to believe misinformation about the President, which creates implicit associations between Obama and Islam in long-term memory. Finally, these implicit associations increase the likelihood of perceiving and explicitly stating that Obama is likely a Muslim. Interestingly, political sophistication mitigates explicit associations, but it has no effect on implicit ones.

Discussion and Conclusions

The finding that explicit statements are driven by implicit associations appears to comport with scholarswho suggest that voters utilizelow-effort devices such as heuristics to form their candidate assessments (Popkin 1991). But our assessment is far from optimistic. In this case,judgments about Obama were significantly influenced by automaticassociations between the President and Islam. For partisans on the political right, who are generallyunmotivated to support Obama, these influences are likely inconsequential. However, for the rest of the electorate, these implicit associations—based upon misinformation—may bias subsequent judgments about the

President in a direction contrary to their own predispositions or motivations. These biases have the potential to undermine the legitimacy of the President and possibly damagesupport for his policy agenda on contentious issues such as healthcare or immigration.

Importantly, research demonstrates that a person must be motivated and able to override implicit associations (Devine 1989).While our findings suggest that sophisticated individuals are capable of overriding these associations when making explicit statements, our results also reveal that sophisticates still have implicit associations linking President Obama to Islam. What we do not know, however, is how the sources of information and frequency of exposure affect associations created from misinformation, as well as the ability to override them.

Linking Obama to Islam is particularly pernicious in today's political climate, given how negatively the media have portrayed Muslims since the September 11th attacks(Jackson 2010). For instance, recent Gallup polls reveal that 40 percent of Americans admit to feeling some degree of prejudice toward Muslims.[xvii]If economic indicators are mixed on Election Day, associations linking Obama with Islam could potentially swing key votes of moderates, independents, and the undecided. Our findings suggest that although routinely condemned, smear campaigns may be quite effective at creating false associations about political candidates. And, it may mean that simply stating something over and over again, regardless of its validity, has an impact on electoral outcomes.

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[i] For instance, see polls conducted by the Pew Research Center (07/21 – 8/5/2010), Time magazine (8/16 – 8/17/2010), and Newsweek (8/25 – 8/26/2010).
[ii] Pew Research Center Report dated 07/21 – 8/5/2010. Retrieved from: http://pewforum.org/Politics-and-Elections/Growing-Number-of-Americans-Say-Obama-is-a-Muslim.aspx#1
[iii]For further discussion of implicit associations, see Greenwald and Banaji (1995).
[iv] Newsweek article "The Illustrated Man" by Jonathan Alter (dated August 10, 2010).
[v] Scripps poll: 94 percent have heard way-out Obama, McCain rumors. ScrippsNews. Retrieved from http://www.scrippsnews.com/node/37045
[vi] These category words were taken directly from the Religion IAT hosted at the Project Implicit website: <https://implicit.harvard.edu/implicit/>.

[vii] Four images of each candidate were carefully selected so that the candidates' poses, facial expressions, and attire were nearly identical.

[viii] Recent evidence suggests that people elicit strong associations between factors such as Christian-ness and American-ness and candidate assessments for Barack Obama and John McCain (Sheets, Domke, and Greenwald 2011).

[ix] The FreeIAT software can downloaded from <http://www4.ncsu.edu/~awmeade/FreeIAT/FreeIAT.htm>. The Presidents-Religion IAT used in this study is available upon request from the authors.

[x] The pairings of categories, as well as their assignment to specific keys, were randomly assigned and varied on successive trials

[xi] Blocks 1, 2 and 4 each contained 20 practice trials to help subjects acclimate themselves to the sorting task. Blocks 3 and 5 consisted of 60 recorded trials that were used to compute Greenwald, Nosek, and Banaji's (2003) IAT D-score ($M = 0.21$, $SD = 0.32$; range -0.66 to 1.24), which is the preferred scoring algorithm for IAT studies.

[xii] Details about the scoring algorithm used to compute the IAT effect (D-score) can be found at http://www4.ncsu.edu/~awmeade/FreeIAT/HowItWorks.htm, as well as Greenwald, Nosek, and Banaji (2003).

[xiii] For ease of interpretation, all independent variables were recoded from 0 to 1.

[xiv] We selected questions that were unrelated to President Obama and his religious views to avoid potential endogeneity issues. The political sophistication scale ($M = 0.57$, $SD = 0.26$; $KR20 = 0.70$) consisted of correct responses to the following items (correct answers and proportions in parentheses): 1) Responsibility to determine constitutionality of laws (Supreme Court; 74%); 2) Harry Reid's job (Senate Majority Leader; 28%); 3) majority needed to override presidential veto (2/3; 64%); 4) more conservative party at national level (Republican Party; 92%); 5) current number of Supreme Court justices (9; 49%); 6) Hillary Clinton's job (Secretary of State; 63%); 7) Constitutional authority to declare war (Legislative branch; 51%); and 8) name of current Supreme Court Chief Justice (John Roberts; 34%).

[xv] A full description of the variable codings and experimental protocol is available from the authors.

[xvi] We also examined the interactions of political sophistication and a) partisan identification and b) ideology. None of these interactions were statistically significant.

[xvii]See Gallup poll conducted between October 31 – November 13, 2009. Retrieved from: http://www.gallup.com/poll/125312/religious-prejudice-stronger-against-muslims.aspx.

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Figure 1. Screenshots from the Presidents-Religion Implicit Association Test (IAT)

Figure 2. Structural Equation Model of Relationship between Explicit and Implicit Measures

Notes: N = 339. Weighted-least squares estimates (WLSMV) using delta parameterization and 1,000 iterations in Mplus (v. 4.1). Fit indices for this model: $\chi^2(39) = 58.49$, $p < .05$, RMSEA = 0.034, CFI = 0.978, TLI = 0.975, WRMR = 0.972. All paths are significant at the $p < .05$ level, except when indicated by a dotted line. Observed variables are shown with rectangles, while the latent variable is indicated with an oval.

Table 1. Explicit and Implicit Associations between Obama and Islam (by Key Characteristics)

	Explicit Measures: Obama's Religion		Implicit Measures: IAT Effect & Reaction Time (RT)	
	Correctly Identified	Likely Muslim	IAT Effect (*D*-score*)*	Δ RT (ms) Obama w/ Christian − Muslim
Total				
All Subjects (n=356)	57%	41%	0.21 (0.32)	115.1 (191.5)
Party				
Democrat (n=103)	69%	28%	0.09 (0.30)	38.7 (174.6)
Independent (n=104)	59%	36%	0.18 (0.35)	108.7 (218.7)
Republican (n=142)	46%	54%	0.32 (0.27)	174.9 (164.0)
Ideology				
Liberal (n=83)	76%	23%	0.07 (0.28)	37.5 (144.9)
Moderate (n=134)	54%	41%	0.20 (0.33)	104.2 (216.9)
Conservative (n=136)	48%	52%	0.32 (0.29)	175.2 (171.7)
Feelings toward Candidates				
Favor Obama (n=157)	70%	26%	0.08 (0.30)	46.7 (197.7)
Favor McCain (n=148)	47%	56%	0.35 (0.29)	191.8 (168.1)
Political Sophistication				
High (n=126)	72%	27%	0.22 (0.31)	112.8 (199.6)
Medium (n=110)	56%	38%	0.20 (0.34)	111.1 (185.3)
Low (n=120)	41%	58%	0.21 (0.31)	112.3 (189.8)
Race				
Non-White (n=34)	62%	42%	0.14 (0.33)	81.6 (230.4)
White (n=317)	56%	41%	0.22 (0.32)	118.8 (187.5)
Gender				
Male (n=171)	62%	39%	0.22 (0.32)	121.3 (204.5)
Female (n=182)	52%	43%	0.21 (0.32)	110.8 (179.6)
Identified Obama's Religion				
Correct (n=202)	- - -	- - -	0.14 (0.32)	72.4 (193.3)
Incorrect (n=153)	- - -	- - -	0.31 (0.29)	172.7 (174.2)
Likelihood Obama is Muslim				
Unlikely (n=209)	- - -	- - -	0.15 (0.32)	79.0 (186.4)
Likely (n=145)	- - -	- - -	0.30 (0.30)	168.1 (188.2)

Notes: Cell sizes do not always total 356 due to missing values. The IAT Effect (*D-score*) is the difference in corrected mean response times between stereotype-inconsistent and consistent trial blocks (i.e., pairing Obama-Christianity and McCain-Islam;Obama-Islam and McCain-Christianity, respectively) divided by the pooled standard deviation. Standard deviations are in parentheses.

Table 2. Models of Explicit and Implicit Associations between Obama and Islam

	Explicit DV: Religion Correctly Identified	Explicit DV: Likelihood Obama is Muslim	Implicit DV: IAT Effect (D-score)
Party Identification	-0.32 (0.69)	**1.42*** **(0.67)**	0.18 (0.10)
Ideology	**-1.50*** **(0.76)**	**1.84*** **(0.74)**	**0.27*** **(0.11)**
Political Sophistication	**2.24**** **(0.47)**	**-2.17**** **(0.38)**	0.01 (0.06)
Male	0.30 (0.24)	-0.07 (0.21)	-0.01 (0.03)
Non-White	0.15 (0.43)	-0.11 (0.40)	-0.02 (0.06)
Intercept	-0.14 (0.42)	- - -	-0.03 (0.06)
Cutpoint 1 (τ_1)	- - -	-0.60 (0.39)	- - -
Cutpoint 2 (τ_2)	- - -	0.96 (0.40)	- - -
Cutpoint 3 (τ_3)	- - -	2.91 (0.42)	- - -
(Pseudo) R^2	0.09	0.09	0.10
N	346	344	345

Notes: The IAT Effect (D-score) is a measure of association, where $-2 \leq D \leq +2$ and positive scores indicate an association between Obama with Islam (and McCain with Christianity). Models are estimated using logit, ordered-logit, and OLS respectively. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *p<.05, **p<.01