**Revenge and Reconciliation in Early Modern Italy[[1]](#footnote-1)\***

We see that many books in other languages attribute the blemish of revenge as a characteristic almost peculiar to us. We can say that this quality does not fall from the sky, or is produced by the climate…It is caused by only one institution; that which has been formed by books about chivalry.[[2]](#endnote-1)

The Italian predilection for revenge is stereotypical and these words, written by Scipione Maffei in 1710, demonstrate that it is a stereotype with a long history. At first glance, Maffei’s *Della scienza chiamata cavalleresca* is an anti-duelling treatise which fits into the model of the Counter-Reformation assault on the vanity of the honour code, the origins of which can be traced back to the condemnation of duelling and vengeance in the 25th session of the Council of Trent and the outlawing of honour duels by Pope Clement VII in 1592.[[3]](#endnote-2) Closer reading suggests this to be a superficial judgement. Although Maffei dedicated his treatise to Pope Clement XI, his intention was not pious moralising: in more than 400 pages of text he makes little reference to Christian teaching, the institutions of the Church and its councils; there are few Biblical references and no exegesis on the Gospel teaching on good neighbourliness. As a progenitor of the Catholic Enlightenment, Maffei was more concerned to demonstrate the superiority of reason over mere custom.[[4]](#endnote-3) His method was ethnographic and historical: he compared Italians with other peoples, their laws, customs and histories, and in most respects he found Italy and its gentlemen wanting.

Maffei sought to establish that the obsession with revenge was a peculiarly Italian phenomenon. He demolished the argument that the honour code can be traced to the Ancients. On the contrary, feud and vendetta were foreign innovations first brought to Italy by the Lombards. He contrasted the Roman and Barbarian concept of enmity: the former was based on reason and had no place for private sentiment, whereas the feud was harmful to the public good and had no utility.[[5]](#endnote-4) ‘This form of enmity, deriving its language from the Germans and the ancient Saxons, is called *Faida,* and its use was common to all German peoples, and more generally to all Northerners and people from across the Alps. These ‘forms of war…gave birth to killings, pillages and burnings, even though they were contrary to all reason and Christian law.’[[6]](#endnote-5) The ‘confusion of governments exacerbated the malignancy’: there was no sovereign, like Philip the Fair in France, capable of outlawing the practice. Political fragmentation was made worse by urbanization, which brought noblemen into close proximity and bred factionalism. Familiarity bred contempt: the bustle of busy streets, piazzas and public places was not a civilizer but a danger to public order; the city produced ‘an infinite enmity of people divided into parties.’ Maffei’s main target was, however, the *Scienza Cavalleresca*, the laws of honour which governed gentlemanly conduct, which had first been codified in the 1550s and which continued to arouse widespread discussion in print and in public disputation in noble academies into the eighteenth century. Its principal error was to sustain the idea that honour could only be satisfied by an equivalent form of compensation. According to Maffei, these were ‘customs brought in by foreign nations which transformed Italy, and on which were erected the [false] rules and mores of honour.’[[7]](#endnote-6)

Maffei’s work was fiercely denounced – he was accused of heresy – but it was popular, going through seven editions. Claudio Donati was the first modern scholar to draw attention to the significance of a work largely forgotten since the eighteenth century.[[8]](#endnote-7) More recently, Italian scholars have re-evaluated the *Scienza Cavalleresca* in more positive terms; building on Donati’s research on the ideological underpinnings of the early modern Italian nobility they have stressed the practical applications of the *Scienza,* its disciplinary role in bringing the nobility to heel and the social function of the rituals of peace-making it espoused.[[9]](#endnote-8) Quite how unique this body of literature was is now becoming apparent to a younger generation of scholars – there is nothing comparable in volume or sophistication for any other early modern society. Paolo Broggio, for example, has shown that Spanish discourse about honour and peace was less coherent than its Italian counterpart and developed largely autonomously from the Italian scene; it was predicated on the established notion of service to the monarchy and strict adherence to the prohibition on duelling. These were not manuals or conduct books as such, but sermons which warned the reader that noble behaviour must conform to the dictates of the Gospels. Spanish works were therefore strong on moralising and short on practical advice: ‘the sole possible foundations of reputation and nobility must be divine law, the love of God and the love of one’s neighbour.’[[10]](#endnote-9) Italian writing about honour was not only more voluminous, more sophisticated and more practically-minded than anything comparable in Europe, it was also more secular.[[11]](#endnote-10)

The reasons why the *Scienza Cavalleresca* remained confined to the Italian peninsula is worth exploring given the enormous influence that Italian culture and learning otherwise exercised across the other side of the Alps, and in particular the popularity of the Italian style of gentlemanly behaviour promoted by Castiglione, Guazzo and other writers. Maffei was the first to expose this point of resistance and to articulate its significance: ‘it is only in Italy that our science is cultivated, and among other nations it is completely ignored, refuted and derided.’[[12]](#endnote-11) In Northern Europe, he went on, the duel was banned and private disputes brought no glory. Italians, in contrast, fostered a false glory based on the self, which led to vengeance and ambushes (*supercherie*). His purview was not confined to Europe: he viewed Turkish customs favourably (hence the charge of heresy); though the Abyssinians were a cruel and barbarous people they did not have vendettas; and Confucianism had a close affinity with Christianity through its belief that strength comes from within. His comparative method made him certain that Italian conceptions of masculinity were different too: ‘according to general opinion, and according to practice and current custom, honour for Italian men is made up of two things: in not suffering an offence and in the chastity, or rather in the concept of chastity, of women.’[[13]](#endnote-12) Maffei’s most serious charge against the *Scienza Cavalleresca* was that it was nothing more than casuistry, which deployed the ‘specious mask of peace’ as a cover for propagating the cult of honour and surreptitiously promoting the duel.

Testing Maffei’s hypothesis is urgent because of the debate among historians and sociologists about the long term decline in homicide rates that occurred in late-medieval and early modern Europe. While most commentators would now agree that the empirical evidence is overwhelming, there is little agreement on the causes of the decline. Italy causes a particular problem for supporters of Norbert Elias’s theory of the civilizing process. Current evidence suggests that Italian homicide rates did not fall anywhere near as quickly as in the North and in many regions of Italy, notably in the South and on the Islands, the rates are static until the nineteenth century. Elias’s theory is predicated on the rise of greater self-control, as individuals internalise social constraints, which are promoted by the expansion of the state with its monopoly on violence and the extension of the market economy resulting in increasing functional interdependency. As Manuel Eisner has pointed out ‘whatever the deficiencies of early modern Italian states may have been they were certainly not characterized by a lesser overall level of state

bureaucracy and judicial control than, for example, states in England or Sweden during the same period.’[[14]](#endnote-13) The inhabitants of Italian Renaissance cities were exposed to levels of social and economic interdependency far in advance of anything comparable in the North. Cultural explanations for Italian exceptionalism also run into similar problems. Two broad cultural streams in Western society have been linked with the decline in interpersonal violence, namely Protestantism and modern individualism. Following Durkheim it is axiomatic that the liberation of the individual from the collective bonds and the collective emotions they generate, and in particular the obligation on kith and kin to take revenge, will lead to a decline in homicide rates. This has inspired several historians to claim that the duel was a signifier of the new moral autonomy; superseding the bloody medieval feud it canalized and contained violence. Italy furnishes the most serious objections to these explanations. The social and self-discipline that was demanded by the Protestant faith was also a characteristic of the Counter-Reformation.[[15]](#endnote-14) As for the honour duel, it was an invention of the Italian Renaissance. But to identify the duel’s rise with the origins of modern individualism relies on us accepting an outmoded Burckhardtian view of the Italian Renaissance.

The rest of this essay will argue for a different approach. First I shall set the regional context. Outright repression was not an option in Italy because state power, paceWeber, rests more on legitimacy than on a monopoly of force.[[16]](#endnote-15) The state’s fiscal demands and the venality of justice were responsible for much of the violence in the first place, notably the plague of banditry. Its power to suppress elite violence, in particular, was limited. In order to function effectively it required the collaboration of local elites, but the new regimes that emerged during the first half of the sixteenth century - whether sponsored or directly controlled by Spain, the Papacy or Venice – lacked legitimacy. After half a century of relative peace, the return of war in the first half of the seventeenth century contributed to internal instability. This explains why factional violence was such a persistent feature of the whole peninsular until the mid-seventeenth century and in some parts beyond. Second, we will look in detail at the application of the science of peace-making to the problem. The ‘Professors’ of this science drew their inspiration from Jesuit teaching and adapted a medieval tradition derived from Aristotelean ethics and Canon Law teaching on satisfaction. Third, I will place Italy in European context. This not only demonstrates the richness and sophistication of Italian discourse, but also highlights its uniqueness. I shall demonstrate that, contrary to what one might expect, the theory of peace-making developed along a different trajectory from the rest of Europe. Finally, I shall conclude with some observations about why this was so and point to some possible consequences for early modern Italian society and political culture.

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Despite the success of Italian states and civil society in curbing the worst excesses of factional violence and banditry all the evidence suggests that Italians were significantly more prone to violence than other early modern Europeans.[[17]](#endnote-16) Eisner has calculated that the homicide rate in England, calculated per 100,000 population, dropped from 7 to 6 in the first half of the seventeenth century and that of Germany and Switzerland was static at 11, while the Italian rates fell from 47 to 32 in the same period.[[18]](#endnote-17) These very high figures – Italy is currently one of the least violent countries in Europe with a homicide rate of less than 1 per 100,000 - are even more significant, given the fact that Italy avoided the religious schism and large scale civil war that afflicted the British Isles, France and the Empire.

The ubiquity of banditry and its political dimension is now well understood.[[19]](#endnote-18) However, high homicide rates in the past reflect the propensity of the social elite to employ violence in pursuit of its political and economic interests. More stress needs to be placed on the persistence of faction and feuding in the urban centres of Northern Italy until the mid-seventeenth century. ‘Today [1608] there are so many encounters, and all of them bloody, that it would be too tedious to recount them all’ explained Giovanni Spaccini, the Modenese diarist. What distinguished these clashes was the ubiquity of firearms , which kept him awake at night: ‘shooting in the city was not a trifle, but no one cared about it, as if it were a trifle.’ By 1621, these ‘disorders are such that a civil war could happen given the number of kin that each party has.’[[20]](#endnote-19) In Brescia, skirmishes between the factions on 17 June 1610 left thirty dead.[[21]](#endnote-20) Even in Rome, where Irene Fosi has shown, successive Popes, beginning with Clement VIII, succeeded in curbing the worst of the factional violence, peace was fragile. The death of a Gregorio Gaetani at the hands of Carlo Colonna, son of the Constable, in 1634 reopened old divisions in the “Roman Civil War”, which did not end until the Gaetani had taken revenge in 1640.[[22]](#endnote-21) Some of the richest evidence comes from Bologna.[[23]](#endnote-22) An eighteenth-century visitor found that ‘No one…is as proud as the Bolognese gentlemen. They are not content to carry a sword at their side, they also have a valet carry a long blade, or duelling sword...they are disposed to fight anywhere.’[[24]](#endnote-23) This had much to do with the conquest of the city by Pope Julius II in 1506: rule by priests was widely resented and the local aristocracy represented themselves as defenders of civic liberty. Attempts by the Papal legate and the judiciary to impose order on the city’s factions became a political issue: the emasculation of the nobility was indicative of the ‘tirannia ecclesiastica’.[[25]](#endnote-24) During the seventeenth century there was a vicious cycle of vendettas – the contemporary term used to describe the revenge killings – that claimed a hundred noble victims, killed or wounded, and which peaked in the 1650s and 1660s.[[26]](#endnote-25) Violence spread to the *contado* where the nobles had their estates and exiles exported their violence to neighbouring cities. Every noble family in Bologna was required to employ squads of *bravi* for its protection. Despite the outlawing of their employment in 1567, they were used to conduct undeclared private war until the 1680s, and the problem of aristocratic violence was only brought under control definitively in the first decades of the eighteenth century.

Justice in Bologna was hampered by the code of *omertà* among the social elite, the failure to pay fines and the pressure and intimidation to which the officers of justice were routinely subjected. The only way to manage violence was through the ubiquitous use of pardons. The most successful legate of the late seventeenth century, Bonaccorsi, issued 469 pardons in five years. These were not, on the whole, issued to the poor, who were unable to meet the costs; they tended to remain outlaws, accounting for the banditry which plagued the countryside. The venal nature of the system was recognized by one legate, Antonio Pignatelli, later Pope Innocent XII, just before he died; racked with remorse he ordered the reimbursement of almost 20,000 *scudi* obtained from the sale of pardons during his period of legate between 1684 and 1687 . More significant in the decline of blood-letting in the last decades of the seventeenth century was the requirement of enemies to pledge financial guarantees of good behaviour – a practice that was successful elsewhere in the peninsula.[[27]](#endnote-26)

The Grand Duchy of Tuscany represents a different model. The rationalization and centralization of the organs of justice under Medici dukes made for a very effective system of social control: factions were integrated into the Medici entourage, as the elites ‘surrendered their political rights in exchange for social stability guaranteed by the prince.’[[28]](#endnote-27) The Medici played an important role in mediating disputes both inside and outside their territory and there can be no doubt that they significantly reduced the extraordinarily high homicide rates which may have touched 150 per 100,000 during the political turmoil of the fourteenth and early fifteenth centuries. However, there were limits to Medici interference and political fragmentation and faction continued to be the cause of violence.[[29]](#endnote-28) Soon after the dismemberment and incorporation of the Sienese Republic in 1555 an inhabitant explained to a French visitor that ‘Siena was no longer Siena and that God’s vengeance would now reign.’ Prompted to explain what this meant, he went on: ‘kindred covered in each other’s blood…for quarrels which arise from nothing. And then he added that the custom was to dip one’s hand in the blood of those companions one had killed, and after to mark one’s faced and show one’s companions.’[[30]](#endnote-29) Even by Italian standards homicide rates in Siena remained high into the first half of the seventeenth century. Elite violence was disproportionately responsible for this and reflects the violence of the takeover and the questionable legitimacy on which Medici rule was founded.[[31]](#endnote-30) Tensions spread to the capital. In 1574, Giuliano De’ Ricci recorded the most pernicious abuse of Florentine men, ‘who in order to be able to take Communion on Easter Sunday, according to the precepts of the Church, indulge in acts of revenge for offences received right up towards holy week.’[[32]](#endnote-31) He returned to the same theme in succeeding years: ‘from the middle of Lent to Easter, which is no less than 23 days, there occur more scandals, homicides, beatings and wounds than in the rest of the year.’ In February 1581 he counted sixty murders and woundings.[[33]](#endnote-32) Holy week was a tense time also because, on the one hand, it was difficult to avoid one’s enemy, but on the other, it offered an opportunity for publicizing grievances, and there were plenty of bystanders to prevent the violence from getting out of hand.[[34]](#endnote-33) Despite efforts to discipline the nobility and the issue of a law against duelling in 1637, diaries provide further evidence of the limits of repression. The 21 murders involving noblemen recorded by Francesco Bonazini between 1640 and 1679 included a roll-call of the Tuscan social elite.[[35]](#endnote-34) It was the aristocracy which set the tone for the rest of society.

Duelling was part of this culture, but the evidence is surprisingly thin, for ‘Despite Italian theoretical and technical primacy and the thick paper trail of *cartelli*, *manifesti* and *pareri*, the surviving evidence of countless affairs of honour, we have only vague impressions as to the number and frequency of duels actually fought in sixteenth- and seventeenth-century Italy.’[[36]](#endnote-35) The sheer vastness of the Italian criminal archives makes systematic research daunting and most work has been done on the more easily accessible collections of duelling ephemera, such as challenges and responses, cartels, manifestoes, the advice and decisions by princely counsel on combats.[[37]](#endnote-36) The absence of evidence for actual duels has led some to doubt the existence of them altogether.[[38]](#endnote-37)

This interpretation is not consistent with high rates of violence in early modern Italy. The failiure to locate the practice is a failiure of interpretation. In 1986 François Billacois wished to make a distinction between the feud and the duel, and he did so because he was sure that the latter was a civilizer that canalized violence, whereas feuding is ‘medieval’, interminable and lacking in rules. He criticized Benedetto Croce for confusing the two in his study of seventeenth-century Neapolitan society: ‘the majority of anecdotes he presents tell us less about duels than about vendettas between great families, with pitched battles, ambushes and recourse to hired swordsmen.’[[39]](#endnote-38) But this is precisely what one would expect in a society in which the political culture tolerated and even required violence: the ‘frenzy’ of duelling in France was very closely linked to the spread of the feud in the century after 1550.[[40]](#endnote-39)

In fact, Italians, like their French counterparts, rarely used the term ‘duel’. Since it was illegal, it was dangerous to do so. After the fatal killing of Giovanni Alammani in a sword-fight in Florence in 1679 by his cousin Giovanni Carlo Rucellai, their accomplices and bystanders were tortured at the behest of the victim’s family. But they said nothing and the matter eventually settled ‘with little difficulty’. Their silence was explained by the code of *omertà*: ‘others did not talk about it either, confirming the saying “that he is a dead man who talks of the dead”. ’[[41]](#endnote-40) Prohibition forced duelling underground. Duels were fought clandestinely beyond the glare of officialdom and without the paraphernalia and formality of officially sanctioned combats, and with them disappeared the ephemera of duelling from the archive. In the judicial archives it is very difficult to distinguish the duel from the brawl. The task is made more difficult by the invention by Italian and French gentlemen of new practices that permitted them to defend their honour without attracting the attention of the authorities. In France, gentlemen referred to their combats as *rencontres* (encounters) which were fortuitous and thus defensible in law.[[42]](#endnote-41)

Italians referred to these encounters as *questioni* or *quistioni* and, in contrast to the French, they developed a sophisticated casuistry related to them.[[43]](#endnote-42) At the moment when jurists and theologians agreed that it was legitimate to kill in defence of life and property, confessors were also developing a line that argued that it was legitimate to defend one’s reputation, recognizing that flight was not possible for a man of honour.[[44]](#endnote-43) The concept of a legitimate *questione* was reinforced by the Papal bull of 1582, *Firmum ita*, which distinguished between a duel and the ‘rixa de improvisio’. The abolition of the duel was thus more apparent than real since it was transformed into case law, in which the casuists recognized the *questione* as a legitimate action. The introduction of ambiguity altered the relationship between the man of honour and the law. Notwithstanding the prohibition on the duel, the ‘Professors’ of honour, as they gradually became known, did not repudiate the central concept that legitimized it, namely that a man of honour was required to punish offences, in deed or word, without recourse to law. This is because a true gentleman demands satisfaction for himself and not punishment by a third party. Many of them claimed that honour has no master. Some ‘Professors’ went further and argued that honour was not strictly personal, but extended to family, kin and servants and even companions.[[45]](#endnote-44)

Bologna has produced the best evidence for the phenomenon.[[46]](#endnote-45) In June 1590, having exited church onto the via San Mamolo, one gang of noblemen bumped into each other and requested a *questione*, which descended into a pitched battle between 40 men using all sorts of weapons. The last of these battles occurred in 1651, and thereafter the participants, in reponse to a crackdown, had to apply the rules of parity more strictly. By the end of the century, the Bolognese *questione* had become a choreographed ritual in which everyone knew the rules and the penalties for transgressing them. The fact that most did not result in injury may explain why priests and the authorities preferred to turn a blind eye.[[47]](#endnote-46) In *La Spada di Honore*, published in 1671, and reprinted many times, Berlingiero Gessi, drawing on his experiences in Bologna, dedicated a whole chapter to the matter:

Nothing is more practised among the ways of revenge than the *questione*…*Questione*, is a substitute for what we call encounters (*incontri*) or combats (*abbattimenti*), which are fought with chivalrous arms between one or more per side to demonstrate their courage, or to satisfy or remove offences and insults without having agreed a time and place to fight.[[48]](#endnote-47)

*Questioni* occurred in different environments, as a result of an argument, as a result of the anger caused by the first exchanges in a brawl (*prima rissa*), or shortly after when the blood was still hot. These were all unpremeditated and therefore licit, in contrast to those planned in cold blood. Wherever possible it was desirable to achieve parity of numbers and avoid taking someone at a disadvantage. Gessi recognized that this ideal was not always realizable, since unlike in the duel one could not measure swords and test the blades! One had to accept the more random nature of the *questione*; wounding had to be accepted as accidental and blows did not carry any stigma, since it was not like an art (like fencing) or a skill, but dependent on fortune.

The rituals of the *questione* cannot be isolated from the broader context of the feud. Streets and piazzas, which marked factional territory, were the scene of the everyday skirmishes and *questioni*, which offered a relatively risk-free way of winning social and political capital. Churches were a different matter. In 1612 Giorgio Pagliari dal Bosco lamented the custom of striking at an enemy during the elevation of the Host: in the kingdom [of Naples], in Abruzzo, the Marche and Romagna the most cruel *vendetta* and murders take place in Churches everyday.’[[49]](#endnote-48) Partly, this was due to the fact that churches were a site for the display of seigneurial authority and power. Maffei himself was moved to write against the *Scienza* because it had exacerbated the feud his family had in Verona with the Emilei family over the patronage over the chapels of San Lorenzo and San Lorenzino.[[50]](#endnote-49) Carlo Guarienti has recently highlighted the symbolism of killing during mass. Assassins used the sacrifice of the mass to stress the legitimacy of human and divine punishment.[[51]](#endnote-50) More often, the decision to strike in sacred space was functional: victims being more likely to be caught unawares. Churches also brought enemies who might otherwise wish to avoid each other into close proximity: a fight between factions in the Carmines at Modena in March 1601 resulted in the unsheathing of ‘more than 200 naked blades, while the women screamed.’[[52]](#endnote-51) Assassinations in churches were a particular instance of the bloody factional violence that was intensified by the Italian Wars and foreign invasion, but the practice continued into the seventeenth century. In the first half of the seventeenth century there are examples from Vicenza, Bologna, Naples, Parma, the Veneto and Lombardy. [[53]](#endnote-52) Despite the attempts of the Counter-Reformation, clergy proved unable or unwilling to unravel themsleves from local factional politics and the carrying of firearms and employment of *bravi* by clerics continued despite regular prohibition. Prelates were seen as fair game. San Carlo Borromeo was the subject of a failed assassination attempt while at the altar in 1569. The murders and attempted murders of the Bishops of Parma (1576), Nicastro (1671), Alife (1673) and Nola (1684) show that this was not an isolated episode. [[54]](#endnote-53)

In a society where people stepped out alone at their peril – some Modenese gentlemen were still in the habit of wearing chainmail at the beginning of the seventeenth century - certain public spaces became synonymous with the activities of preening gallants and their attendants.[[55]](#endnote-54) In Modena on 28 July 1628 people were forced to hide in doors as armed factions ‘publicly roamed the city and its piazzas’ looking for trouble.[[56]](#endnote-55) Two years later the Florentine authorities prohibited, under pain of a 500 *scudi* fine, ‘*quistioni*, brawls and tumults by any persons whatsoever in the piazza of the Church of Our Lady in Monsummano (near Pistoia) or inside the Church’. These prohibitions simply displaced the problem. The authorities forbad ‘any person whatsoever, under pain of the galleys, *quistioni*, brawls and tumults, in which hands are laid on arms, at the Santo Monte Della Verna and particularly inside the entrance to the monastery, the Porta del Martello.’[[57]](#endnote-56) The sanctuary is 75 kilometres to the east of Florence - a considerable way to go to the trouble of bumping into your enemy. The success of pacification in the North from the mid seventeenth century needs to be put into context: in the kingdom of Naples, which after all covered a third of Italy, aristocratic violence continued to be major problem in the eighteenth century and bloody feuds, *questioni* and duels remained indicative of a deeply divided polity.[[58]](#endnote-57)

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The science of peace-making was an amalgam of the casuistic method, Canon Law teaching on satisfaction and Aristotelean ethics. While all three would come under attack in Northern Europe, they continued to be held in high esteem in Italy. As John Bossy explains, satisfaction had both a legal and a theological meaning in the middle ages.[[59]](#endnote-58) In Roman Law it meant to do enough to prevent an angry party from taking vengeance. The 1215 Lateran Council established that satisfaction was the means to content an injury, but that it should be done to God and not to a neighbour. This resulted in a penance that was a modest or token offering of prayers, alms or deeds which compensated the pain. Protestants were hostile and they got rid of satisfaction. Catholics, in contrast, were divided. The theological faculty of Salamanca argued that satisfaction should be ‘proportional’ to the sin, but this was opposed by rigorists like Borromeo and later the Jansenists. This hard-line was in contrast to the Jesuits who developed a casuistry based on probability. They viewed peace-making as a way to return enemies to the discipline of the sacraments. The earliest missions improvised public reconciliations that were followed by confession and communion and this developed into more elaborate rituals that contained some form of token satisfaction. Jesuit casuistry meant that, in certain circumstances, even heinous crimes could be forgiven, and they preached that litigation was a continuation of enmity and promoted the renunciation of judicial complaints.

Critics of the Jesuits argued that this was nothing more than sophistry. In 1614, the Theatine Stefano Pellegrini, claimed that writers of the *Scienza Cavalleresca*, under pretence of writing about how to make peace honourably, were passing off duels as *questioni* in order to circumvent the law and that this was tacitly endorsed and supported by theologians, moralists and confessors.[[60]](#endnote-59) The ‘Professors’ of the *Scienza* retorted that theirs was a peaceful science; that it gave individuals the tools to settle their disputes peacefully and without recourse to the law, the so-called *pace privata*; and that the resort to arms was no barrier to an eventual reconciliation. Crucial to this was the difference between the illegal duel (arranged with malice aforethought) and the *questione*. For Gessi, the two were not to be confused. The latter’s speed and informality made it a more effective tool for cancelling an offence: ‘After the *questione* *honorata* none of the disputants remain in debit. Having satisfied his debt in the *questione*, each gentleman is very quick to reconcile.’[[61]](#endnote-60)

In order to understand the significance of Gessi’s distinction we need to understand the rapid spread of the honour duel, which was an Italian invention that quickly became a European phenomenon at the end of the sixteenth century. Italian writers had an eye on the market. In his treatise of 1550, Girolamo Muzio boasted that he was a man of action: ‘I am no professor, nor theologian, nor writer, no poet. On the contrary, I am a man of the court and used to living among soldiers, and not in the schools of doctors.’ In the period 1550-63 there were at least 27 publications, not counting reprints, on duelling and the satisfaction of honour. Muzio’s treatise alone went through five editions in five years and thirteen by the end of the century; there were two French translations, one Spanish, and various English imitations.[[62]](#endnote-61)

By suggesting that gentlemen were permitted to seek satisfaction for injuries without recourse to a prince, the duel had serious political implications: Fausto da Longiano argued that honour was a religion that could be satisfied outside the civil and ecclesiastical tribunals.[[63]](#endnote-62) Even before Trent several Italian princes responded by outlawing it as a challenge to their authority. Its supporters countered by employing Aristotelian ethics to argue that the duel was a just and rational means of restoring harmony between individuals and therefore upholding civil society. Christian objections were rebutted. Asked whether it was permitted by ‘our religion’, Giovanni Possevino replied: ‘Clearly, the answer is no as regards individual insults, because Christ wishes that we suffer insults for the love of him.’ But it was up to the priest to consider each case on its merits: ‘I defer to those who are more versed in these matters, to those who belong to the *religione*’: the reason being that duelling was a lesser evil, since it had utility in preventing social and political disorder. As for the law, it could not restore honour: honour, like virtue, is acquired through individual acts of valour; it cannot be conferred or restored by a magistrate.[[64]](#endnote-63)

There were voices raised against the chorus. Giovan Battista Susio wrote one of the first anti-duelling treatises in 1558.[[65]](#endnote-64) More significant was the work of Rinaldo Corso, a lawyer and sometime Lutheran, who ended up as bishop in Calabria, and whose *Delle private rappacificationi* went through several editions between 1555 and 1730. Corso’s breakthrough was to reconcile Christian teaching and humanist ethics with the laws of honour. He began with the concept that peace was a Christian duty, but that to comport oneself as a Christian did not mean passively taking insults. Deftly skirting round Augustine’s objection that peace was founded on indivisible unity, he argued that it was based on equality and free will. Discord is not the state of nature, but arises from inequality. In order for there to be union between two parties there must be equality; the restoration of amity requires that relations are re-equalized. He was not referring to the universal human right we associate with the Enlightenment, but a geometric value derived from the Greeks. And he appealed to the social snobbery of his readers because true peace could only be made between those of equal status: ‘you cannot make peace between a lord and subject; nor between a soldier and a captain; a woman and a baby etc.’, all you can expect from those in unequal relationships is ‘concord and peace in a general fashion and remission following the injury, but reconciliation (*rappacificazione*) is not all appropriate.’[[66]](#endnote-65)

Unlike the duelling manuals, the Italian way of peace had little influence beyond the peninsula. True, Susio dedicated his treatise to Henry II of France, but there is no trace of a French edition; and although Corso was translated into Latin it was not destined for a vernacular readership outside Italy. The same fate awaited the greatest treatise on peace and peace-making written in early modern Europe, Fabio Albergati’s *Trattato del modo di ridurre à pace l’inimicitie private*. First published in Rome in 1583 it went through at least eight editions until 1664, but it could not muster a single translation, not even into Latin. Albergati, a Bolognese aristocrat, Papal counsellor and official, was the main source of reference for all subsequent Italian writing on peace-making.

He argued that peace-making among private individuals was essential to the functioning of civil society and attacked both Machiavelli and Bodin and the notion that politics was simply a question of power. The ‘liberation of the community of men from discord’ was preferable to repression:

the discord that is born from matters of honour among…private persons, is almost impossible to remedy and make an honourable peace, even if they are not the most difficult [cases], with the result that quarrels and brawls continue at times for an eternity in honourable families, with trouble not only for individuals, but with danger very often for the public good. [[67]](#endnote-66)

He rebutted critics who claimed that his was a ‘false science.’ Admittedly, it was not a ‘scienza certa’, but rather it was based, following Jesuit teaching, on the laws of probability. For every offence, however grave, there is a remedy. To argue that this was not a science was to likewise condemn medicine, rhetoric, war and other ‘arte congiuttare’. Albergati distinguishes four types of universal peace: tranquillity, union, civic peace or concord among citizens in the republic, and public peace in which diverse republics and cities are united. But these are not the main object of Albergati’s attention: all these forms of peace rely on the particular and the private, ‘which we will call concord between men. Since each man seeks his own particular well-being, it can act as the instrument for the well-being of society [*commune compagnia*].’[[68]](#endnote-67)

The opposite of private peace is the feud, or what Albergati terms ‘la Guerra de privati chiamata nimicitia’ and it was the increase of this ‘new infirmity called discord that the cause of honour has given birth to.’[[69]](#endnote-68) But since true honour was derived from virtue and not the common opinion, he attacked the duelling manuals for traducing Aristotle and Cicero: revenge was not honourable and had no public utility; duels were not only illegal and harmful to the republic, they were irrational, since the man of reason in an ideal republic will not offend or molest another citizen; the gentleman is right to use self-defence if provoked, but to go beyond reasonable force is excessive. How was the prince to uphold civic virtue? Repression could only go so far and, in any case, Albergati was certain that the natural state of man was one of peace, which had been proved by the European encounter with New World: the Burnei, a people who are not civilized and otherwise lack laws, refrain from affronting neighbours and foreigners and if someone is affronted and strives for revenge they do not pick an arena for combat, but immediately search for peace. For this reason, the wise prince educated rather than punished, in order to ‘remove the false opinions regarding honour.’[[70]](#endnote-69)

In his final book, Albergati turns to the solution. Albergati dismissed the *lex talionis* and rebutted the claim by Possevino, Muzio and other supporters of the duel that verbal apologies alone are insufficient to solve a quarrel. On the contrary, they can solve any quarrel, however serious. Satisfaction is the means by which we reach peace, restituting the honour of the offended party which has been taken away. Albergati disproved the commonplace assumption, whereby an insult removed the honour of the victim to the benefit of the insulter and obliged the offended party to regain it. Drawing on Cicero and Plato, he argued that true honour is won by virtuous actions and lost by unvirtuous ones. Honour and shame are not qualities intrinsic to the self, but *beni esterni*, extrinsic signs of inner virtue and vice: it followed therefore that giving satisfaction did not mean abasement for ‘the shame [in the satisfaction is] a sign given by the shamer of his unworthiness to the shamed.’ Satisfaction is an act not only of individual free will in the restoration of honour and equality between two parties, it is crucial to the functioning of a secure republic, since ‘it is a good and honourable thing to submit to just punishment and voluntarily be obedient to authority and law.’[[71]](#endnote-70)

This leads us to casuistry. Since a punch cannot replace a punch, it was up to the mediators to decide what was proportionate. In simple cases words are enough and only in more serious cases does the question of remission enter the equation. The satisfaction required also depended on the nature of the offence - was it forced, or done in ignorance, or voluntarily? This required some examination into the intent, which would inform the calibration of the satisfaction from a simple apology to a humiliating submission. Peace-making was thus a science because satisfaction is rendered according to geometric proportions: corrective justice should be applied in proportion to the offence. This is distinguished from revenge (*vendetta)* which he defined as demonstrating superiority or inflicting punishment on an unwilling party. In spirit, *vendetta* derives from the pleasure we derive from inflicting pain, a balm for the ill we have suffered; satisfaction is a honour that we render in the place of displeasure: ‘It is the difference between a scorpion sting, whose destructive power recompenses our injury and a dog licking us, renouncing his bite with delight and profit.’[[72]](#endnote-71)

There are three essential things we should note from reading Albergati. First, is to highlight his secular approach to peace-making that makes almost no reference to the Gospels, to liturgy or to the Canons. Rather, he adapted the Canon Law concept of satisfaction, that which is sufficient to pay for one sins, to his secular purposes, and the language he used was familiar to theologians: ‘there is no offence (*delitto*), however great it may be, to which one cannot apply the antidote of confession, and with repentance; and however grave the offence, the best satisfaction is in confessing it; and the great offender who shows repentance for an offence also shows the great esteem he has for the victim when he asks him for forgiveness.’[[73]](#endnote-72) This looks similar to Jesuit teaching on grace.

Second, since private peace-making is about restoring geometrical equality, Albergati did not think it suitable for all. Only equals can have their honour offended and only aristocrats, who alone were capable of applying reason, merited the attention of his science. Among the commons, there were too many differences and opposing opinions about who is an equal: some claim that one is more worthy than another and that the rich and poor should not mix; others that men are born and die equal and are thus equal in honour, for them the true measure of worth is reputation. But this was of little interest to Albergati. While he was aware that many disputes were the result of status anxiety, as an aristocrat he dismissed the possibility that people of ‘no estimation’ had the right to take just offence. There could be no private peace between a rich man and a poor man, a father and a son, the robust and the infirm, or the high and the low born unless they were of equal worth, ‘or praised for their courage in the decrees of the Republic, or in popular opinion.’[[74]](#endnote-73) When there was a discrepancy in social rank, it was not a question of peace or amity, but rather of submission, asking for pardon and then giving thanks with humility: genuflection is a sign that authenticates the pardon, but it is not a signal of peace as such.

This raises a third point about his treatise. How practical was it? Albergati prized simplicity of language in the satisfaction; he was sceptical about the utility of mitigating circumstances, such as the loss of reason due to inebriation or anger; he proposed tribunals dedicated to addressing affronts to honour; and he saw some good practice in tribunals among the Ancients and in Venice, widely seen as a model in such matters, where those who caused grave offence were disbarred from public office. But Albergati is otherwise heavy on the theorizing and light on practical suggestions. His approach to the problem of social distinction was simplistic, even old-fashioned. Social mobility had complicated the simple binary opposition between aristocrat and commoner, high and low born, and was the cause of a great many disputes.[[75]](#endnote-74)

Albergati may not have provided an immediate solution, but his work was the inspiration for the more practically-minded. In the century that separated Albergati’s and Maffei’s work there were more than a dozen printed manuals dedicated to peace-making, others circulated in manuscript, and the issue was also the subject of public disputation. Most professed to abhor the duel and claimed they wrote only in order to prevent violence. This was necessary in order to avoid censure from the Church and the secular authorities. And as the seventeenth century progressed there was a tendency to defend publication on pious grounds. In the *Pareri cavalereschi per rappacificare inimicizie private*, published posthumously in 1676, Berlingiero Gessi warned that swords should only be drawn against the enemies of religion, the prince and the patria. However, while he was alive Gessi, subscribed to the traditional sentiment of Ariosto that ‘honour is worth more than life itself’; that anyone who consents to an offence or villainy, tacitly or otherwise, is not a gentleman and lacks virtue, that dishonour is a form of civil death; and that honour is hard to win and easy to lose: ‘honour lost in a moment cannot be regained in a hundred years.’[[76]](#endnote-75) He argued that it was licit to meet ‘violence with violence’, so long as the response was proportionate. It was also licit and right to prevent an attack by attacking first: ‘happy is he who is able to cut off the arm of him who wishes to cut of his head.’[[77]](#endnote-76) It was licit to repulse an offence as long as it is done without anger, and as long as the death of the assailant was fortuitous and not intended. It was perfectly acceptable not just to in defend one’s life, but to defend: ‘the life of one’s own honour…the timid and vulgar plebs flee, they can escape from the rage of their enemies because flight for them has no dishonour; a noble breast can never be a home to fear and [a noble] cannot take to his heels to avoid encounters [*incontri*].’[[78]](#endnote-77) Revenge was wrong, but he defined this as an excessive response. A proportionate response was nothing of the sort. Like usury, revenge was excusable if it was not excessive: ‘if the revenge was compensatory it must not exceed the limits and should be in approximate proportion to the offence.’[[79]](#endnote-78) In any case, those who acted in the heat of the moment did not commit anything dishonourable, since ‘in matters of honour it is more damnable to commit a sin of omission than a sin of excess.’[[80]](#endnote-79)

These were common opinions. Camillo Baldi argued that rancour (*risentimento*) was a natural feeling and that, while a gentlemen should show patience and where possible avoid quarrels, anyone who does not respond to an offence was a vile and timid man, a *goffo*.[[81]](#endnote-80) Giuseppi Ansidei, writing in the 1690s, is testament to the continuing fascination for Ariosto. He admitted that the duel was forbidden, but the ‘honest’ use of the sword, a rational and reasoned response to an offence, was not unchristian, since it did not involve enmity. Giovan Battista Olevano made less effort to hide his disdain for Christian teaching and public law. His *Trattato* of 1603 was grounded in experience, which taught that almost any outrage could be satisfied without punishment. Revenge is permissible, since a blow of equal weight compensates a blow or even verbal abuse, so he who is ambushed is permitted to avenge himself in the same way. Olevano refuted Albergati, who ‘forbade it on philosophical grounds, saying that one cannot acquire honour through shameful deeds, as for example the ambush, nevertheless custom is against his opinion.’[[82]](#endnote-81) And as for parity of arms, this was naïve and one should never take risks, since ‘it always fitting to respect your enemy, even though they may appear weak, because many times guile will overcome might.’[[83]](#endnote-82) Excessive force was relative, since the ‘man gravely provoked merits forgiveness if he commits an outrage out of *risentimento*; and the man who has just reason to get angry from an offence received, though he commits an outrage out of *risentimento*, even if it is in cold blood, should be forgiven by men of worth.’[[84]](#endnote-83) This applied to acts of cruelty: though it was a vile thing to trample on one’s enemy if he was unhorsed during a fight, all that was required in recompense was a simple apology.

There is good reason for believing that these were widely held views. However, they did not go unchallenged. Francesco Birago came to the defence of Albergati, fearing that common opinions would lead readers into sin. Birago was not attacking private settlements in principle; it was a question of degree. For Olevano, no dispute was too difficult to reconcile; no outrage so heinous that it could not be compensated. Birago argued that the boundaries were set by natural and divine law and that there was a role for humbling apologies and even punishment, as for example in the case of an accusation of sodomy. He laboriously went through every one of his opponent’s case studies and suggested a more fitting (and onerous) satisfaction. His quibbling was later referred to ironically in Manzoni’s *Promessi Sposi*, but is reflective of the contemporary concern to fit the appropriate satisfaction to the offence. Olevano’s work was based on fifty case studies which cover all possible eventualities from the most trivial to the most serious. Birago replied in 1623 by publishing fifty of his own. Cases continued to be published until the end of the century and many of the scenarios were recycled.[[85]](#endnote-84)

The casuistical approach placed great emphasis on intent and the social status of the actors. For Giovanni Battista Pigna writing in the 1560s, these were the two principal circumstances that the peace-maker needed to ascertain.[[86]](#endnote-85) Giuseppe Grimaldi identified several types of intent: self-defence, which was reasonable and natural; an immediate riposte, in words or deeds, to an unjust offence or injury; revenge in sudden anger, which can be justified ‘being an impulse agitated by anger, which effects the workings of the mind such that one cannot make reasoned judgments’; and revenge in recompense for an offence received. Only pre-meditated vengeance was inexcusable.

Intent was a relatively uncomplicated issue; it had long been part of the fabric of canon and civil law. Social status was a much more contentious matter. In the second edition of his *Trattato* in 1605, Olevano appended a supplement which addressed the issue of equality directly. Insults from those below our social station are easily scorned, because no loss of honour can result - only equals can inflame resentment. But from time to time we are offended by those ‘who are of some merit, or rank, or not in strength inferior to us, and in such cases one cannot ignore them.’[[87]](#endnote-86) It was essential that in making peace the person of lesser status demonstrated his inferiority. Words should be humiliating and he recommended the custom common in Lombard cities which required the inferior to go to the house of the superior to make his peace. For the aristocratic Albergati, it was impossible for a superior to give offence, and therefore satisfaction, to a social inferior. Olevano was of the contrary opinion, so long as decorum was maintained. Olevano’s book was licenced and published in a great city, Venice, where social rank was less easily discerned than in the countryside. Recognizing that social distinction was not as simple as Albergati would have liked, he dedicated an entire chapter to the vexed issue of rights of way (*il diritto del muro*). Birago, always disdainful of any regulation that hinted at social levelling, fulminated against the Milanese custom that no one was obliged to give way to another: ‘One cannot claim [the right of way] even if one has one’s hand up against the wall…in truth good courtesy and honourable behaviour require the inferior always to give way to the superior, in every place and at any time.’[[88]](#endnote-87)

In the later seventeenth century the debate was still ongoing. In the 1670s, Gessi argued that peace and satisfaction were only possible between equals or between those of little disparity; punishment, on the other hand, was something meted out to inferiors.[[89]](#endnote-88) However, if there was a brawl or dispute between unequals, then it was possible so long as no serious offence was given. He related the question to one of reputation: one should not deal with the base, but those persons of worth, who ‘though of inferior condition to us, it is permissible to make peace’ with. But for the very inferior this was best done by a third party. In 1686, Carlo Antonio Manzini applied mathematical principles to the vexed problem of dignity and worth. The social ranks of his native Bologna were divided into sixteen categories and each given a value:

Gonfaloniere di Giustitia - 16

Antiano - 15

Tribuno delle Plebe - 14

Giudice delli mercanti - 13

Cathedral Canon - 12

Canon of San Petronio - 11

Dottore - 10

Senator - 9

Marchese - 8

Conte - 7

Cavaliere - 6

Gentilhuomo - 5

Cittadino - 4

Mercante - 3

Artista - 1

Plebeo – 0

He further divided offences into twenty categories, ranging from ‘mild verbal insults exchanged in private’ to ‘serious verbal and physical affronts when outnumbered in public’, which were also given a numeric value. The appropriate satisfaction was calculated by taking away the offence in the debit column from the first figure in the credit column. The scores of the parties were then compared. If the scores were equal, peace was made ‘with eyes shut without either party being able to claim any satisfaction.’ Where there was a difference between the two sums, the figure corresponded to a list of satisfactions:

1. greeting

2. greeting with a bow

3. greeting with bow of the head and the body

4. visit the house of the victim to make one’s apology

5. request peace from one’s enemy through a mediator

6. request peace in person with a sign of submission

7. request peace in person and forgiveness from the victim

8. request peace on one’s knees

9. request peace with a rope around one’s neck accompanied by gentlemen, or other persons

10. visit the house of the victim alone and request peace with arms, but with a rope around one’s neck

11.visit the house of the same alone and disarmed and place oneself at his discretion

12. visit the house of the victim, and request peace approaching him on one’s knees with every humility, disarmed and with a rope around one’s neck, and so on and so forth.

Manzini foresaw the universal application of his formula, because he further sub-divided the trades and professions in his list into 25 categories, ranging from notaries at the top to fisherman at the bottom, to deal with the mass of people in the bottom four categories of his initial list.

Ritual mattered a great deal to the ‘Professors’ and it was crucial to choose the correct gesture to reflect the required sentiment. Ottavia Niccoli has claimed these rituals lost their religious meaning as they became more punctilious: the kiss of peace and even the embrace fell out of fashion in the seventeenth century to be replaced by a minutely observed ritual of gestures, words and writings. This seems unlikely. First, it assumes that the sixteenth-century writers were less secular in their approach than their imitators and this is not a conclusion we can draw from writers like Albergati. Second, the example chosen by Niccoli to signify the rise of baroque discipline and hierarchy and the decline of spontaneity is problematic. Birago addresses the problem of whether persons of unequal status can embrace and suggests that there are rites for such occasions when:

Those superior to us in degree and condition, with whom we have a certain familiarity or sociability [*domestichezza*], such as those who also call us friends, [it is permitted] to embrace them between the hips and under the armpit, at the same as making a sign of wishing to kiss their hand, and with the knees bent in sign of reverence. Equals embrace around the neck. The superior embraces his inferior around the neck only with only one arm, and when he does it with both arms it is a great sign of friendship.[[90]](#endnote-89)

This was not an invention of the Baroque; it was a rite copied directly from *Orlando Furioso* and is therefore evidence not of change, but continuity.

When seventeenth-century writers argued that words were enough to make peace they were also reiterating humanist sentiments. In the 1560s Corso argued that the nature of the ritual depended on the type of peace and when it was a matter of ‘simple concord’ the kiss or even a handshake were unnecessary. And Pigna felt that true harmony was achieved through the power of the spoken word, and in the ceremony ‘it was of great importance if the voice is high, or lowered, whether it is grave, urgent, rousing, soft, or harsh.’[[91]](#endnote-90) Albergati was more sceptical than his contemporaries. For him the rituals of peace were mere signs of union, ‘when two people who are in dispute come to make peace, they shake hands, and embrace and kiss, by this means wishing to give a sign of their unity. But this union is not sufficient to make peace.’[[92]](#endnote-91) Rituals belonged to the realm of custom, and varied according to place. Corso disagreed and argued for the importance of symbolism:

First because in the exterior acts one sees that which has been separated from the interior, that is to say it is re-joined with the soul. Then the handshake is a show of the sign of faith, friendship, union and peace, as Homer demonstrates in the greetings of Nestor and the sons of Telemachus, and Virgil that of Evando, and of Pallante to Enea…Besides these there is the palm, which when one touches it has the softest and skin and smoothest complexion of all the whole body. And it signifies being touched by the heart and the appeasement of all disquiet. And as for the kiss, it makes known the voluntary and free consent of the parties.[[93]](#endnote-92)

The fate of the traditional kiss of peace has been much debated by historians.[[94]](#endnote-93) It was removed in both Catholic and Protestant liturgical reforms of the sixteenth century, when fears about carnality merged with doubts that human gestures of peace-making amounted to proper preparation for communion. Corso was a theologian and the evidence suggests that laymen may have preferred the embrace to the kiss. One possible reason for this is alluded to by Olevano. By the turn of the sixteenth century the question of whether the embrace was a sign of equality was ‘always on people’s lips’.[[95]](#endnote-94) In cases of inequality it was preferable for a third party to say the words or to replace the embrace with a reciprocal bow. He too was aware that rituals could be abused:

There are others who, at the moment of reconciliation, stand rigidly with sullen eyes not knowing how to or being capable of taking off their hats, bending their knees, and extending their arms in order to honour, bow, and embrace with their reconciled friend, symbolizing the reunion of souls, on the contrary, they stand like a column of marble, hesitating and waiting for the other party to venerate him.[[96]](#endnote-95)

In his opinion this was likely to maintain the ill-will and stimulate the desire for vengeance. What motivated the punctiliousness of the seventeenth-century commentators, therefore, was less a desire to discipline the body than a fear that it could be manipulated by social climbers: those who provoked incidents with people of higher social status in order to show their equality.[[97]](#endnote-96) Birago was merely echoing Albergati when he stated that reconciliation is made by virtue of words and that the embrace was a sign of love and confirmation in their own souls and signal to the mediators of their consent. It was also axiomatic to Gessi that peace was made through the ‘power of words’, but in adapting Birago, he still found room for the kiss:

They embrace in diverse ways, according to the place, customs and their condition: the inferiors receive their embraces around the neck; equals hold each other equally on their arms and they kiss; and superiors are to be approached by embracing them around the hips while bowing, making a sign of wishing to kiss their hand.[[98]](#endnote-97)

Gessi was describing a living custom: after their duel in 1653 Antonio Malaspina and Alfonso d’Este ‘embraced and kissed and then both went and lodged at the Carmelites in Gonzaga’.[[99]](#endnote-98)

Gessi also made clear his preference for churches as the proper site for a public reconciliation. Bologna was not the only city where medieval traditions endured. In Florence, around the year 1700 peace-making is recorded in the Metropolitan Basilica of San Pietro, the Church of San Firenze and the convent church of the Camaldolese, the reformed Benedictines.[[100]](#endnote-99) These ceremonies signify the ways in which the *Scienza* had made its accommodation with the Catholic Church. Resolving the tension between the two had been a long process. It began with Corso on 1550s, but most writers retained a secular outlook and the process was still incomplete in 1619 when Giulio Cesare Valmarana published, *Modo del far pace in via cavaleresca e Christiana per sodisfattion di parole*, which addressed the issue directly. Valmarana places as much emphasis on the Gospels as he does on Cicero: making peace is both Christian and civil.[[101]](#endnote-100) The Catholic Church aided the process of accommodation by being indulgent towards the *Scienza* and the censors were untroubled as long as lip service was paid to Christian precepts.[[102]](#endnote-101) When Father Ettore Ghislieri was charged by the Inquisitor of Bologna with examining the 1676 edition of Gessi’s *Lo scettro pacifico*, he found that it ‘contained nothing at all against the Catholic Religion, nor the Roman Church…nor good customs.’[[103]](#endnote-102) Gregorio Carafa, a member of one of the leading Neapolitan families and future bishop of Salerno, went much further in his *De monomachia seu duello*; just as a prince committed no sin by permitting the existence of brothels, so a degree of tolerance should be shown towards duelling ‘in order to prevent war, sedition, riots, and rebellion.’[[104]](#endnote-103)

The law also encouraged an accommodation between the Church and the ‘Professors’ of honour. Before the Enlightenment pardon, mercy and grace were integral to the arbitrary nature of the Ancien Regime judicial system and essential to the subordination of the subject to the will of the prince. The religious and legal meaning of these terms was closely intertwined: pardon is where human relations intersect with the divine. In the wake of the Counter-Reformation, many of the ‘Professors’ felt that satisfaction alone was no longer enough and they adapted the rituals of the Church to suit their purposes. However, most agreed that humiliating forms of contrition were likely to have the opposite effect of their intended purpose. Shaming rituals were to be reserved for the most heinous crimes. Gessi, for example, argued that ambushes required a peace which involved ‘humiliating forgiveness’.

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Northern Europeans also experienced a significant upswing in violence from the mid sixteenth century, as a result of civil conflict and religious schism. Even in relatively stable England the homicide rate doubled or tripled between late 1570s and early 1620s and did not return to mid sixteenth century levels until last decade of seventeenth.[[105]](#endnote-104) A great deal was written about peace: Shakespeare mentions the word 547 times and war 261 times. But Northern literature rarely touched upon the theory and practice of peace-making between individuals. No tradition of secular, ethico-political writings on the mechanics or practical guides to private pacts emerged. Non-Italians had to rely on a rich tradition of customary practice. The science of the *pace privata* remained an Italian publishing phenomenon distinguished by its sophistication and quantity. [[106]](#endnote-105) The distinction between the Spain and Italy has been mentioned. Northern Europe provides an even more radical point of departure. Not only did casuistry, satisfaction and Aristotelean ethics come under attack during the sixteenth century, but I would argue that the dominance of Augustinian theology in both Catholic and Protestant Northern Europe and its fusion with neo-stoic ethics created a climate that was hostile to the very idea that peace-making between individuals might constitute a subject worthy of serious consideration. The experience of civil conflict in Northern Europe stimulated an entirely different debate on the relationship between the individual and the state. In contrast to the Ancients, who debated the question of the best regime, the modern thinkers concentrated on the search for the least worst society possible: that which would allow men to avoid the devastation wrought by the bloody combination of the search for personal glory and the fanatic love of God.

The Protestant Reformers would have no truck with satisfaction, since Christ’s crucifixion has already given full satisfaction for all men’s sins. The concept of satisfaction survived as an essential element of the laws of honour, but this secular view could never be truly reconciled with an Augustinian theology of grace. The casuistical method that the Italian ‘Professors’ borrowed from the Jesuits was most controversial in Catholic France, where casuistry was ridiculed by Pascal for excusing the duel. Phil Withington has recently drawn attention to the significance of the Augustinian tradition in early modern England. William Lambarde’s handbook for budding magistrates, Eirenarcha: Or of the Office of Justices of the Peace, which went through twelve reprints between 1582 and 1620 and was the template for staples like Dalton’s The Country Justice, is an example of how widely this was accepted in England. Lambarde knew his Cicero, but the chief source of inspiration for thinking about peace was the Gospels: ‘ye Law of God…only is the true Philosophie.’ From the Gospels Lambarde discerned two forms of peace: inward peace, that is our reconciliation made with God, from which follows the peace of conscience; and outward peace, which either referred to what St Paul defined as refraining from ‘all manner of striving and contention, whether it be in countenance, gesture, worde, or worke’, or to the abstinence from actual force and violence, and therefore contrary to war. While he recognized that a justice of the peace was as much ‘compounder’ of disputes as a judge of wrongdoing, he did not see fit to discuss peace-making itself: ‘as it is not all one, to speak of his proper office in Lawe and of his common dutie in Charitie: so I thought good to sever and distinguish them.’[[107]](#endnote-106)

France provided the only significant contribution to the mechanics of private peace published outside Italy. *L’Arbitre Charitable: pour eviter les proces et les querelles; ou du moins pour les terminer sans peine et sans frais* (1666) was most likely written by the Breton lawyer and agronomist Gabriel de Calloët de Kerbrat. But the fate of L’Arbitre Charitable, which went through at least six editions between 1666 and 1679, is indicative of how far Italian practices had diverged from the rest of Europe. It lacked the secular tone and universal politico-ethical ambition of the Italians. It was instead inspired by the medieval tradition of Saint Yves, the lawyer turned peace-maker whose cult had spread from Brittany across Europe in the late middle ages. Although Calloët de Kerbrat was Jesuit-educated, L’Arbitre Charitable contained none of the casuistry upon which the Italians relied. His book contained pro-formas covering many eventualities and these were for the poor as well as the rich. Calloët de Kerbrat came from a tradition which criticised the aristocracy as more prone in general to vice than other groups and condemned the code of honour in particular. He was more idealistic than the Italians: a rich man and a poor man could and should make peace with each other.

The context within which L’Arbitre Charitable was composed was entirely different to its Italian comparators. Its arguments were shaped by the theological disputes that were plaguing Paris at the time, a microcosm of the confessional disputes that had riven Northern Europe for over a century. As a peace-maker, the author hoped to reconcile the theological differences that divided Frenchmen. And there was no better figure to do this than Saint Augustine, the authority on which the Jansenist theology of grace was grounded. In L’Arbitre Charitable it is Augustine’s pastoral work which is held up as a model to be imitated. And Calloët de Kerbrat was conscious that Augustine was a unifier in another sense. He claimed that his booklet had been translated into English, German, and Danish, and that the Huguenots had approved its use in their synods. His claim supports the contention put forward here that, whatever divided Catholics and Protestants in Northern Europe, their thinking about peace was dominated by a shared Augustinian heritage.

The Reformation made apparent the contradiction between the liberty of persons to find inward peace for themselves and the conformity and unity upon which civil peace was deemed to rest. It was the experience of sectarianism and civil war that ‘stimulated among thoughtful men a profound and widespread yearning for peace’ and encouraged the fashion for Stoicism.[[108]](#endnote-107) In many respects, the Stoic love of personal peace was at odds with the Augustinian search for peace in God. Augustine taught that the possibility of self-control was a symptom of human pride. However, the two conflicting traditions came to dominate thinking about peace in the North and their reconciliation was helped by a shared hostility to Ciceronianism. In the Dutch Republic the modern thinking was associated with Justus Lipsius (1547-1606) and Hugo Grotius (1583-1645), who rebutted the idea that vengeance could ever be reasonable. The Stoics were rarely cited by the ‘Professors’ of the *Scienza* and Lipsius was less influential in Italy than he was in France and the Empire, where his philosophy was immediately seized upon as a balm for religious division and civil war.[[109]](#endnote-108) Even England, with its relatively small printing industry, produced six editions of *De Constantia* in the vernacular between 1594 and 1672 compared to one Venetian edition, dating from 1621. Charron’s *De la Sagesse*, a great popularizer of Montaigne’s ethics, had to wait until 1698 for its Italian translation, by which time it had already clocked up nine editions in English and two in German. By the end of the sixteenth century, Cyracius Spangenberg drew on forty years’ experience as a pastor and his reading of the Stoics in compiling his 1000 page compendium on nobility, the *Adel Speigel*, dedicating several chapters to the feud and good neighbourliness. The mechanics of peace-making are not mentioned, however, since peace derives from Godliness, the avoidance of sin a pre-requisite of good neighbourliness. He promoted clemency and the suppression of anger, since victory is achieved by demonstrating one’s moral superiority: ‘how much more noble, considerate, gentle and conciliatory is one against his vanquished, beaten, submissive and armless enemy’; and ‘fierce anger (as Seneca says in book 1 of *De Clementia*) is ignoble.[[110]](#endnote-109) Spangenberg shows how the Augustinian and Stoic view of the world were successfully reconciled.

Thinking about peace in Northern Europe therefore developed along a different trajectory from that in Italy. France provides the most striking evidence for this: the French had been the first to translate Italian duelling treatises and adopted the laws of honour with relish. The French Wars of Religion turned private enmity into a major social and political problem and it might have been expected that the French would turn to the Italian science for guidance, but they did not. Partly this was a xenophobic reaction to Italian manners, which, it was argued, were all about polish and did not reform the man within. More important was the collapse of civil society in the 1560s and 1570s, which made the Ciceronian faith in man’s capacity for cultivating virtue as the foundation of a peaceful society seem hopelessly optimistic. Montaigne developed an ethics that was entirely different from that of the *Scienza Cavalleresca*; it was based on the reformation of the self and required interior scrutiny and self mastery. He argued that virtue was cultivated by forbearance from revenge; clemency being a sign of the moral superiority of the aristocrat. He prized self-vigilance and modesty and displayed little faith in the the rituals, practicalities and mechanics of peace-making. The French civility that developed from this was far more than etiquette; it was a means of avoiding words and gestures that would lead to dissension.[[111]](#endnote-110)

The widespread revulsion at the excesses of civil conflict was systematized into a general law of civil peace by Thomas Hobbes. *Leviathan* is traditionally viewed as a straightforward apology for state power, since the war of man against man necessitates the submission of all citizens to the will of the sovereign. But it is the contract between individuals for their own mutal self-preservation that sustains society. For Hobbes discord arose not from inequality, as the Italian ‘Professors’ claimed, but from the fact that all men are equally hungry for power. He reduced the cause of quarrels to three essentials: competition, mistrust and the search for glory. Rather than returning disputants to the status quo ante, Hobbes wished to liberate all men from the fear that bred violence in the first place. In doing so, he relativized the honour code. First, his laws were easily grasped and had no need of lawyers and ‘Professors’ to interpret them: ‘The…Lawes, because they oblige onley to a desire, and…an unfeigned and constant endeavour, are easie to be observed.’ This amounted to a simpler and freer code of civility: ‘Justice, Gratitude, Modesty, Equity, Mercy, in sum doing to others, as wee would be done to.’[[112]](#endnote-111) Second, Hobbes was egalitarian: justice must be ‘equally administered to all degrees of people…so as the great may have no greater hope of impunity, when they doe violence, honour, or any Injury.’ And as consequence, the elite would need higher ethical standards in order to demonstrate its right to rule: ‘the violences, oppressions, and injuries [great Persons] do, are not extenuated, but aggravated by the greatnesse of their persons; because they have the least need to commit them. The consequences of this partiality towards the great, proceed in this manner. Impunity maketh Insolence; Insolence Hatred; and Hatred, an Endeavour to pull down all oppressing and contumelious greatnesse.’ [[113]](#endnote-112) Third, Hobbes, like Montaigne, sneered at the efficacy of rituals: ‘as how one should salute another, or how a man should wash his mouth, or pick his teeth before company, and such other points of the Small Moralls.’[[114]](#endnote-113)

In France, Hobbes was regarded not merely as the greatest but as the most convincing philosopher of the age and his thinking formed the basis for the scores of conduct books, which appeared in hundreds of editions in the period 1670-1730. The French civility which conquered Europe in the eighteenth century required not the slavish application of protocol and attention to ritual, but rather knowledge of what to avoid, guaranteeing that social relations are protected from violence by the ‘hygiene of tact’. Antoine de Courtin, one of the most successful authors, contrasted his code with the false laws of honour, which were based on hatred and pride and only led to ‘feuds, murders and division.’ The new civil science was distinguished by its faith in the role of sociability as vehicle for individual improvement; a civic view of religion which emphasised its social utility; the valorization of complaisance and agreeableness that promoted a freer code of manners, which in England became known as politeness.[[115]](#endnote-114)

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This essay began by addressing the conundrum of why early modern Europe’s most advanced and civilized region should also have, contrary to what one might expect, one of its highest rates of violence. Italians did not experience the same levels of pacification in the early modern period, in spite of the sophisticated bureaucratic and legal mechanisms that were developed. Maffei understood that the law alone was insufficient to ensure civil peace. Peace, he argued, should be natural to the man of virtue; he made up spontaneously and with no pretence and to the credit of the person who was outraged, ‘but our science has introduced the idea that every peace is a contract, which is agreed with conditions.’ These contracts, made with long negotiations and stipulations, were inimical to real peace; they were the basis for continuing resentment and enmity. He attacked the *Scienza Cavalleresca* as nothing but ‘sophistry’ and ‘cavillations’, an ‘inextricable labyrinth.’ The ‘Professors’ reduced the spirit of peace to ‘a chaos of questions, a heap of refinement, a triumph of punctiliousness, an explosion of mediocrity.’[[116]](#endnote-115) The evidence for choreographed encounters (*incontri* and *quistioni*), which masked intent with counterfeit spontaneity, suggests that Maffei had a point.[[117]](#endnote-116) For Maffei, the Italian science was the mere appearance of peace; it was vendetta in another guise. The false peace served only to foster enmity and its memorialisation ensured hostility continued down the generations. Fabio Albergati and his followers had taken the opposite view: since man was essentially a peaceable and rational beast, anger and violence must be the result of the failings of the law and civil society. Anger might even be rational: it was a tool for self-preservation and true vendetta was rational when its aim was not harm but restitution. The ‘Professors’ of honour were still repeating these notions at the end of the seventeenth century.

Maffei was inspired by the modern currents of thought that emanated from Northern Europe. He admired Montaigne’s honnête homme guided by ‘a natural sentiment of honesty who will be secure in himself, in a way that his enemy never was.’ The new man understood the distinction between the spirit and the law, acting in accordance with ‘a simple creed of faith’ and not an ‘artificial contract of laws underpinned by a hundred cavillations.’[[118]](#endnote-117) The *Scienza* was not the product of human reason but of vanity; covering its unorthodoxy in jargon, it was nothing more than blasphemy. But before we join Maffei in condemning the *Scienza Cavalleresca* we need to recall that Italian thinking was adapted to Italian realities. The rules of private peace-making were an attempt to heal the divisions in civil society. In many respects the state was the problem: the period of the Italian Wars (1494-1559) was characterized by intense civil conflict and factional violence and many of the new regimes that emerged lacked legitimacy. Randolph Roth has argued that trust in government and the officials who run it is a significant factor in reducing interpersonal violence. The belief that the state is legitimate and that its legal and judicial institutions are unbiased, will redress wrongs and protect lives and property is one of the key variables governing homicide rates. When men doubt the honesty and competence of public officials and question the legitimacy of the government, they feel frustrated, alienated and dishonoured. This can result in seemingly trivial disputes taking on great importance. Feeling dishonoured can prompt men to take offence when no slight was intended; feeling alienated can lead them to view others as predators and prey. Intense frustration can make men hot-tempered in ordinary disputes. A sense of connectedness beyond kin and neighbourhood suppresses violence. Problems arise where boundaries are created along class, factional or national lines that exclude people. People who are disconnected are more likely to kill.[[119]](#endnote-118)

High rates of interpersonal violence in the first half of the seventeenth century were a consequence of the ways in which simmering local discontent was politicized by the return of war to the Peninsula: the revival of the pro-French and pro-Spanish factions added a further layer of complexity to the local scene. The affects of this were felt in cities under widely different forms of governance: from Vicenza (under Venetian control), to Modena and Rome, where there were street clashes in 1646. The killing that resulted was as banal as it was widespread: ‘In Castelfranco [Veneto] a priest, who was for [pro-French] Savoy and a friar came to blows and he killed him because he held for Spain. Also the monks of San Benedetto near Mantua smashed each others faces in for the same reason.’[[120]](#endnote-119) These strong emotions waned in the second-half of the seventeenth century. The revolt of Naples in 1647 advertised the high costs of liberty. Maffei’s work is itself evidence of the change in mood that took place in the next fifty years. He was sufficiently secure in himself to put up with affronts and he avoided feuds in his home town. This pattern was replicated elsewhere in Northern Italy: in Siena there were 90 killings of nobles in the seventeenth century, but only 4 in the eighteenth.[[121]](#endnote-120) Legitimacy was built on the fine balance between coercion and social collaboration. Nowhere was this clearer than in Bologna, where the authorities curbed aristocratic violence by forcing families to post surety for their good behaviour. But this was a two-way process of accommodation. As their diaries show, liberation from the anxiety of having to respond to every affront permitted elite families to cultivate a more fulfilling private life.[[122]](#endnote-121)

The hostility to Maffei points to the limits of the Italian Enlightenment. In the early eighteenth century the murder rate in Italy was still six times higher than in England. The Italian problem became a regional one; it was during the eighteenth century that the North-South divide first became apparent. Neapolitan Enlightenment thinkers, like Paolo Mattia Doria, who had himself renounced duelling, made explicit the connection between the tyranny of the cult of honour and Spanish rule, though the solution they proposed – the revival of Ciceronian republican virtue – was hardly new.[[123]](#endnote-122) The Kingdom of Naples and Sicily remained reliant on the principles elaborated in the *Scienza* *Cavalleresca* to regulate the honour code and temper the excesses of vendetta. By 1861, the province of Naples (population 6.9 million) was the world capital of crime with twice as much violence as England, France and Germany combined (90 million inihabitants). Doria also accused the Catholic Church of condoning the honour code, undermining the law and faith in civil society. The evidence from Rome suggests that he had a valid point. During the pontificate of Clement XIII (1758-69) the Roman courts dealt with 10,000 homicides, of which 4,000 were committed in the city (population 156,000), giving eighteenth-century Rome the dubious accolade of the highest homicide rate yet recorded in history.[[124]](#endnote-123)

These developments point to the ways in which the Italian science may have had more widespread implications for perception of the state and the nature of political culture. The preference for private peace was one aspect of the separation of the public and private spheres as distinct entities in early modern Italy.[[125]](#endnote-124) As Ed Muir has argued, while civil society in Northern Italy succeeded in eliminating the most endemic forms of violence associated with faction politics, this ‘came at the expense of the long-term capacity of public discourse to represent political practices and social conflicts accurately. That cost was a political culture that prized dissimulation or, worse, silence about vital concerns.’[[126]](#endnote-125) The practices encouraged by the ‘Professors’ contributed to distrust of the organs of justice. By urging their readers to place their trust in the sphere of private deals, arrangements and compositions, the Professors undermined the civil society they claimed to uphold.

We like to think that peace is an indubitably good thing, but peace and justice are in tension. The negotiations and deals that private peace-making entailed served to undermine faith in the organs of justice and administration. Contemporaries were well aware of this. Giovanni Spaccini lamented in his diary the ways in which the pressures to make peace at any price turned justice into a ‘transaction’, but ‘the people…did not understand it thus, because they love justice and desired that it be administered for the public good, and not continual occasion given for similar acts of cowardice [*poltronerie*].’[[127]](#endnote-126) Albergati too recognized this tension. But his fear was the consequences of justice exercised in the name of one or other faction. He argued that the common good was better safeguarded by an aristocracy operating above the law.

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1. \* The author would like to thank the anonymous readers for considerably sharpening the argument and John Bossy, Stephen Cummins, Andrew Davies, James Shaw, David Wootton and Tim Stanton for their specialist advice. [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
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3. On Maffei’s background: C. Donati, ‘Scipione Maffei e la *Scienza chiamata cavallersca.* Saggio sull’ideologia nobiliare al principio del settecento’, *Rivista Storica Italiana* 90 (1978), 30-71. [↑](#endnote-ref-2)
4. *Della Scienza chiamata cavalleresca*, 7-8. [↑](#endnote-ref-3)
5. Ibid., 181 [↑](#endnote-ref-4)
6. Ibid., 143 [↑](#endnote-ref-5)
7. Ibid., 231-2 [↑](#endnote-ref-6)
8. Donati, ‘Scipione Maffei’, 53. [↑](#endnote-ref-7)
9. O. Niccoli, *Perdonare: idee, pratiche, rituali in Italia tra cinque e seicento* (Rome : Laterza, 2007) ; P. Broggio, ‘Linguaggo religioso e disciplinamento nobiliare. Il «modo di ridurre a pace l'inimicitie private» nella trattatistica di età barocca, in F. Cantu ed., *I Linguaggi del potere. Politica e religione nell'età barocca* (Rome: Viella, 2009) ; P. Broggio and M. Pia Paoli eds. *Stringere la pace. Teorie e pratiche della conciliazione nell’Europa moderna (secoli XV-XVIII)* (Rome : Viella, 2011). [↑](#endnote-ref-8)
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12. Maffei, *Scienza*, 268. [↑](#endnote-ref-11)
13. Ibid., 100-3. [↑](#endnote-ref-12)
14. M. Eisner, ‘Long-Term Historical Trends in Violent Crime,’ *Crime and Justice: A Review of Research*, 30 (2003), 128. [↑](#endnote-ref-13)
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16. Hannah Arendt*, On Violence* (London: Allen Lane, 1970). [↑](#endnote-ref-15)
17. I. Fosi, *La giustizia del papa. Sudditi e tribunali nell Stato Pontificio in età moderna* (Rome, Laterza, 2007), C. Povolo, *L’intrigo dell’onore. Poter e istituzioni nella Repubblica di Venezia tra Cinque e Seicento* (Verona : Cierre, 1997); O. Raggio, *Faide e parentele. Lo stato genovese visto dalla Fontanabuona* (Turin: Einaudi, 1990); Niccoli, *Perdonare*. [↑](#endnote-ref-16)
18. Manuel Eisner, ‘Modernization, Self-Control and Lethal Violence: The Long-Term Dynamics of European Homicide Rates in Theoretical Perspective,’ *British Journal of Criminology* 41 (2001), 618–638. [↑](#endnote-ref-17)
19. G. Ortalli ed., *Bande Armate; Banditismo; Banditi* (Rome: Jouvence, 1986). [↑](#endnote-ref-18)
20. Spaccini, *Cronaca di Modena,ii*, 363-5; ii, 320, iii, 117. On Vicenza: E. Franzina, *Vicenza: Storia di una città, 1404-1866* (Vicenza: Neri Pozza, 1980), pp. 498-505. [↑](#endnote-ref-19)
21. Guerrini ed. ‘I diari dei Bianchi, iv, 78. [↑](#endnote-ref-20)
22. *Dizionario Biografico degli Italiani*, 27 (1982): <http://www.treccani.it/enciclopedia/carlo-colonna_(Dizionario-Biografico)/> (accessed January 2014). [↑](#endnote-ref-21)
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25. G. Angelozzi and C. Casanova, *La nobilità disciplinata. Violenze nobiliare, procedure di giustizia e scienza cavalleresca a Bologna nel XVII secolo* (Bologna : CLUEB, 2003), 12-17. [↑](#endnote-ref-24)
26. Ibid., 57-8. [↑](#endnote-ref-25)
27. Angelozzi and Casanova, *La giustizia criminale*, part II. It also seems to have had an effect in controlling duelling in the city of Naples by the 1690s, as attested by Domenico Confuorto : *Giornali di Napoli dal 1679 al 1699*, 2 vols. (Naples: Società naploenatna di storia patria, 1930-1), ii. [↑](#endnote-ref-26)
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29. Marco Carvarzere, ‘At the crossroads of feud and law: settling disputes in early modern Tuscany’, S. Cummins and L. Kounine eds, *Cultures of conflict resolution in early modern Europe* (Ashgate, 2015). [↑](#endnote-ref-28)
30. Henri Estienne, *Introduction au Traité de la conformité des merveilles anciennes avec les modernes* (Paris, 1567). [↑](#endnote-ref-29)
31. O. di Simplicio, ‘Sulla nobilità e il crimine a Siena’, in Ortalli ed. *Bande Armate*.

    [↑](#endnote-ref-30)
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33. Giuliani de’ Ricci, *Cronaca, 1532-1606*, ed. G. Sapori (Milan: Riccardo Ricciardi, 1972), 295, 356, 463. [↑](#endnote-ref-32)
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35. *Bisdosso o vero diario di Francesco Bonazini*: http://grantour.bncf.firenze.sbn.it/altre-fonti/Magl\_XXV\_42. [↑](#endnote-ref-34)
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38. Brackett, *Criminal Justice*, 102. [↑](#endnote-ref-37)
39. Ibid., 75. [↑](#endnote-ref-38)
40. S. Carroll, *Blood and violence in early modern France* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006). [↑](#endnote-ref-39)
41. *Diario di Francesco Bonazini*, ii fo.302, 29 July 1679. [↑](#endnote-ref-40)
42. Carroll, *Blood and violence*, 143-7. [↑](#endnote-ref-41)
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44. Angelozzi and Casanova, *La nobilità disciplinata,* 262-86*.* [↑](#endnote-ref-43)
45. Ibid., 270-1. [↑](#endnote-ref-44)
46. Angelozzi and Casanova, *La nobilità disciplinata*, 282-6. [↑](#endnote-ref-45)
47. Ibid., 278-81. [↑](#endnote-ref-46)
48. *La Spada di Honore*. *Libro primo delle Osservazioni cavaleresche Bologna* (Bologna, 1671), 154. [↑](#endnote-ref-47)
49. Giorgio Pagliari dal Bosco, *Osservationi sopra I primi cinque libri degli annali di Cornelio Tacito* (Milan, 1612). [↑](#endnote-ref-48)
50. Donati, ‘Scipione Maffei.’ [↑](#endnote-ref-49)
51. *Il bandito e il governatore: Domenico d’Amorotto e Francesco Guicciardini nell’età delle guerre d’Italia* (Rome: Viella, 2014), chapter 3. [↑](#endnote-ref-50)
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56. Ibid., iv, 570. [↑](#endnote-ref-55)
57. Marc-Antonio Savelli, *Pratica Universale* (Florence, 1681), 321. [↑](#endnote-ref-56)
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60. Angelozzi and Casanova, *La nobilità disciplinata*, 273. [↑](#endnote-ref-59)
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82. Giovanni Battista Olevano, *Trattato academico intento nel quale co'il mezo di cinquanta casi vien posto in atto pratttico il modo di ridurre a pace ogni sorte di privata incimitia, nata per cagion d'Honore* (Venice, 1603), book II, 35-6. [↑](#endnote-ref-81)
83. Ibid., 36. [↑](#endnote-ref-82)
84. Ibid., 82. [↑](#endnote-ref-83)
85. Giuseppe Maria Grimaldi, *Nuova asta d'achille a sopressione del Duello, e della vendetta, per reidurre a pace, ed aggiustamento ogni querela, in via cavalersca* (Bologna, 1693). [↑](#endnote-ref-84)
86. Giovanni Battista Pigna, *Trattato della Pace* (Modena, 1708), 175. [↑](#endnote-ref-85)
87. *Trattato nel quale co'l mezzo di cinquanta casi vien posto in atto prattico il modo di ridurre à pace ogni sorte di privata inimicta, nata per cagion d'Honore* (Venice, 1605), 127-9. [↑](#endnote-ref-86)
88. Birago, *Discorsi*, case 21. [↑](#endnote-ref-87)
89. Gessi, *Lo Scettro pacifico*, 62-3. [↑](#endnote-ref-88)
90. Niccoli, *Perdonare*, 106. [↑](#endnote-ref-89)
91. For a critique of this: Maffei, *Della Scienza*, 333. [↑](#endnote-ref-90)
92. *Del Modo di Ridurre à Pace*, 2. [↑](#endnote-ref-91)
93. *Delle Private Rappacificationi,* conclusion, xiii. [↑](#endnote-ref-92)
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96. *Trattato nel quale co'l mezzo di cinquanta casi*, 133. [↑](#endnote-ref-95)
97. Birago, Discorsi, 182. [↑](#endnote-ref-96)
98. Gessi, *Pareri Cavalereschi*, 122. [↑](#endnote-ref-97)
99. BL add MS 22346, “Cronaca originale di Reggio del signor Sebastiano Carletti Reggiano della meta del settembre 1641 a tutto il giorno 18 marzo 1693” fo. 57. [↑](#endnote-ref-98)
100. *Diario di Francesco Bonazini*, ii fo.247, 24 May 1697; ii, fo. 478, 2 September 1700; ii, /fos. 502-4, 22 Nov 1700. [↑](#endnote-ref-99)
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103. Angelozzi and Casanova, *La Nobilità disciplinata*, 273. [↑](#endnote-ref-102)
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109. G. Oestreich, *Neostoicism and the early modern state* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), chapter 6. [↑](#endnote-ref-108)
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112. *Leviathan*, ed. R. Tuck (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 110-11. [↑](#endnote-ref-111)
113. Ibid., 237-8. [↑](#endnote-ref-112)
114. Ibid., 69 [↑](#endnote-ref-113)
115. S. Carroll, ‘Civility, Violence, Civilization: 1500-1800’, *The Cambridge World History of Violence*, vol 3, forthcoming., [↑](#endnote-ref-114)
116. Maffei, *Della Scienza*, 332. [↑](#endnote-ref-115)
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