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**Oral History, 'Learning Disability' and Pedagogies of Self**

*(Oral History, 37(1), 85-94).*

**Abstract**

Oral history interviews are one form in a wider and changing formation of individualisation, personalisation and self-representation – a formation which is politically volatile. This article explores this volatility through one interview conducted as part of the Heritage Lottery Funded 'History of Day Centres for People with Learning Disabilities' project. In his interview Tom Brown mobilises the idea of 'free will' to account for changes in his life – an account which both contradicts and challenges the professional assessment procedures and eligibility criteria which are likely to have determined his life course. To help explore the complexities of his account, the article traces the multiple histories of the interview showing the specific meanings of Tom's claim to 'free will'. The article concludes by arguing that the oral history interview needs to avoid simply becoming a 'pedagogy of self' used to support the production of a model personhood defined by 'independence' and 'choice'.<sup>1</sup> Instead oral history practice needs to retain its critical edge by specifically understanding the models of personhood being articulated through oral histories as not simply reflecting the past and present but creating the future.

**Key words:** Learning Disability, interview, New Labour, Pedagogies of Self

## Oral History, 'Learning Disability' and Pedagogies of Self

It was a hot day in early summer when Tom and I climbed the stairs and found a room on the first floor. In the recording of the interview the silence between our voices is only occasionally punctuated by the buzzing of a fridge, the distant growl of a lawn mower or a scream of laughter from downstairs. None of this detail is mere scene setting: the very fact we were able to conduct an uninterrupted interview is an expression of substantial change in Tom's life. Tom is eligible to attend one of Croydon Social Services' Resource Bases – where we conducted the interview – because he is classified as having a learning disability. I only came to know Tom because the large day centres Tom used to attend have been closed or re-focused following shifts in professional thinking and government policy. More specifically, I was also only able to be there to interview Tom because the Heritage Lottery Fund agreed that people's memories of Croydon's day centres were worth exploring. This article explores the general significance of the oral history interview within the confluence of changes which made this particular interview possible.

Tom began his time using Croydon learning disability day services by attending what was then called, 'Waylands Craftwork, Training and Social Centre' in the 1970s [Photo 1]. He then moved to 'Cherry Orchard Advanced Adult Training Centre' [Photo 2] and now splits his week between a job and attending the Resource Base. I want to enter our interview at a point where we had already talked about his role doing 'industrial work', specifically working in Waylands laundry which took in washing from the council's old people's homes and where he used 'the washing machines and the spin dryer' [Photo 3]:

H        *Do you know why it was you that you erm, stopped going to Waylands and started going to Cherry Orchard?*

T        Don't know.

H        *Not sure?*

T        Well, I thought . . . the time it came for me to leave I had been there, I'd been there twenty seven years.

H        *Really?*

T        Twenty seven years on the same job. Bit much isn't it? (Laughs)

H        *Yes. So twenty seven years in the laundry?*

T        That was the time I thought, right I'm stopping . . . so that's when I left.

H        *So you were kind of erm given the option to leave to go to Cherry Orchard?*

T        No.

H        *Um.*

T        No, I left of my own free will. (Laughs)

H        *Yeah, of course, yeah.*

[. . .]

- T Then I went to Waylands to the laundry, then I left there. I have been in Cherry Orchard for twenty seven years I thought well, I can't stand it any more I have had enough. (Laughs) I'd had enough after twenty seven years.
- H *Yeah, sure. What about when you sort of . . . left?*
- T I left and came here [the Resource Base].<sup>2</sup>

This extract indexes a range of different histories. Most obviously Tom's account speaks to how learning disability policy and professional practice has developed over the past forty years. His account of his life also references the history of self-advocacy for people with learning disabilities, where people have come to speak for themselves and emphasise 'nothing about us without us'. Implied here too is the history of oral history itself – both as a methodology for listening to individuals and groups ignored by mainstream history production and as a tool for working with people with learning disabilities specifically. Lurking in less tangible ways within the interview's conditions of possibility is New Labour social policy, specifically logics of 'independence' and 'choice' which have defined recent learning disability white papers and the creation of the Heritage Lottery Fund with its aim of 'giving voice' as a means of realising social 'inclusion'.

What links all these indexed strands is a formation: a growing shift in numerous social domains towards individualisation, personalisation and self-representation. Thinking of these apparently differently located histories and debates through the notion of a formation allows us to see the politically volatile nature of any oral history interview. Of course this volatility has long been noted by oral historians, not least in Paul Thompson's recognition that oral history had to be conducted with a certain 'spirit' in order to avoid 'confirm[ing]' rather than changing the world.<sup>3</sup> It was noted too by Luisa Passerini in her warning that oral history should strive for 'critical consciousness' rather than 'mere populism'.<sup>4</sup> More recently, numerous voices – including Alistair Thomson – have argued for community oral history to remain critically engaged and for efforts to be made to ensure connections are made between the local, the national and the global.<sup>5</sup> All of these writers evoke in different ways a sense that the specificity of any given articulation must be noted but not fetish-ised as unique. Each writer emphasises too the political necessity of generating critical engagement with the people, things and ideas which impact on interviewees' lives.

Indeed, at the heart of the negotiations between Tom and I throughout the extract above is the old sociological chestnut of the relative significance of people's individual agency in shaping their life ('free will' as Tom put it) versus structural determinants such as race, economic inequality or, in this case, Croydon Social Services' interpretation of ability and eligibility for specific services. This agency/structure debate has taken a particular form in the oral history literature through a focus on the significance of individual memory. Anna Green has called into question the ways in which some work has searched primarily for structural determinants,

arguing that ‘historians are increasingly focused upon the ways in which individual recollections fit (often unconscious) cultural scripts or templates’ and arguing instead for a re-assertion of ‘the value of individual remembering, and the capacity of the conscious self to contest and critique cultural scripts or discourses’.<sup>6</sup>

Tom’s interview – with his strong account of ‘free will’ – seems a significant site to use in revisiting the relationship between ‘individual remembering’/‘agency’ and ‘cultural scripts’/‘structural determinants’. My aim here is to develop a history of our interview, through tracing its place within the histories of oral history, of learning disability policy and practice and of learning disability day services in Croydon. The purpose of this is to materially and politically locate the significance of Tom’s account of agency. This in turn will help us understand better how this account came to be possible but also what such an account puts at stake within a shifting policy context of tightening eligibility criteria for services and New Labour reassertions of meritocracy. Finally I will conclude by drawing out the implications of this specific analysis for oral history practice today.

### **Oral History and Agency/Structure**

Oral history has always been uneasily located within the agency/structure debate. Through not always referred to using this sociological language, the relative importance of the individual as autonomous and capable of voluntary action and articulations versus structural forces, which determine, organise and limit individuals’ agency is a key feature of the oral history literature. Many social theorists have critiqued the agency/structure polarisation, attempting to find a conceptual framework for seeing the ‘individual’ and ‘society’ as mutually constitutive and in dynamic interrelationship. Perhaps the most influential of these theoretical reworkings is Nobeit Elias’ *The Civilising Process*, which historically accounts for the agency/structure polarisation. Elias argues that the conceptual divide between ‘individuals’ and ‘society’ has precisely enabled the development of the modern individual. He terms this modern individual ‘*homo clauses*’ which he sees as a particular model of humanity-as-agent whose ‘core, his being, his true self appears likewise as something divided within him by an invisible wall from everything outside, including every other human being’. Elias breaches the agency/structure divide through the idea of ‘figurations’ which emphasize ‘individual’ and ‘society’ as mutually producing:

The concept of the figuration has been introduced precisely because it expresses what we call ‘society’ more clearly and unambiguously than the existing conceptual tools of sociology, as neither an abstraction of attributes of individuals existing without a society, nor a ‘system’ or ‘totality’ beyond individuals, but the network or interdependencies formed by individuals.<sup>7</sup>

There are two significant insights here for oral history. The first is that the conceptualisation of the individual as agent – *homo clauses* – is a historically-produced phenomena and that this model of individuality was in no way inevitable. The second is that what we call ‘agency’ – be

that a specific action or a specific articulation in an oral history interview – is actively enabled by a range of past and present ‘pluralities’. In short, an individual’s memories shared through an oral history interview encounter are neither the product of the unique mind of an autonomous individual nor are they fully determined by cultural scripts or social structures. Rather they are co-produced through the figurations that have made up a person’s life and the specific figuration of two people recording their conversation in a room.

### **The interview: pasts**

While *homo clauses* is an historically-produced phenomenon which needs to be accounted for generally, this is more starkly true for people who have been classified as ‘having a learning disability’. The status of ‘agent’ has not been equally conferred and at different times Caucasian women, children and disabled people and non-Caucasian peoples have all been actively exempted from this model of personhood. In fact, as I will go on to show, the figurations that led to Tom and I speaking – and his mobilisation of agency as a way of explaining his life – have been more deliberately and consciously-produced by policy and social care professionals precisely because of that sense of previous exclusion.

The interview I conducted with Tom did have a strong policy context. In 2001 the *Valuing People: A New Strategy for Learning Disability for the 21st Century* White Paper set out its vision: specifically segregated ‘community care’ services such day centres and residential homes would be replaced by more flexible person-centred and individually-tailored support which would be guided by core values of ‘independence’, ‘choice’, ‘rights’ and ‘inclusion’.<sup>8</sup> Since 2001, *Valuing People* has been supplemented and extended by *Improving the Life Chances of Disabled People* which offered a ‘focus on independent living’, *Our Health, Our Care, Our Say*, which reiterated governmental commitment to ‘individualised budgets’ – which would allow people to buy in their own assistance services – and most recently *Valuing People Now: From Progress to Transition*. Each document emphasises the same core values and sees *personalisation* as a means of transforming the ways learning disability services have been conceived as means of ‘improving’ the lives of people with learning disabilities.<sup>9</sup>

These changes in learning disability day services can be tracked through shifting models of power. The ‘training centres’ of the late-60s and 70s mobilised what Michel Foucault has described as ‘disciplinary’ means – such as repetition of work, clocking in machines, bells and buzzers for lunch and tea-time, regimes of personal care and regulation of behaviour such as shouting. However, subsequent changes and certainly post-*Valuing People* services have tended to use techniques of what Foucault characterised as ‘liberal government’, which highlights the ways through which individuals come to govern and control themselves.<sup>10</sup> In their work on New Labour’s creation of a ‘citizen-consumer’ John Clarke, Janet Newman, Nick Smith, Elizabeth Vidler and Louise Westmarland have argued that, when seen through a Foucauldian lens, ‘the consumer’ marks ‘the shift . . . to neo- or advanced liberal governmentality’ and is ‘an

embodiment of the self-managing subject governed “at a distance”.<sup>11</sup> In Croydon’s learning disability services a range of techniques have been deployed to support people to become increasingly self-managing. In the 1990s the time and space of Waylands was gradually relaxed. The highly regulated industrial work in workshops were transformed into new spaces – such as a café and social club – where people were encouraged to exercise more choice over how to spend time. In other words, certain material shifts of space and time were deployed to move people from being subject to others [Instructors, the bell, the clocking-in machine] to becoming subject to themselves and becoming the autonomous, choice-making individuals evoked in the *Valuing People* White Paper.

Nikolas Rose, whose work on the history of psychology has been influenced by Foucault’s work on governmentality, has linked techniques or technologies of subjectification to the rise of ‘psychology’, which he sees as an ‘intellectual technology’ aimed precisely at facilitating the more indirect range of ‘acting upon actions’:

The significance of psychology, here, is the elaboration of a know-how of this autonomous individual, striving for self-realisation. Psychology has thus participated in reshaping the practices of those who exercise authority over others – social workers, managers, teachers, nurses – such that they nurture and direct those individual strivings in the most appropriate and productive fashions. It has invented what one might term the therapies of normality or the psychologies of everyday life, the pedagogies of self-fulfilment disseminated through the mass media, which translate the enigmatic desires and dissatisfaction of the individual into precise ways of inspecting oneself, accounting for oneself, and working upon oneself in order to realise one’s potential, gain happiness and exercise one’s autonomy.<sup>12</sup>

In the context of changing day services, ‘pedagogies of self-fulfilment’ and ‘therapies of normality’ include smaller rooms/ café-style seating at the Resource Bases; the use of a white board to help people make choices between activities offered; equipment for making your own tea/coffee rather than waiting for ‘tea-time’ and the tea urn; travel training, so people can travel on their own to particular places. These techniques have been brought together in learning disability services UK-wide through ‘person-centred planning’ which is used to enable people to identify targets for choice and self-realisation across domains including friends, food and drink, holidays and work and is underpinned by the principle that the ‘[learning disabled] person is central and in control’ and that the process of person-centred planning should set ‘no limits to the person’s wants, needs and dreams for their life’.<sup>13</sup>

In these ways, learning disability day services have been reconfigured to enable self-expression. But there are, however, histories at play here other than policy and professional desires to ‘act on’ learning disabled people’s actions. Where self-expression can be seen as a ‘pedagogy’ to support the development of the ‘self-managing self’, self-expression was also core

to the liberation movements of the late-1960s, 1970s and 1980s. For example, the Women's Liberation Movement included active re-thinking of individualised models of personhood.<sup>14</sup> While in terms of improving social care services, self-advocacy has been connected to the individual being able to express their own needs, self-advocacy has also been situated as a liberation movement where individual self-expression is core to a developing collective understanding and analysis of society. In this vein, Ken Simons has characterised self-advocacy as 'a process of individual development through which a person comes to have the confidence and ability to express his or her own feelings and wishes . . . [and] . . . a process by which groups of people get together and give voice to their common concerns'.<sup>15</sup> Dorothy Atkinson has also emphasised this point, arguing that oral history has been used as a basis for a 'resistance movement', creating a range of opportunities for people to be able to articulate their needs, challenge service-providers and find out about their rights.<sup>16</sup>

Another history at play in the interview with Tom is the new funding to support the production of 'heritage'. Since its inception the HLF has spent over £49 million on oral history projects alone, seeing oral history as giving a 'voice' and creating 'a legacy'.<sup>17</sup> The HLF sees self-expression as a key stepping stone to wider social aims. Recent research on its social impact has emphasised connections between 'giving voice' and self-confidence and makes a link between individual skill development, changes in attitudes and behaviour and social cohesion ('building stronger links within and between communities') and social inclusion (breaking down barriers to access for disadvantaged groups/individuals').<sup>18</sup>

As these multiple histories suggest, self-expression is imbued with a range of significances: as a way of generating increasing *self*-government, as a site through which heritage can create wider 'social' benefit and as a core component in the development of a collective, liberatory analysis of society. In these ways, oral history entered Tom's life at a time when a number of material and conceptual configurations had been actively mobilised to support his self-expression and these are the set of histories which must be fully taken into account in approaching an analysis.

### **The interview: present**

These figurations of learning disability policy and professional practice, use of oral history in self-advocacy and the HLF's emphasis on 'giving voice' as a means of social inclusion are the conditions of possibility of the interview with Tom. Indeed, the specific encounter between us, extracted above, illustrates these figurations and helps see how an expression of 'free will' was produced. A careful reading of the extract shows that it took a range of negotiations for Tom to reach the point of declaring his 'free will'. Tom only claimed it was 'free will' that led to his movement between day centres as my questions became increasingly – through subtly – questioning of his agency.



I asked the question 'why' he had left Waylands for Cherry Orchard because, of course, I had been told by others that Waylands and Cherry Orchard were configured in a hierarchical relationship. That is, a range of assessments of him by members of staff are likely to have preceded his movement. Initially Tom seemed unsure about how to account for this change, saying 'not sure'. It is after taking some time that he moved from 'not sure' – not knowing – to a passive sentence construction which avoids assigning agency – 'time it came for me to leave'. The passive sentence seems to point to a residual sense that there were some sort of influences which shaped his life but no-one specific is evoked and the phrase also evokes a kind of sense of the inevitability of change.

It is only after I used the phrase 'gave you the option' that he found an account which more obviously links to the increasingly dominant discourse of 'independence' and 'choice' and which successfully casts him as the agent who has 'had enough' and wants to move on. The way I framed the question was pretty coy. 'Gave you the option', serves to hide all the assessments both formal and informal which are likely to have underpinned these changes in Tom's life with a phrase which both suggests possibility (that Tom could choose) and limitation (that someone externally offers choice). The question, on reflection, does seem to tread pretty lightly through this territory and introduces limitation only in a subtle way. However, Tom picked up the implication of limitation and thought carefully about this – there was a pause of 2/3 seconds – and then clearly interpreted 'given the choice' as erasing his 'free will'. That moment was pretty difficult, his voice was slightly reproachful and he makes it clear he disagreed with the implication of my question.

My response to Tom's assertion of 'free will' was 'yeah, of course, yeah'. On the recording my voice sounds slightly stressed and the tone of my voice signals the impossibility of reconciling all that I knew about assessment procedures which determined movement between the centres with what felt respectful to Tom. I think I handled this so awkwardly because in that moment it felt specifically *disrespectful* to introduce a sense of (structural) limitation into my conversations with Tom. 'Respect' is core to 'person-centred planning' which operates with the ethos that 'staff' should set 'no limits to the person's wants, needs and dreams for their life' and there are obvious reasons – given that previous services have operated using control and disciplinary means – why such a statement is being used to define new models of professional interaction with learning disabled people. However, we should also note that 'respect' as a mode of relating to other people is defined by 'deference' and 'the avoidance of . . . degrading, insulting . . . or offending'. Obviously 'respect' can be understood as operating on broad scale. At one extreme 'respect' requires that people are not physically abused and verbally insulted. However, the other, much more subtle, end of the range – as is suggested in the word 'deference' – is connected to not questioning or challenging people's views or, perhaps, their account of themselves.<sup>19</sup>

The moment of Tom's claim to 'free will' seems very important precisely because it highlights the volatile meaning and significance of any claim to autonomous personhood. There is a strong trajectory of self-advocacy which would value Tom's claim as a liberatory moment of self-expression and in some ways it was. After all for him to see it as his right to make choices over how he spends his days would have been very challenging to the operation of the day centres in the 70s and early 80s. But to take this claim fully on its own terms, limits the possibility for the collective analysis and action which Simons evokes as the second strand of self-advocacy. Moreover, allowing this claim to simply stand erases the figurations that made it possible and the inequalities – in terms of access to resources and 'opportunities' – which have defined Tom's life. There is an ethical and political dimension needed in analysing Tom's interview which exceeds the demands for complete and full 'respect'.

### **The interview: future**

While figurations have pasts and a present, they also have futures. The oral history interview is not simply made up of a range of existing interdependencies but actively makes some futures more, and others less, likely. Tom's claim to free will and autonomy does not simply reflect changing service contexts and wider cultural shifts, it also contributes a conceptual shift which is mobilising the model of the self-managing individual to limit and re-distribute social care funding.

What is at stake in the '*Valuing People*' model of personhood is partially revealed by the news released by the Learning Disability Coalition that 73% of councils by the end of the financial year 2007/2008 plan only to fund those defined as having critical needs.<sup>20</sup> Clarke et al. argue that the post-1997 UK government has never represented one coherent political philosophy, rather it has been made up of a complex and competing range of ideas and practices which include 'pro-market, anti-poverty, individualistic, communitarian and managerialist tendencies, to say nothing of their peculiar compound of modernising social liberalism and traditional social/moral authoritarianism'.<sup>21</sup> Clarke et al. note that 'choice' has shifted in its meaning since 1997:

Overall, we think there was a move from an early New Labour conception of choice as meaning choice in ways of assessing or engaging with public services (e.g. by telephone, in person or through electronic means ...) to a more 'marketised' sense of people making choices between multiple or competing providers and about the content or substance of the service they receive.<sup>22</sup>

In many ways Tom's new experience of day services is underpinned by Croydon's adoption of this earlier model of choice. Services have been reconfigured – often in spite of specific resistance by some people using the service – in order to enable people to have more influence over how they spend their days. Indeed the changes had been on the cards in Croydon long before 1997, and long before the 2001 and the *Valuing People* White Paper.<sup>23</sup> This 'softer choice' is a 'pedagogy of self' via, what Rose would call, 'therapies of normality' (going to real

shops, rather than buying sweets at a day centre shop, making yourself a cup of tea when you like, rather than waiting for the urn to come round).

Increasingly, however, this earlier understanding of choice is becoming increasingly indexed with the later model of choice identified by Clarke et al. and 'Direct Payments' and 'Individualised Budgets', which allow people to employ their own personal assistance, have been mobilised as consumer-based marketisation devices. These volatile meanings of 'choice' are not accidental, as Jan Glasby and Rosemary Littlechild argue:

[. . .] when we talk about the introduction and expansion of direct payments, we are really talking about two different processes – on the one hand, a victory for disabled campaigners who advocated greater choice and control for disabled people (a civil rights or social justice approach); on the other, an attempt by a Conservative government to introduce the values of the market into social care and reduce welfare expenditure (a neo-liberal or market approach).<sup>24</sup>

Because of this there is, of course, also potentially a rhetorical conflict between arguing for better funding and declaring the values of 'independence' and 'choice'. As Val Williams and Andrew Holman note, 'Paradoxically [. . .] people with learning difficulties can literally work their way out of eligibility for a service, since the basis for their need for support is to do with lack of independence, autonomy and the ability to manage their life'.<sup>25</sup> Linking this analysis with recent shifts in eligibility for Incapacity Benefit under the new Employment and Support Allowance and the notion that every unemployed council tenant must be looking for work, and it is clear that the 'socially liberal' underpinnings of 'softer choice' are likely to be fully connected into the 'moral authoritarianism' Clarke et al. identify as one element in New Labour's polysemic enterprise.<sup>26</sup> This disciplinary tough talk is always waiting for any individual who does not fully accept techniques of *self*-government.

Rose's work on psychology and personhood is underpinned by what he calls 'an unease': he writes 'a sense that while our culture accords humans all sorts of capacities and endows all sorts of rights and privileges, it also divides, imposes burdens, and thrives upon the anxieties and disappointments generated by its own promises'.<sup>27</sup> The powerful discourse of 'independence', 'choice', 'rights' and 'inclusion' doesn't seem to recognise the dangers of accepting this model of personhood, a model of personhood which is problematic not least because it is a yardstick which has been used in the past precisely to judge and classify those literally not 'measuring up'. It must be noted that at the same time that *Valuing People* calls for 'independence', 'choice', 'rights' and 'inclusion' – other government social policy is underpinned by a belief in 'social mobility' underpinned by 'meritocracy'.<sup>28</sup> So the same 'society' into which people defined as have learning disabilities are supposed to become included, is one where differentiation of capacity is an ongoing and perhaps intensifying concern (one example of this would be the concern over how to distinguish between students getting 'A' grades at A Level).

This wider and specific social policy context of 'meritocracy' can be articulated with the source of Rose's 'unease': that the individual of 'independence' and 'choice' is also one who has increased responsibility for their own ability to realise hopes and dreams - a position supported by the increasing invisibility of any analysis which would understand there being any social and economic limitations on individual agency. Moreover, as the power of the intentional individual with 'a unique biography' becomes a more stark 'horizon', the possibility of articulating the personal within a collective framework – which has defined some self-advocacy practices – also becomes harder.<sup>29</sup> In these contexts, oral history practice must take into account that it is through models of the individual that future uses of public money and justifications for inequality are being configured.

### *Conclusions*

I wanted to write this article because I needed to understand better the significance of Tom's claim to 'free will' and my response – 'yeah, of course, yeah'. Tom made a clear claim to autonomy that he required me to respect. His demand for respect is highly compelling precisely because of the histories of people defined as 'having a learning disability' which include institutionalisation, segregation and lack of recognition of the individual as having autonomy or rights. I think there is a way – through tracing these histories – to value why Tom felt that was important. However, ignoring the other historical figurations which made our interview and his claim possible would be to make oral history complicit in the production of a model of personhood which does not benefit everyone equally. The implications of this model of autonomous individuality going unchallenged and unproblematised are likely to be reduced possibilities for a collective political analysis and reduction of resource redistribution to those who find it harder to thrive in the employment market as well as, in Rose's terms, the imposition of increasing burdens of responsibility and culpability.

Oral history has often approached its radical and collective political purpose through individual remembering. There is no inherent contradiction here but in a context where the formation of self-expression is becoming increasingly coupled with consumer capitalism and marketisation of previously publicly held resources and services, a renewed commitment to a critical oral history practice is necessary. Most helpful in this is not to see 'individuals' and 'society' as separate but as fully mutually producing. This makes listening to Tom's individual memories of immense significance and wiping out that particularity through notions of 'cultural scripts' is deeply unhelpful. But neither can the individual be simply hailed as fully autonomous, erasing the complex interdependencies which produce us all as people. A renewed commitment to a critical oral history practice would continue to work with the 'unease' that founded oral history, the concern that worried about 'populism' or the 'spirit' in which oral history was conducted. But it would add to this the unease that Rose expresses. This will help us see our oral histories not simply as domains which reflect the past but which – through the models of personhood being articulated through oral history – are helping to create the future.

- <sup>1</sup> Nikolas Rose, *Inventing Ourselves: Psychology, Power and Personhood*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998.
- <sup>2</sup> Tom Brown is a substituted name. Interview with TB, 16<sup>th</sup> April 2007, History of Day Centre Archive (HDC), Museum of Croydon.
- <sup>3</sup> Paul Thompson, *The Voice of the Past: Oral History, Third Edition*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, [1978] 2000, p 3, p 22.
- <sup>4</sup> Luisa Passerini 'Work Ideology and Consensus under Italian Fascism', *History Workshop Journal*, 1979, vol 8, no. 1, pp 82-108.
- <sup>5</sup> Alistair Thompson, 'Oral History and Community History in Britain: Personal and Critical Reflections on Twenty-Five Years of Change', *Oral History*, Spring 2008, vol 36, no 1, pp 95-105.
- <sup>6</sup> Anna Green, 'Individual Remembering and 'Collective Memory': Theoretical Presuppositions and Contemporary Debates', *Oral History*, vol 32, no 2, 2004, p 36, p 42.
- <sup>7</sup> Norbert Elias, 'The Civilising Process', in Paul du Gay, Jessica Evans and Peter Redman (eds), *Identity: A Reader*, London: Sage, 2000, p 288, p 297.
- <sup>8</sup> *Valuing People: A New Strategy for Learning Disability for the 21st Century* (Department of Health 2001).
- <sup>9</sup> Alan Johnson, Secretary of State for Health, 'Foreword from the Secretary of State for Health', *Valuing People Now*, Department of Health, 2007, p 6.
- <sup>10</sup> Michel Foucault, 'Governmentality' in Graham Burchell, Colin Gordon and Peter Miller (eds) *The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality*. London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991.
- <sup>11</sup> John Clarke, Janet Newman, Nick Smith, Elizabeth Vidler and Louise Westmarland, *Creating Citizen-Consumers: Changing Publics and Changing Public Services*, London: Sage, 2007, p 150.
- <sup>12</sup> See Rose, 1998, p 17.
- <sup>13</sup> See 'Person-centred planning', Circles Network, [http://www.circlesnetwork.org.uk/what\\_is\\_person\\_centred\\_planning.htm](http://www.circlesnetwork.org.uk/what_is_person_centred_planning.htm) (Last accessed 8th February 2008).
- <sup>14</sup> Helen Graham, 'New 1970': "I", "We" and "anyone else?"", in Helen Graham, Ann Kaloski, Ali Nielsen and Emma Robertson (2003) (eds) *The Feminist Seventies*. York: Raw Nerve, 2003.
- <sup>15</sup> Ken Simons, *'Sticking up for yourself': Self-advocacy and people with learning difficulties*, Joseph Rowntree Foundation York, 1992, p 5.
- <sup>16</sup> Dorothy Atkinson, 'Narratives and People with Learning Disabilities', in Gordon Grant, Peter Goward, Malcolm Richardson and Paul Ramcharan (eds), *Learning Disability: A Life Cycle Approach*. Maidenhead: Open University Press, 2005, p 9.
- <sup>17</sup> Heritage Lottery Fund, 'Oral History and Reminiscence', <http://www.hlf.org.uk/NR/rdonlyres/8AF513FD-A258-4114-A689-20D12199281D/0/OralHistoryFactsheetWEB.pdf> (Last accessed 4th February 2008).
- <sup>18</sup> Heritage Lottery Fund/Applejuice, 'Social Impact of Heritage Lottery Funded Projects, 2006-2007', 2007, p 9, <http://www.hlf.org.uk/English/PublicationsAndInfo/AccessingPublications/Research+and+Evaluation.htm> (Last accessed 8<sup>th</sup> October 2008).
- <sup>19</sup> *The Concise Oxford Dictionary of Current English*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990.
- <sup>20</sup> See the Learning Disability Coalition's response to the restrictions in edibility criteria: [http://www.learningdisabilitycoalition.org.uk/news/news\\_15.asp](http://www.learningdisabilitycoalition.org.uk/news/news_15.asp) LD coalition (Last accessed 8th February 2008).
- <sup>21</sup> Clarke et al, 2007, p 35.
- <sup>22</sup> Clarke et al, 2007, p 64.
- <sup>23</sup> 'Younger Adult Day Services. Review of Day Services. Project Brief. John Spedding/ Sue Hutt', 20<sup>th</sup> June 1994, HDC archive.
- <sup>24</sup> Jan Glasby and Rosemary Littlechild, 'An overview of the implementation and development of direct payments', in Janet Lecce and Joanna Bornat (eds) *Developments in Direct Payments*, Bristol: Policy Press, 2006, p 28.
- <sup>25</sup> Val Williams and Andrew Holman 'Direct payment and autonomy: issues for people with learning difficulties', in Janet Lecce and Joanna Bornat (eds), *Developments in Direct Payments*, Bristol: Policy Press, 2006, p 75.
- <sup>26</sup> For details of the Employment and Support Allowance see Neil Bateman, 'Welfare Reform Bill: dangers of reform to incapacity benefit rules', *Community Care*, 15 February 2007. (Last accessed 14<sup>th</sup> March 2008)
- <sup>27</sup> Rose, 1998, p 3.
- <sup>28</sup> Gordon Brown, for example, speaks of 'genuinely meritocratic Britain', 'where all are encouraged to aim high. And by their efforts can rise'. [http://www.labour.org.uk/conference/brown\\_speech](http://www.labour.org.uk/conference/brown_speech) (Last accessed 8th February 2008).

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<sup>29</sup> These words are taken from Nikolas Rose, who sees this model of self as 'coherent, bounded, individualised, intentional, the locus of thought, action, and belief, the origin of its own actions, the beneficiary of a unique biography' and as the 'horizon of our thought', 1998, p 3.