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The value of partial and full pre-trip information under stochastic demand and bottleneck capacity in the morning commute

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This paper studies the welfare effects of providing pre-trip information to morning commuters in a single-bottleneck model, where both bottleneck capacity and travel demand are exogenously stochastic and assumed to follow an arbitrary joint distribution. We first derive the equilibrium travel costs under varying levels of information completeness, and then examine how information completeness influences travel costs and the key factors driving the welfare outcomes of information provision. We find that the welfare effects of providing pre-trip information are associated with the information completeness, the degree of correlation between bottleneck capacity and demand, and the frequency and amplitude of bottleneck capacity and demand changes. Although providing full information is never welfare-reducing, providing partial information can increase travel costs compared to no information (i.e., information paradox) when demand and bottleneck capacity are moderately correlated. Nevertheless, transitioning from partial to full information consistently leads to a reduction in travel costs. Our numerical examples further confirm the theoretical results and highlight the necessity of accounting for uncertainties in both supply and demand when developing traveler information systems.

Keywords: Morning commute problem, stochastic supply and demand, advanced traveler information system, information completeness, information value

1. Introduction

Nowadays, more than 50% of the world's population lives in cities (Goetz, 2019). Although the agglomeration effect of cities can bring benefits to people's lives, such as **high-quality** medical care and education, it also **leads to** many problems. One of the formidable problems in many cities, especially big ones, is traffic congestion (Small and Verhoef, 2007). In particular, many commuters living in big cities often experience severe traffic congestion during peak hours. The 2021 Urban Mobility Report estimated that the price of congestion in the U.S. was up to \$190 billion in 2019, resulting from 8.7 billion hours of travel delay

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18 and 3.5 billion gallons of additional fuel (Schrang et al., 2021). From 1989 to 2019, the delay
19 hours for each commuter in the most populated areas in the U.S. increased from 27 to 54
20 hours per year, **nearly doubling over three decades** (Schrang et al., 2021). It is expected
21 that the urban population will continue to grow in recent years, so the problems caused by
22 traffic congestion may worsen as the urban population grows (Goetz, 2019). The ultimate
23 reason for traffic congestion is the demand-supply imbalance. **Moreover, various unpre-**
24 **dictable events, such as traffic accidents, adverse weather, and unannounced road works, as**
25 **well as individual constraints that prevent commuters from driving, such as residential relo-**
26 **cations, vacations, and other personal circumstances, further exacerbate the uncertainty in**
27 **both travel demand and network capacity. This uncertainty intensifies** the supply-demand
28 imbalance, making traffic congestion more severe and unpredictable. Therefore, reducing
29 the supply and demand uncertainty in transportation is one feasible way to reduce traffic
30 congestion and additional travel costs.

31 In recent years, the development of advanced traveler information systems (ATIS), par-
32 ticularly the widespread use of smartphone navigation applications, can better collect and
33 deliver travel information to commuters (Ben-Elia and Avineri, 2015). The advent of ATIS
34 inspires us to understand how commuters respond to the provided information and what
35 factors and how these factors **affect** the performance of ATIS so that it better develops.
36 Providing information about traffic states to commuters before they depart (i.e., pre-trip
37 information) is a common way to reduce uncertainty in transportation (Lindsey et al., 2014;
38 Han et al., 2021). Previous studies have demonstrated that the welfare effects of pre-trip
39 information in the morning commute are related to many factors, such as information accura-
40 cy (Arnott et al., 1999; Yu et al., 2021), unpredictable fluctuations in road capacities (Arnott
41 et al., 1991; Khan and Amin, 2018; Han et al., 2021), commuter heterogeneity (Khan and
42 Amin, 2018; Yu et al., 2021), historical knowledge (Zhu et al., 2019), and pricing schemes (Yu
43 et al., 2023). These studies did good work in understanding the welfare effects of pre-trip in-
44 formation; however, most of them only considered the uncertainty in supply (i.e., stochastic
45 bottleneck capacity). **Although some studies, such as Arnott et al. (1999), consider uncer-**
46 **tainty in both supply and demand, the underlying factors influencing the welfare effects of**
47 **pre-trip information remain insufficiently explored and understood.**

48 **Uncertainty is ubiquitous in both supply and demand of transportation systems, often**
49 **leading to adverse effects such as increased costs and traffic congestion. These negative**
50 **impacts, however, are typically believed to be alleviated through the provision of travel-**
51 **er information. However, when supply and demand are both stochastic, it is still unclear**
52 **about the welfare effects of information provision and what factors and how these factors**
53 **influence the welfare effects of this pre-trip information in the morning commute. In this**
54 **paper, we investigate the welfare effects of providing pre-trip information to morning com-**
55 **muters in a single-bottleneck model where bottleneck capacity (i.e., supply) and the number**
56 **of commuters (i.e., demand) are both stochastic. We first investigate travel costs at user**
57 **equilibrium under varying levels of pre-trip information provision, specifically focusing on**
58 **information completeness. We distinguish between three levels of information completeness:**
59 **(1) no information, where commuters make decisions without any prior knowledge of the**
60 **stochastic conditions affecting their journey; (2) partial information, where commuters have**

61 access to limited pre-trip details, such as either demand or capacity forecasts; and (3) full
62 information, where commuters are fully informed about the joint realization of both de-
63 mand and capacity before departure. Next, we evaluate the value of providing different
64 levels of pre-trip information (i.e., information value) by comparing the equilibrium travel
65 costs under varying levels of information completeness. The value of pre-trip information is
66 measured by the change in travel costs when providing one level of information complete-
67 ness to commuters, compared to another level of completeness. Specifically, we focus on
68 the value of pre-trip information by comparing partial information with no information, full
69 information with no information, and full information with partial information, as well as
70 examining the effects of two types of partial information, namely demand information and
71 bottleneck information. Pre-trip information is considered welfare-improving (or welfare-
72 reducing) if it results in a decrease (or increase) in travel costs relative to the scenario with
73 lower completeness or no information. However, if the pre-trip information does not affect
74 travel costs compared to scenarios with lower completeness or no information, it is welfare-
75 neutral (Lindsey et al., 2014; Han et al., 2021). Also, we assume the information provided
76 to commuters before departure is one hundred percent accurate.

77 Our study differs from the previous ones about the value of pre-trip information in the
78 morning commute in at least two aspects. First, the stochastic demand and bottleneck ca-
79 pacity are assumed to follow an arbitrary joint distribution, and the degree of correlation
80 between supply and demand is introduced to describe the relationship between bottleneck
81 capacity and demand caused by unpredictable events. Second, the welfare effects of infor-
82 mation completeness are considered by providing different amounts of pre-trip information.
83 We derive the expected travel costs under user equilibrium in the three regimes regard-
84 ing the amounts of information provision: zero-information, partial-information, and full-
85 information. Two scenarios in the partial-information regime, i.e., only providing demand
86 information and only providing supply information, are considered.

87 Our study quantifies the welfare effects of varying levels of information completeness
88 in a correlated stochastic environment, where demand and bottleneck capacity are jointly
89 distributed. By introducing a flexible correlation structure between supply and demand, we
90 develop a analytical framework that captures how different degrees of information complete-
91 ness interact with underlying system uncertainties to influence equilibrium travel costs and
92 commuter welfare. Our study makes several contributions to the literature on the morning
93 commute problem with stochastic demand and bottleneck capacity as well as ATIS. First,
94 we theoretically demonstrate that providing full pre-trip information consistently improves
95 welfare compared to no information, as it simultaneously eliminates uncertainty on both the
96 supply and demand sides. Second, the welfare effects of providing partial information, rela-
97 tive to no information, depend on the correlation between bottleneck capacity and demand,
98 as well as the frequency and magnitude of their fluctuations. Notably, when supply and de-
99 mand are uncorrelated, partial information is either welfare-neutral or beneficial. However,
100 when they are moderately correlated, partial information may lead to higher travel costs
101 compared to no information—a phenomenon known as the information paradox. Third, we
102 find that the type of partial information matters: bottleneck capacity information generally
103 yields better performance than demand information, especially under moderate correlation

scenarios. Fourth, the transition from partial to full information consistently reduces travel costs, even though partial information alone may trigger the information paradox over zero information.

The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the related literature. Section 3 presents the model. Section 4 derives the equilibrium solutions when providing different amounts of pre-trip information. Section 5 investigates the welfare effects of pre-trip information. Section 6 provides numerical examples to confirm the theoretical findings. Section 7 concludes the paper and discusses potential research directions.

2. Literature review

For decades, many transport researchers and policymakers have paid attention to the morning commute problem since commuters during peak hours usually experience more severe congestion than in other traveling periods, thereby leading to many adverse effects, such as additional travel costs and greenhouse gas emissions (Small, 2015; Li et al., 2020). The single-bottleneck model proposed by Vickrey (1969) has been a classical theoretical base to investigate the morning commute problem, in which commuters need to balance the trade-off between travel time and schedule delay. Many studies since then have extended the model in various directions, such as stochastic capacity (Xiao et al., 2015; Long et al., 2022), elastic demand (Arnott et al., 1999; Liu et al., 2025), information provision (Arnott et al., 1991; Khan and Amin, 2018; Han et al., 2021; Yu et al., 2023), the value of reliability (Fosgerau and Karlström, 2010; Liu et al., 2020), congestion pricing and metering (De Palma and Lindsey, 2011), and so forth.

One non-negligible reason for traffic congestion and the difficulties of traffic prediction is uncertainty. In the morning commute, uncertainty significantly influences departure time choice behavior and changes departure flow patterns and travel costs. For example, Xiao et al. (2015) found that uncertainty in bottleneck capacities would cause commuters to depart earlier and spread departure flows over a longer period compared to a deterministic bottleneck setting. Also, the departure flow patterns became more complex under a stochastic bottleneck setting than a deterministic bottleneck setting. For example, Long et al. (2022) identified five possible departure flow patterns formed in different queuing types and schedule delay types when the bottleneck capacity was assumed to follow a general continuous probability distribution; in contrast, only one pattern emerges when capacity is deterministic. Furthermore, Fosgerau (2008) found that the stochastic of demand and bottleneck capacity could increase congestion costs by up to 50% compared to the case where demand and bottleneck capacity were deterministic.

Providing information is a practical and effective strategy to influence travelers' behavior in transportation systems. This, in turn, can help alleviate congestion and optimize system efficiency. Ben-Elia and Avineri (2015) reviewed information classification in travel behavior research. Information sources are typically categorized into three fundamental types: experiential, descriptive, and prescriptive. Experiential information is acquired through continuous learning from historical experience feedback. Descriptive information describes current or predicted travel conditions, while prescriptive information includes recommenda-

145 tions, guidelines, or alternative suggestions. Pre-trip information, which is provided before
146 the journey begins, falls under the category of descriptive information as it helps to elim-
147 inate uncertainty about the trip, providing travelers with critical insights into conditions
148 they may face. Many studies have investigated the welfare effects of information provision
149 in the morning commute. For example, Arnott et al. (1991) used a simple model with depart-
150 ure time and route choices, where bottleneck capacity was assumed to follow the Bernoulli
151 distribution. They found that providing imperfect information might increase travel costs
152 compared to no pre-trip information. Khan and Amin (2018) studied the effects of het-
153 erogeneous information on departure choice behavior in a bottleneck model with stochastic
154 capacity, where information heterogeneity was described using a Bayesian game with two
155 asymmetrically informed commuter populations, providing evidence for the importance of
156 the degree of information penetration. Zhu et al. (2019) studied the impact of long-term his-
157 torical knowledge and real-time information provision on the bounded rational commuters in
158 a bottleneck corridor with stochastic capacity. They found that the convergence of bound-
159 ed rational user equilibrium was influenced by information perceptions. Yu et al. (2021)
160 investigated the joint effects of inaccurate pre-trip information and commuters' respons-
161 es and heterogeneity on morning commute behavior under stochastic bottleneck capacity.
162 They found that the welfare effects of inaccurate information were significantly influenced
163 by commuters' responses and heterogeneity. Inaccurate information might be better than
164 accurate information when commuters complied with the provided inaccurate information.
165 Han et al. (2021) studied the value of pre-trip information in the morning commute with
166 departure time and route choices in which bottleneck capacity was assumed to follow a gen-
167 eral probability distribution. They found that information accuracy and the uncertainty of
168 the free-flow travel time significantly influenced the welfare effects of pre-trip information.
169 Full and accurate pre-trip information might be welfare-reducing when free-flow travel time
170 and bottleneck capacity were both stochastic. Yu et al. (2023) investigated the effects of
171 information provision and congestion pricing on social welfare and travel costs in the morn-
172 ing commute under price-sensitive demand and stochastic bottleneck capacity. They found
173 that responsive pricing performed better than habitual pricing, especially when high-quality
174 information was provided.

175 Furthermore, in the context of information provision, the completeness of information is
176 crucial in shaping the performance of transportation systems. Previous studies have inves-
177 tigated the influence of information complete (or information integrity) on travel behavior
178 and system efficiency. For example, Peeta et al. (2004) quantified information complete-
179 ness as the perceived information reliability (PIR) metric. They found that when PIR was
180 small, the convergence of Wardrop equilibrium decreased. Abdel-Aty and Yuan (2010) de-
181 veloped a robust static traffic assignment model that accounted for incomplete information,
182 demonstrating that the absence of information results in increased total system travel time.
183 Avitabile et al. (2018) discovered that information completeness had an inverted U-shaped
184 relationship with cognitive load, as demonstrated through eye-tracking behavioral experi-
185 ments. They explained that providing too much information can actually reduce the quality
186 of travel decisions. Lu et al. (2020) proposed an information integrity compensation frame-
187 work and developed the information integrity index. They demonstrated that when data

188 completeness was low, prediction errors increased nonlinearly. Furthermore, some studies
189 investigated the welfare effects of pre-trip information in the morning commute under the
190 uncertainty of demand and supply. Arnott et al. (1988) investigated the impact of informa-
191 tion on the time-of-use decisions of commuters in a congestible facility where demand and
192 capacity were stochastic. They further analyzed a simple case of partial information where
193 demand was fixed and capacity followed the Bernoulli Distribution, finding that complete
194 information was better than zero information. Arnott et al. (1999) showed that information
195 might reduce social welfare when demand was isoelastic in price and bottleneck capacity
196 was stochastic. They also found that imperfect information might negatively affect social
197 welfare compared to no information.

198 From the literature mentioned above, we find that most studies only investigate the
199 impact of pre-trip information in the morning commute under the stochastic bottleneck
200 capacity. Relatively few studies have investigated the welfare effects of pre-trip information
201 when both travel demand and bottleneck capacity are stochastic. Furthermore, although
202 Arnott et al. (1988) investigated the impact of partial information on commuting costs, they
203 only studied a simple case where demand was assumed to be fixed.¹ Also, Khan and Amin
204 (2018) argued that additional insights about the value of information could be gained by
205 assuming that the demand and bottleneck capacity followed an arbitrary joint distribution.
206 Motivated by these gaps, this paper presents a general analysis of the impact of partial and
207 full information on the morning commute, where demand and bottleneck capacity are both
208 exogenously stochastic and are assumed to follow an arbitrary joint distribution. Partial
209 information refers to scenarios in which commuters are informed about either demand or
210 bottleneck capacity prior to departure, while full information provides both. We pay special
211 attention to analyzing the impact of information completeness, the degree of correlation
212 between demand and bottleneck capacity, and the frequency and amplitude of bottleneck
213 capacity and demand changes.

214 3. The model

215 3.1. Assumptions and notations

216 In the model, we assume a highway with a bottleneck connecting a residential district
217 (RD) and a central business district (CBD). Unlike the deterministic setting of the classical
218 bottleneck model, there is uncertainty in demand and bottleneck capacity. The uncertainty
219 in bottleneck capacity can arise from factors such as adverse weather, accidents, roadwork,
220 or special events. Furthermore, we incorporate uncertain travel demand to account for
221 commuters who do not drive to work every weekday. This uncertainty in travel demand
222 is exogenous, primarily driven by external factors such as adverse weather, residential re-
223 locations, personal vacations, and other circumstances that prevent commuting. Previous
224 theoretical studies on stochastic demand have typically modeled the variability in travel de-
225 mand as either exogenous (Zhong et al., 2014; Pedroso et al., 2024) or price-sensitive (Arnott

¹Arnott et al. (1988) argued that a general analysis of partial information was conceptually and analytically difficult; therefore, they only investigated a simplified situation where demand was fixed.

et al., 1993b; van den Berg, 2012; Liu et al., 2025). In this study, we assume that both travel demand and bottleneck capacity follow exogenously given probability distributions.

We denote the set of possible bottleneck capacity states as Ω and the possible demand states as Ψ . Let s_ω denote the bottleneck capacity in state ω , where $\omega \in \Omega$, and N_ψ denote the demand in state ψ , where $\psi \in \Psi$. Let \underline{N} and \overline{N} denote the minimum and maximum demand, respectively, and let \underline{s} and \overline{s} denote the lower and upper bounds of the bottleneck capacity, respectively. Then, the relationship between \underline{N} and \overline{N} can be described as $\underline{N} = \pi_N \overline{N}$, where $0 < \pi_N < 1$, and the relationship between \underline{s} and \overline{s} can be described as $\underline{s} = \pi_s \overline{s}$, where $0 < \pi_s < 1$. Without loss of generality, we assume Ω and Ψ are continuous. Let $j(N_\psi, s_\omega)$ denote the joint probability density function of a commuter departing from RD to CBD under demand N_ψ and bottleneck capacity s_ω , and the corresponding joint cumulative distribution function can be described as $J(N_\psi, s_\omega) = \int_{\underline{N}}^{N_\psi} \int_{\underline{s}}^{s_\omega} j(N_\psi, s_\omega) ds_\omega dN_\psi$. Then, the probability density function and cumulative distribution function of s_ω are denoted as $f(s_\omega)$ and $F(s_\omega) = \int_{\underline{s}}^{s_\omega} f(s_\omega) ds_\omega$. The probability density function of a commuter who needs to commute in condition ω is denoted as $g(N_\psi)$, and the corresponding cumulative distribution function is $G(N_\psi) = \int_{\underline{N}}^{N_\psi} g(N_\psi) dN_\psi$.

We use correlation to denote the relationship between demand and bottleneck capacity. Further, referring to the rule of thumb, we classify the strength of the correlation between demand and bottleneck capacity into five levels: independent ($r = 0$), weak, moderate, strong, and complete ($r = \pm 1$). It should be noted that the weak, moderate, and strong correlations are relative divisions. When the correlation coefficient is close to ± 1 , we refer to the case as a strong correlation. When the correlation coefficient is close to 0, we refer to the case as a weak correlation. The strength of the relationship between the weak and strong correlations is regarded as a moderate correlation.

Following the previous studies related to the nature of non-recurrent congestion caused by unpredictable events (Arnott et al., 1988, 1991; Khan and Amin, 2018; Han et al., 2021; Yu et al., 2023), the following assumptions are adopted in our model:

Assumption 1. Commuters are risk-neutral to travel costs.

Assumption 2. Commuters are homogeneous regarding the shadow values of travel time and schedule delay.

Assumption 3. The bottleneck capacity and demand are constant within a day but may fluctuate from day to day.

Assumption 4. The distributions of demand and bottleneck capacity are stationary and commonly known to all commuters.

Assumption 3 reflects the practical observation that demand and bottleneck capacity tend to remain stable within a single day (e.g., during morning peak hours), while exhibiting variability across days due to external factors such as adverse weather, traffic incidents, or day-specific travel patterns. It allows us to capture meaningful uncertainty without introducing within-day complexity. Assumption 4 underpins the formulation of an equilibrium concept in which commuters optimize their departure time choices based on expected travel costs without full information. This expected equilibrium captures long-run behavioral adaptation to a system characterized by stochastic yet predictable dynamics.

Table 1: Notational glossary.

Notation	Description	Notation	Description
Scenarios			
Z	Zero-information scenario	F	Full-information scenario
D	Demand-information scenario	B	Bottleneck-information scenario
Parameters			
α	Shadow value of travel time	Ψ	Set of possible demand states, $\Psi = \{H, L\}$
β	Shadow value of schedule delay early	Ω	Set of possible bottleneck states, $\Omega = \{G, B\}$
γ	Shadow value of schedule delay late	T^f	Free-flow travel time
t^*	Work start time		
Variables			
r	The degree of correlation between the random variables N_ψ and s_ω	$g(s_\omega N_\psi)$	The conditional density function of s_ω at a given N_ψ
$\rho_{\psi\omega}$	The correlation parameter between the random variables N_ψ and s_ω	$G(s_\omega N_\psi)$	The conditional cumulative distribution function of s_ω at a given N_ψ
s_ω	Bottleneck capacity in condition ω	\bar{s}	Maximum bottleneck capacity
N_ψ	Demand in condition ψ	\underline{s}	Minimum bottleneck capacity, $\underline{s} = \pi_s \bar{s}$
\bar{N}	Maximum demand	ω	Possible states of a bottleneck
\underline{N}	Minimum demand, $\underline{N} = \pi_N \bar{N}$	ψ	Possible states of a demand
$\bar{\theta}$	Upper bound of $\theta_{\psi\omega}$	$f(s_\omega)$	Probability density function of s_ω
$\underline{\theta}$	Lower bound of $\theta_{\psi\omega}$, $\underline{\theta} = \pi_\theta \bar{\theta}$	$F(s_\omega)$	Cumulative distribution function of s_ω
p_N	Probability of demand under the high-level ($0 < p_N < 1$)	p_s	Probability of capacity in the good-condition ($0 < p_s < 1$)
$g(N_\psi)$	Probability density function of N_ψ	$G(N_\psi)$	Cumulative distribution function of N_ψ
$k(\theta_{\psi\omega})$	Probability density function of $\theta_{\psi\omega}$	$K(\theta_{\psi\omega})$	Cumulative distribution function of $\theta_{\psi\omega}$
$j(N_\psi, s_\omega)$	Joint probability density function under N_ψ and s_ω	$J(N_\psi, s_\omega)$	Joint cumulative distribution function under N_ψ and s_ω
$P(s_\omega)$	Probability distribution of s_ω	$P(N_\psi s_\omega)$	Conditional probability of N_ψ at a given s_ω
$f(N_\psi s_\omega)$	Conditional density function of N_ψ at a given s_ω	$F(N_\psi s_\omega)$	Conditional cumulative distribution function of N_ψ at a given s_ω
t_0	Earliest departure time	$T_{\psi \omega}(t)$	Travel time at time t under N_ψ at a given s_ω
t_e	Latest departure time	$T_{\psi\omega}(t)$	Travel time at time t under N_ψ and s_ω
$\hat{\theta}$	Pseudo travel time, $\hat{\theta} = t_e - t_0$	$T_{\omega \psi}(t)$	Travel time at time t under s_ω at a given N_ψ
$P(N_\psi)$	Probability distribution of N_ψ	$P(s_\omega N_\psi)$	Conditional probability of s_ω at a given N_ψ
π_s	Capacity degradation rate ($0 < \pi_s < 1$)	π_N	Demand degradation rate ($0 < \pi_N < 1$)
$SDE_{\psi\omega}(t)$	Schedule delay early at time t under N_ψ and s_ω	$C_{\omega \psi}^D(t)$	Travel cost at time t when only providing demand information N_ψ
$SDE_{\psi \omega}(t)$	Schedule delay early at time t under N_ψ at a given s_ω	$C^Z(t)$	Travel cost at time t in the zero information scenario
$SDE_{\omega \psi}(t)$	Schedule delay early at time t under s_ω at a given N_ψ	$C^D(t)$	Travel cost at time t in the demand information scenario
$SDL_{\psi\omega}(t)$	Schedule delay late at time t under N_ψ and s_ω	$C^F(t)$	Travel cost at time t in the full-information scenario
$SDL_{\psi \omega}(t)$	Schedule delay late at time t under N_ψ at a given s_ω	$C^B(t)$	Travel cost at time t in the bottleneck capacity-information scenario
$SDL_{\omega \psi}(t)$	Schedule delay late at time t under s_ω at a given N_ψ	$C_{\psi \omega}^B(t)$	Travel cost at time t when only providing bottleneck capacity information s_ω
$H(t)$	Cumulative departures at time t	$h(t)$	Departure rate at time t
$P(\theta_{\psi\omega})$	Joint probability of N_ψ and s_ω	$Q_{\psi\omega}(t)$	Queue length at the bottleneck at time t under N_ψ and s_ω
$\theta_{\psi\omega}$	$\theta_{\psi\omega} = N_\psi / s_\omega$		

303 *3.3.2. Only providing demand information*

304 When providing demand information, commuters will know the number of commuter-
 305 s before departure. In this case, the conditional density function of s_ω at a given N_ψ is
 306 $g(s_\omega|N_\psi) = \frac{\partial}{\partial s_\omega} J(N_\psi, s_\omega)$, and the corresponding conditional cumulative distribution func-
 307 tion is $G(s_\omega|N_\psi) = \int_{\underline{s}}^{s_\omega} g(s_\omega|N_\psi) ds_\omega$. When only providing demand information, the ex-
 308 pected travel cost of a commuter departing at time t is:

$$E[C_{\omega|\psi}^D(t)] = E[\alpha T_{\omega|\psi}(t) + \beta \text{SDE}_{\omega|\psi}(t) + \gamma \text{SDL}_{\omega|\psi}(t)] \quad (3)$$

309 where $\text{SDE}_{\omega|\psi}(t)$, $\text{SDL}_{\omega|\psi}(t)$, and $T_{\omega|\psi}(t)$ denote the schedule delay early costs, sched-
 310 ular delay late costs, and travel time costs for the commuter departing at time t in
 311 bottleneck capacity state ω at a given demand state ψ , which can be expressed as
 312 $\text{SDE}_{\omega|\psi}(t) = \max\{(t^* - t - T_{\omega|\psi}(t)), 0\}$, $\text{SDL}_{\omega|\psi}(t) = \max\{0, (t + T_{\omega|\psi}(t) - t^*)\}$ and
 313 $T_{\omega|\psi}(t) = Q_{\omega|\psi}(t)/s_\omega + T^f$. The queuing length is $Q_{\omega|\psi}(t) = \max\{\int_{t_0}^t h(x)dx - s_\omega(t - t_0), 0\}$,
 314 where $h(t)$ denotes the departure rate at time t under the given demand state ψ .

315 *3.4. The full-information regime*

316 In this full-information regime, commuters are provided with both demand and bottle-
 317 neck information before departure. In this regime, the travel cost in bottleneck capacity state
 318 ω and demand state ψ degrades into the classical bottleneck model under a deterministic
 319 setting. The travel cost of a commuter departing at time t is:

$$C_{\psi\omega}^F(t) = \alpha T_{\psi\omega}(t) + \beta \text{SDE}_{\psi\omega}(t) + \gamma \text{SDL}_{\psi\omega}(t) \quad (4)$$

320 where $\text{SDE}_{\psi\omega}(t)$, $\text{SDL}_{\psi\omega}(t)$, and $T_{\psi\omega}(t)$ denote the schedule delay early costs, schedule de-
 321 lay late costs, and travel time costs for the commuter departing at time t at given bot-
 322 tleneck capacity state ω and demand state ψ , which can be expressed as $\text{SDE}_{\psi\omega}(t) =$
 323 $\max\{(t^* - t - T_{\psi\omega}(t)), 0\}$, $\text{SDL}_{\psi\omega}(t) = \max\{0, (t + T_{\psi\omega}(t) - t^*)\}$ and $T_{\psi\omega}(t) = Q_{\psi\omega}(t)/s_\omega +$
 324 T^f . The queuing length is $Q_{\psi\omega}(t) = \max\{\int_{t_0}^t h(x)dx - s_\omega(t - t_0), 0\}$, where $h(t)$ denotes the
 325 departure rate at time t under the given bottleneck capacity state ω and demand state ψ .

326 **4. Equilibrium analysis**

327 In this section, we derive the expected travel costs under user equilibrium (UE) in the
 328 three information regimes. We first derive the general formulations of expected travel costs
 329 when the stochastic demand and bottleneck capacity are assumed to follow an arbitrary
 330 joint distribution. Then, we provide an example by assuming that the stochastic bottleneck
 331 capacity and demand follow Bernoulli distributions. The Bernoulli distribution allows us
 332 to capture key dynamics while maintaining analytical tractability. Moreover, in practice,
 333 bottleneck failures often occur suddenly and discretely, such as due to signal failures or lane
 334 closures. The capacity of bottlenecks may completely fail at certain times, while remaining
 335 normal at others. This ‘‘all or nothing’’ randomness is well-suited to the Bernoulli distribu-
 336 tion (Lindsey et al., 2014; Han et al., 2021). Also, fluctuations in travel demand, particularly

in contexts where demand is subject to abrupt changes, may also exhibit binary characteristics, making the Bernoulli distribution a reasonable choice (Albareda-Sambola et al., 2011; Ghaffarinasab, 2022). Furthermore, due to the simplicity of the Bernoulli distribution, its parameters can be estimated using empirical data or historical observations. This involves fitting the data to estimate the probabilities of high and low demand and capacity states, ensuring that the model parameters are both realistic and representative of the observed system behavior.²

4.1. The zero-information regime

4.1.1. General results

Per the definition of user equilibrium (UE), the expected travel costs at UE under stochastic bottleneck capacity and demand can be obtained from

$$dE[C^Z(t)]/dt = 0, \quad \text{if } h(t) > 0 \quad (5)$$

Previous studies typically derived the expected travel costs at UE under stochastic capacity by analyzing departure patterns. Han et al. (2021) developed a simple method to obtain the expected travel costs at UE under stochastic capacity without analyzing the departure patterns. We extend the method proposed by Han et al. (2021) to derive the expected travel costs at UE under stochastic bottleneck capacity and demand. To this end, the following proposition is first proved.

Proposition 1. *The latest departure time t_e at UE is never earlier than the work start time t^* , i.e., $t_e \geq t^*$.*

Proof: Assume this proposition is false, and all commuters depart before t_e . In this case, commuters departing at t_e may encounter three different scenarios: schedule delay early without congestion, schedule delay early with congestion, schedule delay late with congestion. In this case, delaying departure until t^* is always better than departing at t_e because the schedule delay cost and/or queuing cost is reduced, we have $E[C^Z(t_e)] > E[C^Z(t^*)]$. Therefore, the proposition $t_e \geq t^*$ is true. \square

According to Proposition 1, we have two cases, i.e., Case I ($t_e > t^*$) and Case II ($t_e = t^*$), based on the relationship between t_e and t^* . Furthermore, let $\theta_{\psi\omega} = N_{\psi}/s_{\omega}$, where $\theta_{\psi\omega} \in [\underline{\theta}, \bar{\theta}]$. Then, the probability density function of $\theta_{\psi\omega}$ can be obtained from $k(\theta_{\psi\omega}) = \int_{\underline{s}}^{\bar{s}} s_{\omega} j(s_{\omega}, s_{\omega}\theta_{\psi\omega}) ds_{\omega}$, and the corresponding cumulative probability distribution of $\theta_{\psi\omega}$ is $K(\theta_{\psi\omega}) = \int_{\underline{\theta}}^{\theta_{\psi\omega}} k(\theta_{\psi\omega}) d\theta_{\psi\omega}$. Also, we define the pseudo travel time $\hat{\theta}$ under stochastic bottleneck capacity and demand, where $\hat{\theta} = t_e - t_0$. In what follows, we derive the expected travel costs at UE in the two cases.

²It is worth noting that calibrating the model parameters is a challenging yet essential step for translating the theoretical framework into practical applications. However, this process involves substantial empirical analysis and is beyond the scope of the present study.

369 (Case I). Commuters departing at t_0 will not experience congestion and will arrive at the
 370 CBD before t^* . Therefore, the expected travel costs at t_0 under the stochastic bottleneck
 371 capacity and demand is

$$E[C^Z(t_0)] = \beta(t^* - t_0) \quad (6)$$

372 Unlike commuters departing at t_0 , commuters who depart at t_e will experience congestion
 373 if $\theta_{\psi\omega} > \hat{\theta}$ or not experience congestion otherwise. If $\theta_{\psi\omega} > \hat{\theta}$, the travel time of commuters
 374 who depart at t_e is $\theta_{\psi\omega} - \hat{\theta}$. Therefore, the expected travel cost at t_e under stochastic
 375 bottleneck capacity and demand without pre-trip information is:

$$\begin{aligned} E[C^Z(t_e)] &= \int_{\underline{\theta}}^{\hat{\theta}} k(\theta_{\psi\omega})\gamma(t_e - t^*)d\theta_{\psi\omega} + \int_{\hat{\theta}}^{\bar{\theta}} k(\theta_{\psi\omega}) \left\{ \alpha(\theta_{\psi\omega} - \hat{\theta}) + \gamma[t_e + (\theta_{\psi\omega} - \hat{\theta}) - t^*] \right\} d\theta_{\psi\omega} \\ &= \gamma(t_e - t^*) + (\alpha + \gamma) \int_{\hat{\theta}}^{\bar{\theta}} k(\theta_{\psi\omega})(\theta_{\psi\omega} - \hat{\theta})d\theta_{\psi\omega} \end{aligned} \quad (7)$$

376 Since $t_e = \hat{\theta} + t_0$, the expected travel costs at t_e can be denoted as:

$$E[C^Z(\hat{\theta})] = \gamma(\hat{\theta} + t_0 - t^*) + (\alpha + \gamma) \int_{\hat{\theta}}^{\bar{\theta}} k(\theta_{\psi\omega})(\theta_{\psi\omega} - \hat{\theta})d\theta_{\psi\omega} \quad (8)$$

377 The first partial derivative of $E[C^Z(\hat{\theta})]$ to $\hat{\theta}$ is:

$$\frac{\partial E[C^Z(\hat{\theta})]}{\partial \hat{\theta}} = \gamma - (\alpha + \gamma)[1 - K(\hat{\theta})] \quad (9)$$

378 where $K(\hat{\theta})$ is a non-decreasing and right-continuous function. Let $\hat{\theta}^*$ denote the pseu-
 379 do travel time that minimizes the expected travel costs of the last commuter. Setting
 380 $\partial E[C^Z(\hat{\theta})]/\partial \hat{\theta} = 0$, we have $K(\hat{\theta}^*) = \alpha/(\alpha + \gamma)$.

381 Per the definition of UE, $E[C^Z(t_e)] = E[C^Z(t_0)]$. Then we have the expected travel costs
 382 of each commuter at UE under stochastic bottleneck capacity and demand without pre-trip
 383 information in Case I:

$$E[C^Z] = \frac{\beta(\alpha + \gamma)}{\beta + \gamma} \int_{\hat{\theta}^*}^{\bar{\theta}} k(\theta_{\psi\omega})\theta_{\psi\omega}d\theta_{\psi\omega} \quad (10)$$

384 where $\hat{\theta}^* = K^{-1}(\alpha/(\alpha + \gamma))$.

385 (Case II). The expected travel costs at t_0 and $t_e(t^*)$ under stochastic bottleneck capacity
 386 and demand without pre-trip information can be formulated as follows:

$$\begin{cases} E[C^Z(t_0)] = \beta\hat{\theta} \\ E[C^Z(t_e)] = (\alpha + \gamma) \int_{\hat{\theta}}^{\bar{\theta}} k(\theta_{\psi\omega})(\theta_{\psi\omega} - \hat{\theta})d\theta_{\psi\omega} \end{cases} \quad (11)$$

387 Letting $E[C^Z(t_e)] = E[C^Z(t_0)]$, we can have the pseudo travel time $\hat{\theta}^{**}$ by solving $\beta\hat{\theta}^{**} =$
 388 $(\alpha + \gamma) \int_{\hat{\theta}^{**}}^{\bar{\theta}} k(\theta_{\psi\omega})(\theta_{\psi\omega} - \hat{\theta}^{**})d\theta_{\psi\omega}$. The expected travel cost of each commuter at UE under

389 the stochastic demand and capacity without pre-trip information in Case II is

$$E[C^Z] = \beta \hat{\theta}^{**} \quad (12)$$

390 The boundary condition between Case I and Case II can be obtained by solving $K(\hat{\theta}^{**}) =$
 391 $\alpha/(\alpha + \gamma)$. The derivation of this boundary condition can be found in the Appendix A.1.
 392 If the two random variables s_ω and N_ψ follow a joint discrete probability distribution, the
 393 above method can also be used to derive the expected travel cost per commuter at UE (see
 394 Appendix A.2 for details).

395 4.1.2. Results for the Bernoulli distribution

396 To simplify analysis and without loss of generality, many previous studies assumed that
 397 the stochastic bottleneck capacity followed the Bernoulli distribution (Arnott et al., 1991;
 398 Khan and Amin, 2018; Han et al., 2021). Here, we further derive the formulations of expected
 399 travel costs at UE by assuming that the bottleneck capacity and demand follow Bernoulli
 400 distributions. Let $\omega \in \Omega = \{G, B\}$ denote the set of possible bottleneck states, and $\psi \in$
 401 $\Psi = \{H, L\}$ denote the set of possible demand states. We assume the bottleneck capacity
 402 in bad condition (i.e., $s_B = \underline{s}$) with probability $P(s_B) = 1 - p_s$ and bottleneck capacity in
 403 good condition (i.e., $s_G = \bar{s}$) with probability $P(s_G) = p_s$. The relationship between s_G
 404 and s_B can be expressed as $s_B = \pi_s s_G$, where π_s is the degradation amplitude of bottleneck
 405 capacity in bad condition over good condition and $0 < \pi_s < 1$. Furthermore, we set a
 406 commuter's commuting probabilities under the high-level demand (i.e., $N_H = \bar{N}$) and the
 407 low-level demand (i.e., $N_L = \underline{N}$) as $P(N_H) = p_N$ and $P(N_L) = 1 - p_N$, respectively.
 408 The relationship between N_G and N_B can be expressed as $N_B = \pi_N N_G$, where π_N is the
 409 degradation amplitude of the number of commuters in low-level demand over high-level
 410 demand and $0 < \pi_N < 1$.

411 Therefore, we have four possible state combinations under stochastic demand and bottle-
 412 neck capacity, i.e., HG , LG , HB , and LB , and the joint probability under a possible state
 413 combination is $P(\theta_{\psi\omega})$. **In transportation systems, demand and bottleneck capacity are of-**
 414 **ten influenced by common external factors. For example, adverse weather conditions, such**
 415 **as heavy rain or snow, can simultaneously reduce bottleneck capacity and increase travel**
 416 **demand. Therefore, it is reasonable to expect a correlation between demand and capaci-**
 417 **ty in many real-world scenarios. Capturing this interdependence is crucial for accurately**
 418 **modeling system performance and for assessing the effectiveness of information provision**
 419 **strategies under uncertainty. In this study, we apply the Pearson correlation coefficient r as**
 420 **a tractable and interpretable metric to quantify the linear relationship between stochastic**
 421 **demand and bottleneck capacity under Bernoulli distributions:**

$$r = \frac{P(\theta_{HG})P(\theta_{LB}) - P(\theta_{HB})P(\theta_{LG})}{\sqrt{P(N_H)P(N_L)P(s_G)P(s_B)}}, \quad (13)$$

422 where $P(\theta_{\psi\omega}) = P(N_\psi, s_\Omega)$ and $-1 \leq r \leq 1$. If $r = 0$, demand and bottleneck capacity are
 423 uncorrelated. If $r > 0$, demand and bottleneck capacity are positively correlated, indicating
 424 that high and low demand levels are more likely to correspond to good and bad bottleneck

425 conditions, respectively. If $r < 0$, demand and bottleneck capacity are negatively correlated,
 426 indicating that high and low demand levels are more likely to correspond to bad and good
 427 bottleneck conditions, respectively. The relationships among the values of $\theta_{\psi\omega}$ under the
 428 four possible state combinations can be described as $\theta_{LG} < \{\theta_{HG}, \theta_{LB}\} < \theta_{HB}$. To simplify
 429 the following description, we let $\theta_1 = \theta_{LG}$, $\theta_2 = \min\{\theta_{HG}, \theta_{LB}\}$, $\theta_3 = \max\{\theta_{HG}, \theta_{LB}\}$, and
 430 $\theta_4 = \theta_{HB}$ to make sure $\theta_1 < \theta_2 < \theta_3 < \theta_4$. When $\pi_N > \pi_s$, we have $\theta_2 = \theta_{HG}$ and $\theta_3 = \theta_{LB}$,
 431 otherwise, we have $\theta_2 = \theta_{LB}$ and $\theta_3 = \theta_{HG}$. The expressions of $E[C^Z]$ under Bernoulli
 432 distributions can be found in the Appendix A.3.

433 4.2. The partial-information regime

434 We adopt a similar method for deriving the expected travel costs without pre-trip infor-
 435 mation to obtain the expected travel costs when providing partial pre-trip information.

436 4.2.1. Only providing bottleneck information

437 When the bottleneck capacity and demand follow an arbitrary joint distribution, the
 438 expected travel cost of each commuter at UE at a given bottleneck state ω is:

$$E[C_{\psi|\omega}^B] = \begin{cases} \frac{(\alpha + \gamma)\beta}{(\beta + \gamma)s_\omega} \int_{\hat{N}^*}^{\bar{N}} f(N_\psi|s_\omega) N_\psi dN_\psi & \text{if } t_e > t^* \\ \hat{N}^{**}\beta/s_\omega & \text{if } t_e = t^* \end{cases} \quad (14)$$

439 where $\hat{N}^* = F^{-1}(\alpha/(\alpha + \gamma))$ and \hat{N}^{**} can be obtained by solving the nonlinear equation
 440 $\hat{N}^{**}\beta = (\alpha + \gamma) \int_{\hat{N}^{**}}^{\bar{N}} f(N_\psi|s_\omega) [N_\psi - \hat{N}^{**}] dN_\psi$.

441 The expected travel cost of each commuter at UE under stochastic bottleneck capacity
 442 and demand with providing bottleneck information is:

$$E[C^B] = \int_{\underline{s}}^{\bar{s}} f(s_\omega) E[C_{\psi|\omega}^B] ds_\omega \quad (15)$$

443 Furthermore, if the bottleneck capacity and demand follow Bernoulli distributions, we
 444 have the conditional probability of N_ψ at a given s_ω : $P(N_\psi|s_\omega) = P(N_\psi, s_\omega)/P(s_\omega)$. The
 445 expected travel cost of a commuter at UE with bottleneck capacity information is:

$$E[C^B] = p_s E[C_{\psi|G}^B] + (1 - p_s) E[C_{\psi|B}^B] \quad (16)$$

446 where $E[C_{\psi|G}^B]$ and $E[C_{\psi|B}^B]$ denote the expected travel costs when bottleneck capacity in
 447 good and bad conditions, respectively. The expressions of $E[C_{\psi|G}^B]$ and $E[C_{\psi|B}^B]$ can be found
 448 in the Appendix A.4.

449 4.2.2. Only providing demand information

450 When the bottleneck capacity and demand follow an arbitrary joint distribution, the
 451 expected travel cost of each commuter at UE at a given demand state ψ is:

$$E[C_{\omega|\psi}^D] = \begin{cases} \frac{N_\psi(\alpha + \gamma)\beta}{\beta + \gamma} \int_{\underline{s}}^{\hat{s}^*} g(s_\omega|N_\psi)/s_\omega ds_\omega & \text{if } t_e > t^* \\ N_\psi\beta/\hat{s}^{**} & \text{if } t_e = t^* \end{cases} \quad (17)$$

452 where $\hat{s}^* = G^{-1}(\gamma/(\alpha + \gamma))$ and \hat{s}^{**} can be obtained by solving the nonlinear equation
 453 $\beta/\hat{s}^{**} = (\alpha + \gamma) \int_{\underline{s}}^{\hat{s}^{**}} g(s_\omega|N_\psi)[1/s_\omega - 1/\hat{s}^{**}]ds_\omega$.

454 The expected travel cost of each commuter at UE under stochastic bottleneck capacity
 455 and demand with demand information is:

$$E[C^D] = \int_{\underline{N}}^{\bar{N}} g(N_\psi)E[C_{\omega|\psi}^D]dN_\psi \quad (18)$$

456 Furthermore, if the bottleneck capacity and demand follow Bernoulli distributions, we
 457 have the conditional probability of s_ω at a given N_ψ : $P(s_\omega|N_\psi) = P(N_\psi, s_\omega)/P(N_\psi)$. The
 458 expected travel cost of a commuter at UE with bottleneck capacity information is:

$$E[C^D] = p_N E[C_{\omega|H}^D] + (1 - p_N) E[C_{\omega|L}^D] \quad (19)$$

459 where $E[C_{\omega|H}^D]$ and $E[C_{\omega|L}^D]$ denote expected travel costs under high and low demand levels,
 460 respectively. The expressions of $E[C_{\omega|H}^D]$ and $E[C_{\omega|L}^D]$ can be found in the Appendix A.5.

461 4.3. The full-information regime

462 When the bottleneck capacity and demand follow an arbitrary joint distribution, the
 463 expected travel cost of a commuter at UE under stochastic bottleneck capacity and demand
 464 with full pre-trip information can be formulated as follows:

$$E[C^F] = \frac{\beta\gamma}{\beta + \gamma} \int_{\underline{\theta}}^{\bar{\theta}} \theta_{\psi\omega} k(\theta_{\psi\omega}) d\theta_{\psi\omega} \quad (20)$$

465 Furthermore, if the bottleneck capacity and demand follow Bernoulli distributions, the
 466 expected travel cost of a commuters at UE with full pre-trip information is:

$$E[C^F] = \frac{\beta\gamma}{\beta + \gamma} [P(\theta_{HG})\theta_{HG} + P(\theta_{HB})\theta_{HB} + P(\theta_{LG})\theta_{LG} + P(\theta_{LB})\theta_{LB}] \quad (21)$$

467 5. The value of pre-trip information

468 Up to now, we have derived the expected travel costs at UE in the three regimes, i.e.,
 469 zero-information, partial-information and full-information. In this section, we analyze the
 470 value of providing different kinds of information. Figure 1 illustrates the three information
 471 regimes and the value of providing different information. In this section, we analyze the
 472 value of full information over zero information (i.e., G^{ZF}), the value of partial information
 473 over zero information (i.e., G^{ZB} , G^{ZD} , and G^{BD}), and the benefit gains/losses from partial
 474 information to full information (i.e., G^{BF} and G^{DF}).




Figure 1: Three information regimes and the value of providing different kinds of pre-trip information.

475 5.1. The value of full pre-trip information

476 The benefit gains from providing full pre-trip information over zero information are:

$$G^{ZF} = E[C^Z] - E[C^F] \quad (22)$$

477 **Proposition 2.** Let assumptions hold, then,

478 (a) (General probability distribution) providing full pre-trip information does not increase
 479 travel costs compared to zero information (i.e., $G^{ZF} \geq 0$).

480 (b) (Bernoulli distribution) providing full pre-trip information is welfare-neutral (i.e., $G^{ZF} =$
 481 0) when the amplitude of bottleneck capacity drop is equal to the amplitude of demand drop
 482 (i.e., $\pi_s = \pi_N$) and bottleneck capacity and demand are perfectly positively correlated (i.e.,
 483 $r = 1$).

484 **Proof:** The proof can be found in Appendix A.6. □

485 Proposition 2 asserts that providing full pre-trip information never generates adverse
 486 effects on travel costs compared with no information provided when bottleneck capacity and
 487 demand are both stochastic. Therefore, considering uncertainty on both sides of supply and
 488 demand in the morning commute is a sound way of developing ATIS. Previous studies, such
 489 as Arnott et al. (1991) and Han et al. (2021), found that providing full pre-trip information
 490 is always welfare-improving over zero information when demand is fixed and bottleneck
 491 capacity is stochastic. However, Proposition 2(b) provides a special case that providing full
 492 information may be welfare-neutral, indicating the necessity of considering uncertainty in
 493 both supply and demand sides.

494 5.2. The value of partial information

495 The benefit gains/losses from providing partial information (i.e., bottleneck capacity or
 496 demand information) over zero information are:

$$\begin{cases} G^{ZB} = E[C^Z] - E[C^B] \\ G^{ZD} = E[C^Z] - E[C^D] \end{cases} \quad (23)$$

497 where G^{ZB} and G^{ZD} denote the welfare gains/losses from providing bottleneck capacity
498 information and demand information over zero information, respectively.

499 The following corollary reveals the benefit effects of providing partial information over
500 zero information when demand and bottleneck capacity are strongly correlated.

501 **Corollary 1.** *(General probability distribution). Providing partial pre-trip information is*
502 *more likely to be welfare-improving (i.e., $G^{ZD} > 0$ and $G^{ZB} > 0$) when demand and bottleneck*
503 *capacity are strongly correlated.*

504 **Proof:** Obviously. □

505 Commuters can infer the conditional probability of the other state after obtaining one
506 kind of partial information. Corollary 1 indicates that when the changes in bottleneck ca-
507 pacity are strongly associated with the changes in demand, commuters are more likely to
508 benefit from partial pre-trip information. When demand and bottleneck capacity are com-
509 pletely correlated, providing partial information is equivalent to providing full information.
510 When demand and bottleneck capacity are strongly correlated, the effects of providing par-
511 tial information are similar to providing full information. Per Proposition 2, providing full
512 pre-trip information is never welfare-reducing. Therefore, providing partial information is
513 welfare-improving when demand and bottleneck capacity are strongly correlated.

514 5.2.1. The value of bottleneck information

515 The following propositions reveal interesting properties about the welfare effects of pro-
516 viding bottleneck information compared to zero information.

517 **Proposition 3.** *When bottleneck capacity and demand are uncorrelated,*

518 *(a)(General probability distribution) providing bottleneck capacity information does not in-*
519 *crease travel costs compared to zero information (i.e., $G^{ZB} \geq 0$).*

520 *(b)(Bernoulli distribution) providing bottleneck capacity information is more likely to be*
521 *welfare-neutral over zero information (i.e., $G^{ZB} = 0$) when the amplitude of bottleneck ca-*
522 *pacity drop is less than the amplitude of demand drop (i.e., $\pi_s > \pi_N$) and demand frequently*
523 *experiences degradation (i.e., $p_N < \frac{\gamma}{\gamma+\alpha}$).*

524 **Proof:** The proof can be found in the Appendix A.7. □

525 **Proposition 4.** *Let demand and bottleneck capacity follow Bernoulli distributions, then,*

526 *(a) If the amplitude of bottleneck capacity drop is more than the amplitude of demand drop*
527 *(i.e., $\pi_s < \pi_N$), providing bottleneck information is always welfare-improving (i.e., $G^{ZB} > 0$).*

528 *(b) If the amplitude of bottleneck capacity drop is less than the amplitude of demand drop*
529 *(i.e., $\pi_s > \pi_N$), providing bottleneck information can be welfare-reducing (i.e., $G^{ZB} < 0$)*
530 *when bottleneck capacity and demand are moderately correlated and **bottleneck capacity rarely***
531 ***experiences degradation.***

532 **Proof:** The proof can be found in the Appendix A.8. □

533 Propositions 3 and 4 indicate that the benefit gains/losses from bottleneck capacity
534 information are associated with the correlation between capacity and demand and the fre-
535 quency and severity of bottleneck capacity and demand reductions. Proposition 3 implies

536 that providing bottleneck capacity information can be welfare-neutral over zero information
537 if the amplitude of bottleneck capacity degradation is less than the amplitude of demand
538 degradation and demand frequently experiences degradation. Proposition 4(a) asserts that
539 commuters always benefit from providing partial pre-trip information over zero informa-
540 tion when the amplitude of bottleneck capacity degradation is more than the amplitude of
541 demand degradation (i.e., $\pi_s < \pi_N$). However, Proposition 4(b) indicates that providing
542 bottleneck capacity information may induce paradox over zero information when bottleneck
543 capacity and demand are moderately correlated and the amplitude of bottleneck capacity
544 drop is less than the amplitude of demand drop (i.e., $\pi_s > \pi_N$). In this case, providing
545 bottleneck information may induce concentration behavior, thereby possibly generating a
546 deadweight loss.

547 5.2.2. The value of demand information

548 The following propositions reveal interesting properties about the welfare effects of pro-
549 viding demand information over zero information.

550 **Proposition 5.** *When bottleneck capacity and demand are uncorrelated,*
551 *(a)(General probability distribution) providing demand information does not increase travel*
552 *costs compared to zero information (i.e., $G^{ZD} \geq 0$).*
553 *(b)(Bernoulli distribution) providing demand information is more likely to be welfare-neutral*
554 *over zero information (i.e., $G^{ZD} = 0$) when the amplitude of bottleneck capacity drop is larger*
555 *than the amplitude of demand drop (i.e., $\pi_s < \pi_N$) and **bottleneck capacity rarely experiences***
556 ***degradation** (i.e., $p_s > \frac{\alpha}{\gamma+\alpha}$).*

557 **Proof:** The proof can be found in the Appendix A.9. □

558 **Proposition 6.** *Let demand and bottleneck capacity follow Bernoulli distributions, then,*
559 *(a) If the amplitude of bottleneck capacity drop is less than the amplitude of demand drop*
560 *(i.e., $\pi_s > \pi_N$), providing demand information is always welfare-improving (i.e., $G^{ZD} > 0$)*
561 *when bottleneck capacity and demand are negatively correlated.*
562 *(b) If the amplitude of bottleneck capacity drop is larger than the amplitude of demand drop*
563 *(i.e., $\pi_s < \pi_N$), providing demand information may be welfare-reducing (i.e., $G^{ZD} < 0$)*
564 *when bottleneck capacity and demand are moderately correlated and **bottleneck capacity rarely***
565 ***experiences degradation**.*
566 *(c) If the amplitude of bottleneck capacity drop is less than the amplitude of demand drop*
567 *(i.e., $\pi_s > \pi_N$), providing demand information may be welfare-reducing (i.e., $G^{ZD} < 0$)*
568 *when bottleneck capacity and demand are moderately positively correlated and bottleneck*
569 *capacity and demand both frequently experiences degradation.*

570 **Proof:** The proof can be found in the Appendix A.10. □

571 Similar to providing bottleneck capacity information, Propositions 5 and 6 indicate
572 that the benefit gains/losses from demand information over zero information are associated
573 with the correlation degree between demand and bottleneck capacity and the frequency and
574 severity of bottleneck capacity and demand changes. Proposition 5 asserts that providing

575 demand information is also never welfare-reducing over zero information when demand and
 576 bottleneck capacity are uncorrelated. Also, providing demand information can be welfare-
 577 neutral over zero information when the amplitude of demand degradation is less than the
 578 amplitude of bottleneck capacity degradation and **bottleneck capacity rarely experiences**
 579 **degradation**.

580 Like the welfare effects caused by providing bottleneck capacity information, Propo-
 581 sition 6 implies that providing demand information may also induce information paradox
 582 (i.e., providing demand information may increase travel costs compared to zero information)
 583 when demand and bottleneck capacity are moderately correlated. However, different from
 584 providing bottleneck capacity information, there are two possible situations that may oc-
 585 cur information paradox when providing demand information. Especially, Proposition 6(b)
 586 indicates that the paradox of providing demand information may occur when **bottleneck**
 587 **capacity rarely experiences degradation** and the amplitude of bottleneck capacity drop is
 588 larger than the amplitude of demand drop. Proposition 6(c) indicates that the paradox of
 589 providing demand information may occur when demand and bottleneck capacity both fre-
 590 quently experience degradation and the amplitude of bottleneck capacity drop is less than
 591 the amplitude of demand drop.

592 5.2.3. The comparison between bottleneck capacity information and demand information

593 The above analysis indicates that the welfare effects of providing bottleneck capacity and
 594 demand information are different. Previous studies about the welfare effects of providing
 595 pre-trip information under stochastic traffic state usually assume the demand is fixed (Lind-
 596 sey et al., 2014; Khan and Amin, 2018; Han et al., 2021). Next, we analyze the benefit
 597 gains/losses from providing demand information over bottleneck capacity information to
 598 understand the differences in the welfare effects of providing the two kinds of partial informa-
 599 tion. The benefits gains/losses from providing demand information compared to bottleneck
 600 capacity information are:

$$G^{BD} = E[C^B] - E[C^D] \quad (24)$$

601 The following proposition reveals interesting properties about which partial information
 602 (i.e., demand information or bottleneck capacity information) is more valuable when demand
 603 and bottleneck capacity are both stochastic.

604 **Proposition 7.** *Let demand and bottleneck capacity follow Bernoulli distributions, then,*
 605 *(a) If the amplitude of bottleneck capacity drop is larger than the amplitude of demand drop*
 606 *($\pi_s < \pi_N$), providing bottleneck capacity information is more valuable than providing demand*
 607 *information (i.e., $G^{BD} < 0$).*
 608 *(b) If the amplitude of bottleneck capacity drop is less than the amplitude of demand drop*
 609 *($\pi_s > \pi_N$), providing bottleneck capacity information is more likely to be more valuable than*
 610 *providing demand information (i.e., $G^{BD} < 0$) when bottleneck capacity and demand are not*
 611 *strongly correlated and bottleneck capacity rarely experience degradation.*

612 **Proof:** The proof can be found in Appendix A.11 and Appendix A.12. □

613 Proposition 7(a) asserts when the amplitude of bottleneck capacity degradation is larger
614 than the amplitude of demand degradation, providing bottleneck capacity must be better
615 than providing demand information. However, Proposition 7(b) indicates that providing
616 which kind of partial information is better depends on the frequency and severity of bottle-
617 neck capacity and demand changes when the amplitude of bottleneck capacity degradation
618 is less than the amplitude of demand degradation. These results indicate that providing
619 bottleneck information is more likely to be better than providing demand information when
620 demand and bottleneck capacity are both stochastic.

621 Up to now, we have discussed the welfare effects of providing two kinds of partial informa-
622 tion (i.e., demand information and bottleneck capacity information) over zero information
623 and compared the welfare effects between demand information and bottleneck capacity in-
624 formation. We find that the welfare effects of partial information are significantly affected
625 by the correlation relationship between demand and bottleneck capacity and the frequency
626 and severity of demand and bottleneck capacity changes. When demand and bottleneck
627 capacity are moderately correlated, providing partial information can be welfare-reducing
628 over zero information (i.e., information paradox).

629 5.3. The benefit gains/losses from partial information to full information

630 The benefit gains/losses from providing full information over partial information are:

$$\begin{cases} G^{BF} = E[C^B] - E[C^F] \\ G^{DF} = E[C^D] - E[C^F] \end{cases} \quad (25)$$

631 where G^{BF} and G^{DF} denote the welfare gains/losses from full information compared to
632 providing bottleneck capacity information and demand information, respectively.

633 **Proposition 8.** *Let demand and bottleneck capacity follow general probability distributions,*
634 *(a) Providing full information does not increase travel costs compared to providing partial*
635 *information (i.e., $G^{BF} \geq 0$ and $G^{DF} \geq 0$).*

636 *(b) The benefit gains from providing full information over partial information increase as α*
637 *increases (i.e., $\partial G^{BF} / \partial \alpha > 0$ and $\partial G^{DF} / \partial \alpha > 0$).*

638 **Proof:** The proof can be found in Appendix A.13. □

639 Proposition 8(a) asserts providing full information cannot be welfare-reducing over par-
640 tial information, indicating that developing ATIS to provide information on both the supply
641 and demand sides will not generate a deadweight loss for the morning commute. Proposi-
642 tion 8(b) indicates that traffic congestion and travel time caused by congestion play crucial
643 roles in the welfare effects of providing full information over partial information. Providing
644 full information can gain more benefits than providing partial information as traffic conges-
645 tion becomes more severe. In other words, when traffic congestion is severe, providing full
646 information can ease more congestion than providing partial information, thereby reducing
647 travel costs and travel time caused by traffic congestion.

648 **6. Numerical examples**

649 In this section, we present numerical results to illustrate how pre-trip information affects
 650 benefit gains/losses under stochastic demand and bottleneck capacity. Unless otherwise
 651 specified, we adopt the following parameters based on the empirical findings in Small (1982):
 652 $\alpha = 6.4, \beta = 3.9$ and $\gamma = 15.21$. The other parameters are set as: $\bar{N} = 5000(veh), \bar{s} =$
 653 $6000(veh/h)$. We assume the stochastic bottleneck capacity and demand follow Bernoulli
 654 distributions.

655 *6.1. The benefit gains of providing full information over zero information*




Figure 2: Benefit gains from full information for different r , π_N and π_s (i.e., $p_N = p_s = 0.5$).

656 Fig. 2 presents the benefit gains of providing full information over zero information (i.e.,
 657 G^{ZF}) for different correlation coefficients (i.e., r) and the amplitudes of bottleneck capacity
 658 and demand degradations (i.e., π_s and π_N). We can see that the providing full informa-
 659 tion is usually welfare-improving over zero information. This result confirms Proposition 2,
 660 indicating that providing full information to reduce uncertainty on both the supply and
 661 demand sides is usually useful in reducing travel costs. Previous studies, such as Arnott
 662 et al. (1991) and Han et al. (2021), found that providing full and accurate information is
 663 always welfare-improving when bottleneck capacity is stochastic but demand is fixed. How-
 664 ever, when demand and bottleneck capacity are both stochastic and completely positively
 665 correlated, providing full pre-trip information may be welfare-neutral. This result confirms
 666 Proposition 2(b). Furthermore, it should be noted that the benefit gains G^{ZF} are not nec-
 667 essarily monotonic in the correlation coefficient r and the amplitude of demand reduction
 668 π_N (see Figure 13 in the Appendix A.14 for more details).

669 *6.2. The welfare effects of providing partial information*

670 *6.2.1. The benefit gains/losses of providing bottleneck information over zero information*

671 Fig. 3 presents the benefit gains from providing bottleneck capacity information over
 672 zero information (i.e., G^{ZB}) for different frequency and severity of bottleneck capacity and




Figure 3: Benefit gains/losses from bottleneck capacity information over zero information for different p_s , p_N , π_s and π_N when demand and bottleneck capacity are uncorrelated (i.e., $r = 0$). The white solid lines indicate where $G^{ZB} = 0$, and the white dashed line represents the boundary defined by $p_N = \gamma/(\alpha + \gamma)$.

673 demand reductions when demand and bottleneck capacity are uncorrelated. We can see
 674 that providing bottleneck capacity information will not increase travel costs compared to
 675 zero information when demand and bottleneck capacity are uncorrelated, verifying Propo-
 676 sition 3(a). Furthermore, as shown in Fig. 3(a), providing bottleneck capacity information
 677 can be welfare-neutral when $\pi_s > \pi_N$ and demand frequently experience degradation (i.e.,
 678 $p_N < \frac{\gamma}{\alpha + \gamma}$), which confirms Proposition 3(b).

679 Fig. 4 presents the benefit gains/losses of providing bottleneck capacity information
 680 over zero information (i.e., G^{ZB}) for different correlation coefficients r . We can see that
 681 providing bottleneck information is welfare-improving when demand and bottleneck capacity
 682 are strongly correlated (i.e., $|r|$ is large), which confirms Corollary 1. Furthermore, as shown
 683 in Fig. 4(a-b), providing bottleneck capacity information is always welfare-improving over
 684 zero information when the amplitude of demand degradation is larger than the amplitude
 685 of bottleneck capacity (i.e., $\pi_N > \pi_s$), which confirms Proposition 4(a). When bottleneck
 686 capacity rarely experience degradations (i.e., p_s is large) and the amplitude of demand
 687 degradation is less than the amplitude of bottleneck capacity (i.e., $\pi_N < \pi_s$), providing
 688 bottleneck capacity information can be (1) welfare-neutral if demand and bottleneck capacity
 689 are uncorrelated and (2) welfare-reducing if demand and bottleneck capacity are moderately
 690 correlated. These results confirm Proposition 3(b) and Proposition 4(b), indicating that
 691 only providing **bottleneck capacity may even increase travel costs** (i.e., the emergence of the
 692 information paradox) compared to zero information when demand and bottleneck capacity
 693 are both stochastic.

694 Fig. 5 presents the benefit gains/losses from bottleneck capacity information over zero
 695 information (i.e., G^{ZB}) for different p_N , π_N and r . As shown in Fig. 5, providing bottle-
 696 neck capacity information can be likely welfare-reducing when the amplitude of bottleneck
 697 capacity drop is less than the amplitude of demand drop (i.e., $\pi_s > \pi_N$), bottleneck capacity




Figure 4: Benefit gains/losses from bottleneck capacity information over zero information for different r , p_s and p_N (i.e., (a-b) $\pi_s = 0.5$, $\pi_N = 0.8$; (c-d) $\pi_s = 0.5$, $\pi_N = 0.4$).




Figure 5: Benefit gains/losses from bottleneck information over zero information for different p_N , π_N and r (i.e., (a) $r = -0.2$; (b) $r = 0.2$), with fixed $\pi_s = 0.5$, $p_s = 0.8$. The white solid lines indicate where $G^{ZB} = 0$.

698 rarely experiences degradation, and travel demand and bottleneck capacity are moderate-
699 ly positively correlated. This result provides additional evidence that providing bottleneck
700 information can lead to an information paradox compared to zero information when travel
701 demand and bottleneck capacity are moderately correlated, thereby reaffirming Proposi-
702 tion 4(b).

703 6.2.2. The benefit gains/losses of providing demand information over zero information




Figure 6: Benefit gains/losses from demand information over zero information for different p_N , p_s , π_s and π_N when demand and bottleneck capacity are uncorrelated (i.e., $r = 0$).

704 Fig. 6 presents the benefit gains of providing demand information over zero information
705 (i.e., G^{ZD}) for different frequency and severity of bottleneck capacity and demand reductions
706 when demand and bottleneck capacity are uncorrelated. Like providing bottleneck capacity
707 information, we can see that providing demand information is also not welfare-reducing
708 compared to zero information, verifying Proposition 5(a). Providing demand information
709 can be welfare-neutral when $\pi_N > \pi_s$ and bottleneck capacity rarely experience degradation
710 (i.e., $p_s > \frac{\alpha}{\alpha+\gamma}$), corresponding to Fig. 6(b), which confirms Proposition 5(b).

711 Fig. 7 presents the benefit gains/losses of providing demand information over zero infor-
712 mation (i.e., G^{ZD}) for different correlation coefficients r . We can see that providing demand
713 information is also welfare-improving when demand and bottleneck capacity are strongly cor-
714 related (i.e., $|r|$ is large), which reaffirms Corollary 1. Furthermore, as shown in Fig. 7(c),
715 providing demand information is always welfare-improving when the amplitude of demand
716 degradation is larger than the amplitude of bottleneck capacity degradation and bottleneck
717 capacity and demand are negatively correlated, which confirms Proposition 6(a). As shown
718 in Fig. 7(a-b), providing demand information may be welfare-reducing over zero infor-
719 mation when the amplitude of bottleneck capacity degradation is larger than the amplitude of
720 demand degradation and demand and bottleneck capacity are moderately correlated. These
721 results confirm Proposition 6(b). Also, as shown in Fig. 7(d), providing demand information
722 can be welfare-reducing over zero information when the amplitude of demand degradation is




Figure 7: Benefit gains/losses from demand information over zero information for different r , p_s and p_N . (i.e., (a-b) $\pi_s = 0.5$, $\pi_N = 0.8$; (c-d) $\pi_s = 0.5$, $\pi_N = 0.4$).

723 larger than the amplitude of bottleneck capacity degradation, bottleneck capacity and de-
724 mand are **positively** moderately correlated, and demand and bottleneck capacity frequently
725 experience degradations. This result verifies Proposition 6(c). Compared to providing bot-
726 tleneck capacity, providing demand information is more likely to be welfare-reducing over
727 zero information.

728 Fig. 8 presents the benefit gains/losses G^{ZD} from demand information over zero informa-
729 tion for different p_s , π_s and r . As shown in Fig. 8(b), providing demand information can be
730 welfare-reducing compared to zero information when bottleneck capacity and travel demand
731 are moderately positively correlated, particularly under the following two conditions: (1)
732 when the amplitude of bottleneck capacity drop is less than the amplitude of demand drop
733 (i.e., $\pi_s > \pi_N$) and bottleneck capacity and demand both frequently experiences degradation;
734 (2) when the amplitude of bottleneck capacity drop is larger than the amplitude of demand
735 drop (i.e., $\pi_s < \pi_N$) and bottleneck capacity rarely experiences degradation. These results
736 provide additional evidence supporting Proposition 6(b) and (c).




Figure 8: Benefit gains/losses from demand information over zero information for different p_s , π_s and r (i.e., (a) $r = -0.2$; (b) $r = 0.2$), with fixed $\pi_N = 0.5$, $p_N = 0.2$. The white solid lines indicate where $G^{ZD} = 0$.




Figure 9: Benefit gains/losses from capacity information as compared to from demand information G^{BD} for different r , p_s and p_N (i.e., (a-b) $\pi_s = 0.5$, $\pi_N = 0.8$; (c-d) $\pi_s = 0.5$, $\pi_N = 0.4$).

737 *6.2.3. The comparison between bottleneck capacity information and demand information*

738 Fig. 9 shows the benefit gains from capacity information as compared to from demand
 739 information G^{BD} when demand and bottleneck capacity are correlated for different r , p_s ,
 740 and p_N . As shown in Fig. 9(a-b), providing bottleneck capacity information is always bet-
 741 ter than providing demand information (*i.e.*, $G^{BD} < 0$) when the amplitude of bottleneck
 742 capacity degradation is larger than the amplitude of demand degradation (*i.e.*, $\pi_s < \pi_N$),
 743 which confirms Proposition 7(a). Also, as shown in Fig.9(c-d), providing bottleneck capacity
 744 information can still be more valuable than providing demand information when the ampli-
 745 tude of bottleneck capacity degradation is less than the amplitude of demand degradation
 746 (*i.e.*, $\pi_s > \pi_N$), bottleneck capacity and demand are not strongly correlated, and bottleneck
 747 capacity rarely experience degradation. These results verify proposition 7(b).

748 *6.3. The benefit gains from full information as compared to providing partial information*




Figure 10: The benefit gains (*i.e.*, G^{BF} and G^{DF} from providing full information over bottleneck information or demand information for different π_N and r , with fixed $p_N = p_s = 0.5$ and $\pi_s = 0.5$.

749 Fig. 10 presents the benefit gains from providing full information compared to providing
 750 only bottleneck information or demand information for different π_N and r . As shown in
 751 Fig. 10, the benefit gains from full information decrease as π_N increases. Furthermore,
 752 providing full information is always welfare-improving compared to partial information when
 753 demand and bottleneck capacity are not completely correlated, which provides evidence for
 754 supporting Proposition 8(a).

755 Fig. 11 presents the benefit gains from providing full information over partial information
 756 for different α and r . As shown in Fig. 11, providing full information is never welfare-reducing
 757 compared with providing partial information. This result reconfirms Proposition 8(a). Also,
 758 when demand and bottleneck capacity are not completely correlated, providing full informa-
 759 tion is always welfare-improving over partial information, indicating that developing an ATIS
 760 to reduce uncertainty in both the demand and supply sides is useful to reduce commuting
 761 costs. Furthermore, the benefit gains from partial information to full information increase as




Figure 11: The benefit gains (i.e., G^{BF} and G^{DF}) from providing full information over bottleneck information or demand information for different α under different r with fixed $p_N = p_s = 0.5$. (a-b). $\pi_s = 0.5$, $\pi_N = 0.4$; (c-d). $\pi_s = 0.5$, $\pi_N = 0.8$.

762 α increases, indicating the necessity of reducing uncertainty in both the demand and supply
 763 sides when commuters are more averse to congestion. This result affirms Proposition 8(b).

764 Fig. 12 presents the benefit gains from providing full information over bottleneck in-
 765 formation or demand information for different β and γ under different r . As shown in
 766 Fig. 12(a-b), the relation between G^{BF} and β as well as the relation between G^{DF} and β
 767 may be non-monotonic. When demand and bottleneck capacity are positively correlated,
 768 G^{BF} first increases and then decreases as β increases, while G^{DF} initially increases, then
 769 decreases, and finally increases again as β increases. As shown in Fig. 12(c-d), the relation
 770 between G^{BF} and γ as well as the relation between G^{DF} and γ may also be non-monotonic.
 771 When demand and bottleneck capacity are uncorrelated, both G^{BF} and G^{DF} first decrease
 772 and then increase as γ increases. However, when demand and bottleneck capacity are neg-
 773 atively correlated, both G^{BF} and G^{DF} increase as γ increases.




Figure 12: The benefit gains (i.e., G^{BF} and G^{DF}) from providing full information over capacity information or demand information under varying β or γ for different r , with fixed $\pi_N = 0.4$, $\pi_s = 0.5$, $p_N = p_s = 0.5$.

774 7. Conclusions and discussion

775 In this paper, we have investigated the welfare effects of partial and full pre-trip informa-
776 tion on the morning commute behavior under stochastic demand and bottleneck capacity.
777 The factors paid attention in the problem include information completeness, the degree of
778 correlation between bottleneck capacity and demand, and the frequency and amplitude of
779 bottleneck capacity and demand changes. The value of pre-trip information is reflected in the
780 difference between the expected travel costs and different amounts of pre-trip information,
781 including zero, partial, and full information.

782 We find that providing full pre-trip information does not increase travel costs compared
783 to zero information (Proposition 2), indicating that simultaneously eliminating uncertain-
784 ty on both sides of supply and demand can always bring positive benefits to the morning
785 commute. However, the benefit gains/losses of providing partial information over zero infor-
786 mation depend on the degree of correlation between bottleneck capacity and demand and the
787 frequency and amplitude of bottleneck capacity and demand changes (Propositions 3 - 6).
788 We find that providing partial pre-trip information does not increase travel costs compared

789 to zero information when bottleneck capacity and demand are uncorrelated (Propositions 3
790 and 5). However, providing partial information can be welfare-reducing over zero informa-
791 tion when bottleneck capacity and demand are moderately correlated (Propositions 4 and
792 6). Also, the welfare effects of the two kinds of partial information, demand information and
793 bottleneck information, are different when demand and bottleneck capacity are not com-
794 pletely correlated. Which kind of partial information is more efficient depends on the degree
795 of correlation between bottleneck capacity and demand and the frequency of demand and
796 bottleneck capacity changes (Propositions 7). Providing bottleneck capacity information is
797 more likely to have a better performance than providing demand information. Furthermore,
798 although providing partial information may induce information paradox, the welfare effects
799 from partial information to full information are always positive (Propositions 8).

800 Our study has practical implications, particularly for the design and implementation
801 of ATIS. First, given the ubiquity of uncertainties on both the demand and supply sides,
802 ATIS should deliver differentiated levels of pre-trip information based on the correlation
803 between demand and bottleneck capacity, as well as the expected uncertainty in traffic
804 conditions. This allows for targeted information provision that can help optimize commuter
805 decision-making and reduce travel costs under varying conditions. Second, ATIS design
806 should prioritize the provision of full pre-trip information in scenarios with high uncertainty
807 to ensure better overall welfare, while partial information may be sufficient and beneficial
808 when uncertainty is lower or when supply and demand are uncorrelated. Third, integrating
809 pre-trip information with transport policies has the potential to significantly enhance their
810 effectiveness. For example, providing pre-trip information about bottleneck capacity and
811 demand can help commuters make more informed travel decisions, thereby improving the
812 performance of policies such as congestion pricing and variable speed limits in managing
813 demand and alleviating congestion. By dynamically adjusting pricing and speed limits based
814 on real-time and predictive information, ATIS can serve as a key instrument for maximizing
815 the effectiveness of these policies.

816 Our study can be extended in several directions for further research. First, the partial and
817 full information concerned in our analysis is one hundred percent accurate. Previous studies
818 have revealed that information accuracy is an important factor in affecting the performance
819 of pre-trip information in the morning commute under stochastic bottleneck capacity (Arnot-
820 t et al., 1999; Yu et al., 2021). Therefore, the first research direction is to understand the
821 welfare effects of inaccurate information on the morning commute under stochastic demand
822 and bottleneck capacity. Second, our model investigates the morning commute behavior in
823 the classical single-bottleneck highway connecting one origin and one destination. However,
824 previous studies have shown that the commuting behavior in multiple-bottleneck models and
825 complex network structures, such as the Y-shaped networks, are distinct from the classical
826 single-bottleneck model (Arnott et al., 1993a; Li et al., 2024). Therefore, whether the para-
827 dox of providing partial information still exists in multiple-bottleneck models and complex
828 network structures should be further investigated. Third, we only consider the departure
829 time choice under stochastic bottleneck capacity and demand in the morning commute; how-
830 ever, commuters usually face a series of choices, such as departure time, route, and mode, for
831 each trip (Mannering et al., 1994). Therefore, the third direction is to investigate the value

832 of partial and full information under uncertainty when commuters face multiple objectives.
833 Fourth, in our model, travel demand is treated as exogenously given. However, demand
834 may fluctuate in response to factors such as traffic conditions. Therefore, understanding the
835 value of partial and full information under price-sensitive demand and stochastic bottleneck
836 capacity is an important direction for future research. Fifth, the provision of information
837 typically incurs costs, such as those associated with the development of ATIS. While our
838 study focuses on the potential benefits of information provision, integrating the costs into
839 a more comprehensive framework would be essential for assessing the net impact of infor-
840 mation systems. Sixth our study primarily investigates the value of pre-trip information
841 on travel costs under stochastic bottleneck capacity and demand. The interaction between
842 pre-trip information and combination policies, such as congestion pricing and variable speed
843 limits, could provide an effective strategy for reducing congestion and enhancing overall traf-
844 fic flow. Exploring how these policies can be integrated with ATIS offers valuable insights
845 into better demand management and system optimization, particularly during peak hours.
846 Last but not least, we propose a general framework to evaluate the value of partial and full
847 information by assuming that travel demand and bottleneck capacity follow a joint proba-
848 bility distribution. To facilitate analytical derivations, we adopt the Bernoulli distribution
849 as a stylized example. However, it is worth noting that the Bernoulli distribution may not
850 fully capture the complexities and nuances of real-world traffic systems. Therefore, when
851 applying this framework to practical scenarios, the distributions of travel demand and bot-
852 tleneck capacity should be carefully calibrated using empirical data to ensure the model's
853 relevance and accuracy.

854 Acknowledgments

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857 Appendix

858 A.1. Boundary condition between Case 1 and Case 2.

859 In Case 2, assume that the expected travel costs at t_0 and $t_e(t^*)$ when the work start
860 time t^* becomes $t^* + \delta$ are:

$$\begin{cases} E[C^Z(t_0)] = \beta\hat{\theta} + \beta\delta \\ E[C^Z(t_e)] = \gamma\delta + (\alpha + \gamma) \int_{\hat{\theta}}^{\bar{\theta}} k(\theta_{\psi\omega})(\theta_{\psi\omega} - \hat{\theta})d\theta_{\psi\omega}. \end{cases} \quad (26)$$

861 Since $\hat{\theta}^* = t^* - t_0$ and $\hat{\theta} = t^* + \delta - t_0$, we can have $\hat{\theta} = \delta + \hat{\theta}^*$. When the system reaches
862 user equilibrium, $E[C^Z(t^* + \delta)] > E[C^Z(t^*)]$, we have:

$$\gamma > \frac{\alpha + \gamma}{\delta} \int_{\hat{\theta}^*}^{\hat{\theta}} k(\theta_{\psi\omega})(\theta_{\psi\omega} - \hat{\theta}^*) + (\alpha + \gamma)[1 - K(\hat{\theta})]. \quad (27)$$

863 When $\lim \delta \rightarrow 0$, we have $K(\hat{\theta}) \approx K(\hat{\theta}^*) \geq \alpha/(\alpha + \gamma)$ and the condition $\underline{\theta} < \hat{\theta}^* < \bar{\theta}$ needs
 864 to be satisfied at this point. Therefore, the boundary condition between Case 1 and Case 2
 865 can be obtained by solving $K(\hat{\theta}^*) = \alpha/(\alpha + \gamma)$.

866

867 A.2. Equilibrium solution under a general discrete probability distribution.

868 If stochastic bottleneck capacity s_ω and demand N_ψ follows a general discrete probability
 869 distribution, then we denote the probability in bottleneck capacity s_ω and demand N_ψ as
 870 $P(s_\omega)$ and $P(N_\psi)$, in which $\omega\psi \in \{1, 2, \dots, k, \dots, K\}$ denote all possible discrete conditions.

871 (1) When $t_e > t^*$, the expected travel cost per commuter at UE can be denoted as:

$$\phi(\hat{\theta}) = \frac{\gamma\beta}{\gamma + \beta}\hat{\theta} + \frac{(\alpha + \gamma)\beta}{\beta + \gamma} \sum_{\psi\omega=k}^K P(\theta_{\psi\omega})(\theta_{\psi\omega} - \hat{\theta}), \quad (28)$$

872 in which $\theta_{k-1} \leq \hat{\theta}$, and $\theta_k \geq \hat{\theta}$. The first partial derivative of $\Phi(\hat{\theta})$ to $\hat{\theta}$ is:

$$\frac{\partial\Phi(\hat{\theta})}{\partial\hat{\theta}} = \frac{\beta[(\alpha + \gamma)G(\theta_k) - \alpha]}{\beta + \gamma}. \quad (29)$$

873 Letting $G(\theta_k) = \sum_{\psi\omega=1}^k P(\theta_{\psi\omega})$, we assume that there are θ_{k-1}^* and θ_k^* which satisfies
 874 $G(\theta_{k-1}^*) < \frac{\alpha}{\alpha + \gamma} < G(\theta_k^*)$. The expected travel cost at UE is: $E[C^Z] = \min\{\Phi(\theta_{k-1}^*), \Phi(\theta_k^*)\}$.

875 (2) When $t_e = t^*$, the expected travel cost per commuter at UE can be denoted as:

$$\phi(\hat{\theta}^{**}) = \beta\hat{\theta}^{**}, \quad (30)$$

876 in which $\hat{\theta}^{**}$ can be obtained by solving $\beta\hat{\theta}^{**} = (\alpha + \gamma) \sum_{\psi\omega=k}^K P(\theta_{\psi\omega})(\theta_{\psi\omega} - \hat{\theta}^{**})$. Besides,
 877 the boundary condition between Case 1 and Case 2 can be obtained by solving $G(\hat{\theta}^{**}) =$
 878 $\alpha/(\alpha + \gamma)$ and $\hat{\theta}^{**} \in \{\theta_1, \theta_2, \theta_3, \theta_4\}$.

879

880 A.3. Equilibrium solutions when demand and capacity follow Bernoulli distributions.

881 Let $\rho_{\psi\omega}$ be the correlation parameter between the random variables s_ω and N_ψ . Then,
 882 we have the joint probability distribution of the random variables N_ψ and s_ω : $P(\theta_{\psi\omega}) =$
 883 $\rho_{\psi\omega}P(N_\psi)P(s_\omega)$. r is the degree of correlation between the random variables N_ψ and s_ω .
 884 Therefore, we have the relationships between the degree of correlation r and the correlation

885 parameter $\rho_{\psi\omega}$: $\rho_{HG} = 1 + r\sqrt{\frac{(1-p_N)(1-p_s)}{p_N p_s}}$, $\rho_{HB} = 1 - r\sqrt{\frac{(1-p_N)p_s}{p_N(1-p_s)}}$, $\rho_{LG} = 1 - r\sqrt{\frac{p_N(1-p_s)}{(1-p_N)p_s}}$,

886 and $\rho_{LB} = 1 + r\sqrt{\frac{p_N p_s}{(1-p_N)(1-p_s)}}$.

887 We assume the demand in low level \underline{N} with probability $1 - p_N$ and in high level \bar{N}
 888 with probability p_N , and the bottleneck capacity in bad condition \underline{s} with probability $1 - p_s$
 889 and in good condition \bar{s} with probability p_s . When $\pi_N \geq \pi_s$ is satisfied, congestion can
 890 definitely be alleviated by adjusting the bottleneck capacity. If $\pi_N \geq \pi_s$, then $\theta_2 = N_H/S_G$
 891 and $\theta_3 = N_L/S_B$. We can have the specific expression of the joint probability distribution

892 of the random variable s_ω and N_ψ is:

$$P(N_\psi, s_\omega) = \begin{cases} \rho_{HB} p_N (1 - p_s), & \text{if } N_\psi = N_H, s_\omega = s_B \\ \rho_{LB} (1 - p_N) (1 - p_s), & \text{if } N_\psi = N_L, s_\omega = s_B \\ \rho_{HG} p_N p_s, & \text{if } N_\psi = N_H, s_\omega = s_G \\ \rho_{LG} (1 - p_N) p_s, & \text{if } N_\psi = N_L, s_\omega = s_G \end{cases} \quad (31)$$

893 where $\rho_{LB} \in [0, \max\{\frac{1}{1-p_N}, \frac{1}{1-p_s}\}]$, $\rho_{LG} \in [0, \max\{\frac{1}{1-p_N}, \frac{1}{p_s}\}]$, $\rho_{HB} \in [0, \max\{\frac{1}{p_N}, \frac{1}{1-p_s}\}]$,
894 and $\rho_{HG} \in [0, \max\{\frac{1}{p_N}, \frac{1}{p_s}\}]$.

895 The expected travel costs in the four conditions can be denoted as:

$$\begin{aligned} (1) \quad & \frac{\alpha}{\alpha + \gamma} < G(\theta_1) (\text{i.e., } p_s \geq \frac{\alpha}{\alpha + \gamma}, r < \frac{(\alpha + \gamma)(1 - p_N)p_s - \alpha}{(\alpha + \gamma)\sqrt{(1 - p_N)(1 - p_s)p_s p_N}}) : E[C^Z] = \Phi(\theta_1); \\ (2) \quad & G(\theta_1) \leq \frac{\alpha}{\alpha + \gamma} < G(\theta_2) (\text{i.e., } p_s \geq \frac{\alpha}{\alpha + \gamma}, \frac{(\alpha + \gamma)(1 - p_N)p_s - \alpha}{(\alpha + \gamma)\sqrt{(1 - p_N)(1 - p_s)p_s p_N}} \leq r) : \\ E[C^Z] = & \min\{\Phi(\theta_1), \Phi(\theta_2)\} = \Phi(\theta_2) = \frac{\gamma\beta\theta_2}{(\gamma + \beta)} + \frac{(\gamma + \alpha)\beta}{(\gamma + \beta)} \{\rho_{HG} p_s \theta_3 + \rho_{HB}(1 - p_s)\theta_4 - \theta_2\} p_N; \\ (3) \quad & G(\theta_2) \leq \frac{\alpha}{\alpha + \gamma} < G(\theta_3) (\text{i.e., } p_s < \frac{\alpha}{\alpha + \gamma}, r < \frac{\alpha - (\alpha + \gamma)(p_N p_s + 1 - p_N)}{(\alpha + \gamma)\sqrt{(1 - p_N)(1 - p_s)p_s p_N}}) : \\ E[C^Z] = & \min\{\Phi(\theta_2), \Phi(\theta_3)\} = \Phi(\theta_3) = \frac{\gamma\beta\theta_3}{(\gamma + \beta)} + \frac{(\gamma + \alpha)\beta}{(\gamma + \beta)} \rho_{HB} p_N (1 - p_s)(\theta_4 - \theta_3); \\ (4) \quad & G(\theta_3) \leq \frac{\alpha}{\alpha + \gamma} < G(\theta_4) (\text{i.e., } p_s < \frac{\alpha}{\alpha + \gamma}, \frac{\alpha - (\alpha + \gamma)(p_N p_s + 1 - p_N)}{(\alpha + \gamma)\sqrt{(1 - p_N)(1 - p_s)p_s p_N}} \leq r) : \\ E[C^Z] = & \min\{\Phi(\theta_3), \Phi(\theta_4)\} = \Phi(\theta_4) = \frac{\gamma\beta\theta_4}{(\gamma + \beta)}; \end{aligned}$$

896 Then, we have the boundary condition separating Case 1 ($t_e > t^*$) and Case 2 ($t_e = t^*$).

897 By solving $\beta\hat{\theta}^* = (\alpha + \gamma) \sum_{\psi} P(\theta_{\psi\omega})(\theta_{\psi\omega} - \hat{\theta}^*)$, we have $\hat{\theta}^*$.

898 (a) $\theta_1 < \hat{\theta}^* < \theta_2$, $\hat{\theta}_1^* = \frac{(\alpha + \gamma)[P(\theta_{HG})\theta_2 + P(\theta_{LB})\theta_3 + P(\theta_{HB})\theta_4]}{\beta + (\alpha + \gamma)[p_N + P(\theta_{LB})]}$ when $0 < \pi_N \leq \frac{[\beta + (\alpha + \gamma)(1 - p_s)]\pi_s - (\alpha + \gamma)P(\theta_{HB})}{(\alpha + \gamma)(1 - p_s) - (\alpha + \gamma)P(\theta_{HB})}$.

899 (b) $\theta_2 < \hat{\theta}^* < \theta_3$, $\hat{\theta}_2^* = \frac{(\alpha + \gamma)[P(\theta_{LB})\theta_3 + P(\theta_{HB})\theta_4]}{\beta + (\alpha + \gamma)(1 - p_s)}$ when $\frac{(\alpha + \gamma)P(\theta_{HB})}{\beta + (\alpha + \gamma)P(\theta_{HB})} \leq \pi_N < 1$.

900 (c) $\theta_3 < \hat{\theta}^* < \theta_4$, $\hat{\theta}_3^* = \frac{(\alpha + \gamma)P(\theta_{HB})\theta_4}{\beta + (\alpha + \gamma)P(\theta_{HB})}$ when $\frac{[\beta + (\alpha + \gamma)(1 - p_s)]\pi_s - (\alpha + \gamma)P(\theta_{HB})}{(\alpha + \gamma)(1 - p_s) - (\alpha + \gamma)P(\theta_{HB})} < \pi_N < \frac{(\alpha + \gamma)P(\theta_{HB})}{\beta + (\alpha + \gamma)P(\theta_{HB})}$.

901 The expected travel cost when the system reaches the user equilibrium in Case 2 is
902 $E[C^Z] = \beta\hat{\theta}^*$, otherwise, Case 1. The expected travel costs without information when
903 $\pi_N \leq \pi_s$ as shown in Table A1.

904 In Table A1, $\pi_N^* = \frac{[\beta + (\alpha + \gamma)(1 - p_s)]\pi_s - (\alpha + \gamma)P(\theta_{HB})}{(\alpha + \gamma)(1 - p_s) - (\alpha + \gamma)P(\theta_{HB})}$ and $\pi_N^{**} = \frac{(\alpha + \gamma)P(\theta_{HB})}{\beta + (\alpha + \gamma)P(\theta_{HB})}$. π_N^* is a strictly
905 monotonically increasing function of r , i.e. $\partial\pi_N^*/\partial r > 0$, but π_N^{**} is a strictly monotonically
906 decreasing function of r , i.e. $\partial\pi_N^{**}/\partial r < 0$. $\phi(\theta_k) = \frac{\gamma\beta\theta_k}{\gamma + \beta} + \frac{(\alpha + \gamma)\beta}{\gamma + \beta} \sum_{\psi\omega=k}^K P(\theta_{\psi\omega})(\theta_{\psi\omega} - \theta_k)$
907 and $\beta\hat{\theta}_k^* = (\alpha + \gamma) \sum_{\psi\omega=k+1}^K P(\theta_{\psi\omega})(\theta_{\psi\omega} - \hat{\theta}_k^*)$, in which $\hat{\theta}_3^* > \hat{\theta}_2^* > \hat{\theta}_1^*$. From the Table A1,
908 it can be seen that the correlation between demand and bottleneck capacity, the frequency

Table A1: The expected travel costs at UE when the stochastic demand and bottleneck capacity follow the Bernoulli distribution and $\pi_N > \pi_s$.

π_N	$0 \leq p_s < \frac{\alpha}{\alpha+\gamma}$	
	$r_{\min} \leq r < \frac{\alpha - (\alpha+\gamma)(p_N p_s + 1 - p_N)}{(\alpha+\gamma)\sqrt{p_N p_s (1-p_N)(1-p_s)}}$	$\frac{\alpha - (\alpha+\gamma)(p_N p_s + 1 - p_N)}{(\alpha+\gamma)\sqrt{p_N p_s (1-p_N)(1-p_s)}} \leq r \leq r_{\max}$
$0 < \pi_N < \pi_N^{**}$	$\beta \hat{\theta}_3^*$	
$\pi_N^{**} < \pi_N < 1$	$\Phi(\theta_4)$	$\Phi(\theta_3)$
π_N	$\frac{\alpha}{\alpha+\gamma} \leq p_s < 1$	
	$r_{\min} \leq r < \frac{(\alpha+\gamma)(1-p_N)p_s - \alpha}{(\alpha+\gamma)\sqrt{p_N p_s (1-p_N)(1-p_s)}}$	$\frac{(\alpha+\gamma)(1-p_N)p_s - \alpha}{(\alpha+\gamma)\sqrt{p_N p_s (1-p_N)(1-p_s)}} \leq r \leq r_{\max}$
$0 < \pi_N \leq \pi_N^*$	$\beta \hat{\theta}_1^*$	$\beta \hat{\theta}_3^*$
$\pi_N^* < \pi_N < \pi_N^{**}$	$\beta \hat{\theta}_3^*$	
$\pi_N^{**} < \pi_N < 1$	$\beta \hat{\theta}_2^*$	

909 and severity of demand and capacity reduction will significantly affect the expected travel
910 costs and commuting patterns.

911 When this premise is not satisfied, congestion is also bound to occur by adjusting the
912 capacity of bottlenecks. This means that $\pi_N \leq \pi_s$, $\theta_2 = N_L/S_B$ and $\theta_3 = N_H/S_G$. The
913 specific expression of the joint probability distribution of s_ω and N_ψ is same.

914 The expected travel costs in the four conditions can be denoted as:

$$\begin{aligned}
 (1) \quad & \frac{\alpha}{\alpha+\gamma} < G(\theta_1) (\text{i.e., } p_N \geq \frac{\gamma}{\alpha+\gamma}, r < \frac{(\alpha+\gamma)(1-p_N)p_s - \alpha}{(\alpha+\gamma)\sqrt{(1-p_N)(1-p_s)p_s p_N}}) : E[C^Z] = \Phi(\theta_1); \\
 (2) \quad & G(\theta_1) \leq \frac{\alpha}{\alpha+\gamma} < G(\theta_2) (\text{i.e., } p_N \geq \frac{\gamma}{\alpha+\gamma}, \frac{(\alpha+\gamma)(1-p_N)p_s - \alpha}{(\alpha+\gamma)\sqrt{(1-p_N)(1-p_s)p_s p_N}} \leq r) : \\
 E[C^Z] = \min \{ & \Phi(\theta_1), \Phi(\theta_2) \} = \Phi(\theta_2) = \frac{\gamma\beta\theta_2}{(\gamma+\beta)} + \frac{(\gamma+\alpha)\beta}{(\gamma+\beta)} \{ \rho_{HG} p_s \theta_3 + \rho_{HB} (1-p_s) \theta_4 - \theta_2 \} p_N; \\
 (3) \quad & G(\theta_2) \leq \frac{\alpha}{\alpha+\gamma} < G(\theta_3) (\text{i.e., } p_N < \frac{\gamma}{\alpha+\gamma}, r < \frac{\alpha - (\alpha+\gamma)(p_N p_s + 1 - p_N)}{(\alpha+\gamma)\sqrt{(1-p_N)(1-p_s)p_s p_N}}) : \\
 E[C^Z] = \min \{ & \Phi(\theta_2), \Phi(\theta_3) \} = \Phi(\theta_3) = \frac{\gamma\beta\theta_3}{(\gamma+\beta)} + \frac{(\gamma+\alpha)\beta}{(\gamma+\beta)} \rho_{HB} p_N (1-p_s) (\theta_4 - \theta_3); \\
 (4) \quad & G(\theta_3) \leq \frac{\alpha}{\alpha+\gamma} < G(\theta_4) (\text{i.e., } p_N < \frac{\gamma}{\alpha+\gamma}, \frac{\alpha - (\alpha+\gamma)(p_N p_s + 1 - p_N)}{(\alpha+\gamma)\sqrt{(1-p_N)(1-p_s)p_s p_N}} \leq r) : \\
 E[C^Z] = \min \{ & \Phi(\theta_3), \Phi(\theta_4) \} = \Phi(\theta_4) = \frac{\gamma\beta\theta_4}{(\gamma+\beta)}.
 \end{aligned}$$

915 Then we solve the boundary condition separating Case 1 ($t_e > t^*$) and Case 2 ($t_e = t^*$).

916 By solving $\beta \hat{\theta}^* = (\alpha+\gamma) \sum_{\hat{\theta}^*}^{\hat{\theta}} P(\theta_{\psi\omega}) (\theta_{\psi\omega} - \hat{\theta}^*)$, we can be obtained $\hat{\theta}^*$.

917 (a) $\theta_1 < \hat{\theta}^* < \theta_2$, $\hat{\theta}_1^* = \frac{(\alpha+\gamma)[P(\theta_{LB})\theta_2 + P(\theta_{HG})\theta_3 + P(\theta_{HB})\theta_4]}{\beta + (\alpha+\gamma)[p_N + P(\theta_{LB})]}$ when $0 < \pi_s \leq \frac{[\beta + (\alpha+\gamma)(1-p_s)]\pi_N - (\alpha+\gamma)P(\theta_{HB})}{(\alpha+\gamma)(1-p_s) - (\alpha+\gamma)P(\theta_{HB})}$.

918 (b) $\theta_2 < \hat{\theta}^* < \theta_3$, $\hat{\theta}_2^* = \frac{(\alpha+\gamma)[P(\theta_{HG})\theta_3 + P(\theta_{HB})\theta_4]}{\beta+(\alpha+\gamma)(1-p_s)}$ when $\frac{(\alpha+\gamma)P(\theta_{HB})}{\beta+(\alpha+\gamma)P(\theta_{HB})} \leq \pi_s < 1$.
919 (c) $\theta_3 < \hat{\theta}^* < \theta_4$, $\hat{\theta}_3^* = \frac{(\alpha+\gamma)P(\theta_{HB})\theta_4}{\beta+(\alpha+\gamma)P(\theta_{HB})}$ when $\frac{[\beta+(\alpha+\gamma)(1-p_s)]\pi_N - (\alpha+\gamma)P(\theta_{HB})}{(\alpha+\gamma)(1-p_s) - (\alpha+\gamma)P(\theta_{HB})} < \pi_s < \frac{(\alpha+\gamma)P(\theta_{HB})}{\beta+(\alpha+\gamma)P(\theta_{HB})}$.

920 The expected travel cost when system at UE in case 2 is $E[C^Z] = \beta\hat{\theta}^*$, otherwise, Case
921 1. The expected travel costs without information when $\pi_N \leq \pi_s$ as shown in Table A2:

Table A2: The expected travel costs at UE when the stochastic demand and bottleneck capacity follow the Bernoulli distribution and $\pi_N \leq \pi_s$.

π_s		$0 \leq p_N < \frac{\gamma}{\alpha+\gamma}$
$r_{min} \leq r < \frac{\alpha - (\alpha+\gamma)(p_N p_s + 1 - p_N)}{(\alpha+\gamma)\sqrt{p_N p_s (1-p_N)(1-p_s)}}$		$\frac{\alpha - (\alpha+\gamma)(p_N p_s + 1 - p_N)}{(\alpha+\gamma)\sqrt{p_N p_s (1-p_N)(1-p_s)}} \leq r \leq r_{max}$
$0 < \pi_s < \pi_s^{**}$	$\Phi(\theta_4)$	$\beta\hat{\theta}_3^*$
$\pi_s^{**} < \pi_s < 1$		$\Phi(\theta_3)$
π_s		$\frac{\gamma}{\alpha+\gamma} \leq p_N < 1$
$r_{min} \leq r < \frac{(\alpha+\gamma)(1-p_N)p_s - \alpha}{(\alpha+\gamma)\sqrt{p_N p_s (1-p_N)(1-p_s)}}$		$\frac{(\alpha+\gamma)(1-p_N)p_s - \alpha}{(\alpha+\gamma)\sqrt{p_N p_s (1-p_N)(1-p_s)}} \leq r \leq r_{max}$
$0 < \pi_s \leq \pi_s^*$	$\beta\hat{\theta}_1^*$	$\beta\hat{\theta}_3^*$
$\pi_s^* < \pi_s < \pi_s^{**}$	$\beta\hat{\theta}_3^*$	
$\pi_s^{**} < \pi_s < 1$		$\beta\hat{\theta}_2^*$

922 In Table A2, $\pi_s^* = \frac{[\beta+(\alpha+\gamma)p_N]\pi_N - (\alpha+\gamma)P(\theta_{HB})}{(\alpha+\gamma)p_N - (\alpha+\gamma)P(\theta_{HB})}$ and $\pi_s^{**} = \frac{(\alpha+\gamma)P(\theta_{HB})}{\beta+(\alpha+\gamma)P(\theta_{HB})}$. π_s^* is a strictly
923 monotonically increasing function of r , i.e. $\partial\pi_s^*/\partial r > 0$, but π_s^{**} is a strictly monotonically
924 decreasing function of r , (i.e. $\partial\pi_s^{**}/\partial r < 0$). $\phi(\theta_k) = \frac{\gamma\beta\theta_k}{\gamma+\beta} + \frac{(\alpha+\gamma)\beta}{\gamma+\beta} \sum_{\psi\omega=k}^K P(\theta_{\psi\omega})(\theta_{\psi\omega} - \theta_k)$
925 and $\beta\hat{\theta}_k^* = (\alpha+\gamma) \sum_{\psi\omega=k+1}^K P(\theta_{\psi\omega})(\theta_{\psi\omega} - \hat{\theta}_k^*)$, in which $\hat{\theta}_3^* > \hat{\theta}_2^* > \hat{\theta}_1^*$. From the Table A2,
926 it can be seen that the correlation between demand and bottleneck capacity, the frequency
927 and severity of demand and capacity reduction will significantly affect the expected travel
928 costs and commuting patterns.

929
930 A.4. Equilibrium solutions with the bottleneck capacity information when demand and
931 capacity follow Bernoulli distributions.

932 The probability of demand being in different state changes when commuters has acquired
933 bottleneck capacity information before departure. When commuters are given information
934 that the bottleneck capacity is in good condition for the day, the demand in bad condition \underline{N}
935 with probability $P'(\theta_{LG}) = (1-p_N)\rho_{LG}$ or in good condition \bar{N} with probability $P'(\theta_{HG}) =$
936 $p_N\rho_{HG}$. When commuters are given information that the bottleneck capacity is in bad

condition for the day, the demand in bad condition \underline{N} with probability $P'(\theta_{LB}) = (1-p_N)\rho_{LB}$ or in good condition \bar{N} with probability $P'(\theta_{HB}) = p_N\rho_{HB}$. We can have the new joint probability distribution of the random variables is: $P'(N_\psi, s_\omega) = \rho_{N_\psi s_\omega} P(N_\psi)$.

Thus, we have the expected travel costs with bottleneck capacity information under the four possible states $C_{LG}^B, C_{HG}^B, C_{HB}^B$ and C_{LB}^B :

When the bottleneck capacity is in good condition for the day ($\theta_{\psi\omega} \in \{\theta_{LG}, \theta_{HG}\}$),

$$\text{if } r < \frac{[\gamma - (\alpha + \gamma)p_N]p_s}{(\alpha + \gamma)\sqrt{(1-p_N)(1-p_s)p_s p_N}}, C_{LG}^B + C_{HG}^B = \Phi^B(\theta_{LG}) = \frac{\gamma\beta\theta_{LG}}{(\gamma + \beta)} + \frac{(\gamma + \alpha)\beta}{(\gamma + \beta)}\rho_{HG}p_N(\theta_{HG} - \theta_{LG});$$

$$\text{If } r \geq \frac{[\gamma - (\alpha + \gamma)p_N]p_s}{(\alpha + \gamma)\sqrt{(1-p_N)(1-p_s)p_s p_N}}, C_{LG}^B + C_{HG}^B = \min\{\Phi^B(\theta_{LG}), \Phi^B(\theta_{HG})\} = \Phi^B(\theta_{HG}) = \frac{\gamma\beta\theta_{HG}}{(\gamma + \beta)}.$$

When the bottleneck capacity is in bad condition for the day ($\theta_\omega \in \{\theta_{LB}, \theta_{HB}\}$),

$$\text{if } r < \frac{[(\alpha + \gamma)p_N - \gamma](1-p_s)}{(\alpha + \gamma)\sqrt{(1-p_N)(1-p_s)p_s p_N}}, C_{LB}^B + C_{HB}^B = \min\{\Phi^B(\theta_{LB}), \Phi^B(\theta_{HB})\} = \Phi^B(\theta_{HB}) = \frac{\gamma\beta\theta_{HB}}{(\gamma + \beta)};$$

$$\text{If } r \geq \frac{[(\alpha + \gamma)p_N - \gamma](1-p_s)}{(\alpha + \gamma)\sqrt{(1-p_N)(1-p_s)p_s p_N}}, C_{LB}^B + C_{HB}^B = \Phi^B(\theta_{LB}) = \frac{\gamma\beta\theta_{LB}}{(\gamma + \beta)} + \frac{(\gamma + \alpha)\beta}{(\gamma + \beta)}\rho_{HB}p_N(\theta_{HB} - \theta_{LB}).$$

Then We solve the boundary condition separating Case 1 ($t_e > t^*$) and Case 2 ($t_e = t^*$).

By solving $\beta\hat{\theta}^* = (\alpha + \gamma)\sum_{\hat{\theta}^*} P(\theta_{\psi\omega})(\theta_{\psi\omega} - \hat{\theta}^*)$, we can obtain $\hat{\theta}^*$. When the bottleneck

capacity is in good condition for the day, we can be obtained $\hat{\theta}^* = \frac{(\alpha + \gamma)\rho_{HG}p_N\theta_{HG}}{\beta + (\alpha + \gamma)\rho_{HG}p_N}$. We have

that $\theta_{LG} < \hat{\theta}^* < \theta_{HG}$ always holds when $0 < \pi_N < \frac{(\alpha + \gamma)\rho_{HG}p_N}{\beta + (\alpha + \gamma)\rho_{HG}p_N}$. When the bottleneck

capacity is in bad condition for the day, we can be obtained $\hat{\theta}^{**} = \frac{(\alpha + \gamma)\rho_{HB}p_N\theta_{HB}}{\beta + (\alpha + \gamma)\rho_{HB}p_N}$. We have

that $\theta_{LB} < \hat{\theta}^{**} < \theta_{HB}$ always holds when $0 < \pi_N < \frac{(\alpha + \gamma)\rho_{HB}p_N}{\beta + (\alpha + \gamma)\rho_{HB}p_N}$. The expected travel cost

when the system reaches the user equilibrium in case 2 is $C^B = \beta\hat{\theta}^*$, otherwise, Case 1.

By solving $E[C^B] = p_s(C_{LG}^B + C_{HG}^B) + (1-p_s)(C_{LB}^B + C_{HB}^B)$, we can have the expected travel cost of a commuter at UE under stochastic conditions with capacity information.

A.5. Equilibrium solutions with the demand information when demand and capacity follow the Bernoulli distribution

The probability of bottleneck capacity being in different state changes when commuters has acquired demand information before departure. When commuters are given information that the demand is in good condition for the day, the bottleneck capacity in bad condition \underline{s} with probability $P'(\theta_{HB}) = (1-p_s)\rho_{HB}$ or in good condition \bar{s} with probability $P'(\theta_{HG}) = p_s\rho_{HG}$. When commuters are given information that the demand is in bad condition for the day, the bottleneck capacity in bad condition \underline{s} with probability $P'(\theta_{LB}) = (1-p_s)\rho_{LB}$ or in good condition \bar{s} with probability $P'(\theta_{LG}) = p_s\rho_{LG}$. We can have the new joint probability distribution of the random variables is: $P'(N_\psi, s_\omega) = \rho_{N_\psi s_\omega} P(s_\omega)$.

Thus, we have the expected travel costs with demand information under the four possible states $C_{LG}^D, C_{HG}^D, C_{HB}^D$ and C_{LB}^D :

When the bottleneck demand is in good condition for the day ($\theta_{\psi\omega} \in \{\theta_{HG}, \theta_{HB}\}$),

$$\text{if } r \geq \frac{[(\alpha + \gamma)(1-p_s) - \gamma]p_N}{(\alpha + \gamma)\sqrt{(1-p_N)(1-p_s)p_s p_N}}, C_{HB}^D + C_{HG}^D = \Phi^D(\theta_{HG}) = \frac{\gamma\beta\theta_{HG}}{(\gamma + \beta)} + \frac{(\gamma + \alpha)\beta}{(\gamma + \beta)}\rho_{HB}(1-p_s)(\theta_{HB} - \theta_{HG});$$

$$\text{If } r < \frac{[(\alpha + \gamma)(1-p_s) - \gamma]p_N}{(\alpha + \gamma)\sqrt{(1-p_N)(1-p_s)p_s p_N}}, C_{HB}^D + C_{HG}^D = \min\{\Phi^D(\theta_{HG}), \Phi^D(\theta_{HB})\} = \Phi^D(\theta_{HB}) = \frac{\gamma\beta\theta_{HB}}{(\gamma + \beta)}.$$

When demand is in bad condition for the day ($\theta_{\psi\omega} \in \{\theta_{LG}, \theta_{LB}\}$),

974 if $r \geq \frac{[\gamma - (\alpha + \gamma)(1 - p_s)](1 - p_N)}{(\alpha + \gamma)\sqrt{(1 - p_N)(1 - p_s)p_s p_N}}$, $C_{LB}^D + C_{LG}^D = \min \{ \Phi^D(\theta_{LB}), \Phi^D(\theta_{LG}) \} = \Phi^D(\theta_{LB}) = \frac{\gamma\beta\theta_{LB}}{(\gamma + \beta)}$;

975 If $r < \frac{[\gamma - (\alpha + \gamma)(1 - p_s)](1 - p_N)}{(\alpha + \gamma)\sqrt{(1 - p_N)(1 - p_s)p_s p_N}}$, $C_{LB}^D + C_{LG}^D = \Phi^D(\theta_{LG}) = \frac{\gamma\beta\theta_{LG}}{(\gamma + \beta)} + \frac{(\gamma + \alpha)\beta}{(\gamma + \beta)}\rho_{LB}(1 - p_s)(\theta_{LB} - \theta_{LG})$.

976 Then We solve the boundary condition separating Case 1($t_e > t^*$) and Case 2($t_e = t^*$).

977 By solving $\beta\hat{\theta}^* = (\alpha + \gamma) \sum_{\hat{\theta}^*}^{\bar{\theta}} P(\theta_{\psi\omega})(\theta_{\psi\omega} - \hat{\theta}^*)$, we can be obtained $\hat{\theta}^*$. When the demand

978 is in good condition for the day, we can be obtained $\hat{\theta}^* = \frac{(\alpha + \gamma)\rho_{HB}(1 - p_s)\theta_{HB}}{\beta + (\alpha + \gamma)\rho_{HB}(1 - p_s)}$. We have that

979 $\theta_{HG} < \hat{\theta}^* < \theta_{HB}$ always holds when $0 < \pi_s < \frac{(\alpha + \gamma)\rho_{HB}(1 - p_s)}{\beta + (\alpha + \gamma)\rho_{HB}(1 - p_s)}$. When the demand is

980 in bad condition for the day, we can be obtained $\hat{\theta}^{**} = \frac{(\alpha + \gamma)\rho_{LB}(1 - p_s)\theta_{LB}}{\beta + (\alpha + \gamma)\rho_{LB}(1 - p_s)}$. We have that

981 $\theta_{LG} < \hat{\theta}^{**} < \theta_{LB}$ always holds when $0 < \pi_s < \frac{(\alpha + \gamma)\rho_{LB}(1 - p_s)}{\beta + (\alpha + \gamma)\rho_{LB}(1 - p_s)}$. The expected travel cost

982 when the system reaches the user equilibrium in case 2 is $C^D = \beta\hat{\theta}^*$, otherwise, Case 1.

983 By solving $E[C^D] = p_N(C_{HG}^D + C_{HB}^D) + (1 - p_N)(C_{LG}^D + C_{LB}^D)$, we can have the expected
984 travel cost of a commuter at UE under stochastic conditions with demand information.

985

986 A.6. Proof of Proposition 2.

987 Part (a): If $t_e > t^*$, $G^{ZF} = \frac{\alpha\beta}{\beta + \gamma} \int_{\hat{\theta}^*}^{\bar{\theta}} [k(\theta_{\psi\omega})\theta_{\psi\omega} - k(\theta_{\psi\omega})\hat{\theta}^*] d\theta_{\psi\omega} + \frac{\gamma\beta}{\beta + \gamma} \int_{\underline{\theta}}^{\hat{\theta}^*} [k(\theta_{\psi\omega})\hat{\theta}^* -$

988 $k(\theta_{\psi\omega})\theta_{\psi\omega}] d\theta_{\psi\omega} \geq 0$; otherwise, $G^{ZF} = \beta\hat{\theta}^{**} - \frac{\beta\gamma}{\beta + \gamma} \int_{\underline{\theta}}^{\bar{\theta}} \theta_{\psi\omega} k(\theta_{\psi\omega}) d\theta_{\psi\omega} > \frac{\alpha\beta}{\beta + \gamma} \int_{\hat{\theta}^*}^{\bar{\theta}} [k(\theta_{\psi\omega})\theta_{\psi\omega} -$

989 $k(\theta_{\psi\omega})\hat{\theta}^*] d\theta_{\psi\omega} + \frac{\gamma\beta}{\beta + \gamma} \int_{\underline{\theta}}^{\hat{\theta}^*} [k(\theta_{\psi\omega})\hat{\theta}^* - k(\theta_{\psi\omega})\theta_{\psi\omega}] d\theta_{\psi\omega} > 0$.

990 Part (b): If $\pi_s = \pi_N$ and bottleneck capacity and demand are perfectly positive correlated,
991 we have $\theta_2 = \theta_3 = \hat{\theta}^*$ and $P(\theta_1) = P(\theta_4) = 0$. When $t_e > t^*$, $G^{ZF} = 0$; otherwise, $G^{ZF} > 0$

992

993 A.7. Proof of Proposition 3.

994 Part (a): If $t_e > t^*$, using Eq.(10) and Eqs.(14)-(15), we can derive the expected benefit
995 gains from providing bottleneck information over zero information:

996

$$G^{ZB} = E[C^Z] - E[C^B] = \frac{(\alpha + \gamma)\beta}{\beta + \gamma} \left\{ \int_{\hat{\theta}^*}^{\bar{\theta}} \theta_{\psi\omega} k(\theta_{\psi\omega}) d\theta_{\psi\omega} - \int_{\underline{s}}^{\bar{s}} \frac{f(s_\omega)}{s_\omega} \int_{\hat{N}^*}^{\bar{N}} f(N_\psi | s_\omega) N_\psi dN_\psi ds_\omega \right\} \quad (32)$$

997 where $f(N_\psi | s_\omega) = \frac{\partial}{\partial N_\psi} J(N_\psi, s_\omega)$, $k(\theta_{\psi\omega}) = \int_{\underline{s}}^{\bar{s}} s_\omega j(\theta_{\psi\omega} s_\omega, s_\omega) ds_\omega$. When bottleneck capacity
998 and demand are uncorrelated, $f(N_\psi | s_\omega) = g(N_\psi)$, $j(\theta_{\psi\omega} s_\omega, s_\omega) = g(\theta_{\psi\omega} s_\omega) f(s_\omega)$.

$$\begin{aligned} G^{ZB} &= \frac{(\alpha + \gamma)\beta}{\beta + \gamma} \left\{ \int_{\hat{\theta}^*}^{\bar{\theta}} \theta_{\psi\omega} \int_{\underline{s}}^{\bar{s}} s_\omega g(\theta_{\psi\omega} s_\omega) f(s_\omega) ds_\omega d\theta_{\psi\omega} - \int_{\underline{s}}^{\bar{s}} \frac{f(s_\omega)}{s_\omega} \int_{\hat{N}^*}^{\bar{N}} g(N_\psi) N_\psi dN_\psi ds_\omega \right\} \\ &= \frac{(\alpha + \gamma)\beta}{\beta + \gamma} \left\{ \int_{\underline{s}}^{\bar{s}} \int_{\underline{\hat{\theta}^*}}^{\bar{\theta}} \frac{N_\psi}{s_\omega} f(s_\omega) g(N_\psi) ds_\omega dN_\psi - \int_{\underline{s}}^{\bar{s}} \int_{\hat{N}^*}^{\bar{N}} \frac{N_\psi}{s_\omega} f(s_\omega) g(N_\psi) ds_\omega dN_\psi \right\} \end{aligned} \quad (33)$$

999 where $\int_{\hat{\theta}^*}^{\bar{\theta}} g(N_\psi) f(s_\omega) d\theta_{\psi\omega} = \int_{\hat{N}^*}^{\bar{N}} g(N_\psi) dN_\psi = \frac{\gamma}{\alpha + \gamma}$. Hence, $\underline{\hat{\theta}^*} \leq \hat{N}^*$, $G^{ZB} \geq 0$.

1000 Part(b): When two conditional variables are uncorrelated (i.e., $r = 0$), $\pi_s > \pi_N$ and $p_N <$
1001 $\frac{\gamma}{\alpha + \gamma}$, by combining Eq.(16), Tables A1 and A2, we can obtain the expected benefit from

1002 bottleneck information to zero information:

$$G^{ZB} = E[C^Z] - p_s E[C_{\psi|G}^B] - (1 - p_s) E[C_{\psi|B}^B] = \Phi(\theta_3) - p_s \beta \hat{\theta}_1^{**} - (1 - p_s) \hat{\theta}_2^{**} \quad (34)$$

1003 where the specific expressions of $\Phi(\theta_3)$, $\hat{\theta}_1^{**}$ and $\hat{\theta}_2^{**}$ can be found in Appendix A.3 and
1004 Appendix A.4. By substituting specific expressions and $r = 0$, and simplifying, we obtain:

$$G^{ZB} = \frac{\beta[(\gamma + \alpha)p_N - \gamma](N_H - p_s N_L)}{(\gamma + \beta)s_G} + \frac{\beta[(\gamma + \alpha)p_N N_L + (1 - 2p_N)N_H - \alpha N_L](1 - p_s)}{(\gamma + \beta)s_B} \quad (35)$$

1005 When $\pi_N = \pi_s$ and $p_N < \frac{\gamma}{\alpha + \gamma}$, we have $G^{ZB} = 0$.

1006 In the above, we find a special case when demand varies slightly that satisfies $G^{ZB} = 0$,
1007 the proposition is true. So we can conclude that providing bottleneck information can be
1008 welfare-neutral over zero information when bottleneck capacity and demand are independent
1009 (i.e., $r = 0$). If demand and $\pi_s > \pi_N$ frequently experience drops, providing bottleneck
1010 information can be likely welfare-neutral (i.e., $G^{ZB} = 0$).

1011

1012 A.8. Proof of Proposition 4.

1013 Part (a): If two conditional variables are moderately correlated and $\pi_N < \pi_s$:

1014 (1) When p_s is large and p_N is small, the benefit gains from bottleneck information is

$$G^{ZB} = \frac{(\gamma + \alpha)\beta[\rho_{HGPN}p_s N_H s_B + \rho_{HBPN}(1 - p_s)N_H s_G]}{[\beta + (\gamma + \alpha)(1 - p_s)]s_B s_G} - \frac{(\gamma + \alpha)\beta p_s \rho_{HGPN} N_H}{[\beta + (\gamma + \alpha)\rho_{HGPN}]s_G} - \frac{\gamma\beta(1 - p_s)N_L}{(\beta + \gamma)s_B} \\ - \frac{(\alpha + \gamma)\beta(1 - p_s)(N_H - N_L)\rho_{HBPN}}{(\beta + \gamma)s_B}, \quad \rho_{HGPN} > (1 - p_s), \\ G^{ZB} < \frac{\beta(\alpha + \gamma)(1 - p_s)}{s_B} \left\{ \frac{\rho_{HBPN}N_H}{\beta + (\gamma + \alpha)(1 - p_s)} - \frac{\rho_{HBPN}N_H + (\gamma - \rho_{HBPN})N_L}{\beta + \gamma} \right\} < 0 \quad (36)$$

1015 (2) When p_s and p_N are large, the benefit gains from bottleneck information is

$$G^{ZB} = \frac{\gamma\beta(s_B - p_s s_G)N_H}{(\gamma + \alpha)s_G s_B} + (\gamma + \alpha)\beta N_{HPN} \left\{ \frac{(1 - p_s \rho_{HG})(1 - \pi_s)}{(\gamma + \beta)s_B} - \frac{p_s \rho_{HG}}{[\beta + (\gamma + \alpha)\rho_{HGPN}]s_G} \right\} \quad (37)$$

1016 When bottleneck capacity rarely experiences degradation (i.e., $\pi_s < p_s$ and $p_s >$
1017 $\frac{(1 - \pi_s)[\beta + (\gamma + \alpha)\rho_{HGPN}]}{\rho_{HG}(1 - \pi_s)[\beta + (\gamma + \alpha)\rho_{HGPN}] + \rho_{HG}\pi_s(\gamma + \beta)}$), $G^{ZB} < 0$.

1018 Therefore, we can conclude that when bottleneck capacity and demand have a moderately
1019 correlation, bottleneck capacity rarely experience degradation, providing bottleneck infor-
1020 mation is more likely to be welfare-reducing over zero information (i.e., $G^{ZB} < 0$) when

1021 $\pi_N < \pi_s$.

1022 Part (b): When $\pi_s < \pi_N$ and bottleneck capacity and demand are negatively correlated:

$$G^{ZB} = \frac{\gamma\beta N_H}{(\gamma + \beta)s_B} - p_s \left[\frac{\gamma\beta N_L}{(\gamma + \beta)s_G} + \frac{(\gamma + \alpha)\beta}{\gamma + \beta} \rho_{HGPN} \left(\frac{N_H}{s_G} - \frac{N_L}{s_G} \right) \right] - (1 - p_s) \frac{\gamma\beta N_H}{(\gamma + \beta)s_B} \\ \frac{\partial G^{ZB}}{\partial \rho_{HG}} = - \frac{(\gamma + \alpha)\beta p_N p_s (N_H - N_L)}{(\gamma + \beta)s_G} < 0, \quad \frac{\partial \rho_{HG}}{\partial r} > 0 \quad (38)$$

1023

When $\pi_s < \pi_N$ and bottleneck capacity and demand are positively correlated:

$$G^{ZB} = \frac{(\gamma + \alpha)\beta(1 - p_s)[\rho_{LB}(1 - p_N)N_L - \rho_{HB}p_N N_H]}{[\beta + (\gamma + \alpha)(1 - p_s)]s_B} - \frac{(\gamma + \alpha)\beta p_s \rho_{HG} p_N N_H}{[\beta + (\gamma + \alpha)\rho_{HG} p_N]s_G} - \frac{\gamma\beta(1 - p_s)N_H}{(\beta + \gamma)s_B}$$

$$\frac{\partial G^{ZB}}{\partial \rho_{HG}} = \frac{(\gamma + \alpha)\beta p_N p_s (N_L + N_H)}{[\beta + (\gamma + \alpha)(1 - p_s)]s_B} - \frac{(\gamma + \alpha)\beta^2 p_s p_N N_H}{[\beta + (\gamma + \alpha)\rho_{HG} p_N]^2 s_G} > 0, \quad \frac{\partial \rho_{HG}}{\partial r} > 0 \quad (39)$$

1024 Therefore, the benefit gains from bottleneck information decreases as the value of the
1025 degree of correlation increases when $\pi_s < \pi_N$. When bottleneck capacity and demand are
1026 perfectly positive correlated, $G^{ZB} \geq 0$. So we can conclude that the benefit gains from
1027 bottleneck capacity information $G^{ZB} \geq 0$ when $\pi_s < \pi_N$.

1028

1029 A.9. Proof of Proposition 5.

1030 Part (a): If $t_e > t^*$, using Eq.(10) and Eq.(17)-(18), we can derive the expected benefit from
1031 demand information to zero information:

1032

$$G^{ZD} = E[C^Z] - E[C^D] = \frac{(\alpha + \gamma)\beta}{\beta + \gamma} \left\{ \int_{\hat{\theta}^*}^{\bar{\theta}} \theta_{\psi\omega} k(\theta_{\psi\omega}) d\theta_{\psi\omega} - \int_{\underline{N}}^{\bar{N}} N_{\psi} g(N_{\psi}) \int_{\underline{s}}^{\hat{s}^*} \frac{g(s_{\omega}|N_{\psi})}{s_{\omega}} ds_{\omega} dN_{\psi} \right\} \quad (40)$$

1033 where $g(N_{\psi}|s_{\omega}) = \frac{\partial}{\partial s_{\omega}} J(N_{\psi}, s_{\omega})$, $k(\theta_{\psi\omega}) = \int_{\underline{s}}^{\bar{s}} s_{\omega} j(\theta_{\psi\omega} s_{\omega}, s_{\omega}) ds_{\omega}$. When bottleneck capacity
1034 and demand are uncorrelated, $g(s_{\omega}|N_{\psi}) = f(s_{\omega})$, $j(\theta_{\psi\omega} s_{\omega}, s_{\omega}) = g(\theta_{\psi\omega} s_{\omega}) f(s_{\omega})$.

$$G^{ZD} = \frac{(\alpha + \gamma)\beta}{\beta + \gamma} \left\{ \int_{\hat{\theta}^*}^{\bar{\theta}} \theta_{\psi\omega} \int_{\underline{s}}^{\bar{s}} s_{\omega} g(\theta_{\psi\omega} s_{\omega}) f(s_{\omega}) ds_{\omega} d\theta_{\psi\omega} - \int_{\underline{s}}^{\hat{s}^*} N_{\psi} g(N_{\psi}) \int_{\underline{N}}^{\bar{N}} \frac{f(s_{\omega})}{s_{\omega}} dN_{\psi} ds_{\omega} \right\}$$

$$= \frac{(\alpha + \gamma)\beta}{\beta + \gamma} \left\{ \int_{\underline{s}}^{\bar{s}} \int_{\hat{\theta}^*}^{\bar{\theta}} \frac{N_{\psi} g(N_{\psi}) f(s_{\omega})}{s_{\omega}} ds_{\omega} dN_{\psi} - \int_{\underline{N}}^{\bar{N}} \int_{\underline{s}}^{\hat{s}^*} \frac{N_{\psi} g(N_{\psi}) f(s_{\omega})}{s_{\omega}} ds_{\omega} dN_{\psi} \right\} \quad (41)$$

1035 where $\int_{\hat{\theta}^*}^{\bar{\theta}} g(N_{\psi}) f(s_{\omega}) d\theta_{\psi\omega} = \int_{\underline{s}}^{\hat{s}^*} f(s_{\omega}) ds_{\omega} = \frac{\gamma}{\alpha + \gamma}$. Hence, $\underline{s}\hat{\theta}^* \leq \underline{N}$ and $\hat{s}^* \leq \bar{s}$, $G^{ZD} \geq 0$.

1036 Part (b): When $\pi_s \leq \pi_N$ and $p_s > \frac{\alpha}{\alpha + \gamma}$, the benefit gains from demand information to zero in-

1037 formation is $G^{ZD} = \frac{(\gamma + \alpha)\beta(1 - p_s)}{s_B} \left\{ \frac{(1 - p_N)\rho_{LB}N_L + p_N\rho_{HB}N_H}{\beta + (\alpha + \gamma)(1 - p_s)} - \frac{p_N\rho_{HB}N_H}{\beta + (\alpha + \gamma)\rho_{HB}(1 - p_s)} - \frac{(1 - p_N)\rho_{LB}N_L}{\beta + (\alpha + \gamma)\rho_{LB}(1 - p_s)} \right\}$.

1038 If two conditional variables are uncorrelated ($r = 0$), $G^{ZD} = 0$.

1039 In the above, we find a special case when bottleneck capacity and demand both rarely
1040 experience drops that satisfies $G^{ZD} = 0$, the proposition is true. So we can conclude
1041 that providing demand information does not necessarily improve welfare when bottleneck
1042 capacity and demand are independent of each other ($r = 0$). If bottleneck capacity rarely
1043 experience drops, providing demand information can be likely welfare-neutral (i.e., $G^{ZD} = 0$).

1044

1045 A.10. Proof of Proposition 6.

1046 Part (a): If two conditional variables are moderately correlated and $\pi_N \geq \pi_s$. When p_s is

1047 large, the benefit gains from bottleneck information over zero information is

$$\begin{aligned}
G^{ZD} &= \frac{(\gamma + \alpha)\beta(1 - p_s)}{s_B} \left\{ \frac{N_L + p_N\rho_{HB}(N_H - N_L)}{\beta + (\alpha + \gamma)(1 - p_s)} - \frac{p_N\rho_{HB}N_H}{\beta + (\alpha + \gamma)\rho_{HB}(1 - p_s)} \right\} \\
&\quad - \frac{(\gamma + \alpha)\beta(1 - p_s)}{s_B} \frac{(1 - p_N)\rho_{LB}N_L}{\beta + (\alpha + \gamma)\rho_{LB}(1 - p_s)} \\
\frac{\partial G^{ZD}}{\partial \rho_{HB}} &= \frac{(\gamma + \alpha)\beta(1 - p_s)}{s_B} \left\{ \frac{p_N(1 - \pi_N)}{\beta + (\alpha + \gamma)(1 - p_s)} - \frac{p_N\beta}{[\beta + (\alpha + \gamma)\rho_{HB}(1 - p_s)]^2} \right\} \\
&\quad - \frac{(\gamma + \alpha)\beta(1 - p_s)}{s_B} \frac{\pi_N[(1 - p_N)\beta + (\alpha + \gamma)(1 - p_s)]}{[\beta + (\alpha + \gamma)\rho_{LB}(1 - p_s)]^2} \\
&< \frac{(\gamma + \alpha)\beta(1 - p_s)}{s_B} \left\{ \frac{p_N(1 - \pi_N)}{\beta + (\alpha + \gamma)(1 - p_s)} - \frac{(1 - \pi_N)p_N - \pi_N}{\beta} - \frac{\pi_N(\alpha + \gamma)(1 - p_s)}{\beta^2} \right\} < 0
\end{aligned} \tag{42}$$

1048 If bottleneck capacity and demand are uncorrelated, $G^{ZD} = 0$. So G^{ZD} has a value less
1049 than 0 when capacity and demand have a moderate positive correlation.

1050 In the above, we can conclude that providing demand information is more likely to be
1051 welfare-reducing(i.e., $G^{ZD} < 0$) when capacity and demand have a moderately correlation,
1052 $\pi_N \geq \pi_s$, and bottleneck capacity rarely experience drops.

1053 Part (b): bottleneck capacity and demand are negatively correlated.

1054 (1) When $\pi_s \geq \pi_N$, p_s is small and p_N is large,

$$\begin{aligned}
G^{ZD} &= \frac{(1 - p_N)\gamma\beta N_H}{(\gamma + \beta)s_B} - \frac{(1 - p_N)\beta}{\gamma + \beta} \left[\frac{\gamma N_L}{s_G} + \frac{(\gamma + \alpha)\rho_{LB}(1 - p_s)N_L(s_G - s_B)}{s_B s_G} \right] \\
\frac{\partial G^{ZD}}{\partial \rho_{LB}} &= -\frac{(\gamma + \alpha)\beta}{\gamma + \beta} (1 - p_s)(1 - p_N) \left(\frac{N_L}{s_B} - \frac{N_L}{s_G} \right) < 0, \quad \frac{\partial \rho_{HB}}{\partial r} > 0
\end{aligned} \tag{43}$$

1056 (2) When $\pi_s \geq \pi_N$, p_s is large and p_N is small,

$$\begin{aligned}
G^{ZD} &= \frac{(\alpha + \gamma)p_N[s_B + \rho_{HB}(1 - p_s)(s_G - s_B)]N_H}{[\beta + (\alpha + \gamma)(1 - p_s)]s_B s_G} - \frac{\gamma\beta(1 - p_N)N_L}{(\gamma + \beta)s_G} - p_N \frac{(\alpha + \gamma)(1 - p_s)\rho_{HB}N_H}{[\beta + (\alpha + \gamma)(1 - p_s)\rho_{HB}]s_B} \\
&\quad - \frac{(\gamma + \alpha)\beta(1 - p_s)(1 - p_N\rho_{HB})}{\gamma + \beta} \left(\frac{N_L}{s_B} - \frac{N_L}{s_G} \right), \quad \frac{\partial \rho_{HB}}{\partial r} < 0 \\
\frac{\partial G^{ZD}}{\partial \rho_{HB}} &= \frac{(\alpha + \gamma)p_N(1 - p_s)}{s_B} \left\{ \frac{(1 - \pi_s)N_H}{[\beta + (\alpha + \gamma)(1 - p_s)]} - \frac{\beta N_H}{[\beta + (\alpha + \gamma)(1 - p_s)\rho_{HB}]^2} + \frac{\beta(1 - \pi_s)N_L}{(\gamma + \beta)} \right\} > 0
\end{aligned} \tag{44}$$

1058 Therefore, the benefit gains from demand information increases as the value of the degree
1059 of correlation decreases when bottleneck capacity and demand are negatively correlated and
1060 $\pi_s \geq \pi_N$. When bottleneck capacity and demand are uncorrelated, $G^{ZD} \geq 0$. So we can
1061 conclude that the benefit gains from demand capacity information $G^{ZD} \geq 0$ when bottleneck
1062 capacity and demand are negative correlated ($r < 0$) and $\pi_s \geq \pi_N$.

1063 part(c): If two conditional variables have a moderate positive correlation and $\pi_N < \pi_s$.

1064 When p_N and p_s are small, the benefit gains from demand information to zero information

1065 is

$$G^{ZD} = \frac{(\gamma + \alpha)\beta p_N N_H [\rho_{HG} p_s \pi_s + \rho_{HB}(1 - p_s)]}{[\beta + (\gamma + \alpha)(1 - p_s)] s_B} - \frac{\gamma \beta p_N N_H}{(\gamma + \beta) s_B} - \frac{\gamma \beta (1 - p_N) N_L}{(\gamma + \beta) s_G} - \frac{(\gamma + \alpha)\beta \rho_{LB}(1 - p_N)(1 - p_s) N_L (s_G - s_B)}{(\gamma + \beta) s_B s_G} \quad (45)$$

1066 If demand frequently experience degradation (i.e., $p_N < \frac{\pi_N [\gamma \pi_s + (\gamma + \alpha)(1 - p_s)(1 - \pi_s)]}{(\gamma + \alpha)(\gamma + \beta)\pi_s - \gamma(1 - \pi_N)[\beta + (\gamma + \alpha)(1 - p_s)]}$),
 1067 $G^{ZD} < 0$. So we can conclude that providing demand information is more likely to be welfare-
 1068 reducing (i.e., $G^{ZD} < 0$) when capacity and demand have a moderate positive correlation,
 1069 $\pi_N < \pi_s$, and bottleneck capacity and demand both frequently experience drops.

1070

1071 A.11. Lemma 1 and its proof.

1072 If $\int_a^x f(t)dt \geq \int_a^x g(t)dt$, $x \in [a, b]$ and $\int_a^b f(t)dt \geq \int_a^b g(t)dt$, so $\int_a^b x f(x)dx \geq \int_a^b x g(x)dx$
 1073 The proof: let $\phi(x) = f(x) - g(x)$, The two conditions given above become $\int_a^x \phi(t)dt \geq 0$
 1074 and $\int_a^b \phi(t)dt = 0$. Let $\phi(x) = \Phi'(x)$, we have $\int_a^b x \phi(x)dx = -x\Phi(x) - \phi(x)|_a^b \leq 0$.

1075

1076 A.12. Proof of Proposition 7.

1077 Part (a): Assume bottleneck capacity rarely experience degradation (i.e., p_s is large) and
 1078 $\pi_N < \pi_s$.

1079 (1) If bottleneck capacity and demand have a negative correlation, the benefit gains in
 1080 shifting from bottleneck information to demand information is

$$G^{BD} = \frac{\gamma \beta [N_H - (1 - p_N) N_L]}{(\gamma + \beta) s_G} - \frac{p_N \gamma \beta N_H}{(\gamma + \beta) s_B} - \frac{(\gamma + \alpha) \beta [(1 - p_N) - P(\theta_{LG})]}{\gamma + \beta} \frac{N_L}{s_B} + \frac{(\gamma + \alpha) \beta [(1 + p_s - p_N) N_L + p_s N_H - (2N_L + N_H) P(\theta_{LG})]}{(\gamma + \beta) s_G} \quad (46)$$

1081 If $G^{BD} < 0$, p_N needs to satisfy the condition: $p_N \leq \frac{(1 + \pi_s) \pi_N \rho_{LB} - (1 + \pi_N) \pi_s (1 - \rho_{LB})}{(1 + \pi_s) \pi_N \rho_{LB} + (1 + \pi_N) \pi_s \rho_{LB}}$.

1082 (2) If bottleneck capacity and demand have a positive correlation, the benefit gains from
 1083 providing bottleneck information over providing demand information is

$$G^{BD} = \frac{\gamma \beta [(p_s - p_N) \pi_s N_H - (1 - p_N) N_L]}{(\gamma + \beta) s_B} + \frac{(\alpha + \gamma) \beta P(\theta_{HB}) N_H}{(\gamma + \beta) s_B} \left[\frac{\gamma - (\alpha + \gamma) \rho_{HB} p_N}{\beta + (\alpha + \gamma) \rho_{HB} p_N} + \pi_s \right] \quad (47)$$

1084 If $G^{BD} < 0$, p_N needs to satisfy the condition: $p_N \geq \frac{\gamma + \pi_s \beta}{(1 - \pi_s)(\alpha + \gamma) \rho_{HB}}$.

1085 So we can conclude that demand information can be more valuable (i.e., $G^{BD} > 0$)
 1086 when the amplitude of bottleneck capacity drop is less than the amplitude of demand drop
 1087 (i.e., $\pi_N < \pi_s$) and bottleneck capacity rarely experience drops.

1088 Part (b): Assume the amplitude of bottleneck capacity drop is larger than the amplitude of
 1089 demand drop (i.e., $\pi_N > \pi_s$). The benefit gains from providing bottleneck information over

1090 providing demand information are

$$G^{BD} = \frac{(\alpha + \gamma)\beta}{\gamma + \beta} \int_{\underline{s}}^{\bar{s}} \frac{f(s_\omega)}{s_\omega} \int_{\hat{N}^*}^{\bar{N}} N_\psi f(N_\psi | s_\omega) dN_\psi ds_\omega - \int_{\underline{N}}^{\bar{N}} g(N_\psi) N_\psi \int_{\underline{s}}^{\hat{s}^*} \frac{g(s_\omega | N_\psi)}{s_\omega} ds_\omega dN_\psi \quad (48)$$

1091 Let $u = s_\omega / \bar{s}$ and $v = N_\psi / \bar{N}$, we assume $\hat{u}^* = \hat{s}^* / \bar{s}$ and $\hat{v}^* = \hat{N}^* / \bar{N}$. we can get it by
1092 substituting the definite integral:

$$\begin{aligned} G^{BD} &= \frac{(\alpha + \gamma)\beta\bar{N}^2}{\gamma + \beta} \left\{ \int_{\hat{v}^*}^1 v f(v\bar{N} | u\bar{s}) \int_{\pi_s}^1 \frac{f(u\bar{s})}{u} dudv - \int_{\pi_N}^1 v g(v\bar{N}) \int_{\pi_s}^{\hat{u}^*} \frac{g(u\bar{s} | v\bar{N})}{u} dudv \right\} \\ &= \frac{(\alpha + \gamma)\beta\bar{N}^2}{\gamma + \beta} \left\{ \int_{\hat{v}^*}^1 v f(v\bar{N} | u\bar{s}) \int_{\pi_s}^1 \frac{f(u\bar{s})}{u} dudv - \int_{\pi_N}^1 v g(v\bar{N}) \int_{\pi_s}^1 \frac{g(u\bar{s} | v\bar{N})}{u} dudv \right\} \\ &\quad + \frac{(\alpha + \gamma)\beta\bar{N}^2}{\gamma + \beta} \int_{\pi_N}^1 v g(v\bar{N}) \int_{\hat{u}^*}^1 \frac{g(u\bar{s} | v\bar{N})}{u} dudv \end{aligned} \quad (49)$$

1093 By lemma 1 in the Appendix A.11, $f(v\bar{N} | u\bar{s}) \geq g(v\bar{N})$ and $g(u\bar{s} | v\bar{N}) \geq f(u\bar{s})$, we have
1094 $\int_a^b v f(v\bar{N} | u\bar{s}) \leq \int_a^b v g(v\bar{N})$ and $\int_a^b g(u\bar{s} | v\bar{N}) / u \geq \int_a^b f(u\bar{s}) / u$. It follows that:

$$\begin{aligned} G^{BD} &\leq \frac{(\alpha + \gamma)\beta\bar{N}^2}{\gamma + \beta} \int_{\pi_s}^1 \frac{f(u\bar{s})}{u} \left\{ \int_{\hat{v}^*}^1 v f(v\bar{N} | u\bar{s}) - \int_{\pi_N}^1 v g(v\bar{N}) dv \right\} du \\ &\quad + \frac{(\alpha + \gamma)\beta\bar{N}^2}{\gamma + \beta} \int_{\pi_N}^1 v g(v\bar{N}) \int_{\hat{u}^*}^1 \frac{g(u\bar{s} | v\bar{N})}{u} dudv \end{aligned} \quad (50)$$

1096 So we can conclude that when providing bottleneck capacity information is more valu-
1097 able than providing demand information when the amplitude of bottleneck capacity drop is
1098 larger than the amplitude of demand drop (i.e., $\pi_N > \pi_s$).

1099

1100 A.13. Proof of Proposition 8.

1101 Part (a): (From demand information to full information)

1102 If $t_e > t^*$, the expected benefit gains from providing full information over demand informa-
1103 tion are

$$\begin{aligned} G^{DF} &= \frac{(\alpha + \gamma)\beta}{\beta + \gamma} \int_{\underline{N}}^{\bar{N}} N_\psi g(N_\psi) \int_{\underline{s}}^{\hat{s}^*} \frac{g(s_\omega | N_\psi)}{s_\omega} ds_\omega dN_\psi - \frac{\gamma\beta}{\beta + \gamma} \int_{\underline{\theta}}^{\bar{\theta}} \theta_{\psi\omega} k(\theta_{\psi\omega}) d\theta_{\psi\omega} \\ &\geq \frac{\alpha\beta}{\beta + \gamma} \int_{\underline{N}}^{\bar{N}} N_\psi \int_{\underline{s}}^{\hat{s}^*} \frac{j(N_\psi, s_\omega)(\hat{s}^* - s_\omega)}{\hat{s}^* s_\omega} ds_\omega dN_\psi + \frac{\gamma\beta}{\beta + \gamma} \int_{\underline{N}}^{\bar{N}} N_\psi \int_{\hat{s}^*}^{\bar{s}} \frac{j(N_\psi, s_\omega)(s_\omega - \hat{s}^*)}{\hat{s}^* s_\omega} ds_\omega dN_\psi \end{aligned} \quad (51)$$

1105 where $g(s_\omega | N_\psi) = \frac{\partial}{\partial s_\omega} J(N_\psi, s_\omega)$, $k(\theta_{\psi\omega}) = \int_{\underline{s}}^{\bar{s}} s_\omega j(\theta_{\psi\omega} s_\omega, s_\omega) ds_\omega$.

1106 If $t_e = t^*$, the expected benefit gains from providing full information over demand informa-
1107 tion are

1108

$$\begin{aligned}
G^{DF} &= \beta \hat{\theta}^{**} - \frac{\gamma \beta}{\beta + \gamma} \int_{\underline{\theta}}^{\bar{\theta}} \theta_{\psi\omega} k(\theta_{\psi\omega}) d\theta_{\psi\omega} \\
&> \frac{(\alpha + \gamma) \beta}{\beta + \gamma} \int_{\underline{N}}^{\bar{N}} N_{\psi} g(N_{\psi}) \int_{\underline{s}}^{\hat{s}^*} \frac{g(s_{\omega} | N_{\psi})}{s_{\omega}} ds_{\omega} dN_{\psi} - \frac{\gamma \beta}{\beta + \gamma} \int_{\underline{\theta}}^{\bar{\theta}} \theta_{\psi\omega} k(\theta_{\psi\omega}) d\theta_{\psi\omega} > 0
\end{aligned} \tag{52}$$

1109

(From bottleneck information to full information):

1110

If $t_e > t^*$, the expected benefit from bottleneck information to full information is

1111

$$\begin{aligned}
G^{BF} &= \frac{(\alpha + \gamma) \beta}{\beta + \gamma} \int_{\underline{s}}^{\bar{s}} \frac{f(s_{\omega})}{s_{\omega}} \int_{\hat{N}^*}^{\bar{N}} f(N_{\psi} | s_{\omega}) N_{\psi} dN_{\psi} ds_{\omega} - \frac{\gamma \beta}{\beta + \gamma} \int_{\underline{\theta}}^{\bar{\theta}} \theta_{\psi\omega} k(\theta_{\psi\omega}) d\theta_{\psi\omega} \\
&\geq \frac{\alpha \beta}{\beta + \gamma} \int_{\underline{s}}^{\bar{s}} \frac{1}{s_{\omega}} \int_{\hat{N}^*}^{\bar{N}} j(N_{\psi}, s_{\omega}) (N_{\psi} - \hat{N}^*) dN_{\psi} ds_{\omega} + \frac{\gamma \beta}{\beta + \gamma} \int_{\underline{s}}^{\bar{s}} \frac{1}{s_{\omega}} \int_{\underline{N}}^{\hat{N}^*} j(N_{\psi}, s_{\omega}) (\hat{N}^* - N_{\psi}) dN_{\psi} ds_{\omega}
\end{aligned} \tag{53}$$

1112

where $f(N_{\psi} | s_{\omega}) = \frac{\partial}{\partial N_{\psi}} J(N_{\psi}, s_{\omega})$, $k(\theta_{\psi\omega}) = \int_{\underline{s}}^{\bar{s}} s_{\omega} j(\theta_{\psi\omega} s_{\omega}, s_{\omega}) ds_{\omega}$.

1113

If $t_e = t^*$, the expected benefit from bottleneck information to full information is

1114

$$\begin{aligned}
G^{BF} &= \beta \hat{\theta}^{**} - \frac{\gamma \beta}{\beta + \gamma} \int_{\underline{\theta}}^{\bar{\theta}} \theta_{\psi\omega} k(\theta_{\psi\omega}) d\theta_{\psi\omega} \\
&> \frac{(\alpha + \gamma) \beta}{\beta + \gamma} \int_{\underline{s}}^{\bar{s}} \frac{f(s_{\omega})}{s_{\omega}} \int_{\hat{N}^*}^{\bar{N}} f(N_{\psi} | s_{\omega}) N_{\psi} dN_{\psi} ds_{\omega} - \frac{\gamma \beta}{\beta + \gamma} \int_{\underline{\theta}}^{\bar{\theta}} \theta_{\psi\omega} k(\theta_{\psi\omega}) d\theta_{\psi\omega} > 0
\end{aligned} \tag{54}$$

1115

Hence $G^{DF} \geq 0$ and $G^{BF} \geq 0$, we have providing full information does not increase travel costs compared to providing partial information.

1117

Part (b): Take the derivative of G^{BF} and G^{DF} with respect to α :

$$\begin{aligned}
\frac{\partial G^{BF}}{\partial \alpha} &= \frac{\beta}{\beta + \gamma} \int_{\underline{s}}^{\bar{s}} \frac{f(s_{\omega})}{s_{\omega}} \int_{\hat{N}^*}^{\bar{N}} f(N_{\psi} | s_{\omega}) N_{\psi} dN_{\psi} ds_{\omega} > 0 \\
\frac{\partial G^{DF}}{\partial \alpha} &= \frac{\beta}{\beta + \gamma} \int_{\underline{N}}^{\bar{N}} N_{\psi} g(N_{\psi}) \int_{\underline{s}}^{\hat{s}^*} \frac{g(s_{\omega} | N_{\psi})}{s_{\omega}} ds_{\omega} dN_{\psi} > 0
\end{aligned} \tag{55}$$

1118

So we can conclude that the benefit gains from full information as compared to providing only partial information are an increasing function of α .

1120

1121

A.14. The benefit gains G^{ZF} from complete information for different p_s , p_N , r and π_N when demand and bottleneck capacity follow the Bernoulli distribution

1122

1123

As shown in Fig. 13, the welfare gains G^{ZF} are not necessarily monotonic with respect to the correlation coefficient r or the amplitude of demand reduction π_N . When both bottleneck capacity and demand are stochastic and correlated, the relation between G^{ZF} and r becomes significantly more complex.

1126




Figure 13: Benefit gains from providing full information over zero information under varying r for different p_s, p_N, π_s and π_N .

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