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THE OTHER DEMOSTHENES. ON POSSIBLE FORMS OF PHILIATION BETWEEN ECOLOGY AND PHILOLOGY

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ABSTRACT

Beginning with the oratorial askesis of Demosthenes and its use of nature as a tool for the amplitude and clarity of the human voice as a 'Vexierbild', this article suggests that the appropriation of philology to serve a particular end (rather than being an end in itself) risks repeating the very injustice that ecocritical discourses are trying to correct due to the way they restrict the potential of what texts can tell us. To bring out ecological aspects of philology, this article pursues a notion of language that understands it to be intrinsically linked with the opening up of the potential for affiliations, as found in Aristotle, August Boeckh, and Werner Hamacher. This article emphasises language's potential for kinships rather than its ability to make decisions and judgements about the right form for our relationship with the world. It also makes a plea for a philology that is not focused on extracting immediately usable meanings from its interpretations. Instead, philology should open itself up towards linguistic 'wildness'. By doing so, it can provide us with a model for an ethics of co-responsibility that seeks to bring about open and inclusive forms of resonance across times, places and species.

Ausgehend vom Vexierbild der rhetorischen Übungen des Demosthenes und dessen Aneignung der Natur als eines technologischen Werkzeugs zum Zwecke der Verbesserung der menschlichen Stimme, möchte dieser Beitrag darlegen, dass die Aneignung der Philologie für einen bestimmten Zweck (anstatt diese als „Zweck an sich" zu betrachten) das Risiko birgt, genau solche Ungerechtigkeit zu wiederholen, die ökokritische Diskurse zu korrigieren versuchen, indem sie das Interpretationspotenzial dessen einschränken, was uns Texte sagen können. Um ökologische Aspekte der Philologie an sich sichtbar zu machen, verfolgt der Beitrag ein Verständnis von Sprache als einer Möglichkeit, Affiliationen zu eröffnen. Ein solches Potenzial von Sprache lässt sich unter anderem in Texten von Aristoteles, August Boeckh und Werner Hamacher finden. Abschließend formuliert der Beitrag ein Plädoyer für eine Philologie, der es nicht darum geht, aus jeder Lektüre unmittelbar zu verwertende Bedeutungen ableiten zu wollen, sondern darum, die genuine „Wildheit" von Texten zuzulassen. Auf diese Weise liefert Philologie zuletzt auch ein Modell für eine Ethik kollektiver Verantwortung, die offene und inklusive Formen der Resonanz über Zeiten, Orte und Spezies hinweg anstrebt.

1

In Plutarch's *Hellenistic Lives* (circa AD 100) we find an account of the oratory practices of Demosthenes:

Figure 1. Eugène Delacroix, *Demosthenes on the Seashore* (1859). © National Gallery of Ireland Collection, NGI.964. Source: <http://onlinecollection.nationalgallery.ie/objects/11780/demosthenes-on-the-seashore>.

> The exercises [*askéseis*] he adopted for his physical defects (according to Demetrius of Phalerum, who names his source as Demosthenes himself when he was an old man) were as follows. In order to get rid of his mumbling and a tendency to stammer — in other words, in order to articulate clearly — he used to recite passages while holding pebbles [*pséphoi*] in his mouth, and to train his voice he used to talk while running or climbing slopes, and recite a few sentences or verses at a single breath. He also had a large mirror at home and he would declaim while standing in front of it.[1]

This specific use of nature to deal with a physical defect finds its visual expression in a painting by Eugène Delacroix entitled *Demosthenes on the Seashore* (1859) (see Fig. 1), which is on display in the National Gallery of Ireland. To avoid the somewhat perceptibly resistant scene of the inside of Demosthenes' mouth, Delacroix chooses to depict another of

[1] Plutarch, *Hellenistic Lives*, trans. by Robin Waterfield (Oxford University Press, 2016), p. 89.

the legendary methods that Demosthenes is said to have practised to gain mastery over his speech defects and become a great orator: he walked close to the waves and attempted to overcome their amplitude with the sound of his voice. Only the heavy boulder lying by his feet in the painting hints towards the weight of the pebbles that Demosthenes used to tame the uncontrolled movements of his tongue.

Demosthenes' employment of the pebbles and of the waves as oratorical aids appears to offer examples of the ways in which nature is commonly there for us, as a prop or tool that can be used for our own purposes. It seems that Demosthenes had no interest in what the waves could tell him; they were only there as an instrument or resource for his self-improvement.[2] He did not try to speak *with* the pebbles; rather, he spoke by way of *making use* of the pebbles. Nevertheless, Delacroix's painting can be perceived as a kind of 'Vexierbild' that allows it to be regarded in two (or more) ways. If considered in a critical light, we see nothing but an image of humankind's subjugation of nature, a man trying to drown out the sound of waves with his own voice, a man turning pebbles into a tool. When held in a different light, we can see the potential for another kind of relation, one which might enable a radical form of encounter. The image of Demosthenes seems to be caught between two opposing forces, mastery and encounter, and we may wonder why the scales always appear to be tipped in favour of mastery and against the possibilities of what could possibly be experienced. But what if the waves drowned out Demosthenes' voice and he was forced to listen to them or learned to speak with them, rather than over them? What if the presence of the pebbles brought new tonalities to his speech that were not his own? Alongside the image of Demosthenes as a rhetorical master, we find the suggestion of another Demosthenes, one which will accompany our reflections on philology throughout this text. It is the figure of the other, potential and speculative Demosthenes that inspires the following considerations pursued in this article: How radical will our methods need to be to break our instrumental relationship with nature? What conditions would need to be in place so that an open form of encounter between humans and non-humans could take place? In what ways might philology provide answers to these questions?

2

If Demosthenes appears to represent a figure of injustice insofar as he refuses to allow the world around us to enter into conversation with us, then perhaps a form of corrective justice might be found by attempting to establish a form of philology that actively moves against mastery and

[2] It should be noted, however, that two figures appear in the background of Delacroix's painting with their arms raised as if despairing at Demosthenes' actions, perhaps fearing that he might anger the waves with his bellowing voice.

exclusion, one that would be more open to a more ecologically aware form of interpretation. If the injustice of our habitual philological practices is to be addressed, it certainly cannot be done by once again making use of nature to compensate for a human deficiency or lack. August Boeckh's *Encyklopädie und Methodologie der philologischen Wissenschaften* (1886), which originated in his lectures from between 1809 and 1865, illustrates an early tension within classical philology. Directly attacking Gottfried Hermann's (1772–1848) understanding of philology as textual critique, the comparison of texts with one another, Boeckh announces what he regards as the true aim of philology:

> Wem die Philologie nicht für sich Zweck, sondern Mittel ist, und wer durch sie nichts erreichen will als formale Übung: für den mag sie in der Kritik aufgehen; aber dies stimmt nicht mit den höheren Zielen, welche die philologische Wissenschaft sich factisch von Anfang an gesteckt hat.[3]

In doing so, he announces a more radical mode of philology that seeks a knowledge or understanding which is an encounter with its other: the knowing of a knowing, and the understanding of an understanding. Even in its earliest guises, such as that of Boeckh, philology understood itself to be undertaking an activity that, much like the hermeneutic circle, would never and could never be complete. This openness to further levels of possible interpretation finds its modern form in the philological theory of Peter Szondi, Paul de Man and Werner Hamacher.[4] Philology finds itself always to be on the way to understanding and knowing. An eco-philology would, in line with Boeckh, differentiate itself from the thematic collection and comparison of ecologically themed texts. It would instead seek an understanding of the understanding of ecology. If it disregards Boeckh's critical understanding of his higher aim as infinite and always incomplete, ecocritical forms of philology risk sacrificing what is their critical content. Following Boeckh, it should always be a matter of trying to understand our understanding of ecology and not of regarding the ecological as something given and evident.

It is the philological movement without arrival that Hamacher finds to be the essential factor that differentiates it from other '-logies'. Unlike biology or geology, it does not aim for statements of certitude, nor does it identify with them. Rather, its attitude is one of friendship towards what comes from language. Whereas the institutional nature of academic philology seems to increasingly demand justification for its existence through the production of knowledge about literature that is in some way 'useful' or 'relevant', the

[3] August Boeckh, *Encyklopädie und Methodologie der philologischen Wissenschaften* (B. G. Teubner, 1886), p. 8.

[4] See Peter Szondi, *Hölderlin-Studien. Mit einem Traktat über philologische Erkenntnis* (Suhrkamp, 1967); Paul de Man, *Resistance to Theory* (Minnesota University Press, 1986); and Werner Hamacher, *Was zu sagen bleibt: Für — die Philologie, 95 Thesen zur Philologie* (Urs Engeler, 2019).

radical mode of philology that Hamacher suggests is a form of *lógos* that is not knowledge, but a relationship towards the forms of knowing that arise from textual attention:

> Anders als die Wissenschaften — die […] Onto*logie*, Bio*logie*, Geo*logie* — die der Ordnung des *lógos apophántikos* zugehören, spricht die *Philo*logie im Bereich der *euché*. Ihr Name besagt nicht Wissen vom *lógos* — der Rede, Sprache oder Kundgabe — sondern: Zuneigung, Freundschaft, Liebe zu ihm. In ihrer Benennung ist der Anteil der *philía* früh in Vergessenheit geraten, so daß Philologie zunehmend als Logologie, als Wissenschaft von der Sprache, als Gelehrsamkeit, schließlich als wissenschaftliches Verfahren im Umgang mit sprachlichen, insbesondere literarischen Zeugnissen verstanden wurde. Dennoch ist Philologie die Bewegung geblieben, die noch vor der Sprache des Wissens den Wunsch nach sich weckt und in der Erkenntnis den Anspruch des Zu Erkennenden wach hält.[5]

One could well suggest here that ecology too belongs to the order of the *lógos apophántikos*, that it wishes to speak the truth about that which is in a series of propositions. It is tied, in other words, to the word 'is' in the form of a predication. Philology, by contrast, finds its truth in a particular relationship towards the truth, namely the truth as a process without end which recognises its necessary exposure to the constitutive nature of language. Rather than being a neutral medium within which knowledge can be communicated, the non-designatory functions of language are always transforming what is communicated. Along with its message, language is always communicating itself. To understand language solely as the *lógos apophántikos* is always to forget or ignore the presence of language itself. To suggest a more ecological form of philology as a way of coming closer to the other Demosthenes can only avoid a clash between these two forms of *logos*, the *lógos apophántikos* and what Hamacher refers to as the *euché* (the prayer, the plea, the wish), if it refuses to become a 'Mittel' for ecology.[6] This refusal can nonetheless be seen as a form of friendship, a friendship towards all that the *lógos apophántikos* attempts to override.

Similarly, to merely 'include' nature as a theme or to turn philology into a means by which a certain ideal of ecological ethics might be reached seems once again to slam the door shut on the forms of relation that language can bring about through our sustained attention to its potential meanings.[7] Rather than suggesting an encounter between the ecological

[5] See Hamacher, '95 Thesen zur Philologie', in *Was zu sagen bleibt*, p. 54; emphasis in original.

[6] This should not, however, be understood as a poeticising of ecology, or a sovereignty of literature over science. As Roland Reuß points out, philology can be understood to be a particular form of attention, rather than having a particular content: 'Philologie ist am Werk, wo immer Menschen sich aufmerksam auf etwas einlassen, was sie diesem Einlassen zuvor noch nicht verstanden und begriffen haben — unabhängig davon, ob dieser Zusammenhang ein literarischer ist oder nicht.' Roland Reuß, 'Philologie als Aufmerksamkeit', *Text: Kritische Beiträge*, 14 (2013), pp. 137–45 (p. 137).

[7] As Hanjo Berressem suggests, an expansion of philology is not simply about a greening of philology with ecological themes and texts; what is instead needed is an ecology of reading. Such

and the philological, such modes of reading seem to already define what their relationship should be prior to any dwelling alongside each other that might itself give rise to possible forms of relation. What this article suggests is that philological justice can only be reached if it does justice to the infinite and incomplete nature of the aim of philology; accordingly, judgements always come in a suspended manner, always open to a further judgement, always marked by their incompleteness.

Friedrich Nietzsche sensed that there was something anti-academic within a more radical mode of philology as early as the end of the nineteenth century. Against institutional academia, the understanding of understanding has no final results, no solid conclusions. It is not productive, but time-consuming. It requires sensitivity rather than ingenuity, openness rather than theoretical blindness. It is to be regarded as an art rather than a science, or as a way of being, rather than a methodology.

> Philologie nämlich ist jene ehrwürdige Kunst, welche von ihrem Verehrer vor Allem Eins heischt, bei Seite gehen, sich Zeit lassen, still werden, langsam werden […]. Gerade damit aber ist sie heute nöthiger als je, gerade dadurch erzieht sie und bezaubert sie uns am stärksten, mitten in einem Zeitalter der 'Arbeit', will sagen: der Hast, der unanständigen und schwitzenden Eilfertigkeit, das mit Allem gleich 'fertig werden' will, auch mit jedem alten und neuen Buche: — sie selbst wird nicht so leicht irgend womit fertig, sie lehrt gut lesen, das heisst langsam, tief, rück- und vorsichtig, mit Hintergedanken, mit offen gelassenen Thüren, mit zarten Fingern und Augen lesen…[8]

The relationship between philology and ecology cannot be rushed, nor could a final form for it ever be decided upon; it must instead be left open as a question. In many respects, it is the antagonism with institutional practices that leads to the placement of the word 'radical' before forms of contemporary philology which build upon Nietzsche and Hamacher.[9] However, one could well wonder if a still more radical aspect of Boeckh has gone unnoticed in this new-found passion for textual attention. It was Boeckh who suggested that in opposition to Hermann's text-based critique, the understanding of understanding could only be reached through the consideration of all sources of meaning, rather than just textual meaning.[10] Depressingly, we find Nietzsche to be describing a situation above that is all

an ecology is what is aimed at in this work by its development of the notion of friendships. See Berressem, *Ökologien des Lesens: Für eine erweiterte Philologie* (Transcript, 2023), p. 41.

[8] Friedrich Nietzsche, 'Morgenröthe', in Nietzsche, *Morgenröte. Idyllen aus Messina. Die fröhliche Wissenschaft* (dtv / De Gruyter, 1999), pp. 9–331 (p. 17).

[9] See, for example, the contributions to *Triëdere #23: Der philologische Affekt: Schreiben mit Werner Hamacher*, ed. by Matthias Schmidt, Martin A. Hainz, and Thomas Ballhausen (Sonderzahl, 2022).

[10] On this aspect in Boeckh, see *History of Classical Philology: From Bentley to the 20th century*, ed. by Diego Lanza and Gherardo Ugolini, trans. by Antonella Lettieri (De Gruyter, 2022), pp. 133–62.

too familiar to us: a world which demands ever-increasing acceleration of productivity and effectiveness. In place of a higher aim, we find ourselves faced with an incompatible 'Zweck'.

Rather than subjugating philology to the aims of ecology or vice versa, what one could instead aim towards is a going-alongside of ecology and philology, an accompanying movement that keeps them in step while following different paths. Only in the philological pause, in the slowness of the philological movement, can ecology and philology find themselves in the same space and time. It is not a matter of choosing Demosthenes or the stone, but rather of creating a linguistic space within which they might dwell together. Boeckh's philological question, his highest aim, is the unanswerable question of how meanings fit together, how meanings relate to one another. Perhaps it would be possible to suggest here that what is needed is not a *radical* form of philology that overstates its originality and difference to nonradical forms of philology, but a *relational* philology that dares to pose the question of understanding anew and without end.

But just as an overbearing focus on the 'Mittel' can make us lose sight of the aims of philology, so can an overbearing focus upon the 'Zweck' make us lose sight of the textual medium with which we are dealing. One can think here of Heidegger's 'lofty aims' for his interpretations of Hölderlin and the violent disregard they showed for the textual means by which he arrived at them. By enlisting Hölderlin in his project to elucidate the nature of Being, Heidegger showed a terrible blindness towards all who questioned such a project.[11] As much as we aim at the understanding of understanding, we should also aim at non-understanding, at understanding what we do not understand. In Demosthenes' haste to speak well, perhaps he will one day forget the stone in his mouth; perhaps he will speak so articulately one day that he chokes to death on the excluded 'Mittel'.

We could instead turn our attention to the other Demosthenes, the one who is open to the sensation of the pebbles or to what the waves could tell us. Perhaps, rather than shifting our focus towards a new aim for philology, we could attempt to trace a more radical mode of the being-alongside of aims and means that can be developed from within the traditions of philology itself.

Perhaps a 'logical' place to start would be with an interpretation of the word philology itself through its Greek components of *philía* and *lógos*. Robert Beekes states that *philos* means 'friend, friendly, dear', but also what is one's own. *Lógos* is said to be derived from the verb *légein*, meaning to collect or gather, to count, recount, or say. *Lógos* is also found to have such diverse meanings as 'computation, account, esteem, reason, speech,

[11] Examples of Heidegger's interpretations of Hölderlin can be found in Martin Heidegger, *Gesamtausgabe*, 102 vols (Vittorio Klostermann, 1999), xxxix, *Hölderlins Hymnen 'Germanien' und 'Der Rhein' (Freiburger Vorlesung Wintersemester 1934/35)*. See Adorno's critique of Heidegger's interpretations of Hölderlin in 'Parataxis: Zur späten Lyrik Hölderlins', in Theodor Adorno, *Gesammelte Schriften*, 20 vols (Suhrkamp, 2003), xi, pp. 447–91.

word, statement'.[12] To say that philology expresses a love of language or a friendliness towards language is thus already to close down some of the potential forms that philology might take. The phenomenon, however, that philology always fails to find a conclusive definitional ground for itself is not so much to be regarded as a philological failure but rather is evidence of the necessarily unending task of philology itself. In Hamacher's words, one might say that '[j]ede Definition der Philologie muß sich indefinieren — und einer anderen Raum geben'.[13]

As Hamacher elaborates in his essay on 'Sprachgerechtigkeit', it is necessary to think of *lógos* in the plural, rather than the singular.[14] At a crucial juncture in Aristotle, we find a distinction in favour of the delotic *lógos* rather than the critical *logos* in connection to a notion of justice:

> [W]hile the voice [*phonḗ*] is a sign of pain and pleasure, and belongs also to the other animals on that account (since their nature goes this far, to having a perception of pain and pleasure and communicating these to one another), speech [*lógos*] is for disclosing [*deloún*] what is advantageous and what is harmful, and so too what is just and what is unjust.[15]

While the delotic *lógos* makes manifest and opens up language towards the possibilities of what can be said, the critical *lógos* makes differentiations and judgements. Hamacher explains:

> Es sind aber zwei deutlich voneinander unterschiedene sprachliche Funktionen, aus denen Aristoteles seinen Gerechtigkeitsbegriff gewinnt. Der delotische Logos legt frei und macht klar, was dem Leben der Einzelnen wie der Gemeinschaft zuträglich und was ihm verderblich ist; der kritische Logos dagegen greift aus den dargelegten Alternativen eine heraus.[16]

Returning to our earlier discussion of the *lógos apophántikos*, it seems that philology would be firmly placed on the side of the delotic. At the same time, if our aim is to find our way towards a more open form of philology, it cannot be a simple case of deciding for one form of language over another. For philology to be open (and thereby do justice to the delotic), it can never fully decide what language is or what it is for. At the same time, it cannot close off all possibility of a critical form of language, as that would be to unjustly exclude a particular form of language. For philology to do justice to all of the potential functions or modes of language, it must sustain a being-alongside of the different forms of *lógos*. Philology's aim is not the

[12] See Robert Beekes, *Etymological Dictionary of Greek* (Brill, 2010), p. 841 and pp. 1573–74.
[13] Hamacher, '95 Thesen zur Philologie', in *Was zu sagen bleibt*, p. 56.
[14] Werner Hamacher, 'Dike — Sprachgerechtigkeit', in Hamacher, *Sprachgerechtigkeit* (S. Fischer, 2018), pp. 7–49.
[15] Aristotle, *Politics*, trans. by Joe Sachs (Hackett, 2012), p. 5.
[16] Hamacher, 'Dike — Sprachgerechtigkeit', p. 18.

production of judgements and certitude, but it cannot be without relation to such elements.

The delotic and the critical are caught in a torsion of differentiation, but they are not opposites. The decisive difference between them is exactly what cannot be decided upon, at least not without doing an injustice to both of them. The difficulty in creating a certain point of division between the delotic and the critical points towards the impossibility of staking out clear and separate regions of language or of naming a difference between the two that might be regarded as foundational. Making the split reveals and makes manifest different aspects of language; in this regard, the split itself is delotic. At the same time, to decide that they are different is a critical distinction, a judgement about differences. While the split reveals nuances, it also tends to hide similarities. There is always something obfuscating in the delotic; there is always something uncritical in critique. As a friend of language, of all aspects, modes, and functions of language, philology adopts an attitude of *philía* towards both the delotic and the critical. The movement of philology pursues the possibilities of forms of friendship towards language. Judgements, moments of critique and decisions are not the pinnacle of philology, nor are they the goal of philology, but they are moments which must themselves be philologised in a spirit of friendship.

Hamacher tells us that justice, to the extent that it can be understood to be the decision to speak with each other, living side by side with another in a *pólis*, is language.[17] The just form of philology would therefore be one that fosters and sustains forms of 'Miteinanderleben'. A radical mode of philology such as Hamacher's can be seen as a desire for the *philiation* of language, as the seeking and encouraging of linguistic relations and possibilities, both delotic and critical. As *philiational*, it can be understood to stand in an open relationship towards the ecological without the need for a supplemental thematic or methodological intervention.

3

The *philía* of philology does not solely have language as its object; it also extends towards the relationships that can result from what language discloses to us. Demosthenes' pebble could not answer him back with words and no verbal exchange was possible between them, but his tongue could sense (perhaps even read) the surface of the stone and his ears could respond to the change of sonority that occurred due to the presence of the stone within the resonant chamber of his mouth. The pebble had many more forms of 'Zusammenleben' to offer him rather than being only a useful weight. Equally, the waves could be heard as being something other than just an acoustic obstacle for his own audibility. Waves have rhythm

[17] Cf. Hamacher, 'Dike — Sprachgerechtigkeit', p. 15.

just as language has rhythm; Demosthenes' speech and the sound of the waves could find a way to a form of 'Miteinandersein' and another form of *philiation*. One could imagine the other Demosthenes standing on the beach shouting not against but with the waves, allowing his voice to come into contact with their sound, the rhythm of his speech to interact with their rhythm.

In a highly philological reading of Aristotle's notion of friendship, Thomas Schestag finds that *philía* describes a particular way of relating towards language, a liking of the lack of self-similitude of all words, that no word is one with itself but instead produces differences:

> Freundschaft — *philía* — wäre also, so sehr dies Wort auf Sachen, auf Unbelebtes wie auf Lebewesen wie auf Sachverhalte zielt, das eine Wort — im Saum jener eigentümlichen Philologie — für einen Sprachverhalt: für das Gefallen an der Wahrnehmung, daß alle Wörter abweichen von sich, daß kein Wort (Freundschaft eingeschlossen), so sehr es diesen Eindruck erweckt, eins mit sich selbst wiederkehrt.[18]

Any form of 'Sprachgerechtigkeit', a term coined by Hamacher, would then have to do justice to this auto-differentiation of language, open itself up towards it and create the conditions by which it could take place.

We have spoken earlier of justice, but Aristotle suggests that friendship is itself higher than an abstract notion of justice:

> And when people are friends there is no need of justice, but when they are just there is still need of friendship, and among things that are just, what inclines toward friendship seems to be most just of all.[19]

Certainly, one could achieve a form of representational justice, or representational equality, by switching focus from Demosthenes to the stone or the waves. But this in itself does not by any means foster a form of friendship between them, nor does it create the necessary conditions for their being-alongside each other. If friendship is a greater good than justice, then perhaps philology can be seen to relate towards language in a manner that is extra-judicial. It occurs where there is no need for justice or where justice is transformed beyond a system of rights and laws; it casts off its penalising nature and separates itself from its roots in violence and power to pursue a friendship where a critical remark is no longer destructive but is taken in the good humour that characterises good friends. The relationship between philology and justice is, therefore, a *philiatory* movement that seeks only the sustaining of relations and the potentiality of relations; it makes a plea for friendship on account of friendship.

It is perhaps unsurprising then that the work of Paul Celan has become a focus point for more radical forms of philology. His work, perhaps

[18] Thomas Schestag, *Philía* (Matthes & Seitz, 2024), p. 32.

[19] Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, trans. by Joe Sachs (Hackett, 2002), p. 144.

more than any other work, seems to seek the suspension of judgement in favour of sustaining the being-alongside of language and the philiatory possibilities that it suggests to us. We are at our furthest from the *lógos apophántikos* when we read the work of Celan. For Peter Waterhouse, what occurs in Celan's poetry is a philological operation that he refers to as 'Genesis-Ereignisse', where operations of linguistic opposition become null and void in favour of bringing that which appears separated or opposed into a philiatory nearness:

> Wachen und Wachsen [in Paul Celan's poem 'Zu beiden Händen'] sind wie eine Gleichung zweier ungleicher Wörter. — Gleichungen zweier oder mehrerer ungleicher Teile — also Gleichungen/Einigungen von Getrenntem (fern/allen Himmeln, nah/allen Himmeln) — sind Genesis-Ereignisse, in ihnen entspringt etwas, ereignet sich etwas, das in der widerspruchslosen Sprache (ja oder nein) nicht möglich ist.[20]

Judgement is suspended, but that does not mean the abandonment of 'Gerechtigkeit'. In the philological pause, and in the slowness and attentiveness of its movement, a philiatory justice takes place, one that does justice to language's lack of self-similitude and the movement of sense that takes place across its surface. In the delaying of all that stands within the remit of 'Urteilung', that which is apparently 'ungleich' comes alongside us with the potential for an encounter. Upon the tongue, the surface of the stone becomes perceptible, and in this way it glides along the surface of language, speaking softly.

4

With the figure of Demosthenes, Plutarch no doubt wished to portray a man who had overcome adversity, a man who had mastered the uncontrollable and organic aspects of his voice and entered into the realm of pure speech, of delivering meaning without supplement. Instead, from our standpoint somewhat further down the beach, we watch the striding madman forcing his voice to comply, shouting to nobody over the sound of the waves. Rather than a heroic victor over circumstances, we find a figure that has become other-than-human, a voice part-stone and part-wave.

We read him then, not through the meaning of his words, but through the situation of his reading and the readings that this inspired, through Delacroix's reading and our own readings. Alongside those readings, we considered the reading that could have taken place: Demosthenes' reading of the stone and the waves. In this regard, we have perhaps made some tentative steps towards the relational philology of Boeckh, the filiations it implies, and the 'Zusammenleben' which might sustain it.

[20] Peter Waterhouse, *Im Genesis-Gelände: Versuch über einige Gedichte von Paul Celan und Andrea Zanzotto* (Engeler, 2001), p. 41.

As this article is based on the Dublin Dialogue Day, we want to depict the productive dialogues it gave rise to in a written form, whereby the different understandings of philology and what philological reading means remain as respective voices, partly overlapping, partly intersecting, partly diverging abruptly despite having a common ground.

4A

Hanjo Berressem has recently made a plea for an expanded form of philology — an 'erweiterte Philologie' — that would lead to ecologies of reading, 'Leseökologien', which bind together reading and life.[21] Such ecologies would include all that he finds to be implied by operations of reading:

> Materie, Codes und Strukturen. Dazwischen Leseoperationen. Auch als Abtasten, d. h. als Berühren zu denken. Als das Lesen einer Textur. Der heilige Thomas liest die Wunde Jesu'. Algorithmen lesen Codes. Barthes liest Balzac. Der Vogel liest den Wind. Der Fisch liest die Strömung. Das Barometer liest den atmosphärischen Druck. Überall Lesen. Alles liest.[22]

In many respects, this echoes the potential that this text found to be present within the figure of Demosthenes: that his image could stand as a conduit between worlds rather than being taken as an image of exploitation. A reading was possible where Demosthenes, the stones, and the waves could be brought into another form of relation with each other. This was not done through the pursuit of stones and waves as such, but rather through the relational potential suggested by these textual resonances.

However, where this text and Berressem part company is in his desire to delineate a new goal for philology. When he describes the aim of philology to be the pursuit of new ways of thinking about the relationship between the world and texts, rather than textual meaning, he turns philology into being the means to a definite end, rather than it being an end in itself. Berressem's imperative — that we should cease to seek meaning through its multiple linguistic possibilities and should instead seek ways of expressing the 'Multiplizität der Welt'[23] through situated readings — seems to operate on a logic of separability between 'Lesen' and 'Leben'.

Yet it is precisely the inseparability of these two terms that plays out within radical modes of philology such as those put forward by Schestag and Hamacher. Rather than this mode of philology representing a fetishist's affection for language, it opens up language to the potential of life, and opens us up to the life of language, not as an answer about the form that this

[21] Cf. Berressem, *Ökologien des Lesens*, p. 41.
[22] Ibid., pp. 46–47.
[23] Ibid., p. 110.

relationship should take, but as a question. Not only does a more relational form of philology contain within itself the ability to create a more open form of presence for the more-than-human world through its tolerance of differences and overcoming of apparent oppositions, but it also speaks of the potential for a transformation of human understanding and knowing in direct contact with the world around us. The same attention that we bring to bear upon the realm of language could be brought to bear upon our encounters with the more-than-human world. Only through slowness, through shared dwelling and through open forms of attention can new forms of philiation arise.

At the same time, it can be seen that Schestag's and Hamacher's focus on potential meanings of texts removes them somewhat from actual instances of reading (the reading by a particular person, in a particular body and at a particular moment in time). In many respects, the next logical step would be to find a way of enlarging radical philology along the lines outlined by Berressem without the addition of a certain theory of reading or ontological speculation. Berressem's dependence on Guattari ultimately ends up narrowing his notion of philology instead of enlarging it. Such an enlargement can only take place through a medium which allows for the dwelling-alongside of apparently antagonistic discourses or concepts. It would require, for instance, the creation of a space where language and what is thought to be outside it could find some common ground. Perhaps only by a sustained critique of the limitations of both Schestag and Hamacher's *and* Berressem's positions could this be pursued. For the moment, it remains as a utopian horizon.

4B

A 'rewilding' of philology goes hand in hand with a return to the core subject of philology. Philology proceeds in a processual manner: 'All texts are different. One must try never to measure them "with the same eye". Each text calls for, so to speak, another "eye".'[24] Consequently, every theoretical reading will be a continuously reinventing reading. The literary theory that it contains will not have been a fixed (methodological) theory preceding the reading or standing outside it.[25]

Therefore, we suggest an understanding of philological practice in the sense of 'radikale Philologie im Zeichen einer "polykontexturalen" Literatur der Theorie'.[26] This opens up the possibility of bringing ecocritical approaches into dialogue with the appeal for a 'return to

[24] Jacques Derrida, *Points… Interviews, 1974–1994*, ed. by Elisabeth Weber, trans. by Peggy Kamuf and others (Stanford University Press, 1995).
[25] For a related discussion, see: Daniel Müller Nielaba and Boris Previšić, 'Reflexion literarischer (Selbst-)Beobachtung: Skizzen zu einer radikalen Philologie', in *Die Literatur der Literaturtheorie*, ed. by Boris Previšić (Peter Lang, 2010), pp. 9–20.
[26] Ibid., p. 216.

philology' that has been differently articulated in various schools of thought since de Man, Szondi, Hamacher, Schestag and others to this day.[27] What makes philology a resistant activity in the sense of 'rewilding' is that it does not take on a possessive relationship to the text in terms of its comprehension of the text. In its slow reading that moves sentence by sentence, word by word, sign by sign, and in its desire to understand, it does not understand the text as a packaging for *instant meaning* but rather exposes itself to the withdrawal of meaning and in this sense practises a form of textual justice. Thus, in the course of philological reading an attitude of caution is adopted, of protection, of preserving the material remains or the fragmentary nature of meaning. Philology thus moves beyond appropriation and instead enters into resonance with the text. In this sense, philological reading is the appropriate response to the text in its wildness. Philology — even before the genuinely ecological sensation — is an exercise in a biosphere-oriented relationship of human responsibility within an increasingly fragile web of life. This makes philology not only a 'gay science', but also a 'sad discipline'.[28]

[27] Cf. De Man, *Resistance*; Szondi, *Hölderlin-Studien*. See also: Jürgen Paul Schwindt, '(Radikal)Philologie', in *Materiale Textkulturen: Konzepte — Materialien — Praktiken*, ed. by Thomas Meier, Michael R. Ott, and Rebecca Sauer (De Gruyter, 2015) pp. 235–43.

[28] Cf. George Steiner, 'Ten (Possible) Reasons for the Sadness of Thought', *Salmagundi*, 146/147 (2005), pp. 3–32.