

Beyond the Euromissile Crisis

GLOBAL HISTORIES OF ANTI-NUCLEAR
ACTIVISM IN THE COLD WAR



Edited by
Luc-André Brunet & Eirini Karamouzi

Beyond the Euromissile Crisis

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Luc-André Brunet
Eirini Karamouzi
4 August 2024

Introduction

Globalising the History of Anti-nuclear Activism

Luc-André Brunet and Eirini Karamouzi

The Euromissile Crisis of the early 1980s, which saw millions of citizens across North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) countries oppose their governments' support for the deployment of new nuclear weapons, the so-called 'Euromissiles', in Western Europe, has been described as 'the last battle of the Cold War'.¹ Its resolution, namely the landmark 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, which prompted the removal of such nuclear weapons from both Eastern and Western Europe, is heralded as the beginning of the end of the Cold War. Recent years have seen an outpouring of important studies considering aspects of anti-nuclear protest in Western Europe and the United States during the final decade of the Cold War.² Yet, despite this scholarly emphasis on the North Atlantic, the anti-nuclear activism was, and remains, a truly *global* phenomenon. Opposition to nuclear weapons surged on every continent in the late Cold War and beyond, yet these manifestations of anti-nuclear activism have all too often been obscured by the focus on INF deployment in Western Europe in the early 1980s. This volume provides a significant correction to this one-sided focus and illuminates the history and effectiveness of anti-nuclear activism in a unique global perspective.

The basic paradigm of the debates on anti-nuclear mobilisation has been stubbornly similar and Western-centric. This conceptual limitation motivated us to formulate an Arts and Humanities Research Council (AHRC)-funded global network of partners from Brazil, Japan, South Africa, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States to tell a different story, taking inspiration from a recent but thriving scholarship on the mosaic of nuclear narratives.³ This volume, a key output from this project, contributes to the literature in four respects. The first is purely geographical:

by trying to bring together studies of anti-nuclear mobilisation from every continent and from regions that have been consistently under-represented in the literature, this volume broadens our understanding of the phenomenon of anti-nuclear activism in the late twentieth century. While there has been an outpouring of important new scholarship on the Euromissile Crisis with contemporary echoes to current international politics, less attention has thus far been given to regions beyond Western Europe and the United States.⁴ The starting point for anyone interested in the global anti-nuclear movement remains Lawrence Wittner's seminal three-volume *The Struggle against the Bomb*. However, despite its ambitious scope and meticulous research, Wittner's volumes remain focused on Europe and North America; barely five pages are devoted to anti-nuclear movements during the final decade of the Cold War in Africa, Latin America, the Middle East and 'the Asian mainland'.⁵ Another important volume, edited by Benjamin Ziemann, broadens the geographical scope by including a chapter on Japan, but the rest of the contributions are dedicated to Western Europe and the United States.⁶ Michael D. Gordin and G. John Ikenberry's edited volume *The Age of Hiroshima*, for its part, includes chapters on Asia and South America, but focuses on the legacies of the atomic bombing of Hiroshima rather than anti-nuclear activism.⁷ Our volume adds to the chorus of voices that call for inclusiveness in order to unearth the histories of anti-nuclear activism in other parts of the world. As Holger Nehring notes, 'peace movements have been amongst the most active transnational and global actors, and ... pacifism is often seen as the paradigmatic representing of internationalism'.⁸ However, *how* to tell this history is not straightforward, and this applies to our own study of the anti-nuclear movements. This volume makes no claim to provide a comprehensive, global history of the topic, and most chapters deal with activism in relation to a specific nation state. We acknowledge that the challenges of writing global histories of anti-nuclear mobilisation include the requirement of regional specialisms and a range of linguistic and technical skills beyond the scope of individual scholars. However, collating cutting-edge research from an international group of scholars pieces together these specialisms and provides original insights into anti-nuclear activism. We also contend that writing global history of peace activism should not be seen as a panacea. In some cases, it is more appropriate to address questions of locality and specific national social and cultural peculiarities to interpret anti-nuclear protest. This approach is necessary due to the ambiguity of the concept of global peace, as well as how far anti-nuclear activists framed their cause as global and how they went about organising their networks, membership and strategy to achieve this globality.⁹

It is evident that another cause of the marginalisation of regions outside Europe is the marked disparities in surviving evidence upon which historians can draw. Researching anti-nuclear movements requires access to a range of sources – which are at times difficult to find or remain impossible to access – including newspaper clippings, correspondence between different peace organisations, meeting minutes, membership lists, publications of statements and journals, interview transcripts, documents detailing the number and nature of demonstrations as well as boycotts, documentaries, and the writings of some of the protagonists of the protest. Equally challenging is the cyclical rise and fall of the social movements that discourages conservation of their material.¹⁰ Even in European and North American settings, it is only recently that more coordinated attempts have been made to collect and preserve material of different organisations and develop oral history projects. One way of moving away from the evidence conundrum is to afford more coverage to interpretive models that do not see these regions as merely adjuncts to the hegemonic European and North American narrative, but instead as a way to piece together a mosaic of ‘nuclear narratives’.

It is therefore far from surprising that nuclear colonialism, as coined by Jennifer O. Viereck, lends itself to a global approach. It has become an exploratory term to capture how nuclear powers transferred the risks of atomic testing onto former colonies, or to their own indigenous people or what have been called ‘nuclear subalterns’.¹¹ As Robert Jacobs rightly points out, although a nuclear war was deterred between the superpowers during the Cold War, ‘for people living near atmospheric nuclear testing sites, this was not an imaginary war – it was a limited nuclear war’.¹² Recognising these ‘global hibakuska’, historians are turning to personal storytelling to capture the lived experience of survivors from nuclear testing.¹³ This has been especially prevalent after the cessation of nuclear testing, with local communities claiming their rights as victims of environmental degradation and bringing ‘attention to historical legacies of nuclear harm’.¹⁴ This approach allows for a multilayered story of nuclear victims from other parts of the world beyond Hiroshima and Nagasaki.¹⁵

Some of the recent literature has worked to denationalise nuclear narratives, by considering the nuclear age as a chain from uranium mining through weapons and waste storage. In her comparative work, Kate Brown suggests breaking down Cold War barriers and understanding environmental catastrophe by considering human bodies as historical texts so that we can ‘recreate historically voided bodies living on contaminated landscapes in a way that does not dismiss bodies in pain’.¹⁶ Diversifying the nuclear narratives also upends well-established beliefs about the nuclear enterprises.¹⁷ Austin Cooper’s research on the Argentella scandal has challenged

the perception of the French nuclear consensus, which was only derived from a lack of attention to the African member states of the French community.¹⁸ Gabrielle Hecht has also proposed the concept of technopolitics to characterise ‘the tight relationship among institutions, the people who run them, their guiding myths and ideologies, the artifacts they produce, and the technopolitics they pursue’.¹⁹

Inspired by these historians, this volume sheds light on anti-nuclear mobilisation within the anti-imperialist, postcolonial setting, particularly in the Global South. Alexis Vrignon underlines the agency of local actors in French Polynesia in fighting against the French nuclear apparatus, while Anna-Mart van Wyk focuses on South Africa and the World Campaign against Military and Nuclear Collaboration, detailing how the country’s secret nuclear weapons programme became one of the pillars of its global struggle to end apartheid.²⁰ Giulia Quaggio convincingly argues that Spain’s mobilisation was inspired by Latin America and how it embodied the economic and social injustices of the Third World.²¹

Second, beyond expanding the geographical scope of the study of anti-nuclear activism, this volume experiments with the concepts of connectivity, comparison and division. We assembled a range of scholars and invited them to speak to each other across disciplinary and regional boundaries. In all cases, there was consensus over the impossible task of defining peace. It was the fluidity in conceptual boundaries that widened the movement’s public appeal and transformed ‘the anti-nuclear issues into a battlefield for continued political struggles’.²² Although this volume has concentrated mostly on mobilisation against nuclear weapons, it has embraced the definitional dilemma of peace activism and asserts its dynamic in writing a global history of the phenomenon. Each case study seems to confirm how the peace movement’s agenda became more diffuse, embracing broader issues of self-determination, anti-Americanism and national sovereignty, to name but a few.²³ While countries like India and North Korea sought to acquire nuclear weapons as a way of asserting and protecting their countries’ sovereignty, in many cases – as Kapil Patil argues – segments of their population pushed for nuclear disarmament as a means of asserting their own sovereignty. Thinking along these lines echoes scholarly work on Ukraine, Canada and Greece, where nuclear disarmament became an imperative of independence.²⁴ Paradoxically, these legacies of independence, colonialism and sovereignty at times overshadowed nuclear anxieties and rendered global cooperation on anti-nuclear activism difficult.

There were also global connections in the circulation of knowledge, notably through scientific networks or globalised peace organisations. Knowledge on nuclear issues came from a variety of sources and required

modes of transmission and entailed interpretation. Ruud van Dijk discusses the notion of the 'politics of peace', where different peace movements were forced to evolve their agenda to adapt to changing international developments, and not solely on the nuclear field.²⁵ The importance of knowledge and education, and the role of experts, has been hotly debated recently, for example in Benoît Pelopidas' work on France's evolution as a nuclear power.²⁶ The chapters in this volume focus less on the language adopted, instead engaging with how these experts evolved as 'peace advocates', placing tremendous weight on the value of constantly gathering evidence about the threats of nuclear proliferation to reach out to the establishment. Both Anna-Mart van Wyk's chapter on Abdul Minty and Lodovica Clavarino's investigation of the Italian scientific community offer insights into the effectiveness of peace education to influence both governments and civil society. They prove how, in shaping a rhetoric of awareness, these experts could enable people to act against the nuclear threat. Clavarino discusses the Italian scientific community and its entanglement with a global network of scientists, using the concept of science diplomacy as fertile ground to tell a global story of anti-nuclear activism.²⁷ These practices of international scientific cooperation and entanglement with the country's executive branch echoes the work of the historians of science and technology, who have long examined the close entanglement of science and politics and, more recently, of diplomacy.²⁸

Peace groups in the late Cold War were able to build their transnational networks, due to pre-existing mobilisation. The wave of anti-nuclear activism in Western Europe and North America was based in part on the revival of these groups from the earlier wave of activism, during the late 1950s and early 1960s, such as the UK-based Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND). However, during this period, several new, highly influential groups appeared. In the United States, the Nuclear Freeze Movement appeared in the wake of the publication of activist Randy Forsberg's 'Call to Halt the Nuclear Arms Race' based on a freeze on testing and deploying new nuclear weapons and delivery systems by both superpowers.²⁹ The Freeze Campaign offered a modest and easy way for people to understand a possible solution to the arms race and its slogan became 'the rallying cry of the largest peace movement in US history'. April 1980 saw the publication of the European Nuclear Disarmament Appeal by a small group of British intellectuals, which became the foundational document of European Nuclear Disarmament (END). Not only did END call for the removal of nuclear weapons; the organisation also demanded the dismantling of the Cold War and its rival blocs, advancing an alternative strategy of 'détente from below'.³⁰ In addition, the German Green Party was founded in January 1980 and became a crucial

actor in the Western European peace movement, particularly as the ruling West German Social Democratic Party (SDP) was internally divided over questions of Euromissile deployment and nuclear disarmament.³¹ Despite the appearance of important new anti-nuclear groups, important differences remained between them. While END strove for the end of the Cold War and a nuclear-free Europe, the central aim of the Freeze campaign was a relatively less ambitious pause on the development and deployment of further weapons systems (albeit as a first step towards eventual disarmament). The Greens, for their part, were equally opposed to civilian and military uses of nuclear technology, whereas opposition to nuclear energy remained a secondary and at times unrelated issue for many other groups.

Reflecting similar tendencies, the volume explores the transnational elements of division across the Cold War divide and beyond it. Considering the cases of Soviet, Japanese, Italian and Dutch anti-nuclear opposition, the authors do not only identify coherence, but also fragmentation and dissipation. These movements were heterogeneous coalitions of informal networks, formal organisations and unaffiliated individuals divided as well as united in their agenda and purposes.³² Makiko Takemoto offers fresh evidence on the Japanese peace movements and the at times devastating effect of party politics and Cold War divisions on the movement's internal cohesion. Irina Gordeeva, on the other hand, presents the influential interaction of the Trust Group with the Soviet authorities, in line with Petra Goedde's advocacy for a 'politics of peace'.³³ Similarly, Ruud van Dijk examines the Dutch Interchurch Peace Council (IKV) to show how its leadership in transnational resistance to nuclear arms race changed the cultural and political climate towards the weaponry of destruction.³⁴ In all cases, there was an awareness of the challenges of influencing state policy, but often this was not the measure of success or efficiency.

In most cases, the repertoire of action seems to transcend borders and boundaries, and similar tactics were employed to galvanise attention and promote the anti-nuclear message. A tactic, which originated in the Pacific and then spread around the globe, was the creation of local small-scale grassroots nuclear-free zones or nuclear-free cities as 'alternative approaches to arms control, disarmament, and environmental protection'.³⁵ The motto of 'thinking globally, acting locally' allowed everyday people to localise peace-building efforts and challenge elite decisions on the procurement of armaments, a topic usually inaccessible to public view. Paradoxically, the local was in the global. Despite the ridicule that such initiatives received at times, such schemes gained popularity and made decentralisation a key element of nuclear spatial politics.³⁶ Choosing symbolic places to demonstrate also mitigated the movement's scant budgetary resources and challenges of visibility.

There were also human chains, peace camps, marathon walks and other symbolic rituals designed to be affective and impact people's emotions.

Linked to this transnational circulation of nuclear knowledge, a third contribution of this volume pertains to chronology. By provincialising North Atlantic anti-nuclear protest and the controversy around INF deployment, this volume also reassesses how far the chronology of the Euromissile Crisis is relevant for anti-nuclear movements more globally and how we can upend the Western gaze on nuclear policy and protest. For instance, ongoing debates on peace activism discuss the importance of the anti-nuclear movement in bringing about and shaping the end of the Cold War. Historians such as Lawrence Wittner and, more recently, Henry Richard Maar and Stephanie Freeman assert the importance of anti-nuclear protest and, in particular, the social and cultural forces of the grassroots political activism that enabled nuclear diplomacy at the summit level.³⁷ However, there are many different nuclear outcomes beyond the INF agreement.³⁸ There have been cases of nuclear reversal, such as Libya; the post-Soviet republics Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarus chose to relinquish nuclear weapons inherited from the Soviet Union; South Africa voluntarily and unilaterally dismantled its nuclear weapons while it transitioned from apartheid to democracy. As many of the chapters in this volume demonstrate, the years 1987 (when the INF Treaty was signed) and 1989 (with the fall of the Berlin Wall), which are so crucial to North Atlantic narratives, are often far less important and even marginal to the histories of anti-nuclear activism in other parts of the world. In Brazil and Argentina, for example, the decision to terminate national nuclear weapons programmes were closely tied to the process of democratisation seen in both countries during the 1980s, processes largely independent of the INF Treaty and the end of the Cold War. In India, meanwhile, anti-nuclear activism became most notable in the 1990s, following the government's decision to 'go nuclear'. As such, this volume questions the periodisation of the second wave of peace activism, pointing towards more flexible terms, with terminal dates shifting according to the region under examination. It offers new ways of conceptualising the chronology of anti-nuclear protest that go beyond the familiar Cold War paradigm.

Finally, this volume investigates the complex relationships between anti-nuclear movements and governments, and attempts to integrate the world of power politics and peace activism.³⁹ By breaking down the barriers between the global narratives of nuclear protest and the state-based history of nuclear policy, we illustrate the interactions that took place – in some cases fruitful, in others deeply antagonistic – between policy makers and peace movements. Some leaders, even within the Western Bloc, were heavily involved in peace mobilisation and actively campaigned at the diplomatic

level against nuclear proliferation. Even when peace activists were sceptical towards political leaders' involvement in their cause, there were key players who developed high profiles in peace mobilisation.⁴⁰ Thomas Jonter shows how Swedish Prime Minister Olof Palme cooperated with domestic and transnational peace movements, rendering Sweden a major player in the international disarmament arena.⁴¹ He was also a strong proponent of a Nordic nuclear weapons free zone. Equally, David Lange, Prime Minister of New Zealand from 1984 to 1989, became the strongest supporter of peace mobilisation, inaugurating a nuclear-free policy even at the cost of straining relations with the United States, as Exequiel Lacovsky shows.⁴² Greece became the first NATO member to propose a nuclear weapons-free zone in the Balkans. The country's Socialist Prime Minister from 1981 to 1989, Andreas Papandreou earned the reputation of a peacemaker. Not only did he become a leading figure in the country's peace mobilisation, but he also endorsed and participated in several high-level peace initiatives.⁴³ On 22 May 1984, he joined India, Sweden, Mexico, Argentina and Tanzania to launch the 'Six Nation Initiative', believing that 'the prevention of nuclear war is not an issue that concerns only the superpowers. It is of direct concern to all of us since it threatens our lives'.⁴⁴ This idea, championed early on by Indira Gandhi and, after her death, Rajiv Gandhi, was originally promoted by the Parliamentarians for World Order (PWO), which believed that a group of geographically diverse non-nuclear countries acting collectively at the highest level could play a constructive role on the issue of disarmament. The initiative concluded that 'progress in disarmament can only be achieved with an informed public applying strong pressure on governments'.⁴⁵ Moreover, these countries were bound to act as informal mediators between nuclear states. It also proved to be influential on other world leaders. The PWO invited Canadian Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau to join the nascent initiative in the summer of 1983. While he declined, he instead developed his own 'peace initiative' later that year, which was supported by anti-nuclear groups in Canada and internationally, and in turn inspired further initiatives from other governments.⁴⁶

In the name of expanding geographically, the history of the complexity of governmental nuclear policy and peace mobilisation, or lack thereof, is explored in the rising nuclear powers of Brazil, India and North Korea. Brazil's lack of nuclear weapons was hotly debated not only in governmental circles but also among nuclear scientists. The opposition to the Brazilian desire to acquire a nuclear programme was multifaceted and condemned the government's decision to cooperate with other countries to achieve that end. Scientists in Brazil saw anti-nuclear mobilisation as an act of autonomy in mastering indigenous nuclear technology so that local factors

could control its use. In North Korea, by contrast, anti-nuclear protest was state-directed and solely linked to the geopolitical aspirations and objectives of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK). Unlike North Korea, civil society was active in India, with the peace movement influenced by the domestic political dialectic, but also exposed to the transnational network of peace activism.

Structure of the Volume

The volume is divided into four parts. Part I focuses on transnational anti-nuclear politics in the shadow of East–West confrontation, with chapters considering examples from Japan, the Netherlands, Italy and the Soviet Union. In Hiroshima, the site of the world's first nuclear attack in August 1945, anti-nuclear activism developed in a distinctive and highly influential way, at times at odds with larger, national peace groups in Japan. As Makiko Takemoto shows, while the initial focus of such groups in Hiroshima was on supporting the *hibakusha* – the survivors of the atomic bombing – by the 1970s, the city of Hiroshima was playing a leading role in transnational initiatives such as Mayors for Peace and appealing directly at the United Nations (UN) for nuclear disarmament. The case of Hiroshima demonstrates the influence of local and municipal actors in the global anti-nuclear struggle. Moreover, *hibakusha* – many of whom emigrated to the United States, Brazil and elsewhere – played an important role in raising awareness of the effects of nuclear weapons before the renewed interest in such questions in the North Atlantic from the late 1970s onwards. Nevertheless, cooperation within the broader Japanese anti-nuclear movement was undermined by Cold War divisions between communist and noncommunist activists

Turning to the Netherlands, Ruud van Dijk challenges the notion that anti-nuclear activism in Western Europe only revived in the late 1970s. Van Dijk traces the development of the Dutch Interchurch Peace Council (IKV) from its creation in 1966 to the early 1980s, explaining the organisation's success in forcing the Dutch government to postpone a decision to deploy INF in the country. In the end, no 'Euromissiles' were deployed in the Netherlands, marking a significant victory for the anti-nuclear movement. The IKV was also adept at working with likeminded organisations elsewhere in the world, from the United States to the Eastern Bloc, laying the foundations of the transnational cooperation and 'détente from below' that flourished in the final decade of the Cold War.

The importance of transnational links is explored in Lodovica Clavarino's chapter. She argues that scientists were also at the forefront of the anti-nuclear

movement in Italy. Focusing on the Union of Scientists for Disarmament (USPID), established in the early 1980s, she argues that scientists were in effect political nonstate actors who shaped the public discourse around nuclear weapons, engaged in transnational dialogue with likeminded groups elsewhere in the world and sought to influence decision makers in Rome.

One of the distinctive features of anti-nuclear protest is the tension between national governments and grassroots activists competing over the rhetoric of peace. Irina Gordeeva explores how the Trust Group challenged, unnerved and ultimately influenced the Soviet authorities in Moscow. While Moscow had founded the World Peace Council in 1949, which remained an important network of communist-backed peace groups around the world, by the early 1980s grassroots peace groups developed, which challenged these state-run peace organisations. The Soviet authorities cracked down brutally on peace activists, yet they continued their work. The Trust Group found collaborators and supporters across Europe, from likeminded dissident groups in Eastern Europe to transnational organisations like END, which sought 'détente from below'. Under Gorbachev, some of the ideas promoted by the Trust Group were eventually incorporated into Soviet policy.

Part II of this volume investigates the often-overlooked phenomenon of high-level anti-nuclear mobilisation by heads of government, particularly by leaders who developed a constructive relationship with the domestic anti-nuclear movement. The early 1980s in particular saw a proliferation of proposals and initiatives by world leaders to reduce the risk of nuclear war. Therefore, mobilisation against the nuclear arms race was not only a problem for governments that they needed to overcome. Some leaders, even within the Western Bloc, were heavily involved in peace mobilisation and actively campaigned at the diplomatic level against nuclear proliferation. Even when peace activists were sceptical towards political leaders' involvement in their cause, there were key players who developed high profiles in peace mobilisation.⁴⁷ This section considers initiatives launched by Olof Palme of neutral Sweden and by the prime ministers of a peripheral NATO member state, Andreas Papandreu of Greece, and of an ally of the United States, David Lange of New Zealand.

As Thomas Jonter argues, Olof Palme was unusual in that he actively reached out to the anti-nuclear movement and sought to genuinely cooperate with them in the pursuit of disarmament. Taking advantage of Sweden's neutrality – which gave it considerably more latitude in such questions than its Scandinavian neighbours that were part of NATO – Palme also sought to highlight the distinctive role that smaller states could play in areas such as nuclear disarmament that were generally the reserve of the superpowers. This constructive relationship between Palme and the peace movement allowed

Swedish anti-nuclear and peace groups to exert significant influence not only on the government in Stockholm but also internationally, for example, with the proposal for a Nordic Nuclear Weapons-Free Zone (NWFZ). Andreas Papandreou of Greece was amongst the most energetic world leaders and put forward several anti-nuclear initiatives following his election in 1981. While these included a six-month delay to INF deployment and support for a nuclear freeze, of particular interest is his proposal for the establishment of a Nuclear Weapons-Free Zone in the Balkans, which is the focus of Dimitros Chourchoulis' chapter. This proposal was jointly put forward by Greece, a NATO member, along with two members of the Warsaw Pact, namely Romania and Bulgaria. Ultimately, Papandreou and Palme joined forces with the leaders of India, Argentina, Mexico and Tanzania to launch the Six Nation Initiative in May 1984.⁴⁸

Finally, Exequiel Lacovsky explores the anti-nuclear policies of David Lange, elected Prime Minister of New Zealand in 1984. Working closely with the burgeoning peace movement in New Zealand, Lange controversially banned nuclear-armed US vessels from New Zealand ports, opposed nuclear weapons testing the Pacific, and while endorsing a South Pacific NWFZ, in 1987 his government declared the country a Nuclear Weapons-Free Zone. These achievements ultimately gained cross-party support and have become an important aspect of national identity in New Zealand. In all three cases, peace initiatives provided a means of asserting the autonomy of smaller states and the role they could play in helping to avert a nuclear war between the superpowers.

Part III of this volume delves into issues of nuclear colonialism and anti-imperialism, starting with the example of French Polynesia. The region was favoured for nuclear weapons testing, resulting in the proliferation of what Robert Jacobs has termed 'global hibakusha' in the Pacific.⁴⁹ French Polynesia represents an important case, not least as the site of French nuclear tests between 1966 and 1996. As Alexis Vrignon demonstrates, a significant but often overlooked anti-nuclear movement developed in Polynesia in the early 1970s and interacted closely with transnational anti-nuclear groups. In the Polynesian case, opposition to nuclear testing often went hand in hand with demands for more political autonomy for Polynesians. The anti-nuclear movement gained momentum through the 1980s, at a time when metropolitan France was unusual within Western Europe for not seeing a significant anti-nuclear movement.

Echoes of anti-colonialism are also evident in the case of South Africa anti-nuclear mobilisation, which, as Anna-Mart van Wyk shows in her chapter, was inextricably linked with opposition to the apartheid regime and its racist policies. By the late 1970s, it was increasingly clear that Pretoria was

pursuing a covert nuclear weapons programme, with a planned test in the Kalahari Desert in August 1977 called off at short notice. The Anti-Apartheid Movement (AAM) took up the cause of seeking international support for preventing South Africa from developing the ‘apartheid bomb’. In 1979 it launched the World Campaign against Military and Nuclear Collaboration with South Africa, which aimed to stop third countries from providing any form of military or nuclear support to the apartheid regime. Led by the energetic Abdul Samad Minty, the World Campaign lobbied governments and world leaders directly as well as through the UN, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the Commonwealth. Ultimately, South Africa became the first – and to date the only – country that had developed its own nuclear weapons to unilaterally divest itself of them, making it an invaluable case study for anti-nuclear activists and scholars alike.

Giulia Quaggio sheds light on the unexplored links between Spain and Latin America in anti-nuclear mobilisation. The escalation of violence in Latin America that began with the military coup in Chile on September 1973 and spread throughout the decade sparked intense reactions within Spanish civil society, which felt threatened by the aggressive role played by the White House and the Central Intelligence Agency, (CIA). In her chapter, she argues that the violent eruption in Latin America and Central America contributed to the shift in focus of the Spanish peace movement from the Cold War and nuclear disarmament to the wider scope of social action, human rights, global justice, and the changing standpoint from an East–West relationship to North–South dynamics. Together, these three chapters deepen our understanding of the dynamics between anti-imperialism and anti-nuclear activism, as well as the significant transnational links that characterised these campaigns.

Part IV of this volume focuses on activism in countries that sought to develop their own nuclear weapons. In his chapter on India, Kapil Patil shows how, on the one hand, successive Indian governments advocated ambitious proposals against nuclear weapons. On the other hand, Delhi refused to join the Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and tested its own nuclear device in 1974, ultimately developing its own nuclear weapons, which were tested in 1998. Against this apparently anti-nuclear government, grassroots activism in India initially focused on opposing specific nuclear energy projects rather than against nuclear weapons; even the 1974 test failed to prompt a significant movement against nuclear weapons. The 1998 tests, by contrast, prompted a significant anti-nuclear movement that has endured ever since, even in the face of increasing opposition from the government.

Carlo Patti explains how Brazil’s military dictatorship developed the ability to build a nuclear bomb. The existence of this ‘secret’ nuclear

programme was revealed in late 1986, shortly after the Chernobyl nuclear disaster, and prompted a significant but hitherto overlooked anti-nuclear movement in Brazil during its democratisation process in the late 1980s. Indeed, the opposition to Brazil's development of nuclear weapons, led in part by Brazilian scientists, proved to be an important part of the reawakening of civil society in Brazil, and in 1988 the country's new constitution formally limited nuclear programmes to nonmilitary uses, ensuring that Brazil did not become a nuclear weapons state.

Finally, Soon-Ok Shin's chapter on North Korea describes the characteristics of Pyongyang's state-directed anti-nuclear engagement. For her, the DPRK conceived the country's anti-nuclear stance as directly linked to the geopolitical realities of the Cold War. The shifting geopolitical balances between North Korea, the Soviet Union and China influenced the rhetoric from the Soviet-conceived paradigm of peace to an anti-imperialist stance against the aggressiveness of US policies in the region and then against the exclusivity of the NPT treaty. The fear of abandonment was pivotal in the country's drive to join the nuclear club. Collectively, the wide-ranging chapters that make up this volume allow us to re-evaluate anti-nuclear activism in the late twentieth century through a truly global lens.

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Notes

1. This term comes originally from Glitman, *The Last Battle of the Cold War*.
2. Indicatively, Conze, Klimke and Varon, *Nuclear Threats*; Wittner, *Toward Nuclear Abolition*; Ziemann, *Peace Movements*; Evangelista, *Unarmed Forces*; Jones, 'Euro-missiles'; Hansen, 'The End of the SPD as We Knew It?'; Wetting, 'The Last Soviet Offensive in the Cold War'; Nehring, *Politics of Security*; Gordin and Ikenberry, *The Age of Hiroshima*.
3. UK Research and Innovation, AHRC, Global Histories of Peace and Anti-nuclear Activism, Open University. Retrieved 25 September 2024 from <https://fass.open.ac.uk/research/projects/global-peace-histories>.
4. Nuti et al., *The Euromissile Crisis and the End of the Cold War*; Colbourn, *Euromissiles*.
5. Wittner, *Toward Nuclear Abolition*, specifically 212–14 and 349–51.
6. Ziemann, *Peace Movements*. Equally important is Kraft, Nehring and Sachse, 'The Pugwash Conferences and the Global Cold War'.
7. Gordin and Ikenberry, *The Age of Hiroshima*. The one chapter in this volume that deals specifically with anti-nuclear activism is dedicated to West Germany: Nehring, 'Remembering War, Forgetting Hiroshima'.
8. Nehring, 'Peace Movements', 486.
9. Conrad, *What Is Global History?*
10. Tarrow, *Power in Movement*.
11. Tynan, *The Secret of Emu Field*; Tynan, *Atomic Thunder: The Maralinga Story*; Edwards, 'Nuclear Colonialism and the Social Construction of Landscape in Alaska'.
12. Jacobs, *Nuclear Bodies*, 14.
13. MacLellan, *Grappling with the Bomb*, 10.
14. Bolton and Minor, 'Addressing the Ongoing Humanitarian and Environmental Consequences of Nuclear Weapons'.
15. Jayita Sarkar and Caitlin Meyer, 'Radiation Illnesses and COVID-19 in the Navajo Nation', *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* (February 2021); Lacovsky, 'Opposing Nuclear Weapons Testing in the Global South'.
16. Brown, *Plutopia*; Heefner, *The Missile Next Door*; Zaretsky, *Radiation Nation*.
17. O'Driscoll and Hill, 'Britain, West Africa, and the "New Nuclear Imperialism"'; Osseo-Assare, *Atomic Junction*; Mayoux, 'Britain's Safety Arguments'.
18. Cooper, 'The Argentella Scandal'.
19. Hecht, *Entangled Geographies*; Hecht, *The Radiance of France*.
20. Recent literature on these topics includes Murer, *Polynesia, The Ocean on Fire*; Moser, *Disarming Apartheid*.
21. Chapter 10.
22. Carter, *Peace Movements*, 110.
23. Nehring and Pharo, 'Introduction: A Peaceful Europe?'
24. Budjeryn, *Inheriting the Bomb*; Brunet, 'Unhelpful Fixer?'; Brunet, 'Canada's "Polite No" to SDF'; Karamouzi, 'Civil Society and Peace Mobilisation in Greece during the 1980s'; Miller, 'Fractured Alliance'.
25. Building on Goedde's work, see Goedde, *The Politics of Peace*.
26. Pelopidas, *Repenser Les Choix Nucleaires*.

27. Ruffini, 'Conceptualising Science Diplomacy in the Practitioner-Driven Literature'.
28. Kenji and Retenzi, 'The Co-production of Nuclear Science and Diplomacy'; Roehrich, *Inspectors for Peace*.
29. Maar III, *Freeze!*
30. Burke, 'European Nuclear Disarmament'.
31. Klein and Falter, *Der lange Weg der Grünen*; Hansen, *Abschied vom Kalten Krieg?*
32. Meyer and Whittier, 'Social Movement Spillover'.
33. Goedde, *The Politics of Peace*.
34. Iriye, *Cultural Internationalism and World Order*.
35. Schregel, 'Global Micropolitics'; Schregel, 'Nuclear War and the City'. It has also been claimed that Manchester was the first city to declare itself a nuclear-weapon-free zone.
36. Auyero, 'Spaces and Places as Sites and Objects of Politics'.
37. Wittner, *Toward Nuclear*; Maar III, *Freeze!*; Freeman, *Dreams for a Decade*.
38. Mehta, *Delaying Doomsday*.
39. Iriye, *Global Community*.
40. Richter, 'The Protagonists of the Peace Movement', 189–206.
41. Jonter, *The Key to Nuclear Restraint*.
42. Lacovsky, *Nuclear Weapons Free Zones*.
43. Karamouzi, 'At Last, Our Voice Is Heard in the World'.
44. European Nuclear Disarmament, LSE archives (END)/19/16, The Four Continent Peace Initiative, 22 May 1984.
45. END/19/16, The Four Continent Peace Initiative, 22 May 1984; Sergio Duarte, 'Towards a World Free of Nuclear Weapons', Centre for Strategic and International Studies, Delhi, 9 June 2008, 4.
46. Brunet, 'Unhelpful Fixer?'.
47. Richter, 'The Protagonists of the Peace Movement', 189.
48. Karamouzi, 'At Last, Our Voice Is Heard in the World'.
49. Jacobs, *Nuclear Bodies*.

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Part I

**Anti-nuclear Politics in the Shadow
of East–West Confrontation**

Chapter 1

Japanese Anti-nuclear Movements

Local and Transnational Characteristics of Peace Protest in Hiroshima

Makiko Takemoto

Introduction

Hiroshima and Nagasaki sit at the epicentre of the global history of anti-nuclear activism. The experiences of the dropping of the bombs on both cities demonstrated the destructive power of nuclear weapons to the world. The *hibakusha*, survivors of the nuclear attacks have since 1945 played a leading role in the global anti-nuclear movement.¹

This chapter will initially provide an overview of the historical development of Japanese anti-nuclear movements from the 1950s to the present day. It will then analyse mobilisation in Japan from two critical and interwoven perspectives. The first will focus on the distinct features of the anti-nuclear movements in Hiroshima and how they evolved to meet the local needs and issues of the *hibakusha*. The second will investigate the interaction of those local movements, how Hiroshima was internationalised and its legacy on nuclear mobilisation.

Overview of Japanese Anti-nuclear Movements

Japanese peace movements started their activities in the late nineteenth century. These movements were heavily influenced by Western thought, culture and peace theories. Socialism and Christianity were especially influential on Japanese intellectuals who were engaged with the democratic and social movements. The first peace organisation was founded by an initiative of Quakers in 1889, while liberal intellectuals established other peace

organisations to foster international cooperation and understanding. As this movement was developing, the anti-imperialist movement, led by the socialists, also started becoming active. However, the heavily militarised Japanese society of the 1930s and the early 1940s left little room for organised peace movements to flourish.²

The Second World War and the experiences of the atomic bombings in Hiroshima and Nagasaki brought about a radical change within Japanese peace mobilisation. These changes were reflected in the new Constitution and, specifically, Article 9, which renounced war, rendering 'peace' and 'anti-war' policy part of Japan's national culture. The pacifism of Article 9 has served as the framework and the standard to think about war and peace for the Japanese people, and it has also been influential in Japanese peace studies, peace education and peace movements.³ In this context, several public intellectuals became active in establishing new peace organisations.

In the early postwar period, when Japan was occupied by the United States through the government of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP), the Press Code of the General Headquarters (GHQ) censored the spread of information about the impact of the bombings on Hiroshima and Nagasaki between 1945 and 1952. It was almost impossible for many people outside Hiroshima and Nagasaki as well as people in Japan more generally to comprehend the immediate devastating results from the use of nuclear weapons, let alone the long-term damages caused by radiation. The World Federation Movement, which was founded in 1945, aimed to prevent nuclear war through the establishment of a system of world governance and reform of the United Nations (UN). The movement organised, for example, the municipal declaration for the World Federation in many cities in Japan. It was quite popular among intellectuals, especially from soon after the end of the Second World War to the 1950s. The movement has been regarded as not being very influential, but still continues with its work.⁴

The Japanese anti-nuclear movements, called Gensuikin undō (the anti A- and H-bomb movement), started organising from the mid-1950s. In 1952, the peace treaty between Japan and the Allied Powers, the Treaty of San Francisco, came into force and brought the end of the Second World War and the occupation of Japan by the Allied Forces. The end of the rules and restrictions placed on Japan by the occupying forces allowed Japanese people to take part once more in civic activities. In August 1952, a weekly magazine, the *Asahi Gurafu* (*Asahi Gravure*), published pictures of the damage caused by the atomic attack in Hiroshima for the first time in Japan and it shocked Japanese people. Then, the Bikini incident in 1954 inaugurated a new phase of Japanese anti-nuclear activism. The Japanese sailing vessel *Lucky Dragon* was caught up in the fallout from a US hydrogen bomb test over the Bikini

Atoll. After the vessel returned to Yaizu in Shizuoka Prefecture, a newspaper called the *Yomiuri Shimbum* published sensational reports about the damage from radiation and instilled a fear of radiation among Japanese people and then the broader anti-nuclear movements among citizens. Unlike most peace movements that were led by intellectuals and religious groups, the initiative was taken by the fishermen at first and then by a group of housewives who started a signature petition against the hydrogen bomb, which became quite influential. They first gathered together through a reading circle in the Suginami district of Tokyo, the group was concerned about being exposed to irradiated fish. The Bikini incident and the fear of radiation were heavily reported in newspapers and on the radio. The campaign was also treated in the mass media and journals of peace movements, and resonated immensely with the rest of the nation. At first, the Suginami Appeal was only opposed to the hydrogen bomb, and it did not include an anti-atomic bomb element. However, it galvanised citizens in other cities. Intellectuals and politicians saw it as a good opportunity to organise the anti-nuclear movement. They established a committee to make nationwide cooperation against both the atomic bomb and the hydrogen bomb possible. In 1955, the first World Conference against Atomic and Hydrogen Bombs was held in Hiroshima. In the same year the Gensuibaku Kinshi Nihon Kyōgikai (Japan Council against Atomic and Hydrogen Bombs) known as Gensuikyō was established.⁵

However, the boom in popularity of the anti-nuclear movement did not last long. The escalation of the ideological confrontation of the Cold War influenced the Japanese movement and intensified its internal struggles and splits. Gensuikyō was supported by a wide range of citizens from the conservatives to the left (including communists) in its early period and shifted to the left and had a strong anti-American character. The Japan-US Security Treaty in 1951, and particularly its revision in 1960, resulted in a political struggle in Japanese society because many citizens were worried about the possible Japanese involvement in an American war. The strong anti-US position impacted the nuclear issue too. The assessment of whether nuclear weapons testing in the Soviet Union or China could be accepted to secure a balance of power in relation to US bombs became an important issue. In 1961, members who were moderate socialists or close to the Liberal Democratic Party criticised the political stance of Gensuikyō as too close to the Communist countries. They left the organisation and established the Kakuheiki Haizetsu-Heiwa Kensetsu Kokumin Kaigi (National Conference for the Nuclear Abolition and Peace Building), known as Kakkin. Additionally, due to continuous nuclear testing by the Soviet Union as well as the signing of the Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT) in 1963, the socialists also left Gensuikyō and established a new organisation, Gensuibaku

Kinshi Nihon Kokumin Kaigi (Japan National Conference against Atomic and Hydrogen Bombs), known as Gensuikin, in 1965.⁶ These ideological confrontations and power struggles, especially led to antagonism in the left wing which influenced both the so-called 'red' movements, the anti-nuclear movements and the peace movements.⁷ These internal political struggles alienated many citizens, who were disillusioned with the cause of anti-nuclear mobilisation and left the peace movements. Ideological struggles and the withdrawal of the citizenry from the peace movements was also witnessed in West Germany and the United States in the 1960s. Peace mobilisation was regarded as left-wing and 'better dead than red' ('lieber tot als rot' in German) became a well-known anti-communist slogan.⁸ Gensuikyō and Gensuikin repeatedly tried but failed to cooperate. The history of Japanese anti-nuclear movements revolved around the confrontation and compromise between these two organisations. There were also many other anti-nuclear organisations supported by grassroots groups and intellectuals, but, as we will see in the case of Hiroshima in the next section, these groups were very often established as nonpolitical and independent organisations. Throughout their postwar history and right up to the present day, anti-nuclear organisations such as Genshikin and Gensuikyō have struggled to unite and instead became victims of vicious cycles of cooperation and disintegration. This disunity gave rise to a different form of anti-nuclear movements particularly in Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

Within Japan, not only the anti-nuclear movement but also other types of protest – for example, against the Vietnam War, the Japan–US Security Treaty, the existence of US military bases on Japanese soil and the revision of Article 9 of the Constitution – can be found. They coexisted and sometimes cooperated with each other, but they were often conducted as single-issue movements. Similar tendencies were found in Okinawa. It was ruled by the Ryūkyū Kingdom, had been a vassal of Japan and had been officially annexed in the nineteenth century, but had a different culture and language from mainland Japan. It was returned to Japan after the US occupation of Okinawa in 1972, but it still hosted the largest number of US military bases. The anti-nuclear movement was important; however, there civil mobilisation focused on the question of Okinawa's structural status within the Japan–US Security Treaty as well as the pressure on Okinawa from mainland Japan. Therefore, the Okinawa issue should be treated as a unique problem to Okinawa rather than being discussed in connection with the issues of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. For example, according to Noriko Sado, people in Hiroshima tend to address their message to the world, while people in Okinawa tend to push their issue inside Japan and to the Japanese government when they talk about their victimhood during the Second World War.⁹

Anti-nuclear Activism in Hiroshima: Supporting Hibakusha

The concept of 'peace' and 'anti-nuclear weapons' has played an important role not only in the dominance of pacifism among Japanese people, but also in constructing the identity of the city of Hiroshima. In 1946, the Hiroshima Peace Memorial City Construction Law was enacted and since 1970 the city of Hiroshima has officially declared its aim to stand for international culture of peace. Hiroshima is both the capital of the prefecture and a city designated by government ordinance. *Hibakusha* issues, especially the administration and politics are intertwined between the different administrative bodies. City and prefecture administrators, activists, local journalists, teachers and students were involved in the anti-nuclear and peace movement within Hiroshima. About 150 organisations and groups are registered as 'peace-related' organisations in the list of the Hiroshima Peace Culture Foundation, including religious groups, teachers' groups and research institutes at universities.¹⁰ Hiroshima's anti-nuclear activism is a complex web formed with these many actors. Within this complex situation, the main actors are the *hibakusha* themselves.¹¹

The developments of the Japanese anti-nuclear movement, especially the split of Gensuikin undō, which was mentioned above, influenced the anti-nuclear movements in Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Besides the activities of organised nationwide anti-nuclear movements, there were some local activities, including those organised by *hibakusha*. The movements in Hiroshima demanded disarmament and the abolition of nuclear weapons; however, they were primarily formed to support the lives of the survivors and aid them in their pursuit of legal compensation. For example, a *hibakusha* named Kiyoshi Kikkawa first protested about poor treatment of *hibakusha* within medical facilities by showing his back in public and to tourists. His body was covered with keloid scars, and his showed in the most explicit way how atomic bombs had damaged the human body.¹² In Hiroshima and Nagasaki in particular, anti-nuclear mobilisation has been led by *hibakusha* themselves: as such, it differs from the anti-nuclear movements in most countries. The activities that *hibakusha* have undertaken, regardless of the issue itself, have often been regarded as activities for peace and thus such activities start to become a heavy burden for *hibakusha* to shoulder alone. Yukio Yokohara, the former Secretary-General of the Gensuibaku kinshi hiroshima ken kyōgikai (Hiroshima Congress against A- and H-Bombs) known as Hiroshima Ken Gensuikin, said '[i]t has traditionally been the case that in Hiroshima all peace-related issues are left on the shoulders of *hibakusha*'¹³.

However, he meant that *hibakusha*'s activities should constitute part of the peace movement, and it should not be the whole peace movement: 'At an early stage, peace activists in Hiroshima used to place *hibakusha*'s activities at the forefront of the peace movement, based on a recognition that *hibakusha*'s activities were part of the entire peace movement. Nevertheless, this has changed as time passed and now *hibakusha* shoulder everything.'¹⁴ Similarly Toyokazu Ihara, who was a *hibakusha*, a City Council member of Nagasaki and the former President of the Nagasaki ken hibakusha techō tomo no kai (Nagasaki Prefecture Hibakusha Health Handbook Holders' Association), said in the interview in 2019: 'We *hibakusha* have worked to support one another; however, before we realised it, our work was seen as representing activism. We cannot be influential [and shoulder the burden of all activism] with our limited labour.'¹⁵ He worried that their activism will be diminished due to the absence of the successors. The future of *hibakusha* activities as well as shedding the memories of Hiroshima and Nagasaki is a matter of great concern. At the same time, his comment reminds us that the *hibakusha* activities are primarily aimed for support of this community, but it is often forgotten when we talk about Hiroshima and peace in the global context. This can be clearly highlighted with the disjunction of the needs of the *hibakusha* and the push for a nuclear-free world in Hiroshima. As for the support for *hibakusha*, the foundation of the medical law for *hibakusha* was one of the most important issues of the 1950s. The Atomic Bomb Medical Care Law enacted in 1957 and the Law Concerning Relief to Atomic Bomb Survivors in 1994 were the result of efforts by *hibakusha* and their supporters. However, these laws cannot cover the support for all victims, so lawsuits to assess whether someone is a *hibakusha* still continue to this today.

As with the division of Gensuikin undō, the movements in Hiroshima followed the same path. The Hiroshima Ken Genbaku Higaisha Dantai Kyōgikai (Hiroshima Prefectural Confederation of A-Bomb Sufferers Organisations), known as Hiroshima ken hidankyō, a member of the national organisation of *hibakusha*, Nihon Hidankyō (Nihon gensuibaku higaisha dantai kyōgikai: Japan Confederation of A-and H-Bomb Sufferers Organisations) was split into two groups: one was close to the Socialist Party and Sōhyō (Nihon rōdō kumiai sōhyōgikai – General Council of Trade Unions of Japan), while the other was close to the Communist Party.

While the split of the Gensuikin undō brought the decline of anti-nuclear mobilisation at the national level, Hiroshima's movement remained active in a different way. Including two Hiroshima ken hidankyōs, the seven leading organisations cooperated with the city government and hold representative positions advocating for *hibakusha* within the city and prefectural administration as well as to Japanese politics today. These seven

organisations – two Hiroshima ken hidankyos, Hiroshima shi genbaku higaisha kyōgikai (Society of Hiroshima A-Bomb Sufferers), Kankoku genbaku higaisha taisaku tokubetsu iinkai (Korea Special Committee for Welfare of Atomic Bomb Survivors), Hiroshima ken chōsenjin hibakusha kyōgikai (Council of Atom-Bombed Koreans in Hiroshima Prefecture Japan), Hiroshima ken rōdō kumiai kaigi hibakusha dantai renraku kyōgikai (Hiroshima Prefectural Labour Union Confederation of A-Bomb Survivors Organisations) and Hiroshima hibakusha dantai renraku kaigi (Hiroshima A-Bomb Survivors Liaison Council) – took action together to appeal to the Japanese government to support *hibakusha* for the first time in 1993. It was a ‘historically significant scene’ to show collaboration beyond the splits of the anti-nuclear movement.¹⁶

People who were utterly disheartened by the ideological and political struggles in the Gensuikin undō mobilised at a local level or joined various kinds of grassroots peace organisations. These groups collected *hibakusha* testimonies, stressed the nonpolitical nature of their protest, while keeping their distance from anti-nuclear activities led by political parties since 1960s. As a result, these movements were often apolitical and people tended to campaign against nuclear weapons, which was often combined with pacifism based on Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution.¹⁷ Even the administration of the city of Hiroshima made an effort for nonpolitical anti-nuclear appeals and events, alongside ‘politically balanced’ activism following the ideological confrontation experienced during the Cold War.¹⁸ Such an attitude has made the participation of university students and schoolchildren in the anti-nuclear peace activism possible up to the present day.

The growing international awareness of the impact of nuclear weapons on Hiroshima and Nagasaki allowed the *hibakusha* and the citizens of these cities to further embrace their mission of sharing their experiences of the atomic bombs, and to work for a world without nuclear weapons. These depoliticised and universal activities that directly and indirectly appealed for peace and the abolition of nuclear weapons contributed to forming the foundation of peace education and peace culture in Japan. In Hiroshima, we can find many traces of the experiences of atomic bombing not only in the field of social movements but also in terms of culture and education. Hiroshima is still a popular destination for school excursions that are focused on peace studies. Universities in Hiroshima such as Hiroshima University and Hiroshima City University also contribute to peace studies for the younger and older generations with public lectures on war, peace and *hibakusha* issues. The influence of peace education on the younger generation is reflected in diverse activities aimed to record and reflect upon the *hibakushas’* experiences. For instance, high school students continue to run their

own campaigns against nuclear weapons. The role of newspapers (especially the local newspaper the *Chugoku Shimbun*) as well as TV programmes in the campaign for peace was also quite significant in Hiroshima, as Naohiro Fukaya, who published a book on Nagasaki, highlighted a kind of norm of 'anti-nuclear and peace' that is conveyed through the media to young people despite the lack of direct experience.¹⁹

The Anti-nuclear Movement in Nagasaki and Its Relationship with Hiroshima

Hiroshima and Nagasaki are often lumped together; however, there are distinct differences in the cities' nuclear experiences. The first bomb, on Hiroshima, was made with uranium and the second on Nagasaki with plutonium. The power of the second bomb was stronger than the first one. While the city centre was targeted and the function of the city was totally destroyed in Hiroshima, the ground zero of Nagasaki, which was in the Urakami District, was further away from the city centre. The original target of the Nagasaki attack was the city centre but it was not conducted according to plan. Urakami was largely populated by Catholics, a religious minority group discriminated against in Japan. As a result, the reconstruction efforts and the narrative around the experience of the atomic bombs were marginalised within the national context. Therefore, it is not surprising that anti-nuclear mobilisation was not as active in the city of Nagasaki as it was in Hiroshima. The silencing of the suffering was partly reflected in the writings of Takashi Nagai, a medical doctor and radiation researcher, who in his book *The Bells of Nagasaki* in 1949 saw the atomic bomb as a 'punishment' for Japanese aggressions and war atrocities, and the Christians in Urakami as a kind of holy scapegoat for peace. Nagai's book became very popular, and a song and film were made based on this book. This Catholic-led guilt served to influence and quieten dissenting voices against nuclear weapons in Nagasaki when compared to Hiroshima.²⁰ 'Ikari no Hiroshima, inori no Nagasaki', which translates as 'Angry Hiroshima and Praying Nagasaki', clearly echoes the different trajectories of the anti-nuclear movements in the two cities.²¹

The Gensuikin undō stimulated Nagasaki's anti-nuclear movement, but the split was also devastating to the mobilisation in Nagasaki. Here, the initiative of the *hibakusha* activities was taken up by five groups.²² Like the movement in Hiroshima, their main concern was support for *hibakusha* and their livelihoods. But Nagasaki's movements also developed in a way that was far removed from the ideological confrontations of the Cold War. One of the examples is the Nagasaki no shōgen no kai (Nagasaki Testimonial Society),

which was established in 1978 with the aim of collecting testimonies of the *hibakusha* and passing on those experiences to the next generation, while staying independent from any political party. The society is administrated by the citizen's initiative with their own membership and fee. It publishes testimonies every year.²³

Nowadays, Nagasaki's movement seems more unified than Hiroshima's movement. The diverse organisations gathered in the Nagasaki Global Citizens' Assembly for the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons have taken the initiative for signature campaigns such as the 'International Signature Campaign in Support of the Appeal of the Hibakusha, the Atomic Bomb Survivors of Hiroshima & Nagasaki, for the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons' since 2000. This campaign sees high school students taking a leading role, with several acting as the Nagasaki Peace Messengers, who visited the UN to bring the voices of Hiroshima and Nagasaki to that organisation.²⁴ The Research Centre for Nuclear Weapons Abolition of Nagasaki University (RECNA) was established in 2012 and serves as a think tank in the local community aiming for the abolition of nuclear weapons. It closely cooperates with Nagasaki City, Nagasaki Prefecture and other local anti-nuclear organisations. RECNA also provides data on nuclear warheads and fissile material in the world, and organises workshops on an approach to a Northeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone.²⁵

Hiroshima and Nagasaki cooperate in many fields. For example, through the Mayors for Peace scheme. Appeals against nuclear weapons during the Review Conference of the Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT) are important tasks for the mayors of both cities. There is also cooperation in the anti-nuclear movements in both cities via the promotion of peace at the level of culture, administration and education. One example of this cooperation is the Hiroshima-Nagasaki Peace Study Course, which supports peace studies not only in universities and colleges in Japan, but also overseas.²⁶

Internationalisation and the Legacy of Hiroshima

The symbolic character of Hiroshima as the beginning of the nuclear age, nuclear annihilation and total devastation has been the object of scholarly inquiry. So has Hiroshima as a place of war memory that at times is mentioned alongside Auschwitz.²⁷ However, the internationalisation of the anti-nuclear movement in Hiroshima remains largely unexplored. Information on Hiroshima garnered considerable interest in the United States. In the early post-war days, American citizens played a significant role in the support of *hibakusha*. For instance, the Hiroshima Maidens and Moral Adoption was

organised by Kiyoshi Tanimoto, a clergyman at Nagarekawa Church, who was trained in the United States and appeared in John Hersey's *Hiroshima*, cooperating with American intellectuals such as Norman Cousins and Pearl Buck.²⁸ In 1946 the Atomic Bomb Casualty Commission (ABCC) was established in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, but it is still notorious among citizens and *hibakusha* because it did not give medical treatment to *hibakusha* and was eager only to gather data from them, even though many Japanese medical doctors and scientists cooperated with the ABCC.²⁹ At the same time, the American Cultural Center and CIE (Civil Information and Education Section) Library contributed to import American culture to Hiroshima. But the Hiroshima Pilgrimage and the foundation of the World Friendship Center are regarded as examples of mutual cooperation between *hibakusha* and the United States.

But it was not only the United States that had an interest in the Hiroshima issue. In the 1950s, the Governor and Mayor of Hiroshima visited Switzerland to attend a meeting of the Moral Rearmament Movement and also toured Europe to talk about Hiroshima. In the 1960s, a group of young people from Tokyo marched on many sites of battlefields of the Second World War, from Hiroshima to Auschwitz. This Hiroshima-Auschwitz Peace March, as well as the later plan to build a Hiroshima Auschwitz Museum, were supported by leading politicians, intellectuals and religious people in Hiroshima and contributed to the internationalisation of Hiroshima.³⁰ The World Federalist Movement, which saw its influence in Tokyo decline in the 1960s, maintained its popularity in Hiroshima and was supported by the same group as the Auschwitz Peace March. Setsuo Yamada, who was the Mayor of Hiroshima from 1965 to 1975, was a strong supporter of the World Federalist Movement.³¹ The Hiroshima Peace Culture Foundation held a public lecture series on the World Federation until the 1990s.³²

The successor of Yamada, Takeshi Araki, further promoted the internationalisation of Hiroshima. He tried to push the case for Hiroshima at the UN and the first Special Session of the UN General Assembly on Disarmament in 1978, which marked the beginning of comprehensive discussions on disarmament in the UN and was supported by nongovernmental organisations (NGOs) in many countries.³³ The discussions at the UN led to the Japanese anti-nuclear movements regaining their momentum and Gensuikyō and Gensuikin attempting to cooperate once more because they thought that their activities were being recognised.

In the early 1980s, a large-scale anti-nuclear movement against the Double Track Decision of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and Euromissiles took centre stage in the United States and Western Europe. The slogan 'No Euroshima' became popular and briefly

revitalised Japanese anti-nuclear movements. The influence of the West German movement was notable in Japan. For example, Japanese writers announced the Appeal of Writers in Japan against Nuclear War, which was modelled on the West German case.³⁴ Japanese intellectuals like Kenzaburo Oe, the winner of the Nobel Prize for Literature in 1994, were engaged in the anti-nuclear movement and many *hibakusha* visited West Germany. Ichiro Moritaki, who played a leading role in the anti-nuclear movement by *hibakusha* in Hiroshima and was one of the founders of the World Nuclear Victims Forum, built a friendship with Petra Kelly, leader of the West German Greens, who visited Hiroshima in 1978 with Gert Bastian. Kelly invited Moritaki to the anti-nuclear demonstration in Krefeld and Moritaki campaigned for 'No Euroshima' there. Kelly continued to be interested in the issue of Hiroshima and later organised the international tribunal against nuclear weapons in Nuremberg in 1983. At this conference, *hibakusha* Keiko Ogura was invited to present her testimony about Hiroshima: she was the wife of Kaoru Ogura who helped German-Jewish (later Austrian) journalist Robert Jungk write his work on Hiroshima in addition to assisting US psychiatrist Robert Jay Lifton, the author of *Death in Life: Survivors of Hiroshima* (1968), with his interviews with *hibakusha*. Kaoru Ogura also served as a director of the Hiroshima Peace Memorial Museum. Keiko started to work as an English interpreter for the foreign visitors in Hiroshima after her husband's death and established Hiroshima Interpreters for Peace (HIP) in 1983, which is still one of the active volunteer groups today.³⁵

As Hiroshima became widely known around the world, the people of Hiroshima began to understand and embrace their historic mission. Testimonies about the nuclear attack had an important role in raising awareness and many visitors from foreign countries spread the word about the importance of the Hiroshima atomic experience abroad. For instance, Robert Jungk shared the story of Sadako Sasaki, a girl who died from leukaemia ten years after the atomic attack. The story of her efforts to fold 1,000 paper cranes were first written about in Jungk's *Strahlen aus der Asche (Children of Ashes)*, which was promoted throughout Europe. Sadako's story became well known later through Austrian author Karl Bruckner's book *Sadako will leben (The Day of the Bomb)* in 1961 and the Canadian-American author Eleanor Coerr's book *Sadako and the Thousand Paper Cranes* in 1977. Hiroshima's movement actively sought cooperation with well-known foreign intellectuals. Philip Noel-Baker, British winner of the Nobel Peace Prize, was one of the main supporters of the anti-nuclear movements in Hiroshima. Such intellectuals attended the Hiroshima Conference in 1970, which was organised by the city government alongside leading intellectuals and peace activists

in Hiroshima to discuss nuclear abolition, peace education and how to pass on the experiences of the *hibakusha*.

Since the late 1970s, Hiroshima has appealed for nuclear abolition at the UN. With the cooperation of the Japanese Foreign Ministry, Hiroshima has increased its presence in the UN, helped by its notoriety as the first place to be subjected to an atomic bombing, while the city continues to appeal the support for the *hibakusha* and to demand the Japanese government contribute more effort for a nuclear-free world. In addition, the important role of overseas *hibakusha* to spread information on Hiroshima and Nagasaki should not be forgotten. Many Japanese people emigrated from Hiroshima to the United States and Brazil, and they and their families have spread the word about the bombings in various places. The medical care and support for the overseas survivors are important issues that stimulated anti-nuclear movements abroad.³⁶

The memory of atomic bombings in Hiroshima and Nagasaki does not solely revolve around the ugliness and absurdity of the use of nuclear weapons. In the United States, their use during the Second World War is often discussed and taught as a just act in reaction to the attack on Pearl Harbor, whereas many Asian countries see the nuclear attack as the only way out of Japanese aggression.³⁷ In Asian countries, Japan's claim of being 'yuiitsu no sensō hibaku koku' (the only atomic-bombed country during the war) is discounted since it emphasises Japanese victimhood. The interpretation of the atomic bomb and the distance between Japan and Asian countries regarding the issue of Japan's war responsibility have long been raised in Hiroshima. One of the famous examples is a poem written in 1976, 'Hiroshima to iu toki' (When We Say Hiroshima) by Sadako Kurihara, which criticises the tendency to emphasise Japanese victims and damage without mentioning the massacres by Japanese military in Nanking or Manila.³⁸ Seiji Imahori, a professor at Hiroshima University who was active in the anti-nuclear movement, also pointed out in 1985 that the Gensuikin undō tends to obscure Japan's war responsibility and only promotes victim consciousness. According to Imahori, the problem can already be found in the first World Congress of Gensuikin. While people talked about the damage in Hiroshima and Nagasaki and the Lucky Dragon Vessel exposed to radiation in the Bikini accident, no one mentioned the citizens who were killed or injured in China, nor discussed the harm inflicted on the indigenous people in the Bikini atoll. Also, the issues regarding Japanese citizens injured by weapons other than the atomic bomb were also silenced. In Japan, most cities were damaged by air raids during the Second World War. How to cooperate with other war survivors and to tell the histories of the war and the atomic bombing without emphasising victimhood is a subject that is often dealt with in the field of

peace education.³⁹ As Kazumi Mizumoto recently argued, when people in Hiroshima discuss peace, it is very often only in relation to nuclear abolition, while discussions about Japanese aggression are often left out. He writes that it is necessary to talk about peace and nuclear abolition with an awareness of Japan's war responsibility (including economic and political colonialism and military aggression) as well as other kinds of acts of inhumanity all over the world.⁴⁰

Since the 1990s, with the progress of democratisation and rise of liberation movements in Asian countries, there has been more focus on Japan as a perpetrator of war as well as a shifting of the debate on other atomic bomb survivors in Asia. What is notable is the focus on the Korean Peninsula, which is where the largest number of victims of Japan's expansion into Asia are located. In Hiroshima, Takashi Hiraoka, a former *Chugoku Shimbun* journalist who later served as mayor, centred the problem of Korean *hibakusha*. Joint efforts between Korean and Japanese *hibakusha* and their supporters have allowed the atomic bomb survivors in South Korea to tell their story, as seen in the establishment of the first Atomic Bomb Museum in Hapcheon, Gyeongsangnam-do in 2017. Hapcheon is often called 'Kankoku no Hiroshima' (the South Korean Hiroshima) because most Korean *hibakusha* who were exposed to radiation in Hiroshima were originally from this city.⁴¹

Raising awareness about nuclear damage has contributed to the spread of the concept of 'global *hibakusha*', including victims of nuclear power plants and nuclear tests.⁴² Except for the anti-nuclear movement against the Euromissiles during the 1980s, it is difficult to evoke an anti-nuclear weapons movement among citizens in countries where there is no danger of nuclear war. However, when a nuclear accident such as an accident in a uranium mine, depleted uranium or damage caused by radioactive waste occurs, people tend to remember Hiroshima and Nagasaki or associate it with their own experience.⁴³

A major legacy of the anti-nuclear movements in the 1980s has been the initiative of the 'Mayors for Peace', established in 1982 in Hiroshima and Nagasaki. It now includes 90 per cent of Japanese cities within its organisation.⁴⁴ Hiroshima and Nagasaki have been campaigning for the global abolition of nuclear weapons around the world as well as playing a key role in resisting the Japanese government's nuclear policy. Japan's contradictory attitude on the nuclear issue, highlighting the damage caused by nuclear weapons with the phrase 'the only country exposed to war' on the one hand, while following US nuclear politics and being under their nuclear umbrella on the other hand, has its critics in Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The Peace Declaration that is read out by the Mayor of Hiroshima at the Peace Memorial Ceremony on 6 August every year (except 1950) since 1947⁴⁵ implores the Japanese

government to be more actively involved in the abolition of nuclear weapons, adhere to the three non-nuclear principles and participate in the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW).⁴⁶ A similar declaration is also read out in Nagasaki on 9 August, anniversary of the atomic bombing of the city. In recent years, the Hiroshima Prefectural government has also been active. It has introduced its own nuclear disarmament programme and has gathered experts to create the Hiroshima Report on nuclear weapons. Both Hiroshima Prefecture and City have made requests to the government to sign the TPNW and made statements toward non-nuclear and anti-nuclear weapons with Nagasaki, and continue to be the centre of Japan's anti-nuclear movement.

Since Japan's politics have remained conservative since the end of the Cold War and it has strong ties with the United States, the features of the Japanese anti-nuclear movement have not changed fundamentally since the end of the Cold War. The nuclear threat has not disappeared; rather, it became more dangerous due to the depleted uranium nuclear bombs used in the Gulf War in 1991 and, more importantly for Japanese people, the North Korean nuclear development is regarded as a danger. Japanese anti-nuclear activism has committed itself vigorously to the support for the 1996 recommendation by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) regarding the illegitimacy of nuclear weapons. The establishment of the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN) and the TPNW, which was endorsed by many small and medium-sized countries, was a great achievement and encouraged survivors again. However, many nuclear-weapon states and those under the umbrella of nuclear weapons do not participate in the treaty and impede its effectiveness, while the Japanese government does not even attend the proceedings as an observer. At present, there is no sign of a change in Japanese nuclear politics.

Anti-nuclear Weapons Protest as Anti-nuclear Energy

The Japanese anti-nuclear movements have been criticised for not dealing with the nuclear energy issue for a long time. The Suginami Appeal in the 1950s was instigated due to a fear of contaminated foods; however, the Japanese anti-nuclear movement was conscious of nuclear energy issue from the beginning.⁴⁷ For instance, the Atoms for Peace programme overwhelmed the world with a pro-nuclear energy message from the 1950s and Japan cooperated with the United States in this effort. This cooperation could also be seen in Hiroshima. The 'Atoms for Peace' exhibition was held at the Hiroshima Peace Memorial Museum in 1956, with the American Culture Center taking the initiative.

The cooperation between the movements against nuclear weapons along with environmental protection and the anti-nuclear energy movements can be traced to the 1970s, even though restricted at a local level. In West Germany, the anti-nuclear weapons and energy movements united in anti-nuclear mobilisation. This was particularly notable in the Green Party, following the 1968 student movement and the spread of new social movements. In contrast to this tendency, Japanese anti-nuclear weapon movements have hesitated to work with anti-nuclear energy movements, even though some people like Ichiro Moritaki were clearly campaigning against, not only nuclear weapons, but also nuclear energy.⁴⁸ Takemasa Ando explained in his work on Japanese anti-nuclear energy movements that the word 'hankaku' (anti-nuclear) became popular beyond the Gensuikin undō in the early 1980s through the rise of the movements for nuclear abolition. The anti-nuclear weapons movements were clearly distinguished from the anti-nuclear energy movements in order to avoid controversial issues like opposing nuclear power plants and rebuilding a united front between Gensuikin and Gensuikyō.⁴⁹ The anti-nuclear power plant issue has been quite a delicate question for Japanese society for a long time. When Robert Jungk visited Japan in 1980, he visited Hiroshima for the fifth time after touring several nuclear power plants in Japan. He asked why Hiroshima did not campaign against nuclear energy and strongly and angrily demanded cooperation with the European anti-nuclear power plant movements.⁵⁰ Since the Chernobyl accident in 1986, the anti-nuclear power plant movement became active in Japan; nuclear policy has continued to be promoted and opposition to nuclear power has not still become a widespread civil movement connected with the anti-nuclear weapon movements. There were no powerful anti-nuclear political parties such as the German Green Party in Japan.

However, anti-nuclear movements in Hiroshima have changed since the Fukushima incident in March 2011; the issue of nuclear power plants, which was almost a taboo before, has now entered discussions in Hiroshima. *Hibakusha* sympathise with the citizens in Fukushima and the discourse on anti-nuclear power plants is clearly integrated into the anti-nuclear movement in Hiroshima. Thus, the anti-nuclear movement to oppose all nuclear risks has the potential to become a transnational civil movement.

Conclusion

This chapter has detailed the history of Japan's anti-nuclear movement and has zoomed in on the characteristics of the Hiroshima movement. Japan's

anti-nuclear movement has been active at a national level, but was unable to attract the attention of the wider public due to ideological conflicts, leading to the split of the anti-nuclear movement. Since the constant politicisation and conflict within organised peace movements alienated public opinion, anti-nuclear activism was conducted locally in an apolitical manner at a grassroots level. At the same time, Hiroshima gradually became a symbol of the anti-nuclear movement in the world. Testimonies of *hibakusha* strongly impacted the global anti-nuclear movements. Hiroshima's anti-nuclear message has symbolically been equated as a universal desire for the abolition of nuclear weapons and has a significant influence on the formation of Japanese anti-nuclear and peace consciousness. At the same time, the anti-nuclear movements in Hiroshima and Nagasaki are primarily movements for and by *hibakusha*. Many issues such as the effect of the black rain and the after-effects on the health of the second and third generations of *hibakusha* are still not resolved and are ongoing problems. Since 24 February 2022, the nuclear weapons issue entered a new phase. The Russo-Ukraine War, which has been broadcast on TV every day, influences Japanese people's consciousness of war and peace. Right-wing politicians are now openly demanding a Japanese nuclear weapons programme including 'Nuclear Sharing'. People in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, particularly *hibakusha*, are confronting this new threat.

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article in English is 'Peace Studies in Japan: Co-evolution of Knowledge and Practice' in the *Asian Journal of Peacebuilding*.

Notes

1. The definition of '*hibakusha*' is different depending on the context. It is broadly used to mean the survivors of the atomic bombings in Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Legally, it is used in a more limited and defined way. The website of Hibakusha Stories explains as follows: 'According to the Atomic Bomb Survivors Relief Law, there are certain recognised categories of hibakusha: people exposed directly to the bomb and its immediate aftermath; people exposed within a 2 kilometre radius who entered the sphere of destruction within two weeks of the explosion; people exposed to radioactive fallout generally; and those exposed in utero, whose mothers were pregnant and belonging to any of these defined categories'. See <https://hibakushastories.org/who-are-the-hibakusha> (retrieved 3 February 2022). Recently people who were exposed to the radioactive black rain have been also recognised as *hibakusha* after the long-term lawsuit.
2. On Japanese peace movements before the Second World War available in English, see Bamba and Howes, *Pacifism in Japan*. See also the short overview of Japanese peace movements in Takemoto, 'Peace and Peace Movements in Japanese History'. In Japanese, see: Yamada, 'Sengo nihon no heiwa undō to sono rekishiteki imi'.
3. Kimijima, 'Rokumentai to shiteno kenpō 9 jō', 170. On Article 9 and its influence on Japanese peace thoughts and peace studies, see Takemoto, 'Peace Studies in Japan'.
4. On the history of the World Federation Movement and the relationship with Hiroshima, see Takemoto, 'Hankaku undō no kakusan'.
5. See the important work on the history of Suginami Appeal: Maruhama, *Gensuikin shomei undō no tanjō*.
6. This confrontation and split among Japanese anti-nuclear moments related to the Soviet nuclear bombs is known as 'Ikanaru kuni ronsō' (all-state dispute).
7. Fujiwara, 'Nihon no heiwa undō'. On Japanese anti-nuclear movement in English, see, for example, Wittner, *Confronting the Bomb*.
8. Takemoto, *Doitsu no heiwa shugi to heiwa undō*.
9. Sado, 'Kaku hibaku toshi karano hasshin', 36.
10. Hiroshima Ken Kenkō Fukushi Kyōku Hibakusha Shien Ka, *Genbaku hibakusha engo jigyo gaiyō*, 214–21.
11. There are already a large number of books and articles on *hibakusha* and Hiroshima with a variety of topics. The most important work that provides an overview of activities of *hibakusha* and Hiroshima is Ubuki, *Hiroshima sengo shi*.
12. Kikkawa, '*Genbaku ichigō to iwarete*', 44–60.
13. Cited from Asai (ed.), *Reflections from Hiroshima*, 93.
14. Cited from Asai (ed.), *Reflections from Hiroshima*, 93.
15. Ihara, 'Hibakusha undō, tomo no kai', 98.
16. *Asahi Shimbun* (Hiroshima), 25 December 1993.
17. Nemoto, *Hiroshima Paradokusu*.

18. Nemoto, *Hiroshima Paradokusu*.
19. Fukaya, *Genbaku no kioku o keishō suru jissen*, 7.
20. On the complex narrative of the A-bomb in Urakami and discussions of Nagai's interpretation, see for example Shijo, *Urakami no genbaku no katari*.
21. On the anti-nuclear and peace movement in Nagasaki, see Shinki, 'Hansen-heiwa undō to Nagasaki. On Nagasaki in English, see, for example, Sullivan, 'Nagasaki Re-imagined'.
22. The five groups are as follows: Nagasaki genbaku hisaisha kyōgikai (Nagasaki Atomic Bomb Survivors Council), Nagasaki genbaku izokukai (Nagasaki Surviving Families Association), Nagasakiken hibakusha techō tomonokai (Nagasaki Prefecture Hibakusha Health Handbook Holders' Association), Hiakusha techō yuaikai (Nagasaki Prefecture A-Bomb Health Handbook Friendship Society) (dissolved in March 2022) and Nagasaki ken heiwa undō senta- hibakusha renraku kyōgikai (A-Bomb-Exposed Liaison Council, Nagasaki Prefecture Peace Movement Centre). See Nagasaki genbaku no sengo shi o nokosu kai (ed.), *Genbaku go no 75nen*, 70. The English translation of the name of groups is based on the List of Councilors of the Radiation Effects Research Foundation (RERF), https://www.ref.or.jp/uploads/2018/05/2_list_je.pdf (retrieved 3 July 2022). Thanks to Hibiki Yamaguchi (Nagasaki University) for the information on this webpage.
23. See the website of Nagasaki no shōgen no kai; <http://www.nagasaki-heiwa.org/n3/t1/AYUMI.HTML> (retrieved 3 April 2023).
24. Takemoto, 'Nuclear Politics, Past and Present', 97.
25. On RECNA, see the following website: <https://www.recna.nagasaki-u.ac.jp/recna/en-about> (retrieved 1 February 2022).
26. On the Hiroshima-Nagasaki Peace Study Course, see: http://www.mayorsforpeace.org/english/hnpc/hnpc_top.htm (retrieved 1 February 2022).
27. One of the studies on war memory and the meaning of Hiroshima is as follows, see Nehring, 'Remembering War, Forgetting Hiroshima'. On Hiroshima and Auschwitz, see, for example, Heftrich et al. (eds), *Images of Rupture between East and West*, including the author's article, Takemoto, 'Hiroshima and Auschwitz: Analyzing from the Perspectives of Peace Movements and Pacifism'. Also, 'Auschwitz and Hiroshima' is often discussed as the issues of war memory. For one of the recent publications on this, see Kato (ed.), *Horoko-suto to Hiroshima*.
28. The database provided by LinguaHiroshima is useful to find books on Hiroshima in various languages. See LinguaHiroshima, 'Hiroshima and Nagasaki: A Multilingual Bibliography', <https://www.linguahiroshima.com/> (retrieved 30 January 2022).
29. On ABCC, see, for example, Lindee, *American Science and the Survivors at Hiroshima*.
30. On the Hiroshima-Auschwitz Peace March and Hiroshima-Auschwitz Committee, see Zwiegenberg, *Hiroshima*, Chapters 5 and 7.
31. Nemoto, *Hiroshima Paradokusu*.
32. Hiroshima Peace Foundation (ed.), *Hiroshima heiwa bunka senta- 20 nen shi*. See also Takemoto, 'Hankaku undō no kakusan'.
33. Ando, *Hankaku toshi no ronri*, 120–22.
34. On the exchange and comparison between West German and Japanese anti-nuclear movements in the early 1980s, see Takemoto, 'Nuclear Politics, Past and Present'.

35. Takemoto, 'Hiroshima no katarare kata', 147. On HIP, see its website: <https://www.hipj.org/en> (retrieved 1 February 2022).
36. One of the well-known cases of *hibakushas'* activities overseas is given by Setsuko Thurlow, who is a *hibakusha* in Hiroshima and has played an important role in the anti-nuclear movement in Canada. She delivered a speech on the occasion of the Nobel Peace Prize ceremony for ICAN in 2017. See Thurlow and Kanazaki, *Hikari ni mukatte hatte ike*. On the activism of *hibakusha* overseas, see Hirano, *Umino mukō no hibakusha tachi*.
37. One of the recent publications on the US perception of nuclear weapons, see Miyamoto, *Naze genbaku ga aku dewa nai noka*. On the different understandings on the atomic bombings in Hiroshima between Asian countries, see Hiroshima Peace Institute of Hiroshima City University (ed.), *Hiroshima hatsu no heiwa gaku*.
38. Takemoto, 'Hiroshima and Auschwitz'.
39. Imahori, 'Gensuibaku kinshi undō no yakuwari to tenbō'; Takemoto, 'Hiroshima no katarare kata'.
40. Mizumoto, 'Hiroshima to heiwa'.
41. On the Korean *hibakusha* and Hapcheon, see, for example, Ichiba, *Hiroshima o mochikaetta hitobito*.
42. On global *hibakusha*, see Jacobs, 'The History of Global Hibakusha'; and Jacobs, *Nuclear Bodies*.
43. Takemoto, 'Nihon no hankaku heiwa undō', 245.
44. A total of 1,738 cities as of March 2023. See the Mayors for Peace website: <http://www.mayorsforpeace.org/english/index.html> (retrieved 31 March 2023).
45. The Peace Declaration of the Mayor of Hiroshima reflects the political atmosphere and political discussions related to the nuclear weapons. All Japanese texts from 1947 to 2022 (except 1950) are available on the City of Hiroshima website (<https://www.city.hiroshima.lg.jp/site/heiwasengen/list2076-4378.html>) and also available in many other languages from 2003 to 2022 (<https://www.city.hiroshima.lg.jp/site/atomicbomb-peace/9948.html>) (retrieved 31 March 2023).
46. On the Peace Declaration by Mayor of Hiroshima on 6 August and its background, see Hiroshima Peace Culture Foundation, *Heiwa sengen shū*; Ubuki, *Heiwa kinen shikiten no ayumi*.
47. Ando, *Datsu genpatsu no undō shi*.
48. Takemoto, 'Nuclear Politics, Past and Present'.
49. Ando, *Datsu genpatsu no undō shi*, 37.
50. *Chugoku Shimbun*, 13 February 1980.

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The Dutch Interchurch Peace Council and the Anti-nuclear Revolution of the 1970s and 1980s

Ruud van Dijk

Introduction

At the close of her ambitious and innovative study placing transnational peace politics at the heart of the Cold War, Petra Goedde presents a kind of happy ending by linking the onset of détente around 1970 to the work of peace activists in East and West in the previous years.¹ She argues that unrelenting, though changing, advocacy for a ‘politics of peace’ in the face of frequently just rhetorical gestures by officials in charge of policy changed the cultural and political climate in the Cold War so as to make the status quo, particularly the nuclear stand-off, appear absurd. Not only did activism in this way create the conditions for a relaxation of tensions between East and West according to Goedde, she also suggests a more direct link between peace activists and the change in policy that began in the late 1960s. Unfortunately, as has been pointed out, we do not learn as much about ‘tireless lobbying behind the scenes of committed and well-connected peace advocates’ as one would like.² Also, by ending at the beginning of détente, the book leaves the story unfinished. Missing is an examination of what ‘peace politics’ really meant in practice and whether it actually deserves the name.³ Furthermore, particularly relevant in this context is how peace advocates have viewed détente and its accomplishments, and how the activists of the 1970s and 1980s sought to influence the Cold War politics of their age.

This chapter will take up some of the questions *The Politics of Peace* leaves open for other researchers by examining the views, strategies and campaigns of the Dutch Interkerkelijk Vredesberaad (Interchurch Peace Council: IKV)

from the early years of its existence in the late 1960s to its well-known campaign against the nuclear arms race launched in 1977. More than anything, that campaign established the group's reputation, with the IKV's leadership in transnational peace activism after 1979 not far behind.

Founded in 1966, the IKV – a relatively small, fairly coherent group of activists affiliated with various churches in the Netherlands – in the early 1980s became a leader in the transnational resistance to the nuclear arms race. A broad, archive-based look at the IKV and its influence does not yet exist in English, but it can enhance our understanding of the emergence and impact of the anti-nuclear activism in the late Cold War era.⁴ The IKV played a prominent role during the anti-nuclear revolution of the 1970s and 1980s in the Netherlands, and in transnational associations such as the International Peace Communication and Coordination Center (IPCC) and European Nuclear Disarmament (END). In 1977 the IKV launched a campaign to abolish nuclear weapons worldwide (beginning in the Netherlands), while in 1981 it actively sought to coordinate the activities against the NATO Dual-Track decision in various Western European countries.

However, the IKV began as more than just an anti-nuclear weapons group. In its annual 'Peace Weeks', for example, it often focused its public outreach work on development questions, or the impact of the arms race on the world's ability to assist developing countries. Furthermore, after failing to achieve a political breakthrough against the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) deployment plans in the early 1980s, IKV leaders began to focus on broader political goals, such as 'détente from below'. In the tense world of the so-called second Cold War, one could argue that the IKV and other activists sought to promote, once more, 'politics of peace'. How did the IKV develop its activities during its first decade and with whom; what caused the group in 1977 to begin focusing its activities almost exclusively on the nuclear arms race both in the Netherlands and beyond; and why did nuclear weapons become less central to the IKV's preoccupations again after 1981? In addition to helping to locate the IKV in the anti-nuclear revolution of the age and assess its influence, this chapter also reflects on what the IKV's priority shifts suggest about the course of this revolution.

The Era of the 'Peace Weeks'

After its establishment in 1966, the IKV started its main, annual campaign, called a 'Peace Week', which was held in September 1967. Organised around a specific theme in international politics, the Peace Week sought to increase awareness among members of participating churches, and the public at large,

of issues connected with security or development. Given that the IKV's full-time staff was rather small and members representing the participating churches generally held full-time jobs elsewhere, much of the IKV's activism was only possible with the participation of various experts. These were often quite prominent members of university faculties, the civil or diplomatic service, the military, or political parties.⁵

As a matter of fact, in the early years, the number of high-level collaborators of the IKV – people who would advise the group, provide written analysis of prominent international problems, agree to speak at events during Peace Weeks and sometimes serve on the board – was such that separating the IKV from the nation's establishment as an independent activist group would be a futile exercise.⁶ At the same time, it is important to distinguish here between the first decade of the organisation's existence (the 'era of the Peace Weeks') and the second one: that centred around the campaign against nuclear weapons.⁷ In the later period, there was more of an adversarial relationship with the political establishment; indeed, the campaign against nuclear weapons emerged partly out of frustration felt by the IKV leadership during the mid-1970s over their lack of access to, and influence on, elite debates and decision making on the important security questions of the day. Still, during this period, likely because of IKV's success in mobilising large numbers of the public against the nuclear arms race, frequent contacts between IKV leaders and influential members of political parties continued to take place. In other words, the IKV's trajectory seems to fit Goedde's category of 'well-connected peace advocates', even though the quality and intensity of these connections changed over time.

The entanglement between activists and political and other elites in the Netherlands was partly due to the country's small size. Another reason was the way in which the Dutch society and politics were organised: IKV cadres belonged to the highly educated part of society, and some of their contacts in elite circles went back to their student days. In some cases, the same individuals were active in groups such as the IKV and in political parties. Moreover, the IKV had been created by churches and counted church leaders among its cadres, so the organisation almost from the start of its existence was more of a top-down than a bottom-up initiative. Even though Dutch society in the late 1960s and early 1970s was secularising and democratising at a rapid pace, the old denominational hierarchies retained some of their relevance, and the IKV's work, in spite of occasional pushback from individual member churches against specific initiatives, benefited from these networks. Regardless of its preoccupation in its heyday in the late 1970s and early 1980s with mobilising large numbers of people against the nuclear arms race, the group never changed its identity as a self-designated vanguard

organisation set to inform, mobilise and guide its followers, and eager for a seat at the table where the important decisions on peace, security and development were taken.⁸

In thinking about its role, the IKV built on ideas developed by church-affiliated activists earlier in the decade, particularly the Catholic peace group Pax Christi, which was founded in 1945 as a means for reconciliation between the French and Germans. Dutch Pax Christi members, for their part, drew inspiration from Pope John XXIII's 1963 Encyclical *Pacem in Terris*, which emphasised the responsibility of nonstate actors, or individuals acting in 'intermediate groups', to promote peace and the protection of basic human rights in a dangerous Cold War world that was increasingly interconnected and interdependent.⁹ Already before 1963, Pax Christi had sought to exercise this task more systematically, and more professionally, than during the early years of its existence. Pax Christi leaders believed in collaboration with academic peace studies specialists. They worked with the newly established Polemological Institute at Groningen University and promoted the establishment of a Peace Studies centre at the Catholic university at Nijmegen.¹⁰

The person who most personified the interconnections between the peace studies world, Pax Christi and the IKV was social psychologist Ben ter Veer. Employed by the Groningen Institute, he joined Pax Christi's national board in 1966, and the next year also became active in the IKV. As the president of the Catholic student organisation Veritas in Utrecht in 1959, he had co-organised a conference on the dangers connected with nuclear weapons, drawing the interest of the national press.¹¹ Ter Veer immersed himself in the particulars of international politics and the nuclear arms race, and in that context also wrote on Dutch defence policies. In 1964, for example, he questioned the government's lack of interest in shifts in Soviet Cold War policy that could allow for opportunities in nuclear arms control.¹² But his main contribution to the work of Pax Christi, the IKV and peace activism in general was as a strategist, as demonstrated in an address he delivered in October 1966 at the congress of the international Pax Christi movement in Bergamo, Italy.¹³ In what would be a constant theme in his activism, ter Veer argued the peace movement's goal ought to be the creation a 'climate of peace', not in some abstract, general way, but always aiming to affect politics. A 'climate of peace' in society, promoted by Pax Christi, the IKV and allies, should create the conditions for a politics of peace.

Using social science research – another core characteristic of his approach to activism – ter Veer formulated concrete recommendations for how a 'climate of peace' could be created in schools, community groups or local politics: 'A great deal of social science data indicates that people will only begin to change their attitudes, their opinions, once they have said, written, or

done something and in doing so have committed themselves in a particular way.’¹⁴ There were four other themes in this address that characterised ter Veer’s advocacy and that of the organisations in which he took leading roles. It was important to institutionalise peace work in key sectors of society; equally imperative was to democratise foreign and international politics and demystify them as a realm that was only accessible to a small elite; next, peace advocacy ought to be based on academic peace research; and, finally, there was the recommendation that peace activists should decide on specific timetables for themselves and for politicians to achieve concrete results on carefully selected issues. With the benefit of hindsight, ter Veer’s Bergamo address can be seen as a foreshadowing of the ten-year campaign launched by the IKV in 1977 to ‘rid the world of nuclear weapons, starting in the Netherlands’.

A close look at the initiatives and internal debates of the IKV during this first period reveals a good deal of continuity with the subsequent years, both in terms of method and outlook. Examining the internal discussions in these initial stages also reveals how IKV leaders hardly believed that great power détente represented a politics of peace. Their view of international politics mirrored the way they approached domestic politics: for genuine change to occur, it had to come from below and be driven by smaller parties, be they states or activists. Especially with regard to nuclear arms control, the IKV was suspicious of, and impatient with, the Strategic Arms Limitation (SALT) process, while, when they looked at the East–West division in Europe, IKV leaders mostly saw continuity with the preceding era of mutual hostility and intransigence.

Surrounding the 1968 Peace Week, held under the slogan of ‘Reconciliation, Peace, and Security in Europe’, IKV leaders advanced core themes and positions that they would return to during regularly during the 1970s and again in the 1980s, after the campaign against nuclear weapons had failed to achieve the primary goal of getting the Dutch government to take unilateral steps towards nuclear disarmament. Central was a rejection of living with nuclear weapons, a refusal to accept the risk of nuclear war as a fact of life. The alternative was reconciliation in Europe because, a certain convergence between the two competing systems already being underway, ‘ideological differences ... have nothing to do any more with reality’. The division of the continent had to be overcome by initiatives from many people, not least grassroots efforts to make connections across the blocs. Such connections could then be institutionalised with the help of the Council of Europe. Eventually there ought to emerge a joint European security system, guaranteed by the Soviet Union and the United States. One had to begin with arms reduction, while small states, according to the IKV, had a special

responsibility to take the small steps required as a precondition for later breakthroughs.¹⁵

Almost from the beginning, IKV leaders frequently discussed ways to maximise the impact of their work and maintain control over the initiatives once they were launched. For instance, local groups were given clear directions so as to avoid others from using the Peace Week for their own priorities (what they called the 'brush fire effect'). The IKV felt it had to keep tight control, so that in subsequent months it could pursue concrete results, among politicians.¹⁶ However, interestingly enough, already in the run-up to the 1968 Peace Week, Ben ter Veer questioned the whole concept of a peace 'week', calling it too brief to achieve lasting results.¹⁷ It was not the last time that ter Veer, or others in the leadership, would express dissatisfaction with the Peace Week approach. In fact, by 1976 the experience of ten consecutive Peace Weeks had left ter Veer and his colleagues quite frustrated and eager to try something new. As a sign of how in its early years the IKV was still looking for an identity beyond its organisation of the annual Peace Week, there were discussions as to whether the group 'should not be built out in the direction of a peace movement?'.¹⁸

Just a few years after its founding, the IKV felt it was stuck. Another strategy discussion in the autumn of 1970 implicitly concluded that after four years of trying, the group's impact on the big issues of the day remained very limited: the Peace Week was not 'dangerous' enough and generally had little resonance; the IKV lacked expertise on issues of war and peace, and it consciously ignored some issues because addressing them would divide member churches; and it had trouble making up its mind as to whether to direct its energies at the grassroots or (through the formulation of position papers) politicians.¹⁹

In subsequent years, the IKV did not decisively resolve any of these problems; however, arguably its two most significant initiatives prior to the launch in 1977 of the campaign against nuclear weapons were primarily aimed at decision makers in The Hague. The first initiative, a *Standpunt*, or position paper, was prepared in 1972 and focused on the European security situation. It received a good deal of attention, but in the eyes of its authors failed to have any significant impact, either on public debates of security issues or on government policy.²⁰

In 1973, the IKV did conduct a successful search for a new executive secretary, eventually settling on Mient Jan Faber, a mathematician working at Amsterdam's Free University. After assuming his position in 1974, Faber quickly revealed himself not only to be a strategic thinker, but also a bold operator with a sharp sense for public relations. Internally, he may have led spirited debates, but his charismatic public persona and skill in dealing with

the press turned out to be the missing element for the IKV. Looking back at the 1970s and 1980s in 2006, Faber said: ‘We wanted to be a political movement that in the interest of disarmament and detente develops all kinds of political models and proposals.’²¹ But in spite of this, or maybe because of it, in 1974 he could also be caught arguing that ‘our security policy is determined too much by the rational considerations of technocrats and ... emotion, the belief that there has to be change, does not get a chance’.²² Faber soon became the public face of the IKV. In the 1980s, the same qualities that made him a well-known – and at times polarising – public figure in the Netherlands quickly made him one of the more prominent figures in the transnational community of peace activists.

The second initiative the IKV pursued in its years of distress was close to ter Veer’s heart and concerned the push for a permanent national commission for the promotion of peace awareness (Nationale Commissie voor Vredesvraagstukken [NCV]). The initiative was prepared in collaboration with Pax Christi and it was modelled on the recently established National Commission for Development Strategy (Nationale Commissie Ontwikkelingsstrategie [NCO]). In its promotion of the plan from 1974 to 1976, the IKV reached out to State Secretary for Foreign Affairs and former IKV chairman Peter Kooijmans, but also to the Prime Minister, Social Democrat Joop den Uyl. Writing the latter in June 1975, Faber argued that while the government already supported the independent study of international security issues, what was lacking was an institutionalised approach to peace education (*vormingswerk*).²³ In the end, the government did not get on board, leaving the IKV to contemplate its next move.

Reversing the Nuclear Arms Race

The IKV emerged from its slump in 1977 when it launched its soon-to-be renowned campaign for a unilateral first step by the Netherlands as a way to begin reversing the nuclear arms race. The campaign played an important part in turning the Netherlands into an outlier among NATO countries envisioned to participate in a modernisation of the alliance’s Theater Nuclear Weapons arsenal (TNF, or Long-Range Theater Nuclear Weapons [LRTNF]; later Intermediate Nuclear Forces [INF]). From 1979, the government in The Hague repeatedly postponed a decision on whether to accept its share of the new missiles to be introduced under NATO’s Dual-Track decision. In 1981, historian Walter Laqueur coined the term ‘Hollanditis’ to mark, as he saw it, ‘a new stage of European neutralism’.²⁴

Mass resistance against NATO nuclear modernisation plans indeed emerged early on and on a large scale in the Netherlands. As in most other NATO countries, its first manifestation was during the Neutron bomb episode, in 1977–78, when the Dutch communist party played a central role in organising the ‘Stop the Neutron Bomb’ campaign. The campaign, together with broader opposition to the proposed weapon, extended well into the Dutch Parliament and made it a near-certainty that neutron weapons would never be deployed in the country, regardless of what NATO might decide.²⁵

However, the IKV began to plan its campaign well before revelations about neutron weapons appeared in newspapers in June 1977 (to say nothing of NATO’s Dual-Track decision of December 1979), and it soon took over the leading role from the communists in mobilising for peace. Mient Jan Faber relates in a memoir that as early as 1976, he and several colleagues in the leadership of the IKV began discussions about a campaign that specifically and exclusively targeted the nuclear arms race. As if to confirm IKV scepticism earlier in the decade, the nuclear arms race had not been put in reverse; on the contrary, from the IKV’s perspective, the world was becoming a more dangerous place – nuclear war was a growing, not a declining threat.²⁶ If policy makers had ever pursued a ‘politics of peace’, they were certainly backsliding. In this view, the IKV leadership was part of a wider trend in the countries of the West, but they were among the first to take action. In addition, the IKV leaders themselves had already become frustrated with the annual Peace Week format for its lack of impact on public debates, to say nothing of government policy. They felt a similar frustration about other initiatives such as *Standpunt* and other position papers, and about the idea of government-sponsored institutionalisation of the promotion of peace awareness that had come to nothing.

A strategy paper of early March 1977, prepared by Ben ter Veer, who served as IKV’s chair at the time, confirmed the shift towards a major anti-nuclear campaign, to be launched during the Peace Week later that year. The contours of what would follow in the campaign were already visible: it should be focused on *action* instead of *talking*. There had to be a *visible change* in the direction of abolition of nuclear weapons. The IKV would demand ‘the openly announced removal of all nuclear weapons from Dutch soil’. The risks would be limited and the potential gains significant: ‘What would be learned then, namely that the hellhounds do not immediately break loose, that the allies will respond less panicky than is often predicted, etc. etc. can perhaps also have a beneficial effect on talks between east and west.’ The 1977 Peace Week would mark the beginning of a decade-long campaign, focused exclusively on anti-nuclear mobilising. It would represent a shift from primarily

reaching out to policy-making elites and thus ‘shadow-boxing’, to the grassroots. Contact with, and support from, political parties was welcome; however, the campaign would be directed at the general population: ‘We want to win people over for our vision: nuclear weapons out of the Netherlands. We know exactly what we want! We also talk about the accompanying risks. We do not pretend there aren’t any dangers connected to what we want. We point out that real change may not be possible without suffering, but we strongly emphasise the bigger risks of other options.’²⁷

The IKV went public in June with an emphatic appeal to break through the endless action–reaction cycle of the nuclear arms race:

let it begin in the Netherlands ... it is not our intention to plead for a ‘clean’ Netherlands that leaves the dirty laundry to others. On the contrary, the anti-nuclear weapons campaign aims to have a radiating effect toward other countries, both inside NATO and inside the Warsaw Pact. Potential church allies certainly do exist. The World Council of Churches and the Vatican have plainly declared themselves against weapons of mass destruction. But also the Evangelische Kirche in the GDR has recently protested against the militarization of its own society. We may expect – and we will do our best for it – that the campaign in the Netherlands will be understood and picked up in other countries.²⁸

IKV leaders emphasised that its campaign and the broader international protests against the nuclear arms race should have clear political goals. They should be about more than a general expression of concern, no matter how many hundreds of thousands would support that. General expressions of concern could easily be deflected by policy makers. They could, as they had done in the past, declare themselves to be worried too, and meanwhile continue the same policies, including arms control, that had kept propelling the arms race forward for years. However, while prominent IKV representatives such as Laurens Hogebrink and Philip Everts certainly did their homework on the technical aspects of the arms race and arms control process, specific recommendations were few and far between. Therefore, an important, and ultimately unresolved, weakness of the IKV’s campaign from the start was that while it called for ‘action’, it fundamentally mistrusted those (national security elites and their political allies) in a position to act.

This mistrust extended to the arms control component of NATO’s Dual-Track decision, and this was difficult to explain to large parts of the public. Western leaders made arms control a part of the NATO plan specifically with West European public opinion in mind – even before large-scale

protest movements materialised. Once the so-called INF talks got underway in late 1981, part of the public, and their political representatives, took them seriously. The IKV's misgivings about these negotiations significantly complicated the group's work and contributed to the ultimate failure of the peace movement to achieve a political breakthrough.

To launch its campaign in 1977, the IKV mobilised church members all over the country in local 'core' groups and provided them with documentation and concrete instructions on how others (ultimately politicians) might be persuaded. Thanks also to the news about neutron weapons, this mobilisation got off to a fast start. Then, right when the campaign appeared to be losing steam, discussions in 1979 about the NATO plan for the modernisation of its Theater Nuclear Weapons in Europe provided a new impetus. Gradually, the IKV would also become active in organising resistance on an international level.²⁹

By the time NATO formally adopted the Dual-Track strategy, pressure from the IKV contributed significantly to an impasse in Dutch politics. Due especially to divisions within the governing Christian-Democratic Party (CDA, Christen Democratisch Appèl), there was no majority in Parliament for an unqualified Dutch endorsement of the plan simultaneously to deploy the new missiles and offer the Soviet Union negotiations. A clear majority against the Dual-Track decision could not be assembled either. Again, as in 1977–78 over the Neutron 'bomb', the Netherlands – as one of the member states envisioned for deployment – threatened to break the NATO consensus.³⁰

Organising Transnational Resistance

The next two years would be very important, as the Dutch government had declared that it would take a decision on accepting its share of the NATO deployment (forty-eight cruise missiles) at the end of 1981 when, presumably, results from the arms control track could also be taken into account. Because no deployments were foreseen in any country prior to late 1983, the years following the Dual-Track decision offered activists elsewhere, most crucially in West Germany, opportunities to prevent what many viewed as a new escalation in the nuclear arms race. Many were taking action already, worried by growing tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union and a corresponding erosion of the détente policies of the preceding decade. When Ronald Reagan moved into the White House in early 1981 with an aggressively anti-Soviet agenda, activists on both sides of the Atlantic felt an even greater sense of urgency.

The IKV had maintained contacts especially with religious peace groups abroad well before 1977. In the late 1970s, contacts with especially like-minded groups in the two German states (in the GDR official groups, later also groups unsanctioned by the regime) became a priority.³¹ IKV leaders such as Faber, but also members of local ‘core’ groups, maintained contacts with, and sometimes travelled to, West and East Germany. The IKV’s annual Peace Week action model served as an example for many West German groups in the late 1970s.³²

Specifically on the anti-nuclear weapons campaign, the IKV had already prepared English-language materials in late 1977 for distribution through Jim Forest’s International Fellowship of Reconciliation (IFOR) in the United States and Pax Christi International, with the aim of inspiring others to organise similar campaigns.³³ However, there was no systematic effort to internationalise the campaign. The files of the IKV’s International Working Group for 1978–80, while showing increasing activity, contain many papers and meeting summaries in which responsible IKV officials point to the absence of a coherent strategy and insufficient resources to support the growing workload. At the same time, members argued that engaging with likeminded groups in other countries ought to be an IKV objective.

There was one significant initiative an IKV representative did take in these early years. In early 1979, Laurens Hogebrink, in collaboration with Flemish activists, proposed the establishment of ‘an international newsletter of groups committed to resisting the arms race’. The initiators sought to contribute to the programme on ‘militarism and the arms race’ initiated by the World Council of Churches (WCC) and the newsletter, launched in early 1980 under the name of *Disarmament Campaigns*, would fill a growing need for a forum where groups around the world could share information about their activities. But Hogebrink was also thinking specifically of the new NATO plans. It was important, he wrote, that the newsletter be based at the recently created peace centre in Antwerp. The centre provided a solid infrastructure, but more importantly, in this way Dutch–Belgian collaboration would be strengthened: ‘whether W. Germany accepts new intermediate range missiles on its territory will strongly depend on the attitudes of both the Netherlands and Belgium’.³⁴ Hogebrink’s initiative was an early example of the how the IKV sought to promote a transnational network against the nuclear arms race and the NATO plans.

Disarmament Campaigns did not yet reflect a genuine commitment to a transnational strategy. In an essay published in 1983, Hogebrink relates that early on, Mient Jan Faber, for example, used to say that ‘I never read those kinds of magazines’.³⁵ In August 1980, in its own newsletter, the *IKV Berichten*, the group did not include *Disarmament Campaigns* among its

international activities, even though it called the internationalisation of its campaign 'a very important task'. The focus was on activities with the WCC, contacts in the United States and with peace groups in both German states.³⁶

As the anti-nuclear campaign geared up after 1979, a greater emphasis on collaborations with likeminded groups in other countries seemed not only appropriate but also necessary. The IKV received many expressions of support from abroad for its pioneering national campaign. There were frequent requests for advice and information, often in the form of invitations to conferences, workshops and the like. Internationalisation (or transnational expansion), however vague, had always been implicit in the IKV strategy. Opportunities now grew exponentially for greater coordination with groups elsewhere that were either emerging for the first time or expanding existing membership and activities.

Transnational collaboration made sense for many reasons. IKV leaders, most prominently Mient Jan Faber, Ben ter Veer and Laurens Hogebrink, were activists who, in spite of the initial emotional and moral nature of the 1977 appeal, were interested in results. Grassroots mobilisation against the nuclear arms race had to be oriented towards concrete political outcomes. In the end, enough politicians needed to be won over for concrete arms reduction to have a chance. This would have to be accomplished by national movements within their own countries, but if the various national movements exchanged information and coordinated their activities, national campaigns could reinforce each other. The IKV did not see itself in competition with other groups, but it did distinguish between organisations with some political heft, and those it viewed as merely engaging in symbolic acts of resistance. Finally, in its efforts to achieve a political breakthrough in the Netherlands, the IKV was reaching an impasse in the course of 1980–81. Its campaign, while mobilising thousands within and outside the IKV network, failed decisively to change the position of the CDA. Part of the government, and eager to maintain its central role in Dutch politics, the party stuck with its 'neither-nor' position regarding the Dual-Track decision: no unconditional endorsement (translated as an acceptance of the Dutch share of the new missiles), but not a rejection either. As Hogebrink would admit in 1983, the IKV had little choice other than to internationalise its campaign.³⁷

Most activities remained focused on West Germany (the Federal Republic of Germany [FRG]), something that could also be seen in the appointment in early 1980 of Gisela Ennen, a doctoral student from Germany who was fluent in Dutch, to coordinate and develop the work of the International Working Group, but especially IKV contacts in Germany.³⁸ It would take until the middle of 1981, arguably the heyday of

the IKV's international prominence, until the IKV would appoint a full-time International Secretary.

Early 1980 was also the time that the British END, working through the Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation, prepared what in April of that year became the END Appeal for a nuclear-free Europe 'from Portugal to Poland'.³⁹ However, END was not taken very seriously by the IKV until about a year later. The IKV files contain several letters from Ken Coates, one of the organisers of the appeal, to Mient Jan Faber from early 1980 with requests for input. One came with a return stub to be used to endorse the upcoming appeal.⁴⁰ It appears not to have elicited any reaction from the IKV.⁴¹ In March, Wilke Schram of the International Working Group travelled to England for a fact-finding mission. In his report, he talked of 'a certain E.P. Thompson', referring to the historian soon to be the public face of END. Schram deemed Thompson's booklet *Protest and Survive* to be of 'mediocre quality'.⁴² In 1980, at least, the IKV did not consider END as an initiative worth engaging in the promotion of IKV objectives.

But the IKV's aspirations for a leadership role among the growing number of movements worldwide opposing the nuclear arms race were growing. In June 1980, for example, Mient Jan Faber sent a letter to the WCC's Commission of the Churches on International Affairs, in which he encouraged a WCC team to visit the Netherlands, arguing that 'we believe that by now our experiences are sufficiently valuable to be shared with others ... Our work aims at a new approach to disarmament ... We believe that our experiences as a resistance movement to one of the most deadly demons of our time might be useful for churches elsewhere as well'.⁴³

Germany was vital because of its centrality to the success or failure of the NATO modernisation plans and because the IKV had good ties to several groups there, particularly the Aktion Sühnezeichen/Friedensdienste (ASF). In November 1980, Ben ter Veer participated in one of its meetings in Kassel, during a Peace Week modelled on the events the IKV had been organising in the Netherlands since the 1960s. Ter Veer was especially gratified by this development, since the movement in the Netherlands could easily be marginalised unless 'in other NATO countries something similar developed to what is taking place with us'. Ter Veer warned towards the end of his address that in order for a new Cold War policy, with nuclear disarmament at its core, to be successful, very strong pressure from below in society was indispensable. This pressure needed to be organised in the Federal Republic in the same way it had been organised in the Netherlands. Ter Veer was pleased that in Germany a national peace movement was now also emerging, but he warned that 'you do not, like the Interchurch Peace Council, have ten years to become politically effective'. The German friends

could not afford just to organise annual Peace Weeks for several more years, but instead had to ‘formulate and publicize as quickly as possible a good proposal for a unilateral step by the Federal Republic’. Ter Veer urged the ASF to campaign against West Germany’s acceptance of the 108 Pershing II missiles envisioned by NATO as part of the FRG’s share of the new deployments.⁴⁴

The year 1981 would see the IKV finally moving on several fronts to seek the leadership of the emerging transnational network of anti-nuclear activists. As it planned its own activities for the autumn of 1981 in anticipation of the Dutch government’s evaluation of its position in the NATO modernisation process, the IKV became active transnationally. It also appointed political scientist and long-time Pax Christi activist Wim Bartels as its first International Secretary. The culmination came in October and November, when a coordinated series of anti-nuclear rallies were held in cities all over Europe, demonstrating as never before the extent of public unease with the nuclear arms race.

It was clear to everyone involved that what happened in the Federal Republic would be decisive. Therefore, in Faber’s discussions with German activists of the ASF in the spring, he argued (on behalf of the IKV and several other Dutch peace groups), and the Germans agreed, that before Dutch, Belgian and other movements held their protests rallies later that year, the Germans should have theirs. From that point onwards, the IKV and the ASF collaborated closely on the preparations for a large peace manifestation in Bonn on 10 October.⁴⁵ Under Faber’s initiative, the IKV not only built on its long history of contacts in Germany and ter Veer’s encouragements of the previous November, but also actually became directly involved in the planning of anti-nuclear activities in no less important a country than the Federal Republic. Faber also prepared a letter to other movements, proposing a shared strategy for the autumn and suggesting a series of common goals, and inviting delegations to a strategy meeting in Bonn at the end of August. Soliciting written responses, Faber concluded somewhat modestly, given his aspirations, that ‘[t]he IKV had the administrative resources to coordinate the international contacts’.⁴⁶

On 20 June, Ben ter Veer addressed another meeting of the IKV’s German partners, now urging all joint efforts onwards to the national protest march, scheduled for 10 October in Bonn. Change is achieved, he argued, from below – and from IKV initiatives:

The Dutch peace movement changes Dutch policy. This changed Dutch policy does not primarily influence German policy, but it influences German public opinion, it encourages here, with you, the

peace movement. And then, through your own public opinion you influence German policy.⁴⁷

Change in Europe would then also encourage activists in the United States to bring about change there: ‘Meanwhile, there are still German politicians who would prefer it if the Dutch still exported flowers as their main export item. But now the Dutch peace movement has become the main export item.’ People called it a Dutch disease, but, Ter Veer said, it was of course Dutch medicine against ‘the armaments madness’.⁴⁸

The next month, Faber and Hogebrink also decided that the time had come to conduct, according to the title of their report, a ‘flash visit’ to London so that END and IKV activities might be aligned. In the preceding months, the IKV had become more interested in the potential – and perhaps also the potential rivalry – of END’s growing visibility. International Working Group member Willem van de Ven attended a meeting organised by END in Frankfurt in early March, but likened the affair to a ‘hiking club’. END’s lack of a political strategy still made it difficult to see how the two groups might collaborate, but given the organisation’s raised profile, it was now on the IKV’s radar.⁴⁹ At the end of May, an END research conference was held in Amsterdam, after which Mary Kaldor, a founding member of END, wrote ‘Jan Faber’ (who, apparently, she did not yet know very well) suggesting that END and the IKV together issue a statement concerning TNF that groups from other countries could then join. Kaldor also suggested a meeting.⁵⁰ Hogebrink’s report on the July trip to London acknowledges that both organisations were busy organising internationally, but at the end of the visit, he and Faber had the impression that any competitive aspects had been taken out of the relationship and that some constructive agreements had been concluded. However, according to Hogebrink, it remained important ‘to respect END’s sensitivities about being a ‘European peace movement’ and to call them frequently, etc’. The two Dutchmen had also hoped to hold a thorough discussion of END’s ideas, but that goal ‘went by the wayside during a congenial meal’.⁵¹

The mood in London may have been congenial and there may have been agreement on the general direction forward, but this did not mean that END evaluated the outcome in exactly the same way as Hogebrink and Faber. Just as Hogebrink detected leadership aspirations in his British counterparts, E.P. Thompson in a quick follow-up letter to Faber expressed the following concerns: ‘What we were trying to explain was that we very much respect your initiatives and wish to support these, but *also* can you please consider carefully our own proposals and initiatives and can we work on these *together*?’ And towards the end, discussing the idea for a

more formal European consultative committee, Thompson added: ‘Please understand, WE IN BRITAIN DO NOT WISH TO DOMINATE SUCH A COMMITTEE OR TO BE THE CENTRE. The centre might well be with you or in the FRG. What we do ask is a close consultation as to the necessary steps.’ The Dutch, it appears, struck at least these British activists as perhaps a little too proactive, or maybe what we see in this letter is the pay-off of the IKV’s focus on politics and strategy of the previous year; perhaps END feared that it was in danger of being overwhelmed by the activities promoted by the IKV.⁵²

These activities were gathering steam by late July. The preceding month, Faber had actually had to move quickly in order to maintain the initiative when a proposal arrived from the Danish group *Nej Til Atomvaben* to form an organisation consisting of peace groups in most Western countries, in the interests of greater effectiveness of everyone’s activities towards the general shared goal of disarmament.⁵³ By 21 July, Faber had finalised not one but two letters of invitation to what now was a series of meetings in Bonn for 26 and 27 August. On the latter date, groups in countries where peace groups were planning anti-nuclear rallies in the autumn were encouraged to get together and coordinate their activities, under a common appeal – this had been sorely lacking in the run-up to NATO’s 1979 Dual-Track decision. In his four-page letter that invited groups to this 27 August meeting, Faber sketched out the context surrounding the NATO plans going into the autumn of 1981, proposed a text for a common appeal, laid out a strategy for activities in the autumn and detailed the preparations made for the meeting. Perhaps most significantly, Faber emphasised that the goal of the combined action was concrete, political change:

The actions should be focused on the *preparations* of the Western European NATO-countries for the NATO-council meeting in Brussels from 7–11 december 1981. The aim of our actions should be to strive for a *political change* in each of the *positions* of the Western European *NATO-governments* towards the LRTNF-programme ... So we will not concentrate on NATO as a block, but the more on each of *the member-states!*⁵⁴

For the first Bonn meeting on 26 August, Faber hoped to gather the groups planning to go to Copenhagen in September for a preparatory meeting. In his invitation letter for what he called an agenda-setting discussion, Faber provided a list of ‘subjects that must be dealt with’.⁵⁵ With these initiatives, the IKV was off and running as a leader (though sometimes coming from behind) among anti-nuclear movements from all over Europe, implementing

a strategy in line with the focus on concrete political outcomes the IKV had been seeking since 1977, if not before.

Anti-climax and Adjustments

At the Copenhagen meeting in September, the International Peace Communication and Coordination Center (IPCC) was founded. The IKV's newly appointed International Secretary, Wim Bartels, would coordinate the activities of this shared endeavour of the major peace groups in the West; soon, the IKV would also become the editorial centre for *Disarmament Campaigns*. The remainder of 1981 brought a series of protest marches in many European cities; much of it had been coordinated by the IKV, starting with the 10 October event in Bonn and ending with a rally in Brussels on 6 December, on the eve of the NATO Council meetings. This was by no means all due to the efforts of the Dutch activists. Still, the IKV leaders could justifiably be proud of what had been accomplished.

However, the autumn of 1981 was also a bit of an anti-climax. In November, the INF talks got underway between the United States and the Soviet Union in Geneva. Also, on 13 December of the same year, martial law was imposed in Poland to suppress the independent trade union Solidarnosc. The former development weakened the appeals for unilateral first steps towards nuclear disarmament by small countries such as the Netherlands, because it could now be argued that such initiatives jeopardised the negotiations. The latter led to some serious soul-searching within the IKV, END and peace groups everywhere: had the focus been too much on the nuclear arms race and too little on human rights? Had there been too much emphasis on peace and not enough on freedom – too much détente and not enough solidarity? In any case, the political breakthroughs that Faber and his colleagues wanted failed to materialise in the West, also in the Netherlands. There, the government announced the country would take another two years before deciding whether to accept the Dutch share of the new NATO deployments, arguing that arms talks had only just gotten underway.

Thus, in spite of many subsequent shared and local initiatives culminating in 1983, when deployment was scheduled to begin, late 1981 appears to have been the high-water mark for the anti-nuclear movements in Europe. From this point onwards, the IKV and its partners failed to make further progress at integrating the various national campaigns (though not for want of trying); they were also powerless in terms of interfering with the NATO modernisation process, and their focus became more diffuse and gradually shifted to debates over new strategies for a 'détente from below' and which

groups – official or unsanctioned – in the Soviet Bloc deserved most to be partners in this new campaign.⁵⁶

As an exchange of letters at this time between the IKV's Laurens Hogebrink and E.P. Thompson, the historian and co-founder of END, indicated, Western peace movements would in the future focus on both peace and freedom. Thompson's 'analysis of the unholy division of labour between "peace" and "freedom" is quite helpful', Hogebrink wrote in February. Crediting Thompson's contributions, Hogebrink added: 'we (I mean IKV and END) are very much on the same line in our attitude toward Eastern Europe'.⁵⁷

A year before, at the beginning of 1981, Faber had begun to think more expansively about his group's advocacy of unilateral Dutch initiatives to bring about a different dynamic in the arms race. In a paper in which he explored what he called a 'small countries approach', he explicitly targeted the preponderance of power exercised by the two great powers – in East–West relations, but also vis-à-vis the Third World: 'More and more countries, especially small ones, should through joint efforts get out from under the nuclear protection and preponderance of power of the great powers.' As potential partner countries, Faber mentioned Yugoslavia, Tanzania, Finland, Zambia, Romania and Sweden. In other words, in a paper he himself called little more than a thinkpiece, the IKV secretary was thinking very broadly (or vaguely) about ways to loosen the hold of the two nuclear superpowers on international politics, focusing on (nuclear) disarmament.⁵⁸ Not pursued by the IKV in an organised way for very long, the 'small countries approach' is perhaps best viewed as one of many attempts after 1981 by peace activists such as Faber to find ways to stay in the conversation – nationally and as part of the transnational network of peace activists – about international security issues after having gained a seat at the table through the success of the 1977 campaign and the popular mobilisations of 1981.

Indeed, reading the minutes of the IPCC and END meetings held after 1981, one is struck by how much of the discussion concerned itself with the question of how the peace movement could become, or remain, relevant to public and policy debates about peace and security, especially in Europe. Gradually, the struggle against deployment of the new NATO missiles was being lost – how, with what vision and what strategy, could one continue to have a voice and make an impact?⁵⁹

In early 1982, Faber took stock of where the peace movement found itself in the wake of the mass protest marches, the start of the INF talks and the events in Poland. Had the Europeans made any headway vis-à-vis the superpowers? Faber believed that thanks to the peace movement, it was becoming more difficult for the United States to add more nuclear weapons

to NATO's arsenal. However, there had been no progress yet on disassociating European countries politically from the superpowers. Promotion of nuclear weapons-free zones on the continent might be one way to move in that direction; the Helsinki process, particularly contacts with Helsinki movements in the East, might be another. Illustrating how his thinking was evolving, Faber concluded that 'the peace movements need to learn to see themselves as Helsinki-movements'. Even if the INF talks, with their US-proposed zero option, were to bear fruit, this would still be the old 'numbers game' in which the superpowers had engaged for so long. Instead, the various peace movements together should 'strongly propagate the alternative 'geographic approach', fitting in a process of political dissociation.'

Faber quickly admitted that the important work of developing contact with independent groups and individuals in the Soviet Bloc would be difficult and controversial. In fact, this question would preoccupy the IPCC and END meetings more and more in the coming years and would produce serious fissures. As a result, a lot of time and energy – for example, at the annual END conventions – would be spent on internal discussions rather than on concrete initiatives either to influence Western public opinion and policy or to develop meaningful contacts in Eastern and Central Europe. What is important in this context is that the IKV secretary was now explicitly talking about joint efforts in East and West to call into question the system of the two major military blocs in Europe, and that he saw independent activists in the East as indispensable partners.⁶⁰

As a keynote speaker in Athens, Greece at an international conference on nuclear-free zones in Europe at the end of 1982 (confirming his and the IKV's prominence in the transnational network of peace activists), Faber reflected frankly on how his and his movement's thinking had evolved: 'More than five years of campaigning against nuclear weapons have brought my organisation, including myself, closer to reality than we were in 1977 ... We have understood that a fight against nuclear weapons must be combined with a fight against the underlying bloc system.' Echoing his small state concept, Faber next prioritised the need for a new East–West dialogue, a "détente from below", [which] can create a new kind of stability inside Europe and, in the long run, loosen the present bloc system'. The importance of stopping the nuclear arms race, especially the deployment, foreseen for late 1983, of the first cruise and Pershing missiles under the Dual-Track decision had become a secondary goal for him.⁶¹

After the actual deployment of these missiles in West Germany, Great Britain and Italy in late 1983, Faber seemed to move on definitively. The minutes of an IPCC meeting in Stockholm – scheduled to coincide with the Conference on Confidence and Security-Building Measures and

Disarmament in Europe (part of the Helsinki process) – show him arguing that ‘we must have a priority list. Détente in my view is more important than the nuclear issue’.⁶² Reliance on governments, ‘old-style’ détente, would not be enough. Détente from below, he wrote several months later in a discussion paper for the END convention in Perugia, Italy, was the way forward now that the missile deployments had stabilised the status quo. One would have to work for change through greater mutual understanding, which would reduce the number of reasons to have an arms race in the first place. Unilateral initiatives to reverse the dynamic of the arms race were still necessary, but détente from below was now a precondition, not a byproduct. How ‘détente from below’ in practice was to lead to arms reduction Faber did not try to specify or even discuss in general terms. In spite of this vagueness, it may still be possible to see Faber’s vision as pragmatic: unable to have much impact on the high political level, the peace movement should seek to make a contribution where it was able, i.e. through its own contacts and its own network. Nonetheless, this was all still a far cry from the leverage the peace movement appeared to be gaining back in 1981.⁶³

A Dead End?

The Perugia (1984) and Amsterdam (1985) END conventions confirmed that building what Faber had called ‘new types of East–West structures’ was a challenging task. Official Peace Councils from Soviet Bloc countries, if they engaged at all, had their own ideas of what détente ought to look like, and it continued to be very difficult for Western activists such as Faber to travel east, let alone extend the activist network to independent groups and individuals behind the Iron Curtain.

In fact, 1985 was yet another turning point for the IKV and its partners in the West. First, the peace movement itself seemed to have reached a dead end. Reflecting on the Amsterdam END convention, which had been a mixed success at best, Faber worried that the peace movement was losing its way: ‘we are not in a good position to develop our political priorities and make the most of them, because we aim too short in political reflection, political theory and a political programme’. Détente from below seemed to stall, and in the West, he wrote, the peace movement was threatened with marginalisation.⁶⁴ Second, and contributing to this marginalisation, in 1985 NATO’s two holdouts on the Dual-Track decision, Belgium and the Netherlands, decided to accept their share of the new missiles, certifying the peace movement’s failure to affect the ultimate outcome of the battle over the Euromissiles.

Third was the Kremlin's selection of Mikhail Gorbachev as General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. While nobody, including the new General Secretary himself, could foresee how Soviet foreign policy would evolve under his leadership, let alone its impact on the arms race or the division of Europe, it was soon evident to Western activists that proposals coming out of the Kremlin deserved serious attention. Kicking off an IPCC discussion of a recent Gorbachev speech on arms control in January 1986, Jane Mayes (of the British Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament [CND]) warned that 'the whole speech is couched *in our language* and is therefore difficult to criticize'.⁶⁵

However, a year later, with a breakthrough in the INF talks in the making, the IPCC put a more positive spin on these developments. In a letter to the network's participants, coordinator Wim Bartels reflected on the peace movement's share:

People often wonder these days if the new opportunity to get rid of INF-missiles is a result of the peace movements [*sic*] work or – like the politicians like to tell us, of their firm and tough attitude. I guess, politics is more complex than a simple either/or answer would tell. But it is sure that politicians, over the last few years have taken over much of the vocabulary and even some of the ideals of the peace movement (like the zero option), and may now feel bound to stick to them; even despite some misgivings.⁶⁶

In drafting a public declaration in July 1987, IPCC members were less modest: 'If today a first and important step towards disarmament is to be made, it is first of all thanks to the fact what the peace movement did.'⁶⁷ Another version, probably of a later date (it was typed on an IPCC letterhead), was a bit different in tone, but essentially made the same claim: 'The signing of the zero-zero agreement on medium-range nuclear missiles ... will prove that politicians could not remain insensitive to pressures from public opinion and from peace movements.'⁶⁸ The IPCC did not attempt to explain how, two years after they had met final defeat in their struggle to prevent the deployment of the new NATO missiles, they could now claim credit for the successful outcome of the arms control negotiations they had distrusted and criticised from the beginning.

However, also in July 1987, Faber wrote an internal piece in which he looked forward rather than backward, using the title 'How to End the Cold War?' The imminent INF treaty was welcome, he argued, especially because it represented a potential break with NATO's flexible response strategy. According to him, this was actually why the West European governments

were sceptical: 'The West European and NATO's security policy rests on the assumption that East and West will be enemies until time immemorial.' For this reason, he continued, Western Europe favoured high levels of armaments: 'the doom of total destruction is at the same time the guarantee for peace'. Later in the piece, Faber came to the point:

How can we put an end to MAD [Mutually Assured Destruction] habits in West Europe? Can we really wither away current NATO and Warsaw Pact strategies so that military alliances will eventually lose their importance? ... our questions will remain questions as long as we are unable to turn *reconciliation* between East and West into desirable and obtainable political perspectives. No matter how mild it is, the Cold War must be ended.

Faber concluded his article with a plea for what he called 'humanisation' of society in East and West, based on basic rights and responsibilities of the individual. And in a rare passage where he came as close as ever to giving the new leadership in the Kremlin credit for the shifts occurring in the Cold War landscape in Europe – closer also than most of his colleagues in the peace movement – he emphasised the importance of Gorbachev's *Glasnost* policies: 'Obviously Glasnost allows us to recognize much of the fundamental values we have in common. Peace in Europe, between East and West, is greatly served by this development.'⁶⁹

Conclusion

The political breakthroughs that the IKV leaders envisioned in the 1970s did not materialise, but that in no way negates the impact of this small group of dedicated activists. At home in the Netherlands, the IKV played a major part in mobilising public resistance to the nuclear arms race, making life very difficult especially for CDA politicians for years and contributing to a situation where no majority could be assembled in Parliament for the new NATO deployments until 1985. The IKV's influence in transnational anti-nuclear and peace networks cannot be denied either. It played a leading part in the emergence a transnational network of 'likeminded' peace groups after 1980. However, while the participants collaborated intensively, a real transnational movement operating in a coordinated and unified fashion never emerged. Participants themselves regularly emphasised that the responsibilities and challenges of each national group first and foremost lay in their own, unique national context. The IKV did not disagree.

Beyond the organisational results (maintained for the better part of a decade), the record is less impressive. Once the structures – the IPCC, annual END conventions – had been created, much of the network's time and energies were spent on keeping it running and on arguments over its uses. This mirrored developments in many individual countries, where there was also frequent controversy over strategy and substance within national coalitions of anti-nuclear and peace activists. Over time, peace activists spoke more and more to each other (including partners and potential partners in the East) and less to the general public.

The IKV and its many partners did engage deeply, earnestly and relentlessly with the major East–West problems of the time – hence the search after 1981 for a better balance between peace, on the one hand, and freedom, on the other hand, and also the seemingly endless stream of discussion papers, publications and initiatives that can be found in the archives. The impact of all this activity on the major transformations of the 1980s seems to have been modest: the Euromissiles got deployed and later dismantled without any direct role by peace movements; the 'new thinking' in Gorbachev's Kremlin only seems to have been affected by peace movement ideas in the most tangential of ways; and the contribution of Western peace groups to the revival of civil society in Eastern and Central Europe also seems to have been limited. A 'Politics of Peace' eventually did overtake the Cold War. However, the direct impact of the IKV and its partners is difficult to establish (their own retrospective claims notwithstanding). Nonetheless, the peace movements are an integral part of the story of the final decade and a half of the Cold War because of the way they were able to mobilise growing popular opposition against the nuclear arms race and reach out to activists behind the Iron Curtain, but even more as one prominent manifestation of the many ways in which more and more people at the time were not only questioning what the Cold War had become, but also were searching for ways to overcome it.

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Notes

1. Goedde, *The Politics of Peace*.
2. Ibid., 220. The book has been the subject of an *H-Diplo Roundtable* discussion, 4 January 2021, <https://hdiplo.org/to/RT22-19> (retrieved 25 September 2024).

See especially Talbot Imlay's review on the difficulty of integrating the activist and policy levels of the story. Goedde's thesis contradicts Jeremi Suri's argument, which portrays détente as a shared defensive strategy by leaders in East and West in response to the revolutionary activism of the late 1960s.

3. There is a reference to a later deterioration of East–West relations, but it is placed only in the wake of the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, where in reality détente ('politics of peace') began to fall apart much earlier, again raising questions as to what had really been achieved when a politics of peace allegedly became prevalent around 1970. Ibid.
4. Works on transnational peace activism do at times contain brief and useful discussions. See, for example, Ziemann, 'A Quantum of Solace?', 364–66.
5. 'Opzet en organisatie van het Interkerkelijk Vredesberaad', *IKV Archive, International Institute for Social History, Amsterdam* (IKV-IISH). IKV/1. The document lists eight participating churches, including Anabaptist, Evangelical-Lutheran, Quaker, Dutch-Reformed, Old Catholic and Roman Catholic denominations.
6. List of experts who have agreed to contribute to the 1968 Peace Week, to be held under the theme 'Europe: Reconciliation, Security and Peace', 5 July 1969. IKV/1, *IKV-IISH*. The three-page list reads like a virtual who's who of academics, politicians and church officials occupying themselves with international issues in the Netherlands.
7. Dion van den Berg, *IKV 1966–2006* identifies the 1966–77 period as the 'era of the Peace Weeks'.
8. On how changes in Dutch society during the 1960s and 1970s can be seen as a process in which elites participated, often in a guiding role, see Kennedy, *Nieuw Babylon in aanbouw*. On the rise of civil society activism, particularly on behalf of the developing world, see Hellema, *Nederland en de jaren zeventig*, Chapter 1. On the churches in particular van den Bos, *Mensen van goede wil*.
9. 'PACEM IN TERRIS. ENCYCLICAL OF POPE JOHN XXIII ON ESTABLISHING UNIVERSAL PEACE IN TRUTH, JUSTICE, CHARITY, AND LIBERTY, APRIL 11, 1963', https://www.vatican.va/content/john-xxiii/en/encyclicals/documents/hf_j-xxiii_enc_11041963_pacem.html (retrieved 25 September 2024).
10. Van den Bos, *Mensen van goede wil*, 83–91.
11. 'Wij hebben het ook maar een keertje geprobeerd', interview with Ben ter Veer, in van den Berg, *IKV 1966–2006*, 171–77.
12. Ter Veer, 'Defensienota 1964'.
13. Ter Veer, 'Hoe scheidt men een Vredesklimaat?'.
14. Ibid, 68.
15. 'Conclusies Vredesweek '68'. Brochure text, n.d. *IKV-IISH* IKV/1. In 1969, the IKV brochure on the 1968 Peace Week yielded a critical response from a member of the political establishment, C.L. Patijn, former Member of Parliament, chair of the Ecumenical Council and holder of a special chair in international law at Utrecht University, who charged the IKV with ignoring the basic facts of the international situation, particularly the unwillingness of the Soviet Union to engage in genuine dialogue. The critique led to a back-and-forth eventually published in the journal *Wending*. *IKV-IISH* IKV/2.

16. Minutes working groups 1969 Peace Week, 28 October 1968. *IKV-IISH* IKV/1.
17. Minutes of a Meeting with leaders of study and schooling centers 'Bouvine' and 'Kerk en Wereld', 26 June 1968. *IKV-IISH* IKV/1.
18. Meeting discussing the Nijmegen Center for Peace Studies report on the Peace Week, 19 March 1970. *IKV-IISH* IKV/3.
19. Minutes of the IKV meeting, 12 November 1970. *IKV-IISH* IKV/3.
20. 'De toekomst van Europa: een standpunt van het Interkerkelijk Vredesberaad'. *IKV nota* (The Hague: September 1972). The efforts in 1974 and 1975 to formulate a new *Standpunt* frustratingly came to nothing, while internal disenchantment with the diminishing impact of the annual Peace Week continued to grow.
21. 'Het samengaan van IKV en Pax Christi was met mij nooit gelukt', interview with Mient Jan Faber, in Ten Berge et al, *IKV 1966–2006*, 147–53, at 149.
22. 6 December 1974, minutes of the IKV meeting, 13 November 1974. *IKV-IISH* IKV/8.
23. Faber to Den Uyl, 26 June 1975. *IKV-IISH* IKV/10. The Prime Minister's reply, dated 12 August 1975, was rather noncommittal. *Ibid.*
24. Laqueur, 'Hollanditis'. On the Euromissiles Crisis, see Nuti et al, *The Euromissile Crisis and the End of the Cold War*.
25. Van Dijk, 'Prelude to the Euromissile Crisis'. For the run-up to the Dual-Track decision of December 1979, see van Dijk, 'A Mass Psychosis'.
26. Faber, *Vooruitgeschoven Spionnen*, 24–28.
27. Concept voor Vredesweek en Vredeskant 1977 – 9 March 1977. *IKV-IISH* IKV/44.
28. Mient Jan Faber, *IKV Berichten*, June 1977.
29. Pax Christi was part of the IKV, but was not formally behind the campaign launched in 1977 until 1980. See van den Bos, *Mensen van goede wil*, Chapters 4–6.
30. Van Dijk, 'A Mass Psychosis'. For broader accounts from a Dutch perspective, see van Diepen, *Hollanditis*; van Eenennaam, *Achttienveertig kruisraketten*.
31. For relations with the GDR, see de Graaf, *Over de muur*. See also Kalden, 'A Case of 'Hollanditis''; and Nehring, 'Transnationale Netwerken der bundesdeutschen Friedensbewegung.'
32. Kalden and Wiechmann, 'Kirchen', 248–49.
33. 'Werkgroepen en mededelingen vanuit het secretariaat'. *IKV-IISH* IKV/330. Working Group on the Internationalization of the IKV campaign. Report on meeting with Jim Forest (IFOR), 30 January 1978. *Ibid.*
34. Hogebrink to Wilke Schram, IKV, 17 May 1979; Proposal for an international newsletter of groups committed to resisting the arms race, 16 May 1979. *IKV-IISH* IKV/330.
35. Hogebrink, 'Vorbij de "hollanditis"', 51.
36. *IKV Berichten* 1979/1980, 4 (August 1980), 7.
37. Hogebrink, 'Vorbij de "hollanditis"', 50.
38. Meeting International Working Group, 29 January 1980. *IKV-IISH* IKV/331.
39. Burke, *European Nuclear Disarmament*.
40. Letters from January to April 1980, including draft appeals for a European nuclear-free zone. *IKV-IISH* IKV/199-4.
41. The END appeal did not list the IKV among its many supporters: European Nuclear Disarmament: Ken Coates, *No Cruise Missiles, No SS20's* (Nottingham: Bertrand

- Russell Peace Foundation, 9/80), <https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/110907.pdf?v=7aedf26d66d4a4c0abe01f1bffa77507> (retrieved 25 September 2024).
42. Report, Visit to England, 21–25 March 1980. *IKV-IISH* IKV/331.
 43. Faber to Ninan Koshy, 23 June 1980. *IKV-IISH* IKV/331.
 44. 'Kalkulieerde Vorleistinge in im Rahmen einer neuen Ostpolitik'. *IKV-IISH* IKV/332.
 45. Hogebrink, 'Voorbij de "hollanditis"', 52–53; Kalden and Wiechmann, 'Kirchen', 250. April 25, 1981, Invitation to meeting International Working Group on April 29. *IKV-IISH* IKV/333. Wolfgang Müller, 'Einige Anmerkungen zu den gemeinsamen Aktionen im Herbst 1981', 2 June 1981. *IKV-IISH* IKV/333.
 46. n.d. Draft letter to other European peace groups. International Working Group/333. *IISH-IKV*.
 47. Address at the 'Fürchtet Euch – Wehrt Euch! Der Atomtod bedroht uns alle' rally, Hamburg. *IKV-IISH* IKV/333.
 48. Ibid.
 49. 'Bezoek aan de tweede END-Conferentie te Frankfurt, 6–8 maart 1981,' 13 March 1981. International Working Group Meeting, 3 April 1981. n.d., Exit paper Gisela Ennen. *IKV-IISH* IKV/333.
 50. Kaldor to Faber, 9 June 1981. *IKV-IISH* IKV/384.
 51. L.J. Hogebrink, 'Verslag bliksembezoek MJF en LJH aan Londen, 27 en 28 juli, 1981'. *IKV-IISH* IKV/333.
 52. Thompson to Faber, 30 July 1981. *IKV-IISH* IKV/333 (emphasis in the original). Just two months later, a better mutual understanding appeared to have been established, when on 15 October, Mary Kaldor wrote Faber another letter on collaboration, following in-person discussions, signing off with 'Love, Mary'. *IKV-IISH* IKV/384.
 53. June 1981, invitation to gathering in Kopenhagen on 5 and 6 September 1981. *IKV-IISH* IKV/333.
 54. 21 July 1981, Faber letter to 'some Western European peace-movements', planning meeting in Bonn, 27 August 1981, for fall rallies against the Dual-Track decision. *IKV-IISH* IKV/333 (emphasis in original).
 55. Faber letter to 'some Western European peace-movements', agenda-setting meeting in Bonn, 26 August 1981, for the Copenhagen meeting in September. *IKV-IISH* IKV/333.
 56. The best study on the IKV's 1981/1982 shock and reorientation is Miedema, *Vrede of Vrijheid?*, Chapter 3.
 57. Laurens Hogebrink to E.P. Thomson, 11 February 1982. *IKV-IISH* IKV/483.
 58. 'Kleine landen politiek', confidential paper, 17 February 1981. *IKV/333*.
 59. One way, which is not taken up in this chapter, was increased collaboration with US peace activists, especially the Freeze movement. The Freeze initiative, but eventually also so-called Helsinki monitoring initiatives, did make their way into IPCC discussions especially, and prominent representatives of U.S. groups were regular participants in IPCC meetings.
 60. 'Political and Strategical Remarks in Regards to the Peace Movement in Europe', 28 February 1982. *IKV-IISH* IKV/502. On the debates among activists on how to

associate with which Soviet Bloc groups, see especially Burke, 'A Transcontinental Movement of Citizens?'

61. 'How to Denuclearize Europe?', Athens, 10 December 1982. *IKV-IISH* IKV/503.
62. 13–15 January 1984. *IKV-IISH* IKV/506. A decision on deployment in the Netherlands still being delayed by the government, Faber and the IKV continued their opposition there all the way to the final decision in November 1985.
63. Mient Jan Faber, 'Detente from Below'. Paper for the END convention, Perugia (July 1984). June 1984. *IKV-IISH* IKV/203/3.
64. Mient Jan Faber, 'A Few Lessons from the END Convention', n.d. *IKV-IISH* IKV/202/4. As a possible sign of the peace movement's marginalisation, Faber – always focused on the practical political impact of peace movement activities – would take a much less active role at IPCC or END meetings as time went on. Discussions at this time about the future of the *Disarmament Campaigns* newsletter also point to a network looking for direction and momentum. Eventually, the newsletter would continue as an insert in the *END Bulletin*.
65. Minutes, IPCC meeting Barcelona, 18 January 1986. *IKV-IISH* IKV/510 (emphasis in original).
66. Bartels to IPCC members, 5 March 1987. *IKV-IISH* IKV/511.
67. 'Draft Declaration of IPCC organisations', prepared July 1987. *IKV-IISH* IKV/511.
68. 'Common IPCC-Declaration, to Be Issued by the Participating Movements during the Last Week of October 1987', n.d. *IKV-IISH* IKV/511.
69. Mient Jan Faber, 'How to End the Cold War?', 3 July 1987. *IKV-IISH* IKV/511.

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Italian Epistemic Communities in the Arms Control Field

The Case of USPID

Lodovica Clavarino

Introduction

During the late Cold War, several Italian scientists undertook a multifaceted series of initiatives in the field of arms control. A key figure in these circles is undoubtedly Edoardo Amaldi, who worked with Enrico Fermi in the Via Panisperna group in the 1930s and then became one of the main individuals responsible behind the reconstruction of Italian physics after the Second World War. Together with Amaldi, several Italian scientists developed a profound interest in the disarmament issue, and during the whole Cold War strenuously campaigned against the exploitation of nuclear energy for military purposes.¹ Over the years, a wide and heterogeneous network of scientists blossomed around (and beyond) Amaldi's personal commitment and their advocacy for arms control revolved around several undertakings. In the early 1980s, this group had grown considerably in numbers and included diverse scholars – at first mainly physicists – who were committed to the same goals while being involved in different initiatives in Italy, such as Pugwash, the International School on Disarmament and Research on Conflicts (ISODARCO), the Unione Scienziati per il Disarmo (USPID: Union of Scientists for Disarmament), activities based at the Accademia dei Lincei and elsewhere.²

There was a broad network of scientists, in close contact with each another, determined to strengthen their ties and expand their activities on disarmament in the hope of raising public awareness on these issues and even trying to influence politics at home and internationally.³ In other words, they

formed an epistemic community.⁴ The Pugwash (Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs) is an international organisation deeply inspired by the 1955 Russell-Einstein Manifesto and founded in 1957 on the occasion of a first meeting held in Canada; while ISODARCO is a nongovernmental organisation (NGO) – closely associated with Pugwash – established in Italy in 1966.⁵ The purpose of the latter was to organise residential summer/winter courses in order to provide a ‘nuclear education’ to persons interested in the field. Among these initiatives, this chapter deals mainly with one specific case study, namely USPID, an association founded in the early 1980s and that remains active today.⁶

USPID was established in Italy in 1982–83 and consisted of a structured group of *experts* active on issues related to arms control, nonproliferation and peace. So far, the study of this group has almost never been addressed by historians and – as for other associations and movements in this field – the available publications are often memoirs or articles and essays written by key figures involved in their activities, providing contributions that, although interesting as (sometimes even primary) sources, have all the features of an ‘embedded viewpoint’. My interest, as a Cold War historian, is to critically put this story in the history of the debate on nuclear weapons and of the ‘social activism’ of a particular group of experts in a field related to the foreign and security policy.⁷ Some steps have been taken in this direction, such as the case of the Pugwash conferences, on which a number of historical studies have been published.⁸ As for the methodology, through oral history interviews with the witnesses and the study of the available documents, I would like to shed light on this specific case study and incorporate it into the global Cold War history of anti-nuclear mobilisations. Assessing the impact of these activities promoted by the groups of scientists is indeed challenging and controversial, and we will only be able to provide some indications. Moreover, my approach shares similarities with recent research on science diplomacy, which is experiencing a scholarly renaissance especially after Pierre-Bruno Ruffini’s 2015 pivotal publication.⁹ Other studies investigate the civic activism of scientists during the Cold War and their advocacy on specific questions, such as disarmament or human rights.¹⁰ As for the studies of transnational civil society, from the available literature we can observe that transnational activists – and especially scientists – derive their authority from their expertise, a sort of ‘moral influence’, which lead them toward the claim to political legitimacy.¹¹ However, beyond these more general studies, the case of these Italian epistemic communities is not properly covered by the historiography. In this context, the Italian scientific community acts as a political nonstate actor active in both fostering a transnational dialogue about arms control and in searching for possible channels of communication

with decision makers.¹² The first step of this endeavour was therefore to establish a forum of open discussion.

Building on the limited secondary literature on the topic,¹³ this research expands on interviews conducted with several scientists involved in the foundation of USPID.¹⁴ These interviews reveal that their main purposes in founding USPID were: first, to build a strong Italian network of scientists with a shared interest in arms reduction and nonproliferation; second, to raise public awareness around the perils of nuclear weapons; and finally – but equally important – to try to interact with policy makers. This was not the first time in contemporary Italian history that scientists emerged as a political actor in relation to arms control and nonproliferation issues; an example of their civil activism was evident in the public debate around Italy's accession to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), from the late 1960s to the early 1970s.¹⁵

The research also relies on a personal collection of USPID documents belonging to the physicist Francesco Lenci, (second) Secretary of USPID from 1983 to 1990.¹⁶ USPID bulletins are a valuable source for understanding the aims and the structure of the Italian community of scientists. Thanks to the availability of the *Bollettini USPID*, we can investigate how this association framed the challenges of the international context. With circulation commencing in 1984 – with a frequency of two/three issues per year – the USPID *Bulletin* is useful for mapping the most important members of the association (with contacts of secretaries of local sections), and the activities of the association at the local (universities, institutes, research centres) and national levels. Each edition also included special sections on announcements, documents and informative material. It also featured national and international papers presented at conferences, op-eds and articles published in scientific journals or newspapers, and reports and statements from similar foreign/international associations and networks (FAS, UCS, Pugwash, etc.), creating a collection of heterogeneous material that worked as 'food for thought' for the association.¹⁷ This sort of newsletter reveals not just the features of this Italian group but also its strong transnational calling. If one thinks that these activities spread in a pre-digital era and that the association worked with limited and voluntary funding, the personal dedication of some USPID members is remarkable, especially in the initial phase of network building. Important help in this endeavour came from conscientious objectors, people who carried out the substitute civil service (instead of the regular mandatory military service) at the association, thanks to an agreement with the Italian Minister of Defence. The intellectual link with the renowned *Bulletin of Atomic Scientists* (published by the Federation of Atomic Scientists since the mid-1940s) was reflected in the reprinting of the

iconic Doomsday Clock on the cover of the first issues of the Italian USPID's Bulletin.¹⁸ Pointing just three minutes to midnight in 1984, the choice to show the Doomsday Clock's timeline since 1947 gave the readers a clear sense of urgency.

The Foundation of USPID: Raising Awareness and Establishing a 'Cultural Space'

At the end of the 1970s, the onset of the Euromissile Crisis and heightened tensions between the superpowers gave rise to mass mobilisation in Europe.¹⁹ It also instigated action within international scientific circles, as is manifested in the rich publication of articles and essays of that period (e.g. Bernard Feld's article entitled 'Madder than the MAD' in *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* in October 1980).²⁰ Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), launched in 1983, soon became a new topic of analysis by scientists and contributed to revived concerns and a renewed debate on arms control, both in the United States and abroad.²¹

In Italian scientific circles the feeling was that the world was experiencing a period of renewed tensions that could turn out to be particularly dangerous for Europe, which was at the centre of the dispute for geographical and strategic reasons. About fifteen years after their mobilisation around Italy's accession to the NPT, the deteriorating arms race and the international developments again pushed a number of scientists to partake in various initiatives. The Euromissile Crisis became a sort of trigger for their social activation. Deeply inspired by foreign associations such as the Federation of the Atomic Scientists (FAS) and the Union of Concerned Scientists (UCS) in the United States, and the Scientists against Nuclear Arms (SANA) in Great Britain, the Italian USPID was informally established in the autumn of 1982, in the cultural climate of the 1981 *Appello dei fisici italiani*.²² The activities and the goals pursued by the association were indeed very similar to those carried out by analogous groups and associations based abroad. At the same time, the community of Italian scientists was framing issues of nuclear disarmament in line with domestic concerns, so it is difficult to precisely establish who was inspired by whom.

The association gave itself a formal statute some months later, in April 1983. Then, in June 1983, a conference was held in Bologna, not properly organised as an USPID conference but – as the papers indicate – it symbolised a sort of founding moment for the association.²³ In the statute, USPID claims to be born as 'totally independent of any political party or organization' and to have been established 'in response to the actual movement

towards nuclear rearmament and the growing risk of nuclear war'.²⁴ The promoters explicitly intended to 'fill the gap in the actual national situation', considering Italy as 'one of the few western countries in which research into the questions of peace and disarmament are almost entirely non-existent'.²⁵

In the founding phase of the association, the physicists were the 'catalyst element' of the group, but the Union soon included other kind of scientists and experts who embraced its goals. USPID, like other scientists' initiatives, was an 'elite' group of highly educated persons, a minority within civil society, but it strived to communicate with the broader public, operating outside the academic circles too. On the one hand, USPID members felt they were part of the wider phenomenon of the peace movement, but on the other hand, they claimed a special place in anti-nuclear mobilisation, which came from their expertise on the complexities of the nuclear dimension of the international context. However, unlike the Pugwash's more elitist approach, USPID seemed more willing to interact with grassroots anti-nuclear groups. This relationship was not always easy. While both grassroots movements and USPID members were against nuclear weapons, the peaceful use of nuclear energy was much more divisive, with USPID holding heterogeneous opinions and the majority of the broader movement completely rejecting any possible use of nuclear energy.

From the beginning, there was intense activity in organising local meetings in high schools and universities, scientific workshops and roundtables, giving contributions to the radio, as well as staging film screenings accompanied by debates. This commitment was on a totally voluntary basis, on top of the scientists' daily research and teaching duties. In the early years of the association, the coordination among the activities of the various sections was pivotal and it turned out to be successful due to the work of both the Committee for National Coordination and the Scientific Committee acting as 'transmitting antennas' of the local events. Another crucial concern for the organisers in the initial stages was how to get the attention of the media. They rightly understood how important it was to venture out from the boundaries of their research institutes and departments and attempt to interact with citizens through an open and understandable approach. Similarly, sometimes they sent the association's information dossiers to Italian political representatives, receiving – according to the scientists' recollections – a polite welcome but having almost zero impact. Their open and sometimes even 'media-seeking' approach was therefore intentionally different from the usual attitude of Pugwash-related activities, which considered it important not to have much attention from the media, for the sake of an open and fruitful dialogue among experts without the perils of propaganda and governments' intrusions.

One of the first actions from the Union was the statement simultaneously addressed to the governments of various countries on 11 November 1983, calling for a freeze of the nuclear arsenals and a test ban regarding new nuclear weapons.²⁶ The 'Freeze' appeal was a short and clear text conceived in 1980 by the American activist Randall Forsberg and – according to the proponents of the campaign – effectively represented the sense of urgency and the need to revert the arms race.²⁷ In Italy, USPID members of several local sections were active in collecting signatures for the Freeze call, and a scientists' delegation (Carlo Bernardini, Francesco Calogero, Paolo Cotta-Ramusino, Michelangelo De Maria, Franco Duprè, Francesco Lenci and Mario Vadacchino) met the presidents of the Chamber of Deputies (Nilde Jotti) and of the Senate (Francesco Cossiga) while also holding a press conference to present and explain this international appeal.²⁸ The timing was particularly crucial for Italy since the Parliament was about to vote (14–16 November 1983) on the installation of the Euromissiles on its soil, which then started in the spring of 1984.²⁹ Italy was in fact one of the few Western European countries chosen to host these newly advanced missiles, having been accepted by the government, but heavily criticised by its citizens.³⁰ The idea of the Freeze call coincided with USPID's reasoning for a multifaceted and pragmatic approach to disarmament, namely combining the struggle for ambitious goals while envisioning intermediate useful (sometimes minor) steps in this direction.

Reading the USPID documents, it can be seen that the association in fact pursued a 'controlled nuclear disarmament'. The goal was absolute, namely general disarmament and peace, but it was necessary to start from pragmatic and gradual steps: arms control and détente. From USPID's viewpoint, these involved a gradual development of a 'conscience of peace' that could only come from an intense information campaign. Such training activity meant that scientists would act as 'public educators'.³¹ In this sense, USPID can be seen as an example of the push toward the concept of 'détente from below', championed by the European Nuclear Disarmament (END) and other groups and movements. In particular, these scientists strongly believed that peace and disarmament should be achieved through a gradual process based on building trust and détente between both citizens and governments of the Cold War blocs. To raise awareness among their audience, scientists sometimes used maps and scientific data, even simulating a nuclear blast on Italian territory (for example, on the Pisa-Livorno district, in Tuscany, and on other targets),³² which highlighted both immediate and longer-term consequences of the radioactive fallout. These tools, such as pictures, movies, documentaries, simulations, slides, data and posters, were used to describe what a nuclear war would look like and bring nuclear education into classrooms

and citizens' debates. An important point in this sense was to challenge the idea of a possible 'limited nuclear war' or 'surgical nuclear attack', showing that it was almost impossible to keep such a war confined just to military targets due to the radioactive consequences related to the use of even a single nuclear weapon.

These armaments were not just another powerful and destructive category of weapons, but had to be understood for their specific distinctive features.³³ With raising tensions in the geopolitical arena and competing security visions, USPID seemed to foster from the beginning the need – and even the urgency – for establishing as many fora of discussion as possible in order to draw attention to the danger of nuclear fallout and revamp international détente at every conceivable level.

Euromissiles, SDI and Other Concerns

As a non-nuclear country that hosted US nuclear weapons on its soil as part of NATO's nuclear-sharing agreements, Italy had a particular status and a specific relation with this kind of armaments. The first deployments of tactical nuclear weapons on Italian territory dated back in the late 1950s/early 1960s within the framework of the NATO strategic concept MC48 issued in 1957 (which conceived the doctrine of Massive Retaliation) and of the establishment of the Southern European Task Force (SETAF).³⁴ Years later, with the Euromissile Crisis and the consequent US offer to some European allies to host a new category of nuclear armaments, the issue of Italy's official position towards the deployment of nuclear weapons on its soil again became crucial in the Italian political debate.³⁵

Italian historian Leopoldo Nuti offers a detailed analysis of the divisions in the Italian political landscape about the Euromissile issue, in this sort of renewed 'test for the Atlanticism'.³⁶ As Matthew Evangelista writes, the decision to allow the new deployments shows how concerns on Italy's international status outweighed military considerations: the opportunity to host these new weapons on its soil appeared indeed to be for Italy 'the last stand for nuclear prestige'.³⁷ Despite different political allegiances and opinions on the crisis, these scientists felt the need to bring together *experts* active on issues of arms control, nonproliferation and peace in an effort to play a role in shaping the debate on the country's foreign and security policy. Within the scientific community, there were different positions on the Euromissile Crisis, with some scientists standing in complete opposition to any new NATO deployments notwithstanding Soviet behaviour, while others maintained as indispensable the restoration

of the European nuclear balance of power, whilst supporting negotiations between superpowers.

In an article published in 1984 by the *Bulletin of Atomic Scientists*, Francesco Calogero harshly criticised what he saw as the superpowers' dangerous and irresponsible behaviour for the impasse in arms control negotiations (after the period of agreements and talks from the 1963 Limited Test Ban Treaty to the Strategic Armaments Limitation Talks in the 1970s) and for what appeared to him as a violation of Article VI of the NPT. Calogero – an Italian physicist close to Amaldi and very active in the arms control field from the early 1960s – described the situation as a 'runaway nuclear arms race in Europe' and claimed that the new NATO deployments were damaging the Alliance itself because they produced 'disarray among its members and, most importantly, it erodes the broad popular consensus that constitutes the main political and strategic asset of NATO vis-à-vis the Warsaw Pact nations'. He concluded in a gloomy tone, writing:

We must hope that the behavior of the superpowers will be rectified, and that the European countries will not, in any case, follow their example, that is, pursue a course that is detrimental to their own security. But these hopes appear at present to be based on wishful thinking rather than on real developments.³⁸

In the spring of 1984, the new Italian government, led by the leader of the Italian Socialist Party (PSI) Bettino Craxi (who had just been elected the previous summer), proposed a moratorium on deployment, after the first placements of new missiles had already taken place on Italian soil.³⁹ There is no evidence so far that this political proposal for a freeze was somehow inspired or influenced in particular by USPID, but we can assume that the efforts of this community of scientists (specifically their advocacy of the international Freeze campaign) played a part in fuelling a debate about the opportunity to continue to seek possible room for negotiations on this issue (while respecting the Atlantic loyalty) at a time of extremely high international tensions and of strong disputes among Italian political forces.⁴⁰

The themes in which USPID was particularly interested were risk of nuclear conflicts, perspectives of disarmament (especially in Europe), superpowers' nuclear strategies, space militarisation, consequences of potential nuclear explosions on people and on the environment and international negotiations on arms control. Almost each *Bulletin* had a section devoted to suggested materials to read and bibliographic references, aimed at circulating contributions written by USPID members or selected by themselves among essays published in Italian or foreign journals and newspapers. An important

point was then to encourage the local sections to establish specific branches in their own libraries with books, articles and visual documentation on topics as nuclear weapons and arms control. The associates thought that it was crucial to stay updated with the latest scientific information and to spread data on armaments and international security. Echoing these practices was a joint effort between USPID and Archivio Disarmo (another nonprofit research association established in Rome in 1982) in translating in Italian some editions of the well-known Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) yearbook (1984–85). Their collaboration was also evident in the publication of pieces by USPID members in Archivio Disarmo's newsletter.⁴¹

Starting in 1984, one of the core activities of USPID was a cycle of seminars entitled 'Science and Disarmament', hosted for some years at University of Rome 'La Sapienza', which made the association widely known and catalysed interest from Italian students, researchers and professors. Some of the topics covered by USPID conferences and roundtables were the consequences of a possible use of nuclear weapons on humankind (deaths, casualties and long-term radiation effects) and on the planet (prospects of a 'nuclear winter'⁴² and the collapse of the economy), together with the impossibility of effectively protecting populations. Through the investigation of the features of weapons of mass destruction, the new technologies in the armaments field (from neutron bombs to the militarisation of space and computer science–weapons interaction) and especially the qualitative and quantitative expansion of nuclear arsenals, the experts also dealt with more political aspects. They spoke about the governments' perceptions and misperceptions, accidental wars and risk assessment. As one USPID member (at the time a young researcher at La Sapienza) recalls, in those years the atmosphere in the Departments of Physics of many Italian universities was vibrant and there were debates, conferences and events open to the general public that connected the scientists with the international landscape.⁴³ Therefore, the debates went beyond the conventional Pugwash restricted and high-profile circles and were accessible to a broader part of the society.

One year after its establishment, on 28 May 1985, USPID's Scientific Committee addressed a declaration on SDI to the Presidents of both branches of the Italian Parliament. The following day, it organised a press conference where it presented the document and announced the prospect of an USPID international conference.⁴⁴ Although SDI was launched by Reagan back in March 1983, the European interest in the 'Star Wars programme' surged in the spring/summer of 1985 in response to the US Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger's invitation to NATO allies to formally participate in the programme and to the European tour of the Director of the Strategic Defense Initiative Organization.⁴⁵ Therefore, the SDI issue became quite an

urgent topic on the Italian security/industrial agenda to be discussed from 1985 onwards.⁴⁶

The public statement on SDI represented almost an exception to its practices, since documents of this kind were not a frequent phenomenon in USPID history. According to the association, missiles interception based in space, as conceived by the SDI proposal, implicate 'fundamental technical problems' that made the project almost certainly unfeasible and, furthermore, 'introduced worrying elements of insecurity'. The 1985 statement argued:

The development of anti-missile defenses, even if ineffective, would however constitute a powerful stimulus for the further quantitative and qualitative expansion of the offensive nuclear arsenals, as each side would work to preserve intact its ability to inflict damage on the adversary ... the presence of anti-missile defense systems would make the situation less stable and any agreement more difficult.⁴⁷

USPID's scientists were persuaded that the SDI initiative (although officially a 'defensive' technology) could in fact destabilise the relations between the superpowers. It contributed to the continuation and the worsening of the arms race, while challenging the very pillar of deterrence, namely the mutual vulnerability of both sides.⁴⁸ Scientists talked about an 'illusion', often combined with the notion of 'dangerous'.⁴⁹ After more than ten pages written with a scientific/technical approach, the statement concluded:

an element of concern is precisely the tendency to ignore reality, calling into question the very foundation of the international security in the nuclear age, that is, the recognition that the survival of our civilization requires responsible behavior both on the part of oneself and of the adversary, which implies a *common* interest in a policy of détente, arms control, and in a longer perspective, cooperation, as the only alternative to catastrophe.⁵⁰

These lines, explicitly mentioning the 'survival of civilization', bring to mind passages from the 1955 Russell-Einstein Manifesto.⁵¹ Referring to the commitment under Article VI of the NPT to negotiate arms control measures in good faith, the USPID document also restated the concerns for the potential involvement of other countries, such as Italy itself, in this scientific-technological initiative (the impact of a massive programme directed from abroad, the secrecy implied in the research connected with this project, etc.). Opposing the vicious logic of the arms race, they insisted

on the positive effects of a broad European East–West cooperation in various fields because ‘the greater the collaboration and interdependence among all European nations was, the less likely was that a conflict break out’.⁵²

The Gorbachev Effect and the Transformation of the International System

Inside USPID, Gorbachev’s arrival at the Kremlin was welcomed with deep interest and genuine hopes for the gradual waning of international tensions. From the onset of Gorbachev’s period in power, the ‘new thinking approach’ of the Soviet leader seemed to unlock potential avenues. A first step in arms control field was the Soviet moratorium on nuclear testing launched in August 1985 (it remained in force until the end of 1986). Francesco Lenci – at that time Secretary of USPID – later recalled the significant impact of this unilateral step on scientists’ reflections and how it really opened up a possible path of a new approach to international security, contributing to the reversal of arms race.⁵³

The first USPID international conference, entitled ‘Armi nucleari e controllo degli armamenti in Europa’ (‘Nuclear Weapons and Arms Control in Europe’), was held in Castiglioncello (Tuscany, Italy) in October 1985.⁵⁴ The conference was partially sponsored by some scientific institutions and the local administration, while the Italian Parliament financed simultaneous translations. During the five days of the conference, scientists, experts, scholars from many different countries, including the United States and the Soviet Union, commented on different matters related to nuclear weapons and the European context. The backing of the local administration was due to the personal decision of the communist mayor of the city, Giuseppe Danesin, who allocated generous funding for cultural initiatives. Moreover, the group managed to get some support from other institutions mainly due to the prestige of the convenors and the participants. The prospect of the first Reagan–Gorbachev meeting filled the atmosphere of the convention with great expectations and prospects for change. From 1985 onwards, USPID ran its international conferences biannually with at least one event open to the public.⁵⁵

In 1986 and in 1987 the Academy of Sciences of the Soviet Union organised two conferences in Moscow, which some members of the association attended. The first one was dedicated to the Soviet moratorium on nuclear tests and the prospect for a total nuclear test ban treaty, while the second (with a broader attendance not only of scientists but also of representatives of the cultural circles) addressed the more general topic of reductions of nuclear

weapons and international peace. Participating in these events and witnessing the transformation within the Soviet Union left a lasting impression on the Italian scientists. It also made possible the strengthening of the arms control transnational network and resulted in increased attention from national governments and the media.⁵⁶ Speaking at the 1986 Forum, Calogero – in agreement with Amaldi and other Italian scientists – officially asked the Soviet government for Sakharov's release from confinement (accomplished at the end of that year), and for the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, with the hope of exploiting media attention and his personal scientific prestige and respected status. On the occasion of the 1987 Moscow Forum, Calogero then expressed the hope that the superpowers' talks on Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) deployed in Europe could reach an agreement soon and advocated the importance of negotiations on confidence and security building measures, and of the parallel reduction of conventional forces with the help of 'an informal dialogue on these questions among military and civilian experts from both camps'.⁵⁷ Another point stressed by Calogero at the 1987 Forum was the usefulness of unilateral initiatives in navigating the complex process of arms control and disarmament, and he asserted that 'they retain their validity independently of any reciprocation by the other side'.⁵⁸ He also made it clear that nuclear disarmament had to be conceived as a long, challenging and gradual process, due to risks of 'serious destabilizing consequences' and that it was therefore necessary to proceed through a mix of negotiations, unilateral measures and other initiatives. In fact, the Italian scientists' approach on arms control and security maintained a rather sophisticated and thoughtful posture – differently from the maximalist requests of the mass movement – that demanded total disarmament while often dismissing compromises and intermediate steps. In Herbert York's words, 'nuclear disarmament is both a goal and a process'.⁵⁹

Consistent with these assumptions, the 1987 INF Treaty was welcomed by the transnational arms control network.⁶⁰ Moreover, the signing of the Treaty seemed to create a rather favourable climate for considering new concepts of European security, and in this spirit the USPID community hoped that the impasse over conventional arms control talks (Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions or MBFR) could be finally overcome.⁶¹ The correspondence between members of the association revealed an unprecedented optimism that in the post-INF period, the international system would enter a new phase of opportunities for a change that was still unpredictable but probably even more groundbreaking than the previous détente achieved during the late 1960s and early 1970s.⁶² The breakdown of the Cold War system did result in fact in progress on arms control and a decrease in international tensions.⁶³ However, this promise of success brought about a

parallel loss of interest from both the public opinion and academia on arms control negotiations, as many USPID members observed. The association itself experienced a crisis of self-image, and a phase of internal debate about the way the network could effectively position itself in the post-Cold War era.⁶⁴ According to USPID's founding fathers, despite concrete advances in the disarmament field, several thorny issues persisted and awaited resolution. Therefore, the biggest challenge was keeping experts' and public interest in the nuclear threat alive, which was even more elusive and hard to pin down than before.⁶⁵

Conclusions

Italian scientists were often involved in the same social circles, but the various initiatives committed to arms control, disarmament and peace were diversified. In contrast to the Pugwash Conferences, which were established as an exclusive international forum of discussion at a high level, aiming mostly at making proposals to the governments, USPID had a different agenda. The main goal was developing a widespread network, consisting of many local sections (more than twenty during the 1980s) in the Italian universities and research centres, in order to work primarily on the education/awareness side.

Although engaged in different kinds of activities, USPID and ISODARCO helped each other, raising awareness on the same topics and mutually spreading information on their initiatives. Moreover, both associations targeted younger generations.⁶⁶ As one of USPID's founding fathers wrote, 'information is the foundation of awareness, and awareness supports the ability to act'.⁶⁷ Similarly, the US physicist Sidney Drell wrote in the *Bulletin of Atomic Scientists*: 'in our society there is no substitute for, nor power equal to, an informed and responsible public constituency'.⁶⁸ To achieve this, the Union organised seminars and conferences, where arms control official negotiations and proposals were critically analysed from a risks-and-advantages perspective, allowing for evaluations at a personal level in a climate of open debate and – sometimes even heated – discussions.

In Italy, a fourth pillar of the activities in this field, beyond USPID, ISODARCO and Pugwash was the Accademia dei Lincei, with the initiatives carried on by the SICA (Sicurezza Internazionale e Controllo degli Armamenti) group, which was established in 1987 by Edoardo Amaldi, with the help of Calogero and Schaerf. The aim was to foster dialogue on international security and arms control through the national academies and the involvement of high-level diplomats, scientists and experts, possibly interacting with policy makers. These initiatives inspired the 'Amaldi Conferences',

(so named after Amaldi's death) which are still active at the Accademia dei Lincei.⁶⁹ There were intersections among all these initiatives, and scientists were often involved in more than one association/group at the same time: for example, Schaerf was director of ISODARCO and a member of USPID's Scientific Committee (SC); Calogero was a member of the USPID SC and Pugwash Secretary General from 1989 to 1997; Cotta-Ramusino was a member of the USPID SC and Pugwash Secretary General from 2002 to 2024; and Lenci was both USPID Secretary General in the 1980s and a member of Pugwash.

As the Italian historian Renato Moro has written, the 'nuclear issue profoundly transformed the very question of war and peace',⁷⁰ and there is still room for the historiography to analyse how peace movements and antinuclear initiatives modified politics, not only in relation to their impact on decision makers but also regarding multifaceted aspects of civic participation.⁷¹ Up until now, scientists' advocacy for arms control and détente has not been extensively studied from a historical point of view. The case of USPID shows how the 'authority of scientific knowledge' can be an effective tool in spotlighting arms control and disarmament concerns both in public opinion and in policy makers' circles. Persuaded that the first step in trying to influence governments' security policies was providing accurate information on nuclear issues, these 'concerned scientists' felt that keeping a debate alive was an 'unavoidable civil obligation'.⁷² In the words of Roberto Fieschi (one of USPID's founding fathers), 'the greater the expertise, the greater the social responsibilities'.⁷³ In contrast to the first wave of scientists' civil commitment (from the 1950s to the early 1970s), in the 1980s there was very limited reference to an 'ethical mission' and more focus on a pragmatic approach.⁷⁴

Reading USPID's material in depth, it is revealing to observe the language the members employed on the issue of disarmament and arms race. Laura Considine's work on the Non-Proliferation Treaty offers an interesting take on the connection between language and nonproliferation. She convincingly shows how the narrative around the NPT affected the debate amongst policy makers.⁷⁵ As language is never neutral, the author urges other scholars in the arms control field to consider the relevance of narrative and language in the discourse on nonproliferation and arms control. In this regard, a pivotal point in USPID's efforts was the reflection on 'which was the most effective and best way to set up a discourse on nuclear war, in order to arouse in the public not fear and denial of the danger, but rather that kind of interest and emotional involvement that result in the willingness to act and directly engage'.⁷⁶ Fear could in fact activate civic commitment to disarmament, but – at the same time – also numb people or give rise to hysteria.⁷⁷ As to the contents, it is important to consider USPID

within the framework of the debate on possible alternative thinking about a defence based not just on nuclear deterrence but also on such concepts as collective defence, non-offensive defence, confidence-building measures and arms control architecture.⁷⁸ For that matter, ‘coexistence, cooperation and common security’ were also some of the keywords of Pugwash Conferences in the mid-1980s.⁷⁹

The impact of USPID’s initiatives on decision makers is difficult to evaluate, but we can argue that this was probably the least successful goal of all. However, it is very difficult to gather clear-cut evidence of a possible direct consequence on policy making and therefore to assess the precise impact of USPID activities. Some events in this sense may be USPID’s support for the Freeze appeal in the autumn of 1983 and the idea of a moratorium on Italian deployments, mooted by Prime Minister Craxi some months later, or the fact that the criticisms of SDI by several USPID members were somehow almost echoed in some official assessments of the programme (although the Italian government eventually joined the SDI project). Hence, we can argue that in some cases, scientists’ analyses and activities may have had a certain degree of influence on policy makers, but it is very difficult to maintain that USPID’s efforts to influence policy makers had a direct impact on the political environment and on official decisions.

According to several USPID members, their activities had only a minimal impact (if any) at a strictly political level, albeit that there were certainly some sporadic personal connections between the scientific community and political-diplomatic circles. For example, it is worth mentioning here that General Carlo Jean, a geopolitical expert and then military advisor to the Italian President of the Republic, took part at that time in some USPID meetings. However, USPID’s impact was remarkable in high schools, as well as in the parishes and local cultural centres, at least until the end of the 1980s. Therefore, USPID effectively accomplished the building up of an arms control epistemic community in Italy, along with promoting peace education within higher education institutions. One of the USPID legacies was the establishment of interdepartmental programmes for peace studies, university courses on peace and conflicts (for example, at Pisa, Bari, Bologna, Milan and Padua universities) and other similar initiatives based at different Italian universities.

Equally important was the feeling of belonging that these scientists experienced within this transnational network, encouraged by reading the same material (‘science & society’ journals, articles and papers), meeting regularly at international conferences and debating by correspondence the main issues connected with arms control and disarmament that affected the international system.⁸⁰ Distancing themselves from a generic call for peace and for a swift

overcoming of the Cold War blocs, Italian ‘concerned scientists’ hardly ever supported vague appeals for Italy to leave NATO – often requested by part of the anti-nuclear/peace movement of that period – but framed peace in a very pragmatic way. In the words of Giuseppe Longo, a USPID member: ‘the necessary intermediate steps may appear modest in the face of the grandeur of the final perspective, but in order to reach a goal, the important thing is to move in the right direction’.⁸¹ Therefore, ‘a more stable and deep détente’, as termed by the scientists, was a goal to strive for, through a gradual approach based on arms control negotiations and confidence-building measures, at both the official governmental level and at every other possible level. In this sense, progress in arms control was always intertwined with the hope for a relaunch of an international détente. The 1980s was a time of significant dynamism in the Italian epistemic communities engaged in arms control, with scientists strategically leveraging their knowledge and expertise to assert their legitimacy and rightful influence in the field.

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Notes

1. Clavarino, *Scienza e politica nell’era nucleare*; Clavarino, ‘Italian Physicists and the Bomb’, 665–92. The research for this essay is part of (and funded by) an Italian project of cooperation among a number of universities (PRIN – Progetto di Ricerca di Interesse Nazionale, 2017 call), entitled ‘Science, Technology and International Relations: Case Studies in Italian Foreign Policy’.
2. International School on Disarmament and Research on Conflicts, <https://www.iso.darco.it> (retrieved 25 September 2024); Foradori, Giacomello and Pascolini (eds), *Arms Control and Disarmament*.
3. Clavarino, ‘Italian Physicists and the Bomb’.
4. The term ‘epistemic community’ is used for ISODARCO here: Foradori, Giacomello and Pascolini, ‘Conclusion: ISODARCO as an Epistemic Community’, in *Arms Control and Disarmament*, eds. Foradori, Giacomello and Pascolini, 329–50. For a conceptual framework and a definition of epistemic community see Haas, ‘Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordination’; and for epistemic communities in the arms control field, see Adler, ‘The Emergence of Cooperation’.

5. <https://pugwash.org>; <https://www.isodarco.it> (retrieved 25 September 2024).
6. See <https://www.uspid.org> (retrieved 25 September 2024).
7. On scientists' transnational networks in the arms control field, see Evangelista, *Unarmed Forces*; on anti-nuclear movements, see Wittner, *The Struggle against the Bomb*.
8. Kraft and Sachse (eds), *Science, (Anti)Communism and Diplomacy*; Kraft, Nehring and Sachse (eds), 'The Pugwash Conferences and the Global Cold War'; Research Network *Writing Pugwash Histories*, <http://h-diplo.org/reports/PDF/Pugwash-Vienna-Report-2012.pdf> (retrieved 14 November 2024).
9. Ruffini, *Science and Diplomacy*; Ruffini, 'Conceptualizing Science Diplomacy'. For the relations between science, technology and international affairs, see John's Krige's research and publications.
10. Bini and Vezzosi (eds), *Scienziati e Guerra Fredda*.
11. Price, 'Transnational Civil Society'. On the general rise of transnational civil society, influence and responsibilities of the activists, see Florini, *The Third Force*.
12. For an example of literature about scientists and transnational dialogue on arms control see Barth, 'Catalyst of Change'.
13. Fieschi, *Scienza e guerra*; Fieschi and de Renzi, *Macchine da guerra*; Calogero (ed.), *Armi, strategie e disarmo*; Calogero and Devoto (eds), *La proliferazione delle armi nucleari*; Greco (ed.), *Fisica per la pace*, especially Chapters II, IV, VII and VIII.
14. Among the scientists interviewed were Francesco Calogero, Paolo Cotta Ramusino, Roberto Fieschi, Francesco Lenci, Alessandro Pascolini and Carlo Schaefer.
15. Clavarino, 'Many Countries Will Have the Bomb'. On Italy and nuclear issues, see Nuti, *La sfida nucleare*; Bini and Londero (eds), *Nuclear Italy*.
16. I have been able to study this set of documents thanks to the kind permission of Francesco Lenci.
17. FAS: Federation of the American Scientists; UCS: Union of Concerned Scientists.
18. In fact, there were a few exchanges between some participants in USPID meetings and people connected with the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (BAS); moreover, the most prominent Italian scientists of the association were passionate readers of the BAS and certainly felt themselves part of the same intellectual environment.
19. Nuti et al. (eds), *The Euromissile Crisis and the End of the Cold War*; Colbourn, *The Nuclear Weapons That Nearly Destroyed NATO*.
20. Feld, 'Madder Than the MAD', 5.
21. Reagan, 'Address to the Nation on Defense and National Security', 23 March 1983.
22. Appeal to the President of the Italian Republic Sandro Pertini, 27 November 1981.
23. Convegno internazionale su rischi di guerra nucleare e sul disarmo, Bologna, 16–18 June 1983.
24. USPID Statute and list of members, 14 April 1983, Article 1.
25. USPID Statute and list of members, Article 2.
26. Bollettino di informazione USPID, n.0 (January 1984), 12.
27. Wittner, *The Struggle against the Bomb: Toward Nuclear Abolition*, 175–78; Santese, *La pace atomica*.
28. It should not be surprising that the USPID members of this delegation were all men. In fact, at that time there were a very small minority of female scientists in

- the association; the USPID Scientific Board consisted of eight persons (all men), and among the twenty-four local sections on the Italian territory, only two were led by women: Modena with Patrizia Baralli, and Povo (Trento) with Giuseppina Orlandini, the latter still active in the association.
29. For Italy's position regarding NATO's dual-track decision, see Nuti, *La sfida nucleare*, Chapter VIII.
 30. Nuti et al., *The Euromissile Crisis and the End of the Cold War*; see in particular chapters 13 (Nuti) and 15 (Guasconi).
 31. This expression is on *BAS* (December 1985), 30.
 32. *Bollettino di informazione USPID*, n.0 (January 1984), 18–21.
 33. Heuser, *The Bomb*.
 34. For a detailed analysis, see Nuti, *La sfida nucleare*, Chapter V.
 35. For the Italian foreign policy during the Cold War, see Ferraris, *Manuale della politica estera italiana*.
 36. Nuti, *La sfida nucleare*, 347–93.
 37. Evangelista, 'Atomic Ambivalence', 125.
 38. Calogero, 'Why Missiles in Europe?', 12–13.
 39. Nuti, *La sfida nucleare*, 384–88.
 40. For the Italian political situation and stance regarding security issues in that period, see Gala, 'Italy and the SDI Project'; for Italy's behaviour about the dual track decision, see Gala, 'Italy's Role in the Implementation of the Dual-Track Decision', 151–62.
 41. For example, Farinella, 'Difese antimissile e Guerre Stellari'; Lenci, 'Test nucleari militari'.
 42. Rubinson, 'The Global Effects of Nuclear Winter'; Sagan, 'The Nuclear Winter'; and 'Nuclear War and Climatic Catastrophe: Some Policy Implications'; special section on Nuclear Winter on *BAS* (April 1984).
 43. Giovanni Battimelli, conversation with the author.
 44. 'L'Iniziativa di Difesa Strategica Americana e la ricerca in Italia', Documento del Consiglio Scientifico dell'Unione Scienziati per il Disarmo, in *Bollettino USPID* 2, 2 (June 1985), 3–27.
 45. Brunet (ed.), *NATO and the Strategic Defense Initiative*; Gala, 'Italy and the SDI Project', 104.
 46. For the Italian reaction to the US defence initiative, see Gala, 'Italy and the SDI Project', 95–110.
 47. 'L'Iniziativa di Difesa Strategica Americana e la ricerca in Italia', Documento del Consiglio Scientifico dell'Unione Scienziati per il Disarmo, in *Bollettino USPID* 2, 2 (June 1985), 14.
 48. Some points of this analysis are similar to the government assessments of SDI; see Gala, 'Italy and the SDI Project'.
 49. Fieschi, 'Dubito ergo sum'; Bertotti, 'The Illusion of Star Wars', 35–42; Lenci, *L'Illusione dello Scudo Spaziale*.
 50. 'L'Iniziativa di Difesa Strategica Americana e la ricerca in Italia', *Bollettino USPID* 2, 2 (June 1985), 22, emphasis in original.
 51. Butcher, 'The Origins of the Russell-Einstein Manifesto'.

52. 'L'Iniziativa di Difesa Strategica Americana e la ricerca in Italia', *Bollettino USPID* 2, 2 (June 1985).
53. Francesco Lenci, conversation with the author, 9 March 2021.
54. Proceedings of the 1985 USPID international conference were published by *Scientia* (1985) 120(2), under the title 'Nuclear Weapons and Europe'.
55. Among others, see Colombetti and de Maria (eds), *Tecnologie avanzate: riarmo o disarmo?*
56. Francesco Lenci, conversations with the author; for a contribution to 1987 Forum from a prominent Italian scientist: Calogero, 'Nuclear Disarmament and European Security', *Bollettino USPID* (1987) 4(1), 75–81.
57. Calogero, 'Nuclear Disarmament and European Security', 78.
58. Ibid.
59. York, 'Negotiating from the Bottom up', 54–57.
60. Panofsky, 'Limited Success, Limitless Prospects', 34; From the BAS Editors, 'Winds of Hope', *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* (1987) 43(9) (November), 2.
61. Ragionieri, 'Sicurezza europea e difesa difensiva', 127.
62. Among others, see Longo, 'La svolta possibile', 52–69.
63. Walker, *Weapons of Mass Destruction and International Order*.
64. Debate: 'Quale futuro per l'USPID', contributions by Paolo Farinella, Bruno Bertotti, Diego Latella, *Bollettino USPID* (March 1990), 133–43.
65. For example, Lenci, 'L'arma del disarmo', 105–06; similar reflections are in SICA documents on 1989–90 at the Accademia dei Lincei.
66. Foradori and Giacomello, 'Fighting Nuclear Proliferation through Education', 331–44.
67. Roberto Fieschi, conversation with the author, 1 December 2019.
68. Drell, 'L+R: A New Formula for Arms Control', *BAS* (April 1982), 34.
69. <https://www.lincci.it/it/sica> (retrieved 25 September 2024). This group was established in the summer of 1987 and organised the first international workshop in June 1988. On the establishment of this group, see the 1987 intense correspondence between Amaldi and Panofsky, in Archivio Gruppo SICA, box 1, Accademia dei Lincei.
70. Moro, 'I movimenti antinucleari dagli anni Quaranta agli anni Sessanta', 134; Moro, 'Against the Euromissiles'. A brilliant study on nuclear cultures and mentalities is Cigliani, *Culture atomiche*. Pivotal reflections on how the nuclear issue transformed war and peace are given in Brodie (*From Crossbow to H Bomb*, 1973) and Jervis (*The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution. Statecraft and the Prospect of Armageddon*, 1989).
71. For a methodological framework to peace studies, see Moro, 'Sulla storia della pace', 97–140. Many stimulating suggestions are presented by Ziemann, 'Peace Movements in Western Europe, Japan and the USA during the Cold War'; and Grant and Ziemann, *Understanding the Imaginary War*.
72. *Scientia* 1985, 120(2), special issue, introduction.
73. Fieschi, *Macchine da guerra*, 183.
74. On ethical aspects about nuclear weapons, see, among others, Agnoli, *Hiroshima e il nostro senso morale*.
75. Considine, 'The Importance of Narrative in Nuclear Policymaking'.
76. Farinella, 14 June 1986, in *Bollettino USPID* 3, 3 (July 1986), 11.

77. 'Scared stiff – or scared into action', *BAS* (January 1986), 12–16.
78. For example, Calogero, 'Nuclear Disarmament and European Security', 79; Ragionieri, 'Sicurezza europea e difesa difensiva', 120–27.
79. For example: Statement of the Pugwash Council on the 36th Pugwash Conference, September 1986, in *Bollettino USPID* (December 1986), 51–7.
80. This feeling was confirmed to me by several Italian scientists involved in these initiatives on occasion of interviews and conversations.
81. Longo, 'La svolta possibile', 68.

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The Soviet Peace Committee and 'Détente from Below' in the 1980s

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Introduction

After the Second World War, the 'struggle for peace' became a prevalent theme of Soviet ideology and propaganda, both domestically and internationally. From the 1950s until the late 1980s, many public associations within the Soviet Union associated themselves with the peace movement that emerged in the country. In keeping up with the Soviet public sphere, these organisations presented themselves as nongovernmental organisations (NGOs), but very few were. From 1949, the leading organisation in the Soviet peace movement was the Soviet Committee for the Defense of Peace (Soviet Peace Committee [SPC]). The Soviet Peace Fund (SPF), founded in 1961, operated as the official distributor of public donations for peace. These two organisations constituted the core of the large network of associations that 'struggled for peace' in the USSR and abroad. In Eastern Europe the 'official' peace movement originated through a network of national peace committees affiliated to the Soviet-controlled World Peace Council (WPC), established in 1950 to propagate Soviet views and to rally international solidarity for Soviet peace and disarmament initiatives. It was also supported by numerous communist parties and groups worldwide, known as 'international front organisations'.

Contemporaries extensively documented the intricate relationship between the Soviet propaganda apparatus and the Western peace movement, yet researchers have been unable to unravel these relations due to a scarcity of primary sources.¹ In the early 1980s, these connections transitioned into conflict as the longstanding divide between pro-Soviet and independent peace groups gave rise to the transnational movement called 'détente from below'.² This development presented a profound challenge not only for the

SPC but also the entire Soviet propaganda machine. This chapter describes the dynamics of the relationship between the 'official' Soviet peace movement, the independent peace movement in the USSR, and the transnational 'détente from below' movement in the 1980s. Pundits at the time thought that the 'détente from below' movement provided an impetus to the 'new political thinking' and Perestroika in the USSR.³ However, the extent and nature of the influence remain relatively unknown. This chapter traces the roots of the conflict between the SPC and the groups representing 'détente from below' and explores the specific characteristics of the SPC as a public organisation during this conflict. It also examines how the Western peace movement affected the ideology and methods of the SPC as well as the personal outlooks of its officials.

The history of the relationship between the SPC and the 'détente from below' movement has a broad, extensive, and truly transnational primary source base. This chapter is based on official documents, particularly materials from the SPC archive (Fond 9539 in the State Archives of the Russian Federation, *GARF*) and official Soviet media articles.⁴ It also draws upon numerous articles, pamphlets and books by Western and Eastern peace activists, materials from the archives of European Nuclear Disarmament (END) at the London School of Economics (LSE), records and *samizdat* collections of the Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Research Institute collection from the Vera and Donald Blinken Open Society Archives at the Central European University (HU OSA) (Budapest), *samizdat* materials from the archives and the library of Memorial International Society (Moscow), documents of the Archiv-Grünes-Gedächtnis (Berlin) and interviews with peace movement participants.

Former officials of the Soviet peace movement had little interest in writing memoirs; neither are they eager to give interviews to historians. Only a few short essays and memoirs by these officials exist, in the form of articles⁵ and interviews,⁶ and a single thin book of recollections by Oleg Kharkhardin.⁷ Since the Committee for the State Security (KGB) archives in Russia remain closed for the foreseeable future, these memoirs provide a valuable window into the events of the 1980s.

The SPC, the 'Official' Peace Movement in the USSR and the Nature of Soviet Public Organisations

The SPC never had a charter, but it was officially 'a mass public organisation of peace supporters in the USSR, uniting and coordinating their activities'.⁸ It was supposedly created to give to the 'broad circles of the Soviet public' the

opportunity to shape and implement the foreign policy of the Soviet state. Alongside providing ideological support for Soviet foreign policy, the SPC was also responsible for convincingly demonstrating the peace-loving nature of the Soviet people, ‘humanising’ the country in the eyes of millions abroad and challenging the Western view of the Soviet state as an enemy.⁹ To this end, the SPC produced a monthly magazine, *Vek XX i Mir (The Twentieth Century and Peace)*, published in Russian, English, French, Spanish and German between 1967 and 1995.

In the USSR, official texts obsessively emphasised the grassroots, democratic nature of the Soviet peace movement, and it is only in rare comments by contemporaries and occasional memoirs that the grassroots nature of this initiative is revealed to be largely a façade, exploiting the Soviet people’s desire for peace. This tension between initiatives from above and from below was a common problem for all Soviet public organisations.

The SPC was established by a decision of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), though it was officially presented as an initiative of a group of public figures at the first Conference of the Peace supporters in August 1949. Its local branches were opened two years later. The growth of the SPC’s importance in Soviet propaganda was matched by an increase in staff and funding. By the early 1980s, almost every Soviet republic and region had its local branch of the SPC. Although officials of the SPC now admit that the decision was made from above, they insist that ‘it was impossible to create such a mass social movement on order’ and that all its participants had ‘their own inner and deep motivation that prompted them to give this cause time, sincere strength, personal savings, talent and energy’. At the same time, they admit that the ruling party kept ‘the aspirations and moods of the masses under strict control, not allowing them to “overflow” and used them to ensure unconditional support for their political course’.¹⁰

The SPC periodically convened the All-Union conference, which was proclaimed as the supreme body of peace supporters in the USSR. SPC plenums were held annually and along with conferences determined the main political tasks and directions of the agenda. Plenums elected the presidium, the chairman, deputies and the executive secretary to manage current activities. The Committee operated mainly on a voluntary basis with the assistance of a small apparatus providing organisational, technical and information services. Its staff included ten to fifteen political employees and about the same number of technical staff, who were appointed by the leadership of the SPC on approval by the International Department (ID) of the Central Committee of the CPSU.

Participants of the SPC included well-known Soviet writers, journalists, scientists, artists and other cultural figures, representatives of mass public

organisations (such as women's groups and trade unions), heroes of labour and shock workers, hierarchs of the Russian Orthodox Church and representatives of other confessions. Many (though not all) activists were members of the CPSU or deputies of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, the highest legislative body. On a voluntary basis, they coordinated actions and held mass public events, rallies and demonstrations, and organised exhibitions, discussions and meetings with foreign guests.

In SPC reports and printed materials, ordinary citizens appeared only as participants in orchestrated campaigns organised from above to collect signatures against the arms race, hold peace demonstrations, stage 'thousands-strong' demonstrations and peace marches or contribute to the Peace Fund. In most cases, mass supporters of the SPC remained anonymous. The archives of the SPC and the SPF contain no evidence of the activities of the Soviet rank-and-file peace supporters. Their letters, peace proposals, tracts, amateur songs or poetry, which they clearly sent to these organisations, have not been preserved. The bureaucracy of these organisations seemingly did not consider these documents worthy of being saved for history.

Officially, the SPC was subordinate to the ID, with one of the latter's deputies overseeing SPC affairs and managing contacts with the WPC. The agenda was initially prepared within the Committee and then submitted to the ID for approval, after which an official document decision was issued. While peace initiatives were primarily driven by the CPSU, smaller ones could originate from SPC employees, but always required ID approval.¹¹ The former secretary of the SPC Grigory Lokshin admits that a social movement independent of the authorities could not exist in the USSR, as at that time the entire society was totally controlled by the CPSU. But he also doubts the independence of the Western civil society organisations, arguing that they depended on their governments, political parties and public opinion.¹² According to Lokshin, the SPC served as a 'transmission belt' between the party and that part of society that constituted the social base of the peace movement. He believes that this 'belt' worked in both directions, enabling the CPSU leadership not only to advance its agenda but also to gain a better understanding of the sentiments of various intellectuals groups, and occasionally to adjust their own policies accordingly.¹³

Despite Lokshin's assertion that the Soviet peace movement was initially conceived by its founders as 'a reliable tool of political control and manipulation of public opinion' and that propaganda always remained its primary function, he believed that the movement transcended its prescribed role. It became 'for many a small, yet significant window to the outside world, through which we heard a lot from a new, unusual and disturbing public

consciousness'.¹⁴ Until his death in 2022, Lokshin continued to consider the SPC a kind of 'oasis' of a creative approach to international relations, although he admits that in the early 1980s 'many contradictions of the communist system began to appear, and above all, the mutual inconsistency of words spoken and things done'.¹⁵

The Personal Dimension of 'the Struggle for Peace' in the USSR in the 1980s

Due to the predominant 'official' approach in the activities of the SPC, the organisation's archives lack a personal, human dimension. Memoirs by former committee members partly compensate for this lack. They allow us to reconstruct, in general terms, the views and motivations of several key figures of that period: Yuri Zhukov, Oleg Kharkhardin, Grigory Lokshin¹⁶ and, in part, Tair Tairov. A study of their biographical narratives is important as this highlights common themes: they insist that the Soviet peace movement was a genuine grassroots movement; they admit or even admire the mass character and efficiency of the Western peace movement of the late 1970s and 1980s; and some of them regard themselves as true dissidents within the Soviet peace movement, as people who generated the ideas of the 'new political thinking' concept. For all of them, the emergence of the 'détente from below' movement was both a personal and a professional challenge.

In the 1980s, the head of the SPC was Yuri Zhukov (1908–91), a Soviet international journalist, translator, candidate member of the Central Committee of the CPSU, deputy of the Supreme Soviet of six convocations, political commentator for the *Pravda* newspaper, member of the Writers' Union and recipient of high state decorations. Zhukov was born in Lugansk, Ukraine, where his father was an ordinary teacher. He started his career as a mechanic in a railway workshop and continued as an assistant engine driver. He then took a course in journalism and worked for a local media outlet, followed by positions at several nationwide newspapers and magazines. During the Second World War, Zhukov was a war correspondent for the *Komsomolskaya Pravda* newspaper, and after the war he became a reporter focusing on international issues, the vices of capitalist society, the memory of the war, and the anti-nuclear movement. He wrote dozens of books and multiple articles.

From 1962, Zhukov held various positions in the *Pravda*, rising from a political observer to deputy editor-in-chief, responsible for international issues. He travelled to foreign countries and was a correspondent in France. From 1968 until his death in 1991, he was President of the USSR-France

Society, and between 1957 and 1962 chaired the Committee for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries. From 1962 until 1982, he was deputy chairman of the SPC. He was elected chairman on 26 March 1982, remaining in this position until March 1987 before retiring the following year.¹⁷ Colleagues remember Zhukov as a man who set the goal of expanding the social base for the peace movement. In his speeches, articles and books, he clearly delivered the 'grassroots' message of Soviet ideology. He was a gifted propagandist who emphasised the importance of public feedback and carefully monitored the impact of propaganda on public opinion.

Zhukov's professional specialisation is best exemplified by the programmes he hosted on Central TV starting in 1972. Each episode featured Zhukov reading questions from viewers' letters and providing detailed answers. He surveyed pressing issues of international relations: the struggle for peace and détente, the problems of Soviet–American relations, militarisation in capitalist countries, the Vietnam War, the Israeli military, national liberation struggles, assistance to Third world countries, and anti-Soviet propaganda by imperialist countries. The programmes were markedly anti-American; they were also extremely popular. Workers, engineers, collective farmers, teachers, agronomists, students, war veterans and Communist Party local activists wrote letters to Zhukov. Often these came from labour correspondents, political agitators and organisers of political courses.¹⁸ Some letters were obviously fictional or significantly amended by the editors of the programme. The author of the preface to Zhukov's book on his television experience stated that 'the exchange of views on foreign and domestic policy issues with the editorial boards of newspapers, television and radio is a familiar feature of the Soviet way of life, a vivid manifestation of further development of democracy in our society, the rise of political activity of the Soviet people'.¹⁹ In 1988, Zhukov published a book on the history of Soviet–American relations, which can be regarded as his memoirs.²⁰ Released at the height of Perestroika, the book contained many Cold War assessments, disaffection with Mikhail Gorbachev and the humiliation of the politics of the 'new political thinking'.

Oleg Kharkhardin (1924–2024) joined the peace movement as an international journalist. He started as a worker in Kuibyshev, but went on to graduate from the elite Moscow State Institute of International Relations (MGIMO). In the year of his graduation (1953), by his own recollection, he stood with tears in his eyes as part of the honour guard near Stalin's coffin.²¹ From 1958, Kharkhardin was a consultant and later an executive secretary of the Soviet Committee of Solidarity with Asian and African countries, organising campaigns of international support to Third World countries. In 1963, he joined the ID to supervise the peace movement. From the mid-1970s,

he headed the International Forum for Liaison of Peace-Loving Forces.²² He worked for the SPC from 1958, acting as deputy chairman from 1973 to 1993, while also being a permanent representative of the USSR in the WPC.

Kharkhardin's journalism focused on the role of the 'public' in the Soviet peace movement and the problem of its social base.²³ He sought to denounce 'the lie about the "lack of mass character"' of the Soviet peace movement.²⁴ In his memoirs published in the early 2000s, the acknowledgement of certain mistakes and 'excesses' is combined with reaffirmation of loyalty to the general direction of the peace movement in the USSR, along with an undisguised negative attitude towards Gorbachev.²⁵

Another active participant in the campaigns in the 1980s was Grigory Lokshin (1938–2022), a scholar specialising in Vietnamese studies with a Ph.D. in history. Lokshin came from a working-class family and graduated from the French Special School and the Oriental Studies Department of the MGIMO. He worked at the Institute of Oriental Studies before joining the *Soviet Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee* in 1965. According to his memoirs, the most important event in his life was his appointment as executive secretary of the Vietnam Solidarity Committee during the Vietnam War (1968–73). He then served as secretary of the SPC from 1973 until 1993.

In the Vietnam Solidarity Committee, Lokshin was responsible for organising a mass movement of solidarity with the Vietnamese people and cooperating on this issue with foreign organisations.²⁶ This extensive and effective experience of participating in a 'genuine mass social movement' and solidary actions had a great impact on his views and values.²⁷ The idea of a mass social movement inspired him: 'Never before had acts of aggression and violence against nations provoked such powerful protest and active opposition from the world public opinion. Never before had such powerful state and social forces set in motion, aiming to stop the aggressor and put out the most dangerous hotbed of war. Not a single government of the leading countries of the world could ignore them.'²⁸ Like Kharkhardin, Lokshin's main propagandistic papers emphasised the role of the 'public' in the peace movement.²⁹

Peter Jarman, a peace activist from British Quaker Peace and Service organization who frequently visited the USSR, considers Lokshin a complex person. Jarman observed that in the early 1990s, Lokshin was critical of the Soviet experience in the 'struggle for peace' and expressed pacifist ideas. Lokshin told Jarman that he and his colleagues reported in detail to the Communist Party the ideas of the Western peace movement, and their activists were later 'surprised when Gorbachev adopted most of their ideas'.³⁰

Unfortunately, today we lack reliable primary sources to understand the

personalities of two other active participants in the events of those years, Tair Tairov (b. 1937) and Genrikh Borovik (b. 1929).

Tair Tairov graduated from the MGIMO and in the 1960s worked in the Soviet Committee of Youth Organisations. He had a doctoral degree, specialised in international law, focusing on the struggle against racism and published several papers about apartheid. In an interview, Tairov calls his works 'peace research' and cites his collaboration with some European institutions, academic communities and prominent scholars, including Johan Galtung.³¹ From 1979 to 1986, Tairov 'suddenly' held two positions: director of the Information Centre and Soviet representative of the WPC in Helsinki. According to him, the Communist Party assigned him the task of 'raising public opinion in Europe' against the plans by the NATO to deploy missiles in Europe. He attended international peace forums, communicated with prominent figures of the Western peace movement and organised peace marches and other international events. According to Tairov, the representatives of 'détente from below' greatly influenced his opinion. He is proud of his acquaintance with E.P. Thompson, who mentioned him in one of his books. Tairov states that in 1983 the collaboration with the Western peace movements inspired him to develop a pilot version of the 'new thinking' concept. However, the leadership of the SPC was against his innovations, and he therefore lost his position at the WPC. He is convinced that Gorbachev's foreign policy was driven by the demands and expectations of ordinary people and democratic pressure, shaped 'by peace and new social movements in Europe and inside the USSR as well'.³²

During Perestroika, Tairov headed the department studying NGOs in the Institute of World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO). He was one of the first former Soviet officials to participate in the creation of the new type of NGOs. In 1991, Tairov was chairman of the preparatory committee of the 19th END Convention, held in Moscow in August of that year. In short, Tairov seems to have defected from the 'official' Soviet peace movement to the camp of 'détente from below'.

Genrikh Borovik was an 'ambassador of Perestroika' in the SPC. At the time of his appointment as head of the committee, he was a well-known writer and international journalist specialising in the culture and social life of America. After graduating from MGIMO, Borovik became famous for his reports from 'crisis spots'. In the 1960s and 1970s, he worked for the chief Soviet propaganda body *Novosti Press Agency*, much of the time in its New York office. Borovik participated in the Soviet ideological campaign against dissident writer Alexander Solzhenitsyn. In the 1980s, Borovik hosted the weekly 'International Panorama' programme on Central TV and was a political observer for the State Committee for Television and Radio Broadcasting

(Gosteleradio). Borovik's articles denounced the 'vices of capitalist society' and 'American imperialism', and exposed 'subversive activities' of the US intelligence services. At the same time, he effectively covered the anti-racism movement in the United States, the Vietnam War, the New Left, the hippie and peace movements, the Cuban Revolution and other national liberation movements, providing numerous details unfamiliar to ordinary Soviet people.³³ Borovik had a reputation as a man who worked for the KGB and was exceptional in detecting the nuances and slightest changes in official ideology.³⁴

In 1980, Borovik spent several months in Afghanistan as a reporter. In his post-Soviet interviews, he spoke at length about his negative stance on the Afghan war. He claimed that he refused to publish articles about it, which led to his falling out of favour.³⁵ In 1987, Borovik replaced Zhukov as chairman of the SPC and at the same time became a deputy chairman of the WPC. He participated in several of Gorbachev's foreign trips as an expert. In 1989–91, he was people's deputy in the Congress of People's Deputies of the Soviet Union. In 1990, he left the CPSU. In the mid-1990s, he wrote scripts for anti-war documentaries about the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the Great Patriotic War.

The Challenge of Building Support for the Soviet Peace Movement: The Soviet Peace Committee and the Western Peace Movement

Despite the unique aspects described above, the authors of these memoirs believed that the 'defence of peace' in the USSR was genuinely a cause that was embraced by the people. Their decisive arguments include the sincerity of the peace-loving sentiments of the Soviet people, the widespread participation in the movement, and its grassroots sources of its financing. The chronicles of the SPC's history and the memoirs of its officials are filled with statistics aimed at confirming its mass character and broad social reach. Soviet officials proudly stated that membership in their country's peace movement numbered tens of millions of participants in 120 local branches, and that the movement had managed to collect 115 million signatures on a Stockholm petition against the arms race in 1950 (amounting to almost all the adults in the Soviet Union, whose total population at the time was 179 million).³⁶

To confirm the sincerity of Soviet peace initiatives, the memoirists recommend reading the thousands of letters sent by ordinary Soviet people to

the SPC and the SPF. The phrase 'Do the Russians Want War?', from a popular Soviet song, served as the title of numerous Soviet propaganda articles and pamphlets. A vehemently negative answer to this question was assumed: in the fight against fascism from 1941 to 1945, the Soviets Union had lost more than 20 million people. The activities of the Soviet peace movement were financed by voluntary donations from millions of Soviet citizens. This practice arose spontaneously, and in 1961 the SPF was created to manage these funds. Local affiliates of the fund were formed at many large factories and institutions of education and science. The flow of donations constantly grew, especially at times when the international situation worsened and military conflicts flared up.³⁷ The memoirists acknowledge that the voluntariness of donations was not always upheld.

In Soviet times, the notion of 'public' (*obshchestvennost'*) was used to denote the Soviet analogue of civil society.³⁸ The official peace movement has generated enormous amounts of literature on the 'struggle for peace' of the Soviet 'peace-loving public'. It was assumed that the 'public' had no disagreements with the Soviet government or the Communist Party. 'The main feature of the Soviet peace movement', stated the SPC leadership, 'is the fact that, because of the very nature of the Soviet state, there should not be any antagonisms or contradictions between the public and the state in understanding questions of war and peace, disarmament, détente, and peaceful cooperation.'³⁹ Such ideas gave birth to the slogan about the 'indestructible moral and political unity of the people, party and state'.⁴⁰ According to Soviet ideologists, 'socialism' and peace were indivisible; as a result, the task of the SPC was not to try to influence the Soviet government (which, by definition, supposed to be peaceful), but rather the policies of those 'imperialist' countries that were seen as inimical to the Soviet Union.

Meanwhile, SPC officials felt that their organisation lacked genuine democracy. Starting in the 1960s, the SPC frequently expressed its goal of broadening the social and political spectrum of the foreign sociopolitical forces with which it collaborated.⁴¹ Also, the officials of the SPC did not escape the feeling that the 'peace-loving public' within the country did not have the necessary qualities of subjectivity, whereas the Western 'public' demonstrated greater initiative and more creative approaches to the struggle for peace.

At first, in search of allies abroad, the SPC relied on the Communists, then turned its attention to national liberation movements. Soviet peace fighters treated the so-called 'parallel' movements with distrust for a long time. This attitude prevented Moscow from signing the Russell-Einstein Manifesto in 1955, whose 'emphatic neutrality' and humanism ran counter

to the 'Soviet ideological attitude about the death of the capitalist system in a nuclear war unleashed by imperialism'.⁴²

One of the campaigns for the expansion of the movement unfolded during preparations for the October 1973 World Congress of Peace Forces. It was assumed that during the Congress, the principle of the broad representation of various sociopolitical forces would be realised and that the discussion would be open and transparent. Oleg Kharkhardin played a significant role in the preparations of the Congress. It was indeed attended by delegates representing not only the Communists, but also dozens of social democratic, liberal, Christian democratic and other parties and political associations, along with trade union, youth, women's and religious organisations and movements.⁴³ Kharkhardin was so proud of the success of the congress and subsequent forums that he even suggested in his memoirs that these events could 'prove to be one of the unofficial channels for the development of the topic of convergence – a fashionable topic at the time'.⁴⁴

In the late 1970s and early 1980s, representatives of the SPC observed with admiration the rapid growth of the peace movement in the West. In the summer of 1977, people in the West launched mass protests on an unprecedented scale against the production and deployment of the neutron bomb at its bases in Europe. Both Soviet publicists and modern memoirists have written emotionally, with sincere admiration, about the scope and boldness of the European peace movement in those years. The success of the protest against the 'neutron death' was deemed to be 'stunning' in the SPC.⁴⁵ This impression was produced not only by the protest's mass scale, but also its truly grassroots nature and the sincerity and courage of its participants, drawing together people from different social backgrounds and different political views.

European protests intensified even more after NATO's decision of 12 December 1979, to deploy Pershing-II missiles and the so-called medium-range cruise missiles in five Western European countries. Despite the tragedy of the situation, it suited the Soviet side that for the first time, the fear of the American threat in Western countries exceeded the fear of the Soviet threat.⁴⁶ The SPC can take partial credit for the success of the anti-war movement of the late 1970s, as its anti-American orientation aligned with the main line of Soviet propaganda at that time.

In the movement against American missiles, the SPC singled out groups such as the CND, Pax Christi, the Inter-Church Peace Council in Holland, the women from Greenham Common, Generals and Admirals for Peace and Disarmament, and various women's, religious, youth and trade union organisations. Representatives of Soviet ideological departments learned from Western scientific literature that one could call these organisations 'new

social movements'. The documents of the SPC show what persistent efforts were made to attract representatives of the new social movements into the ranks of the worldwide peace movement. Tair Tairov goes even further in recognising the significance of the anti-nuclear protests of this period: he believes that they 'demonstrated the possibilities of mass non-violent protests in Europe. In fact, I believe that mass demonstrations in the early 1980s were a prelude to the people's revolutions in Eastern Europe in 1989: people learned from each other'.⁴⁷

The Emergence of the Independent Peace Movement in the USSR

While supporting peace activists 'in the other camp', Moscow and its allies suppressed the slightest manifestations of unsanctioned peace initiatives at home. Soviet citizens felt alienated from the peace movement. The movement has remained in the historical memory of the former Soviet peoples as nothing more than 'dreary and hypocrisy-laced tedium'.⁴⁸ Indeed, it was impossible to carry out independent actions for peace in the USSR: some felt this intuitively, while others experienced this personally. Before the 1980s, there had been only one attempt to organise an independent peace movement in the USSR, initiated by the Soviet dissident Yuri Galanskov (1939–72) in the 1960s.⁴⁹ In the 1970s, there were several attempts to conduct uncoordinated anti-war street actions by Soviet hippies and ordinary schoolchildren, all of which were suppressed as potentially anti-Soviet initiatives.

In June 1982, the Group for Establishing Trust between the USSR and the USA (later between East and West), better known as the Trust Group, began its independent peace activity in the USSR. According to the 'Appeal', the programme document of the Trust Group, it was the absence of trust between the USSR and the United States, and between East and West, that was responsible for the nuclear threat hanging over humanity.⁵⁰ They appealed to the foreign and Soviet publics to launch independent, unofficial peace initiatives, and they challenged governments to 'secure the conditions' for an international, free and open exchange of opinions and information.⁵¹

The Soviet independent peace movement had a complex, paradoxical membership and support base. It emerged during the decline of Soviet dissident activity and attracted representatives from various social groups that were considered marginal from the Soviet perspective. Their cultural baggage, life experience, goals and motives were different and ranged from sincere idealism to outright cynicism. Refuseniks, scientists, parapsychologists, hippies,

artists, disabled people, representatives of persecuted religious groups, simple humanists and adventurers – all of them were united by the values of open society, nonviolence and humanism, as well as the belief that people's efforts are not useless and can change the existing system for the better.

The author of the idea of 'trust' was Sergei Batovrin, a twenty-five-year-old artist, hippie and refusenik. Sergei was a son of a Soviet diplomat, and between 1965 and 1970 he lived with his family in New York, where his father worked in the United Nations (UN) Secretariat. Batovrin embraced the best, humanistic aspects of Soviet culture, which, influenced by the counterculture of American youth, transformed into a genuine cosmopolitan idealism within him. After his return to the USSR, he took part in the Soviet hippie community and the Jewish emigration activity, but he was not satisfied with the political limitations of either movement.

The Trust Group began sending appeals to governments and the public in both superpowers and other countries on either side of the Iron Curtain, calling for an immediate halt to nuclear testing and proposing measures for establishing trust. They held regular research seminars on peace issues, and scholars and group members wrote research articles on peace-related topics. They also organised anti-war art exhibits. Between 1982 and 1987, the agenda of the Trust Group developed from anti-nuclear issues and citizen diplomacy to traditional pacifist activity, focusing on conscientious objectors' rights, alternative civil service, nonviolent education, civil resistance, ecological issues and so forth.

On the eve of the group's organisation, its future members studied the experience of their dissident predecessors and decided that they would not criticise the government, thereby making the movement legally invulnerable. They even asked that the police sign the 'Appeal', thereby wanting to show that they did not consider this document to be in opposition to Soviet policy.⁵² From the very beginning, the Trust Group proclaimed its support for all the disarmament initiatives of the Soviet government, the SPC and other peace groups. It appealed to official peace activists, expressed their solidarity and suggested that they collaborate.⁵³ It did not receive a single positive response to its letters.

From the group's inception, both the Soviet police and the KGB intensely scrutinised the locations of its meetings. The members of the Trust Group were subjected to detentions, arrests, threats, interrogations, searches, dismissal from work, internment in psychiatric hospitals, provocations, imprisonment, official warnings, accusations and psychological terror. Since the KGB could not directly accuse activists of participating in the peace movement, it fabricated charges of 'hooliganism' or anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda against them.

Western activists, for their part, looked to establish contact with the Trust Group. Between 1982 and 1988, groups such as END, the Interchurch Peace Council (IKV), Quaker Peace and Service, Women for Life on Earth travelled to the Soviet Union, attended group meetings and visited members at their homes. To express their solidarity with independent peace activists in the Soviet Union, foreign groups organised solidarity campaigns and demonstrations, and issued numerous leaflets, bulletins and zines expressing anti-nuclear, pacifist, and anti-borders sentiments.

The 'Détente from Below' Movement as a Challenge for the SPC

'Détente from below' was a broad, non-aligned movement in Europe and the United States, which shared some common ideas and values. Its supporters claimed that 'peace was threatened not just by the nuclear arms race, but also, and more fundamentally, by the Cold War itself: the confrontation – military, political, economic and cultural – between East and West. Both sides shared responsibility for the Cold War and its consequences'.⁵⁴ This idea was conceptually implemented in the END Appeal drafted by E.P. Thompson, Mary Kaldor, Dan Smith and Ken Coates in 1980.⁵⁵ From that time onwards, the European peace movement had two goals, one anti-nuclear and the other political: 'free[ing] Europe from confrontation ... enforc[ing] détente between the United States and the Soviet Union, and ultimately ... dissolv[ing] both great power alliances' – in short, ending the Cold War. The peace groups shared this purpose and 'stressed the need to create an alliance of independent citizen initiatives in East and West, an alliance that would create a Europe "beyond the blocs"'.⁵⁶

The following ideas were clearly formulated and subsequently embodied by the 'détente from below' movement: the thesis of equal responsibility of representatives from both blocs for the threat of nuclear war; the idea of a transnational community of activists capable of acting across national borders; the conviction of the need to liberate Europe from 'superpower occupation'; and the assertion of the necessity not only for technical disarmament but also for the ideological rapprochement of representatives from different blocs to end the Cold War.

The values of the movement assumed support for an independent peace movement in Eastern Europe. The interaction of the Western and Eastern European movements served to further develop the platform of 'détente from below'. The suppression of the Polish Solidarity movement and the repressions targeting other Eastern European grassroots initiatives pushed

some Western peace activists to proclaim the 'indivisibility' of the peace and human rights questions. This trend soon produced tensions in the peace movement between loyalists to the Moscow line and its critics, as many participants came to identify their cause with that of the Eastern European dissidents who claimed that a peace movement could not exist without a human rights agenda.

The SPC was very unhappy with the emergence of a movement with such a platform just as it was launching another campaign to expand the ranks of the peace movement. This came at a time when there was a global trend towards increasing the isolation of the USSR due to the outbreak of the war in Afghanistan and events in Poland.⁵⁷ The concept of the 'détente from below' movement and its support for the independent peace movement in Eastern Europe inevitably brought its supporters into conflict with the SPC and other official Soviet institutions. The history of this conflict is documented in the correspondence and discussions between the SPC and representatives of Western peace groups that supported the END platform and the independent peace movement in the USSR.⁵⁸ It is also reflected in the many articles and pamphlets published by both sides during these years, as well as at international events, especially the END Conventions.⁵⁹

The idea of equal responsibility evoked the greatest exasperation in the SPC. In Moscow, for ideological reasons, they could not admit the militarisation of the economy of the USSR: it was assumed that in socialist countries, governments act in the interests of the people, and that forces interested in the development of the military-industrial complex simply cannot exist under a socialist property system. Many memoirists from the Soviet establishment and the scientific elite write that while promoting the peace policy of the USSR, they remained in the dark about the true size of the USSR military budget and the size and nature of the country's nuclear arsenal.⁶⁰

Soviet concerns over tactical and ideological splits in the Western European peace movement were expressed in an open letter by Yuri Zhukov that was sent to several hundred Western, non-Communist peace groups in Western Europe on 2 December 1982. The letter accused END activists of supporting the equal responsibility concept. In addition, Zhukov criticised Western peace groups for favouring ties with independent peace movements in Eastern Europe. According to Lokshin, Zhukov's letter 'was his serious miscalculation [on his part], which he himself later regretted more than once'.⁶¹

In August 1983, the influential Soviet newspaper *Literaturnaia Gazeta* published a discussion between the British professor Gabriel Horn and

the high-ranking Russian academician Evgenii Primakov, entitled 'When Fighters for Peace Must Oppose Their Governments'. Horn stated that Western peace groups had an independent voice and opposed the governments of both blocs, including their own. However, he did not see such independent movements in the USSR, so he concluded that the Soviet peace movement was controlled by the government. According to Primakov, 'this [arose] not because the peace movement in the USSR [was] some kind of continuation of the line of its government, but because the actions of the Soviet leadership reflect[ed] the true aspirations and wishes of the Soviet people'.⁶²

At the same time, the SPC intensified its efforts to promote the idea of the truly popular nature of the peace movement in the USSR. An ever-increasing number of publications from local peace committees, as well as interviews with 'grassroots' activists, ordinary workers and teachers began to appear in the press. Soviet TV, in an effort to demonstrate the official peace movement's grassroots nature, showed housewives drafting their own peace statements and appeals.⁶³ In their memoirs, former SPC functionaries speak of their attitude to the appearance of 'détente from below', displaying the whole gamut of contradictory emotions. On the one hand, they tended to seek excuses for their previous negative attitude towards the movement: its appearance and the subsequent course of events damaged the reputation of Soviet peace programmes, disrupted the plans of the SPC to expand the base of the movement, and negatively affected the careers of its officials. On the other hand, today they acknowledge the value of the ideas of 'détente from below'. One can even detect a kind of remorse for participating in the campaign to discredit E.P. Thompson and his associates. For Lokshin, his role in this campaign no longer evokes 'anything but bitterness and regret'.⁶⁴ He demonstrates excellent knowledge of Thompson's anti-nuclear books and pays tribute to his ideas. He admits that the END Appeal was indeed 'striking and convincing', and that 'in 8 to 10 years, these theses in our country would not have surprised anyone and would even have found many supporters'.⁶⁵

Tairov claims that he did not participate in the campaign against the END, but, on the contrary, sympathetically followed the development of the 'détente from below' movement. According to him, in contrast to the SPC, 'the Soviet Party leaders took the END movement very seriously and the Central Committee was anxious to know as much as possible about it', and he always informed the Soviet leadership about trends in the Western peace movements.⁶⁶

The Independent Peace Movement and Official Soviet Peace Organisations

The SPC took an antagonistic stance towards the independent peace groups from the outset. It viewed the emergence of the unofficial peace movement in the USSR as part of a Western plot aimed not only at discrediting the SPC but also at undermining the socialist system by encouraging organised opposition to the regime.⁶⁷ Moscow was convinced that the 'NATO public relations department' began to create 'their own' public organisations and movements in the United States and other countries to counter the anti-war movement.⁶⁸ They interpreted the formation of the Trust Group as a provocation by Western special services, intentionally prepared to coincide with the beginning of the 'Peace March 82'. From their perspective, the purpose of this provocation was to discredit the pro-peace movement developing under the SPC's leadership. They believed it aimed to convince Western participants that they were dealing with an 'official' peace movement and that only the 'independents' truly represented public opinion.⁶⁹

The SPC's archival fond holds a large number of letters from Western peace activists and ordinary people concerned about the crackdown on the Trust Group. The standard response from SPC officials included the statement that there was a mass, independent, nongovernmental movement of Soviet citizens for peace in the USSR, as represented by their committee. The response would also list the latest activities of the SPC. They also portrayed the Trust Group as impostors who replicated the SPC's programme and aimed to discredit the Soviet peace movement:

A simple question suggests itself – what for these people had need to proclaim arrogantly the creation of a certain supposedly 'independent' (of whom? or of what?) organization, virtually applying for support and publicity to certain Western circles (and they have their support!), which use any occasion for the slanderous representation of the Soviet reality. Why they have not wished to join the many-millions movement of the Soviet peace supporters? Why they have not donated a kopeck to the Soviet Peace Fund?⁷⁰

These responses often emphasised that the Trust Group contained many refuseniks, who sought to emigrate from the USSR.

The SPC categorically denied the right of the Trust Group to remain involved in the peace movement and to seek independent contact with the Western public. Even the most innocent anti-war actions of the Trust

Group were immediately suppressed. On 5 August 1982, representatives of the police and the KGB prevented the opening in a private apartment of an exhibition of works by Sergei Batovrin, dedicated to Hiroshima. KGB officers seized eighty-eight anti-war paintings by Batovrin and took him first to the military service registration office, and from there to the psychiatric hospital No. 14, to the department of the seriously ill, where they at once began giving him anti-depressants.⁷¹ According to Batovrin's account, the deputy chief physician told him: 'We will treat you as long as it takes. Until you stop acting on your own in the international arena. Your "peace" activities are caused by mental illness, because only the Soviet government can fight for peace.'⁷²

As Mark Reitman, an activist of the Trust Group, recalls, a KGB officer told him that the Trust Group was an 'anarchist organization': 'The Soviet Union has been struggling for peace since 1917. And then, ten people come along and declare that they are "fighters for peace" and the Soviet Union is just doing nothing. Do you know how many people put their signatures on the [second] Stockholm appeal? (I can answer – 167 million). There is the Peace Committee. Go and fight there.'⁷³

Although the Trust Group members received many invitations to attend international peace conferences, the Soviet authorities routinely denied them exit visas. No members from the USSR, for example, attended the END Conventions before 1989. They were also forcibly excluded from domestic events. During the Scandinavian women's peace march in July 1982, the Moscow International Youth Festival in July 1985, the Twenty-Seventh Communist Party Congress in February 1986 and the Goodwill Games in July 1986, independent peace activists were detained and confined to psychiatric hospitals to prevent them from organising demonstrations or contacting the foreigners in attendance. In July 1987, during the three-week-long American-Soviet Peace Walk from Leningrad to Moscow, seven members who travelled to Leningrad to try to join the rally were detained and sent back to Moscow.⁷⁴

The complete list of ideological objections to the Trust Group's position was detailed in two expert assessments conducted in August 1982. These assessments were based on a draft of the Trust Group's 'Appeal' that was confiscated during the detention of Alexander Shatravka.⁷⁵ According to these experts, while the document appeared pacifist at first glance, it was actually anti-Soviet and aligned with Western propaganda. It equated the USSR with the United States and the CPSU with American political parties, attempted to undermine the significance of modern peace movements, and promoted the cosmopolitan idea of a global force above governments. Additionally, it sought to pit 'a certain public' against the Soviet government.⁷⁶

Perestroika, 'New Thinking' and the 'Reboot' of the Peace Movement

Perestroika brought about a fundamental shift in Soviet foreign policy. During this period, Mikhail Gorbachev's 'new thinking' closely aligned with anti-nuclear, environmental and pacifist ideas, as well as concepts about the interdependence of the globalising world, expressed by both international and Soviet scholars.⁷⁷ This policy was introduced by Gorbachev in February/March 1986 and in the following years was reinforced both theoretically, in Gorbachev's book, *Perestroika: New Thinking for Our Country and the World*, published in 1987, and practically, in a series of high-level meetings, summits and forums with Western leaders. In his speech at the UN General Assembly on 7 December 1988, Gorbachev renounced the principle of class struggle as the basis of the Soviet foreign policy and recognised the priority of 'universal values; and 'trust', the 'global interdependence' of all powers and the need to convert 'the economy of armaments into a disarmament economy'. He urged the United States to cooperate with the Soviet Union in ending the Cold War by stopping the arms race, and to seek to resolve regional conflicts without the use of force.⁷⁸

The SPC had to adjust its ideology to the new prescriptions of the Communist Party. In this period, the SPC replaced its chairman Yuri Zhukov with Genrikh Borovik, who was perceived as more 'liberal'. The updated SPC ideology gradually came to embrace the ideas of 'détente from below' and the agenda of the Trust Group. During this period, the concepts of 'trust', 'independent peace initiatives', 'grassroots peace movement' and 'humanisation of peoples' relations' became extremely widespread in the discourse of Soviet peace organisations. This marked a striking contrast to their being labelled 'anti-Soviet' only a year earlier. The SPC started to direct attention to the issues raised by peace activist groups in the Soviet Union and abroad, such as the inherent connection between 'peace' and 'human rights', overcoming the enemy image, ecological problems, conscientious objection and alternative civil service, civil transformation of defence conversion, and ideas of pacifism and nonviolence.

From 1987, the SPC increasingly emphasised the role of the 'public' in foreign policy. Media articles highlighted the need to put the activities of the foreign affairs agency under the control of the 'public' and even suggested that the 'public' be involved in preliminary discussions of foreign policy decisions.⁷⁹ Especially striking among the innovations was the rehabilitation of pacifism. Already in the first half of the 1980s, it became evident that the ideological ban on pacifism was weakened by the influence of war

fears in Soviet society. In the early 1980s, the WPC and the SPC began to actively cooperate with Western pacifist groups, and in 1987 started to publish articles on the need to revise the Soviet attitude towards pacifism as a doctrine.⁸⁰ In his memoirs, Grigory Lokshin not only declared his positive attitude towards pacifism, but also demonstrated an excellent knowledge of its history.⁸¹ We can conclude that from 1987, the SPC changed its tactics. Although it continued to persecute independent peace groups, it incrementally co-opted their agenda, concepts and political language. This allowed the SPC to establish closer ties with segments of the Western peace movement with which it had previously struggled to connect.

During Perestroika, independent peace activists gained the right to present their ideas at official events and meetings. Among others, in May 1987, Irina Krivova, a representative of the Trust Group, delivered a speech at the Fourth Information Meeting-Dialogue sponsored by the SPC. This only became possible thanks to the pressure put on SPC officials by foreign peace activists. However, only one speaker from the group was admitted, and the SPC insisted that the content of the Trust Group's presentation be submitted to it beforehand. The event was a sensation for the foreign participants of the meeting who called it 'a historic moment in the development of the peaceful movement in the USSR'.⁸² There were several other forums in Moscow in which the Trust Group participated in 1987, including international ones.

At the same time, the authorities continued to obstruct the Trust Group's activities by denying exit visas and banning street actions, among other measures. In July 1987, SPC officials prevented Trust Group representatives from participating in the 6th END Convention in Coventry, United Kingdom. Instead, the SPC sent an imposter disguised as a representative of the Trust Group. At the Convention, this person spoke in unison with official Soviet delegation and never participated in any other peace activities afterwards.⁸³ In 1987, the Soviet authorities continued to suppress street actions organised by the Trust Group and its regional branches. In February, the pacifists failed to hold a demonstration for alternative civil service because most of the potential participants had been detained on the eve of the action. In the spring of that year, all their attempts to organise street actions were thwarted. On 10 May 1987, the Trust Group together with hippies organised a meeting at Gogolevskii Boulevard under human rights and pacifist slogans. Demonstrators were attacked by unknown people calling themselves 'representatives of the public' (*obshchestvennost*). This action had another uncommon feature in that, for the first time ever, reports in the Soviet press favoured the young people. The autumn of 1987 saw continued persecution of street actions against the war in Afghanistan and arrests of independent peace activists in Moscow, Leningrad and Lviv.

‘*Neformaly*’ for Peace: GONGOs Disguised as ‘Grassroots Peace Initiatives’

It was an old Soviet tradition, but starting in 1987, the SPC intensified its efforts by establishing pseudo-public organisations and engaging youth groups to collaborate in the struggle for peace. It resulted in the boom of government-organised NGOs (GONGOs) that pretended to be grassroots organisations. These now drew supporters not only from the usual pool of prominent scientists, writers, artists and members of different religious groups, but also from independent youth activists of the so-called ‘informal’ organisations (*neformaly*) that the authorities allowed to exist during Perestroika.

In the mid-1980s, there was a surge of interest towards *neformaly* from both the state and intellectuals, manifested primarily in the realms of documentaries and social sciences. The term ‘neformaly’ became popular in the Soviet Union during the Perestroika era. It referred to representatives of various youth subcultures, and members of informal associations (as opposed to official ones) who the state and its experts – sociologists, psychologists and teachers – had ceased to categorise as socially marginal (‘difficult youth’) and began to perceive as agents of civil society. For the first time since the beginning of Perestroika, there arose a need to adapt the old Soviet version of the ‘public’ (*obshchestvennost’*) to new realities, including the explosive growth of grassroots social initiatives. In the concept of *neformaly*, Soviet scholars and bureaucracy found an alternative to the notion of *obshchestvennost’*, associated with a lack of independence and initiative.

In the summer and autumn of 1987, the problem of the political activity of *neformaly* was discussed at the higher levels of the Communist Party and the KGB. All ‘informal’ groups were divided into ‘good’ (i.e. useful for the Party and the Komsomol) and ‘bad’ (whose activities were associated with influences from abroad and harmful to Perestroika). The Trust Group was classified into the second category. The KGB decided to start ‘demoralising’ such groups from the inside by infiltrating them with its agents.⁸⁴ Another tool used to control the public activity was evident to Western observers, who noted that ‘in addition to trying to co-opt *informals*, Soviet authorities also attempted to lure their members into official organizations that appeared to mirror the views and goals proclaimed by the independents’.⁸⁵

The SPC and some other Soviet official organisations ‘energetically began forming groups under their aegis that were completely subordinate to them’.⁸⁶ It is challenging to locate documents in the Russian archives that detail which state organisations participated in the creation of these

numerous GONGOs, how they were controlled and who financed them.⁸⁷ We can assume that besides the SPC and the International Department (one of its branches took care of public organisations), there were other official organisations (Komsomol, trade unions, the Soviet Women Committee, etc.) and ministries that also created pseudo-informal groups. Obviously, several academic institutes were also involved in this activity.⁸⁸

Nevertheless, I identified several public organisations with a focus on the struggle for peace. While their status as GONGOs has not yet been confirmed in the documents, their true origins can be discerned through the typically Soviet discourse they use for self-description and communication with other public actors. Additionally, their access to freedoms and resources unavailable to similar organisations or groups – such as free street actions, international travel and the free publication of periodicals – further indicates their origins. These groups enjoyed extraordinary freedom at a time when independent peaceniks were being persecuted. The history of some 'informal' groups can demonstrate the way in which they hijacked the agenda and international contacts of independent peace activists.

According to the directory of informal organisations, the *Vakhta mira* (Peace Watch) group was founded in the spring of 1987 to support American scientist and dissident Dr Charles Hyder during his hunger strike near the White House.⁸⁹ The group aimed at 'creating an international movement for a world without violence'.⁹⁰ It collaborated not only with the SPC but also with the local Komsomol organisation that provided its premises for free to hold weekly seminars on the history of public movements.

Vakhta mira organised seminars to discuss the problems of war and peace, people diplomacy, the democratisation of Soviet society and ecological issues, and even succeeded in organising public discussions in the 'Hyde Park' format in Leningrad. From 21 March 1987, in the same period as the police and the KGB prevented the Trust Group from organising any street actions, this group held its weekly meetings in the city centre. In early 1989, the branches of *Vakhta mira* operated in more than ten cities across the Soviet Union.

In the summer of 1987, the SPC demanded that the Trust Group cancel its human rights agenda, but just a few months later, in December, it organised the Peace and Human Rights discussion club. The SPC took special pride in the club and called it 'a social experiment' and 'the most informal entity out of all informal groups', or even an analogue of the Speaker's Corner in London's Hyde Park.⁹¹ TASS reported on the club in the spirit of initiatives of the Trust Group from the early 1980s: 'In the circumstances of *glasnost*' and democratization of Soviet society, foreign policy ceases to be the matter of professionals only. The public (*obshchestvennost*) is increasingly

initiating constructive actions.⁹² The SPC demonstrated that from now on, 'peace' and 'human rights' were 'indivisible' for them and for the Soviet officials as well.⁹³

Another illustrative case is the 'Musicians for Peace' movement created in the summer of 1987, initially as an amateur club supported by a local Komsomol committee in Moscow. The SPC claimed that Soviet rock musicians (an impressive total of seventy-two rock bands) joined the movement under the leadership of Alexander Gradsky (1949–2021). One of the goals of the movement was collaboration with Western rock musicians in the struggle for peace by citizen diplomacy and people-to-people contacts.⁹⁴ At a certain point, musicians turned to cooperation with the SPC. As such, it was a striking case of a symbiosis of *neformaly* and Soviet 'official' peace activists.

On 12–13 August 1989, the Moscow Music Peace Festival (known as the 'Russian Woodstock') was held at Luzhniki Stadium. This first international rock festival in the Soviet Union featured Western rock stars Bon Jovi, Ozzy Osbourne, Skid Row, Mötley Crüe, Scorpions, Cinderella and Gorky Park. Under the slogan 'Rock against Drugs', it aimed at demonstrating the level of freedom in the country. Over two days, more than 150,000 people attended the festival. It was broadcast in fifty-nine countries with TV audiences reaching about one billion. The Moscow Music Peace Festival was the best international PR action in the history of the SPC. 'What we were really struck by were the people', recalls Doc McGhee, an American music manager who attended the Festival. 'They were ready for change.' After this visit to the Soviet Union, The Scorpions band recorded their famous song 'Wind of Change'.⁹⁵

Clearly, everyone in these groups wanted peace. Sometimes they had no idea they were being used, but some *neformaly* deliberately pretended to be peace activists in order to gain access to privileges that could only be granted by official Soviet organisations, such as exit visas. For the SPC, they were important in demonstrating mass support for Perestroika.

In the late 1980s and 1990s, such organisations were actively used on the international scene, establishing contacts and accessing financial and other resources of genuine anti-militarist and pacifist groups. For example, two such groups, 'Musicians for Peace' and the ecological group 'The Green World', accompanied the SPC in the aforementioned 1987 END Congress in Coventry. At the annual Convention of END in the summer of 1988 in Lund, Sweden, Trust Group members were once again denied access, while the organisers of the Convention invited official delegates from the SPC without a prior guarantee that independent activists would be allowed to attend.⁹⁶

The activists of the Soviet independent peace groups attended two END Conventions in 1990 and 1991. However, by that time, the agenda of Trust Group leaders had already extended beyond peace activism. Among the active participants of these conventions were only those members of the Trust Group who collaborated with a new NGO founded by Tair Tairov: the Civic Peace. Almost none of these groups survived the collapse of the USSR. In the 1990s, the SPC was transformed into the Federation of Peace and Reconciliation. Despite many noteworthy initiatives of the Federation in the first post-Soviet decade, at that time the movement on the whole rapidly declined and soon collapsed completely. The Trust Group gradually dissolved into the new grassroots peace initiatives of 1988–90. Those of the group's leaders who did not emigrate became active in the 1990s in the Transnational Radical Party and several other small anti-militarist projects. Almost all peace groups of the 1990s aiming at educating society in the spirit of nonviolence and promoting the alternative civil service and peace making in the North Caucasus had disappeared by the beginning of the 2000s.

Conclusion

Russia's full-scale war against Ukraine began shortly after this chapter was written. Civil society in Russia was caught off guard by both the military preparations and the outbreak of the war. To understand why there is no significant peace movement in Russia today, it is essential to consider the influence of the Soviet legacy, including Soviet propaganda and the relationship between the state and society.

Holger Nehring and Benjamin Ziemann have demonstrated persuasively that 'the peace movement did not merely emerge in response to the break-up of détente. Instead ... [the] activists, already dissatisfied with the specific kind of democracy under which they lived ... regarded peace activism as the appropriate issue to voice their concerns'.⁹⁷ This conclusion is especially true of the 'détente from below' movement and the independent peace movement in Eastern Europe. Their emergence became a real challenge for Soviet propagandists, pushing them not only to the 'new political thinking' doctrine, but also to the reconsideration of many domestic policy issues. They prompted the SPC to reconsider its social base, its ways of interacting with the general public and its role in the formation of civil society in the Soviet Union. The SPC and other Soviet 'official' peace activists expanded their circle of foreign contacts as much as possible and began to collaborate even with those movements they had previously considered anti-Soviet.

In the recollections of SPC memoirists, attempts to reflect on achievements and mistakes of the Soviet peace movement are combined with sincere regret that the movement ceased to exist in post-Soviet Russia. While Kharkhardin laments the absence of a peace movement in contemporary Russia of countering what he considers aggressive policies of NATO and the United States, Lokshin is deeply concerned about the militarisation of thought and culture in Russia, the lack of dialogue between the government and society, and the absence of grassroots control over foreign policy.⁹⁸ Neither of them acknowledges the role the SPC played in the peace movement's demise.

The Soviet independent peace movement, which closely aligned with the Western pacifists in its ideas, remained a genuine enemy for the SPC. Even in their memoirs, SPC officials did not find impartial words for it. Although they allowed 'informals' into the struggle for peace, SPC officials could not abandon the notion that initiatives from below should not be spontaneous and 'happen of their own accord'. They were convinced that grassroots initiatives always needed leadership from above, from 'professional' organisers. Therefore, the 'democratisation' of the peace movement by the SPC evolved into attempts by the Soviet authorities to usurp the civil society agenda and create a special, controlled zone within it, and from the end of the 1980s to the 1990s in Russia, the newly emerged truly independent peace groups coexisted with a large number of GONGOs.

This story helps to explain why the achievements of the 'new thinking' were so short-lived and were practically nullified at the national level within ten to fifteen years. It is impossible to create human agency artificially or to imitate it. The idea of a social movement directed and controlled from above, such as embodied in the Soviet peace movement, has suffered a historic collapse.

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Notes

1. Rose, *Campaigns against Western Defence*; Wernicke, *The Race to Tip the Scales*; Wettig, 'The Last Soviet Offensive'; Ziemann and Nehring, 'Do All Paths Lead to Moscow?'; Egorova, *Narodnaia Diplomatii i Iadernogo Veka*.
2. Here the term 'independent peace groups' embraces both the Western peace groups that were not pro-Soviet and opposed the nuclear weapons of both sides, and the independent peace movement that emerged in the Socialist Bloc countries (Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Poland, East Germany and the Soviet Union) in the late 1970s and early 1980s. This movement acted independently of the 'official' peace movement and linked the peace theme to the issues of pacifism, anti-militarism and human rights. Their ideologies and protest tactics combined the traits of late dissident groups and new social movements. Their activity made a considerable contribution to the 'Velvet' Revolution in Eastern Europe in the late 1980s and early 1990s.
3. Kaldor, *Europe from Below*.
4. This archive is extensive, but consists mainly of correspondence with foreign peace activists and contains no records to reveal the decision-making process in the SPC.
5. Lokshin, 'Vek Probudivshikhsia Mass'; Lokshin, *Kto za Chto, a My za Mir*; Lokshin, *SSSR i Dvizhenie Solidarnosti*.
6. Especially striking is a recent interview with Tair Tairov: Suomen Rauhanliitto, *40 Years*.
7. Kharkhardin, *Sorok Let*; Kharkhardin, *Mezhdu Staroi Ploschad'u i Prospektom Mira*.
8. Kharkhardin, *Sovetskii Komitet*, 206.
9. Lokshin, 'Vek Probudivshikhsia Mass', 187.
10. Lokshin, 'Vek Probudivshikhsia Mass', 185.
11. Kharkhardin, *Sovetskii Komitet*, 207.
12. Lokshin, 'Vek Probudivshikhsia Mass', 184.
13. Lokshin, 'Kto za Chto', 68.
14. Lokshin, 'Vek Probudivshikhsia Mass', 186.
15. *Ibid*, 157, 189.
16. The memoirs of Kharhardin and Lokshin contain significant parts with verbatim textual matches. Perhaps we are dealing with a relic of the phenomenon of collective authorship, which was widely accepted in Soviet propaganda texts.
17. Mikhailov, *Mir v Sobstvennom Dome*, 380.
18. A labour correspondent was a nonstaff correspondent from the working environment.
19. Zhukov, *Tridtsat' Besed s Telezriteliami*.
20. Zhukov, *SSSR-SSHA*.
21. Kharkhardin, *Sorok Let*, 6. The author admits that over the past years, his attitude towards Stalin 'of course, could not help but change'; however, 'this change was not cardinal'.
22. Mikhailov, *Mir*, 374–75.
23. See, among othersm Kharkhardin et al., *Obshchestvennost' i Problemy Voiny i Mira*; Kharkhardin, *Volia Narodov*; Kharkhardin, *Sovetskaia Obshchestvennost'*.

24. Kharkhardin, *Sorok Let*, 59.
25. See the personal impression of Ann Pettitt from Greenham Common on Kharkhardin: Pettitt, *Walking to Greenham*, 240–53.
26. Lokshin, 'K 75-letii'u'.
27. Lokshin, 'SSSR', 364–85.
28. *Ibid*, 364.
29. Lokshin, *Vsemirnyi Kongress*; Lokshin, *Vmeste My Pobedim*; Lokshin, *Narody Vossta'ut Protiv Voiny*.
30. Jarman, *The Demise of the Soviet Peace Committee*.
31. Suomen Rauhanliitto, '40 Years', 8.
32. Tairov, 'From New Thinking to a Civic Peace', 46.
33. Gosudarsvennyi Departament SSHA, 'Genrikh Borovik', 60–61.
34. United States Department of State Washington, *Foreign Affairs Note*, 1, 3.
35. Velekhov, 'Borovik'. I failed to find materials which can confirm this claim.
36. Tarle, *Dvizhenie Storonnikov Mira*, 52.
37. Lokshin, 'Vek Probudivshikhsia Mass', 185.
38. Volkov, "'Obschestvennost'".
39. Bogdanov, 'Delo Vsego Naroda'.
40. Zhukov, 'Doklad na Soveschaniia Komitetov', 54.
41. Egorova, 'Narodnaia Diplomatia', 258–60.
42. *Ibid*, 110.
43. Kharkhardin, *Sorok Let*, 43.
44. *Ibid*, 95.
45. *Ibid*, 54.
46. Lokshin, 'Vek Probudivshikhsia Mass', 207.
47. Tairov, 'From New Thinking to a Civic Peace', 45.
48. Reitman, 'Mir i ne ot Mira Sego', 43.
49. Galanskov, *Yuri Galanskov*, 86–97. Galanskov and his dissident friends were arrested in 1968; they were convicted under several articles, including 'anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda'. Galanskov was sentenced to seven years in prison, where he died in 1972.
50. See the collection of Trust Group documents from the first years of its existence: Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, *Documents of the Soviet Groups to Establish Trust*.
51. Gordeeva, 'The Spirit of Pacifism'.
52. Trust Group, 'Pis'mo Gruppy Doveriia', 3.
53. Godiak, Medvedkov and Reitman, 'Otkrytoe Pis'mo', 1–2.
54. Burke, 'Détente from Below'.
55. Burke, 'European Nuclear Disarmament'.
56. Burke, 'Détente from Below'.
57. Lokshin, 'Vek Probudivshikhsia Mass', 216.
58. SPC, 'Zapis' Besedy s Ul'iamom Bartonom', 40–45; SPC, 'Materialy k Dokladu na Zasedanii Prezidiuma SKZM'.
59. Burke, 'A Transcontinental Movement of Citizens?', 189–206.
60. Arbatov, *Zatianvsheesia Vyzdorovleniei*, 233–34.

61. Lokshin, 'Vek Probudivshikhhsia Mass', 216.
62. Horn and Primakov, 'Dolznyi li Bortsy za Mir', 10.
63. Reitman, *Mir*, 52.
64. Lokshin, 'Vek Probudivshikhhsia Mass', 218.
65. *Ibid*, 215, 218.
66. Tairov, 'From New Thinking to a Civic Peace', 45.
67. Gruppa Doveriia, 'Materialy o Gruppe Doveriia', 5.
68. Lokshin, 'Vek Probudivshikhhsia Mass', 208.
69. *Ibid*, 215.
70. Buyanov, 'Letter to Mrs. J. Hackett'.
71. Gruppa Doveriia, 'Soobschenie o Presledovaniiakh Chlenov', 16.
72. Batovrin, 'Soobschenie o Presledovaniiakh Chlenov', 2. Batovrin was released only a month later.
73. Gruppa Doveriia, 'Materialy o Gruppe Doveriia', 5.
74. Fitzpatrick and Fleischman, *From Below*, 117.
75. In the summer of 1982, while working in Tiumen region, Shatravka and his friend Vladimir Mishchenko distributed a draft of the appeal among workers. They were convicted under Article 190–1 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Soviet Socialist Republic, 'Dissemination of fabrications known to be false, which defame the Soviet political and social system'. Shatravka was sentenced to three years in the camps and Mishchenko to one year.
76. Shatravka, 'Bor'ba za Mir', 38–40.
77. Burlatskii, *Novoe Myshlenie*, 138–67.
78. Cherniaev, *Otvechaia*, 29–34.
79. Tarle, *Dvizhenie Storonnikov Mira*, 233.
80. *Ibid*, 218, 231.
81. Lokshin, 'Vek Probudivshikhhsia Mass', 168.
82. Fitzpatrick and Fleischman, *From Below*, 129–30.
83. Tismaneanu, *In Search of Civil Society*, 67.
84. Petrov, 'Podrazdeleniia KGB SSSR', 176–77.
85. Fitzpatrick and Alexeyeva, *Nyeformaly*, 11.
86. *Ibid*, 52.
87. There are almost no documents for 1985 and beyond in the archives of the SPC; the yearly scope of the files of this period is significantly less than in previous years and looks like a random collection of separate documents. So the Perestroika period cannot be explored on the base of this archive.
88. See also Tairov's story about the NGOs he created during Perestroika: Suomen Rauhanliitto, '40 Years', 24, 27–31.
89. The expression 'vakhta mira' (peace watch) was derived from the Soviet political vocabulary, where it meant a working campaign at plants; money earned during this period were transferred to the Peace Fund.
90. Berezovskii and Krotov, *Neformal'naia Rossiia*, 353–54.
91. Mlechin, 'Gaid-Park', 41.
92. TASS, 'Diskussionnyi Klub'.
93. Apparently, the similar processes of creating GONGOs took place in other areas;

see the story how the state attempted to hijack the idea of the ‘Memorial’ society (Liozina, *XX Vek*, 512–19) and the story of how the dissident’s Press Club ‘Glasnost’ was mirrored by the creation of the Public Commission for International Cooperation on Humanitarian Problems and Human Rights (Fitzpatrick and Alexeyeva, *Nyeformaly*, 23).

94. Rudnitskaia, ‘Budet Muzyka?’, 34–35, 37.
95. Sinelschikova, ‘How the “Russian Woodstock” Became a Reality’.
96. Khramov, ‘Ekho Konventa’, 39–41.
97. Ziemann and Nehring, ‘Do All Paths Lead to Moscow?’, 3.
98. Lokshin, ‘Vek Probudivshikhsia Mass’, 172, 236.

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Part II

**Co-opting and Adopting
Anti-nuclear Rhetoric: Three Leaders**

Olof Palme and the Peace Movements in Sweden in the Late Cold War Period

Thomas Jonter

Introduction

On 23 June 1982, Olof Palme, Prime Minister of Sweden from 1969 to 1976 and again from October 1982 until his assassination in 1986, delivered a speech at the United Nations (UN) Second Special Session on Disarmament, which in many respects echoes the spirit of the time in Western Europe. In his speech, he talked about disarmament and possible solutions to halt the nuclear arms race and prevent the world from running into a nuclear war. Palme started off by thanking the global social movements for their disarmament engagement:

a special appreciation of the non-governmental organizations, the popular movements, the peace groups, the churches, the doctors, the trade unions, the scientists – all those that have together formed public opinion and have created such a strong popular support for disarmament in the last two years or so.¹

Palme was speaking in his capacity as Chairman of the Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security, which was created in 1980. The aim of the Commission, often called the Palme Commission, was 'to contribute to the dialogue on security issues and to find new practical ways for the disarmament efforts. The members of the Commission came from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and Warsaw Pact nations, from neutral and non-aligned states, from industrialised as well as

developing countries, and they all served in a private capacity. Some of its members were prominent statesmen and experts such as Cyrus Vance, the former US Secretary of State, David Owen, the former Foreign Minister of the United Kingdom, and Georgy Arbatov, the foreign policy advisor to the Soviet government.

Chairman Palme continued his speech, where he presented the Palme Commission's report on common security. The concept of common security became an often-cited concept in the late Cold War, meaning that 'no country can obtain security, in the long run, simply by taking unilateral decisions about its own military deployment'. This is because security also depends on the actions and reactions of potential adversaries. Security must be found in common with those adversaries. In the words of the Palme Commission's report: 'States can no longer seek security at each other's expense; it can be obtained only through cooperative undertakings.'² Once again, Palme stressed the importance of social movements' impact on the international politics of disarmament:

I certainly do not agree with all arguments, or all slogans or all proposals from these groups but I think that we should all recognize what a great service they have rendered. They have made us all much more aware of the dangers of the arms race ... I am convinced that without all these arguments put forward in books and articles, at seminars and conferences and without these marches and demonstrations we would not have been able to see how negotiations that have been idle now are being revived. And we would not have had the many proposals to reduce, to freeze, to cut or not to use nuclear weapons, that have been put forward lately.³

Sweden was quite the outlier on several fronts. First, Olof Palme and his Social Democratic Party, unlike other Western European leaders, did not feel threatened by peace mobilisation. Instead, he reached out to the peace movements in Sweden, officially proposing to them to join forces in the name of peace. In contrast to most Western European countries in the 1980s, Sweden was a non-aligned state and therefore not a member of NATO. Although Sweden had an advanced nuclear weapon programme in development in the 1950s and 1960s, it abandoned these plans with the signing of the Treaty of the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and rose to become one of the most recognised players in the international game of disarmament.⁴ Under the leadership of Olof Palme, Sweden gradually embraced a highly profiled 'active foreign policy' that strove for East–West détente, North–South dialogue and solidarity with the Third World.

The core of this policy was to defend 'small state interests' as a discursive alternative to the antithetical bipolarism of the Cold War. The active foreign policy mantra became a way to defend the neutral position's moral and ideological legitimacy. It made it easier to deal with the contradiction in Sweden's ideological and economic belonging to the Western world, while retaining a non-aligned status in foreign policy.⁵ In this context, the moral and ideological active foreign policy was in many respects a break from the strict neutral foreign policy that was pursued by the Social Democratic Minister of Foreign Affairs Östen Undén during the 1950s.⁶ The Swedish disarmament and nonproliferation policy came to play a key role in defining and developing this activist foreign policy.

As Olof Palme got more involved in issues of disarmament, he was acutely aware of the importance of winning over public opinion both nationally and internationally in order to push for successful initiatives. He spent much time travelling to meet state leaders and representatives from civil society, peace organisations, churches and scientific communities.⁷ The creation of the Swedish Social Democratic think tank Fredsforum (Peace Forum) in 1981 was another important step. The organisation was founded when Olof Palme was appointed chairman of the Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security in 1980. The Peace Forum aimed to act as a global hub for nongovernmental organisations (NGOs), politicians, media, science and civil society organisations, with the intention to raise public awareness around the threat of nuclear weapons. The social democratic think tank viewed itself as a bridge between politics and the world of social movements.⁸ Swedish ambassador Alva Myrdal, a global leader for disarmament who also received the Nobel Peace Prize in 1982, was chosen to act as chairman of Fredsforum, which gave the organisation a high international status.

In Sweden, as in many Western European countries, peace mobilisation involved numerous organisations with different backgrounds and identities. This chapter focuses on the two most active peace groups and their interactions with the Swedish Social Democratic disarmament policy: the Swedish section of the Womens' International League for Peace & Freedom (IKFF) and the Swedish Peace and Arbitration Society (SPAS). In addition, the work of other groups will also be touched upon. How did these two peace groups mobilise and what kind of strategies were attempted to influence governmental decision making? What kind of collaboration existed among different Swedish peace groups and their counterparts in the Scandinavian neighbour states and in Eastern and Western Europe? In addition to working towards the elimination of nuclear weapons, opposition to nuclear power started to grow in Sweden in the 1970s. Indeed, social activism against nuclear power became so influential in the domestic debate that a national referendum on

its future was held in 1980. Did the IKFF and the SPAS view the campaign against nuclear power as a part of their struggle against nuclear weapons? Did they collaborate with anti-nuclear power resistance groups, especially the umbrella organisation *Folkkampanjen Nej till kärnkraft* (the No to Nuclear Power Campaign), which was the leading actor in Sweden at the time? Although it is correct to say that many of the members of the peace movements in Sweden had an ideological orientation towards parties on the left side of the political spectrum, there were no strict boundaries between the social movements against nuclear arms and the movements against nuclear power. For example, *Centerpartiet* (the Centre Party), the biggest party among the liberal-conservative parties in the Parliament, was against nuclear power. In fact, all parties in the Parliament supported the disarmament policy that evolved after Sweden abandoned its nuclear weapons program in 1968.⁹ In other words, there was no specific Swedish nuclear culture that encompassed a common standpoint against both nuclear power and nuclear weapons. However, it can be argued that Olof Palme's disarmament proposals and activities were indeed more offensive and radical than the liberal-conservative view on disarmament when they were in power in various coalitions between 1976 and 1982.

There are many studies on the struggle against nuclear power in Sweden and how social movements acted.¹⁰ There are, however, few studies on social activism against nuclear weapons in the late Cold War period. A couple of studies touch upon this theme by focusing on women's participation, including their social background, age and political views.¹¹ Furthermore, there are two unpublished papers that study the Social Democratic Party (*Socialdemokratiska arbetarepartiet* [SAP]) and the disarmament policy during 1970s and 1980s.¹² In 1985, Swedish historian Kim Salomon published a book on the European peace movement in which he discusses the roots of the engagement and the kind of strategies that were used by activist groups to influence political parties. In this comprehensive analysis Sweden is only mentioned in reference to efforts to establish nuclear weapons-free zones in Scandinavia and in the Baltic Sea.¹³ Historian Magnus Hjort has analysed the Swedish Security Police's surveillance of peace groups, especially communist-oriented peace organisations.¹⁴ Research on official Swedish disarmament policy of the late Cold War era is scarce, which is rather surprising given the prominent role Sweden played in international disarmament forums.¹⁵ However, one of the leading disarmament figures in Sweden, Ambassador Alva Myrdal, published an often-cited book in 1976 entitled *The Game of Disarmament*.¹⁶

The main sources used in this chapter are the three organisations' membership magazines, newsletter, annual reports, and interviews. In addition,

speeches, published interviews and articles by Olof Palme, Alva Myrdal and Inga Thorsson, former UN Ambassador and expert on disarmament policy, have also been included.

The Swedes and Nuclear Weapons: A Brief Background

Swedish security policy during the Cold War relied on a combination of foreign and defence policy. The Swedish policy of neutrality can be understood as a combination of these two features of security: Sweden should remain outside of military alliances, but should maintain a strong national defence to back up this position.¹⁷ Sweden's self-proclaimed role as an advocate of disarmament, and its past experiences in relation to nuclear weapons and disarmament, make the Swedish case especially well suited for study. One of the most important reasons why the Swedish nuclear weapon programme was shelved after heavy investments in 1968 had to do with the strong resistance that those plans encountered within the Parliament and growing opposition from anti-nuclear and peace activist groups.¹⁸ Within the SAP, the Social Democrat Women's Organisation (SSKF) and its chairperson Inga Thorsson became the strongest voice against nuclear acquisition.¹⁹ Impactful nuclear opposition was also found outside of the party-political sphere: various labour unions, churches and peace groups publicly opposed the nuclear option. Several Social Democrat members belonged to these groups, which created further problems for the SAP leadership. Some of these networks continued to function in the emerging resistance against nuclear power in the 1970s.

Social movements against nuclear weapons in Sweden, especially the two peace organisations under investigation, emphasised the importance of international negotiations in effective change within the disarmament field. The experience of ending Sweden's quest for nuclear weapons had encouraged these peace organisations of the prospects of influencing the politicians. Since the abandonment of the nuclear weapon programme, which was a contentious issue, the neutral position of Sweden cultivated a culture of cooperation and coordination between the government, the biggest party (the SAP) and the leading peace organisations. Although all Nordic countries had a strong desire to maintain a broad social consensus behind security policy, Sweden enjoyed the added benefit of not belonging to NATO. In the case of Denmark and Norway but also other NATO countries, a strong anti-establishment culture developed that, in practice, hindered a closer collaboration between peace organisations and the governments, even if some of them were ruled by social democratic governments.

The conservative-liberal governments which ruled Sweden in the period from 1976 to 1982 had encountered similar challenges. Therefore, it was not paradoxical that Swedish peace movements' main strategy focused on influencing governmental decision making.²⁰

However, the Conservative Party and the military were often sceptical and criticised the initiatives to create a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone (NWFZ) around the Baltic Sea. When Olof Palme and the Social Democrats returned to power in 1982 and started to push for more radical initiatives in the disarmament field, the Conservative Party and leading military circles interpreted such initiatives as concessions to the Soviet Union. They argued that a possible NWFZ would only tip the balance of power in favour of Moscow. In their view, the Social Democratic government had embarked on a one-sided and dangerous policy that placed too much emphasis on confidence-building measures at the expense of military deterrence capability.²¹ However, all parliamentary parties agreed that Sweden's position had been more exposed and vulnerable, given the increased international tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union in the period from 1982 to 1985. Yet, views were divided regarding what Sweden ought to do to reduce these geopolitical vulnerabilities. The Social Democratic government wanted to invest in confidence-building steps towards Moscow and play down its relations with Washington DC in an effort to reduce the tensions. The Conservative Party and the military, on the other hand, preferred to keep the Soviet Union at bay and search for closer cooperation with the United States. The Liberal party and the Centre Party took an intermediate position. Ultimately, governmental policy seemed to oscillate between the wishes of both the Conservative Party and the SAP, and red lines were never crossed. Deterrence in some form was present in the country's foreign policy and there was never a push for Sweden to abandon its policy of neutrality or for it to apply for membership of NATO.²²

However, what became a bone of contention in parliamentary and media debates of the 1980s were foreign submarine intrusions. Even though foreign submarines had been spotted in Sweden before, these debates intensified after a Soviet nuclear armed submarine, U137, ran aground on the southern Swedish coast in a military restricted naval base in 1981. This was the starting point of what is still referred to as 'the Swedish submarine crisis'. The crisis played out against renewed tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union, and in a national context where armed neutrality and non-alliance had served as Sweden's foreign policy orientation for years. Since the submarine crisis was an obvious violation of Swedish territorial borders, the military and leading politicians were criticised for failing to protect the nation from a nuclear armed foreign threat. Hence, the

submarine crisis brought into question the state of Swedish security policy – the policy of armed neutrality.²³ Moreover, in the eyes of the Conservative Party and the military, the presence of the Soviet submarine U 137 showed how unrealistic the Social Democratic disarmament policy was in practice. From the mid-1980s, even the Liberal Party and the Centre Party started to join forces with the Conservative Party. They put pressure on the Social Democrats to tone down the confidence-building policy towards the Soviet Union and increase the military defence budget to strengthen the deterrence capability.²⁴ A pattern of conflict developed which came to characterise Sweden's disarmament policy and limit the room for manoeuvre between the Social Democrat government and the peace movements in the final years of the Cold War.

Nuclear Power and Social Movements

When the Swedish Parliament voted to abandon the nuclear weapons programme in 1968, peace organisations entered a period of declining interest and engagement. The big battle had already been won, and the engagement was channelled through other issues such as resistance to civilian nuclear power and the support for liberation movements in the Third World, especially the strong support of Vietnam's struggle against the United States.²⁵ Creating a strong and independent nuclear power system had become an important goal in the Swedish energy policy in the 1950s. The ambitious nuclear research and development (R&D) programmes that were initiated in the 1960s and the early 1970s were left to develop without any strong opposition. However, after the termination of the nuclear weapon programme, protest against nuclear power started to grow, significantly impacting how the government handled the expansion of the civilian use of nuclear energy in Sweden during the late Cold War period.²⁶

Both IKFF and SPAS were involved in different campaigns against the expansion of nuclear power. In several editions of their magazines and in organised study circles, nuclear power was portrayed as one part of the Janus face, with nuclear weapons representing the other. Early on, the boards of both associations took decisive stands against nuclear power and the struggle took the form of a two-front battle. Nuclear power was seen as a potential fast track to producing nuclear weapons and therefore it was considered necessary to campaign against civilian nuclear energy programmes.²⁷ In the 1960s, the major political parties in the Parliament were in favour of nuclear power. However, this consensus was broken in 1973 when the liberal agrarian Centre Party proposed in Parliament that further development of nuclear

power should be stopped. The Centre Party became very successful during the 1970s and in 1973 gained 25.1 percent of the votes in Parliament, which remains the best result in its history.²⁸ In 1979, the Party argued that a national referendum on the future of nuclear power should be held. During the 1970s, six commercial reactors were built and put into service, and on the political agenda there were plans to build six additional reactors in the following decade.

The Three Mile Island nuclear accident in Harrisburg in 1979 became the straw that broke the camel's back and forced the political elite to respond to the growing demand of the Centre Party with strong support from anti-nuclear movements to hold a referendum on the future of nuclear power in Sweden. The result of the national referendum, which was held in March 1980, was that nuclear power should be phased out within thirty years. What happened and completely disarmed the anti-nuclear groups' influence during the campaign was that a third alternative, called Line 2, was launched alongside the original choices of either Yes or No to nuclear power. Line 2's campaign was headed by the liberal politician Hans Blix, who later became Director General for the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and was supported by the SAP and the Liberal Party. Line 2 took a middle-ground position between the obvious Yes and No alternatives, and argued that it would be reasonable to abandon nuclear power in the long run given the risks associated with this technology. However, it should be phased out in a step-by-step process when alternative energy sources were available. It is interesting to note that this political game had a role model in the nuclear field in Sweden. Olof Palme had used the same tactic at the end of the 1950s when he was the author of a report that worked out a compromise between proponents and opponents of nuclear weapons acquisition within his own party.²⁹ The winning formula then was that nuclear weapons research should be allowed until the technical prerequisites and prospects for successful international agreements on disarmament would be clearer. Once these two criteria were fulfilled, Parliament would be ready for a decision on whether Sweden should acquire nuclear weapons or not.³⁰ As party leader of the SAP, Palme was one of the leading architects behind the winning alternative in the national referendum in 1980. Despite the outcome of the referendum, nuclear power still represents about 30 per cent of the total electricity consumption in Sweden today. The struggle against nuclear power nevertheless continued, and both IKFF and SPAS were involved in national campaigns run by the umbrella No to Nuclear Power Campaign organisation. This created some tensions with the SAP and its think tank Fredsforum.³¹ On the other hand, many Social Democratic members and politicians were also against nuclear power.

The Euromissiles Issue and the Nordic NWFZ Debate

Even though the work on nuclear disarmament had declined in Sweden after the signing of the NPT, the wind changed direction with the introduction of the neutron bomb by the United States and the NATO Dual-Track decision to deploy intermediate-range nuclear weapons in Europe in the late 1970s. Membership of anti-nuclear and peace groups grew immensely in the following years and different mass activities were organised not only nationally but also in cooperation with peace organisations in the Nordic and other Western European countries. Peace marches were organised all over Europe, but also in Eastern Europe, and, for example, a peace meeting in Gothenburg in southwest Sweden convened with over 100,000 participants. Both the IKFF and the SPAS shared the same goals in many respects. To get rid of all nuclear weapons in the world was one of the more visionary and overarching goals, but there were also other missions that both organisations were jointly engaged with: to stop, or radically minimise, Swedish arms exports; to phase out national arms production; and to decrease the military defence system.³²

Olof Palme's engagement in nuclear disarmament had a long history. As a young and promising politician in the late 1950s, he was in favour of equipping the Swedish military with nuclear weapons. However, he changed his mind and became an ardent advocate for disarmament.³³ He often referred to the need for disarmament efforts and to halt the nuclear arms race in speeches he gave during the 1970s.³⁴ However, his engagement on the international stage started in real terms in 1976 when he was elected vice-chairman of the Socialist International (SI). Together with the chairman of the SI, German Chancellor Willy Brandt, it was decided that general nuclear disarmament should be the ultimate objective, and the major task was 'to help form public opinion in favour of disarmament'. In speech after speech he emphasised the essential task of informing the public and let civil society – peace groups, scientists, churches and other organisations – be part of a mass movement to put pressure on the nuclear weapons states to take action to reduce the threat of nuclear weapons.³⁵ With the creation of European Nuclear Disarmament in 1980, a broader European network had been established that brought leading politicians, scientists and peace researchers together with the aim of pushing for disarmament. The same year, Palme became chairman of the Independent Commission of Disarmament and Security. The following year, the national Social Democratic Peace Forum was established with the aim of cooperating and coordinating their efforts with other leading disarmament organisations and influential politicians, media and scientists.

When Palme and the SAP became active in international disarmament and reached out to collaborate with different civil society groups in

Sweden, the IKFF and the SPAS modified their objectives in order to influence decision-making processes. Previously, the attitude of different governments had been rather cautious in their relations with peace groups, even though they remained in contact. Meetings were held where different issues in the disarmament field were discussed and certainly there existed a kind of exchange of ideas on how the political situation should be interpreted. However, Palme's increased engagement and his view that social movements played a crucial role for political action meant that peace groups and other NGOs were invited to cooperate with the political power. This new political opportunity prompted them to follow a more pragmatic route. As IKFF declared in its annual report of 1981, the target was to strive for a nuclear-weapons-free Europe and to encourage Swedish negotiators in the UN Conference on Disarmament to present more radical proposals.³⁶ In that respect, the goals to stop arms exports, to phase out the Swedish arms industry and to decrease the military defence were toned down.

The NATO double-track decision to deploy Euromissiles in different Western European states resulted in a real upswing for peace groups in Sweden. The engagement and will to act to stop the nuclear arms race and hinder the deployment of the US intermediate-range missiles was an obvious starting point. However, what could be done in concrete terms? The deployment of the Soviet SS-20 missile was viewed very negatively, but it was deemed more realistic to be able to influence Western European states and the United States on the nuclear race issue. Both IKFF and SPAS discussed different strategies on how to best influence the Swedish government to act in international fora. SPAS had invested much energy into creating Nordic cooperation in the end of the 1970s. One idea that was discussed with other Scandinavian peace organisations was the creation of a Nordic peace council (Nordiskt fredsråd) that could act as a pressure mechanism on their respective governments.³⁷ Increased cooperation among Nordic countries became an important stepping stone for Swedish peace groups in the beginning of 1980s, in lending their support to a proposal for a Nordic NWFZ. This initiative stood at the epicentre of IKFF's and SPAS's campaign to shape the peace agenda with the Swedish government.³⁸ A petition for a NWFZ in the Nordic countries in 1982 gathered more than 750,000 signatures and was handed over to the Swedish Liberal Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ola Ullsten.³⁹ During the spring of 1983, seven Nordic peace organisations presented a joint proposal to establish a Nordic NWFZ. SPAS was one of the initiators of this proposal.⁴⁰ The proposal meant that the Nordic states should agree not to acquire, receive or allow foreign nuclear weapons on their territories. Additional agreements with nuclear weapons states outside the zone should also be part of the package. For example, an agreement with

the Soviet Union to withdraw all nuclear submarines from the Baltic Sea could be one such additional agreement. If a Nordic NWFZ was established, the ambition would be to extend the zone to cover the entire European continent. Today such a proposal may sound unrealistic and naïve. Would it be realistic to believe that the Soviet Union would conform to such an agreement in a war situation? However, the proposal was not a totally unrealistic and far-fetched idea.

A Nordic NWFZ had been discussed several times among the Nordic states since President Urho Kekkonen of Finland proposed it in 1963. Different summits looked into various proposals on how to establish such an agreement during the 1960s and 1970s. But these discussions ended in stalemate, given Denmark's and Norway's membership of NATO and its doctrine of nuclear deterrence that made a positive outcome difficult, if not impossible to achieve. Against this background, Sweden's engagement was also fairly limited. However, when Jens Evensen, the Norwegian diplomat and former Minister of the Sea, suggested that the Scandinavian countries ought to establish a NWFZ in 1980, the debate started again that involved both peace organisations and leading politicians. During 1981, Olof Palme started declaring in his speeches that he was now in favour of a Nordic NWFZ. He justified his earlier scepticism in consideration of his brother parties' obligations to NATO, but the situation had changed and a positive outcome was more likely. The change referred mostly to the Soviet Union. While Soviet leaders had been previously sceptical of any NWFZ proposal around the Baltic Sea, President Leonid Brezhnev took an unprecedented step forward and welcomed such a proposal. In a Finnish daily newspaper, he explained how the Soviet Union was prepared to consider the inclusion of parts of the Kola Peninsula in the proposed Nordic NWFZ. The governments of Denmark and Norway gave a cautious reply and stressed the importance of establishing a Nordic NWFZ in a wider European perspective and not solely limited to the northern parts of Europe. The debate on the Nordic NWFZ continued, especially in Sweden, towards the end of 1982. Palme proposed in January 1983 that a NWFZ ought to be established with an extension from Scandinavia along the border between the Western and socialist states, as a 150-kilometre-wide corridor on both sides.⁴¹ This NWFZ idea was one of the proposals in the final report of the Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security that Palme presented in the UN in 1982. In the end, both Denmark and Norway backed off and the initiative came to nothing.

Despite these difficulties, IKFF and SPAS continued to lobby for the Nordic NWFZ idea. However, the NWFZ initiatives also started to cause some internal resistance within the Social Democratic Party. For example,

these lobbying activities caused a conflict between the IKFF and the Social Democratic Ambassador Inga Thorsson, who had been one of the leading opponents against the Swedish plans to acquire nuclear weapons. She had a strong position both nationally and internationally as a constructive and outspoken voice for disarmament. She had also been a member of IKFF since 1935 and published articles in its magazine *Fred och Frihet* (*Peace and Freedom*). Thorsson, who also was undersecretary of state and head of the Swedish disarmament delegation, maintained that IKFF and other peace organisations ought to be more realistic and push for more achievable goals, such as a complete ban on nuclear weapon testing. She continued, explaining how far-removed from reality some proposals from the peace movements on disarmament were.⁴² According to her, 'a successful disarmament policy does not stand and fall with a failed Nordic NWFZ as a first step towards a nuclear weapon free Europe'. Her message was clear. When a proposal has no real impact on ongoing disarmament talks due to political realities, one must face up to it, give it up and invest in more constructive ideas that stand a chance of being taken seriously by the central actors in the negotiations.

Furthermore, Thorsson accused the Swedish peace groups, and especially the IKFF, of not understanding the mischievous role of the Soviet Union. In this respect, the submarine crisis of 1981 led to political turmoil in Swedish–Soviet relations.⁴³ Thorsson maintained that this submarine incident must be 'a lesson for all of us with regard of how much we can trust in security guarantees from a cynical superpower to a small state, neutral or belonging to a western defence alliance'.⁴⁴ Ingrid Segerstedt, the chairperson of the Swedish IKFF, responded in an editorial of *Fred och Frihet* that activism and peace marches for a NWFZ were important and played a significant role. If people were silenced, there would be no results at all at the negotiations table.⁴⁵ In another editorial in December 1981, Segerstedt took a more conciliatory tone and wrote that IKFF was willing to listen to Thorsson's arguments even if they still believed in the Nordic NWFZ idea. Moreover, she argued that a constructive debate would be beneficial for peace. In this context, it is important to stress that following an intense debate, IKFF decided to lend support to the official Swedish disarmament efforts that were taking place in 1981 within the UN Special Session on Disarmament.⁴⁶ It was obvious that Segerstedt understood that the IKFF needed to maintain good relations with Thorsson if the organisation was going to be able to influence the Swedish disarmament policy in the future.

Olof Palme took another view on the potential to establish a Nordic NWFZ that was more in line with the wishes of the peace groups. In a speech to a trade union's congress, he responded to Inga Thorsson: 'Allow

me, with a degree of decisiveness establish the fact that Social Democracy in Sweden whole-heartedly and with a clear-cut decision stands behind the demand of a Nordic nuclear-free-zone.' He declared that there was 'no reason to put aside a genuine public opinion in the Nordic countries by lining up technical, technocratic and different political difficulties'. As a politician it is necessary to 'meet the opinion and with full energy try to solve the people's problems'.⁴⁷ Two years later in a speech to the Paasikivi Society in Helsinki on 1 June 1983, Palme came back to the NWFZ idea:

A reduced nuclear threat and a reduced presence of nuclear weapons in our vicinity can contribute towards reducing tension between the great-power blocs. A nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Nordic area can thereby promote détente and strengthen the security of the Nordic area and of Europe.⁴⁸

Despite the growing tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union, Sweden continued to push for initiatives that were not supported by the two superpowers. All in all, the engagement was manifested in three different ways: (1) direct disarmament initiatives such as the Nordic NWFZ and Palme Commission's proposal to create a 150-kilometre-wide corridor through the borders between West Germany and East Germany and Czechoslovakia; (2) participation in multilateral negotiations on legally binding agreements and treaties; (3) participation in the UN General Assembly. The results of all these initiatives were mixed.⁴⁹

The Palme Commission's proposal *Common Security – A Programme for Disarmament* came to be influential in the international debate as an often-cited concept of different ideas on the need for international cooperation instead of deterrence. In the end, the proposal didn't receive the necessary support, especially from the Western powers, to make a difference on actual disarmament policy.⁵⁰ However, Sweden became more successful in its ambitions to implement a ban on nuclear weapon tests. Under the leadership of Inga Thorsson, Sweden presented proposals together with Australia, Mexico and New Zealand in the Committee on the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva during the 1970s and 1980s, which, in many ways, paved the way to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) in 1996. The Swedish expertise in the area of verification and detection technology became an important tool in efforts to convince other states to join the CTBT that bans nuclear weapon tests explosions or any other nuclear explosions for both civilian and military purposes.⁵¹ Another Swedish initiative was the so-called Five Continent Initiative, issued on 22 May 1984 where Olof Palme together with Raoul Alfonsín (Argentina), Indira Gandhi (India), Miguel

de la Madrid (Mexico), Julius Nyerere (Tanzania) and Andreas Papandreu (Greece) declared:

We urge, as a necessary first step, the United States and the Soviet Union, as well as the United Kingdom, France and China, to halt all testing, production and deployment of nuclear weapons and their delivery systems, to be immediately followed by substantial reductions in nuclear forces ... This first step must be followed by a continuing programme of arms reductions leading to general and complete disarmament, accompanied by measures to strengthen the United Nations system and to ensure an urgently needed transfer of substantial resources from the arms race into social and economic development.⁵²

This initiative was inspired by the so-called freeze movement's idea introduced by Randall Forsberg's publication of 'Call to Halt the Nuclear Arms Race' in 1980, which was also picked up in different political arenas in the United States. Palme stated that he had studied the proposal with great interest; in particular, he thought 'a call for a nuclear freeze by a number of government leaders was a very good idea'.⁵³ SPAS became involved in the efforts to push for the initiative. The Chairman of SPAS travelled to the Nordic capitals to seek support for the initiative by the peace organisations in those countries, which in many ways was a successful project, according to chairman Tomas Magnusson.⁵⁴ What kind of concrete influence, if any, did the Five Continent Initiative have on the global disarmament efforts at the time? Eirini Karamouzi argues that the initiative had a significant impact and served as an inspiration in informing parliamentarians and global public opinion in different campaigns about the state of the global arms race and to simultaneously bring together three different audiences that otherwise tended to exclude each other, namely the nuclear powers, the peace movements and independent scientists.⁵⁵ On the other hand, it can be argued that the social movements and the peace groups in the nuclear field also had an important impact on Palme and other state leaders at the time. It is hard to imagine the level of attention the state leaders' initiative received without the support from the peace movements and all their activities across the world. In Sweden, the peace movements certainly influenced Palme to push for initiatives such as the Nordic NWFZ proposal. Palme's charismatic personality and the organisational machinery that he put in motion also inspired the IKFF and the SPAS to invest in joint initiatives to get rid of nuclear weapons in collaboration with state leaders, scientists and other civil society groups from other countries. In the period from 1980 to 1985, it is fair to say that

the peace movements in Sweden shared the same agenda as Palme and the official Swedish disarmament policy.

However, in the mid-1980s, a split between them started to emerge. This was partly due to the fact that the Social Democrats began to play down the confidence-building policy and, like the liberal-conservative opposition, prioritised the need to strengthen the country's defence capability. Throughout the 1980s, several submarine incidents took place, which sparked heated debates domestically about the country's defence and were interpreted as Soviet intrusions and a threat to Swedish security.⁵⁶ Consequently, the deterrence capability was then prioritized to the detriment of the confidence-building ambitions that characterised the first half of the 1980s. This new political orientation shook the foundations of the alliance between the Social Democrats and the peace movements to its core. Traditionally the Social Democrats emphasised a strong defence combined with a confidence-building policy. The peace movements, on the other hand, argued that the Swedish national defence could be drastically reduced and the arms industry should be phased out. As long as the Social Democrats emphasised a confidence-building approach with radical disarmament proposals, the collaboration with the peace movements worked well. While the Nordic NWFZ proposal and other initiatives received strong support from Palme, it nevertheless became important to also demonstrate civil society's independence and push for their own, often more radical, ideas and proposals. Under the umbrella organisation *Svensk folkriktdag för nedrustning* (Swedish People's Parliament for Disarmament), which was created in 1982, bold and challenging proposals were presented that in many respects clashed with the official Swedish disarmament policy. In an interview, Social Democrat Gunnar Lassinanti, the former Secretary General of Peace Forum, withheld the fact that the peace movements in principle sided with the SAP disarmament policy and with Peace Forum's initiatives until the mid-1980s. From then on, SPAS withdrew from close collaboration with the Peace Forum in a step-by-step manner in the mid-1980s due to diverging views, especially regarding Swedish arms exports.⁵⁷

Another reason why the Social Democrats and the peace movements started to distance themselves from one another was due to a more optimistic worldview on the prospects for disarmament. The world seemed to be heading in a more positive direction manifested in the arms control negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union. The signing of the INF Treaty in 1987 created new security policy preconditions for Sweden and the Nordic states. As a result, the idea of a Nordic NWFZ lost its relevance.⁵⁸ The peace movements started to focus on other goals such as stopping Swedish arms exports and phasing out the national arms industry.

One wonders whether the murder of Olof Palme in February 1986 affected the climate of cooperation between the official Sweden position and the peace movements. Palme was certainly a strong and charismatic voice for disarmament who played an important role in elevating Sweden's international profile, hence making it easier for the peace movement to side with him. On the other hand, the increasing investments towards defence had already begun during his time in office.⁵⁹ Therefore, we should not place too much importance on Palme's individual role. More importantly, there were also structural reasons at play that changed the course of Swedish foreign policy and its direction at the end of the Cold War. This reorientation of Sweden's foreign policy toned down neutrality and led to a more favourable policy towards closer cooperation with the European Community. The shift of the Swedish foreign policy resulted in Sweden's admission to the European Union in 1995. In this process, Sweden's role as a strong voice for disarmament and an advocate for small states' interests gradually lost its force. This process has continued since then and the application to join NATO in 2022 in the aftermath of Russia's invasion of Ukraine is a clear sign that is not much left of the traditional Swedish disarmament policy today.

Conclusions

Sweden offers an interesting case study where the political elite interacted with parts of the civil society in a constructive manner. Olof Palme and the Social Democratic Party joined forces with the peace movements in the early 1980s. Establishing a Nordic NWFZ was one area where both sides' goals and priorities met. This chapter has also shown the ever-evolving nature of the peace group's agenda and strategy. Instead of seeing it as a monolithic, static movement, peace mobilisation was quite diverse in its effort to remain relevant and attract public opinion. The peace groups initially avoided protesting against national arms production and arms exports, and instead focused on how to make a joint disarmament policy with the Social Democratic government possible. The Swedish peace groups also employed transnational tactics and collaborated with their counterparts in the Nordic countries organising peace marches and petitions to put pressure on the Danish, Finnish, Norwegian and Swedish governments to take bolder initiatives in the disarmament field. It was only when the Swedish government showed an increased focus on defence policy in the latter part of the 1980s that peace movements called for reductions in the national arms industry and a halt to Swedish arms exports. As long as the priorities of the government were in line with those of the peace organisations, it was possible to

talk about successful interaction between the two spheres. However, after the passing of Palme, the ending of the Cold War and the diminished importance of Swedish active foreign policy, the ties between the Swedish government and peace movements were gradually weakened.

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Notes

1. http://www.olofpalme.org/wp-content/dokument/820623_fn.pdf (retrieved 25 September 2024).
2. The citation is from the homepage of Stockholm International Peace Institute (SIPRI), where the book *Policies on Common Security* was presented, 3 July 2022: <https://www.sipri.org/publications/1985/policies-common-security> (retrieved 25 September 2024).
3. Ibid.
4. I have studied how disarmament rose as a common ground between those in favour and those against nuclear weapons in a previous book; see Jonter, *The Key to Nuclear Restraint*.
5. Bjereld, Johansson and Molin, *Sveriges säkerhet och världens fred*, 339.
6. Kronvall and Petersson, *Svensk säkerhetspolitik i supermakternas skugga 1945–1991*, 13.
7. Stellan Andersson, 'You Can Never Say No to Noel-Baker'.
8. Interview with the Secretary General of Fredsforum, Gunnar Lassinanti, 17 January 2021.
9. Jonter, *The Key to Nuclear Restraint*.
10. See, for example, Anshelm, *Mellan frälsning och domedag*; Leijonhufvud, '(parantes?) En historia om svensk kärnkraft'; Schagerholm, 'För het att hantera'.
11. Kodama, *Peace on the Move*; Peterson 'The New Women's Movement'.
12. Stellan Andersson, 'You Can Never Say No to Noel-Baker'.
13. Salomon, *Fred i vår tid*.
14. Hjort, *Den farliga freds rörelsen*.
15. In her dissertation, Emma Rosengren analyses Swedish disarmament policy during the Cold War from a feminist perspective. Focusing on disarmament policy making

- in relation to the nuclear weapons debate (1954–68) and the submarine crisis (1981–89), she scrutinises the gendering, nationalisation and sexualisation of disarmament policy. See Rosengren, ‘Gendering Nuclear Disarmament’.
16. Myrdal, *The Game of Disarmament*.
 17. See Kronvall and Petersson, *Svensk säkerhetspolitik*; Bjereld, Johansson, & Molin, 2008.
 18. Jonter, *The Key to Nuclear Restraint*.
 19. Rosengren, ‘Gendering Nuclear Disarmament’.
 20. Salomon, *Fred i vår tid*, 43.
 21. Rosengren, ‘Gendering Nuclear Disarmament’, 177–85; Kronvall and Petersson, *Svensk säkerhetspolitik*, 133–43.
 22. Kronvall and Petersson, *Svensk säkerhetspolitik*, 133.
 23. See, for example, Åse, ‘Ship of Shame’; Bynander, ‘The Rise and Fall of the Submarine Threat’.
 24. Rosengren, ‘Gendering Nuclear Disarmament’, 177–85; Kronvall and Petersson, *Svensk säkerhetspolitik*, 133–43.
 25. See, for example, Salomon, *Rebeller i takt med tiden*.
 26. There are several studies on the political management of the expansion of nuclear power in Sweden. For a good overview, see Anshelm, *Mellan frälsning och domedag*.
 27. ‘Kärnkraft – ett folk mord’ (Nuclear power – Already Now a Genocide), *Pax*, 1980: 4; ‘Kärnkraft ger kärnvapen’ (Nuclear Power Leads to Nuclear Weapons), *Pax*, 1980: 5;
 28. Centerpartiet/Historia/1970-talet. <https://www.centerpartiet.se/vart-parti/historia/1970-talet/#:~:text=Centerpartiet%20kr%C3%A4vde%20stopp%20%C3%B6rnbyggnaden%20av%20k%C3%A4rnkraft%20och,ha%20%C3%B6rnbybara%20energik%C3%A4llor%20och%20effektiva%20anv%C3%A4ndning%20av%20energin.>
 29. See the report that was published in 1959, *Neutralitet, försvar, atomvapen*.
 30. Jonter, *The Key to Nuclear Restraint*.
 31. Interview with Tomas Magnusson, 22 April 2021.
 32. On how disarmament advocacy was linked to other goals such as arms export in Sweden among different actors, see Rosengren, ‘Gendering Nuclear Disarmament’.
 33. Jonter, *The Key to Nuclear Restraint*, 199.
 34. Stellan Andersson, ‘You Can Never Say No to Noel-Baker’.
 35. Olof Palme to Maurice Strong, 29 April 1980, Olof Palme’s archives, volume 4.2: 152; Olof Palme’s archives, volume 2.4.0: 091; Arbetarrörelsens arkiv och bibliotek (Swedish Labour Movement’s Archives and Library (ARAB)); Speech at the Stockholm Worker’s Community, 12 January 1980, Palme Commission’s archive, volume F 3: 1, ARAB.
 36. IKFF, Annual Report of 1981. In an interview with the former chairman of the SPA, Tomas Magnusson, the collaboration with the Peace Forum meant that they had access to a large network of international organisations and prominent actors in the disarmament field. However, it became important for the SPA that the collaboration with the Peace Forum rested on an independent ground to avoid losing the role as an organisation that also pushed for their own initiatives that didn’t fit the official policy. Interview, 22 May 2021.

37. The Swedish Peace Arbitration Society, Annual Report 1 June 1978–20 May 1979.
38. IKFF, Annual Report of 1981. About the Nordic Peace Forum and its agenda: 'Norden banar vägen', *Fred och Frihet*.
39. IKFF, Annual Report of 1982.
40. See Salomon, *Fred i vår tid*, 61.
41. Broms, 'Proposals to Establish a Nordic Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone'.
42. 'Några synpunkter på den aktuella fredsdebatten', *Fred och Frihet*, 1981, 5.
43. Rosengren, 'Gendering Nuclear Disarmament'.
44. Ibid.
45. 'Mångsidig fredsdebatt', *Fred och Frihet*, 1981, 5.
46. 'En förtvivlans vrede avlöste jublande glädje', *Fred och frihet*, 1982:4; 'Sverige bör stödja det Sverige driver i FN', *Fred och Frihet*, 1983, 1.
47. Palme made the statement at the trade union congress of government employees, Statsantäldas förbund, quoted from Stellan Andersson, 'You Can Never Say No to Noel-Baker'.
48. See http://www.olofpalme.org/wp-content/dokument/830601b_paaasikivi.pdf (retrieved 25 September 2024).
49. *Fred och Säkerhet*, 455.
50. Bjereld, Johansson and Molin, *Sveriges säkerhet och världens fred*, 285.
51. *Fred och Säkerhet*, 455–57.
52. Quoted from Stellan Andersson, 'You Can Never Say No to Noel-Baker'.
53. Ibid.
54. Interview with Tomas Magnusson, 22 May 2021.
55. Karamouzi, 'At Last, Our Voice Is Heard in the World'.
56. On the debate, see Rosengren, 'Gendering Nuclear Disarmament', 143–64.
57. Interview with the Secretary General of Fredsforum, Gunnar Lassinanti, 21 January 2021.
58. Bjereld, Johansson and Molin, *Sveriges säkerhet och världens fred*, 288.
59. Kronvall and Petersson, *Svensk säkerhetspolitik*, 157.

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A Nuclear Weapons-Free Zone in the Balkans during the 1980s

A Bid for Multilateral Cooperation?

Dionysios Chourchoulis

Introduction

This chapter examines the efforts to establish a Balkan nuclear-weapons free zone (NWFZ), and in particular the goals and motives of certain governments and head of states behind this initiative. It also seeks to assess how far this initiative was part of the regional powers' bid to improve relations with their neighbours and facilitate Balkan cooperation. In past years and decades, there has been a flourishing scholarly work on the history of the fall of détente, the Euromissile Crisis, the rise of peace and anti-nuclear movements in Western Europe, and, to some extent, the foreign policies of the Balkan states. However, there is scant literature on regional developments in the later stages of the Cold War, and even less on the place the Balkans held in rising nuclear tensions.¹ Here, the analysis will largely revolve around Greece and the regional anti-nuclear policy of the Greek Prime Minister Andreas Papandreou, which culminated in 1983 and early 1984. This is not only because this remains an unexplored incident, but also because relevant sources, particularly the Andreas Papandreou Archive, have only recently become available.² It is equally important to explore how Papandreou's effort to establish a Balkan NWFZ and to push for Balkan cooperation became entangled with the Romanian and Bulgarian governments. Indeed, Andreas Papandreou, Nicolae Ceausescu and Todor Zhivkov presented their countries as a third force which encouraged the podding East and West towards disarmament; they claimed that Europeans in general and Balkan people in particular should apply serious pressure to the two superpowers and have

a say in any disarmament negotiations. This demonstration of ‘independence’ from Washington and Moscow also had domestic benefits. However, Yugoslavia, Turkey and Albania were not as forthcoming, and the effort to establish a Balkan NWFZ (and, through it, multilateral regional cooperation) was not successful.

These developments had been preceded by a period of relative relaxation of Cold War tensions across the region after the successful conclusion of the negotiations on the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe and the signature of the Helsinki Accords/Final Act during the summer of 1975. The Helsinki Accords constituted the culmination of détente. Starting in 1976, successive Balkan conferences on technical and economic cooperation took place. These conferences did not lead to spectacular tangible results, confirming that important political questions could not be dealt with at a multilateral level as long as the Balkans were divided into blocs. Nevertheless, this was the first case in modern history where a multilateral initiative was not directed against another Balkan state and resulted on gradual confidence building.³

The state of research on anti-nuclear movements and peace initiatives in the Balkans during the late Cold War is still in an embryonic stage.⁴ However, today there are plenty sources available to scholars. Archives from the UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), various American collections, selected West and East German documents of the Political Archive of the Federal Foreign Office, the Konstantinos Karamanlis Foundation and the Andreas Papandreou Foundation, as well as selected US and UK newspapers (*The Times*, *The Guardian*, the *New York Times*, the *Financial Times* and the *Washington Post*) and articles from the Greek press have been utilised as primary sources to write this chapter.

Setting the Scene: The Crisis of Détente and the Policy of the Balkan States towards the Nuclear Arms Race and Regional Denuclearisation, 1977–81

By 1977–78, Cold War tensions began to rise. Eventually, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the decision by the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) to deploy the Pershing II and Cruise missiles killed superpower détente and led to the new intensification of the Cold War. However, this did not occur in the Balkans. Despite having different priorities, the countries in the region sought some form of accommodation with one another. The Greek outreach to the socialist Balkan states was fully endorsed by most of public

opinion, nearly all political parties and the press.⁵ Romania favoured cooperation between the Balkan states, partly as a way to maintain a more independent, 'national Communist' course that questioned Soviet policies.⁶ Yugoslavia's basic foreign policy tenet in Southeastern Europe was 'good-neighbourliness'. The concept aimed to improve Yugoslavia's relations with its neighbours, but only at a bilateral level. Thus, Yugoslavia was reluctant to pursue multilateral cooperation, except in limited technical fields.⁷ Unsurprisingly, Albania remained self-isolated and disinclined to participate to any form of Balkan cooperation.⁸ During the 1970s and 1980s, Turkey questioned the usefulness and feasibility of multilateral regional cooperation as long as the bilateral problems remained unsolved.⁹ In particular, Turkey objected the concept of a regional NWFZ and the separation of Balkans from the rest of Europe in relation to arms control and/or disarmament. The Turkish position on these issues remained unchanged until the end of the Cold War.

The Bulgarian case is an interesting one. Up until 1980–81, Bulgaria had largely been in favour of improving bilateral relations with its Balkan neighbours, but due to Soviet objections, it was less enthusiastic about broader Balkan collaboration.¹⁰ However, in the early 1980s, the Bulgarian leader Todor Zhivkov embraced the prospect of multilateral regional cooperation. This was probably a reflection of a cautious recalibration of Bulgarian foreign policy towards 'a cautious assertion of its national image, a more pointed consideration of its own national interests, and a generally more active role in world affairs'.¹¹ Gradually, Bulgaria projected a more nationalistic image by emphasising Bulgarian history and culture as distinctive national characteristics. This was particularly evident in 1981, during the celebration for Bulgaria's 1,300th anniversary of the creation of the Bulgarian state.¹² In addition, Bulgaria wished to improve its relations with the West and expand its trade links.¹³ In February 1984 the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) even assessed that Bulgaria was indeed 'entering a period of political and economic transition that portends increasing strains in its traditionally close, subservient relationship with the USSR'.¹⁴

Thus, the Bulgarian regime cautiously began to differentiate itself from the Soviets, albeit without overall challenging the Soviet Union.¹⁵ Zhivkov carefully tried to outmanoeuvre the Kremlin, which opposed Balkan multilateral cooperation, and sought to avoid isolation from the other Balkan states. By 1981, Bulgaria's Balkan policy was best summarised by FCO officials as 'especially good relations with Greece, some difference of opinion with Romania over foreign policy, a wish to see relations with Yugoslavia improved. Bulgaria aimed to exert a moderating influence in the area'. It was also evident that the Bulgarian government wished to be considered and treated as an independent agent rather than a satellite of the Soviets.¹⁶

In a similar manner, Greece's old doctrine of planning against a 'menace from the north' was re-adjusted to take into account a 'threat from the East' now coming from *within* the Western alliance.¹⁷ The rapid deterioration of Greek–Turkish relations, which had already reached breaking point following the projection of Turkish claims in the Aegean Sea in late 1973 to early 1974 and culminated in the two Turkish invasions of Cyprus in the summer of 1974, caused a significant re-adjustment of Greece's national security and foreign policy. Moreover, the Greek policy makers faced the challenge of 'reintroducing' the country onto the international arena after its isolation under the Colonels' dictatorship of 1967–1974. The challenge was compounded by the Greek decision to withdraw from NATO's integrated military command structure in protest at the Turkish invasions of Cyprus.¹⁸ A 'multidimensional' foreign policy was pursued in order to enhance the country's international position, counterbalance Turkey and placate the Greek public opinion that demanded diversification of the country's orientation. While anti-Americanism was on the rise, a Greek version of 'Ostpolitik' belatedly emerged. The country cautiously sought to expand relations with its communist neighbours. This was already manifested in Karamanlis' visits to the Balkan communist countries in the spring of 1975 (including the first ever official visit of a Greek Prime Minister to Sofia). Since then, the process of rapprochement between Greece and its northern neighbours continued. This culminated in 1979 with Konstantinos Karamanlis becoming the first Greek Prime Minister to pay official visits to the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China.¹⁹

It is both intriguing and peculiar how Western officials perceived Greece's effort to foster multilateral cooperation in the Balkans and improve its relations with its northern neighbours. In April 1981 the UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office commented that in the years following the 1974 crisis, it made sense for the Greek government 'to show that its foreign policy horizons were not confined to the Atlantic Alliance or to Western Europe'; nevertheless, it claimed that 'the search for a Balkan dimension was never more than atmospheric'. Now that Greece had been reintegrated fully into NATO and had acceded to the European Economic Community (EEC), the FCO argued that Greece's 'search for a détente of her own might seem redundant'. According to the author of the British document, 'even the shadow of a Hellenic Ostpolitik' could be a valuable asset for the Nea Dimokratia government in an election year.²⁰

This was not the case: Greek openings to the Balkan socialist countries was neither intended simply as a reaction to Western 'apathy' of the Turkish invasion and occupation of Northern Cyprus, nor as Greece's bargaining chip to extract concessions from the United States, NATO or the EEC.

Since 1974, the New Democracy governments under Konstantinos Karamanlis and Georgios Rallis were genuinely and strongly in favour of multilateral Balkan cooperation and improvement of the relations of Greece with the socialist Balkan states.²¹ At the same time, PASOK (the Greek socialist party), under the leadership of Andreas Papandreou, which had been the main opposition party since November 1977, stood for closer links with Greece's northern neighbours in the Balkans. Papandreou repeatedly publicly praised the then President of the Republic (and former Prime Minister) Karamanlis for his Balkan policy and promised to build on those achievements. A few days before PASOK's landslide electoral victory of 18 October 1981, Papandreou stated that should he win (as he expected), his government could set up a nuclear-free zone in the Balkans within six months. However, he was reluctant to clarify if his government would act unilaterally (thus removing US nuclear warheads from Greek territory), hoping that other Balkan states would follow suit, or if this would be conditional on the other Balkan states accepting his plan.²² It was also unclear if he had already discussed the issue with officials from Romania or Bulgaria.

Papandreou, Balkan Cooperation and the Re-emergence of the Idea for a Balkan NWFZ

Before the October 1981 elections, PASOK had pledged to pull Greece out of NATO and close the US bases on Greek territory.²³ But upon his assumption of the premiership, Papandreou declared that he would not press for the immediate closure of the four major US bases in Greece; instead, he would make an early request for the removal of tactical nuclear warheads in US custody from Greek territory. He reassured both the NATO allies and the Greek public opinion that his government was not prepared to move unilaterally with regard to the future status of the US bases in Greece, that 'it would be foolish to move toward a confrontation between Greece and the United States' and that 'we have no desire to take our country into any adventure'. Negotiations would soon start on the future of American bases in Greece, while another thorny issue was the status of Greek participation in NATO's integrated command structure.²⁴ Instead, the PASOK government appeared to champion the removal of US tactical nuclear warheads from Greek territory. Dimitris Maroudas, the new government spokesman, stated during a press conference that Athens was confident that 'the denuclearisation of the Balkans will be a general development, since our neighbours and the Soviet Union have also called for it'. If eventually no such zone could be agreed, Athens would eventually demand the removal of the US nuclear weapons,

as the Kremlin had offered Greece and other countries a guarantee from nuclear attack if the warheads were withdrawn.²⁵

But as with other public proclamations, the Papandreou government quietly, though gradually, dropped the issue of the unilateral removal of US nuclear warheads from Greece; certainly, it did not raise the matter during its negotiations with the Reagan administration.²⁶ Instead, the Greek Prime Minister favoured and toyed with the idea of regional denuclearisation: the establishment of a Balkan NWFZ – which, as we will analyse, was a remote (if at all possible) prospect. This was the first time that a NATO member expressed its desire for a NWFZ. On 22 November 1981, Papandreou gave his first major policy address in the programmatic proposals presented to Parliament. There he pointed out that ‘the Government is proposing a denuclearised zone in the Balkans. Greece, after the necessary deliberations, will first apply, in a short period of time, this principle by removing nuclear weapons from its territory’.²⁷ Of course, the significance of such a proposal had been psychological rather than practical: in case of an East–West war in Europe, a nuclear-free zone in the Balkans would not have spared the region from a nuclear exchange, while Greece (as well as Turkey) would still lie within the range of the Soviet nuclear arsenal. However, this proposal offered the opportunity for advancing regional cooperation, reducing superpower influence and Cold War tensions in the Balkans, and putting the issue of the removal of US nuclear warheads from Greece on ice.

Perhaps it was no coincidence that just after Papandreou’s electoral victory, the Bulgarian government also championed the idea of a Balkan NWFZ (originally it had been a Romanian idea dating back to 1957).²⁸ During the period preceding Papandreou’s electoral victory of October 1981, Greek–Bulgarian relations had developed significantly, and Zhivkov was eager to continue the political dialogue with Athens. On 20 October 1981, the Bulgarian leader publicly declared that he was eager to host the convocation of a multilateral Balkan summit in 1982.²⁹ This did not result in anything tangible.³⁰ However, despite rising Cold War tensions, the Balkan leaders continued to exchange views on the possibility of multilateral initiatives and negotiations. The Romanian leader Nicolae Ceausescu endorsed the idea of multilateral Balkan cooperation as well as the call for a conference of Balkan leaders to discuss the possibility of turning the region into a zone free of nuclear weapons. What is also noteworthy is that large anti-nuclear demonstrations took place across Romania in December 1981, especially in Bucharest and other big cities such as Timisoara. These disarmament rallies voiced their support for President Ceausescu’s ‘peace initiative’.³¹ Even if these rallies were organised and orchestrated by the Romanian government,³² the support of the majority of Romanian for the basic foreign policy tenets

of the regime was genuine. Romania and Ceausescu had called for a denuclearisation of the Balkans or the reduction of the superpowers' nuclear arsenal several times.³³ It was in that context that in late 1981, Andreas Papandreou began taking the initiative to 'denuclearise' the Balkans.

In late March 1982, Papandreou stated that his government was promoting the idea of the denuclearisation of the Balkans 'with the hope that we [i.e. the Balkan governments] shall all agree to it'.³⁴ The first tangible steps towards the denuclearisation of the Balkans were undertaken on 4–7 May 1982, when Papandreou and Ceausescu held their first round of talks in Athens, which concentrated on disengaging the Balkans from East–West rivalries. The two leaders agreed to work for the cause of regional peace and multilateral Balkan cooperation, and they discussed the prospect of establishing a nuclear-free zone and of calling a summit conference of the Balkan leaders.³⁵ During Papandreou's visit to Romania in early November 1982, both leaders agreed that their governments should call a summit conference of Balkan leaders to discuss turning the region into a zone free of nuclear weapons within 18 months. There were already no nuclear arms in Scandinavia, so the addition of such a zone in the Balkans would 'no doubt has its effect in influencing similar developments in the rest of Europe'.³⁶ Papandreou commented to Greek reporters that Ceausescu assured him that Turkey no longer objected to plans for the denuclearisation of the Balkans. He also claimed that he and his government opposed the existence of the two military blocs and that the PASOK government *ultimately* wanted to expel American bases.³⁷ However, once again he did not explicitly demand the removal of US nuclear weapons from Greece.

In May and June 1982, Papandreou actively pursued his policy for Balkan cooperation by visiting several Balkan capitals. The initiative to create a regional nuclear-free zone was a significant part of this effort. He first visited Belgrade and sought to gain Yugoslav support for his plan. At this point, Greek–Yugoslav relations had improved significantly (if temporarily), since the Yugoslavs had warmly welcomed PASOK's electoral victory and the Greek government's initial indications of an independent stance in foreign policy matters, such as Greece's reluctance to impose sanctions on Poland and the Soviet Union. However, on the subject of Balkan denuclearisation, the Yugoslavs were reticent.³⁸ For them, the plan could hardly succeed with the context of European security was overlooked. Additionally, the Yugoslav government was sceptical of the chances of success of a Balkan summit, given the existing outstanding bilateral problems (mainly between Yugoslavia and Bulgaria, Yugoslavia and Albania, Greece and Turkey, but also – to some extent – between Yugoslavia and Greece).³⁹ Besides these considerations, there is enough evidence to suggest that the Yugoslavs were also unwilling to

see the existing balance of military forces in the Balkans disrupted. We know that during the following years, the Yugoslavs expressed their concern to Western diplomats about recent Soviet aggression, claiming that '[the Soviet invasion of] Afghanistan had been an even greater shock to the Yugoslavs than to the West'. They also claimed that 'the situation in the Balkans justified some warning' as 'Yugoslavia was surrounded by states in flux'.⁴⁰ The Yugoslav leadership was also particularly alarmed by reports that recently the Bulgarian armed forces had installed new missile launchers that could easily be converted to accommodate a Soviet nuclear capability.⁴¹

Available archival sources point out that Papandreou was fully aware that the plan for the denuclearisation of the Balkans would pose several problems, mainly resulting from different international obligations of Greece, Turkey, Bulgaria and Romania, as well as divergent national security priorities of the local powers. In addition, it is worth noting that several Greek reports indicate Romanian, Bulgarian and Yugoslav embarrassment at, or even resentment towards, Papandreou's 'independent' foreign policy and anti-nuclear initiatives.⁴² The Greek Prime Minister nevertheless pointed out that Greece had friendly relations with all the neighbouring states along its northern frontier and therefore did not hold any reservations to strike an agreement for a nuclear-free zone in the Balkans.⁴³ Evidently, Papandreou's anti-nuclear initiatives fit in his broader foreign and domestic policy goals: the PASOK government was attempting to turn the Greek peace movement into an instrument of support for its foreign policy by trying to adapt the movement's slogans to the PASOK line. As the Greek peace movement was gaining momentum, Papandreou publicly and unequivocally declared his support of the European peace movements and their struggle for nuclear arms control or disarmament.⁴⁴ Therefore, the Greek government became the first NATO government to lend full support to European pacifists. At the same time, he believed that regional denuclearisation plans could precede – and even pave the way for – a general agreement on nuclear arms reduction between the two superpowers and the respective military blocs.⁴⁵ The Greek Prime Minister supported his view by claiming that various UN decisions, as well as the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), encouraged the establishment of regional NWFZs by mutual consent of the local countries.

It seems that the Greek Prime Minister aimed to use the proposal for the denuclearisation of the Balkans as a means to partial disengage Southeastern Europe from the mounting East–West rivalries and tensions. Additionally, he sought to create an institutionalised framework for multilateral Balkan cooperation, including political cooperation. This goal had been pursued by the previous conservative Greek governments of Nea Dimokratia (ND)

as well, but with little success, as multilateral Balkan cooperation had lost its momentum.⁴⁶

Greece's Push for a Balkan NWFZ, Multilateral Cooperation and the Response of Other Local Powers

In 1983 the Balkan governments had conflicting views and attitudes regarding the establishment of a regional nuclear-free zone, with some insisting on a broader agenda, while others showed limited interest in a Balkan negotiating forum. Ceausescu wished to include on a Balkan summit agenda the discussion of all regional problems, including the Macedonian question, the Cyprus issue and Greek-Turkish relations. However, such an inclusive approach would probably doom the summit to failure from the beginning and it would definitely fail to contribute to the mitigation of tension in the region.⁴⁷ Available sources also indicate that Romanian and Bulgarian leaders shared the vision and goal of a Balkan NWFZ (and of regional cooperation), but did not hold identical views on the process or on its chances of success. The Romanian leadership favoured the development of multilateral relations of the Balkan countries in the fields of the economy, transport and science, while also pushing for the 'great idea' of regional denuclearisation. Although Ceausescu acknowledged that conditions were not yet ripe for an immediate meeting between Balkan officials, he nevertheless believed that not only Yugoslavia but also Turkey would eventually discuss the prospect of Balkan denuclearisation. However, the Bulgarian government was more hesitant to pursue the growth of multilateral economic, scientific and technical cooperation among the Balkan states, as the existing controversies between them could not be easily overcome. On the prospects of a Balkan NWFZ, the Bulgarians accurately predicted that Turkey would flatly reject the idea of a nuclear-free zone and that Yugoslavia would probably not support it. Furthermore, although Zhivkov wholeheartedly supported the idea of denuclearising the Balkans, he preferred that this initiative be primarily undertaken by scientific institutions and other public organisations; on the contrary, Ceausescu believed that the idea should be promoted by the states in cooperation with various public organisations.⁴⁸

The Greek government therefore understood that a multilateral high-level summit could not be held in the foreseeable future. Thus, Athens first opted for proposing an experts' meeting that would help pave the way for a future summit. On 18 May 1983, Papandreou sent confidential letters to the leaders of Bulgaria, Romania, Yugoslavia, Albania and Turkey, inviting them to send 'qualified experts' to a conference to be held in Athens to promote

regional cooperation and discuss the NWFZ proposal. The agenda had to be agreed upon through diplomatic channels. Bulgaria and Romania agreed without reservations with both the procedure and the spirit of Papandreou's invitation. Yugoslavia declared its endorsement to any effort for the promotion of regional cooperation and viewed the proposal for a NWFZ in that context – provided that the protection of the Balkans from outside nuclear attacks was also ensured. Turkey supported any initiative for promoting Balkan cooperation and peace, but stated that it would respond until after reviewing the full agenda of the proposed meeting, implying that it was not in favour of discussing the denuclearisation plan. Albania rejected the offer altogether. Tirana considered regional cooperation infeasible as most of the other Balkan states belonged to opposing military alliances.⁴⁹

This initiative did not have any conclusive and tangible results, while the effort to convene a multilateral Balkan conference (and then a summit) failed. A conference of Greek, Turkish, Bulgarian, Romanian and Yugoslav officials was held in Athens in mid-January 1984. But Turkey essentially objected the concept of Balkan nuclear disarmament (and arms control in general) as separate from general disarmament in Europe. Instead, it wished to concentrate on issues of technological and economic cooperation. Ankara asked for a last-minute postponement of the meeting until 'tactical issues' were resolved and decided to send observers rather than a delegation. Then, the Athens conference was cut short significantly (the session lasted only from 8 to 10 January 1984) because the Turkish move prevented a start of substantive discussions and hindered any progress. In a face-saving formula for the hosts, the postponement was presented as a decision to hold the conference in two phases: a second phase was tentatively set for February 1984.⁵⁰

This conference convened in Athens from 12 to 19 February 1984. However, before it even started, the prospects for the establishment of a Balkan NWFZ appeared remote. When diplomats from Greece, Turkey, Bulgaria, Romania and Yugoslavia were invited to set the meeting agenda, the Turkish side remained adamant that the plan for the denuclearisation of the region should not be discussed. Thus, the other countries had to agree that the meeting should focus primarily on multilateral economic and technical cooperation, and the issue of denuclearisation was removed from the top of the agenda.⁵¹ A conference discussing nuclear disarmament in the Balkans would make little sense so long as Turkey – the country of Southeastern Europe hosting the most nuclear warheads and delivery systems – was determined to boycott it.

Therefore, the hosts (Greece) and the other proponents of Balkan nuclear disarmament (especially Bulgaria and Romania, and to a lesser extent Yugoslavia) had to settle for discussing ways to build confidence and improve

good neighbourly relations and cooperation on various fields. Procedures for continuing multilateral dialogue were also discussed among the five participants. Denuclearisation was addressed only as a parallel issue, focusing on peaceful uses of nuclear energy and 'procedures to promote the transformation of the Balkans into a zone free of nuclear weapons', as well as actions to protect the region's inhabitants and the environment from the consequences of the use of nuclear arms elsewhere.⁵²

As previously mentioned, the Greek government attempted to reverse its earlier stance that denuclearising the Balkans would enhance regional cooperation. It was becoming evident that the plan could proceed only should closer multilateral cooperation among the local powers was achieved and consolidated. Thus, Karolos Papoulias, the Undersecretary of State for Foreign Affairs, stated that he was confident that 'these efforts will be pursued until our ideal can materialise for a comprehensive Balkan cooperation in all fields, especially the protection of our peoples from the calamity of nuclear war, with our countries free of nuclear arms'.⁵³ Turkey, however, would continue to reject flatly the idea, ruling out the possibility of a future agreement on denuclearisation and even threatening to boycott future multilateral Balkan meetings unless the issue was struck off the agenda in future. Mustafa Aksin, head of the Turkish delegation, called the debate on removing nuclear weapons from the Balkans 'an exercise in futility' and stated that 'as a member of NATO, Turkey does not feel that these zones contribute to international security. They are a Soviet idea'.⁵⁴

During that second meeting, the socialist Balkan countries made several other proposals to improve regional cooperation and build confidence. Yugoslavia proposed the negotiation and conclusion of a regional 'small Helsinki Charter'. This should be based on principles of inter-Balkan cooperation, the mutual reduction of conventional armed forces in the area, the free circulation of goods and other relevant measures. Romania favoured the signature of a Balkan non-aggression pact.⁵⁵ However, little progress was made. The Greek government described the six-day conference between Greece, Turkey, Bulgaria, Romania and Yugoslavia as 'useful and successful', but the reality was that little progress was made towards multilateral confidence building or the improvement of the climate to facilitate Balkan cooperation – partly (though not exclusively) because of Turkish intransigence.⁵⁶ A final communique that was issued left no doubt about the very future of the Balkan conference. Romania had proposed a further round of talks to be held in Bucharest that year, but admitted that the rest of the Balkan governments would 'make their views known' about holding a next round only after reflecting on the results of the Athens sessions. Romanian officials conceded that future talks would have to accommodate Turkey's

opposition to denuclearisation by concentrating mainly on the less thorny issue of general regional cooperation. ‘Confidence-building measures should be the priority. We all agree that relations in the Balkans should improve’, said Romulus Neagu, the head of the Romanian delegation.⁵⁷

After the Athens conference of February 1984, Turkey made clear that it would not participate in any future meeting if the matter of the Balkan NWFZ was included again in the agenda. The Romanian government believed that Turkey’s opposition needed to be addressed before calling for the next session in Bucharest. However, the Turkish position did not change.⁵⁸ Specific research should be undertaken to further analyse Turkey’s position and determine whether other factors contributed to Ankara’s blunt refusal to discuss proposals for the denuclearisation of the Balkans. For instance, was the Turkish priority to align with the NATO nuclear strategy and planning? Or was it to ensure that US nuclear warheads remained in Turkey, thereby securing the benefits of being a valuable American and NATO ally? The Turkish policy makers were aware of how important their country was as a lever of both NATO’s Southern Flank defence system and US defence planning in the Middle East, especially in the context of the manifold crises looming in Southwest Asia. They would therefore do nothing that might undermine this Turkish significance.⁵⁹ Greek officials acknowledged that Greece had to move cautiously. Turkey was clearly willing to modernise the tactical nuclear weapons and delivery systems integrated in its armed forces, and it was not challenging US and NATO nuclear strategy. Under those circumstances, how could Greece afford to undermine its own value and leverage by requesting the removal of US nuclear warheads and delivery systems?⁶⁰ US intelligence experts had come to the same conclusion. In early 1984, a CIA report assessed that, unless Turkey and Bulgaria also removed tactical nuclear weapons from their territory, ‘the Greek Government is unlikely to follow through on earlier statements that it would force removal of US nuclear weapons from Greek soil’.⁶¹

However, another factor that must be also taken into consideration is Turkey’s effort to develop significant nuclear capabilities – first and foremost for peaceful means – in cooperation with Canadian and West German companies, but also with Pakistan. The distant possibility that Turkey might also seek to produce nuclear weapons was a matter that Greek policy makers had to take into account.⁶² Indeed, during the 1980s, Greece, as well as India, worried about the possibility of illicit Turkish–Pakistani nuclear cooperation that might eventually lead to the acquisition of nuclear weapons capabilities by both Turkey and Pakistan.⁶³ Prime Minister Andreas Papandreou had allegedly expressed his concern by telling Alexander Haig, then US Secretary of State, that ‘Pakistan expected Turkey to act as a transhipper of material

for a nuclear bomb and would reciprocate by proudly sharing the nuclear technology with Turkey'.⁶⁴ Most Western countries – including the United States – also held reservations in relation to the course and consequences of the Turkish nuclear programme; therefore, any Western (particularly Canadian and West German) support for the Turkish nuclear programme was withdrawn.⁶⁵

Yugoslavia's ambivalent attitude should also be examined and explained. The records of West German–Yugoslav talks held in 1983 shed light to the thinking of the Yugoslav government. According to the Yugoslav Foreign Minister Lazar Mojsov, the relaunch of the idea of a NWFZ in the Balkans served mainly 'propagandistic' goals. However, if the superpowers failed to reach an agreement on the intermediate-range weapons, the situation in the Balkans would continue to deteriorate. Therefore, Mojsov explained, Yugoslavia supported discussing the denuclearisation of the Balkans not so much as a realistic prospect, but rather as a forward-looking idea – a psychological slogan. As a result, Yugoslavia agreed with Papandreou's proposal for convening a summit with preceding expert meetings, even though the summit to discuss denuclearisation was never held.⁶⁶

Assessing Papandreou's Initiative for a Balkan NWFZ

Papandreou's initiative for the denuclearisation of the Balkans, which received extensive publicity, outraged several NATO members and officials. This was particularly notable because he sent his proposal to Balkan Warsaw Pact members without even informing – let alone consulting – Greece's NATO allies in advance. The Greek proposal was clearly at odds with the approved NATO strategy and had serious implications for the alliance as a whole rather than just for its southeastern flank.⁶⁷ Still, it is important to note that several Western officials and diplomats who knew of Papandreou's idiosyncrasy and motives, and even the US intelligence community, reached the conclusion that although the NWFZ concept had deep roots in Socialist and Papandreou's thinking, it was most likely that the Greek Prime Minister sought to use the issue to 'fend off attacks from the Greek Communists'. Therefore, advocacy of a zone of peace allowed Papandreou to demonstrate that he was 'struggling for peace' and to deflect criticism for the conclusion of the 1983 US–Greek agreement allowing US bases to remain in Greece.⁶⁸ Greece's Western European allies also believed that Papandreou's effort would not succeed, and that it was not intended to produce tangible results: for instance, a high-ranking Italian diplomat conveyed the belief to his West German counterpart that the project for a Balkan NWFZ was doomed to

fail and that, after all, it was just a 'Greek theatre', as Papandreou sought to please the Greek public opinion without undertaking major risks while conducting his foreign policy.⁶⁹

Papandreou's initiative was nevertheless endorsed by other proponents of nuclear disarmament, such as Olof Palme, the Swedish Prime Minister. During his official visit to Athens in August 1983, Palme expressed his support for another proposal from his Greek counterpart, a six-month delay in deployment of the Pershing II and Cruise missiles. Palme also called for the establishment of three NWFZs in Europe: in Scandinavia, the Balkans and Central Europe.⁷⁰ The Swedish government had already begun pursuing anti-nuclear initiatives and, in late 1982, had approached the Greek government about the prospect of common action.⁷¹ According to East German sources, Greece held consultations with Sweden on the formation of NWFZs in Europe.⁷² Thus, Papandreou was not the sole non-Communist leader who advocated the establishment of a NWFZ. The possibility of the establishment of a NWFZ in Northern Europe was a matter of continuous discussion in Denmark and Norway (both NATO members) as well as Sweden (a Western non-NATO country). Finland strongly advocated the implementation of the idea, particularly if Soviet territory were also included in such a nuclear-free zone. The possibility for a NWFZ in Northern Europe was a matter of periodical debate especially in Norway and Sweden, and it was also discussed at the conference of the socialist parties of the Benelux and Scandinavian countries that was held in Amsterdam in early January 1981. Nevertheless, it should be noted that the Norwegian and Danish supporters of such a zone did not express positions very similar to that of Papandreou, while making it clear that they would not undermine NATO's strategy and cohesion, nor the primacy of the United States in negotiations with the Soviet Union, and that such an initiative would be part of the broader framework of Western efforts. Even so, the relevant initiative of Papandreou must be examined in conjunction with similar other moves and perceptions not only in the Balkans but also elsewhere.⁷³

Furthermore, Greece's initiatives encouraged Romania and even Bulgaria to express their disapproval of rising Cold War tensions and the potential further deployment of Soviet missiles in parts of Eastern Europe.⁷⁴ Zhivkov had assured Papandreou that Bulgaria would not accept any Soviet missiles on its territory (even if the Soviets were mainly interested in deploying their missiles in East-Central Europe and not in Southeastern Europe, there was concern about the possibility to demand a deployment to Bulgaria as well). While Romania denounced the deployment by both sides and urged Moscow to drop its demand that the UK and French nuclear arsenal be included in the Geneva arms talks and essentially endorsed the American position of

the 'zero-zero option' that all US and Soviet medium-range ballistic missiles should be abolished.⁷⁵ It should be mentioned that Romania and Bulgaria possessed short-range, nuclear capable missiles (FROG and SCUD), but had no nuclear warheads.⁷⁶ In July 1986, Bulgaria did receive the much more sophisticated OTR-23 Oka (NATO designation SS-23 Spider) mobile theatre ballistic missile – although still without nuclear warheads.⁷⁷ Yet, the intelligence community of the West was aware of the fact that during the Euromissile Crisis, Bulgaria and Romania, as well as most East European countries, were concerned about Soviet policies on East–West relations, and, especially, of the Kremlin's willingness to deploy additional SS-20 missiles on the territory of its Warsaw Pact allies. The Bulgarian government and the press not only continued to express Sofia's desire for a Balkan NWFZ, but also publicly denounced as 'groundless' the reports in the Western press that Soviet missiles would be deployed in Bulgaria. As for Romania, it was well known for being the most open critic of Soviet INF policy within the Warsaw Pact.⁷⁸

Greek archival material further corroborates the view that Andreas Papandreou and his government did not actually intend to go too far with the denuclearisation proposal. Therefore, the Greek initiative should be seen in a broader context of Greece's détente policy towards the Soviet Bloc and particularly the Balkan Warsaw Pact members – neighbouring Bulgaria as well as Romania – at a time when Cold War tensions had been heightened both globally and across Europe. Andreas Papandreou and the Greek diplomats were fully aware of Turkey's flat opposition to any regional NWFZ initiative, Yugoslavia's disinterest to the idea and Albania's disinclination to participate to any form of Balkan cooperation.

In practice, the Greek proposals produced no conclusive results. So, while Papandreou aimed to keep the Balkan NWFZ idea alive as a means to facilitate Romania's and Bulgaria's interest in a broader dialogue on Balkan cooperation on other issues, he did not expect much from his denuclearisation initiative. Proposals for the establishment of confidence-building measures and strengthening of Balkan economic and technical cooperation ensued from 1984 onwards. However, and although the PASOK government continued to publicly endorse the idea, the initiative for a regional NWFZ quietly died out after February 1984.

Papandreou himself began to shift his focus on another initiative. In May 1984 he joined with five other heads of state and government (including Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, Swedish Prime Minister Olof Palme, Mexican President Miguel de la Madrid, Argentinian President Raul Alfonsín and Tanzanian President Julius Nyerere) to launch the 'Six-Nation Initiative' for Peace and Disarmament, a movement promoting prevention

of arms race in outer space and the need for a nuclear test ban.⁷⁹ As for the other two supporters of a Balkan NWFZ, in the mid-1980s Bulgaria and Romania raised a similar and complementary idea: that is, to turn the Balkans into ‘a zone free of chemical weapons’. To this end, they publicly announced a joint initiative on 22 December 1985. Greece and Yugoslavia welcomed the idea, but Turkey once again declared that such issues could be addressed only globally, while Albania remained indifferent.⁸⁰

After the rise to power of Gorbachev, Cold War tensions gradually began to defuse and the Kremlin viewed the prospect of regional cooperation more positively. Apparently, this might have facilitated to some extent the process of multilateral regional cooperation and especially bilateral Greek–Bulgarian collaboration.⁸¹ Therefore, even before the conclusion of the INF Treaty between the two superpowers that signalled the thaw in Cold War tensions, interbloc relations in the Balkans had been developed significantly. Eventually, *all* Balkan countries – Albania, Bulgaria, Greece, Romania, Turkey and Yugoslavia – were brought together for the first time at the meeting of ministers of foreign affairs of the Balkan countries held in Belgrade on 24–26 February 1988. The second foreign ministers’ meeting took place in Tirana on 24–25 October 1990. However, by that time, the situation in the region and in Europe and the whole world was very different from that of the 1980s.

Conclusion

By the late 1970s, détente was spiralling out of control with heightened tensions across much of Europe and the globe. The Balkan states were not affected significantly by the increased tension between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. The Euromissile Crisis and the new arms race between the two superpowers seemed irrelevant to crucial national security interests and priorities of the countries of Southeastern Europe. Balkan détente continued to flourish, despite its many problems and restrictions. In this context, ideas and initiatives for establishing a Balkan ‘atom-free zone’ and/or ‘zone of peace’ were introduced.

However, multilateralism in the Balkan states remained confined to aspects of everyday cooperation and issues of ‘low politics’: industrial and trade cooperation, cross-border traffic, and water management. Despite the gradual intensification of multilateral and, particularly, of bilateral contacts of Balkan government officials and experts after 1981, cooperation was not possible regarding the nuclear arms race. The Balkans could still not be extricated from the military or at least of the nuclear orbit of the two blocs.

In essence, Yugoslavia and Albania were the only actual atom-free areas in the Balkans, whereas Greece and Turkey were under the nuclear umbrella of NATO, and Romania and Bulgaria were under that of the Warsaw Pact. It is also significant to note that a regional initiative for the denuclearisation of the Balkans could not succeed even if, theoretically, all Balkan countries were forthcoming. The two superpowers would also need to accede by providing 'negative security assurances', i.e. by providing guarantees that they would not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against the countries participating in the NWFZ.⁸² In addition, the political presence of the superpowers in the Balkans was not only confined to the member states of the two blocs, but was also felt in non-aligned Yugoslavia and uncommitted Albania. Of course, political divisions along Cold War lines were not simply a Balkan issue, but were also a European reality in general. However, the Balkan countries held different views on the question of setting up a regional 'peace and cooperation zone' not only because most of them were members of rival blocs and economic integration systems; but also because Balkan bilateral differences (including ethnic ones) beyond and irrespective of the Cold War system effectively hindered the realisation of the initiatives to turn the region into a non-nuclear zone of peace and cooperation. If that was the case, why did Papandreou, Ceausescu, and Zhivkov eventually favour and pursue regional denuclearisation? Was it mainly because this policy could generate domestic support for them? Did the Bulgarian and Romanian governments seek to please the Kremlin, which favoured the idea of regional denuclearisation? Concurrently, did they also seek to avoid future Soviet pressure for the deployment of Soviet nukes on their territory should the nuclear arms race escalate further? As for Papandreou, did he have a 'hidden' or parallel agenda? For instance, as some archival and other sources suggest, one could justifiably assume that the project of a Balkan NWFZ – and therefore of Greek denuclearisation – could also serve as a means of exerting Greek pressure on the United States and/or NATO so that Greece could extract concessions elsewhere,⁸³ or, conversely, as a bargaining chip for getting Soviet support against Turkey in Cyprus and/or the Aegean.⁸⁴

The story of Balkan cooperation was not only one of failure and disappointment; already by the early and mid-1980s, there were signs of forthcoming change. To varying degrees, Balkan countries improved their bilateral relations and toyed with ideas of multilateral cooperation. Transcending Cold War mentalities, several Balkan states pursued a cautiously independent foreign policy that prioritised national interests by seeking regional solutions and a limitation of external interference and influence. Papandreou and Ceausescu felt that their countries were threatened by nuclear destruction and demanded in the name of the European people to be heard during

the Soviet–American arms reduction talks in Geneva. Zhivkov kept a lower public profile, but also strongly supported both the concept of regional denuclearisation and that of multilateral regional cooperation. The governments of Greece, Romania and Bulgaria constituted a transnational movement which enjoyed significant popular support and sought to reach across the borders of the Cold War coalitions to establish a foundation for détente and to promote regional peace and disarmament. Even if this effort proved to be stillborn, not least because of the limitations imposed by the bipolar system but also because of the reservations of Yugoslavia and the objections of Turkey and Albania, it nevertheless reflected the ease of Cold War tension and the improvement of relations between certain Balkan states (most notably between Greece and Bulgaria).

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Notes

1. Academic literature on this subject has emerged very recently, especially in a special issue of the *Journal of Contemporary History*, 56(3) (2021). The most relevant articles published there are: Baumeister and Ziemann, ‘Introduction: Peace Movements in Southern Europe during the 1970s and 1980s’, 563–78; Lomellini, ‘Under Attack? The PCI and the Italian Peace Movement in the 1980s’, 579–94; Bonfreschi, ‘“Against Any Army”: Italian Radical Party’s Antimilitarism from the 1960s to the Early 1980s’, 595–616; Karamouzi, ‘“Out with the Bases of Death”: Civil Society and Peace Mobilization in Greece during the 1980s’, 617–38; and Quaggio, ‘Walls of Anxiety: The Iconography of Anti-NATO protests in Spain, 1981–6’, 693–719.

2. The Andreas G. Papandreou Archive, especially the series PASOK Archive, has become gradually accessible to a handful of researchers.
3. Karamouzi, 'Managing the "Helsinki Spirit" in the Balkans'.
4. Only the Greek peace/anti-nuclear movement has been explored to some extent. Relevant works are Markopoulos, *With Andreas Papandreou and the World Peace Movement*; Karamouzi and Chourchoulis, 'Troublemaker or Peacemaker?'; and the other essays of Eirini Karamouzi: "'Out with the Bases of Death" and 'At Last, Our Voice Is Heard in the World'.
5. Emmanouilides, *Greek Foreign Policy in the Balkans*, 84–85, 99–100.
6. On the issue of the extent, nature and goals of Romanian 'autonomous' or 'independent' foreign policy, see, for instance, Deletant, "'Taunting the Bear"'.
7. TNA, FCO 28/5200, ENU 021/3, Edwin Bolland (Belgrade) to Francis Pym, 19 April 1982.
8. Katsikas, 'An Overview of Albania's Foreign Policy-Making during the 1980s'.
9. See, for instance, 'Ankara Misgivings in Balkan Talks', *The Times*, 27 January 1976, p. 10.
10. 'Bulgarian Reservations in Balkan Talks', *The Times*, 7 February 1976, p. 4; 'Bulgaria Holds Back on Balkan Links', *The Times*, 10 July 1978, p. 6. In the early 1970s, Bulgaria had endorsed the concept of the transformation of the Balkan peninsula into an 'internationally-guaranteed nuclear-free zone' without any foreign military presence, perhaps responding to Romania's relevant initiatives. However, at that point the Bulgarian government did not wish to pursue the idea through a multilateral initiative of the Balkan states because this would mean that the superpowers would be excluded from the negotiations, which would cause Soviet (as well as US) disapproval. Apparently, Todor Zhivkov's reference to an 'internationally-guaranteed nuclear-free zone' was a mean to get the Soviet Union involved in the negotiations aimed at setting up such a zone. See TNA, FCO 28/2250, ENG 3/365/1, D. K. Timms (Sofia) to FCO, 30 October 1973.
11. TNA, FCO 28/4856, John Hawes to Glenn Cella, Assessment of US Delegation to NATO on Bulgaria's New Foreign Policy Activism, 31 March 1982.
12. TNA, FCO 28/4856, pp. 6–10; see also 'Bulgaria Is Zealously Marking Its 1,300th Birthday', *New York Times*, 8 November 1981, p. 20.
13. 'Bulgaria Seeks More Western Takeovers', *Financial Times*, 6 July 1982, p. 6.
14. CREST – CIA Digital Archive, CIA-RDP84S00895R000200110002-5, Bulgaria: A Country in Transition, February 1984.
15. CREST – CIA Digital Archive, CIA-RDP89T01156R000100050006-2, The Trend in Soviet-Bulgarian Relations, 30 May 1985.
16. TNA, FCO 9/3186, WSG021/1, Sofia to FCO, 13 July 1981.
17. Koumas and Chourchoulis, *Selected Topics in Greek Foreign Policy 1923–2014*, 220–21.
18. Ibid; see also Svolopoulos, *Greek Policy in the Balkans, 1974–81*, 203–7, 217–18.
19. See, for instance, Stergiou, *Greece's Ostpolitik*, 121–31; and Lykourgos Kourkouvelas, "'Détente" as a Strategy'.
20. TNA, FCO 9/3186, WSG021/1, FCO to Sofia, 16 April 1981.

21. This topic had first been dealt with in Svolopoulos, *Greek Policy in the Balkans, 1974–81*.
22. ‘Papandreou Seeks Atom-Free Balkans’, *The Times*, 12 October 1981, p. 3.
23. Nevertheless, it should be pointed out that the official pre-election declaration/programme also left some room for manoeuvre, as it declared that: ‘The individual steps to be taken to achieve the inexorable strategic goals [of a PASOK government] will take into account the armament needs of our country’s armed forces, as well as the evolving international balance of power, especially in our region’ and also that: ‘With regard to the measures that PASOK will take for the implementation of its national defense and foreign policy, their impact on the strength of the armed forces will be taken into account. PASOK will not, at any step and under any circumstances, allow the degradation of the readiness of the armed forces of the country.’ PASOK Publications, *Socialist Party Manifesto – Contract with the People* [in Greek], (Athens, 1981), 31–32.
24. ‘Greece’s Leader Eases His Stand on U.S. Bases’, *New York Times*, 26 October 1981, p. A1. For a detailed account and analysis, see Karamouzi ‘Negotiating the American Presence in Greece’.
25. ‘Greece Says It Wants to Ban US Nuclear Arms on Its Soil: 2 Issues Are Separated’, *New York Times*, 12 November 1981, p. A12.
26. Such an initiative would have constituted a direct challenge to US and NATO strategy and prestige, and might have had some adverse consequences for Greek security if US nuclear weapons had remained on Turkish territory.
27. Hellenic Parliament Library (HPL), *Parliament Debates, Plenary Session*, vol. I, *Sessions A’–ΑΔ’* (Athens, 1982), Third Period, First Session, 22 November 1981, p. 17.
28. Kourkouvelas, ‘Denuclearization on NATO’s Southern Front’.
29. ‘Bulgaria Backs Greek Plan for Atom-Free Zone’, *The Times*, 21 October 1981, p. 5.
30. Todor Zhivkov commented later to East German leader Erich Honecker: ‘When we initiated similar idea, the other Balkan states restrained. Now such idea was initiated by Papandreou, and an agreement to carry out a meeting was reached.’ Quoted in Baev, ‘Bulgaria and the Nuclear Proliferation in the Balkans’, 47.
31. ‘Romanians Hold Huge Peace Rally’, *The Times*, 7 December 1981, p. 4.
32. ‘Rumanians Stage Protest on A-Arms’, *New York Times*, 6 December 1981, p. 4.
33. The old Romanian idea for the denuclearisation of the Balkans had revived in 1979, when the Romanian Minister of Foreign Affairs Ștefan Andrei called for ‘the transformation of that region [i.e. the Balkans] into a zone of peace and good neighbourliness, free from nuclear weapons, as an element of security and co-operation in Europe’. UN Digital Archives, United Nations General Assembly Thirty Fourth Session, 12th Plenary Meeting, 27 September 1979, <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/384686> (retrieved 25 September 2024).
34. Papandreou nevertheless stated that, in any case, if needed Greece would proceed even unilaterally to denuclearisation, thus adopting ‘exactly the same position as that of the Labour Party in the UK’. See TNA, FCO 9/3524, WSG021/1, Athens to FCO, 30 March 1982.

35. 'Athens and Bucharest Propose a Balkan Summit', *Kathimerini* [in Greek], 8 May 1982, p. 1.
36. 'First Step towards a Balkan Summit', *Eleftherotypia* [in Greek], 3 November 1982, pp. 1, 15.
37. 'Greece and Rumania Urge Talks To Rid Balkans of Nuclear Arms', *New York Times*, 6 November 1982, p. 3; 'Turkey Will Also Participate in the Balkan Conference', *Eleftherotypia* [in Greek], 5 November 1982, p. 1. Various sources demonstrate that the Romanians were truly confident that Turkey was willing to discuss the possibility of establishing a Balkan NWFZ. This is quite strange because other available sources clearly indicate that Bulgarian, Yugoslav and Greek officials all held the (accurate) view that the Turks opposed the prospect of regional denuclearisation.
38. TNA, FCO 28/5200, ENU 021/3, Edwin Bolland (Belgrade) to Francis Pym, 19 April 1982. See also 'Belgrade: The Warm Atmosphere "Freezes" the Outstanding Issues', *To Vima* [in Greek], 30 May 1982.
39. TNA, FCO 28/5200, ENU 021/3, Gavin Hewitt (Belgrade) to FCO, 5 January 1982; 'Papandreou Promotes His Plan for the Balkans', *The Times*, 27 May 1982, p. 9; 'Papandreou Plays the Balkan Card', *The Times*, 29 May 1982, p. 6.
40. TNA, FCO 28/6936, ENU 021/4, Yugoslavia's Foreign Relations, 21 October 1985.
41. 'Papandreou Takes Pet Project to Sofia', *The Times*, 24 June 1982, p. 7; 'Papandreou Promotes His Plan for the Balkans', *The Times*, 27 May 1982, p. 9.
42. The Bulgarian and the Romanian governments were in favour of a Balkan NWFZ, but they both appeared annoyed that the initiative gained some momentum only after its embrace by Andreas Papandreou. During private discussions, Romanian officials appeared to envy Papandreou's initiative because the idea was originally a Romanian one. See APF, APA, Box_ 9, Bucharest to HMFA, no. 4510/11/ΑΣ/353/22-7-1983, 22 July 1983. Moreover, the Yugoslavs, although they welcomed PASOK's 'independent' foreign policy and Greek overtures towards the Third World, had also second thoughts that the new Greek government might go too far and outshine non-aligned Yugoslavia. APF, APA, Box_ 9, Belgrade to HMFA, no. Φ.1133/46 E.X., 13 October 1983.
43. APF, APA, Box 3_ 1982, Papandreou's speech at KEADEA's conference, 10 December 1982.
44. Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amtes (: PA AA), M 95/24902 [1986], Griechische Friedensbewegung, 64/IX, 15 September 1986. According to East German officials, the Papandreou government also wished to utilise the Greek anti-nuclear/peace movement to: (a) increase PASOK's domestic political influence; and (b) exert pressure on the United States and NATO.
45. 'Papandreou Backs Antinuclear Movement', *Washington Post*, 11 December 1982.
46. 'Papandreou Seeks Romanian Backing', *The Guardian*, 6 May 1982, p. 7.
47. KKF, KKA File 55B, Talks between Karamanlis and Zhivkov at Varna, 25 and 26 April 1983.
48. 'Minutes of Conversation between Todor Zhivkov and Nicolae Ceausescu on Multilateral Cooperation on the Balkans, Perla Residence [Bulgaria]', 24 February 1983, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, Central State Archive,

- Sofia, Fond 1-B, Record 60, File 305. Obtained by the Bulgarian Cold War Research Group, <http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/111120> (retrieved 25 September 2024).
49. 'Greeks Will Go Ahead with Balkan Summit', *The Times*, 25 June 1983, p. 4.
 50. 'Balkan Nations Postpone Talks on Regional Nuclear-Free Zone', *Financial Times*, 17 January 1984, p. 2.
 51. 'Nuclear Ban in Balkans Recedes into Future', *The Times*, 14 February 1984, p. 6; 'Turkey in Nuclear Conference', *Financial Times*, 14 February 1984, p. 2.
 52. Andrikos, 'A Balkan Nuclear-Weapons-Free Zone', 30.
 53. 'Nuclear Ban in Balkans Recedes into Future', *The Times*, 14 February 1984, p. 6.
 54. 'Turks Want Nuclear Issue Dropped from Balkan Talks', *Financial Times*, 16 February 1984, p. 3.
 55. Andrikos, 'A Balkan Nuclear-Weapons-Free Zone', 30–31.
 56. 'Sterile Talks on Nuclear-Free Zone in Balkans', *The Times*, 20 February 1984, p. 4.
 57. 'Agreement Blocked at Balkan Nuclear Talks', *Financial Times*, 20 February 1984, p. 3.
 58. Andrikos, 'A Balkan Nuclear-Weapons-Free Zone', 31.
 59. See, for instance, Çalıř, *Turkey's Cold War*, 171–72, 175–77.
 60. Greek advisors expressed their reservations for Greek denuclearisation should Turkey keep US nuclear warheads on its territory. APF, APA, Box_16/1984, I. Valinakis to C. Papoulias and E. Spyridakis, Note on Greek positions during the second phase of the Interbalkan Experts Conference, 30 January 1984.
 61. CREST – CIA Digital Archive, CIA-RDP84S00895R000200070004-8, Research Paper on Nuclear-Weapons-Free-Zones: Proposals and Prospects, January 1984.
 62. For this last issue, see, for instance, KKF, KKA File 69B, HMFA's Note on Turkey and Nuclear Affairs, no. 3161.4/ΣΗΜ/, 27 February 1985.
 63. Jewell and Seyithan Ates, 'Introducing Nuclear Power in Turkey'.
 64. Quoted in Kibaroglu, 'Turkey's Quest for Peaceful Nuclear Power', 35.
 65. Ibid, 35–36; Jewell and Ates, 'Introducing Nuclear Power in Turkey', 275.
 66. *Akten zur Auswärtigen Politik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland* (hereinafter *AAPD*) 1983, (Oldenbourg Verlag, 2014), no. 255, Botschaftsrat I. Klasse Gerz, Belgrad, an das Auswärtige Amt: Staatsbesuch vom 5. bis 8.9.1983 – zweite Gesprächsrunde BM mit AM Mojsov, 6. September 1983, 1291.
 67. Karamouzi and Chourchoulis, 'Troublemaker or Peacemaker?', 53–54.
 68. CREST – CIA Digital Archive, CIA-RDP84S00895R000200070004-8, Research Paper on Nuclear-Weapons-Free-Zones: Proposals and Prospects, January 1984.
 69. *AAPD 1982* (Oldenbourg Verlag, 2013), no. 323, Aufzeichnung des Ministerialdirigenten Schauer: Deutsch-italienische sicherheitspolitische Konsultationen in Bonn am 22 November 1982, 29 November 1982, 1675. Furthermore, early on, the Italians correctly assessed that Bulgaria and Romania would support the idea of a Balkan NWFZ, but that Yugoslavia would essentially reject it.
 70. 'Palme Wants Three Nuclear-Free Zones', *Financial Times*, 24 August 1983, p. 2.
 71. APF, APA, Box 3_ 1982, Kostas D. Zepos (A3 Directorate of Political Affairs) to A7 Directorate of Hellenic Ministry of Foreign Affairs and to the Director of Political

- Affairs, 'Swedish proposal for nuclear-free zones in Europe', no. A3 Δ.Φ. 2112/30/ΑΣ 1539, 8 December 1982; APA, Box 3_ 1982, Giannis Pottakis (Deputy Minister of National Economy) to Andreas Papandreou, Note on the missile-free zone, 29 November 1982; see also Jonter, Chapter 5 in this volume on Palme's initiatives in this volume.
72. PA AA, M 95/17590 [1983], Griechische Haltung zur nuklearen Abrüstung, 18/I, 5 January 1983.
 73. KKF, KKA File 42B, HMFA – Note on Nuclear-Free Zone in the North, 2 December 1981.
 74. 'East Europe Is Uneasy over Missiles', *New York Times*, 28 December 1983, p. A3.
 75. 'Unrest over Missile Stationing – Disquiet among Moscow's Allies', *Financial Times*, 15 November 1983, p. 4; 'Soviet Bloc Rift Reported by U.S.', *New York Times*, 21 December 1983, p. A3.
 76. Greek policy makers were aware that even if no Soviet nuclear warheads were deployed in Bulgaria and Romania, in the event of a global or European war, the Warsaw Pact could either strike Greece with SS-20s or the Soviet Union could immediately and easily deploy tactical nuclear weapons on Bulgarian territory, especially if Soviet troops would be deployed as well. Similarly, the United States could launch strikes by utilising its own INF, its bombers and its naval forces (the US Sixth Fleet). In this respect, a Balkan NWFZ could not add much to the avoidance of a nuclear war should Greece and Bulgaria themselves become embroiled in a NATO–Warsaw Pact war. But should a bilateral Greek–Bulgarian conflict erupt (although by that time this was a rather remote possibility), it was highly unlikely that either superpower would employ nuclear weapons to support its ally. Either way, the Balkan NWFZ appeared quite irrelevant to the avoidance of a local or regional nuclear holocaust. It was more suitable as a confidence-building measure.
 77. Since the 1960s, when the Bulgarian armed forces received their first Soviet tactical missiles, the Warsaw Pact had decided that 'the approved number of nuclear warheads with fixed KT should be kept on Soviet territory' in Ukraine and would be delivered to Bulgarian Armed Forces only after a respective Warsaw Pact leadership political decision. Baev, 'Bulgaria and the Nuclear Proliferation in the Balkans', 34.
 78. CREST – CIA Digital Archive, CIA-RDP85T00287R001100360001-2, Report on Eastern Europe – USSR: Rising Discord within the Soviet Bloc, 26 June 1984. Indeed, by 1983–84, Western policy makers acknowledged that Bulgaria had begun to take a somewhat more independent position on security issues. This was especially true in the case of its refusal to accept the deployment of Soviet nuclear missiles on its territory. See also *AAPD 1984*, no. 129, Deutsch-amerikanisches Regierungsgespräch in Washington: Gespräche des Herrn Bundesministers mit AM Shultz in Washington am 8.5.1984, 8 May 1984, 621–22.
 79. For a detailed analysis of this initiative and the role of Andreas Papandreou, see Karamouzi, 'At Last, Our Voice Is Heard in the World'.
 80. Baev, 'Bulgaria and the Nuclear Proliferation in the Balkans', 47.
 81. However, it is worth noting that as late as February 1988, the Soviet Foreign Ministry considered that the primary goal of Warsaw Pact policy in the Balkans

- should continue to be ‘neutralization of the pro-Atlantic tendencies in the policy of Greece and Turkey’. Quoted in *ibid.*, 48–49.
82. For more on this specific aspect/challenge, see Platias, ‘The Nuclear Problem in the Balkans’.
 83. APF, APA, Box_16/1984, I. Valinakis to C. Papoulias and E. Spyridakis, Note on Greek positions during the second phase of the Interbalkan Experts Conference, 30 January 1984. Valinakis suggested that Greece might be willing to consult with its NATO allies and perhaps secure that the Americans would not provide to Turkey additional dual-capable platforms (combat aircraft or howitzers) that could be used in a conventional attack against Greece. Others such as the then young scholar Athanasios Platias (and one of the pioneers of the research field of Strategy/Strategic Studies in the Greek academic community) believed that Greece could secure the withdrawal of US atomic warheads – or, at least, that Greek regional anti-nuclear initiatives would ease possible US/NATO pressures for a modernization of nuclear warheads and delivery systems stationed in Greece. See Platias, ‘The Nuclear Problem in the Balkans’, 163.
 84. APF, APA, Box 14/1983, I. Valinakis to A. Papandreou and C. Papoulias, Note on the possibility of deployment of [Soviet] nuclear weapons in Bulgaria, 5 December 1983.

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David Lange

The Anti-nuclear Prime Minister of New Zealand,
1984–89

Exequiel Lacovsky

Introduction

David Lange became New Zealand's Prime Minister on the Labour Party ticket in 1984. By that time, anti-nuclear sentiments were running high both within the party and in the country as a whole. In the 1980s, New Zealand had one of the largest grassroots anti-nuclear movements in the Western world.¹ There were around 300 different peace groups that opposed nuclear activities and were engaging in rallies, public petitions and direct action. Unwanted nuclear activities included the visit of US nuclear vessels to New Zealand and the French nuclear testing program in the South Pacific.

During his five-year premiership, Lange championed the anti-nuclear cause in New Zealand and the South Pacific. Building on the Labour Party nuclear-free platform and the popularity of the anti-nuclear movement, he advanced the policy of banning the visit of nuclear vessels to New Zealand harbours and promoted the New Zealand Nuclear-Free Zone, Disarmament, and Arms Control Act that was passed in 1987. Moreover, during his administration, four other events consolidated his commitment to the anti-nuclear cause: first, his refusal to allow the *USS Buchanan* to anchor in New Zealand harbours, an incident that triggered an unprecedented rift with the United States; second, his famous speech at the Oxford Union in 1985 where he delivered an admonition against nuclear weapons; third, his strong opposition to France following the 1985 *Rainbow Warrior* incident, which occurred in the context of France's nuclear testing in the Pacific; and, finally, his support for the establishment of the South Pacific nuclear weapon-free zone (NWFZ) in 1985.

Interestingly, New Zealand's anti-nuclear policy in the 1980s has not attracted much attention from international peace scholars. Its immense domestic popularity has been well documented by academics in New Zealand and the South Pacific, but has not entered the global discourse on anti-nuclear activism in the late Cold War to the same extent as the struggle against the Euromissiles. This chapter aims to address this lacuna by posing the following questions: what actions did the New Zealand anti-nuclear movement take and what vision did it put forward? How did David Lange's government address the demands of the anti-nuclear movement? What was the impact and legacy of Lange's years as Prime Minister on the cause of nuclear nonproliferation? To assess Lange's anti-nuclear record, this chapter relies on personal testimonies of key protagonists of the period such as Lange, former New Zealand diplomat and defence official Gerald Hensley, the diplomat Malcolm Templeton and the activist and sociology lecturer Kevin Clements, as well as secondary sources and declassified US documents. The chapter's focus is on the relationship between policy making and the anti-nuclear movement. The Labour Party built its support base among the anti-nuclear social movements, whose membership included key party members. Simultaneously, these social movements found their political home within the Labour Party. This symbiotic relationship enabled the rise of a political leader like Lange, who fully embraced the anti-nuclear agenda, even at the cost to the country's bilateral relations with the United States.

The chapter is organised into three sections. First, it begins with a brief account of the nuclear activities in the South Pacific and the surge and growth of the anti-nuclear movement in New Zealand. Then, the main milestones of the Lange administration are highlighted along with the American reaction to New Zealand's anti-nuclear policies. Finally, the legacy of Lange's years as Prime Minister of New Zealand is analysed.

Nuclear Activities in the South Pacific

The South Pacific region occupied a central role in the nuclear arena of the Cold War from its onset to its very end. Nuclear powers such as France, the United Kingdom and the United States outsourced many of their nuclear activities and moved their nuclear testing programmes to the South Pacific.² The United States conducted sixty-seven atmospheric nuclear tests between 1945 and 1958 in the Pacific: the Marshall Islands and Bikini Atoll. Moreover, the United States had a widespread military and nuclear presence in the South Pacific region throughout the Cold War.³ It had permanent bases in Guam, Australia and Micronesia, and a maritime presence of nuclear

vessels. In addition, Washington had a security pact with New Zealand and Australia called the Australia, New Zealand, United States Security Treaty (the ANZUS Treaty), which formed the cornerstone of the US military presence in the South Pacific and was designed to contain the Soviet Union. The ANZUS Treaty entailed visits of US nuclear vessels, and joint military exercises with Australia and New Zealand. The United Kingdom also tested twelve nuclear bombs on Australian soil from 1952 to 1957. Between 1957 and 1958, nine hydrogen bomb tests were carried out in the central Pacific Ocean by the United Kingdom (Christmas Island).⁴ France also tested nuclear weapons in the South Pacific for thirty years, from 1966 until 1996. Between 1966 and 1974, it carried out forty-one atmospheric nuclear tests in the Mururoa atoll and later it moved its testing programme underground.⁵ Overall, France carried out around 190 nuclear tests in the region. In sum, the South Pacific region became the epicentre of nuclear activities during the Cold War, prompting the emergence of an assertive anti-nuclear movement.

The Anti-nuclear Movement in the South Pacific and New Zealand

The flurry of nuclear activities carried out by the nuclear powers in the South Pacific was accompanied by anti-nuclear mobilisation across the region, and more intensely in New Zealand.⁶ Concerns over nuclear testing brought together pacifist groups, leftist parties, various denominations of churches and trade unions. While still marginal in the 1960s, the movement gained momentum in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Similar to peace mobilisation in the rest of the world, New Zealand protesters organised mass demonstrations, presented petitions to their governments, led public awareness campaigns on the threats of nuclear weapons, and actively pursued the establishment of a NWFZ in the South Pacific.

In New Zealand, it is possible to trace the origin of the anti-nuclear movement as far back as 1956.⁷ That year, the Religious Society of Friends (Quakers) in Auckland presented one of the first petitions to the New Zealand government demanding the suspension of both UK nuclear testing in the region and New Zealand's involvement in them.⁸ This petition came against the backdrop of the UK hydrogen bomb test in the South Pacific that included observers from New Zealand. Years later, in 1959, the New Zealand Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND) was established to oppose UK nuclear testing in Australia. Inspired by its British sister organisation, the New Zealand CND organised rallies against nuclear weapons. In 1963, it recorded one of its first significant achievements.⁹ The CND

presented to the New Zealand Parliament a petition calling for a Southern Hemisphere Nuclear-Free Zone in a campaign with the slogan 'No Bombs South of the Line'.¹⁰ By 1963, the CND was already the largest peace organisation in New Zealand, with branches in many cities and a membership of 700 people.¹¹ The concerns raised by the peace protesters seemed to be partly shared by the New Zealand government. In 1963, New Zealand was one of the first countries to sign the Partial Test Ban Treaty. The same year, when France was about to move its nuclear testing programme to the South Pacific, New Zealand made a formal protest to the French government.¹² Following the beginning of the testing programme in 1966, New Zealand's policy continued to express diplomatic opposition to French policy through regular diplomatic channels.¹³

In the late 1960s, the anti-nuclear movement began to lose steam in the context of the Vietnam War. As New Zealand contributed to that war by sending troops, anti-nuclear and peace movement protests shifted their struggle against the Vietnam War.¹⁴ Once the Vietnam War faded, the anti-nuclear movement gained momentum in the early 1970s by adopting direct action methods. For example, in 1972, Greenpeace, a much smaller organisation at the time, and groups such as Peace Media sent ships from New Zealand to the Mururoa atoll to protest against nuclear tests.¹⁵ This form of protest was later adopted by Labour Prime Minister Norman Kirk, who sent ships (with ministers onboard) to protest against French nuclear testing in the Mururoa atoll.¹⁶ In 1973, the Kirk administration sued France in the International Court of Justice in The Hague over its nuclear testing programme. In 1975 it promoted, a United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) resolution advocating of the establishment of a NWFZ in the South Pacific.¹⁷ These actions and initiatives did not lead to the suspension of the French nuclear testing programme, but did compel France to move its tests underground in 1974. However, when the conservative National Party – led by Robert Muldoon – won the elections in 1975, US nuclear warships to visit New Zealand ports intensified and the proposal of establishing a NWFZ in the region was shelved.¹⁸

Because of Muldoon's pro-nuclear policies, by the 1980s, the anti-nuclear movement grew in size and assertiveness by opposing the visit of nuclear warships and by challenging New Zealand's participation in the ANZUS Treaty.¹⁹ The anti-nuclear movement's growth received a further boost from the impact of the Euromissile Crisis.²⁰ The US decision of deploying the Pershing II missiles in Europe during the first years of the Ronald Reagan administration caused protests in New Zealand in solidarity with the European anti-nuclear movements. In this context, the New Zealand social movement framed its opposition to the transit of US nuclear vessels

as part of the international struggle against the doctrine of mutually assured destruction. The mobilisation became a diverse amalgam of peace and social groups, and at the height of the anti-nuclear struggle, more than 300 peace groups were in operation. Among them were the Anti-Omega campaign, the Peace Squadron, the Peoples' Charter for a Nuclear Free and Independent Pacific, the Progressive Youth Movement, Greenpeace, the New Zealand Foundation for Peace Studies, Peace Movement Aotearoa and the Nuclear-Free Zone Committee. At the same time, lawyers, doctors, architects and other professionals also created groups opposing nuclear weapons.²¹

All these groups would adopt direct non violent actions against nuclear ships. For instance, the Peace Squadron blockaded nuclear-armed vessels as they entered New Zealand harbours. Several city councils raised the anti-nuclear flag and campaigned for establishing nuclear-free city councils. In 1981, the New Zealand Nuclear-Free Zone Committee was established and encouraged groups around the country to push for nuclear-free declarations at the local level. The success was such that by the mid-1980s, around 60 per cent of New Zealanders lived in nuclear-free zones and the country's six largest cities were officially designated as nuclear-free.²² Moreover, mass protests were carried out periodically during those years. Among the most significant protests, in May 1983, on Women's Day of Action for Nuclear Disarmament, 25,000 people gathered in Auckland in what was considered to be the largest women's protest in New Zealand.²³ That same year, more than 100 yachts, speedboats and canoes assembled to block the nuclear-powered submarine *USS Phoenix* from entering Auckland harbour. Similarly, the visit of the nuclear-powered guided-missile cruiser *Texas* sparked anti-nuclear rallies on land and sea, with 7,000 people marching in Wellington in 1983.²⁴

A distinctive characteristic of the New Zealand anti-nuclear movement was its close collaboration with the Labour Party, which played a decisive role in integrating anti-nuclear sentiments into the mainstream political discourse. Historically the Labour Party has supported anti-nuclear policies. Back in the early 1960s, it devised the first proposal for establishing a NWFZ in the South Pacific, and in 1975, once in government, it presented an UNGA resolution recommending a NWFZ in the region. In the 1970s, the Kirk administration challenged France at The Hague for its nuclear testing programme. In the early 1980s, whilst still in opposition, the Labour Party continued cultivating its traditional stance on nuclear weapons, but changed its tone. It became more radical by closer subscribing to the demands of the peace movement. The ban on nuclear-armed and nuclear-powered vessels became the cornerstone of the Labour Party platform in 1983 and New Zealand's relationship with the ANZUS Treaty

began to be put into question. At the lower ranks of the party, the surge of figures such as Helen Clark was also remarkable. Clark, who would eventually become Prime Minister (1999–2008), was elected to Parliament for the first time in 1981, and her first actions were focused on condemning US nuclear deployments in the Pacific. In 1983, she was appointed as the Labour Party's spokesperson for disarmament, and during Lange's first government she chaired the Committee on Disarmament and Arms Control.

The peace movement not only benefited from the synergies with the Labour Party that had a proven record of promoting anti-nuclear measures both in government and opposition, but also capitalised on a series of political opportunities that allowed it to influence institutional politics and policy making.²⁵ The nature of the federal system encouraged local politics and was therefore more likely to respond to social demands at local councils, such as the calls for nuclear-free cities. Moreover, peace protests flourished due to the political system's openness to the expression of constituencies like the anti-nuclear movement. Ultimately, the success of the mobilisation beyond any expectation relied on the rise of a leader committed to promoting the cause of peace once in power, fully endorsing the anti-nuclear message. In this regard, an unexpected turning point occurred when in June 1984 the Labour Party introduced the Nuclear Free Act to Parliament. The bill was aimed at prohibiting the dumping of nuclear waste, the prohibition of building nuclear reactors, and the entry of nuclear vessels. The bill was narrowly rejected, but some members of the National Party crossed party lines and voted in favour of the anti-nuclear legislation. Since the National Party was a supporter of the status quo in relation to nuclear issues, Prime Minister Robert Muldoon decided to call for a snap election one month later in order to put the house in order.²⁶ The gambit failed, and the Labour Party came to the helm after almost a decade in opposition. In that election, three out of the four political parties had run on anti-nuclear platforms, including the rejection of the entry of nuclear-armed and nuclear-powered ships.²⁷ Once in government, David Lange rapidly became the anti-nuclear champion.

David Lange, the Anti-nuclear Champion

In 1984, at the age of forty-one, David Lange became the youngest prime minister of New Zealand at that time. Lange was born in 1942 and passed away after a long illness in 2005. He was a lawyer by profession and had a Methodist upbringing, regularly attending church services for most of his life. He acquired an interest in politics from a very early age. As he recounted in his memoirs, his support for Labour was rooted in the fact that it was

the 'underdog', and he hated the National Party for its 'smugness and arrogance'.²⁸ He joined the Labour Party in 1963 as a rank-and-file activist and participated in elections during the 1960s and 1970s. His first big break came in 1974 when he ran as a candidate for the Auckland City Council. Although he did not succeed, his engagement with the Labour Party soon provided him with new opportunities. Lange was invited to run as a Labour candidate for the northern district of Mangere in 1977 and got elected to Parliament at the age of thirty-five, a position he would occupy until 1996. After that, his path towards the premiership was meteoric. In 1979, he became Deputy General Secretary of the Labour Party and eventually came to lead it in 1983. His leadership of the Labour Party in 1983 coincided with the peak of the anti-nuclear movement and the Labour Party's endorsement of the peace movement's main demands: namely, the exclusion of both nuclear-armed vessels and nuclear-powered vessels from New Zealand.²⁹ Lange himself participated in demonstrations against the bomb in his twenties, and subsequently he believed in the evil of nuclear weapons. In his account of New Zealand's anti-nuclear struggle, he recounted how he was affected by a US nuclear test in 1962: 'at the edge of the world in the South Pacific was no longer far enough away from the quarrels of the great powers to escape their consequences'.³⁰ This episode left a strong impression on the young Lange.

After winning the election against the incumbent Robert Muldoon in 1984, Lange rapidly began delivering on his promises: He championed the anti-nuclear cause by adopting the nuclear-free platform of the Labour Party. The day after he won the election, the nuclear question came into the spotlight, foreshadowing the upcoming crisis with the United States. In July 1984 a planned ANZUS Council meeting took place in New Zealand. Lange, who had been elected but not yet sworn in as Prime Minister, met with the US Secretary of State George Shultz, where both presented their respective positions on nuclear issues.³¹ They met again at the UNGA in September 1984, where Schultz reiterated that the defence pact between the United States and New Zealand required the visiting of nuclear vessels. For Lange, it was only acceptable to have the visit of vessels carried out under the nuclear-free policy.³² At that stage, there was no final agreement, but both countries left a channel of communication open for further discussions. While the United States was aiming at moderating New Zealand's position, Lange was keen to promote a nuclear-free policy towards the United States. The talks faltered, as Washington was unwilling to consider an ANZUS Treaty that excluded visits by nuclear or nuclear-powered vessels.

The election of Lange and his administration presented a challenge for the United States. A historic and stable ally, while not questioning the

alliance, was defying a major tenet of US defence policy by denying access to any nuclear-powered or nuclear-missile-carrying vessel to New Zealand ports. New Zealand wanted assurances that the regular US warships' visits to its ports were not carrying nuclear weapons. Washington, citing its security concerns, could not accept these demands. It was deeply attached to the 'neither confirm nor deny' policy regarding the presence (or absence) of nuclear weapons on visiting ships. In February 1985, New Zealand's policy was put to the test, when it refused to allow the *USS Buchanan* to enter its ports. As a result, the Reagan administration accused New Zealand of breaking its commitments and responsibilities under the ANZUS Treaty and the security agreement was suspended. Despite the attempts to bridge the gaps between the parties, in 1986, Australia and the United States suspended New Zealand from the ANZUS council, and for its part, the United States suspended its security guarantees to New Zealand.³³

The storm that followed the Buchanan crisis ended the defence cooperation between both allies in ways that neither could prevent. While the Lange administration sparked an unprecedented crisis with the United States due to the Buchanan affair, the anti-nuclear policy championed by Lange was hardly a surprise. The Americans had been closely monitoring the 1984 elections as New Zealand's support for US nuclear ties was at stake. A Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) declassified report focused on the impact of the election on nuclear issues.³⁴ The report predicted that a victory for Muldoon would ensure the continuation of the close ties with the United States, including nuclear vessel visits. Conversely, it presented a pessimistic outlook in the event of a Labour Party victory. A Labour-led government entailed policies that would antagonise US nuclear interests in the region such as banning US vessels, renegotiating the ANZUS Treaty and establishing a South Pacific NWFZ. The intelligence report concluded that a Labour government would pose a serious risk to US–New Zealand cooperation and did not foresee a moderation of the anti-nuclear platform once Labour was in power. In fact, the biggest fear was the potential spillover of anti-nuclear policies and legislations across the South Pacific, where opposition to the French nuclear testing programme was widespread. Therefore, it is not surprising that the emergence of the Nuclear Disarmament Party of Australia was seen as connected to the developments in New Zealand. The United States also feared the willingness of the Soviets to exploit anti-nuclear sentiments in the region to their benefit. According to the CIA's analysis, Moscow's objective was to encourage South Pacific countries to adopt bans on nuclear vessels.³⁵ For its part, the proposed nuclear legislation in New Zealand was portrayed as counter to US interests and was seen as contradictory to the country's commitment to the ANZUS Treaty.

The crisis with New Zealand put the United States between a rock and a hard place: either punish a small country and historical ally or concede to its position, which could set a risky precedent for other US alliances. For two years, both countries engaged in extensive diplomatic negotiations to save the alliance, but to no avail. New Zealand proposed accepting the visit of vessels upon a public declaration that they were not nuclear, while convincing the United States of its commitment to the ANZUS alliance.³⁶

In the name of deterrence, the United States could not give up its 'neither confirm nor deny policy' or allow a breach in its containment wall against the Soviet Union. In the end, the Americans suspended the defence cooperation with New Zealand, but refrained from taking more severe measures such as economic sanctions and trade reprisals. The only reprisal was limited to the security cooperation: joint exercises were cancelled; military exchanges and conferences were stalled. New Zealand was declared an inoperative member of ANZUS and limits were put on meetings between New Zealand's Ambassador and top-level US officials. Some members of the US Congress submitted proposals for punishing New Zealand, but they did not prosper.³⁷ Besides the United States, the country's other two main allies, the United Kingdom and Australia exercised strong pressure and tried to convince Lange to reconsider his course of action. Even some Southeast Asian leaders personally addressed Lange about the damage that the nuclear-free policy was causing to the Western alliance.³⁸

From New Zealand's perspective, domestic support for ANZUS began to unravel much earlier. Already in the late 1960s, the Vietnam War triggered a wave of opposition to American policy and the United States failed to grasp the extent of the discontent and grievance caused by the French testing programme across the South Pacific region.³⁹ The benign security environment for New Zealand in the 1980s meant that any alliance entanglements, from the Labour Party's perspective, could only push the country in the direction of another war.⁴⁰ Hence, the ANZUS Treaty and the strings attached to it were seen more as a burden than as an asset. American intransigence to New Zealand's requests backfired, igniting a wave of deep national sentiment that legitimised the most radical voices of the anti-nuclear movement.⁴¹ However, it is worth mentioning that the New Zealand government stressed that its policy was anti-nuclear and not anti-American.⁴² This same sentiment was mostly shared by the anti-nuclear movement.⁴³ Ultimately, the implementation of a nuclear-free policy became a synonym for national pride and independence, which David Lange was willing to exploit to the fullest.

Several weeks after the Buchanan crisis, Lange was invited to partake in a debate at the Oxford Union, where he faced the Reverend Jerry

Falwell, a US evangelical leader and a close associate of President Reagan. The topic was on the morality of nuclear weapons. Falwell was invited to argue in favour of the morality of nuclear weapons and Lange was expected to oppose that line of argument. At the debate, Lange clearly articulated his position, stating 'so I can say very simply that it is my conviction that there is no moral case for nuclear weapons. That the best defence which can be made of their existence and the threat of their use is, as we have heard tonight, that they are a necessary evil; an abhorrent means to a desirable end'.⁴⁴ However, 'it is self-defeating logic, just as the weapons themselves are self-defeating: to compel an ally to accept nuclear weapons against the wishes of that ally is to take the moral position of totalitarianism, which allows for no self-determination, and which is exactly the evil that we are supposed to be fighting against'. Lange remembered the debate as 'the highest point in my career in politics'.⁴⁵ His performance left a deep impression on his audience as well as his countrymen. Back in New Zealand, he was received as a national hero.

On July 10, 1985, the *Rainbow Warrior* affair triggered an unprecedented conflict between France and New Zealand.⁴⁶ The *Rainbow Warrior*, a ship owned by the environmental group Greenpeace, was sunk by French intelligence officers while it was anchored in Auckland harbour. The Greenpeace ship was preparing to stage a protest against the projected nuclear test in Mururoa. Just one month before the *Rainbow Warrior* incident, France had detonated a 150-kiloton bomb there. Initially, France denied any involvement in the sinking of the ship, but later admitted its role after New Zealand captured two of the French officers who participated in the bombing. The affair severely poisoned the relationship between New Zealand and France, and the dispute required a mediation that was carried out by the UN Secretary-General. One month after the *Rainbow Warrior* affair, the South Pacific NWFZ, historically supported by the New Zealand Labour Party, was approved on 6 August 1985.⁴⁷

Overall, these events consolidated Lange's popularity and enabled him to pursue anti-nuclear legislation with public backing. Eventually, he achieved his greatest triumph with the passing of the New Zealand Nuclear-Free Zone, Disarmament, and Arms Control Act on 4 July 1987. The Act prohibited the acquisition, stationing and testing of nuclear explosive devices. At the core of the Act were Articles 9, 10, and 11. Article 9 regulated the entry of warships into New Zealand's territorial waters and reads as follows:

1. When the Prime Minister is considering whether to grant approval to the entry of foreign warships into the internal waters

of New Zealand, the Prime Minister shall have regard to all relevant information and advice that may be available to the Prime Minister including information and advice concerning the strategic and security interests of New Zealand.

2. The Prime Minister may only grant approval for the entry into the internal waters of New Zealand by foreign warships if the Prime Minister is satisfied that the warships will not be carrying any nuclear explosive device upon their entry into the internal waters of New Zealand.⁴⁸

Article 10 had the same wording for the landing of foreign military aircraft in New Zealand and Article 11 prohibited the ‘visits by nuclear-powered ships Entry into the internal waters of New Zealand by any ship whose propulsion is wholly or partly dependent on nuclear power’.⁴⁹ In defence of the anti-nuclear legislation, Lange portrayed New Zealand’s security environment as relatively benign, downplaying the Cold War’s main assumptions:⁵⁰ on the one hand, he portrayed the Soviet Union as ‘an imagined threat’;⁵¹ and on the other hand, he underlined that ‘nobody could for a moment imagine that the United States would risk its people and the world, by defending its small and distant ally with nuclear weapons’.⁵²

Ironically, just as the anti-nuclear cause had raised Lange to the premiership and had marked his tenure, it would also signal his fall. In 1989, he was invited to give a talk on nuclear issues at Yale University. At this venue, he stated that ANZUS had left New Zealand, but was apparently misquoted by a journalist stating the opposite: New Zealand had left ANZUS.⁵³ Critics at home from the National Party and his colleagues in the cabinet fumed at him for having gone too far. Lange may have indeed overplayed his hand, but the tension around the ANZUS Treaty and the nuclear issue had proved impossible to resolve. The nuclear issue in New Zealand during the Cold War was framed in the context of the ANZUS alliance. The ANZUS alliance entailed a price that New Zealand was willing to pay throughout most of the period. However, by the 1980s, New Zealanders still wanted to continue to be members of ANZUS, but no longer wanted to pay the nuclear price attached to ANZUS. For instance, in 1986, the New Zealand Defense Committee of Enquiry was established with the mission of consulting the public on key issues such as defence and security.⁵⁴ Without delving too deep into the details of the Committee’s work, it commissioned a public opinion poll that reflected a certain consensus in New Zealand politics. The results of the poll showed that public opinion favoured the major tenets of the anti-nuclear policy, but did not want to risk damaging New Zealand’s relations with the United States or,

even more so, its relationship with its main ally, Australia. In other words, New Zealand wanted to have the cake and eat it too. Despite the fact that ANZUS became inoperable after the Buchanan crisis, New Zealanders continued to maintain the appearance that the country was still part of the alliance. The uproar caused by Lange's slip of the tongue illustrates that paradox. Eventually, political events ran their course and several months after Lange's resignation, the Berlin Wall fell and, with it, the rationale for Cold War alliances, including ANZUS. For its part, the National Party announced during the turbulent last months of 1989 that once in power, it would respect Labour's nuclear-free policy.

Nuclear-Free New Zealand and David Lange's Legacy

What was the legacy of New Zealand's anti-nuclear movement and David Lange's administration in particular? Undoubtedly, the New Zealand Nuclear-Free Zone, Disarmament, and Arms Control Act is the major legacy. The National Party that initially opposed the anti-nuclear legislation eventually came to terms with it.⁵⁵ Indeed, Lange predicted that once approved, the National Party was not going to either amend or repeal it. Therefore, by the early 1990s, the anti-nuclear stance was no longer the property of Lange's government, but had transcended party lines to become a national policy 'cemented in place'.⁵⁶ As stated by Lange: 'Our nuclear-free policy was becoming part of our national identity.'⁵⁷ The lasting impact of the Act was also acknowledged by the National Party Foreign Affairs Minister Gerry Brownlee when on the occasion of the thirtieth anniversary of the nuclear-free legislation, he asserted how it had become 'a defining aspect of this country's international reputation'.⁵⁸ More than thirty years since it was anchored in law, the anti-nuclear legislation is still in place and seems unlikely to be repealed in the future.

Indeed, the question of identity best explains why New Zealand's anti-nuclear policy maintains its popularity. Former New Zealand diplomats and officials who wrote about New Zealand's longtime opposition to nuclear weapons have shared this perception. For example, Gerald Hensley, former New Zealand diplomat and Minister of Defense in the 1990s, found a psychological and identity-related explanation for the anti-nuclear turn of the 1980s.⁵⁹ First, the United Kingdom's entry into the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1973 dealt a serious economic blow to New Zealand due to the duties and restrictions on products from extra-regional markets. European protectionism against New Zealand's products was seen as a betrayal of the country's efforts in the Second World War. The economic

impact was such that New Zealand was about to default on its public debt in 1984. Second, nuclear testing in the South Pacific added another grievance, since France continually disavowed regional appeals to stop its nuclear testing programme. Third, the ANZUS Treaty was regarded as a relic of the previous generation, with most of society lacking any emotional and historical attachment to it, with the exception of the diplomatic and defence establishment. All these reasons explain New Zealand's quest for an independent foreign policy. Diplomat Malcolm Templeton believed that anti-nuclear legislation was a path towards full independence.⁶⁰ New Zealand entered the twentieth century as part of the British Commonwealth and later aligned its fate with alliances with Australia and the United States. By adopting the anti-nuclear legislation, New Zealand came of age by standing in opposition to its longtime allies. For a small country like New Zealand, the anti-nuclear policy represented a symbolic function beyond the letter of the Act. Along the same lines, the activist and sociology lecturer Kevin Clements argued that the anti-nuclear policy represented 'a new national maturity, a desire for greater independence, and a willingness to think of defense more inclusively than has been the case in the past'.⁶¹

The case of David Lange is paradigmatic in that he was the only head of a government that embraced the agenda of the anti-nuclear movement in the way he did. The exceptional case of Lange also stands in opposition to other leaders who co-opted the anti-nuclear message of the 1980s. Canadian Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau promoted his Peace Initiative for nuclear disarmament, Greece Prime Minister Andreas Papandreou co-founded the Six-Nation Initiative for Peace and Disarmament, while in Sweden, Prime Minister Olof Palme called for nuclear-free zones in Scandinavia and Central Europe.⁶² These high-profile initiatives were ambitious in aiming to change structural power relations across the world and Europe. In contrast, Lange carefully crafted his discourse to ensure that his anti-nuclear policy was solely for his domestic audience, with no plans to influence his allies. Metaphorically, it can be stated that Lange, as a religious person for most of his life, did not want to attract others to his anti-nuclear faith as Trudeau, Papandreou and Palme tried to do. However, a series of structural, political and geopolitical factors allowed Lange to pursue his policy, with much lower risks for New Zealand than would have been the case for Australia, Sweden, Greece or Canada.⁶³ Since there were no US military bases in New Zealand and its role in the Western security alliance was marginal, Lange could afford a policy of antagonising the US at a price that his counterparts in other countries would never dare to pay.

Despite New Zealand's minor role in the Western Alliance in comparison to other countries, Lange still faced enormous pressure from the

United States, but prevailed and did not backtrack. The Buchanan dispute showed that small states could defy their major patrons and come out unscathed. While strongly opposing New Zealand's course of action, in the end, the United States did not impose punitive measures on New Zealand. The Lange administration's fear of a trade war never materialised. As an ironic turn, when Lange was deposed as Prime Minister in 1989, the Cold War began to unravel. The breakdown of the Soviet Union, which began after the fall of the Berlin Wall, rendered the Soviet threat – the main target of the ANZUS Treaty – an abstract issue. The ANZUS Treaty as well as other alliances such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) had to reinvent themselves after the end of the Cold War, but their initial purpose no longer existed, and defence cooperation between New Zealand and the US would be restored only during the last decade. Currently, New Zealand has a close defence relationship with the United States, but its nuclear-free policy remains in place.⁶⁴ In retrospect, the recently negotiated AUKUS pact between the United Kingdom, the United States and Australia aimed at countering China in the Asia-Pacific region excluded New Zealand, in what is perhaps another legacy of Lange's years as Prime Minister.

Lange admitted that the anti-nuclear legislation was a joint enterprise between the public and the government.⁶⁵ The New Zealand anti-nuclear movement in the 1980s was one of the strongest and largest in the Western world, and as such exploited the political opportunity that presented itself when Lange was elected Prime Minister and achieved its main goal: the passing of the nuclear-free legislation. However, having achieved all its goals, and with the end of the Cold War, the anti-nuclear movement could no longer mobilise people as effectively as it did in the 1980s. As in other countries, the anti-nuclear movement went through a process of professionalisation and transformation into non governmental organisations. Interestingly, the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN) (which pushed for the Nuclear Weapons Ban Treaty) includes in its New Zealand chapter some of the organisations that were active in the 1980s, such as the Peace Foundation and Peace Movement Aotearoa.

In conclusion, the legacy of New Zealand's anti-nuclear outlook presents a mixed record. Since the anti-nuclear policy was not 'for export', its regional reach was limited and had a marginal impact on global discussions on nuclear disarmament.⁶⁶ However, the emergence of a nuclear-free policy became one of the major milestones in New Zealand's twentieth-century foreign policy and an important element of its national identity. It solidified the quest for independence of a small state in a transitional period when the country was re-evaluating its place within the Cold War, and forcefully

showed how global nuclear politics are entwined with the national and cultural peculiarities of each country.

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Notes

1. Wittner, *Toward Nuclear Abolition*, 202.
2. Firth, 'The Nuclear Issue in the Pacific Islands'.
3. Hamel-Green, *The South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty*, 105.
4. Milliken, 'Australia's Nuclear Graveyard'.
5. Danielsson, 'Poisoned Pacific: The Legacy of French Nuclear Testing', 26.
6. Hamel-Green, 'Antinuclear Campaigning and the South Pacific Nuclear-Free Zone'.
7. Wittner, *Resisting the Bomb*, 26.
8. Clements, *Back from the Brink*, 38.
9. Wittner, *Resisting the Bomb*, 206.
10. Clements, *Back from the Brink*, 53.
11. Wittner, *Resisting the Bomb*, 207.
12. Clements, *Back from the Brink*, 59.
13. Wittner, *Resisting the Bomb*, 390.
14. *Ibid*, 458.
15. Clements, *Back from the Brink*, 64.
16. *Ibid*, 78.
17. Wittner, *Resisting the Bomb*, 431.
18. Clements, *Back from the Brink*, 84; Wittner, *Toward Nuclear Abolition*, 33.
19. Clements, *Back from the Brink*, 87–88.
20. Capie, 'Nuclear-Free New Zealand', 383.
21. *Ibid*, 113.
22. Clements, *Back from the Brink*, 114–16.
23. *Ibid*, 208.
24. Barber, 'New Zealanders Protest Nuclear Weapons with Canoes and Zoning'.
25. Meyer and Minkoff, 'Conceptualizing Political Opportunity', 1457–1458.
26. Wittner, *Toward Nuclear Abolition*, 209.
27. Clements, *Back from the Brink*, 123.
28. Lange, *David Lange: My Life*, 48.
29. *Ibid*, 159.
30. Lange, *Nuclear Free: The New Zealand Way*, 11.

31. Lange, *David Lange: My Life*, 177.
32. Ibid, 193.
33. Templeton, *Standing Upright Here*, 480.
34. Central Intelligence Agency, 'New Zealand: Muldoon Goes to the Polls'.
35. Central Intelligence Agency, 'Growth and Manipulation of Antinuclear Sentiment in East Asia: Consequences for US Forces'.
36. Hensley, *Friendly Fire*, 71.
37. Wittner, *Toward Nuclear Abolition*, 330.
38. Hensley, *Friendly Fire*, 134–35.
39. Ibid, 9.
40. Ibid, 15.
41. Meyer, 'Political Opportunity and Nested Institutions', 29.
42. Clements, 'New Zealand's Role in Promoting a Nuclear-Free Pacific', 404.
43. Ibid, 99.
44. Oxford Union, 'Nuclear Weapons Are Morally Indefensible'. <https://publicaddress.net/great-new-zealand-argument/nuclear-weapons-are-morally-indefensible/> (accessed 14 November 2024).
45. Lange, *David Lange: My Life*, 208.
46. Thakur, 'A Dispute of Many Colours'.
47. Lacovsky, *Nuclear Weapons Free Zones*.
48. New Zealand Nuclear Free Zone, Disarmament, and Arms Control Act.
49. Ibid.
50. Lange, 'New Zealand's Security Policy'.
51. Lange, *Nuclear Free: The New Zealand Way*, 40.
52. Ibid, 29.
53. Lange, *David Lange: My Life*, 271.
54. Clements, *Back from the Brink*, 146–47.
55. Lange, *Nuclear Free: The New Zealand Way*, 208.
56. Templeton, *Standing Upright Here*, 509.
57. Lange, *Nuclear Free: The New Zealand Way*, 201.
58. Quoted in Capie, 'Nuclear-Free New Zealand', 391.
59. Hensley, *Friendly Fire*, 297–98.
60. Templeton, *Standing Upright Here*, 513.
61. Clements, *Back from the Brink*, 9.
62. Karamouzi and Chourchoulis. 'Troublemaker or Peacemaker?'; Brunet, 'Unhelpful Fixer?'; Karamouzi, "'Out With the Bases of Death'".
63. Meyer, 'Political Opportunity and Nested Institutions', 30.
64. Capie, 'Nuclear-Free New Zealand', 392.
65. Lange, *Nuclear Free: The New Zealand Way*, 8.
66. Interestingly, the Australian nonproliferation policy devised in the 1980s had more impact globally. Australia promoted the Australia Group in 1985 (which paved the way for the Chemical Weapons Convention in 1993) and had an outstanding role in the final push for the CTBT.

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Part III

**Nuclear Colonialism,
Anti-imperialism and Anti-nuclear
Activism**

Pacifism and Anti-nuclear Protest in Polynesia at the End of the Cold War

Alexis Vrignon

Introduction

Between 1966 and 1996, France conducted 193 nuclear tests on two atolls of the Tuamotu archipelago in French Polynesia: Moruroa and Fangataufa. To do so, a joint structure, bringing together the French Army and the French Atomic Energy Commission (the Commissariat à l'Énergie Atomique or CEA) was created in 1962, namely the Pacific Experiment Centre (the Centre d'Expérimentation du Pacifique or CEP). The CEP's installation had enormous economic, social and cultural consequences on a very large but sparsely populated territory, with just 85,000 inhabitants at the time (and 275,000 at present).

After having carried out its first tests in Algeria, France had to choose another test site when Algerian independence became inevitable. The military authorities considered different locations, both in France and its overseas territories. French Polynesia was chosen because it was considered a sort of an aquatic desert, far from foreign countries, with a more pleasant environment than the Kerguelen Islands.¹ According to the authorities, in Moruroa and Fangataufa, the conditions of security and radiological safety would be optimal. In doing so, they underestimated both the presence of Polynesian populations a few hundred kilometres from the sites and the sensitivity of the countries in the Pacific region to these issues.

Like other imperial powers before it, France chose as a test site a peripheral territory in a colonial situation, which allowed the French government to swiftly overcome the local opposition that emerged when the project was announced.² From this perspective, the French nuclear tests appear to be a paradigmatic example of 'nuclear colonialism'. From the early 1980s, activists

used this term both in France – where they advocated for Polynesia’s right to self-determination³ – and in the United States, where they denounced the health effects of civil nuclear activities such as uranium mining and waste management on Native Americans.⁴ More recently, academic research has used this term to analyse ‘a system of domination through which governments and corporations disproportionately target and devastate indigenous peoples and their lands to maintain the nuclear production process’.⁵ At present, new research projects are seeking to clarify this concept in various spaces.⁶

From this perspective, the case of French Polynesia offers interesting insights. During the period of activity of the CEP, this territory acquired a relatively broad level of institutional autonomy, especially with respect to French traditions of centralisation.⁷ However, this evolution did not lead to the end of nuclear tests; the CEP only closed in 1996 with the transition to a new simulation programme. Such a paradox has long led to the minimisation of Polynesian protests against the tests, based on the assumption that throughout the life of the CEP, Polynesians implicitly agreed to the tests and were, eventually, passive victims of the French state.⁸

Fallouts from French nuclear tests on inhabited areas, especially during the aerial tests (1966–74), are undeniable and can now be well documented thanks to declassified archival documents.⁹ Several tests contaminated Polynesian populations on different atolls as well as the soldiers deployed there. Yet these tests should not lead one to underestimate the inhabitants’ agency. It is simply not true that technical action was solely on the side of the Europeans, while the passive Polynesians, anchored to their island, were incapable of understanding the global stakes, especially the radioactive phenomena, and remained fundamentally disinclined to protest, aside from a few episodes of irrational anger. This narrative perpetuates the European cliché of the ‘good savage’ living happily and innocently on New Kythera, which emerged at the end of the eighteenth century.¹⁰

In contrast to those caricatures, anti-nuclear protest and pacifism are in fact key features crucial to understanding the period from the 1970s to the 1990s. Two historiographical approaches currently underline how those phenomena could be understood through the prism of the circulation of actors, ideas and militant knowhow. On the one hand, the new Cold War history emphasises how much this period was conducive to bringing together spaces that were previously disjointed and considered peripheral, as the South Pacific could be.¹¹ On the other hand, the process of decolonisation that marked the region – Fiji in 1970 and Vanuatu in 1980 – was also part of the affirmation of the agency of local actors.¹² Although multiple contacts may exist at different times, French Polynesia was not characterised by

peace movements similar to those existing in Europe at the same time. From the 1960s onwards, pacifism in Polynesia was significantly influenced by a Christian understanding of peace and quickly merged with environmental issues. Studying anti-nuclear protest and pacifism in Polynesia during the late Cold War era, from the late 1970s to the mid-1990s, allows us to examine the complexity of the positions taken, the coalitions formed and the scales on which they were deployed.

The Ebbs and Flow of Protest against French Nuclear Testing

As far as anti-nuclear protests are concerned, the gap between Europe and Polynesia is not only geographical. In Tahiti and the five archipelagos, more than 15,000 km away from metropolitan France, the repertoires of action, the scope of militant coalitions and the chronology of actions were unique. The interknowledge that structures Polynesian society, the importance of the churches in collective life and the specificities of local political life – notably the absence of the Communist Party – contributed to the specificities of the forms of collective action. From this perspective, pacifism played an important role and served as a *lingua franca* that facilitated contacts between militant spheres, particularly in the 1970s when connections with the peace and green movements were established.

From 1966 to 1974, France conducted atmospheric nuclear tests after refusing to endorse the 1963 Partial Test Ban Treaty.¹³ Although opposition to the tests was initially limited, it gained momentum between 1972 and 1973 both in French Polynesia and within the Pacific area.¹⁴ In 1972, David MacTaggart, a navigator based in New Zealand, responded to a call from Greenpeace (founded the previous year), and independently sailed to Moruroa with his ship.¹⁵ The following year, the ‘peace battalion’ brought together representatives and activists from France who embarked on the *Fri* for Moruroa.¹⁶ Meanwhile, on 23 June 1973, between 4,000 and 5,000 people marched in Pape’ete, the territory’s administrative capital, to protest against the current test campaign. This was a significant event for an island with 75,000 inhabitants, especially since the organisers explicitly linked opposition to nuclear testing with a demand for political autonomy for the territory, a stance that was quite unpopular with the authorities at the time.¹⁷ Pacifism played an important role in developing a rhetorical critique of the nuclear tests. However, at that time, these references were mainly articulated by French and Anglo-Saxon activists rather than by Polynesians, whose use of nonviolence theory was primarily strategic.

In the Pacific area of the early 1970s, the pacifist critique of nuclear testing was not new. It was based on the ideals of nonviolence and the refusal to see the region become a new arena for Cold War conflict. Marked, in particular, by the involvement of members of the Quaker community, nonviolence postulated that armed conflicts, and especially nuclear ones, must be proscribed in favour of other approaches allowing the settlement of conflicts between individuals and human groups. For instance, in 1957, in an act of civil disobedience, the Emergency Committee for Direct Action against Nuclear War and Japanese activists planned to form a fleet to enter the zone where the British were conducting tests in the Christmas Islands.¹⁸ While such an action remained in the planning stage, fifteen years later it took shape at Amchitka during the first Greenpeace expedition of 1971.¹⁹ In both cases, the aim was to stop the tests, but also to express an ethical opposition to nuclear weapons. In addition, environmental and health concerns about radioactive fallout were essential.

In the 1960s and 1970s, this pacifism took a specific turn in the Pacific area. It was motivated by the desire to keep this area clear of nuclear arsenals and even nuclear energy in general. As early as 1963, the New Zealand Women's Appeal to President de Gaulle accused the French authorities of 'poison[ing] the earth's atmosphere' and made direct reference to the Encyclical *Pacem in Terris* of Pope John XXIII to demand equal and simultaneous disarmament.²⁰ In December 1972, the Baptist Union of New Zealand addressed a letter to the French Embassy underlining its opposition to the tests in the name of Christian and moral principles. In the 1970s, peace movements based on religious convictions were associated with the warning against the health and environmental consequences of nuclear fallout, leading the main workers' unions to join the fight. The case of Stephanie Mills is indicative of the importance of that period in the politicisation of some activists over the long term.²¹ Born into a progressive family in New Zealand, she accompanied her parents during the demonstrations against the French tests in the early 1970s. As a student at the beginning of the following decade, she was involved in the mobilisation over the denuclearisation of the Pacific, and in particular the refusal to see nuclear ships docking in New Zealand.²² She then moved to the United Kingdom, where she worked for the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND) before joining Greenpeace New Zealand in the early 1990s.

The pacifist and environmental matrix was instrumental in the constitution of a critical discourse against nuclear tests and, on a more practical level, played an important role in connecting activists on a transnational scale. In 1973, contacts with New Zealand pacifist circles were particularly useful for French activists to reach Tahiti by circuitous routes despite the

circulation restrictions imposed by the French state. For example, in 1972, the port of Rapa was instructed to detain the *Greenpeace* ship for as long as possible if it ever docked there.²³ General de Bollardière, Brice Lalonde, Jean-Marie Muller and Abbot Toulat thus passed through Pago-Pago (Samoa) and then Auckland, where they coordinated their future action with the New Zealand pacifist and environmentalist movements (and in particular Greenpeace and Peace Media) before reaching the Tuamotu archipelago.²⁴ A one-off action involving activists from different countries is not necessarily evidence of the existence of a structured and perennial network; yet, it seems that pacifism was at that time a kind of *lingua franca* in the protest against nuclear testing.

It is from this perspective that we must also understand the Polynesian use of pacifist and nonviolence references in the opposition to the tests. During those days, the leaders of the movement were the prominent local political figures Francis Sanford and John Teariki, whose central demand was institutional autonomy from France.²⁵ They protested against the CEP due to its environmental and health impacts, but also because they were certain that the French state would refuse any institutional reforms as long as it needed to continue its nuclear tests in Polynesia. The claims for autonomy and the contestation of the tests were particularly monitored and disqualified by the French state as unpatriotic activities.²⁶ Emphasis on pacifism thus had a strategic value beyond the possible ethical adherence to this struggle. Besides, the Polynesian society was and still is deeply influenced by religious values – 40 per cent of the inhabitants were Catholic, and an equivalent proportion were Protestant. Priests and pastors were not only spiritual guides but also often played prominent roles in the daily life of their community. Yet, in the 1970s, the Protestant Church did not play a leading role in the opposition of nuclear test. On the one hand, pastors wanted to demonstrate their loyalty to the French state; on the other hand, the installation of the CEP brought economic benefits to the Polynesian society, which in turn benefited the parishes. In this context, for the political leaders of the opposition, associating a form of evangelical nonviolence – embodied by religious figures such as Pastor Richard-Molard and even General de Bollardière – to the protest against nuclear tests was utterly useful. By making the mobilisation against the tests more respectable, it was possible to broaden its appeal among Polynesian population.

In the 1970s, activists opposing French nuclear tests shared some thematic concepts around pacifism, but their political agendas differed from other another. This is why common actions only occurred for a relatively short period, as joint efforts required an alignment of circumstances and objectives – hence the specificity of the chronology and this anti-nuclear

mobilisation in the early 1970s, during a time when, at least in Western Europe, opposition to civil nuclear power was a major issue.

Misalignment of Agendas in the Second Half of the 1970s

After a peak of protest against the French tests in the Pacific in 1972–73, the political and activist agendas in the Pacific area were no longer aligned. Consequently, it was only with the emergence of new actors in the early 1980s that a new cycle of contestation began. One of the first factors that changed the situation was the transition to underground tests from 1974. This decision of the French government was primarily motivated by geopolitical considerations and a response to mounting international pressure. The election of Valéry Giscard d'Estaing as President hastened that decision: not being from the Gaullist Party, he had a more pragmatic approach to the military nuclear programme.²⁷ From then on, France conformed to the practices of other nuclear weapons states, as only China subsequently conducted three more atmospheric tests. In Polynesia, the CEP entered an era of standardisation, marked by a relative reduction in costs and personnel employed at the sites.²⁸ The less spectacular aspect of the tests – because of the disappearance of a mushroom cloud visible from a great distance, – the hope that the radioelements were much more effectively confined, and the 1,400 km distance between Tahiti, the most populated island, and the Tuamotu sites were all important factors contributing to the decrease in the mobilisation against the French tests.

This shift was particularly significant because, at the same time, the French state unveiled a massive nuclear power plant construction plan within metropolitan France. Consequently, environmentalists and, to a large extent, nonviolence activists became involved in this issue, temporarily abandoning the Polynesian terrain and the struggle against nuclear tests in the Pacific. In addition, political developments in French Polynesia and the Pacific played a role in putting other issues on the agenda. In New Zealand, the arrival in power of Robert Muldoon, leader of the National Party, led to a reaffirmation of the country's involvement in ANZUS collective safety Treaty with Australia and the United States, abandoning support for the policy of denuclearisation of the Pacific promoted by the Labour Party. In French Polynesia, the autonomist parties changed their strategy after the election of Valéry Giscard d'Estaing in the 1974 presidential election. Betting on his institutional liberalism, they opted for negotiation in the hope of reducing Paris' oversight of the territory, temporarily abandoning direct

criticism of nuclear testing. Indeed, in 1977, Polynesia obtained administrative autonomy, which evolved into political autonomy in 1984.

Separatism and Anti-nuclearism in the 1980s

In Europe, the Euromissile Crisis signalled the return of East–West tensions and expanded the audience of pacifist activism. While anti-nuclear activism had not completely disappeared in the 1970s, it had not enjoyed such widespread media coverage, militant support or general public interest for more than a decade.²⁹ This new pacifist wave was particularly important in the Netherlands, in Belgium and in West Germany; in metropolitan France, by contrast, the peace movement was significantly weaker.³⁰ This weakness can be attributed to political divisions between communists and noncommunists, as well as the tendency of many French people to separate the issue of Euromissiles and superpower disarmament from the French independent nuclear deterrent, which was considered a separate matter.³¹ Thus, in Polynesia, the revival of anti-nuclear protest was largely independent from developments in metropolitan France, as mobilisation was not driven by external factors. In this context, the Polynesian interweaving of pacifism, anti-colonialism and anti-nuclearism is more than ever based on specific foundations.

At the beginning of the 1980s, three main arguments against nuclear testing and the presence of the CEP coexisted in French Polynesia. The first argument was political, likening the CEP to a specific form of colonialism, echoing analyses made in other parts of the world.³² The context of decolonisation in the South Pacific and the highly sensitive New Caledonia issue gave these analyses a wide resonance. According to independence movements such as the Tavini Huiraatira and the Ia Mana te Nunaa, Polynesia could not have real autonomy or even effective independence while the CEP remained in place.³³ Besides, they believed that France would never willingly abandon a territory strategic for its policy of *grandeur*, i.e. affirmation of its power and influence.

The second argument highlighted the negative impacts of the CEP on Polynesian territory, noting that the test centre had induced an unequal and unbalanced mode of development that led to the depopulation of the islands, dependence on imports and the marginalisation of Polynesian cultures. These criticisms mirrored the broader critique of development that spread in the 1970s. It is important to note that the sanitary and environmental issues, which became central to public debate in the early twenty-first century, were rarely mentioned at the time due to the lack of precise data.³⁴ The final

argument was based on ethical and moral values opposing the CEP's activities: the experimentation of devices intended for mass destruction. Unlike the previous period, this argument, related to pacifism and nonviolence, was more directly embraced by Polynesian protesters within a context of expanding local civil society, which included new environmentalist associations (such as the *Ia Ora te Natura*) and new political parties.

These three arguments were distinct, but were shared, to some extent, by every protester. In the discourse of the two Polynesian independence parties – the *Tavini Huiraatira* and the *Ia Mana te Nunaa* – the ethical and moral refusal to see Polynesian territory used to build an arsenal capable of mass destruction was certainly present.³⁵ This stance was largely rooted in the religious culture of the Polynesians, which remained very prevalent during this period. As such, references to the Scriptures – whether explicit or implicit – abounded within political movements, while some churches made clear political statements. Pacifism was central to the positions taken by the Evangelical Church of French Polynesia (EEPF), which explicitly pronounced itself on that issue at the beginning of the 1980s. Following the first declarations by its general secretary John Doom in 1979,³⁶ the entire synod took a position in 1982 and sent a letter to François Mitterrand, President of the Republic, which went unanswered.³⁷

The EEPF decided to repeat its initiative in 1983.³⁸ In the first letter, evangelical pacifism seemed to be the core of its approach, excluding any political stance. It argued that preparing for war to maintain peace contradicted the Gospel and asked Mitterrand to unilaterally cease nuclear testing permanently and enter into a disarmament process that could serve as a global example.³⁹ The second message reiterated this pacifist argument, affirming the EEPF's conviction that 'the only future solution for the peoples of the world lies in dialogue and disarmament'.⁴⁰ Other arguments linked to environmental and safety issues were also put forward, which shows how each group organised and composed its critical discourse against the CEP and nuclear testing according to its convictions and strategic imperatives of the moment in order to deliver a constantly recomposed mosaic.

This initiative reflected an increasingly assertive involvement of the EEPF on the major issues relating to the future of French Polynesia and in particular on ethical and identity-related issues.⁴¹ Such a position had often been interpreted by the French authorities as the result of the Anglo-Saxon influence within the EEPF and therefore of a lack of loyalty towards France. It seems more appropriate to see in it the influence of liberation theology, applied in a way specific to the Pacific that values its autonomy and specificity, particularly in rehabilitating the unique Maohi.⁴² This is exemplified

by Duro Raapoto, a linguist and theologian, who became involved in the *Ia Mana Te Nunaa* in the 1970s and then in the EEPF.⁴³

The commitment of the Protestant Church against nuclear testing marked a turning point that should not be viewed in isolation from other essential developments in Polynesian society such as the expansion of the tertiary sector and the growing use of the French language. New research, both sociological and historical, will be necessary to better understand the complexity of its relations with Polynesian society and to avoid attributing the Protestant Church as the sole driving force behind political and cultural developments in Polynesia.

A Polynesian Version of the Pacifist Wave of the 1980s

In the 1980s, anti-nuclear contestation was particularly discredited by local authorities, starting with the head of the executive, Gaston Flosse. During this period, New Caledonia, another French territory in the Pacific, was engulfed in political violence, with clashes between separatists and loyalists, leading to nearly ninety deaths between 1984 and 1988 in a climate of civil war. Although tensions were never as high in French Polynesia, several events in August 1977 suggested that a deterioration of the situation was possible. On 12 August, a bomb attack hit the telephone exchange of the Central Post Office at Pape'ete without causing any casualties. During the night of 26–27 August, Pierre d'Anglejean, a former soldier from the CEP, was assassinated by militants of *Te Toto Tupuna*, whose members, quickly arrested, were said to have acted in the name of pro-independence and anti-nuclear ideas.⁴⁴

These events left a sufficiently strong impression on various actors involved in the anti-nuclear protest, leading them to emphasise the non-violent character of their approach. In this respect, the trial of the activists accused of having participated in or inspired this action, which took place in Versailles between 1979 and 1981, seemed to mark a turning point for many actors. For the vast majority of the movements involved in the protest against nuclear testing, there is no doubt that this was a political struggle that could only be resolved through political means and not through armed resistance. John Doom, sent by the EEPF to testify at the Versailles trial in 1981, considers that this event, together with the disillusionment that followed the Socialist Party's arrival in power in 1981, were the triggers for the EEPF's official anti-nuclear stance in the following years.⁴⁵

Once again, beyond the question of convictions, the reference to pacifism helped to broaden the mobilisation around a common denominator

that was much more consensual than the issue of independence. In 1982, for example, different Polynesian organisations chose to call their coalition the 'peace committee' when they organised mass demonstrations against nuclear testing and the presence of the CEP in Polynesia.⁴⁶ Pacifism appeared as a neutral, seemingly nonpartisan frame at the political level, which did not allude to disagreements between Polynesia and France. Similarly, it is not a coincidence that the nongovernmental organisation (NGO) constituted in 1988 after the social unrest at the end of 1987, under the aegis of the EEPF, was called Tomite Te Ra'i Hau (Peace and Development Committee).⁴⁷ Likewise, in 1989, the youth of Tavini, one of the main independence parties, undertook a fast in front of the cathedral of Pape'ete, emphasising the need for a more peaceful society.⁴⁸

Such an analysis does not negate pacifism as a conviction, but it does highlight that within the Polynesian contestation, pacifism played an essential role in neutralising differences and broadening a movement that polarised positions on the territory. However, the significance of the anti-nuclear protest in French Polynesia in the 1980s must be put into perspective. Its purpose was not only to reject nuclear tests but also contest the presence of the CEP and the development model it imposed on the entire territory. Yet, the relative importance of military bases in Tahiti gave the army considerable economic weight. In the Tuamotus, the army made major contributions in the 1960s and 1970s to opening up many islands and improving the health and supply situation through a policy of good offices, which had a lasting impression on the population.⁴⁹ Furthermore, the symbolic weight of the army in Polynesia must not be overlooked. The reference to the 'Polynesian poilus' of the First World War as well as to the Pacific Battalion of the Second World War remained significant in the 1980s, along with the particular reverence of General de Gaulle among many Polynesians.⁵⁰

More specifically, the prominent role of the French army in Polynesia had long limited or even prevented the emergence of a critique of the nuclear tests that could have been championed by Catholics. The Catholic hierarchy at the time (and even now) was more culturally oriented towards France than the EEPF, more reluctant about the prospect of political autonomy for the territory, and more closely linked to the military. For instance, the references to Vatican II, used by some Catholic activists, were also employed by the Archbishop of Pape'ete to justify not taking a specific stance on this issue. Thus, despite some tensions (linked in particular to the competition between young Polynesians and young French soldiers over girls), there was no unanimous rejection of the French army in Polynesia, which limited the scope of anti-nuclear protest.

Towards an Increased ‘Oceanisation’ of the Protest?

Pacifism and anti-colonialism were both vectors of integration into transnational coalitions opposing the military use of the atom and contributed to an ‘oceanisation’ of the contestation. In other words, references and activists movements became much more centred on the Pacific area than they had been before. Prior to the 1980s, Australia and, especially, New Zealand had been important actors in nuclear opposition, but the process of oceanisation meant that cultural references and actors were increasingly anchored in the Pacific. This does not imply that Europe (and especially France) was forgotten, but rather that there was a sort of prioritisation of contestation spaces.

For instance, a demonstration was organised on 25 February 1982, a date chosen because of its proximity to 1 March, the anniversary of the American Castle Bravo test on Bikini Atoll, which in 1954 led to significant radiological contamination of the surrounding populations and the military personnel.⁵¹ In the second half of the 1980s, the principle of a demonstration in Pape’ete on 6 August was established to commemorate the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. According to the organisers of these mobilisations, the primary idea was that the Pacific region, in the broadest sense, had been a frequent victim of nuclear power throughout its history. In this respect, the Polynesian protest could not be isolated from other similar situations. Pacifism as expressed in Polynesia in the 1980s mobilised universal values, but tended to be rooted in the Pacific rather than appearing organically linked, or subordinate to the European movement from which it seemed largely disconnected.

Thus, this pacifist critique of French nuclear testing was not isolated from a broader commitment to the denuclearisation of the Pacific in general. It addressed issues such as the circulation of nuclear-powered ships or ships carrying nuclear weapons, the fallout from American nuclear testing on the Marshall Islands, and the consequences of the American bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.⁵² John Doom played a key role in defining a regional and even a global approach to the issue of nuclear testing within the EEPF, and the broader Polynesian protest movement. As General Secretary of the EEPF from 1971 to 1988, Doom was also a member of the Executive Committee of the Pacific Conference of Churches (1966–89) and the Central Committee of the World Council of Churches (WCC) (1976–83). In 1989, he created the ‘Pacific’ office within the WCC, forging important links with European anti-militarist and pacifist circles. Such links were particularly visible during the General Assembly in Vancouver in 1983.

This oceanisation of nuclear contestation was hindered by efforts from the French government to limit the formation of a transnational coalition

on the issue. For instance, in November 1982, the *Greenpeace III*, sailing at the limit of the 12-mile zone around Moruroa, was boarded and seized by the French navy.⁵³ On 10 July 1985, the most famous event occurred place with the attack on the *Rainbow Warrior* by the French secret services to prevent the international NGO from carrying out its planned campaign.⁵⁴ Throughout this period, the French secret services reportedly intervened several times to obstruct planned campaigns or prevent ships from reaching French Polynesia.⁵⁵ Additional obstacles included border controls and the power of the French administration to expel foreign militants – such as the Grünen member of the European Parliament Dorothee Piermont in 1986.⁵⁶ These actions by the French state, coupled with the remoteness of French Polynesia, explain why transnational protest actions were relatively rare until the end of the 1980s and why contacts were mainly focused on exchanges of information. For example, a delegation of Polynesian women, including Marie-Thérèse Danielsson, travelled to Stockholm for an international congress where they raised the issue of the CEP and the tests.⁵⁷

France and Polynesia and the Nuclear Tests

Despite these difficulties, activists gradually began circulating between French Polynesia and metropolitan France in the second half of the 1980s. In this context, pacifism and the theme of nonviolence emerged as foundational elements of these new coalitions. Oscar Temaru's emphasis on a nonviolent approach in its mobilisation against the CEP and French sovereignty over Polynesia played an important role in his international recognition as a leading Polynesian protest figure. He compared his approach to those of Gandhi and Nelson Mandela, which was part of his effort to legitimise himself and seek respectability, distinguishing himself from the image of the violent separatists sent back by Gaston Flosse. For foreign activists who were anxious not to interfere in internal political debates in Polynesia, nonviolence and pacifism were key features that distinguish peace and environmental activism from political action.⁵⁸ As a result, Oscar Temaru was invited to speak at the German Grünen Congress in 1985.⁵⁹ He also visited the Larzac plateau, a major site of anti-militarist protest in France.⁶⁰ Stephanie Mills, who joined Greenpeace New Zealand in 1990 as a nuclear campaigner, organised Peace Camps in Polynesia in 1991 and 1992; she declared that Temaru's pacifist posture convinced foreign partners that it was possible to establish lasting ties with him.⁶¹

In France, one of the pacifist structures called upon to play an important role in the transnational connections around nuclear testing was the Centre de Documentation et de Recherche sur la Paix et les Conflits (CDRPC)⁶²

founded in 1984 by three activists from Lyon – Bruno Barrillot, Patrice Bouveret and Jean-Luc Thierry – all of whom had long been involved in pacifist and anti-militarist movements.⁶³ Their objective was to provide the French peace movement with precise information on the strategic stakes of armaments. The direct involvement of the founders of the CDRPC in the question of the nuclear tests in Polynesia began in 1990. Thierry was hired by Greenpeace France as a nuclear campaigner and later participated in the mobilisation against the resumption of the tests in 1995, while Barrillot was sent to Polynesia in 1990 at the request of Greenpeace-France, where he established lasting ties with activists who had long been involved in these issues, such as Marie-Thérèse Danielsson and John Doom.

Conclusion: 1995, the Last Mobilisation?

In 1995, when newly elected President Jacques Chirac decided to resume nuclear testing for a final campaign, a multifaceted opposition re-emerged. In the Pacific area, pacifism was one of the main factors of mobilisation on an international scale alongside environmental issues. Four years after the collapse of the Soviet Union, South Africa had just dismantled its arsenal and the Non-Proliferation Treaty was about to be renewed for an unlimited period of time. The resumption of French nuclear testing appeared to be out of step with the times. In Polynesia, while the rejection of nuclear weapons in the name of evangelical pacifism had not disappeared, the motivations for mobilisation were more fundamentally related to the rejection of a certain relationship with metropolitan France, one that mixed economic dependence with a façade of political autonomy. From this perspective, the practice of nonviolence, considered by outside militants as a reassuring guarantee of moderation, remained a common denominator within the broad but loose coalition being formed. To a large extent, the place of pacifism in the 1995 mobilisation was characteristic of a long-term trend in the contestation of nuclear testing and the presence of the CEP in Polynesia. It always coexisted with other arguments, notably political or socioeconomic ones, and the local actors of the protest constantly balanced these different possibilities according to their convictions and strategic options.

After the end of the tests in 1996, thanks to John Doom's ecumenical relations, a sociological survey of former Polynesian workers was organised jointly by the Hiti Tau association and the EEPF, with the informal support of the separatist party, the Tavini. The results of this survey are known through the book *Moruroa et nous (Moruroa and Us)* published by the Observatoire des armements.⁶⁴ The initiative demonstrated the fruitful

relationship established since the 1980s in the context of nuclear contestation. Shortly afterwards, two associations were created to represent the veterans in metropolitan France (the AVEN on 9 June 2001) and Moruroa e Tatou (on 4 July 2001).⁶⁵ This dialogue between Polynesian and European NGOs was instrumental in transitioning from a critique of nuclear testing to addressing post-tests issues such as compensation for victims and questions of memory.

The contestation of this last campaign sheds light on the processes at work since the 1960s. At a time when the decolonisation of the French colonial empire in Africa was coming to an end, the installation of the CEP was carried out in a context of imperial resurgence, where the maintenance of a colonial situation and nuclear tests was closely linked. Protest movements were structured around three themes – anti-colonialism, environmentalism and pacifism – which were associated and mobilised in a specific way according to the era. In French Polynesia, where separatism was long seen as a radical political opinion, highlighting peace and environment issues allowed actors to make sense of the situation they were facing, but also to forge alliances at different levels within the Pacific region and with the rest of the world. In the 1980s, the anti-colonialism of the anti-nuclear fight in Polynesia was more central in a context of the oceanisation of protest, a trend that was highlighted in the events of 1995.

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Notes

1. Meltz and Vrignon, *Des bombes en Polynésie*, 25.
2. Balandier, ‘La situation coloniale’, 9.
3. Jeanneret, *Sous le colonialisme atomique français*, 4.
4. Churchill and LaDuke, ‘Native North America’, 241.
5. Endres, ‘The Rhetoric of Nuclear Colonialism’, 39.
6. For example, see Urwin, *Chain Reactions* or Hill, ‘Britain, West Africa and “The New Nuclear Imperialism”’.

7. Al Wardi, *Tabiti Nui*, 34.
8. Pambrun, *Henri Hiro*, 134.
9. This process is still ongoing. Cf. https://www.liberation.fr/politique/essais-nucleair-es-en-polynesie-francaise-louverture-des-archives-progresse-sous-conditions-2022-0204_4C6QOM7RG5HPBKW3VNL5RH66Q (retrieved 25 September 2024).
10. Salmond, *Aphrodite's Island*.
11. Westad, *The Cold War*.
12. Banivanua Mar, *Decolonisation and the Pacific*.
13. It prohibits tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and in water.
14. Wright, *Mururoa Protest*, 75.
15. In the 1980s, he became the first President of Greenpeace's international branch.
16. Collectif, *Le bataillon de la paix*, 25.
17. Danielsson and Danielsson, *Moruroa*, 47.
18. Maclellan, *Grappling with the Bomb*.
19. Hunter and Keziere, *The Greenpeace to Amchitka*.
20. Diplomatic Archives (Centre de Nantes). Fonds Wellington. 739PO_1_76. 'New Zealand Women's Appeal to President de Gaulle'. n.d. (around 1963).
21. Testimony of Stephanie Mills collected by the author. 17 March 2021.
22. See Lacovsky, Chapter 7 in this volume.
23. SPAA [Local archives, Tahiti]. Fonds 146W 49. Note confidentielle défense sur les mesures prises à l'encontre des navires étrangers susceptibles de se rendre dans le quadrant d'Anaa au cours de la campagne 1972, 17 May 1972.
24. Guillebaud, 'Les Tahitiens sont peu disposés à renoncer aux avantages du centre d'expérimentation du Pacifique', *Le Monde*, 26 June 1973.
25. National Archives. 19850665/41. 'Pierre Messmer a mis l'assemblée territoriale en garde contre les 'risques' de l'autonomie interne', *Le journal de l'île de la Réunion*, 10 September 1971.
26. National Archives. 19940165/33-34. Procès-verbal de la réunion du comité de coordination du renseignement du 26 octobre 1973, 7 November 1973.
27. Mohamed-Gaillard, *L'Archipel de la puissance?*
28. SPAA. 146W50. 'Le CEP d'aujourd'hui et de demain'. Exposé d'accueil de l'amiral CEP aux représentants de la presse française et étrangère en visite au CEP. n.d. [1976].
29. Wittner, *Confronting the Bomb*.
30. Milza, 'Les mouvements pacifistes', 265.
31. Pincé, *La construction politique*.
32. Nelta, 'Nuclear Colonialism', 109.
33. 'Ce que nous proposons', *la Mana*, n°32, Marhc–April 1981, 21.
34. 'Dénucléariser le Pacifique', *la Mana*, n°40, September–October 1982, 11.
35. Barrillot, *Témoins de la bombe*.
36. Doom, *A he'e noa i te tau*.
37. Letter from l'EEPF to François Mitterrand, 27 October 1982. <http://moruroa.assemblee.pf/medias/pdf/EEPF%20%C3%A0%20Mitterrand%20271082.pdf>.
38. Letter from l'EEPF to François Mitterrand, 26 February 1983. <http://moruroa.assemblee.pf/medias/pdf/EEPF%20%C3%A0%20Mitterrand%20050983.pdf>.

39. Letter from l'EEPF to François Mitterrand, 27 October 1982. <http://moruroa.assemblee.pf/medias/pdf/EEPF%20%C3%A0%20Mitterrand%20271082.pdf>.
40. Letter from l'EEPF to François Mitterrand, 26 February 1983. <http://moruroa.assemblee.pf/medias/pdf/EEPF%20%C3%A0%20Mitterrand%20050983.pdf>.
41. Saura, *Politique et religion*.
42. Monod and Vernaudo, 'Turo Raapoto'.
43. Fer et Malogne-Fer 2013.
44. Danielsson and Danielsson, *Moruroa*.
45. Doom, *A he'e noa i te tau*, 168.
46. 'Manifestation antinucléaire du 27 février', *Ia Mana*, n°37, February–March 1982, 10.
47. Tomite Te Ra'i Hau, *Compte-rendu et propositions du premier rassemblement 'Paix et développement'*, 1988. <http://moruroa.assemblee.pf/medias/pdf/Tomite%20Te%20Rai%20Hau%2029%20juil%201988.pdf>.
48. 'Lettre du comité des jeunes du Tavini à Jean-Michel Boucheron (président de la Commission de la Défense à l'Assemblée nationale'. 4 July 1989. <http://moruroa.assemblee.pf/medias/pdf/Comit%C3%A9%20jeunes%20Tavini%201989.pdf>.
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51. 'La manifestation du 25 février', *Ia Mana*, n°117, March 1984, 2.
52. 'Une mission de médecins français en Polynésie en avril 1990', *Ia Mana*, n°154, March 1990, 12.
53. Schmitt, 'Greenpeace vers Mururoa', *Le Monde*, 2 September 1985.
54. King, *Death of the Rainbow Warrior*.
55. Ockrent and de Marenches, *Dans le secret des princes*, 80.
56. 'Expulsion de Dorothee Piermont par le HC en 1986. Une décision du Conseil d'Etat qui fait date', *La Dépêche de Tahiti*, 16 June 1989.
57. 'Ia Mana Te Nunaa au congrès international des femmes à Copenhague', *Ia Mana*, n°29, October–November 1980.
58. Testimony of Stephanie Mills collected by the author, 17 March 2021.
59. 'Controverse à propos de la "libération" de la Polynésie', *Le Monde*, 19 December 1985.
60. J. Bové and F. Roux, 'Oscar Temaru mérite notre soutien', *Libération*, 2 March 1985.
61. Testimony of Stephanie Mills collected by the author, 17 March 2021.
62. Centre for Documentation and Research on Peace and Conflict.
63. <http://www.obsarm.org/spip.php?article2> (retrieved 25 September 2024).
64. 'John Doom'. Retrieved 25 September 2024 from <http://obsarm.org/spip.php?article284>.
65. 'Aven' stands for Association des Vétérans des Essais Nucléaires (Association of Nuclear Test Victims); in Tahitian, 'Moruroa e Tatou' means 'Moruroa and us'.

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Abdul Samad Minty and the World Campaign against Military and Nuclear Collaboration with South Africa

Anna-Mart van Wyk

In 1969, coinciding with a time when the world had become increasingly cognisant of the dangers of nuclear weapons and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) had opened for signature, South African-born activist and Honorary Secretary of the British Anti-Apartheid Movement (AAM) Abdul Samad Minty published *South Africa's Defence Strategy*, in which he indicated his belief, inter alia, that the minority South African apartheid government was seeking a nuclear weapons capability.¹ At that point, the National Party, having been in power in South Africa since 1948, had entrenched a policy of 'apartheid' as a political, social, legal and constitutional system.² This racial segregation system was maintained through an aggressive expansion of the government's military industrial complex, with brutal suppression of all opposition against apartheid.

In the nuclear field, South Africa was well into a civil nuclear research and development programme by the end of the 1960s. It continued to be an important supplier of uranium to the Western nuclear powers since the Second World War. The nuclear activities included, inter alia, the building of the Pelindaba research complex close to the capital (Pretoria); installation of a small US-supplied research reactor (Safari-1), along with provision of research quantities of high enriched uranium (HEU) for its operation; planning for the construction of a nuclear power station at Koeberg on the west coast of South Africa; theorising about peaceful nuclear explosives (PNEs) mimicking the United States' Plowshare project of developing and testing nuclear explosive devices for civil construction applications; and developing

a uranium enrichment process – a crucial step towards the development of nuclear weapons. By 1974, a decision was taken to build a single PNE device earmarked for testing at an underground site under construction in the Kalahari Desert. In 1977, gripped in a war against Soviet and Cuban-backed forces in Angola, a decision was taken to construct a top-secret, small nuclear weapons arsenal as a deterrent against what the apartheid government perceived as a ‘communist onslaught’ in decolonising Southern Africa. Between 1979 and 1989, six nuclear bombs were constructed before a decision was taken in late 1989 to secretly destroy the arsenal, following the collapse of the Soviet Union, an end to the border war with Angola, the independence of South African-occupied Namibia, and the imminent democratisation of South Africa, amongst other contributing factors.³

Meanwhile, the international struggle against apartheid was gaining momentum, led by an alliance of governments, nongovernmental organisations and individuals. Various anti-apartheid campaigns mobilised governments, trade unions, churches, youth and student organisations, women and other segments of their respective populations to take action to isolate the apartheid state, and assist the African National Congress (ANC) and other organisations exiled by the apartheid state in their liberation struggles. The efforts of many of these campaigns are well documented in the literature,⁴ but a focus on activist resistance against the apartheid state’s nuclear endeavours is lacking, even in the historiography on South Africa’s nuclear weapons programme.⁵ As such, this chapter aims to add to the historiography of the global anti-apartheid campaigns, South Africa’s nuclear journey and international anti-nuclear activism by focusing on the efforts of the World Campaign Against Military and Nuclear Collaboration with South Africa (hereinafter ‘World Campaign’). While the efforts of other major transnational activists, such as the World Council of Churches, the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom, and the Catholic Church, for example, should certainly not be disregarded, the World Campaign had a very specific and unique focus on exposing the apartheid government’s military and nuclear build-up.⁶ It played a pivotal role in campaigning for South Africa’s nuclear disarmament at a time when Western states turned a blind eye to the apartheid government’s continued refusal to sign the NPT and its disregard for calls to put all its nuclear equipment under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards.

The AAM played a pivotal role in initiating the World Campaign on 28 March 1979, under the Directorship of Abdul Minty, to intensify its work on military and nuclear collaboration with South Africa, both in Britain and globally.⁷ Before the launch, Minty was already well known in the AAM and among the liberation movements for his efforts to prove that the apartheid

state was an ‘incipient nuclear power’ that posed ‘a grave danger’ to Africa and the world.⁸ His subsequent research and findings got the attention of the Special Committee on Apartheid (hereinafter ‘Special Committee’) and the Africa Group at the United Nations (UN), and he was called to the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Arms Embargo Committee on Apartheid four times to give evidence as an individual expert.⁹ He was also given an audience at every Commonwealth conference since 1960 and invited to speak at numerous anti-apartheid conferences and seminars. His close association with the Special Committee enabled him to establish contacts with government leaders in Africa and globally, whom he continuously lobbied for action against ‘collaborators of the apartheid regime’. He worked closely with the African Group, the Non-Aligned Movement, and other members of the IAEA, and lobbied for sanctions against the apartheid regime through speeches, statements, press releases and other means.¹⁰

In the forthcoming discussion, pieced together primarily from documents from the AAM Archives at Oxford’s Bodleian Libraries, other primary sources and interviews with Minty, his efforts as Director of the World Campaign to bring an end to all nuclear cooperation with South Africa are investigated. Particular focus is placed on global solidarity campaigns and his efforts in the UN, the IAEA and the Commonwealth. His relationship with the ANC is also examined.

From the Kalahari Desert to Oslo: The Beginnings of the World Campaign

Minty claims that after a statement by apartheid Prime Minister Hendrik Verwoerd in 1965, at the inauguration of Safari-1, that ‘it is the duty of South Africa not only to consider the military uses of the material (i.e. uranium) but also to do all in its power to direct its uses for peaceful purposes’,¹¹ he started reading the small print in every report and found that South Africa was preparing to build a nuclear weapon.¹² He particularly started pursuing his suspicions in earnest in August 1977, when, while attending the World Conference for Action against Apartheid in Lagos, he heard that a possible nuclear test site was detected in South Africa’s Kalahari Desert. On 8 August, Soviet President Leonid Brezhnev informed the governments of the United Kingdom, United States, France and West Germany of information in his possession that pointed to South Africa completing work on the production of nuclear weapons and undertaking preparations for a test explosion. Brezhnev requested the various governments ‘to take all the corresponding effective measures’ to prevent South Africa from proceeding.¹³ This led

to various responses from Western governments. The United Kingdom, France, and the United States noted that should the information be accurate, it would be 'an extremely grave matter' with the 'gravest consequences'.¹⁴

Minty had a field day calling out the Western nations on double standards:

There was an international outcry and the French President said to South Africa 'don't explode'. So, I made a statement, 'how can they explode what they don't have?', because I had been to every Western country regarding their nuclear collaboration and they had all told me, 'South Africa doesn't have nuclear weapon capability and our cooperation is only for peaceful purposes'.¹⁵

Following the Kalahari incident, Minty met with Ambassador Leslie O. Harriman of Nigeria, the Chairman of the Special Committee, and Enuga Reddy, an Indian-born diplomat at the UN who was involved in the Special Committee, to discuss aspects of a mandatory arms embargo against South Africa. It was proposed that Minty set up the World Campaign, with the support of global anti-apartheid movements, to complement the efforts of the Special Committee.¹⁶ Minty would wear two hats: Honorary Secretary of the British AAM and Director of the World Campaign.¹⁷

Meanwhile, calls by Minty and his allies for a mandatory arms embargo against South Africa increased. The Kalahari incident added fuel to the fire, and finally, in November 1977, the UNSC adopted Resolution 418, which placed a mandatory arms embargo on South Africa. However, little attention was given to it was scant on the issue of nuclear weapons, merely stating that the Security Council was 'gravely concerned that South Africa [was] at the threshold of producing nuclear weapons'; hence, 'All States shall refrain from any co-operation with South Africa in the manufacture and development of nuclear weapons'.¹⁸ It did not contain anything on civil nuclear cooperation.

Following the passing of Resolution 418, Minty dedicated all his energy to campaigning against violations of the arms embargo and Western powers aiding and abetting the apartheid regime. A conference paper entitled 'South Africa's Military and Nuclear Build-up', which was published in 1978 at the request of the Special Committee, serves as an example of Minty's consistent narrative: there was no doubt that South Africa had a nuclear capability, it just wasn't clear what type and how many; there was close nuclear cooperation with the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and Germany; South Africa already in the mid-1960s confirmed the country's capability to produce nuclear weapons; and South Africa had boasted about its possession of uranium enrichment technology, 'obviously developed as a result of

close collaboration with certain Western Powers and particularly the Bonn Government'.¹⁹ In particular, Minty pointed out contradictions in the West's actions:

Considerable efforts are made by the major Western Powers to restrict the transfer of nuclear technology to various third world countries for fear of encouraging the proliferation of nuclear weapons, but no such considerations apply in the case of South Africa. It is remarkable how easily the argument is changed when it applies to the Pretoria regime. Yet, these same powers have continuously provided South Africa with nuclear expertise and technology, claiming that their assistance only related to the peaceful application of nuclear energy. However, every nuclear expert confirms that it is virtually impossible to restrict information and technology in such a way as to prevent the 'peaceful' methods from being used for the development of nuclear weapons.²⁰

Minty called the 1977 arms embargo meaningless insofar as it applied to the development of South Africa's nuclear capability. He argued that it was doubtful that any state would admit that it was cooperating with South Africa in the manufacture and development of nuclear weapons. Instead, the 'major nuclear partners' of South Africa (the United Kingdom, the United States, France and West Germany) responded to evidence about South Africa's nuclear capability by merely suggesting it would be preferable to persuade South Africa to sign the NPT and bring its nuclear facilities under some degree of international control. Hence, Minty charged, South Africa continued to receive nuclear technology and know-how, as well as equipment, plants and fissionable material provided by these countries. In addition, these same powers had provided the apartheid regime with Africa's most modern and destructive armoury. As such, 'the policies of the major Western Powers to assist South Africa's military and nuclear build-up ... constitute[d] a grave threat to international peace and security' and should be stopped.²¹

The World Campaign was officially launched on 28 March 1979 at the Zambian High Commission in London,²² following consultations with the Special Committee, the Southern African liberation movements and the Frontline states.²³ It was based in Oslo and was funded by the governments of Norway and Sweden.²⁴ The World Campaign enjoyed the support of the Special Committee, as well as the patronage of Presidents Julius Nyerere (Tanzania), Seretse Khama (Botswana), Agostinho Neto (Angola), Kenneth Kaunda (Zambia) and Olusegun Obasanjo (Nigeria). Its sponsors included

former Swedish Prime Minister Olof Palme, British politicians David Steel and Joan Lestor, and Coretta Scott King, widow of Martin Luther King.²⁵ It was set to work closely with the UN, the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), anti-apartheid and solidarity movements, liberation movements in Southern Africa, and the Frontline states.²⁶ Its aims and objectives were as follows:

- (1) To promote the widest awareness by world public opinion of the grave and increasing threat to international peace and security created by the system of apartheid in South Africa.
- (2) To campaign for an end to all forms of military, nuclear and security collaboration with South Africa.
- (3) To work for the effective implementation of the UN arms embargo against South Africa and to ensure that it was reinforced to encompass all forms of assistance and cooperation to South Africa in the maintenance and strengthening of its military and police establishment and its nuclear programme.
- (4) To make representations to the governments concerned on violations of the embargo and about any military, nuclear or security collaboration by them with South Africa.
- (5) To cooperate with appropriate organs of the UN and the OAU on the implementation of effective measures against military, nuclear and security collaboration with South Africa.
- (6) To publicise all information concerning the military and nuclear plans of the South African regime, its threat to and breaches of international peace and security, and actions by governments and organisations to end all collaboration with that regime.²⁷

The World Campaign planned to achieve the above aims and objectives in the following manner:

- (1) Encouraging and stimulating campaigns on particular aspects of the arms embargo.
- (2) Investigating and following up on violations of the arms embargo by establishing the facts and making representations to relevant governments.
- (3) Initiating research and drawing attention to South Africa's military and nuclear build-up through meetings, seminars and consultations.
- (4) Publishing papers, documents and pamphlets on South Africa's military and nuclear build-up, and on military and nuclear collaboration with South Africa.²⁸

Following the establishment of the World Campaign, global messages of support poured in, including a joint message from the presiding officers of the UN bodies concerned with Southern Africa; the President of the ANC; the Commonwealth Secretary-General; the Prime Ministers of Sweden and Norway; and from the South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO).²⁹ In his congratulatory statement, ANC President Oliver Tambo noted that his organisation had insisted since the early 1960s that the Western powers have rejected the ANC's position that the apartheid regime was a threat to international peace and security, and, in defiance of UN Resolutions and global public opinion, continued to expand their economic and military collaboration to South Africa, to the point where the apartheid regime had embraced the development of nuclear weapons. As such, 'these Western states' policies towards South and Southern Africa had become similar threats to global peace and security'. Therefore, the ANC welcomed the launch of the World Campaign 'as an important and timely contribution to the struggle for peace in Southern Africa, in Africa, and internationally'.³⁰ Sam Nujoma, President of SWAPO, noted that it was the hope of his organisation that the World Campaign would make an 'immense contribution for the prevention of nuclear holocaust ... which today threatens the peace and security of the world as a result of the continued, institutionalised militaristic policy and actions of the fascist minority regime of South Africa, which, hitherto, enjoys all-round military support and nuclear collaboration of its god-fathers – the Western powers, including the U.S.A., Britain, Federal Republic of Germany, France and Canada'.³¹

The Suspected Nuclear Test and the 'Stop the Apartheid Bomb' Campaign

As the above support messages and various AAM documents aptly demonstrate,³² and as highlighted by Das, the World Campaign was launched during a time when 'there was an explicit attempt to connect the issue of apartheid with that of nuclear disarmament as a struggle for human rights'.³³ Statements made by ANC leaders in joint ANC-AAM conferences, as well as connecting campaigns focused on nuclear disarmament of the apartheid regime with those focused on divestment and an end to financial aid, also reflect this.³⁴ Nuclear reversal advocates specifically lobbied for the 'subordinated and dominated people of South Africa to be given their legitimate right to self-determination, and not be terrorised by a racist regime with nuclear weapons'.³⁵ Indeed, it can be argued that the AAM launched the

World Campaign to explicitly drive this agenda and coordinate international activity in this regard at a time when other protests against nuclear power and a revival of the nuclear arms race were gaining renewed momentum in Western countries.³⁶

It wasn't long before the World Campaign acquired major ammunition for its cause. In September 1979, a US Vela satellite picked up the signature double flash of a nuclear test in the Indian Ocean, near Prince Edward Island, a South African territory. This led to widespread suspicions that South Africa had tested a nuclear device, either on its own or in collaboration with Israel. Both countries denied involvement, and, to date, despite a substantial amount of circumstantial evidence that it was a nuclear event, there has been no definitive conclusion on who was responsible.³⁷ Nonetheless, the incident raised global suspicions about South Africa's nuclear capabilities, and Minty acted fast, petitioning the President of the Security Council for an immediate meeting of the Council 'to consider South Africa's nuclear threat to the peace and security of Africa and the world'.³⁸ He also reached out to global anti-apartheid groups, to which he emphasised that a campaign against nuclear collaboration with South Africa could not wait until the next year, so action on a national level would be welcomed. In particular, the various groups had to do everything possible to draw the public's attention to South Africa's nuclear and military threat to world peace; to support the World Campaign's suggestion that the Security Council discuss the matter immediately by putting pressure on their respective governments to request this from the Security Council; and, lastly, to start preparing for a major effort in January 1980, led by the World Campaign, to highlight South Africa's nuclear threat.³⁹ Minty also wrote to a host of governments, imploring them to give serious consideration to the matter of South Africa's nuclear weapon capability and threat, with 'a view to taking the appropriate initiatives to ensure that the Security Council meets soon to discuss the question'.⁴⁰

Shortly after the Vela incident, Minty, with the support of the AAM, launched a joint international campaign for the extension of the 1977 arms embargo to cover all forms of nuclear collaboration. The campaign involved a widely circulated petition, including to all Labour Parties and the engineering workers union.⁴¹ The petition stated that it would be presented to the British government during the 1980 UN General Assembly (UNGA) as a contribution 'to an international campaign to end all nuclear collaboration with South Africa', initiated by the World Campaign.⁴² It was noted that similar campaigns were organised in the United States, France, West Germany, Scandinavia, the Netherlands and Ireland. By signing the petition, people declared:

We, concerned at South Africa's growing nuclear capability, urge the British government to terminate all forms of nuclear collaboration with South Africa. We believe that the United Nations and its member states must take mandatory action to end all forms of nuclear collaboration with Apartheid South Africa.⁴³

Another document circulated by the World Campaign was a Statement for Endorsement by Scientists on Nuclear Collaboration with South Africa. Scientists and engineers were called upon to sign it and encourage their peers to deny South African scientists and engineers new technologies or scientific information that could be used to further South Africa's nuclear or military capability. The Statement went so far as to declare:

The threat to world peace posed by the acquisition of nuclear weapons by the racist regime of South Africa is so grave that South African scientists and engineers concerned in any way with the development of a nuclear capability, should be placed in quarantine in as much the same way as, before World War II, many anti-fascist scientists refused traditional international cooperation with Nazi scientists.⁴⁴

In February 1989, the World Campaign and the AAM launched a major international 'Stop the Apartheid Bomb'⁴⁵ campaign by publishing a research report by Dan Smith, entitled *South Africa's Nuclear Capability*.⁴⁶ The well-researched report traces the development of South Africa's nuclear capacity and how the Western powers aided the apartheid regime in creating this capacity. It is interesting how Smith draws conjectures on why South Africa would need a nuclear capability.⁴⁷ He takes it back to 1976, when the South African military expedition into Angola 'received some very rough handling' from the Cuban and Angolan forces, solidifying the conviction of the apartheid regime that something more was needed to maintain the 'myth of its military invincibility'. As the regime was already stretched economically and in terms of personnel for its military efforts, 'some dramatic increase in the capacity to apply force' was needed – something that nuclear weapons could provide.⁴⁸

Smith concluded that the apartheid regime probably believed that it needed nuclear weapons (as a force multiplier); they had the capability (enriching their own uranium); they had the means to deliver nuclear weapons to targets (using its British Buccaneer and Canberra, and French Mirage aircraft); they could probably identify specific uses (nuclear destruction of major guerrilla camps and bases, or major cities in the Frontline states providing aid to guerrilla forces). They expected political advantages from the possession of nuclear weapons (convincing allies such as the United

Kingdom, France, West Germany and the United States not to drop South Africa, for fear that it might 'unleash a nuclear catastrophe' when the regime reached a point where it believed that its very existence was at stake). Smith estimated that South Africa had likely produced enough weapons-grade uranium by December 1979 for four Hiroshima-size nuclear devices or, alternatively, for about a dozen relatively small nuclear weapons. For the latter contention, Smith pointed out that the suspected explosion in the Vela incident was calculated to be less than four kilotons; therefore, if it was indeed South Africa that conducted a nuclear test, it suggested thinking on their part for an arsenal of smaller weapons. In conclusion:

South Africa now ha[d] a very small military nuclear capacity which could be changed within a few years to an extremely significant one. This emphasise[d] the urgency of international action, and it emphasise[d] that there [was] still time for effective action.⁴⁹

Smith's report was aimed at mobilising maximum international action on the question of South Africa's 'Apartheid Bomb'. On 11 February 1980, Minty reached out to anti-apartheid movements globally to request maximum publicity for the report when it was launched a few days later, particularly among the media, and political and other leaders. Concurrently with the release, he requested that organisations coordinate a major campaign to end all forms of nuclear collaboration with South Africa and obtain more signatures from scientists on the Statement for Endorsement by Scientists on Nuclear Collaboration with South Africa. Organisations were also asked to communicate the names of prominent scientists in their respective countries for Minty to use on an international level. Minty also planned to provide copies of the scientist statements to the UN.⁵⁰

Subsequent statements by Minty built on the Smith report and are best described through the example of an article in *The Times* on 30 April 1981, in which Minty answered questions such as: 'does South Africa have the bomb? Can South Africa deliver the bomb? What is the evidence? Is there a real danger of a nuclear holocaust? And what can we do to help stop a nuclear holocaust in Southern Africa?' In his answers, Minty alluded to South Africa's scientific capability, including technology, know-how and personnel, the country's resources, namely uranium mining in Namibia and South Africa, and a uranium enrichment plant. He also pointed out that South Africa had not signed the NPT and that many experts believed that the country already had a small arsenal of nuclear weapons, which could be delivered by the advanced military aircraft and missiles it possessed. Interestingly, Minty also alluded to South Africa being in the process of developing an artillery system for firing low-

yield nuclear shells.⁵¹ As evidence of South Africa's nuclear capability, Minty cited the Kalahari and Vela incidents, with the latter being 'the unmistakable scientific evidence of a nuclear explosion', especially since 'the CIA also reported a South African naval operation in that area at the same time'.⁵²

Minty seemed to believe that a nuclear holocaust in South Africa was a real possibility if the government in Pretoria was determined to uphold apartheid. He cited the South African Deputy Defence Minister at the time as stating in September 1980: 'it would be very stupid not to use it if nuclear weapons were needed as the last resort to defend oneself'.⁵³ Minty alluded to the fact that apartheid had been designated as a crime against humanity by the UNGA in 1973 through the adoption of the International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid. This came into force in 1976, and notes that the UNGA had adopted 'a number of resolutions in which the policies and practices of apartheid are condemned as a crime against humanity'.⁵⁴ The 'crime of apartheid' is applied in the Convention as 'consisting of inhuman acts committed for the purpose of establishing and maintaining domination by one racial group of persons over any other racial group of persons and systematically oppressing them'.⁵⁵ Yet, as resistance to apartheid grew in South Africa and Namibia, the apartheid regime became even more intransigent. It increased its reliance on the use of force, also warning independent African states that 'continued resistance to apartheid [would] create a catastrophe too ghastly to contemplate'.⁵⁶

Therefore, in order to 'stop the apartheid bomb', Minty listed two immediate priorities for action: ensuring that the new Reagan administration in the United States did not overturn the ban on the supply of enriched uranium to South Africa, which was introduced by the Carter administration; and stopping the delivery of two French nuclear reactors to South Africa for the Koeberg nuclear power station that was set to start operating in March 1982.⁵⁷ Minty (and the ANC) believed that Koeberg might be used to produce weapons-grade plutonium for the nuclear weapons program, and, together with other civilian nuclear facilities and programmes, it was just a cover for the weapons programme.⁵⁸ Consequently, he advocated the following steps to be taken: ending all forms of nuclear collaboration with South Africa; securing a mandatory UN ban on all forms of nuclear collaboration with South Africa; campaigns to end all the agreements and arrangements on nuclear collaboration with South Africa; halting South Africa's global recruitment of nuclear scientists and engineers, and the training of South African engineers overseas; campaigning to stop imports of Namibian and South African uranium; and exposing the role of transnational corporations involved in nuclear collaboration with South Africa and campaigning for an end to such collaboration.⁵⁹

The extent to which the Western powers were accused of nuclear collaboration with South Africa in the few years after the launch of the World Campaign is summarised in Table 9.1 below.

Table 9.1 Nuclear collaboration with South Africa by Western states, up to 1983. Data from: Consultation on Military and Nuclear Collaboration with South Africa, 22–23 April 1983, MSS AAM 1550, AAM Archives; World Campaign Information Note: US Approves Nuclear Collaboration with South Africa, MSS AAM 1550, AAM Archives; Barber, Bitter US row over Koeberg contract, 29 September 1983, MSS AAM 1550, AAM Archives; ‘US Accused of Violating Pretoria Arms Embargo’, *South China Morning Post*

Country	Manner of collaboration
United States	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Edlow International and Separative Work Unit Corporation (SWUCO) allowed to broker enriched uranium from Europe to South Africa, to start up Koeberg. • Belgian-Swiss consortium brokered as a proxy in Europe to supply enriched uranium for Koeberg to South Africa. • South African nuclear experts periodically trained in the United States (e.g. about 80 in 1982). • Uranium from South Africa and Namibia imported into the United States, with no distinction as to origin. Ten utilities in the United States were identified as using this uranium. • Five companies allowed to buy 80 tons of South African owned uranium, which was stored at facilities of the Department of Energy. • Seven companies allowed to compete for a contract to provide essential services (training, maintenance and technical assistance) in the start-up of Koeberg. • Proposed export licences for helium-3 and a hot isostatic press.
France	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Export of ‘peaceful nuclear energy’ technology and plant sales to South Africa permitted. • Sale of two reactors for Koeberg nuclear power plant.
Belgium	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Consortium with France and Switzerland for the export of enriched uranium for Koeberg.
Sweden	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Close cooperation with South Africa in high-pressure technology needed for manufacturing nuclear bombs.
United Kingdom	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • South African nuclear students sponsored to study at Imperial College. • British nuclear engineers signed consultancy agreements with South African power utility ESCOM. • Two South African offices openly recruited nuclear experts.
West Germany	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Complicit in assisting South Africa to develop a method for uranium enrichment.

In April 1980, the International Committee against Apartheid, Racism and Colonialism in Southern Africa posted a summary of a paper by Minty entitled 'South Africa's Growing Military and Nuclear Threat'. Again, the Western powers were chastised for not implementing even 'the limited decisions of the Security Council' and, through years of consistent and unrestricted nuclear cooperation, aiding the apartheid regime to acquire a nuclear capability. Minty once again called for the mandatory arms embargo to be strengthened and for public action to be mobilised by global solidarity movements to bring about an end to all forms of nuclear collaboration with the apartheid regime and which would make a direct contribution to the African liberation struggle.⁶⁰ Typical activities to mobilise more comprehensive sections of the public included posters on strengthening the arms embargo; the use of photographs; possible visits to the Frontline states for purposes of reporting back; the preparation of booklets; the exchange of speakers within peace movements; efficient exchange of information and coordination, with the World Campaign being the central point of distribution; gathering of information about South African uranium shipments and transportation; and publishing the World Campaign's address, telephone and telex numbers in national publications, for violations and information to be reported quickly.⁶¹ In addition, Minty wrote many letters to eminent public servants and others, seeking information in their respective countries regarding specific issues related to the South African nuclear programme, including licensing agreements; nuclear links with South Africa; uranium import and export controls; details on the import of uranium from either South Africa or Namibia; whether enriched uranium was supplied to South Africa; and what legal measures existed to control the export of enriched uranium to South Africa, including on transit routes.⁶² He then packaged and disseminated the information received in global press releases and research reports, speeches and statements, inter alia, to the UN, the IAEA, foreign ministers in the Commonwealth and the liberation movements, as highlighted below.

The World Campaign and the UN

The World Campaign became an important source of information to the UN on arms embargo violations. At the time of its launch, it received a joint message of support from the presiding officers of UN bodies concerned with Southern Africa. This joint message called the World Campaign 'an indispensable complement to the efforts of the United Nations towards the effective implementation and reinforcement of the mandatory arms embargo against the racist regime in South Africa'.⁶³ Subsequently, the World Campaign

worked in close cooperation with the Special Committee to publicise loopholes and violations of the arms embargo, to propose measures for strengthening the embargo, and to campaign for a mandatory decision under Chapter VII of the UN Charter to end all nuclear collaboration with South Africa, including the dismantling of all nuclear plants in South Africa.⁶⁴

Minty became a regular speaker at the UN. Aside from the Special Committee, he gave extensive evidence to the UN Expert Panel on South African Nuclear Plans, formed by UNGA Resolution 34/76 B of 11 December 1979, and to the Security Council's 421 Arms Embargo Committee.⁶⁵ He was called to give evidence as an individual expert to the 421 Committee on four occasions. His statements across the board had a familiar theme: requesting an end to the import of uranium ore from South Africa and Namibia; chastising the West for continued nuclear collaboration with South Africa to such an extent that the latter had received more nuclear assistance than many nations who were NPT signatories; and emphasising his firm belief that the Vela incident in 1979 was a nuclear test by South Africa, based on evidence of South African ship deployments in the area on the night in question and ionospheric evidence from Puerto Rico. France, the United Kingdom and West Germany were criticised for not insisting on full-scope safeguards in their nuclear dealings with South Africa. He repeated his call for a Security Council resolution for a complete halt to all nuclear collaboration with South Africa, asked for South Africa to be kicked out of the IAEA and asked the London Nuclear Suppliers Group to explain what steps it had taken to reduce South Africa's capabilities for making nuclear weapons. He rejected the Western approach that nuclear collaboration was a necessary carrot to get South Africa to sign the NPT.⁶⁶

Minty often felt frustrated by the 421 Committee, calling it 'weak and limited' in its mandate and 'hardly doing any independent investigation'.⁶⁷ The Committee was also divided on the question of South Africa in the first few years of its existence, to the point where the United States called the Committee's meeting on 18 March 1980 'disjointed and unfocussed'. All but the Western states backed a proposal by Jamaica that Minty's evidence form the basis of a report to the Security Council on strengthening the arms embargo. However, in the view of the United States, most non-aligned nations took Minty's allegations at face value, seeing minimal need for an extended debate. The Soviet representative suggested that the Committee was a political body and, therefore, it should avoid technical details. Western representatives insisted on terms of reference. France opined that the Committee was not empowered to deal with peaceful nuclear cooperation and emphasised that the French-supplied Koeberg reactors would be adequately safeguarded and, therefore, would not aid South Africa's nuclear

weapons capacity. Yet, the non-aligned nations (who supported the World Campaign) were unconvinced. With Mexico at the forefront, they showed strong scepticism regarding the efficiency of safeguards 'and of any meaningful distinction between peaceful and military uses of nuclear energy in the South African case'.⁶⁸ Nonetheless, in September 1980, the Committee submitted a report to the Security Council containing sixteen proposals for making the embargo more effective. The report also noted that the Western governments expressed their reservations on the proposals. Three years later, the proposals were still not fully discussed by the Security Council due to fears of a United States and/or Western veto.⁶⁹ Still, Minty did not give up. In September 1983, he testified again at the 421 Committee. He asked for the urgent attention of the Committee to South Africa's nuclear capability, which had grown to such an alarming extent that even the major Western powers were conceding that there was a real danger of nuclear proliferation in Southern Africa.⁷⁰

It was only in 1986 that the World Campaign's efforts in the 421 Committee and the Security Council paid off, albeit marginally. On 28 November 1986, the Security Council adopted Resolution 591, which reaffirmed the mandatory arms embargo and added several new items, including a ban on importing South African armaments. However, it only slightly expanded the regulation on nuclear cooperation to demand 'all States to implement strictly its Resolution 418 (1977) and to refrain from any cooperation in the nuclear field with South Africa, which will contribute to the manufacture and development of South Africa of nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices'.⁷¹

At the beginning of 1988, an Advisory Committee for the World Campaign was established. Its members included: Reulf Steen, Vice-President of the Norwegian Parliament; David Steel, Leader of the British Liberal Party; A.B. Nyaki, High Commissioner of Tanzania to the United Kingdom; and Abdul Minty. It met for the first time in Oslo from 26 to 27 February 1988. The Advisory Committee voiced its 'grave concern' about the apparent failure of the UN Security Council, the 421 Committee, and individual governments to take effective action to prevent several major breaches of the mandatory arms embargo and make it more comprehensive and effective. It agreed that the objectives of the World Campaign should be promoted once again, and closer cooperation should be established with the UN and other intergovernmental organisations as well as key governments, anti-apartheid and other nongovernmental bodies, parliamentarians, and other groups and individuals. A programme was launched, which included missions to certain countries and governments and sustained lobbying at the UN and the IAEA.⁷²

The World Campaign and the IAEA

For several years, the World Campaign took initiatives to promote action within the IAEA to end all nuclear collaboration with South Africa. What was concerning to Minty was that South Africa still enjoyed full membership rights of the IAEA, participated in all other conferences and seminars, and had experts serving on numerous working groups despite its credentials having been rejected annually at the IAEA General Conference since 1976. Minty accused South Africa of deliberately misusing its membership to promote recognition for the Bantustans⁷³ by, for example, making entries in the Uranium 'Red Book' for the 'Republic of Bophuthatswana' (one of the Bantustans) or (illegally occupied) Namibia. This happened regularly, and it was only in 1985 that the World Campaign, through the African bloc in the IAEA General Assembly, was able to make corrections in this regard through Resolution 442.⁷⁴ This resolution requested that South Africa be excluded from all expert meetings, panels, conferences and seminars 'where such participation could assist South Africa to persist with its exploitation of Namibian uranium' and that South African entries on Namibian uranium in the 'Red Book' not be published without full consultation with the United Nations Council for Namibia. It also requested the Director General 'to report to the General Conference any information that Namibian soil [was] used by South Africa in any way as a dumping ground for radioactive wastes of whatever nature'.⁷⁵ This followed information the World Campaign claimed it had of Western European countries having made advances to South Africa to dump their nuclear waste in Namibia.⁷⁶

Another point of contention for the World Campaign was the Western rejection of annual resolutions at the IAEA General Assembly that raised concerns about South Africa's unsafeguarded facilities and called upon South Africa to submit all its nuclear installations and facilities to inspection by the IAEA. These resolutions also called upon IAEA member states to terminate all transfers of fissionable material and technology to South Africa, which could be used for the development of nuclear arms.⁷⁷ The Western states argued that any action to remove South Africa from any of the working groups would limit its membership rights and violate the principle of 'universality' (i.e. no state should be excluded from international organisations).⁷⁸ Minty pointed out the irony of Western governments having strong anti-apartheid policies, yet they rejected the resolutions. He called on parliamentarians, public organisations and individuals to take the initiative in all countries that abstained and opposed the resolutions to secure a more positive policy.⁷⁹ The non-aligned and socialist countries heeded his call, taking a series of steps over the years through the adoption

of resolutions at the annual IAEA General Conferences.⁸⁰ However, these resolutions lacked 'bite' due to the Western states consistently voting against the resolutions or abstaining.

Furthermore, the World Campaign consistently called for South Africa's expulsion from the IAEA.⁸¹ In 1986, a Resolution was tabled by the African Group, requesting the IAEA Board of Governors to consider recommending South Africa's suspension from the Agency if, by 1987, 'SA ha[d] not complied with the relevant General Conference Resolution and conducted itself in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the UN'.⁸² However, the Western Group again voted against the resolution, prompting Minty to declare that the Western states, through their behaviour, clearly signalled to the apartheid regime that its membership would be protected even if it did not place its secret nuclear plants under IAEA inspection by the next General Conference.⁸³ According to him, 'with such solid Western support SA [would] persist in refusing to sign the NPT and continue with the development and expansion of its secret nuclear plants'.⁸⁴ By June 1987, it transpired that the IAEA Director General was not able to report any real progress regarding safeguards negotiations with South Africa to the IAEA Board of Governors. The Board subsequently resolved to recommend the suspension of South Africa's privileges and rights of membership, until such time as it complied with the relevant General Assembly resolutions and conducted itself in accordance with the purposes and principles of the UN Charter.⁸⁵

The United States was heavily opposed to South Africa's suspension, going as far as to threaten to withdraw from the IAEA if the suspension went ahead.⁸⁶ This stance was strengthened even more after South Africa indicated in September 1987 that it was ready to make an offer to sign the NPT, 'depending on the outcome of the current IAEA conference'.⁸⁷ Subsequently, on 25 September 1987, the UNGA adopted Resolution 485, which resolved to decide on South Africa's suspension if it did not comply with previous resolutions by the next meeting of the UNGA in 1988.⁸⁸ Minty did not take this lightly, stating that it appeared 'as if [South Africa's] statement had been deliberately secured to discourage the Conference from excluding South Africa'.⁸⁹ He once again called for a mobilisation of public opinion, in particular in the Western states, to ensure that South Africa was expelled from the IAEA.⁹⁰

For the next three years, South Africa managed to survive the calls for expulsion by participating in a series of talks with the NPT depository states (the United States, the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom), with the IAEA deciding every year to postpone the question of South Africa's suspension to the next General Conference.⁹¹ In 1989, the Dutch Foreign Minister stated that if South Africa agreed to sign the NPT, 'we would logically be

expected to lift our embargo on uranium and nuclear technology'. Minty's reaction was that 'until now South Africa has only made vague promises about signing the non-proliferation treaty, but even if it did so, its signature would be worthless' due to South Africa already having developed '20 nuclear devices (sic) and a vast stockpile of enriched uranium'.⁹² For him, the NPT negotiations were just a ploy to prevent South Africa's suspension from the IAEA.⁹³

As noted in the introduction, a confluence of factors convinced the apartheid regime in late 1989 to secretly disarm and dismantle its small nuclear weapons arsenal and destroy all blueprints and traces of the weapons programme. Once the process was completed, it finally signed the NPT on 10 July 1991.⁹⁴ In September of that year, South Africa again presented its credentials to the IAEA General Conference. Despite protests by the African Group, it was allowed to take its seat for the first time since 1976.⁹⁵ However, Minty remained dubious about South Africa's intentions:

It appears that Pretoria and its allies have decided to remove and demobilise South Africa's nuclear weapons so as to prevent a democratically elected government from inheriting such a military capability. It is in this light that Pretoria has decided to sign the NPT.⁹⁶

Minty regarded South Africa's accession to the NPT as a trick to secure the relaxation of nuclear sanctions against the country. He rejected South Africa's last apartheid President, Frederik Willem de Klerk's statement that the end of the Cold War and the withdrawal of Cuban forces from Angola contributed to the decision to sign the NPT. He also rejected de Klerk's contention that the refusal to sign the NPT was based on a single consideration: protecting the secret of its uranium enrichment process. He also called out the apartheid government over duplicity regarding its stated wish to create a nuclear-free zone in Southern Africa: 'Since 1963, when the OAU declared Africa to be a nuclear-free continent, only South Africa has violated the declaration. It is therefore a sheer propaganda ploy for the regime to now claim that it is creating a nuclear-free zone in Southern Africa'. He once again appealed to the international community to maintain nuclear sanctions and to 'resist any moves to weaken South Africa's isolation in the nuclear and military fields'.⁹⁷

The World Campaign and the Commonwealth

Minty had a long history with the Commonwealth, even before the World Campaign was launched. In 1961, as part of the AAM, Minty participated

in a vigil outside the Commonwealth Prime Ministers Summit to have South Africa expelled from the Commonwealth – which did happen in the end. Later, he and AAM colleagues regularly visited the Commonwealth nations' representatives in London to give them documents and encourage them to take up specific issues in Commonwealth Heads of Government Meetings (CHOGMs).⁹⁸ At first, Minty thought that the Commonwealth Secretariat was not sympathetic in all matters, but it changed when Shirdrath ('Sonny') Ramphal became the Commonwealth Secretary General. Under his leadership, the Commonwealth pledged its support to the World Campaign. According to Minty, '[Ramphal] stood out on sheer principle'.⁹⁹ At the World Campaign's launch event, Ramphal sent a message stating that it was 'a matter of deepest concern' that South Africa was able 'to draw succour from other countries in the military and nuclear fields [and that] a global campaign aimed at exposing the unpalatable realities of this collaboration is thus to be warmly welcomed as a service to humanity, to world peace, and to the countless victims of apartheid'.¹⁰⁰ According to him, the Commonwealth was determined 'to play its part in eliminating the scourge of apartheid ... and the World Campaign may be assured of the fullest Commonwealth support in its endeavours'.¹⁰¹

Minty often spoke at Commonwealth conferences or summits or provided reports for consideration at Commonwealth meetings. In 1983, he submitted supportive documents to the Commonwealth Secretariat on the nuclear capability of the apartheid regime.¹⁰² He also presented his accumulating evidence on South Africa's nuclear weapons programme to the Commonwealth Foreign Ministers' meetings in 1988 and 1989 and requested their assistance in lobbying the Security Council to meet and take appropriate action to end all forms of nuclear cooperation with South Africa. He also proposed a few measures to tighten the arms embargo: sharing information; extension of jurisdiction and legislation; action to cover loopholes; proposals; action by the Security Council; and Commonwealth support for an effective arms embargo. Anti-apartheid movements and other nongovernmental bodies within the Commonwealth were requested to redouble their efforts in investigating and exposing arms embargo violations, and campaign for strengthening the embargo and ensuring strict implementation, in cooperation with the World Campaign. Commonwealth members were further requested to endorse sixteen proposals submitted by the 421 Committee to the Security Council in 1980 as a first step towards making progress at the UN.¹⁰³

Minty claimed that informally, officials in the Commonwealth Secretariat would be helpful; however, 'formally, it was a little difficult because some important countries, like Britain, were not in favour, so they couldn't go too far at times unless they had the authority from the CHOGM'.¹⁰⁴ In February

1985, Ramphal called for all the sanctions the world had at its command to be instituted against South Africa.¹⁰⁵ This followed violence in South Africa's black townships, which focused the attention of the world on the country.¹⁰⁶ Subsequently, despite British opposition, a limited sanctions programme was adopted at the Commonwealth Summit in the Bahamas. Although these sanctions fell short of what some member states wanted to see, they were deemed important, as they represented 'the growing strength and influence of public opinion against apartheid in the countries concerned'.¹⁰⁷ Amongst other things, member states wanted to see a strengthening of the arms embargo against South Africa, as well as the termination of an official scientific agreement between the UK Atomic Energy Authority (UKAEA) and the Nuclear Development Corporation of South Africa (NDC), under which the NDC had associate membership in the UKAEA's Safety and Reliability Directorate.¹⁰⁸

In 1987, the question of economic sanctions was again high on the CHOGM agenda, but with no prospect of persuading British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher to modify her lone opposition to stronger sanctions. Indeed, at the end of the CHOGM, Thatcher grilled the Commonwealth leaders who opposed and denounced her stance of blocking stronger sanctions. She also described the ANC as a terrorist organisation to whom she had no intention of ever talking.¹⁰⁹ She rejected stronger sanctions because she believed that black people in South Africa would feel the impact more than white people.¹¹⁰ Nonetheless, the Commonwealth Summit adopted the Okanagan Statement and Programme of Action on Southern Africa. It established a Committee of Foreign Ministers to meet periodically and provide the necessary impetus and guidance.¹¹¹

Despite Thatcher's opposition, in January 1988, following consideration of evidence presented to them by Minty (as mentioned earlier), the Commonwealth Committee of Foreign Ministers (consisting of the foreign ministers of Australia, Canada, Guyana, India, Nigeria, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe), indicated that they would take urgent steps to reinforce the international arms embargo against South Africa and work to undermine the apartheid regime's financial links with the rest of the world.¹¹² In August 1989, the Committee of Foreign Ministers issued a concluding statement in which it was noted that the situation in South Africa had not improved despite talk about reform. Amongst other things, the statement noted that the apartheid regime's policies of destabilisation and repression highlighted the importance of maintaining and strengthening the arms embargo. In this regard, they noted the updated report received from the World Campaign. They welcomed the efforts of the UNSC 421 Committee to hold hearings with experts and undertake thorough investigations of recent security

breaches. Finally, they undertook to consult at the UN to encourage further progress on strengthening the arms embargo.¹¹³

The collaboration between White, Asian and African countries in the Committee of Foreign Ministers is what Minty termed to be the Commonwealth's greatest value: it covered several continents and different cultures, 'and above all, it included countries of the West, and Australia and Canada at different times took good positions'.¹¹⁴ Indeed, Minty had high regard for the Commonwealth's role in South Africa's transition. He is on record saying that this role has often been underestimated by many, although it did not work in isolation.¹¹⁵ For him, the Commonwealth was exceptionally important:

We didn't have any other structure where things were happening like that and it is where, with Afro-Asian countries and one or two white countries, we had to do such things and demonstrate our support ... this solidarity action made people in South Africa realize that whilst most whites inside the country were brutalising them, there were whites abroad who were against apartheid and believed in a non-racial society.¹¹⁶

The World Campaign and the ANC

It is important to note that Minty did not consider himself an extension of the ANC in his various roles. He made it clear in interviews with Sue Onslow and with the author that he did not have any direct formal affiliation with the ANC, even though he regarded ANC leader Oliver Tambo as his leader in South Africa. In fact, he pointed out that Tambo had told him that the AAM must not be an extension of the ANC. Minty claims that he was 'quite upset about apparently being disengaged from the liberation struggle', but in the end, the ANC and other Southern African liberation movements served on the national committee of the AAM and benefited from information distributed by the World Campaign.¹¹⁷

While Minty worked closely with the ANC and other liberation movements, he made it clear that he did not publicly espouse ANC policy only. For example, there was close collaboration vis-à-vis the Commonwealth. Even though the ANC's Thabo Mbeki and SWAPO's Peter Katjavivi attended the CHOGMs in Malaysia and Australia, respectively, they knew that Minty attended all the summits and would inform them about all the issues. According to Minty, they understood that he and his colleagues in the AAM and his role as Director of the World Campaign were neither

intermediaries nor mediators but facilitators. For him, it was all about solidarity: 'Our policies were that the liberation movements represent the people of the country. We [were] a support movement for them. So, we would ask everyone who wants to support us, to also talk to their representatives.' This included civil society.¹¹⁸

In terms of anti-nuclear activism in South Africa and whether it was linked to Minty's international efforts, Minty noted in an interview that internal debates in the ANC over the apartheid government's acquisition of a nuclear capacity were always based on the policies that he detailed and research that he shared. According to him, they 'supported it, so there was no disagreement'.¹¹⁹ The ANC also did not have a specific policy of specifically targeting nuclear facilities in South Africa for sabotage. Instead, the Special Operations Unit (SOU) of its military wing, Umkhonto we Sizwe, was mandated to execute high-impact attacks on economic and military targets in South Africa. The bombing of Koeberg in December 1982 was but one of a variety of facilities that were targeted, which also included police stations, fuel storage facilities, electric power stations, railroads, and the Army and Air Force headquarters. However, it would appear that Koeberg was specifically targeted due to Minty and the ANC's belief that it was a cover for a nuclear weapons programme, as mentioned earlier.¹²⁰

It should also be noted that another small anti-nuclear group in South Africa, the Koeberg Alert Group, was initially suspected by the apartheid government as being responsible for the Koeberg bombing, particularly since this group constantly pointed to the apparent irrationality of further nuclear development due to the expense and risks involved, and the apartheid government's determination to proceed with its nuclear programme.¹²¹ In 1983, a French magazine referred to this group as 'a vociferous anti-nuke group [which] had emerged in South Africa, protesting at possible health hazards and the alleged risk of a major disaster'.¹²² Koeberg Alert rejected the accusation of being responsible for the Koeberg blast, 'with absolute contempt', and pointed out that the ANC claimed responsibility. They also found it laughable that a 'small local citizen information group' was linked with the incident.¹²³

A Turning Tide and the Dismantling of the World Campaign

On 24 March 1993, de Klerk, South Africa's last apartheid President, revealed to a specially summoned session of the South African Parliament that the Republic had a nuclear weapons programme and that six devices were built as a credible deterrent capability. Within a few days, on 3 April

1993, Minty stated in a memo to the Chairman of the Special Committee that de Klerk's announcement had 'most important implications for the UN Security Council, UN Special Committee, and the UN System as a whole ... concerning the effectiveness of the UN machinery to enforce mandatory decisions'.¹²⁴ He also pointed out several of de Klerk's statements contradicting the evidence the World Campaign had collected over many years.¹²⁵

In any event, at this point, South Africa was well on its way towards democratic reform. The IAEA also confirmed the complete verification of South Africa's nuclear disarmament by June 1993.¹²⁶ On 10 May 1994, a fully democratic government under the ANC came to power. On 25 May 1994, the Security Council voted to lift the arms embargo and to dissolve the 421 Committee.¹²⁷ On this day, Minty appeared before the Security Council for the fourth time in his long activist career. He noted that the previous three times were to call for action against apartheid. This time, coinciding with Africa Day, it was to celebrate the democratic transformation of South Africa. He reflected on how the World Campaign worked closely with the 421 Committee over the years, with its records testifying to the World Campaign's consistent efforts to ensure the strict and comprehensive implementation of the arms embargo. He thanked the African states 'for their long commitment to anti-apartheid action' and Norway and Sweden for their direct support of the World Campaign. The United Kingdom was thanked for ending the Simonstown Agreement in 1975, and other major Western powers 'which were also persuaded over the years, often through mass, nationwide campaigns, to take more effective actions against apartheid'. The 421 Committee, the Special Committee and the Centre against Apartheid were thanked for their cooperation. Tribute was paid to 'the thousands of extraordinary people who assisted us, some by providing information at considerable personal risk and sacrifice, and others who acted through various anti-apartheid organizations in helping to implement the decisions of the Security Council'.¹²⁸ Minty ended his speech as follows:

South Africa has had a long struggle for freedom, and our leaders and people always kept hope alive, as did the Frontline States and supporters abroad. All that has helped to produce a new reality, which is truly miraculous ... This is an almost unbelievable experience. It is truly a dream that has come true, for hope at last has become a reality. We can all agree today that the mission has been accomplished.¹²⁹

Following the new democratic dispensation in South Africa and the end of the arms embargo, the work of the World Campaign 'to isolate apartheid

South Africa in the military, nuclear and security spheres' was completed.¹³⁰ In December 1994, the World Campaign was formally disbanded.

Conclusion

People have often wondered how Minty was able to obtain such a vast (and astoundingly accurate) amount of information. According to him, he had to unceasingly calculate what the moves of the apartheid government were likely to be. Given that the World Campaign had limited resources compared to the apartheid government, he had to work hard and not let go once intuition led him along a certain way. Furthermore, it was imperative to study each country's arms trade laws to identify arms embargo violations. For him, it was simple: 'if we were wrong, we would have been discredited; but all these years they didn't find a single thing wrong with our information, not one. We made no mistake'.¹³¹ Last but not least, he indicated that he bought and read all the *Jane's Weapon Systems* books in order to monitor links with South Africa. In addition, he obtained South African propaganda magazines under a false name. In these magazines were entries about new weapons systems and how they worked.¹³² It is probably also not far-fetched to think that the ANC or other parties had informants within the apartheid government who were feeding through information.

In an activist career spanning over three decades – with a little more than a decade as the Director of the World Campaign – Abdul Samad Minty became 'one of the most articulate and influential antagonists of apartheid'.¹³³ His (and the World Campaign's) vision was putting an end to South Africa's military and nuclear build-up. It wasn't an easy road to take, as acknowledged by Minty himself in two statements a decade apart. In 1983, Minty told the Special Committee that South Africa was never armed as well as it was at that point due to every successful move against that country being answered by increased Western support.¹³⁴ A decade later, he again described that he encountered tremendous opposition from the Western powers to his efforts to convince the international community that South Africa was developing nuclear weapons and that 'despite intense anti-apartheid pressure over the years, it proved impossible to exclude South Africa from IAEA membership', because the 'Western governments were so committed to retaining South Africa as a member'.¹³⁵ Yet the impact of the World Campaign should not be underestimated. Even if it did not stop the apartheid regime from building 'the Apartheid Bomb', at the very least, it raised awareness and saw several resolutions in the UN and the IAEA condemning South Africa's military and nuclear build-up. The World Campaign also made it clear that no distinction

should be drawn between nonmilitary and military uses of nuclear technology. Consistently, the World Campaign regarded South Africa's civilian nuclear programmes as a front for its military programmes.

There was wide international acknowledgement of the work of the World Campaign and of Minty himself, which can perhaps be used as another measuring stick of their impact. In December 1994, for example, at the reception to mark the disbanding of the World Coalition, the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs expressed its gratitude to the World Campaign and other partners 'for the good cooperation in the anti-apartheid struggle'.¹³⁶ The National Council of Action for Southern Africa (successor to the AAM) lauded the World Campaign for 'its tireless efforts to expose all forms of military and nuclear collaboration' with South Africa. It noted that 'there was every prospect that South Africa's military and nuclear capability would have been significantly greater and the consequences for the region would have been much more devastating if it hadn't been for the work of the World Campaign'. The National Executive Committee of the Association of Corporate Treasurers of Southern Africa (ACTSA) asked for the 'record of tremendous service of Abdul Minty' to be recognised, 'without whose inspiration the World Campaign would not have achieved such great success'.¹³⁷ The former President of the AAM, Reverend Trevor Huddleston C.R., expressed his 'thanks and admiration for the unique contribution which Abdul Minty and the World Campaign have made to helping rid the world of the immorality of apartheid, by investigating, exposing and campaigning ... for effective action so that apartheid South Africa could be denied the military and nuclear capacity to sustain its evil system'.¹³⁸ Reulf Steen, the Chairman of the International Committee of the World Campaign, noted that it was an honour to have cooperated with Abdul Minty in a wide variety of solidarity actions 'over fifteen years of consistent and dedicated effort, which in the final analysis was always respected by the international committee, the UN and all governments – and feared by those who were involved in breaking the arms embargo'.¹³⁹ The Commonwealth Secretary-General Emeka Anyaoku wrote that the World Campaign, through sustained and vigilant monitoring over a period of fifteen years, helped to ensure that no government collaborated with apartheid South Africa in the development of its nuclear industry: 'In the result [it] rendered a signal service to the cause of freedom and peace in Southern Africa. I salute the World Campaign on a job well done'.¹⁴⁰

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Notes

1. Minty, *South Africa's Defence Strategy*, 8; Abdul Minty, conversation with the author, at Workshop on Anti-nuclear Activism in Africa: A Historical Perspective, University of Johannesburg, 3–4 April 2023.
2. 'Apartheid' is an Afrikaans word meaning 'apartness'. It called for the separate development of the different racial groups in South Africa. These groups were forced to live separately and develop separately, in a grossly unequal manner See <https://www.sahistory.org.za/article/history-apartheid-south-africa> (retrieved 25 September 2024).
3. Van Wyk, 'South Africa's Nuclear Programme and the Cold War', 562–63; Van Wyk, 'South African Nuclear Development in the 1970s', 1152, 1155.
4. The most recent comprehensive work on this subject is Konieczna and Skinner, *A Global History of Anti-apartheid*, which contains an extensive bibliography of monographs, book chapters, and journal articles.
5. See, for example, the work of active participants in the programme: Steyn, Van der Walt and Van Loggerenberg. *Nuclear Armament and Disarmament*; Wielligh and von Wielligh-Steyn. *The Bomb*; as well as other work such as Walters. *South Africa and the Bomb*; Purkitt and Burgess. *South Africa's Weapons of Mass Destruction*; Albright and Stricker. *Revisiting South Africa's Nuclear Weapons Program*.
6. Das, 'Role of Moral Foundations', 106.
7. Correspondence by Abdul Minty: National Information/Campaign Meeting on Nuclear Collaboration with South Africa, February 1980, MSS AAM 1494, Anti-Apartheid Movement Archives (hereinafter AAM Archives), Bodleian Libraries, Oxford; AAM Campaign Aims, n.d., MSS AAM 1494, AAM Archives; Press release: 'New International Campaign Against South Africa to Be launched 28 March 1979', MSS AAM 1513, AAM Archives; Stop the Apartheid Bomb, AAM Archives Committee.
8. Minty, interview with Sue Onslow; Minty, conversation with the author; 'The Nuclear Conspiracy', *Sechaba*; Minty, 'Statement before the Special Committee against Apartheid', 9–10; Minty, 'South Africa's Defence Strategy'; Hildrew, 'Nuclear Bomb Danger in South Africa'.
9. The Special Committee on Apartheid was formed through United Nations General Assembly Resolution 1761 of 6 November 1962, in response to the racist policies of apartheid established by the National Party government in South Africa.
10. Reddy, *Anti-apartheid Movement and the United Nations*, xiii–xiv; Hobbs, 'Minty to Return', 6; Wits University, 'Ambassador Abdul Minty Citation'. Retrieved

- 25 September 2024 from https://www.wits.ac.za/media/wits-university/news-and-events/images/documents/2023/Ambassador%20Abdul%20Minty_Citation.pdf.
11. Minty, *South Africa's Defence Strategy*, 8. While the statement is not definitive in proving that the apartheid regime sought to acquire nuclear weapons at this early stage of its nuclear development, other sources also point to an early desire in this regard at the very least. For example, two officials of the Atomic Energy Board opined that South Africa had the technical ability to develop nuclear weapons and that the state should have a nuclear arsenal to prevent aggression from the decolonised and hostile Afro-Asian nations (United Nations Centre Against Apartheid and K.F. Nyamekye, 'South Africa's Nuclear Build-up: A Threat to International Peace'. United Nations Reports. 1978. https://jstor.org/stable/10.2307/al.sff.document.nuun1978_36; Richelson, *Spying on the Bomb*, 243).
 12. Minty, conversation with the author.
 13. Soviet Allegations about South African Nuclear Weapons Development, *World Conference for Action Against Apartheid*, Lagos, 22–26 August 1977, Supplement to Brief No. A7 (Nuclear Questions), 22 August 1977, FCO 45–2131, United Kingdom National Archives.
 14. Ibid.
 15. Minty, interview with Onslow.
 16. Reddy, *Anti-apartheid Movement*, xv; Anti-apartheid Movement, *Annual Report*.
 17. Minty, interview with Onslow.
 18. UNSC Resolution 418 (1977) of 4 November 1977.
 19. Minty, 'South Africa's Military and Nuclear Build-up'.
 20. Ibid; Anti-apartheid Movement, *Annual Report*, 12.
 21. Minty, 'South Africa's Military and Nuclear Build-up'.
 22. 'No Arms for Apartheid', *Sechaba*, 18.
 23. A group of Southern African states that supported the collapse of apartheid and the advent of democracy in South Africa. These states included Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Mozambique, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe (from 1980). See <https://www.sahistory.org.za/article/frontline-states> (retrieved 25 September 2024).
 24. Letter by Abdul Minty, n.d., MSS AAM 1513, AAM Archives; Reddy, *Anti-apartheid Movement*, xv.
 25. Smith, *South Africa's Nuclear Capability*, preface; Background Paper, n.d., MSS AAM 1513, AAM Archives; 'Arms for Apartheid', *Sechaba*, 18.
 26. Background Paper, c. 1981, MSS AAM 1513, AAM Archives; Memorandum by Abdul Minty: World Campaign Against Military and Nuclear Collaboration with South Africa, 10 December 1978, MSS AAM 1513, AAM Archives.
 27. Smith, *South Africa's Nuclear Capability*, preface.
 28. World Campaign Background Paper, c1981, MSS AAM 1513, AAM Archives.
 29. Background Paper, c. 1981, MSS AAM 1513, AAM Archives; Agenda for Meeting on 28 March 1979, MSS AAM 1513, AAM Archives.
 30. Tambo, 'Statement at the Launch of the World Campaign', 18; Message from Oliver Tambo, President of the African National Congress (SA) to the launching

- of the World Campaign against Military and Nuclear Collaboration with South Africa, 28 March 1979, MSS AAM 1513, AAM Archives.
31. SWAPO Message of Support, 2 May 1980, MSS AAM 1513, AAM Archives.
 32. See, for example, the following documents on <https://www.aamarchives.org/archive>: arm21, Nuclear Collaboration with South Africa; arm23, Stop the Apartheid Bomb; arm24, Stop the Apartheid Bomb; 80s01, Southern Africa after Zimbabwe Conference; arm26, Apartheid and the Bomb; tu20, Message to TUC delegates; History of the Anti-Apartheid Movement in the 1980s; AA News March 1981; Arms Embargo and the Anti-Apartheid Movement Campaign; History of the Anti-Apartheid Movement in the 1970s; AA News December 1989–January 1990.
 33. Das, 'Role of Moral Foundations', 106; MMS AAM1514, AAM Archives.
 34. <https://www.sahistory.org.za/archive/address-conference-southern-africa-social-ist-international-and-socialist-group-european> (retrieved 25 September 2024).
 35. Das, 'Role of Moral Foundations', 106.
 36. See, inter alia, Falk, *Global Fission*; Cortright, *Peace: A History of Movements and Ideas*; Wittner, *Confronting the Bomb*; Kitschelt, 'Political Opportunity and Political Protest'; Giugni, *Social Protest and Policy Change*.
 37. South Atlantic Nuclear Event, National Security Archive; The 22 September 1979 Event, National Security Archive; Submission to the Witvlei Control Committee (WBK), Memorandum by the Chief of the SA Defence Force (Planning Division), 3 September 1987, in Wielligh and Wielligh-Steyn, *The Bomb*, 488–90.
 38. Letter from Abdul Minty to unknown recipients, 14 Nov 1979, MSS AAM 1494, AAM Archives.
 39. Ibid.
 40. Letter from Abdul Minty to governments, 14 Nov 1979, MSS AAM 1494, AAM Archives.
 41. Petition: Stop the Apartheid Bomb, 6 Dec 1979, MSS AAM 1498, AAM Archives.
 42. Ibid.
 43. Ibid.
 44. Statement for Endorsement by Scientists on Nuclear Collaboration with South Africa, 1979, MSS AAM 1494, AAM Archives.
 45. Stop the Apartheid Bomb, 1980, AAM Archives Committee; South Africa's Nuclear Capability, AAM Archives Committee; Stop the Apartheid Bomb, 1983, AAM Archives Committee.
 46. Smith, *South Africa's Nuclear Capability*, 23.
 47. At the time of writing, Dan Smith has been the Director of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) since 2015. Prior to joining the SIPRI, he was the Director of the Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO; 1993–2001) and the Secretary-General of International Alert (2003–15). According to him, Minty asked him in 1979, at a small vigil/demo for the liberation martyr Solomon Mahlangu, who was hanged by the apartheid government, to write the report on South Africa's nuclear capability (email correspondence with the author, 27 June 2022).
 48. Smith, *South Africa's Nuclear Capability*, 23.

49. Ibid, 24.
50. Letter by Abdul Minty, 11 February 1980, MSS AAM 1494, AAM Archives.
51. Minty was likely referring to the G5 towed and G6 155 mm self-propelled howitzers that South Africa developed from blueprints clandestinely acquired from the Space Research Corporation in the late 1970s.
52. 'South Africans Now Able to Produce a Bomb', *The Times*, 30 April 1981, MSS AAM 1498, AAM Archives.
53. Ibid.
54. United Nations, International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid.
55. Baldwin, 'Apartheid and Persecution'.
56. 'South Africans Now Able to Produce a Bomb', *The Times*, 30 April 1981, MSS AAM 1498, AAM Archives.
57. Ibid.
58. Van Wyk and Van Wyk, 'The African National Congress', 26.
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The Dark Mirror of Latin America and the Spanish Anti-NATO Movements in the Late Cold War

Giulia Quaggio

Introduction: The Dirty War in Latin America and the Second Cold War in Spain

In the spring of 1985, the anti-NATO Commission (Comisión Anti OTAN [CAO]), a multifaceted broad-based body that, since 1981, had brought together grassroots groups from different neighbourhoods of Madrid in a fierce rejection of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), sent a long letter to the European Nuclear Disarmament movement (END). In it, the CAO spelled out that on the occasion of Ronald Reagan's visit to Spain, it had organised a series of demonstrations against 'the bellicose nature of Reagan's policies and US imperialism', with large crowds applauding 'the raising of the Sandinista flag over a statue of Christopher Columbus, symbolising a rejection of all forms of colonialism'.¹

The CAO mobilisation was not an isolated incident. According to the Catalan Antinuclear Committee, over 1.2 million people took part in similar protests all over Spain in the spring of 1985.² These mass civic demonstrations reflected a widespread disapproval of US security policies towards Spain. Some years earlier, the Euromissiles Crisis and the fear of a possible nuclear war had prompted an avalanche of global peace mobilisation.³ A great amount of research has been devoted to the rise of these new social movements in Western Europe, but Spain's involvement is still barely investigated due to an alleged apathy of civil society during the democratisation process.⁴ By contrast, Spain, which had only recently transitioned from a

long military dictatorship under General Franco to a parliamentary democracy, experienced the rise of a vociferous popular movement. This movement openly criticised the global dynamics of the Cold War and vehemently demanded the restoration of the alleged Spain's tradition of neutral and non-interventionist foreign policy.

The political and cultural character of Spanish peace and anti-nuclear protests was distinct from other contemporary peace movements.⁵ As this chapter will show, the question polarising public debate was chiefly concerned with the controversial decision adopted between 1980 and 1982 by the centre-right government of the Union of the Democratic Centre (Unión de Centro Democrático [UCD]) to draw the country into the political structure of NATO, and subsequently the decision taken by the initially ambiguously neutral Spanish Socialist Workers' Party (Partido Socialista Obrero Español [PSOE]) to hold a referendum on Spain's continued membership in NATO in 1986. In the case of Spain, it is more accurate to refer to an anti-NATO umbrella movement that was strongly critical of American imperialism and opposed to domestic US military bases rather than strictly to a mobilisation demanding nuclear disarmament.

The Cold War featured in the framing of the collective identity of the Spanish peace and anti-NATO movement, but mostly due to its complicated impact on developing countries as Latin America. During the 1970s and the early 1980s, the bloodiest images of global Cold War confrontation disseminated by the media were mostly from Third World countries. Notably, there was widespread public outrage at the so-called 'dirty war' in the Southern Cone of Latin America, which cast aspersions on hidden links to the United States and its anti-communist policies. Similar fury was brought about by the violent militarisation of right-wing dictatorships in Chile, Argentina, Uruguay, Paraguay and Brazil, resulting in the transnationalisation of terror against citizen mobilisation through the code-named Operation Condor. Furthermore, from the early 1980s, the worsening situation in Central America, the experience of the Sandinista revolution in Nicaragua and the associated paramilitary counterinsurgency operations by the Contras all combined to create an urgent need for activists to reassess the impact of the bipolar conflict on the trauma inflicted on the central and southern part of the American continent.⁶

As a result, many Spanish activists experienced a unique ideological connection with Latin American population and emotionally identified with the traumatic effects of the Cold War in the region. In their view, the Cold War was being camouflaged in three ways in these countries: first, by the opacity of indirect military intervention in Latin America orchestrated by the White House and the Central Intelligence

Agency (CIA); second, by Moscow's silence regarding human rights violation; and, third, by the supposed inequalities triggered by the stringent application of monetarist economics in the region by the so-called Chilean 'Chicago Boys'.⁷ Spanish anti-NATO and peace activists also related closely to Latin America, largely because Soviet ideology was progressively losing its foothold in Western Europe.⁸ The violent upheavals in Latin America during the 1980s, the shattered dreams of the 1960s pro-Third World protests, the ambiguous revolutionary allure of local guerrillas and the aspiration to indigenous self-determination all rekindled among protestors.

This chapter aims to examine to what extent political and cultural solidarity with Latin America played a pivotal role in the construction of a distinctive interpretative framework within the anti-NATO movement during the final stage of the Cold War.⁹ In the first section of the chapter, I will analyse the cultural and political uniqueness and the transnational links of the peace and anti-NATO movement in Spain. In the second section, I will explain why Latin America featured so prominently in the protest culture and collective imagery of the mobilisation. For this purpose, I consulted documents and reports drafted by the CAO international group and now preserved in the END collection at the London School of Economics Archives. I combined the investigation of the END documentation with an iconographic and discursive analysis of cultural artefacts and leaflets produced by several Spanish anti-NATO and peace groups. These ephemera relating to peace mobilisations come from the still not classified archives of the Spanish Communist Movement (Movimiento Comunista [MC]) and the Conscientious Objectors Movement (Movimiento de Objeción de Conciencia [MOC]).

Local or Transnational Activism? Politico-cultural Peculiarities of the Peace and Anti-NATO Movements in Spain

The Spanish peace and anti-NATO movement gathered pace in 1981, reaching its peak in 1984–86, when the anti-Euromissiles protest groups of Northern Europe or the Nuclear Freeze Movement in the United States began to lose momentum.¹⁰ There was no plan to deploy the advanced nuclear weapons in Spain. However, this did not mean, as clarified in a dossier by Catalan activists, that the Spanish movement 'appear[ed] out of the blue'.¹¹ Its emergence was part and parcel of the global wave

of peace protests of the early 1980s, despite displaying distinctive socio-cultural traits.

Due to strict censorship throughout the long period of the Francoist military dictatorship, Spain, unlike the rest of Western Europe, had almost no experience of anti-war or anti-nuclear armament protests in the postwar period.¹² Social movements did not start to gain momentum until a few years before Franco's death in 1975, driven by grievances over inequalities resulting from the technocratic and liberalist economic policies of the final years of his rule. Such movements in the late Franco period and during the transition to democracy were notable for their distinctive anti-Franco and pro-democratic character, which was also marked by an intense indoctrination by Marxist or post-Marxist ideals.¹³ The Spanish Communist Party (Partido Comunista Español [PC]) and to a lesser extent the Socialist Party (Partido Socialista Obrero Español [PSOE]), the Workers' Trade Union (Comisiones Obreras [CCOO]) and various Maoist or Trotskyist groups of the New Left as the Communist Movement (Movimiento Comunista [MC]) regarded social movements as a 'transmission chain' of the political objectives of Marxist parties and the workers' struggle during the troubled years of the fight for democracy.¹⁴

As Gabriel Flores, an MC activist and one of the leading members of the CAO in Madrid, explained: 'Protesters in this period were a mix of those participating in mobilisations at the end of the dictatorship ... and other young people who had not participated in the struggle against the dictatorship but who had experienced the transition process just as directly'.¹⁵ Thus, the Spanish social movements of the 1980s were not only composed of Marxist militants from late anti-Francoist period, but also included politically disengaged young and very young generations. These young protesters were, on the one hand, the product of the economic uncertainties caused by the 1970s energy crisis. On the other hand, they represented a younger generation that did not identify with the all-encompassing political commitment of the anti-Francoist militants. Instead, they valued individual liberty, civil rights and care for the environment and their neighbourhoods, without expressing any apparent interest in a political party.¹⁶

Despite the existence of a longstanding anti-war tradition in Spain, contacts with European peace organisations only began at a grassroots level during the early 1970s along with peace debates held by progressive Catholic groups of conscientious objectors.¹⁷ Following Franco's death, the movement gained momentum with a surge in anti-militarist associations, and the revival of anarchist and libertarian ideas that expressed the sentiment of a section of Spanish society against the militarism of the right-wing National-Catholic Francoists.¹⁸ Moreover, the traumatic collective memories of violence associ-

ated with the Spanish Civil War (1936–39) and the harsh repression of the Francoist dictatorship contributed to the consolidation of a heterogeneous political culture opposed to militaristic values and the intrusion of the military into civil society.¹⁹ In the case of Spain, the concept of ‘pacifism of fear’, coined by the French historian Maurice Vaisse, is applicable. The concept describes the widespread neutral existence of the Spanish society that implied a passive request for security and simultaneously distrust of military institutions by a section of civil society.²⁰

Some Spaniards felt that their country’s weak position in the international arena was due to the machinations of the great powers during the twentieth century and the two world wars.²¹ Indeed, sections of Spanish society complained about the existence of double standards on the part of Western international organisations in the aftermath of the Second World War: for instance, Portugal under Salazar’s dictatorship was allowed to join both NATO and the European Free Trade Association (EFTA).²² This widespread perception of powerlessness and international lack of empathy was compounded by the long-term effect on society of Spain’s distinctive position within the Cold War’s balance of power. Spain had received no economic aid under the 1948 European Recovery Program, was not granted membership of the Atlantic Alliance due to its position as a supporter of the Axis Powers until 1942, and was not part of the European integration process.

As a result, the only direct experience most Spaniards had of the Cold War alignments were the bilateral agreements that Franco’s regime had signed with the United States in 1953 and the subsequent construction of four large aerial-naval bases and various facilities (oil pipelines, depots and space observatories) for US armed forces on its soil in exchange for economic aid. This aid was in no way comparable to the material benefits of the European Recovery Program in Western Europe, nor did Spain obtain the same US defence guarantee as other US allies.²³ The Spanish connection with the Western Bloc was thus shaped by an unequal relationship that was reminiscent of other US political alliances with military dictatorships throughout the bipolar conflict.²⁴ In exchange for international legitimisation, economic modernisation advice and the annihilation of the common communist enemy, Franco’s Spain allowed the US military almost total freedom to stockpile and move nuclear weapons by land, sea and air. One consequence of this was the serious nuclear accident at Palomares in 1966.²⁵ When a US Air Force bomber collided in mid-air with a tanker aircraft, resulting in the loss of four thermonuclear bombs on the Almeria coast at Palomares, the popularity of the US bases declined sharply. This was despite Franco’s attempt to conceal the accident and the general lack of awareness among Spaniards about radioactive hazards.²⁶

Moreover, Spain became an ideal breeding ground for the US 'Atoms for Peace' campaign, which sought to demonstrate to the world the economic benefits of civil nuclear energy. The various Francoist factions and local businessmen agreed on the desirability of developing domestic nuclear energy production with US and Western Europe economic and technological assistance. As a result, Spain – one of the poorest countries in Western Europe – paradoxically joined the prestigious club of Western countries doing business with civilian uses of the atom under US tutelage. Up to twenty-five nuclear power plants were planned in the 1970s, although only ten ever became operational. The PSOE's National Energy Plan in 1983, spurred on by a vibrant grassroots anti-nuclear activism, put an end to these ambitious nuclear projects.²⁷ However, it was not until 1987 that Spain signed the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Indeed, from 1963 onwards, despite not enjoying the same economic advantages as France, the Franco regime harboured secret ambitions of becoming a European atomic power like its northern neighbour. The regime gave the green light to the Islero Project, an attempt to build a nuclear arsenal by developing a Spanish atomic bomb. Early transitional governments also pursued nuclear weapons projects of this kind at the Nuclear Research Centre in Soria.²⁸

At the beginning of the 1970s, within this context of challenging intersection between military and civilian uses of nuclear technology, part of Spanish society had already become 'immune' to the ideological discourse of the Cold War. On the one hand, Spaniards aspired to integrate into the European Community, seeing it as a model of stability and modernisation. On the other, the credibility of the United States regarding its purported defence of liberty was already weakened in the eyes of various segments of society. The Soviet threat was regarded as a pretext to justify the alliance with the United States rather than a real danger, in contrast to the status quo in North Africa and the Arab Mediterranean, which was felt to be of real concern.²⁹ The US image was further tarnished following the discovery in 1979 of a secret clause to the 1953 agreements establishing that, until 1970, in the case of 'evident communist attack', the United States was permitted to use its areas and military bases on Spanish soil to launch offences against military targets without the consent of the host country.³⁰ Moreover, during the processes of transition and the consolidation of democracy, negotiations over the US military bases in Spain held in 1976, 1981–82, and 1986–88 made the wider public aware of Spain's unwarranted submissive stance towards the United States. By contrast, the Soviet Union remained an almost unknown quantity and of little interest to the majority of Spanish people.³¹

When in 1981 the UCD government accelerated the procedure for parliamentary authorisation for Spain's accession to NATO, these negative feelings

towards the United States suddenly came to the fore. Spain's rapid entry into NATO was perceived as a moment of social rupture. During the transition, an implicit pact between the political parties to maintain Spanish neutrality while negotiating bilaterally with the United States on the issue of military bases had kept all these questions out of the popular debate. However, as the media agenda in the early 1980s shows, after years of secrecy, there was an open debate in Spain about different defence models, the issue of national security, and possible alliances.³² Spanish society soon became polarised on the question of the benefit of entering the security system of the Atlantic Alliance. On the one hand, several conservative, liberal and social democratic Spaniards believed that NATO membership, on a par with integration into the European Community, represented an inevitable step that would lead both to the modernisation and democratisation of the Spanish Army, especially in the wake of the attempted military coup of February 1981, and to the liberation of the country from Franco's long international isolation, bringing it into line with the other Western democracies. On the other hand, segments of society, linked to a varied left-wing cultural milieu and a very small minority of Francoist Falangists, perceived Atlantic integration not so much as an opening towards Western Europe, but rather as a further negative consequence of Spain's unbalanced relationship with the United States and an outcome of its supposed imperial power over the Iberian Peninsula.³³

Once Spain's membership of NATO became official, there was a sense of betrayal in progressive sections of Spanish society at the hasty government and parliamentary manoeuvre to conclude Atlantic integration. Furthermore, the PSOE had come to power in 1982 after more than forty years in the political wilderness. The party progressively modified its initial ambiguous position of non-alignment, maintaining that NATO membership was a concrete necessity if Spain were to successfully democratise its foreign policy and consolidate membership of the European Community. In March 1986 a referendum on NATO's continued membership was held in which the PSOE called for a 'Yes' vote. The consensus of the anti-NATO movements grew as a sign of disenchantment with the alleged PSOE's unfulfilled neutralist promises.

In 1983 the National Coordinating Organisation of the Spanish Peace Groups (Coordinadora Estatal de Organizaciones Pacifistas [CEOP]) was created, loosely bringing together over 400 local committees nationwide, and strongly influenced by the New Left militants of the MC and the Revolutionary Communist League (Liga Comunista Revolucionaria [LCR]); the PCE was also intensely active in the anti-NATO movement through the Association for Peace and Disarmament and later the Platform that favoured a sole focus on the referendum. By contrast, the PSOE's own peace organ-

isation, the Movement for Peace, Disarmament and Liberty (Movimiento por la Paz, Desarme y Libertad [MPDL]) dropped its opposition to NATO membership.³⁴

In Spain, the peace and anti-NATO movement brought together a large assortment of different groups for the first time in a confrontational network of informal relations: intergenerational communists and pro-Soviet communists, nongovernmental and independent socialists, extraparliamentary left-wing radicals, progressive Catholics, ecologists and feminists. It was not fear of a potential nuclear annihilation that primarily fuelled the Spanish activists; their true anxiety was caused by NATO, which they viewed as the main potential risk for the domestic security and democratic stability of their country during the Cold War. As outlined in the set of rules (*decálogo*) drafted by the CEOP in 1985, NATO and the US military bases posed a tangible local threat. Membership of NATO, they felt, would increase the possibility of war on Spanish soil, the deployment of nuclear warheads and the militarisation of Spain. The resulting acquisition of weapons to be deployed in different parts of the country would lead to the impoverishment of social resources at a time of economic stagnation in the wake of the oil and energy crisis. Notably, the set of rules drafted by the CEOP stated that: 'Neutrality is our best guarantee against the nuclearisation of Spain, the guarantee against being an aggressive platform for one side, or a target for the other side.'³⁵

The possibility of holding a referendum on the NATO question was presented by Spanish activists as an opportunity for the movement to promote global peace, as this referendum would be an exception in a world dominated by bipolarism. It might exert a steadying influence, helping to steer other countries towards the construction of a 'third' denuclearised – and, in their opinion, more 'peaceful' – Europe, where civil society would finally have the power to express its desires on defence policy issues. The idea that abandoning NATO was not an isolationist gesture for Spain, but rather a tool of internationalisation of peace was in fact the brainchild of the British social historian Edward P. Thompson, the END's principal ideologist. He visited Madrid and Barcelona several times in 1985 and 1986 to participate in large anti-NATO gatherings.³⁶ The CAO set up an international group to interact with European activists, and on various occasions requested support and solidarity for its local campaigns.³⁷ Spanish transnational activism involved translating and disseminating various texts by E.P. Thompson, engaging in Mary Kaldor's debates on unilateralism, polemics on militarism with the Italian Radicals, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) publications on armaments and Olof Palme's model of an 'active' neutral policy.³⁸ Petra Kelly, leader of the Green Party of the Federal Republic of Germany and later of the pro-

peace movement in West Germany, not only held conferences in Spain but also wrote 'a letter from a German pacifist to Spanish citizens' for the daily newspaper *El País*.³⁹

This international debate on peace influenced the drafting of a common programme for peace movements in the Mediterranean.⁴⁰ Meetings were held to discuss the notion of a 'denuclearised Iberian Peninsula', and there was fierce criticism of the idea of implementing the Western European Union (WEU), which entailed reinforcing the security of the European Community through an integrated military system independent of the two blocs.⁴¹ The issue that remained contentious among activists was the peace and anti-NATO movement's position on pro-Soviet groups, and the solidarity that some activists wished to establish with Eastern European dissidents. While there were strong statements of support for the people who were victims of the bloody Latin American military dictatorships, the position towards the Soviet Union and the defence of human rights within the Warsaw Pact was less clear-cut among Spanish activists. In the Spanish mobilisations against NATO, there were several pro-Soviet activists, and accusations of being manipulated by the USSR frequently accompanied the media coverage of their protests. As a result, to avoid compromising the unity of this diverse movement, the activist Francisco Peñas explained in 1987 that 'the dividing line within the peace movement does not pass through the question of the backing or not of the Soviet Union: neither here in Spain nor in Western Europe'.⁴²

Latin America as a Dark Mirror: Anti-Americanism, Democratisation and Violence

In the first half of the 1980s, Latin America became a recurrent and contentious issue in the cultural framework of Spanish protest actions. Of particular concern were the crisis in Central America, with three ongoing civil wars in Nicaragua, El Salvador and Guatemala, the US invasion of Grenada in 1983, and aggressive military dictatorships in the Southern Cone.⁴³ In 1985 the CAO International Commission declared that 'US imperialist aggression, particularly in Central America, and Spain's membership of NATO were the main focus of our protest'.⁴⁴ Another declaration by the CEOP in 1985 conceptually paired the demand to leave NATO with the importance of Spain's neutrality in the Cold War when it came to showing effective solidarity with Latin America in a postcolonial framework: 'Neutrality as we understand it also means extending our solidarity to those people fighting for their independence, and the right to self-determination without

external interference.⁴⁵ The CAO went on to explain to the END activists: 'We would like to mention that, in addition to our pre-referendum activities, the anti-NATO Commission has also actively participated in solidarity events for South Africa and Chile. We continue trying to link the issues of military bloc politics with those of Third World oppression and national liberation struggles.'⁴⁶

Solidarity with Latin America as an alternative to Soviet international policies was certainly not a new phenomenon in the history of Western European radical social activism.⁴⁷ Starting in the 1960s, the activities of various Cuban insurrectionist movements in the continent captured the attention of younger generations. They later embraced Third World issues raised after the Second Vatican Council, leading to a growing interest among progressive Christians in Latin American liberation theology. In Spain, in particular, the cultural impact of post-Vatican II Christian doctrines was especially significant among forward-thinking Catholics.⁴⁸ Moreover, in the 1970s the network of exiles who had fled to Spain from the violent repression of military dictatorships in Latin America fuelled the circulation of ideas on the Third World, and contributed to the creation of transnational networks against the violation of human rights.⁴⁹

Latin America had always held a privileged position in the imagery of progressive collective opinion in Spain. While this was true for other countries as well, it was particularly pronounced in Spain. The continent across the Atlantic became something of a myth, not only for right-wing neo-Imperialist Francoists but also for the Spanish left, which saw in it an energetic younger generation capable of 'reviving' Spain from its cultural stagnation.⁵⁰ The attention of the Spanish peace and anti-NATO movements in the early 1980s was once again drawn by an outcry over the deep inequalities in the distribution of power and economic resources that had characterised relations between the North and South subcontinents since the revolutionary upheavals of 1820, as well as by the use of violence against civilians as an omnipresent component in this conflictual relationship.

The anti-American sentiment behind the rejection of the North Atlantic Alliance rekindled the pro-Third World and anti-imperialist cultural milieu that characterised the left-wing anti-Francoists; in particular, it sparked off the student protests organised by the 1960s New Left along with a number of communist militants.⁵¹ In the collective imagery of Spanish activists, opposition to NATO was associated with the idea that membership of the Atlantic Alliance was little more than a state of servitude 'guided by the hands of Yankee Imperialism'. Related to these ideas was the conviction held by many activists that Spain had been subjected to external threats by the United States to try and force it to join the Atlantic Alliance, taking advan-

tage of Spain's supposed semi-peripheral and vulnerable position in a world divided between the industrialised and imperialist North and the dependent South. There were therefore two macro-issues which led Spanish activists to conflate the crisis in the American subcontinent with the effect of worsening of East–West relations in Spain: the belief that Latin America had, like Spain, been a 'victim' of the Cold War; and the celebration of Latin America's desire to 'resist' the dynamics generated by the bipolar conflict, particularly those pressures imposed by the United States.

This conflation led anti-NATO activists to identify culturally with the bloody events and the democratic backsliding in Latin America. On 15 November 1981, a massive protest was held on the Ciudad Universitaria campus in Madrid against Spain's membership of NATO. The activists marched to the sound of well-known Spanish singer Ana Belén's rendition of 'The Wall' (La Muralla), a 1969 Chilean ballad invoking the need to tear down all social and psychological barriers to make room for 'a new world'. The song was later censored by Augusto Pinochet, military dictator of Chile between 1973 and 1990.⁵² In a mural painted by the Madrid neighbourhood association Alto del Arenal, there is a Chilean condor and a bald eagle perched on a NATO tank.⁵³ The Andean Condor – the national symbol of Chile – represented the sense of outrage felt by left-wing Spanish activists at the Chilean coup d'état on 11 September 1973. According to worldwide progressive activists, the violent military overturning of the Socialist Salvador Allende's political project represented a brutal determination to annihilate through military violence the embodiment of Allende's revolutionary ideals via democracy. Allende was indeed enthroned as a martyr for democracy. His suicide as troops attacked the presidential palace to oust him was symbolically associated both with the dramatic disappearance of democracy in Latin America, and with the value and courage to resist and directly face the Armed Forces.⁵⁴ Spanish activists felt violated by the alleged collaboration of the United States in the coup, and by US participation in counterinsurgency training activities in the entire South America subcontinent. The United States, they believed, was acting in connivance with a military project intent on the physical elimination of progressive sectors and structures that had favoured democratic mobilisation in the previous decade in Latin America, in the name of anti-communist security ideals.

According to the activists, the Cold War had generated a gradual inversion of trends in the dynamics of democratisation in the subcontinent, thereby blocking any social or economic development by democratic or redistributive means. The greatest concern for Spanish social activists was a possible similar anti-democratic backlash in Spain following Franco's death. Consequently, the example of Chile was often invoked to incite unease

within the anti-NATO movement. The activists were fearful that if Spain joined a military alliance, such as NATO, the Spanish Armed Forces might be pushed into seeking defence relations with the United States similar to those implemented with military dictatorships in the Southern Cone, using national security as an excuse. Spain's failed military coup on 23 February 1981 only served to exacerbate these fears in a country that harboured strong anti-military sentiments and unresolved trauma from the Spanish Civil War. It is also important to remember that the entire process of transition towards democracy was overshadowed by threats of coups by the Armed Forces and – as many recent studies have demonstrated – the transition in Spain was far from peaceful.⁵⁵ Violence cast a shadow over the entire process and generated a strong desire for security among the population, probably leading to an increased sense of identification with the victims of Latin American military coups.

The activists also felt aggrieved by a perceived lack of US support for Spain's process of democratisation, which contrasted sharply with the strong backing received from other Western European countries. Indeed, some activists and a part of the Spanish population suspected that a conspiracy lay behind the 1981 coup, perceiving some form of direct collaboration between the United States and the anti-democratic military commanders. It is improbable that such a collaboration existed: the US relationship with part of the Franco regime at the end of the dictatorship was not entirely straightforward when it came to the question of maintaining the American military bases on Spanish soil after the democratisation process. The US Secretary of State Alexander Haig asserted in 1981 that the attempted coup was 'an internal Spanish affair', a statement that further discredited the United States in the eyes of the activists, demonstrating a lack of empathy or clear support for the fledgling democracy.⁵⁶

The fear that Spain could return to a military dictatorship featured prominently in the activists' anti-NATO murals, which portrayed military-style moustachioed puppet-like figures with the United States flag pulling their strings.⁵⁷ A basic argument for the Spanish social movements' identification with Latin America was their criticism of the idea of democracy and liberty as presented by the United States and, consequently, they rejected the pro-Atlantic thesis, according to which becoming a member of NATO would help consolidate Spain's democratisation process and contain its Armed Forces. The United States, having given indirect support first to the Franco regime and later to Latin American military dictatorships, could not – in the activists' view – represent an effective example of democracy.⁵⁸

Some members of the anti-NATO and peace movements upheld a different vision of democracy from the liberal democratic model that had pre-

vailed in Spain since the transition. This divergence was due to the specific 'transition by transaction' that had prevailed in Spain. The Spanish transition resulted from a complex path of negotiations and reconciliation between the reformist élite of Francoism and the anti-Francoist opposition.⁵⁹ Liberal democracy was reached not through a democratic rupture with the Francoist state, but instead through a process of amnesty for crimes connected with repression under the dictatorship and the acceptance of negotiated reforms in exchange for the legalisation of anti-Francoist parties. For this reason, in the early 1980s part of Spanish society felt estranged from the terms negotiated during the transition and, through their support for the anti-NATO movement, strove to affirm the existence of other models of democratic interaction, beyond the rigid norms of parliamentary democracy.

Activists were disillusioned and felt that an opportunity had been lost in the post-Francoist era to shape a new and progressive society. Such ideals of social transformation fed into the myth of the Sandinista Revolution and, more generally, the idea of local guerrilla groups in the subcontinent as a laboratory for social change against the neoliberal trends in Latin America. The Sandinistas were inspired by Augusto C. Sandino, leader of a rebellion between 1927 and 1933 against the US occupation of Nicaragua. The 1970s struggle against the Somoza family dictatorship, headed by guerrillas belonging to the Sandinista National Liberation Front (Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional [FSLN]) had drawn the attention of radical left-wing groups, and in particular progressive Christians, in Western Europe. When the dictatorship of Anastasio Somoza Debayle collapsed in July 1979, activists throughout Europe and the United States organised public fundraising campaigns in favour of the new FSLN majority government and praised the political and social project of the Sandinista Revolution.⁶⁰ This support intensified when Nicaragua became a key player in the East–West conflict due to the explicit support by Reagan of local military counterinsurgency groups, financed through the sale of weapons to Iran, which was at that time the subject of an arms embargo.

The prime concern of the Spanish anti-NATO movement was the low intensity warfare that the United States was fuelling in the region to topple the FSLN. At a time when, in Western Europe, the illusion of social reform was wearing thin and the economic consequences of the energy crisis and high levels of unemployment had put the left in a difficult position, many young Spaniards, without asking too many questions about the controversial results of the revolutionary government, embraced the socialist ideals of the Revolution in Nicaragua, which they also perceived as a model beyond bloc politics. Many activists experienced a real sense of identification – both personal and collective – with the events in Nicaragua and felt directly involved

in this last armed revolution in Latin America.⁶¹

Between 1984 and 1985, the CEOP started to organise solidarity brigades in support of Nicaragua. Young Spaniards travelled at their own expense to take part in the Nicaraguan Literacy Campaign (*Cruzada de Alfabetización Nacional*), in a range of other projects in collaboration with the National Union of Farmers and Ranchers (*Unión Nacional de Agricultores y Ganaderos*) for the construction of homes for the rural population in El Salto and La Lata, and in the establishment of a people's democracy in Nicaragua. In turn, FSLN members – including *guerrilleros* – travelled to Spain to inform the various committees on the progress of the revolution. At the same time, the anti-NATO committees organised 'Latin American festivals' and concerts to raise funds for the Sandinista Revolution. The song 'Nicaragua Sandinista' by the Basque rock band Kortatu in 1988 became an anthem for many young Spaniards who saw Nicaragua as a sort of doorway into a process of revolutionary democratisation that they could experience directly.⁶² For many young activists, these 'revolutionary trips' to Latin America were their first experience of a Third World country, and direct contact with poverty in Nicaragua reinforced their sympathies for the social reforms promoted by the Sandinistas.⁶³

Progressive Christian communities in Spain further mobilised against violence in the subcontinent following the assassination in 1980 by a paramilitary squad of the Archbishop of San Salvador Monsignor Oscar Romero, a symbol of nonviolent resistance to Latin American dictatorships. Solidarity with Latin America broadened the vision of many Spanish activists who until then had mostly focused on the issue of working-class struggle. The violence that permeated Central America at the beginning of the decade reinforced the conviction within these groups that their main struggle was no longer against East–West confrontation, but rather against 'global injustice', between the North and South, achieved by 'liberating the oppressed' from colonialist neoliberalist economic systems. In other words, an anti-imperialist stance based on generic Marxist ideals was united with the 'anti-global' currents, advocating for the creation of a 'movement of movements' to oppose US neoliberal globalisation.⁶⁴

Unlike their European peers, many Spanish activists were convinced of the possibility of a new nuclear conflict not in the European theatre, but instead in Latin America as a result of the rampant conflict and inequalities in the region. Moreover, contacts with Central American guerrillas through the support of much of the progressive clergy in Nicaragua gave rise to an internal debate among anti-NATO activists on whether it was morally acceptable to express solidarity with social groups using arms and violence to resist military interference by the local conservative elite or the United

States. The numerous debates published in the CAO's journal *Zona Cero* on violence and the type of actions that the anti-NATO movement should or should not accept make for a very interesting reading.⁶⁵ For instance, the activist Francisco Peñas, who had risen from the ranks of the MC, a political organisation originally formed by expelled left-wing ETA members, reached the conclusion that what was needed during the 1980s was not violence, but a 'superior level of conflict – that is to say civil disobedience – ... always with the understanding that nonviolence should not be legitimised by passivity'.⁶⁶

As a result of the debate promoted by nonviolent factions within the peace and anti-NATO movement the extraparliamentary radical left, which in the previous decade had on several occasions argued for the need for violent social revolution when conflict arose during Spain's transition towards democracy, gradually began to distance itself from the justification of violence as an effective anti-imperialist tool. It opted instead to support a strategy of resistance and civil disobedience, framing peace and consequently their anti-NATO struggle to the revival of interest in social justice. Indeed, as Peñas asserted, for the activists, peace was not an 'absence of war but a society free from national, political, or social oppression, without sexism and without poverty'.⁶⁷

Conclusion: From the Cold War to the North-South Global Division

This chapter has investigated how the distinctive political and cultural context of post-Francoist Spanish society profoundly shaped the discursive repertoire of the peace and anti-NATO movement, which in the last phase of the Cold War was linked to European transnational activism. However, the case of the Spanish movement during the Euromissiles Crisis exemplifies the importance of national factors in explaining public mobilisation.⁶⁸ In the early 1980s, Spanish opposition to nuclear armament was driven primarily by a multifaceted rejection of the country's membership of NATO, and a pervasive support for the country's neutralist tradition. The rejection of the alliance was closely connected to the widely held perception that the US had abused Spanish national sovereignty, and the ambivalent stance of the Spanish towards the intensive exploitation of nuclear energy, instigated by the Francoist industrial elites in line with US economic interests.

Following the death of Franco, the peace and anti-NATO movement was inextricably bound up with several issues: the fears over the process of democratisation based on political negotiations and pacts with Francoist reformists, and any possible backlash arising from this; the role of the armed

forces in a democratic society; and the still-present trauma of a society divided by the controversial memory of the bloody Spanish Civil War. In the eyes of Spanish activists, the cultural framework of the meaning of democracy and the debate on the type of democratic relations between rulers and the ruled was inextricably linked to the final phase of the Cold War. For instance, point number 10 in the CEOP set of rules states that: 'Spain's membership to NATO and its definitive introduction into the bipolar dynamic will contribute to the already evident decay of democracy ... We proclaim to our government, and to all governments subject to a military bloc, that we will decide our own future.'⁶⁹

Latin America played a pivotal role in this association of the idea of peace with democracy. The region was transformed into a symbolic space generating new channels of dialogue and transnational networks, laying the foundations for a culture of protest that reached far beyond the grievances connected with the final stage of the Cold War. For activists, Latin America highlighted the unresolved issue of the relationship between peace and violence, and they called for the various cultural components of the movement to join together against a potential anti-democratic backlash in Spain similar to that which had occurred in Latin America. In the collective imagery of activists, Latin America also embodied the economic and social injustices of the Third World and the anti-imperialist credo of the anti-Francoist resistance. However, during the 1980s, the pro-Third World vision of anti-Francoist activists was exacerbated by the concerns of a new generation, unfettered by the hegemony of Marxist doctrine and the communist parties. This generation introduced new objectives into their activism, concentrating not only on class struggle but also on issues of global humanism and the defence of human rights in the Global South, and searching for a new rapport with politics that went beyond any single political party. Consequently, Spanish activists challenged the equilibria of the Cold War, identifying themselves in the postcolonial perspective of 'the other', symbolically embodied by the indigenous and precolonial cultures of the South American continent.

This chapter has shown that the global histories of peace activism can only be fully told when we provincialise the hegemonic narrative of the Cold War bipolar dynamics and understand the popularity of peace mobilisation by focusing on national characteristics and transnational links not solely focused on Western Europe but also on Latin America. The peace mobilisation of Spain may have failed to bring about significant political changes to the country's foreign and security policies, but the narratives emanating from these activists were able to shift the centre of gravity of global relations from the East–West conflict to North–South global

inequalities.

Furthermore, the space gained in the Spanish social imaginary by anti-NATO and peace movement did not disappear, and in the following decades it fuelled other mobilisations, such as the disobedience movement against compulsory military service, the environmental movement, the feminist and anti-globalisation movement, the massive peace protests during the 2003 invasion of Iraq or the anti-austerity movement in 2011. The anti-NATO movement contributed to the grassroots dissemination of the idea that Spain, after a tragic civil war and military dictatorship, should stop imagining itself exclusively as a violent and militarised society. The anti-NATO protests in Spain helped to make way to democratic participation in the debate about security and military arsenals in Europe, about whether the Soviet and Third World revolutionary models were acceptable to postwar left-wing European cultures in terms of the exercise of violence and the violation of human rights, or about the possible benefits of non-alignment in a rigidly bipolar world.

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Notes

1. London School of Economics Archive (LSE), Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, END/20/10 Spain, Comisión anti-OTAN Madrid, International Newsletter 3, p. 1, May 1985.
2. LSE, Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, END/20/10 Spain, Dossier 'Towards Neutrality: An Overview of the Spanish Peace Movement and its Prospects', by Rafael Grasa and Louis Lemkow (Catalan Antinuclear Committee), p. 4, June 1985.
3. On the origins of the Euromissiles crisis, see Nuti, Bozo and Rey, *The Euromissile Crisis*. On Cold War cultures during the 1980s in the Western Bloc, see Conze, Klimke and Varon, *Accidental Armageddons*. On concerns in the United States, Europe and the Soviet Union regarding the threat of nuclear war, see Schatz and Fiske, 'International Reactions to the Threat of Nuclear War'.
4. For example, Wittner, in his monumental history of global peace movements, devoted a mere two pages to Spain during the period of the Second Cold War: Wittner, *Towards Nuclear Abolition*, 163–64. On new social movements in Spain, see Karamichas, *New and Alternative Social Movements in Spain*; and Baumeister and Ziemann, 'Introduction: Peace Movements in Southern Europe', 563–78. Recently, numerous studies are challenging the idea of an alleged apathy of the Spanish society. On the contrary, they highlight the dynamism of social mobilisations during the Transition. See, for instance, Cavallaro and Kornetis, *Rethinking Democratization*; and Radcliff, Kornetis and Aires Oliveira, *50 Years of Scholarship on the Southern European Democratic Transitions*, 7–36.
5. Quaggio, 'Social Movements and Participatory Democracy'.
6. On the concept of 'transnationalisation' of the Cold War in Latin America, see Harmony, 'Transnationalizing the Dirty War'.
7. Since the 1980s, the term 'Chicago Boys' has been used to refer to Latin American economists who identified with the liberal economic theories taught at the University of Chicago at the time.
8. On the ideological crises of the postwar political cultures during the 1970s, see Ferguson et al., *The Shock of the Global*.
9. Lindekilde, 'Discourse and Frame Analysis'.
10. Prevost, 'The Spanish Peace Movement in a European Context'.
11. LSE, Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, END/20/10 Spain, Dossier 'Towards Neutrality: An Overview of the Spanish Peace Movement and Its Prospects', by Rafael Grasa and Louis Lemkow (Catalan Antinuclear Committee), June 1985, p. 1.
12. See, for instance, the case of Britain and West Germany after the Second World War: Nehring, *The Politics of Security*.
13. Ramos and Aguilar, 'Is Spain Still Different?'.
14. On the relationship between social movements and Marxism, see Barker et al., *Marxism and Social Movements*.
15. Gabriel Flores, interview with the author, Madrid, 19 February 2021.

16. On the social and cultural composition of Spanish social movements in the 1980s, see Tudela and Cattaneo, 'Beyond Desencanto'.
17. On different ideas on peace and pacifist cultures from the nineteenth century to the Spanish Civil War, see Leira Castiñeira, *El pacifismo en España*, 21–228. Aguado Hernández, 'El pacifismo-antimilitarismo en España desde el siglo XIX hasta la Guerra Civil'.
18. On the origins of the movement for peace during the period of Transition, see Pastor Verdú, 'El movimiento pacifista (1977–1997)'.
19. On the memory of the Spanish Civil War during the process of transition to democracy, see Aguilar, *Memory and Amnesia*.
20. Vaïsse, 'Pour une histoire comparée de pacifisme européens'.
21. Heiberg, *US-Spanish Relations after Franco*.
22. Blanco Sio-López, 'Transitional Margins to Re-join the West: Spain's Dual Strategy of Democratization and Europeanization', 212.
23. Pardo Sanz, 'Furthering US Geopolitical Priorities and Dealing with the Iberian Dictatorship'.
24. Schmitz, *Thank God They're on Our Side*.
25. Before Spain's entry into the Atlantic Alliance, the United States had stockpiled some 200 atomic bombs between 1958 and 1976. After joining NATO, at least thirty-two nuclear warheads were still stored by the US Navy's VI Fleet at the Rota Naval Base in 1986. See Acosta Ortega, 'La energía nuclear como instrumento de la política exterior española'.
26. On the protests after the Palomares accident, see Sánchez-Vázquez and Menéndez-Navarro, 'Nuclear Energy in the Public Sphere'; and Florensa, 'A Nuclear Monument the Size of a Football Field'.
27. Rubio-Varas and de la Torre, 'Nuclear Power for a Dictatorship', 385–411.
28. Castro Berrojo, *La bomba atómica española*.
29. Powell, *El amigo americano*.
30. Viñas, *En las garras del águila*.
31. Garrido Caballero, 'España y la Unión Soviética a finales de la Guerra Fría'.
32. Del Val Cid, *Opinión pública y opinión publicada*.
33. On the polarisation of the Spanish intellectual field, see Muñoz Soro, 'El final de la utopía'.
34. Socorro Arencibia, 'La última batalla de la Transición'.
35. LSE Archive, Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, END/20/10 Spain, CAO Madrid, Dossier 'Our Ten Reasons for Neutrality', 1985, p. 1.
36. LSE Archive, Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, END/20/10, E.P. Thompson, visit to Spain, 20–24 February 1986.
37. For example, a request for help in: LSE Archive, Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, END/20/10 Spain, CAO Madrid, International Newsletter 5, 14 November 1985, p. 2.
38. Communist Movement Archive Madrid (AMC), Dossier International Group CAO, Debate on Multilateralism/Unilateralism, n.d. (unclassified).
39. P. Kelly, 'Carta de una pacifista alemana a los ciudadanos españoles', *El País*, 20 September 1984. On the contacts between some Spanish feminist activists and Petra Kelly, see Blasco, 'Entrevista a Carmen Magallón Portoles', 109.

40. Archive Conscientious Objectors Movement Madrid (AMOC), File Italy, Notes for an analysis of the problems of the Mediterranean, CAO Madrid – Carlos Otamendi and Paco Peñas, May 1984 (unclassified).
41. Archive Pablo Iglesias Foundation (AFPI), International Relations Secretariat, Proposals for Nuclear Free Zones 1984–1985, ‘Denuclearisation of the Iberian Peninsula’, 110 D, PSD-J, folder 2, doc. 2.
42. AMC, CAO Report by Paco Peñas on the USSR, 1987, pp. 36–37 (unclassified).
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44. LSE Archive, Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, END/20/10 Spain, CAO Madrid, International Newsletter 3, May 1985, p. 1.
45. LSE Archive, Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, END/20/10 Spain, CEOP, Statement of the Spanish State-State Level Coordinator of Peace Organisation, 1985.
46. LSE Archive, Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, END/20/10 Spain, CAO Madrid, International Newsletter 4, 30 September 1985.
47. Giuseppe and Ágreda Portero, ‘Redes internacionales de apoyo y solidaridad’; Giuseppe, ‘Discovering the “Other” America’, 107–28. Davis, ‘The Anti-Cold War Left’.
48. Rainer Horn, *The Spirit of Vatican II*.
49. Roniger and Green, ‘Exile and Politics of Exclusion in Latin America’.
50. Escudero, ‘Hispanist Democratic Thought versus Hispanist Thought of the Franco Era’.
51. Kornetis, ‘Cuban Europe?’.
52. The Cuban poet Nicolás Guillén was the author of this politically charged song. See González Lucini, *Veinte años de canción en España (1963–1983)*.
53. Quaggio, ‘Walls of Anxiety’, 16.
54. Alcázar Garrido, ‘La pugna de las memorias’.
55. For more on the dimension of violence in the Spanish Transition, see Baby, *El mito de la transición pacífica*.
56. J.M. Markham, ‘Comment by Haig Draws Fire in Spain’, *New York Times*, 12 March 1981.
57. Quaggio, ‘Walls of Anxiety’, 16.
58. Pee and Schmidli, *The Reagan Administration, the Cold War and the Transition to Democracy Promotion*.
59. For a summary of the Spanish process of Transition and possible factors of public disenchantment, see Powell, ‘Revisiting Spain’s Transition to Democracy’.
60. Ommen, ‘Isolating Nicaragua’s Somoza’; Perla, ‘Heirs of Sandino’.
61. Ágreda Portero, ‘Un acercamiento al Comité de Solidaridad con Nicaragua en Zaragoza’.
62. In 1981 the English punk-rock band The Clash released their fourth studio album entitled *Sandinista!*
63. Ágreda Portero and Helm, ‘Solidaridad con la Revolución Sandinista’.
64. Della Porta, *The Global Justice Movement*.
65. See the supplementary edition of *Zona Cero* of July 1984, which is devoted to contentious issues within the CAO.

66. P. Peñas, 'Violencia o no violencia', *Zona Cero*, July 1984, p. 14.
67. Ibid.
68. Della Porta and Tarrow, *Transnational Protest and Global Activism*.
69. LSE, Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, END/20/10 Spain, CAO Madrid, 'Our Ten Reasons for Neutrality', 1985, p. 1.

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Part IV

Rising Nuclear Powers

Resistance and Reappropriation

Nuclear Peace and Pacifism in Postcolonial India

Kapil Patil

No Water, No Electricity, No Jobs, No Problem: We Have the Bomb!

— A placard at an anti-nuclear protest in Delhi on Hiroshima Day in 1998

Introduction

Studies on anti-nuclear and peace movements in India are scarce in comparison to diplomatic and techno-strategic accounts of the country's atomic evolution.¹ An overt preoccupation of the extant historiography with India's progressive shift towards acquiring nuclear weapons has curiously overlooked anti-nuclear and peace voices that historically co-shaped the country's nuclear discourse. Their scope and periodisation too distinctly differ vis-à-vis the peace movements that emerged all over Europe in the late Cold War era. The anti-nuclear and peace mobilisations in India ordinarily trace their genesis to the country's nonviolent freedom movement, which employed 'peaceful resistance' to gain freedom from British colonial rule. For Mahatma Gandhi, the architect of India's non-violent freedom struggle, the practice of 'Ahimsa' (nonviolence) and 'Satyagraha' (holding on to truth) reigned superior over armed struggles to counter the physical and symbolic violence of nuclear weapons.² The widespread destruction and ruins of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945 saw Gandhi reject atomic weapons as 'the most diabolical use of science'.³ The "physical and material violence" of the atom bomb', Gandhi believed, could only be countered through the moral and ethical force of 'non-violence', and emphasised that 'unless ... the world adopts

non-violence, it will spell certain suicide for mankind'.⁴ Gandhi's appeal to embrace the moral force of nonviolence over the 'terror' and deterrent of atom bomb profoundly shaped postcolonial India's worldview on nuclear weapons.⁵ India's first Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, also saw nuclear weapons as a 'symbol of incarnate evil', and committed himself to reinforce the moral force of nonviolence through a global campaign for nuclear disarmament. At the first Afro-Asian Conference held in Bandung in 1955, Nehru and many leaders from newly independent Asian and African countries launched a coalition of developing countries, which made a concerted appeal to free the world from nuclear weapons.⁶

Nehru's vision that 'India, in common with other countries', would 'prevent the use of atomic bombs', nevertheless also entailed the development of peaceful uses of atomic energy that would enable India to technologically 'leapfrog' and foster its economic development.⁷ The intrinsic necessity of science for country's socioeconomic progress saw India building Asia's first atomic research reactor in 1955.⁸ Reckoning the 'peaceful-uses only' atomic energy programme, a harbinger of India's progress, Nehru evidently diverged from Gandhi's expansive peace vision that was sceptical of modern science for its myriad sociocultural pathologies.⁹ Therefore, the labelling of India's nuclear test in May 1974 as a 'peaceful nuclear explosion' (PNE) may not have triggered serious opposition, but by the late 1970s, a disenchantment grew around the country's atomic energy programme with grassroots communities, urban elites and environmentalists opposing atomic energy development for its varied social and environmental impacts. The anti-nuclear and peace mobilisations particularly witnessed an upsurge following New Delhi declaring itself as a nuclear-weapon power in May 1998. Forging a consolidated opposition to both peaceful and military uses of atomic energy, the peace movement post-1998 acquired a more broad-based character as it opposed the country's shift away from the moral revulsion of atomic weapons towards their formal acceptance while underlining the risks of atomic energy in India's developmental contexts.¹⁰

The Indian peace movement, in this sense, primarily took shape within domestic political dialectic and around virtues like *ahimsa*, with circulatory knowledge and peace networks being its integral components. The uniqueness is crucial in order to put into perspective the ideological moorings of domestic opposition to atomic technologies and the role of external networks in India's peace mobilisations. From condemning the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki to voicing concerns over radioactive fallout from atomic weapon tests, New Delhi had played a crucial role during the early Cold War to mobilise the so-called neutral countries against nuclear weapons.¹¹ The anti-nuclear ideology of leaders like Mahatma Gandhi

formed a significant basis for anti-nuclear energy mobilisations within India, which drew extensively from similar movements in parts of Europe and the United States during the 1960s and 1970s.¹² In the wake of atomic disasters such as Three Mile Island (TMI) in 1979 and Chernobyl in 1986, transnational networks circulated significant knowledge concerning atomic energy's health, safety and environmental impacts and mobilised resistance against atomic energy. Forged in the early stages of the Cold War and sustained over time by a generation of activists and scholars, these networks have had an informal yet critical role in India's anti-nuclear and peace repertoire.¹³ The Indian peace movement has thus been an integral part of the global collective against atomic weapons through its unique ideas and resistance modalities.¹⁴

India's anti-nuclear and peace movements arguably reveal an expansive conception of peace, embodying Gandhian ideals of nonviolence, grassroots democracy and decentralisation. While Nehruvian India's prolonged campaign for nuclear disarmament aimed to save humanity from threat of nuclear war, the people's movements strove to achieve 'just peace' through their demand for right to safety, decent livelihoods, a clean ecosystem and a dignified life in peace. In this chapter, we present a *longue-durée* perspective on the evolution of India's anti-nuclear and peace mobilisations, which forged a conjoined opposition to both civilian and military uses of nuclear technologies. The chapter charts the evolution of post-colonial India's involvement in a campaign for universal nuclear disarmament, alongside the rise of peoples' movements within the country against the peaceful and military uses of atomic energy. Drawing upon the social studies of science and public movements, it weaves together a comprehensive account of India's anti-nuclear and peace campaigns and, in turn, addresses a critical gap in the historiography.

Peace as a Global Imperative

In the thick of unprecedented tragedy and suffering from two world wars, the postwar period witnessed a wave of pacifism around the world. In India, the spread of Gandhi's *satyagraha* (or nonviolent resistance) against British colonial rule also inspired pacifist movements around the world.¹⁵ As Lawrence Wittner documents, the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki prompted the leaders of the three major international pacifist organisations – the War Resisters' International, the International Fellowship of Reconciliation, and the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom – to invite Mahatma Gandhi to preside over the largest

post-Second World War peace congregation to be held in India.¹⁶ However, Gandhi's assassination in January 1948 deeply troubled his Indian and international followers. Nevertheless, the three international organisations seeking to uphold his legacy and path of *satyagraha* decided to hold the conference at Gandhi's Ashram at Sevagram in December 1949. Over a hundred pacifist leaders from thirty-four countries participated in the congregation. Prime Minister Nehru addressed this historic meeting, pledging to 'work to remove the causes of war'.¹⁷ The meeting also decided to deploy 'Satyagraha Units' or 'The Peace Army' in different countries to carry the message of nonviolence and 'organise defence based on soul-force or non-violence', contending that science and military power could no longer protect human civilisation.¹⁸ The fear of science being put to ever-increasing military use prompted Albert Einstein, the noted scientist who had joined the concerned scientists' movement, to observe that 'if civilisation survives, Gandhi will go down as the greatest man of our time'.¹⁹ Gandhi's assassination in January 1948 also marked a setback for India's peace movements, but his moral outrage against nuclear weapons continued to influence the country's nuclear discourse for years to come.

Carrying Gandhi's legacy forward, Nehru championed a global campaign against nuclear weapons amidst heightened fears of the use of nuclear weapons in the Korean War.²⁰ The onset of the Cold War and the polarisation of the world into two ideologically opposed power blocs led Nehru to put forward a radical alternative of 'non-alignment', appealing newly independent colonies of Asia and Africa to refrain from joining either of the Cold War ideological blocs.²¹ The group of these so-called non-aligned countries frequently coalesced to voice concerns over issues of global peace, international cooperation, and economic aid and assistance to the developing world. The non-alignment movement particularly rallied opposition to a nuclear arms race between the two superpowers, with India raising concerns over radioactive fallout from atmospheric testing of nuclear weapons.²² Proposing a 'standstill agreement' for the immediate cessation of atomic testing in 1955, Nehru, like many other world leaders, expressed deep concerns about radioactive fallout from relentless atmospheric nuclear weapons testing by the US and Soviet Union.²³ In view of scientific debates surrounding large-scale fallout from nuclear weapon tests and the biological effects of low-level atomic radiation, Nehru asked Indian scientists to undertake a first-of-its-kind study called 'nuclear explosions and their effects'.²⁴ The study categorically challenged the proponents of nuclear tests and contested their claims surrounding the effects of ionising radiation on humans and the environment, stating that:

There are people who argue that tests can continue because it is not yet firmly established that, on the present scale, they would lead to any substantial increase in the existing somatic and genetic load of mankind. In effect, this means that tests can continue so long as it is not known with certainty that they would cause serious harm to man. This is a rather strange line of argument. To argue that tests should stop only if it were definitely established that their continuation would bring certain disaster to the mankind, is a regrettable commentary on 2500 years of progress since the Buddha.²⁵

Furthermore, Nehru, in his foreword to this study, expressed an earnest hope that 'it [study] will be of some use to directing people's minds to the dreadful prospects of nuclear war and to the dangers of continuing nuclear test explosions'.²⁶ By reiterating India's official stance that the use of nuclear weapons in 'any' form implied 'committing genocide', the study appealed nuclear weapon possessor states to expeditiously halt the test explosions. The sustained campaign of Nehru and his compatriot C. Rajagopalachari delivered the goods when the international community adopted the Partial Test-Ban Treaty (PTBT) in 1963, which banned the atmospheric testing of nuclear weapons.²⁷ Besides the test ban, Nehru also actively supported negotiations for an international treaty for total elimination of nuclear weapons by the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee (ENCD/ENDC). Following the release of the historic Einstein-Russell Manifesto on 9 July 1955, Nehru expressed a keen interest in hosting the conference of scientists from the Western and Eastern Blocs in India, as envisaged in the manifesto. The manifesto, signed by leading Nobel laureate scientists, appealed to world leaders to consider the prospect of wholesale destruction from the use of nuclear weapons in future wars and the urgent need to avoid conflicts among nations.

Nehru's endorsement of the Russell-Einstein manifesto had lent credence to Russell's belief that a conference of scientists might provide the 'best entree toward genuine cooperation' on mitigating risks of nuclear war.²⁸ As Joseph Rotblat has recorded, Russell even issued invitation letters for the conference in New Delhi in December 1956.²⁹ However, the outbreak of the Suez Crisis led to the cancellation of the conference in New Delhi, which was reconvened at Pugwash in Nova Scotia, Canada, in July 1957.³⁰ The Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs, commonly known as the Pugwash Movement, mobilised scientists from around the world to deliberate on the risks of nuclear war and find ways to achieve a world free from nuclear weapons. In January 1964, India formally held the Pugwash Conference, where participants stressed the urgency to move forward on nuclear disarmament and enhance economic aid to underdeveloped countries.³¹

The 1960s proved to be consequential for India's peace discourse in many ways. China's first nuclear tests at Lop Nur in October 1964, just two years after the devastating Sino-Indian war of 1962, led to growing calls on India's domestic political scene for weaponising its nuclear capability to counter the Chinese threat.³² Despite fervent appeals from opposition parties such as the right-wing Jan Sangha and socialist factions like Praja Socialist Party and the Samyukta Socialist Party for India to build a nuclear deterrent at any cost, Lal Bahadur Shastri, Nehru's successor and a noted Gandhian, affirmed India's principled opposition to atomic weapons.³³ Similarly, V.K. Krishna Menon, formerly defence Minister and India's Permanent Representative to the United Nations, admonished Homi Bhabha, the chairman of India's atomic energy commission, for his claims that a nuclear explosive device could be produced in eighteen months and that a stockpile of about fifty A-bombs would cost the nation only ten crores rupees (\$21 million).³⁴ Recalling India's nonviolent and largely peaceful freedom struggle and noting that 'Nehru and Gandhi lived and died for the cause of peace', Shastri at the session of the All-Indian Congress Committee (AICC) obliged fellow Congress members to endorse the 'policy of not manufacturing nuclear weapons'.³⁵

However, Shastri could not decisively prevail over Homi Bhabha and reportedly permitted theoretical studies on peaceful nuclear explosives within the bounds of the peaceful uses-only nuclear energy programme.³⁶ Shastri also sought to continue the policy of his towering predecessor by extending support to the development of nuclear energy for civilian purposes. Shastri's sudden death in January 1966 saw the ruling Congress Party losing a prominent Gandhian voice against nuclear weapons. During this period, India's nuclear scientific establishment began to shift its focus towards mastering the technological capability for conducting underground atomic explosions for purported civilian applications.³⁷ By the mid-1960s, an emerging consensus among Pugwash members to accept the distinction between nuclear 'haves' and 'have-nots', as envisaged in the text of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), brought home profound disillusionment in terms of the prospects of global nuclear disarmament. In 1967, New Delhi refused to sign the NPT as an act of dissent against a discriminatory regime that would divide the world between the nuclear haves and have-nots.³⁸

More importantly, cracks grew within the ruling party over its outlook on nuclear weapons.³⁹ For Nehru's daughter, Indira Gandhi, who had assumed the leadership mantle, Gandhi-Nehru's peace legacies were paramount even though India faced severe geopolitical headwinds. An apparent US hostility towards India during the 1971 India-Pakistan war became a potent factor, as security analysts argue, in Indira Gandhi's decision to give Indian scientists a go-ahead in late 1972 to conduct an underground nuclear explosion,

which was carried out in May 1974.⁴⁰ However, Mrs Gandhi stopped short of declaring India a nuclear weapons state, and the Department of Atomic Energy (DAE) rationalised the test as a ‘peaceful nuclear explosion’ (PNE).⁴¹ Whether or not the peace imperative indeed restrained Mrs Gandhi from pronouncing India as a nuclear weapons power, the PNE’s characterisation as ‘Smiling Buddha’ was indeed ironic since New Delhi had rejected the nuclear weapons tests of Western powers, ‘a regrettable commentary on 2,500 years of progress since the Buddha’. Although the nuclear explosion did not face significant domestic opposition, the Gandhi Peace Foundation, a noted New Delhi-based Gandhian organisation, was among the vocal critics of the test. Calling it ‘a cruel joke’ on the people of India, the foundation asked if ‘[India’s] national prestige lies in setting off this nuclear test’.⁴² Rejecting the popular assertions that tests had boosted the ‘sinking morale of the nation’, the Foundation lamented that ‘only the most gullible will believe that it is only for peaceful purposes’.⁴³

Mobilisation against Nuclear Energy

Notwithstanding Nehru’s global eminence, the anti-nuclear and peace constituency in independent India spanned across a broader political spectrum that hardly finds mention in the country’s peace history. For instance, groups such as the All-India Peace Council (AIPC) had forged international connections from early on and campaigned against atomic weapons.⁴⁴ Two noted members of AIPC, Saifuddin Kitchlew and Damodar Dharmananda (or D.D.) Kosambi Kosambi, were tireless campaigners against any peaceful and military uses of nuclear power. Although the AIPC came to be labelled as the ‘Soviet-sponsored peace movement’, Kitchlew and Kosambi’s public renown went beyond such denunciations.⁴⁵ As a member of AIPC, D.D. Kosambi spoke resolutely against India’s plans to generate electricity from atomic power stations. Contesting the DAE’s claims of producing abundant and cheap electricity using nuclear reactors, Kosambi highlighted the investment value of atomic energy, stating unequivocally that:

The whole affair is fantastically costly. Those who say that atomic energy can compete with thermal or hydropower carefully omit to mention the fact that the preliminary costs have always been written off to someone else’s account, usually that of some government.⁴⁶

An admirer of Gandhi’s *gram-swaraj* (local self-rule) idea, Kosambi advocated solar energy over nuclear to meet the country’s needs. He believed that

this approach was crucial for making large swathes of rural India energy-independent.⁴⁷ Kosambi's views once again reflected the contrasting visions of Gandhi and Nehru on the relevance of modern science and technology for India's socioeconomic development.⁴⁸ For Gandhi, India should eschew the social inequities and destructive impacts of science and instead foster village industries that are attuned to the overall socio-ecological balance. In contrast, Nehru's deep fascination with modern science and cutting-edge inventions produced in European laboratories saw him supporting the establishment of modern science and technology institutions within the country.⁴⁹ The Pursuit of modern science and imparting 'scientific temper' among Indian masses was integral to Nehru's modernist imagination and strongly reflected his approach to setting up a network of scientific laboratories and institutions under state control, including atomic energy installations.⁵⁰

By the 1970s, the expansion of nuclear power had started facing opposition from grassroots communities for its perceived impact on the livelihood and local environment. The agitations against nuclear energy became a part of generalised public opposition to mega-developmental projects in different parts of the country for forcing displacement upon local communities and posing irreversible biodiversity and environmental risks. Two important movements, namely the 'Chipko' Movement against deforestation in the Himalayas in the 1970s and a considerable public agitation against constructing a mega-dam on the Narmada River in central India in the 1980s, symbolised rising public consciousness towards environmental risks of industrialisation.⁵¹ Resisting the modernist onslaught through Gandhi's method of peaceful resistance, these movements opposed mega-developmental projects for inflicting environmental damages and forcing displacement on indigenous communities.⁵² The construction of nuclear power plants also drew public resistance for similar reasons.⁵³

In the 1980s, the DAE's plans to set up a nuclear station at Kaiga, an ecologically sensitive zone in the Western Ghats, stirred up mass opposition for its potential impacts on the local environment and biodiversity.⁵⁴ Protests also emerged at various proposed and commissioned nuclear plant sites such as Narora in the state of Uttar Pradesh, Kakrapara in Gujarat, Kothamangalam in Kerala and Kudankulam in Tamilnadu, accentuating the determination of local communities to protect their socioenvironmental ways of life against industrial projects.⁵⁵ The knowledge circulating from anti-nuclear energy mobilisation in many parts of Europe and North America was crucial in shaping public perceptions of atomic risks worldwide. In India, umbrella groups like the Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy (COSNUP), which included prominent activists, scholars and urban elites, became active nodes in disseminating and communicating nuclear risks.⁵⁶ COSNUP members

frequently highlighted declining public support for nuclear power in the West as they voiced concerns over the economic and social viability of India's civil nuclear energy programme.⁵⁷ Referencing large protests in countries like the United States and Germany, COSNUP challenged the DAE's ambitious projections for nuclear capacity addition and called for public debate on constructing nuclear power stations in the country.⁵⁸

In 1979, the Three Mile Island accident stirred significant controversy over the safety of first and second-generation nuclear plants in the United States and worldwide. The COSNUP members pointed to a lack of public knowledge about radioactive hazards and emergency measures needed in the event of large radioactive releases. There have been reported instances of labour unrest over radiation contamination in India at a few sites. At the Tuticorin Heavy Water Plant in Kerala, the workers demanded insurance against radiation exposure. In contrast, workers at the Rajasthan Atomic Power Plant (RAPP) went on strike due to reports of high tritium levels in boiler units.⁵⁹ Similarly, at Tarapur, tensions between workers and plant management culminated in a suspicious event involving the unauthorised manual shutdown of the operating reactor.⁶⁰

However, the anti-nuclear protests at various nuclear plant sites achieved varying levels of success. At the Narora and Kakrapara sites, protestors failed to mobilise large crowds and reverse the government's decision to build additional units. Following the Chernobyl disaster in 1986, the call for a 'band' (public shutdown) against the Narora project and its alleged radiation impacts on local people by Parmanu Urja Virodhi Manch (Forum against Atomic Energy) received limited support from the people.⁶¹ The incidents of radioactive leaks incidentally failed to move people against the project. In Karnataka state, local communities and concerned citizens opposed the construction of nuclear reactors in the forests of Western Ghats. Two prominent regional groups, namely the Karnataka State Social Forum and Citizens against Nuclear Energy (CANE), regarded the nuclear station as threatening the region's fragile ecology and conducted an extensive signature campaign against the project.⁶²

Although more than 100,000 people signed the petition, the groups failed to stop the Nuclear Power Corporation (NPC) from commissioning the twin reactors. However, in Kerala and Tamil Nadu, anti-nuclear protests successfully mobilised the local populace against the proposed nuclear projects. At the Bhoothathankettu (Kothamangalam) site in Kerala, members of a local group called the 'Organisation for Protection from Nuclear Radiation' led a concerted opposition to setting up a nuclear plant in the riverine ecosystem.⁶³ The group petitioned the state government for overlooking the 'minimum' population criteria stipulated by the International

Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) guidelines for determining the nuclear plant location.⁶⁴ Threatened by the prospect of displacement, large-scale protests by families residing in and around the designated site compelled the state government to withdraw its support of the project. Similarly, at Kudankulam in Tamil Nadu, the local farmers and fisherfolk were involved in prolonged anti-nuclear demonstrations against constructing twin Russian VVER-1000 reactors.

Conceived in the shadows of the 1986 Chernobyl disaster, the Kudankulam project marked the Soviet Union's bid to regain status in the nuclear export market and for New Delhi to resume international cooperation stalled after its 1974 nuclear test.⁶⁵ The project, however, faced opposition from its inception as local communities moved against the decision to source fresh water from the nearby Pechiparai dam, while fisherfolk opposed the plant's proposed maritime exclusion zone.⁶⁶ Lasting for over two decades, the Kudankulam project experienced two major protest waves. In the first wave, a rally organised by the 'National Fish Workers Union' involved the participation of over 10,000 people, including local politicians and eminent personalities like Justice Vaidyanathapuram Rama Krishna Iyer (or V.R. Krishna Iyer) and Thomas Kochery, who appealed to Indian and Soviet leaders to stall the project.⁶⁷ The second protest wave at Kudankulam occurred in late 2000 when the construction of the reactors was close to completion. The agitation stirred considerable public opposition, especially after the Fukushima disaster in March 2011, with protestors seeking judicial intervention to stall the commissioning of twin reactors.

Similarly, at the Kakrapar nuclear site in Gujarat, local communities lodged peaceful protests led by noted Gandhian social worker, Narayan Desai.⁶⁸ Desai's key associate in the agitation, Surendra Gadekar, a physicist-turned-Gandhian activist, started India's first anti-nuclear journal called *Anumukti (Liberation from the Atom)* in 1987, publishing studies on the effects of radiation on the local populations around India's nuclear installations.⁶⁹ Dedicated to providing extensive coverage of anti-nuclear protests in the country, the journal sought to diffuse anti-nuclear discourse among the English-speaking urban populace. In March 1992, Gadekar embarked on a bicycle expedition from Kakrapar (Gujrat) to Peringome (Kerala) along India's Western coast to raise awareness about the perils of atomic radiation in the aftermath of the Chernobyl disaster. The mobilisation against atomic energy throughout the 1980s thus aimed to bring public concerns to the forefront of nuclear energy policy and raise awareness of nuclear energy's uneven distribution of risks and benefits.

Encountering the Bomb

The end of the Cold War presented a markedly challenging milieu for India's anti-nuclear and peace collective. By the late 1980s, India's political scene witnessed a growing trend towards formalising the country's nuclear weapon status. By the mid-1990s, several external factors, such as the indefinite extension of the NPT, the advent of Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) negotiations and the deepening Sino-Pak nexus, became prominent reasons for changing India's outlook towards nuclear weapons. However, the electoral rise of the *Bhartiya Janata Party* (BJP), widely referred to as a Hindu nationalist party, became crucial in terms of shaping India's atomic transition. Promising to 'exercise the option to induct nuclear weapons' in the party's 1996 election manifesto, the BJP's national leadership commissioned five underground nuclear tests in May 1998.⁷⁰ The drift towards weaponisation had already been set in motion two decades earlier when Mrs Gandhi demonstrated India's technological capability by conducting an underground nuclear test in May 1974.

In the following years, Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi's regime further drifted from nuclear restraint in the face of lukewarm response from nuclear weapon states to his 'Action Plan' for achieving time-bound nuclear disarmament, presented at the United Nations (UN) General Assembly meeting on 21 January 1988.⁷¹ In the mid-1990s, his successor Narasimha Rao reportedly ordered preparations for underground tests amidst pressure from negotiations on the CTBT underway in Geneva. Although New Delhi vacillated throughout the CTBT negotiations and refused to sign it in June 1996, the anti-nuclear campaigners made a compelling case for India to sign the treaty and renounce its option of building nuclear weapons.⁷² The BJP's determined push to change the nuclear status quo nonetheless saw India conducting five underground nuclear tests in May 1998 and proclaiming itself a nuclear weapon power.⁷³ However, this formalisation of India's nuclear weapons status drew widespread opposition from anti-nuclear groups and prominent citizens all over the country.⁷⁴ On 6 August 1998, over 250,000 citizens participated in a public rally in Kolkata to oppose nuclear tests.⁷⁵ Accusing the BJP of walking back on the country's longstanding peace tradition and ratcheting up tensions in the region, with Pakistan following suit, the anti-nuclear and peace voices condemned the ruling party for pushing the country into a deterrence trap.

Following the May 1998 tests, the citizens' groups called 'Parmanu Bomb Virodhi Andolan' (PBVA) (Movement against Nuclear Weapons) held a series of peace demonstrations in New Delhi, appealing to leaders of India and Pakistan to reverse their decision and make South Asia a

nuclear weapons-free region.⁷⁶ The PBVA launched an 'Anti-Nuke Action/ Friday Campaign' in New Delhi in collaboration with prominent civil society members.⁷⁷ Another citizens' group comprising women activists, scholars and scientists, called the Movement in Nuclear Disarmament (MIND), organised a series of public and press briefings against India's decision to build a three-tier system of nuclear delivery system. Pointing to the welfare costs of building a nuclear deterrent, the members of MIND outlined the imperative of peace and demilitarisation for South Asian people.⁷⁸ On 6 August 1999, the commemoration day for the atomic bombing of Hiroshima, both MIND and the PBVA held meetings in major Indian cities to mobilise people against nuclear weapons. Prominent Indian citizens opposed the government's decision to build the bomb. Calling nuclear weapons the 'purveyors of madness', 'the ultimate colonizer' or 'whiter than any white man that ever lived', the well-known Indian writer Arundhati Roy's essay 'The End of Imagination' reminded the country that if nuclear war ever took place, 'our foes will not be China or America but the earth herself'.⁷⁹ Littérateur Amitav Ghosh's nonfictional work on India's nuclear explosion, *The Countdown*, denounced nuclear weapons as a means to 'push India into an imagined circle of twice-born nations – "the great power"'.⁸⁰

Drawing upon the rich legacy of independent India's peaceful struggles, the anti-nuclear campaigners sought to mobilise masses through public meetings, rallies, distributing pamphlets and using digital tools to disseminate the peace message. The MIND and PBVA members also mobilised several environmental, labour and other social groups and held India's first-ever National Convention for Nuclear Disarmament and Peace in 2000 with over 600 participants from India and the neighbouring countries. In partnership with over 200 organisations, the Convention also established a network called the Coalition for Nuclear Disarmament and Peace (CNDP) to support popular resistance against the peaceful and military uses of nuclear power.⁸¹ Along the way, various other groups like the Indian Doctors for Peace and Development (IDPD) and Journalists against Nuclear Weapons also joined the anti-nuclear cause, raising concerns over radiation hazards, thus expanding the agenda of the anti-nuclear campaign.⁸²

Highlighting the trade-offs in the acquisition of a three-pronged nuclear deterrent, they echoed the sentiment that 'it is far easier to make a bomb than to educate four hundred million people', pointing to pervasive failures in the provision of public goods. The outbreak of conflict between India and Pakistan in the following summer of 1999 proved a major catalyst for the anti-nuclear weapons campaign as leaders of India and Pakistan publicly traded nuclear threats.⁸³ In the immediate aftermath of May 1998, the Pakistan military, emboldened by its newfound nuclear status, sought to

capture parts of the Indian-occupied Kashmir region by nuclear blackmailing India in the Kargil hills of northern Himalayas. The heightening threat of nuclear war in the region during the Kargil conflict triggered a region-wide anti-nuclear campaign bemoaning the deterioration of regional peace. In December 2001, the attack on the Indian Parliament by Pakistan-based terrorist groups that brought the two countries to the brink of war led peace activists across the border to condemn the exchange of 'nuclear' threats by their leaders and appeal for sanity and restraint. Post-Kargil, the anti-nuclear movement grew more assertive with the emergence of new groups, such as the Bangalore Platform against Nuclear Weaponisation and the Pakistan-India People's Forum for Peace and Democracy (PIPFDP), which appealed for peaceful coexistence.⁸⁴ The onset of the digital age also saw anti-nuclear campaigners turning to the internet to connect with urban youth through online forums, blogs and websites.

New web portals like 'South Asians for Peace' or the more recent *dianuke* became the first-of-their-kind web platforms for activists and concerned citizens to spread the anti-nuclear campaign.⁸⁵ Similarly, the Delhi Science Forum (DSF), a New Delhi-based grouping of writers, scientists and activists, provided extensive critical commentary on India's nuclear policies and communicated nuclear safety risks to people. A report entitled *Bombing Bombay?* by M.V. Ramana, a noted physicist, painted a scenario of possible consequences of a hypothetical nuclear detonation over the Indian city of Bombay (or Mumbai) to convey a sense of urgency in relation to nuclear weapons risks.⁸⁶ In 2004, the Bush administration's announcement of the resumption of civil nuclear energy cooperation with India marked another critical point for the anti-nuclear movement to expand its scope and reach. The nuclear 'deal' triggered a significant anti-nuclear upsurge within India that drew widespread international coverage and attention. The campaign against nuclear weapons led by groups like MIND and the PBVA following the weaponisation of India's nuclear capability in May 1998 and supported by well-known writers, scientists, and public officials weaved a resolute peace narrative that alerted the broader population of the dangers of nuclear war and recalled Gandhi's moral revulsion against these weapons.

People versus Nuclear Power

One of the key elements of the post-1998 anti-nuclear movement was its unified opposition to both peaceful and military uses of nuclear weapons. The Indo-US nuclear energy cooperation announcement sparked widespread opposition amongst political parties of diverse hues and ideologies. The

anti-nuclear groups protested against India's advance commitment to buying about 40 GW of nuclear power capacity from the United States, France, and Russia. The negotiation and signing of the US-India nuclear cooperation agreement during 2005 and 2007 was fraught with intense political drama as members of the ruling coalition withdrew their support for the government on anti-imperial and anti-nuclear grounds. Similarly, adopting India's civil nuclear liability legislation to compensate victims of nuclear accidents became mired in controversy as anti-nuclear groups opposed the government's bid to indemnify nuclear reactor and equipment suppliers for any latent or patent defects. In 2010, the Indian Supreme Court's verdict on the Bhopal Gas Disaster drove anti-nuclear activists to cite India's failure to punish Union Carbide, the operator of the chemical plant, for its patent negligence and demand strong provisions to bring suppliers under the purview of the law.

The effect of the anti-nuclear movement was felt inside the Indian Parliament with the growing involvement of local political parties in anti-nuclear energy protests around the country. In the past, the support of local political parties proved valuable for anti-nuclear energy activism in places such as Kothamangalam in Kerala. It also proved vital at designated nuclear sites like Haripur in West Bengal, where the state's major political party, the All-India Trinamool Congress (TMC), extended support to the anti-nuclear campaigns of grassroots organisations and civil society groups against the proposed nuclear project, effectively keeping it on ice for over two decades.⁸⁷ In March 2011, Japan's Fukushima nuclear disaster triggered a significant resurgence in anti-nuclear energy protests.⁸⁸ An opinion poll conducted by New Delhi Television (NDTV) in major Indian cities after the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster recorded a decline in public support for nuclear energy. Post-Fukushima, the campaign against the Kudankulam project witnessed a large-scale surge. With the two Russian-built reactors nearing completion in 2008, the Nature Conservation Trust and the Nuclear Power Awareness Committee (NPAC) sought to mobilise considerable public support to stop the commissioning of the project. The NPAC had been leading the local opposition at Kudankulam for over a decade and held a black-flag demonstration against the project in March 2000.⁸⁹

On 10 September 2012, a coalition of anti-nuclear groups led by the Peoples' Movement Against Nuclear Energy (PMNAE) held a rally of over a thousand people to stall the launch of twin Russian reactors. Notwithstanding police action, the protestors laid a siege to the plant for several months, with the PMNAE seeking judicial intervention against commissioning the reactors.⁹⁰ The Supreme Court's verdict against the petitioners nonetheless marked a setback for the campaign.⁹¹ The anti-nuclear energy protests also emerged at new nuclear plant sites such as Gorakhpur in the

state of Haryana, Kovvada in Andhra Pradesh and Mithi Viridi in Gujarat, forcing Indian policymakers to reckon with the livelihood effects of nuclear projects. Hot on the heels of Kudankulam, the Jaitapur site in Maharashtra also witnessed opposition from local farmers and fisherfolk. In April 2011, the police crackdown on a large rally at Jaitapur caused the death of one protester and the mass incarceration of villagers in the area.⁹² Nevertheless, the agitation continued with support from a leading political party in the state, the Shiv Sena.

The support of local political parties has thus been critical to the success of anti-nuclear energy protests. Centred on wide-ranging environmental and sociopolitical concerns, the anti-nuclear energy protests drove Indian policymakers to introduce a series of reforms, including India's archaic land acquisition law and announcing various rehabilitation and resettlement incentives. The Fukushima crisis also saw debate over India's preparedness to deal with potential emergencies at nuclear power stations. The failure of the Fukushima plant operators to comply with national and international regulations drove prominent Indian citizens to demand an independent inquiry into the safety of India's nuclear power sector.⁹³ Over time, the alliances between various local groups like the People's Movement Against Nuclear Energy (PMANE), Poovulagin Nanbargal (Friends of the Earth), Haryana Parmanu Sanyantra Virodhi Morcha (Haryana Nuclear Plant Opposition Front) and Chutka Parmanu Virodhi Sangharsh Samity (Chutka Anti-Nuclear Struggle Committee) with their national-level counterparts like the National Alliance of People's Movements (NAPM) and the Coalition for Nuclear Disarmament and Peace (CNDP) gave the anti-nuclear energy campaign a more pan-Indian character.

Confrontation with the 'nuclear state' has nevertheless not come about without grave personal costs, as anti-nuclear protesters frequently battled against police crackdowns and repressions. There have been many reported incidents of police brutality at anti-nuclear rallies, as well as the incarceration of campaigners. Despite upholding their commitment to the principles of nonviolence and peaceful methods of resistance, the anti-nuclear and peace movements have been at loggerheads with the developmental state, which frequently regards people's struggles as an obstacle to the country's growth and development. Recently, groups like Greenpeace India have faced restrictions in receiving overseas funds, while the CNDP and other groups have been called out for their so-called 'negative impact' on the Indian economy.⁹⁴ However, the activists have termed these allegations totally 'unfounded' and aimed at 'discrediting' the popular struggles.⁹⁵ In confronting the atomic leviathan, the anti-nuclear and peace movements worldwide have served a critical dialectical role, as we have seen in this chapter. Through their per-

sistent appeals for reason and sanity, the anti-nuclear movement has long warned about the dangers of atomic energy and informed people about its grave consequences. Pointing to the undemocratic distribution of atomic risks, the movement has also advocated for a human-centred approach to security. Especially in the context of the subcontinent, it has provided a critical platform for concerned citizens to deliberate on the shared risks of nuclear technologies, whether for peaceful or military purposes, and to create the prospects for peace and disarmament. In India's democracy, the anti-nuclear and peace movements have, therefore, long served as the harbinger of regional and global peace.

Conclusion

In this chapter, we have mapped the genesis and evolution of India's anti-nuclear and peace mobilisations and their core motivations and modalities. A *longue-durée* view of India's peace struggles underlines that the opposition to nuclear weapons never existed separately from its conjoined twin, peaceful uses-only nuclear power. The Indian peace movement not only moved against the deadlier nuclear arms race between the superpowers in the early Cold War but also held deep suspicions towards India's plans to harness nuclear technology in order to fulfil its energy needs. Acknowledging the widespread sociocultural violence of modern science and (statist) developmental projects, the Indian anti-nuclear and peace proponents did not accept any officially defined separation between peaceful or military uses of atomic energy and viewed the intrinsic violence of atomic weapons and atomic energy in equal terms. Consequently, the anti-nuclear movement challenged India's pursuit of peaceful uses-only nuclear power and its concurrent technological and economic promise early on. Especially in moments of crisis that threatened India's perceived core interests, such as in its conflicts with China and Pakistan and the US entanglement in regional security, the anti-nuclear and peace groups persistently served as critical voices against calls for the country to acquire nuclear weapons.

In the post-Cold War era, the shift in domestic politics and India's proclamation as a nuclear weapon power in May 1998 thus spawned a broad-based peace movement that vehemently criticised atomic weapons and their professed role in upholding the country's territorial integrity. Seeking to dismantle the awe and wonder expressed towards nuclear weapons by the trusting masses, the peace movement underlined the cost of building a nuclear deterrent. As the text of a placard at the anti-nuclear protest in Delhi on Hiroshima Day in 1998 pithily noted: 'No Water, No Electricity,

No Jobs, No Problem: We Have the Bomb!’ Also, embodying an expansive conception of ‘peace’ to protect people and the environment and to foster participatory governance, the anti-nuclear movements highlighted public concerns in relation to atomic energy projects and fought for their closure. Employing Gandhi’s ideal of ‘nonviolence’, the peace movement also served to appropriate ‘social’ space and perform a vital dialectical role. Moreover, its members also viewed themselves as part of a global collective against atomic weapons through various cooperative and solidarity-based networks and institutional links. Amid the ongoing resurgence of a nuclear arms race in the subcontinent, the challenge for anti-nuclear and peace movements nevertheless remains onerous, namely how to reinvent ‘nonviolence’ and fight for a world free of nuclear weapons.

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Notes

1. See Perkovich, *India’s Nuclear Bomb*; Anderson, *Nucleus and Nation*; Abraham, *The Making of the Indian Atomic Bomb*; and, most recently, Sarkar, *Ploughshares and Swords*.
2. Ahimsa, a philosophical term in Sanskrit, broadly means committing no harm to other living beings, leading to the practice of satyagraha. See Gandhi, *Gandhi on Non-violence*.
3. See, Gandhi, *Non-violence in Peace, and War*, 94. The collection documents Gandhi’s thoughts on nuclear weapons.
4. Gandhi, ‘Atom Bomb and Ahimsa’. See also Anand, *What Mahatma Gandhi Said about the Bomb*.
5. Gandhi, ‘Atom Bomb and Ahimsa’.
6. Final Communiqué, *Asian-African Conference*.
7. Cohen, *Nuclear Weapons and Conflict in South Asia*.
8. Mandal, ‘Nehru and Development of Science in India’, 1169.
9. Prasad, ‘Towards an Understanding of Gandhi’s Views on Science’; Visvanathan, *A Carnival for Science*.
10. Ramana and Reddy, *Prisoners of the Nuclear Dream*.
11. Neutral countries here refer to newly independent colonies of Asia and Africa, which were refused to be part of Cold War alliance system.

12. At the time of peace mobilizations following the Euromissile Crisis, India was officially a non-nuclear weapon country.
13. The controversy surrounding radioactive fallout spawned the development of transnational network against atomic weapons in the early 1950s. See Kraft, 'Dissenting Scientists'.
14. In their appeal to free the world from nuclear weapons, the Indian leaders sought to build a global campaign against nuclear weapons and emphasised nonviolence and global peace.
15. Allman, 'Nuclear Imperialism'.
16. Wittner, *One World or None*, 156.
17. Ibid.
18. Ibid, 157.
19. Ibid, 166.
20. Barnes, 'Between the Blocs'.
21. Rothermund, 'The Era of Non-alignment'.
22. Final Communiqué, *Asian-African Conference*.
23. Nehru, 'Stand-Still Agreement'.
24. Government of India. 1956. 'Nuclear Explosions and Their Effects'.
25. Ibid, 184.
26. Ibid, v–vi.
27. Mr Rajagopalachari led the Gandhi Peace Delegation to the United States in 1962 and held meetings with President Kennedy seeking a ban on nuclear tests. See Parliament of India. 'C. Rajagopalachari – A Profile'.
28. Griffin, *The Selected Letters of Bertrand Russell*.
29. Rotblat, 'The Early Days of Pugwash'.
30. As former Prime Minister Manmohan Singh remarked, the 'conference' may have been known as 'Delhi Movement' had the Suez Crisis in 1956 not led to change of venue from New Delhi. See Singh, *Inaugural Address at International Conference*.
31. New York Times. *Pugwash Conference Urges Arms Cut and Aid to Needy*, 3 February 1964.
32. Subrahmanyam, 'Indian Nuclear Policy'.
33. Couper, Indian Party Conflict on the Issue of Atomic Weapons.
34. Couper, Indian Party Conflict on the Issue of Atomic Weapons, 192; and Subrahmanyam, 'Indian Nuclear Policy', 293.
35. Ghatate, *India's Disarmament Policy*, 152–53.
36. Perkovich, 'Bhabha's Quest for the Bomb', 56.
37. Subrahmanyam, 'Indian Nuclear Policy'.
38. Subramanian, 'Nuclear India and the NPT'.
39. These include 1962 Sino–Indian war, and two India–Pakistan wars of 1965 and 1971 respectively.
40. Karnad, 'India's Nuclear Policy'.
41. Ganguly, 'India's Pathway to Pokhran II', 160.
42. Weinraub, 'Major Foundation in India Denounces Government for Nuclear Test'.
43. Ibid.

44. Raju, 'The Peace Movement in India'.
45. The AIPC shared close ties with Soviet-led World Peace Council; Kitchlew was founder President of the former and Vice President of the latter.
46. Kosambi, 'Atomic Energy for India', 2.
47. Kumar, 'Make Hay While the Sun Shines!'.
48. Visvanathan, 'A Celebration of Difference'.
49. *Nature*, 'Mahatma Gandhi and Sustainable Science'.
50. Mandal, 'Nehru and Development of Science in India'.
51. Karan, 'Environmental Movements in India'.
52. Gadgil and Guha, 'Ecological Conflicts'.
53. Mathai, *Nuclear Power, Economic Development Discourse*.
54. Rao, 'Nuclear Plants Spark Protest'; Karan, 'Environmental Movements in India'.
55. Jayaraman, 'Holy River No Obstacle'; Gadekar, 'Kakrapar to Rawatbhata Cycle Yatra'; EPW, 'Anti-nuclear Movement'.
56. Sharma, 'India: Worshipping the Atom'; Jayaraman, 'Holy River No Obstacle'.
57. Kamath, 'Risks Inherent in Nuclear Energy'; Sharma, 'Time to Move away from Nuclear Power'.
58. Sharma, 'Time to Move away from Nuclear Power'.
59. Prahladan, *The Nation Declassified*, 567.
60. Ibid.
61. EPW, 'Anti-nuclear Movement'.
62. Bidwai, 'The Kaiga Story'; Bidwai, 'Chernobyl One Year on'.
63. EPW, 'Anti-nuclear Movement'.
64. Ibid.
65. Rediff, 'Countdown to Kundankulam'.
66. Ibid.
67. Mohan, 'Koodankulam, Ground Zero'. Thomas Kochery was a Catholic priest and trade union leader associated with the fishermen's rights movement in the states of Kerala and Tamil Nadu.
68. Desai, 'Why I Oppose Nuclear Power'.
69. The journal issues can be accessed at: https://www.laka.org/docu/magazines/anu_mukti/index.html (retrieved 25 September 2024).
70. BJP, 'Election Manifesto 1996'.
71. Gandhi, 'Disarmament'.
72. Bidwai and Vanaik, 'Why India Should Sign CTBT'.
73. Government of India, 'India Conducts Nuclear Tests'.
74. Jayaraman, 'India's Nuclear Tests'.
75. Ramana and Reddy, *Prisoners of the Nuclear Dream*.
76. Interview with former member of the Parmanu Bomb Virodhi Andolan (Movement Against Nuclear Bomb) on Peace Demonstrations held in May-August 1998.
77. Ibid. The PBVA held meetings every Friday from 31 May to 6 August, (Hiroshima Day) to oppose India's nuclear weapons as part of the 'Anti-nuke Action/Friday Campaign'.
78. Ghosh, 'Nuclear Arms, the Budget and the Economy', 105–6; Vanaik, 'Nuclear Weapons and Issues of Security'.

79. Roy, 'The End of Imagination', 95–102.
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The Opposition to the Brazilian Nuclear Programme, 1972–88

Carlo Patti

Introduction

‘We do not have the objective of making an atomic bomb, but if it is necessary, we are going to build it’, General Haroldo Erichsen da Fonseca, head of Brazil’s army’s science and technology secretariat, publicly declared in March 1987.¹ A few months earlier, in December 1986, Dr Rex Nazaré Alves, Chairman of the Brazilian National Nuclear Energy Commission (CNEN), admitted to the press that Brazil had a ‘secret’ nuclear programme, which had begun during the military dictatorship (1964–85). The ultimate goal, according to Alves, was not building a bomb, but mastering the nuclear fuel cycle.² Brazil had opposed the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) of 1968 and supported the creation of a national nuclear complex. The vision for a nuclear Brazil relied on a multibillion agreement with West Germany signed in 1975, which aimed to provide the technologies and reactors necessary to turn Brazil into a country that was fully capable of producing atomic energy, leveraging its vast mineral resources. A few years after the agreement, the implementation of the West German–Brazilian pact faced significant challenges due to technical reasons and growing international constraints, driven by stricter norms for the trade of nuclear materials and technologies for countries that were not part of the NPT. This situation led the Brazilian government to opt for secret nuclear projects that were not covered by International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards. The secret nuclear programme also included the possible design and construction of atomic devices, even if they were intended for peaceful purposes.

Despite the official rejection of claims about Brazil’s nuclear weapon capability and intentions, Erichsen de Fonseca’s statements were not isolated.

Other high-ranking military officials, such as the powerful army minister Leônidas Pires Gonçalves, supported the possibility of Brazil developing nuclear explosives. These public declarations augmented the domestic tension while a Constituent Assembly, convoked after the end of the military regime, also debated a possible ban on atomic energy. The elaboration of a new constitution was a crucial part of the democratisation process. Unlike the recent authoritarian past, the new political environment allowed open and public opposition to governmental nuclear choices. Fonseca's proposal for the necessity of a nuclear bomb, issued a few months after the Chernobyl accident and the revelations about the existence of a secret nuclear project, sparked anti-nuclear, pacifist and green movements. These movements, led by congressmen Fabio Feldman and Fernando Cunha, may not have achieved nuclear disarmament, but ensured the awakening of civil society. Nuclear scientists, political and social movements that had criticised past Brazilian choices in the atomic field felt vindicated when the 1988 Brazilian Constitution formally limited nuclear activities solely to peaceful uses.

Protagonists of this effort, such as the physicist José Goldemberg and the environmentalist José Lutzenberger, became cabinet members of the government of Fernando Collor (1990–92), the first directly elected President in thirty years. Goldemberg, Secretary of Science and Technology, and Lutzenberger, Special Secretary of the Environment, were crucial in dismantling the remaining aspects of secrecy around the atomic programme. In the past, they manifested their strong criticism against the government nuclear technological choice and possible atomic weapon ambitions.

Despite the importance of this movement, the opposition to the Brazilian nuclear programme and its international connections (above all in Western Europe) remains understudied. A few scholarly works have tackled the issue, but have neglected to trace the evolution of the opposition back to governmental nuclear decisions and its various facets.³ Popular narrative has long considered that the country's atomic programme was free from criticism until Brazil's return to democracy. However, strong evidence demonstrates how since the beginning of the nuclear age, scientists had resisted the governmental choices in the atomic field and their lack of transparency. It was their polemic stance that sparked public opposition to the secret nuclear programme at the end of the military regime. This chapter will shed light on this missing narrative. It will rely heavily on primary sources from Brazil (the National Archive, the Foreign Ministry archive and personal papers from private archives), the United States (the National Archive and Record Administration), Great Britain (the National Archive), France (diplomatic archives at La Courneuve) and Germany (the foreign ministry archive). Moreover, oral history interviews enriched this research.

This study aims to trace the period from 1972, when the first critical voices against the Brazilian nuclear programme emerged, to 1988, with the promulgation of the new Constitution. This chapter will be divided into three sections. The first section will discuss the strong opposition towards Brazil's technological choices and, in particular, the acceptance of an unproven uranium enrichment technique from West Germany. The second section will deal with the growing criticism towards the deal with Bonn and the influence of the country's nascent environmentalist movement. The third section will touch upon the activities of the anti-nuclear movement, composed of activists from scientific, political and social fields, in the context of full democratisation from 1979 to 1988.

The Opposition over Technological Choices (1972–78)

Since the mid-1940s, Brazil had a keen interest in setting up a national atomic programme. Rich in atomic mineral reserves (above all thorium and, supposedly, uranium), the Latin American country saw this new energy source as key to its future economic development. With an economy heavily reliant on exporting coffee until the early 1960s, Brazil set out to support the country's industrialisation and diversify its income, with projects in the atomic field initially set up in 1951. The government established the National Research Council (CNPq – Conselho Nacional de Pesquisa) and, then, the Brazilian Nuclear Energy National Commission (CNEN – Comissão Nacional de Energia Nuclear). Despite ambitious goals of achieving autonomy in the field, Brazilian actions were largely limited to scientific research and cooperation with the United States through the 'Atoms for Peace' programme.⁴

Since the beginning of the nuclear age, the governmental policies provoked fierce criticism from the national scientific community and sections of the public opinion. Concerns were raised over the export of atomic minerals to the United States. The revelation that Brazil's authorities exported monazite sands to Washington without technological compensations in the nuclear field (as required by the national legislation) led Brazil's Congress to set up a parliamentary commission of inquiry in 1956. It investigated the US interference in Brazil's domestic nuclear choices. The debate revealed a sharp internal division between the partisans of the cooperation with the United States (the so-called *entreguistas*) and those who supported an autonomous path towards the mastery of nuclear energy (the *nationalists*). This tension would characterise the nation's long atomic history. In the late 1950s, when Brazil's developmental strategy aimed at building one or two nuclear power plants in the country, the choice to depend on US atomic energy companies prompted a

nationalist reaction from the scientific community that supported complete autonomy in the nuclear field. Supported by nationalist congressmen, this group of scientists published a manifesto in defence of a nationally designed and manufactured nuclear reactor, fuelled by thorium, a mineral that was abundant in Brazil.⁵ Budget limitations, a growing inflationary crisis and a chaotic political situation impeded the country from expanding its atomic sector. It ended up with only three research reactors for scientific use, despite the passing of the 1962 legislation that defended autonomy in the nuclear field and the development of a natural uranium nuclear power reactor.

Alongside the talks of establishing a nuclear energy programme, the Brazilian government was promoting global nuclear disarmament and nuclear nonproliferation. It actively participated in the United Nations (UN) Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee (ENDC), which gathered from 1962 to 1968 to negotiate a global disarmament and nuclear nonproliferation treaty. Brazil also promoted a Latin American Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone (NWFZ). All these initiatives were a direct consequence of the Cuban missile crisis, and the threat of using atomic devices in the region. The 1964 coup, which inaugurated a twenty-one-year period of military rule, would substantially change Brazil's diplomatic attitude. Brazil signed and ratified a treaty that prohibited nuclear weapons in the region, but refused full-scope inspections and left the door open to peaceful nuclear explosives. The decision allowed the country to produce atomic devices, but justified this on the grounds of scientific and developmental aims. Marshal Arthur da Costa e Silva, the nationalist President who ruled Brazil from 1967 to 1969, defended the idea of having 'a device that can explode', not a bomb.⁶ His government also announced new guidelines for a nuclear policy that should master the nuclear fuel cycle. This policy mirrored the country's stance in the negotiations over the NPT. Brazil's representatives at the ENDC criticised the treaty as an unfair instrument that deepened the divide between nuclear and non-nuclear countries. It was the beginning of a thirty-year opposition to the agreement. The United States and the Soviet Union strongly condemned the Brazilian position, but no domestic criticism emerged. On the contrary, nationalist forces (both from the left and the right) praised the decision that was considered as a signal of nuclear independence and political autonomy from the superpowers. Since the early 1960s, several politicians, military officials and scientists opposed accepting any possible denuclearisation agreement. The NPT, but also the treaty for the imposition of a Latin American NWFZ, were seen as possible obstacles towards the full mastery of nuclear energy in the future. Both international agreements would impose limits on the construction of atomic devices along with the IAEA international supervision over the nuclear activities of the country.

The academic community also supported the official policy of having a research group working on national-designed thorium reactors, based in the Institute of Radioactive Research (IPR – Instituto de Pesquisas Radioativas) in Belo Horizonte. The tiny nuclear research groups were in line with the governmental decisions and the nation's programme to grant autonomy in all phases of production of nuclear energy (from mining to the construction of power plants). The situation changed when the military regime, after an international bid, opted for light-water reactors fuelled by enriched uranium. According to a 1971 agreement, the United States would provide Brazil with a turnkey nuclear power plant and nuclear fuel. The participation of the national industry would be limited to the construction of few components. A national atomic complex that would involve industry and research centres was one of the goals of the military regime's economic plans. A new public company, the Brazilian Company for Nuclear Technology (CBTN – Companhia Brasileira de Tecnologia Nuclear), a subsidiary of the CNEN, would supervise and plan the following steps of the nuclear projects. The creation of the CBTN, while an old demand of the scientific community, failed to involve researchers from Brazil's universities. Prominent Brazilian atomic scientists, such as Marcelo Damy de Souza Santos (former CNEN chairman and head of the department of physics of the State University of Campinas) and José Goldemberg (physicist from the State University of São Paulo), strongly criticised Brazil's nuclear choices.⁷ Dependency on the United States and supply of external nuclear fuel were deemed too dangerous in the quest for autonomy. The Brazilian Society of Physics (SBF – Sociedade Brasileira de Física) and the Brazilian Society for the Progress of Science (SBPC – Sociedade Brasileira para o Progresso da Ciência) both condemned the policy.⁸ It was an important, albeit isolated reaction against the decisions of the military regime. Brazil's agreement with the United States coincided with the most repressive moment of the dictatorship. Recently declassified files of Brazil's intelligence reveal that Brazilian nuclear scientists were under the close surveillance of the National Service of Information (SNI – Serviço Nacional de Informação), one of the leading institutions of the regime. The SNI strategy was to portray any form of criticism against the government as a sign of a pro-communist position, incompetence or anti-national sentiment. Atomic scientist Marcelo Damy, as revealed in the US files from the 1950s and 1960s, was also depicted as a leftist.⁹ Despite this, criticism, though limited and censored, persisted.

In early 1974, the new President, General Ernesto Geisel, began a slow and controlled ten-year-long democratisation process. This process included the dismantling of the dictatorship's most repressive institutional acts, creating new parties (abandoning the two-party system established in 1966),

enacting the 1979 amnesty law (that involved both members of the military apparatus and regime opponents) and, eventually, holding an indirect election for a new democratic president. At the beginning of the 1970s, Brazil experienced an economic boom that was interrupted by the 1973 oil crisis, which provoked an inflationary crisis. In response to oil dependency, Geisel's government (1974–79) decided to expand the nuclear sector and to reach full nuclear autonomy. The US decision not to provide Brazil with the complete nuclear fuel cycle, reactor technologies and nuclear fuel drove Brazil to seek an alternative partnership with West Germany. The 1974 Indian 'Smiling Buddha' nuclear test did not impede Bonn from cooperating with a government that, like India, opposed the NPT and defended the option of peaceful nuclear explosives (PNEs). On 27 June 1975, a multibillion agreement guaranteed Brazil the gradual acquisition of the entire nuclear fuel cycle, including reactor manufacturing capabilities and sensitive dual-use technologies, such as spent fuel reprocessing and uranium enrichment. The agreement was met with a burst of national pride. The collaboration with Bonn would enable Brazil to master atomic power, an essential element of national greatness for the military government.¹⁰ The domestic press and the national Congress also praised the deal. Abroad, despite nonproliferation commitments contained in the agreement, leading foreign newspapers and US officials and Congress members saw it as a concrete step towards Brazil's nuclear weaponisation.¹¹ They believed the deal could threaten the nascent atomic nonproliferation regime and that other nuclear aspirants might emulate Brazil. Many analysts, both in Latin America and elsewhere, viewed it as a clear signal of a potential nuclear arms race between Brazil and Argentina, the country's historical rival, even though the last conflict between the two had occurred more than a century earlier.

Foreign criticism aside, several voices within Brazil condemned the deal. Luis Carlos Prestes, the charismatic leader of the Brazilian Communist Party, echoed Moscow's position, highlighting the risks to international peace posed by Brazil's potential nuclearisation and calling for the country's adhesion to the NPT.¹² A Brazilian congressman from the opposition party criticised the West German–Brazilian nuclear cooperation at the Brazilian Chamber of Deputies.¹³ Reflecting the position of the Brazilian Society of Physics, particularly scientists like Marcelo Damy, José Goldemberg and José Israel Varga), the deputy noted that the West Germans included an unproven uranium enrichment method in the agreement: the jet-nozzle technique. Considered less dangerous from a nonproliferation perspective, the Germans opted for this method over the ultracentrifuge technique due to commercial and security concerns (West Germany would need authorisation from Urenco partners to cede centrifuge enrichment technologies). This choice prompted an adverse reaction from

the Brazilian scientific community and the dissatisfaction among members of Brazilian nascent nuclear complex.¹⁴ The scientists openly criticised the creation of a new public enterprise, Nuclebrás, led by Brazilian diplomat and principal negotiator of the deal, Paulo Nogueira Batista. Nuclebrás, which replaced the CBTN, was tasked with overseeing the agreement's implementation by creating several Brazilian–German joint ventures to handle various aspects of the cooperation. Despite the CNEN research centres being placed under the new enterprise's control, Brazil's academia continued to be excluded.

Although President Geisel was aware of the troublesome aspects of the cooperation, from 1975 to 1978, the Brazilian government defended the deal even in the face of constant US attacks, both from Congress and above all from the newly elected Carter administration. All political parties criticised the foreign interference in Brazil's domestic affairs. Argentina and other Third World countries expressed their solidarity against a US policy that sought to curtail the peaceful use of nuclear energy in the developing world. Both Argentina and Brazil resisted the US strategy to impose nonproliferation commitments.¹⁵ However, during the 1976 IAEA General Conference in Rio de Janeiro, Brazilian and Argentine top nuclear scientists discussed giving up the PNE option and promoting deeper cooperation between their countries. This was a clear signal that fruitful collaboration could replace the supposed rivalry. The major Southern Cone countries began their nuclear rapprochement in 1979, and an agreement in 1980 marked the first step towards creating a bilateral mechanism for mutual control and accounting of nuclear activities and materials.

Alongside American disapproval, the Brazilian authorities began to face increasing domestic and foreign criticism over their cooperation with Bonn. In early 1977, the Dutch Parliament threatened to cut the Urenco fuel supply to Brazil due to nonproliferation concerns. Christian and pacifist movements were not convinced by the safeguards proposed to cover the atomic activities.¹⁶ A direct Dutch–Brazilian negotiation would temporarily resolve the conundrum, even as Brasília's authorities began to show scepticism towards the agreement's implementation. Domestically, the national press reported the possible flaws in the gigantic nuclear programme. The Brazilian cabinet began internal discussions over alternatives to dependence on Bonn. Growing economic troubles, mismanagement and doubts about the enrichment method to be transferred prompted a downscaling of the nuclear programme. Geisel requested assessments from José Goldemberg and Israel Vargas, two prominent Brazilian nuclear scientists, regarding the West German uranium enrichment laboratories. After visiting Karlsruhe nuclear centres, the two renowned nuclear scientists confirmed their negative evaluation of the jet-nozzle technology developed in 'dusty laboratories'.¹⁷

Meanwhile, hundreds of West German scientists signed a petition against the deal, arguing that it could allow Brazil to produce a bomb. Moreover, *Der Spiegel*, one of West Germany's leading magazines, reported scandals of corruption and pointed out flaws in the deal. The extent of the international scandal led the Brazilian Congress to commission a parliamentary inquiry. Chaired by the then senator and future President Itamar Franco, the commission concluded its work after four years, recommending the revision of the deal along the lines suggested by Brazilian scientists.¹⁸ It was a clear victory for the forces opposing the deal and a signal of the imminent changes in the country's nuclear policy.

Fear of Nuclear Weapons Projects and Environmental Protesting

At the very end of the Geisel administration, in March 1979, the government approved the establishment of secret and nuclear projects free from IAEA control. The secret programme would be parallel to the civilian programme emanating from the deal with Bonn. The impossibility of reaching nuclear autonomy through the cooperation with Bonn and stricter limitations to the nuclear trade imposed by the Carter administration led Brazil to create a secret programme free from international interference. Military research centres, the CNEN and university research centres would jointly collaborate with the aim of achieving autonomous mastery of key-sensitive technologies of the nuclear fuel cycle. In less than seven years, Brazil's scientists achieved the complete control of an indigenous ultracentrifuge uranium isotopic separation method. Many members of Brazil's universities that had previously opposed the deal with the Germans supported those activities, since they directly involved the academic community and respected the requests for production of national technology. However, the programme (officially known as the Autonomous Programme of Nuclear Technology [PATN]: Programa Autônomo de Tecnologia Nuclear) did not involve exclusively dual-use technologies (spent fuel reprocessing techniques were mastered at a laboratorial scale in São Paulo), but also the development of graphite reactors that could produce plutonium and the design and creation of nuclear devices for peaceful purposes. The last two projects were coordinated respectively by the Army and the Air Force, without civilian supervision. For a few years the programme would remain secret.¹⁹

In the late 1970s, Brazilian civil society was influenced by the rise of the international green movement. The Three Mile Island nuclear accident in 1979 prompted environmentalists to demand safer forms of energy

production. The rise of social movements became integral to the democratisation process, allowing the first manifestations of public discontent. Environmental protests, coupled with economic hardship, led to the downscaling of Brazil's ambitions to build several nuclear power plants. The most important cases occurred in the regions of São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro. In the original plans, Nuclebrás intended to build the Iguape I and II reactors in an area of environmental preservation in the state of São Paulo. However, strong reactions from the local community contributed to the decision to abandon the construction. One of the main legacies of the battle was the endurance of active environmentalist movements that continue even today.²⁰

In Angra dos Reis, a city on the coast of the state of Rio de Janeiro, the building of the first nuclear power reactor suffered continuous delays because of engineering miscalculations. Geological problems (since the plant was built on the beach of Itaorna – literally 'rotten stone' in the indigenous language) were also threatening the construction. From 1980 onwards, local associations manifested possible environmental and safety problems and requested the suspension of the construction. In the same place, three reactors were supposed to provide energy to both the states of Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo. This marked the beginning of a long fight between the government on the one side, and the local population, and the oppositional political anti-nuclear associations on the other side. The 'Hiroshima Nunca Mais' (Hiroshima Never Again) movement organised public discussions over nuclear energy in the region immediately after the inauguration of the first atomic reactor in 1982. 'Hiroshima Nunca Mais' involved the former exiles and political activists Fernando Gabeira and Alfredo Sarkis, who had been participants of the revolutionary movements during the military regime and pre-eminent politicians at the beginning of the democratisation period. The anti-nuclear actions gradually involved political parties such as the Workers Party (also present in the Iguape protests) and the newly created Green Party (Partido Verde). Alongside the first anti-nuclear movements, hundreds of *hibakusha*, survivors of the atomic explosions in Hiroshima and Nagasaki who moved to Brazil after the war, created the Association of the Survivors of the Atomic Bomb (Associação dos Sobreviventes da Bomba Atômica). Until that moment, Brazil's *hibakushas* had not publicly manifested their presence in the country due to fear of possible social discrimination. Initially, the survivors created an association to claim economic compensation and medical assistance from the Japanese government. However, their focus later shifted to promoting the memory of the nuclear bombings and advocating for nuclear disarmament.²¹ The anti-nuclear protests in the early 1980s prompted the inclusion of the environmental issue in the national political agenda.²²

While the environmentalist movement was growing, rumours about the secret nuclear programme emerged, sending shockwaves across the scientific community. The French and US intelligence services were suspicious of the secret activities that Brazil's scientists were conducting at São Paulo's Institute of Nuclear Energy Research (IPEN – Instituto de Pesquisa em Energia Nuclear) in conjunction with the Navy. *Folha de São Paulo*, one of the leading dailies of the country, reported accounts of the autonomous parallel programme in 1981. Scientific societies, such as the SBF and the SBPC, were concerned about the issue, even if many members were not convinced of the ultimate goal of the programme. *The Guardian* reported that CNEN and the military could in a few years obtain plutonium thanks to a new sodium reactor being built in Rio de Janeiro.²³ Brazilian society was in the dark about clandestine international transactions that allowed the country to acquire a significant amount of enriched uranium from China. Moreover, the Brazilian population was not aware of a proposal to build and test a nuclear device that the Minister of the Air Force submitted in 1984 to João Figueiredo, the last President of the military regime.²⁴

It was during the last year of the dictatorship that many intellectuals, politicians, religious leaders and other public figures coalesced around the pacifist movement. Numerous people, such as the Catholic Cardinal of São Paulo Evaristo Arns, the football players Sócrates Oliveira and Walter Casagrande (protagonists of the Corinthians team experience of self-management), Luiz Carlos Prestes and Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (leader of the Workers Party and a future Brazilian president) requested the end of any possibility of nuclear war. As in the past, the regime intelligence described the organisation as a clear leftist movement. The Air Force information service rejected the accusations of the pacifists as a sign of political actions.²⁵ The pacifist position was not isolated. The concern of the international scientific community over a possible nuclear arms race led the Pugwash Conference on Science and World Affairs, an international organization that brings together scholars and public figures to work toward reducing the danger of armed conflict and to seek solutions to global security threats, to organise its annual conference at the State University of Campinas, a city close to São Paulo. As the minutes of the meeting reveal, the scientists denounced possible secret atomic activities in both Brazil and Argentina, and requested both governments to give up the nuclear weapon option.²⁶

The Pugwash gathering happened a few months after the dramatic transition from the military to the democratic government. In January 1985, the Brazilian Congress (whose members were still voted under the rules imposed by the military regime) elected the opposition leader Tancredo Neves and his running mate, José Sarney, as the new President and Vice-President

of Brazil. Neves, who was supposed to continue his support for the autonomous nuclear programme, died of a sudden illness. Sarney, who took over, ruled the country in the middle of a debt and inflationary crisis, and would partially follow Neves' policy for the next five years. But Sarney was not alone; he had to rely on several military ministers, like General Leônidas Pires, who controlled the Army. The nuclear programme therefore became a delicate issue to deal with, even if the new President would take significant steps to deepen the collaboration with Argentina from 1985 to 1989. Moreover, Brazil's new government established a blue-ribbon commission to assess all future nuclear projects in the country. José Israel Vargas would head the commission composed of scientists such as Marcelo Damy, former chairman of the Brazilian National Nuclear Energy Commission. The commission's recommendations, which were only made public in 1990, pointed to the need to merge civilian and military programmes, and praised domestic efforts to reach the capability of enriching uranium with the creation of a centrifuge cascade in 1986.

Technological and scientific advances in line with the scientists' recommendations of the 1970s were achieved. Nuclear autonomy could give the country key tools for its development, but new scandals characterised the first two years of the Sarney presidency. In early 1985, reporters from *Folha de São Paulo* discovered the existence of at least one nuclear test site in the Air Force base of Serra do Cachimbo (in the state of Pará) in the Amazon region.²⁷ The Air Force designed and built nuclear shafts in the early 1980s that were to be used in project *Solimões* (the codename for the peaceful nuclear explosives project conducted by the Air Force). The government, through the CNEN and the military, immediately rejected the accusation and declared that the tunnels were designed as disposals of nuclear waste. Brazil's Ministry of Foreign Affairs reiterated that the holes were repositories of spent radiological and nuclear material in special notes to Argentina, a country particularly concerned during this period of rapid rapprochement in the nuclear field. Scientists and engineers close to the government publicly declared that there were no geological conditions for a nuclear test site at the Air Force base. The news ignited negative reactions from the civil society and had a vigorous impact on the pacifist, indigenist and environmentalist movements.

Representatives of tribes living in a restricted indigenous area close to the military base protested against the Air Force activities. They requested clarifications from the government. The presence of radioactive waste could undermine the environmental conditions of the area and the traditions of the tribes.²⁸ The military authorities dismissed the issue. When the news was published, scientists had mixed reactions. At the beginning, some

researchers declared that the country had no intention of building an atomic bomb. However, when more detailed information surfaced from Serra do Cachimbo and the military and civilian nuclear research centres, the attitude of many members of the scientific community changed. This was the case for Ênio Candotti and Rogério Cerqueira Leite.²⁹ Growing suspicions led José Goldemberg, President of the University of São Paulo and Chairman of the SBPC, to submit directly to President Sarney a proposal to give up the right to build peaceful nuclear explosives. According to Goldemberg, Brazil's renouncement to PNEs would eliminate international concerns, above all in the context of the forthcoming 1985 NPT review conference. Brazil's Foreign Ministry recommended that the proposal should be firmly rejected, which was considered a signal of the possible external interference in Brazil's domestic affairs.³⁰

The most dramatic decisions over nuclear energy would be taken by the National Constituent Assembly that gathered in 1986 to discuss the new Brazilian Constitution. One of the issues under discussion was the future of nuclear energy in the country. Despite the ambitious 1975 deal, Brazil only inaugurated the US-provided Angra 1 nuclear power reactor in 1985 after significant delays. The cooperation with West Germany yielded no substantial results and was seen as a negative legacy from former administrations. Moreover, nuclear energy was undergoing a deep crisis after the 1986 Chernobyl accident in the Soviet Union, leading to a global perception of nuclear reactors as sources of threat. Countries with several nuclear power plants, such as Italy, decided to abandon such form of energy, and Brazil considered following suit. However, two episodes complicated Brazil's nuclear trajectory.

The first occurred in September 1987 when President Sarney announced that the country had mastered uranium enrichment technologies, signalling future complete autonomy in the field. While Sarney guaranteed Brazil's peaceful intentions, the declaration surprised many countries, apart from Argentina, which had been previously informed. The President and the CNEN Chairman emphasised that the country had no plans to build a bomb. However, a few weeks later, the mismanagement of an abandoned teletherapy machine caused the worst civilian radiological accident in the world. In Goiânia, a city close to Brasília, hundreds of people were contaminated by caesium contained in a teletherapy instrument. A task force was deployed to decontaminate the city, thanks to the joint effort of local, national and international authorities. Environmental associations, with support from the West German Green Party, denounced the lack of control by the CNEN. Criticisms over the government's lack of transparency also emerged in the state of São Paulo, in the area where the new nuclear

Navy facilities were inaugurated. The local population were in the dark over activities conducted in a former farm close to the city of Iperó. The new Aramar Navy experimental centre, inaugurated by President Sarney and his Argentine homologue, Raul Alfonsín, had been created without involving the local authorities, who strongly protested against the decision. The growing opposition to the nuclear programme became a focal point of political debate within the Constituent Assembly.

The Final Battle over Nuclear Energy at the National Constituent Assembly (1987–88)

One of the main steps in Brazil's democratisation process was the redrafting of the Brazilian Constitution to replace the one imposed by the military dictatorship in 1967. One of the policies the deputies debated was the future of nuclear energy. The military, the supporters of the past regime and the nuclear authorities wanted a sector free from constraints. However, the lack of transparency and the previous limited involvement of the population in the decisions over Brazil's use of atomic energy encouraged constitutional limitations on the nuclear sector. There were three different approaches on the table: the first included a ban on the use of nuclear energy or a limitation to peaceful purposes; the second involved maintaining the atomic sector under state control, avoiding any possible privatisation; and the third focused on preserving the Brazilian atomic minerals by limiting the export to specific compensations.

The opposition to Brazil's nuclear programme, as it had been shaped during the military regime and substantially maintained by President Sarney, was split in two different wings. On the one side, the scientific community, led by José Goldemberg, supported limitation of atomic energy exclusively for peaceful purposes and banning the possible fabrication, transportation or importation of nuclear devices. According to this proposal, Brazil's President would be ultimately responsible for implementing the prohibition. The new Constitution should also explicitly impede 'governmental members with megalomaniac and warmonger attitudes' from building nuclear bombs.³¹ On the other side, political forces close to pacifism and environmentalism requested a total ban of nuclear energy. Deputies Fabio Feldman and Fernando Cunha (both from the Party of the Movement for Brazilian Democracy) were the most vocal members of this group and on several occasions denounced the ambitions of the military to build a bomb. Moreover, the accidents in Chernobyl and Goiânia provided strong examples of the risks connected to the lack of strict control of nuclear power

plants and radiological equipment. The military authorities also send mixed signals. Several generals along with Army Minister Leônidas Pires Gonçalves defended the nuclear option. Analyses from international and domestic commentators reported that Brazil could build its bomb in a few years. Banning any possibility to construct an atomic device could be the solution to dissipate proliferation risks.

The National Constituent Assembly ultimately decided the future of atomic energy in the country. Thanks to a bilateral consensus, despite a few opponents, atomic and other strategic minerals would remain under state control. Similarly, the nuclear sector would remain public, without possible private interventions. While nuclear energy was not banned, pacifist movements and progressive political parties urged the country to renounce the right to peaceful nuclear explosives. The major battlefield was over Article 21 of the new Brazilian Constitution. Feldman, the environmentalists and members from the Workers Party requested an explicit prohibition of nuclear devices. In contrast, the rest of the political parties proposed an alternative formula: limiting nuclear energy to peaceful purposes. This proposal was heavenly supported by the military, the nuclear energy associations and the CNEN. All these institutions, with the key support of Brazil's National Security Council (an institution that would be dissolved just after the end of the Assembly's works), lobbied the congressmen to avoid further limitation to Brazil's nuclear activities.

Rallies around the country, above all after the Goiânia accident, supported a comprehensive prohibition to explosive activities and were generally oriented against nuclear energy. The tension over the issue ran high. Political leaders Fernando Henrique Cardoso and Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (Presidents in the period from 1995 to 2010) voted against the proposal.³² However, at the final vote, the nuclear lobby won. The CNEN celebrated it as a victory. Brazil's civilian and military programmes would continue. The opponents to military nuclear activities were not utterly disheartened as they scored some important points. The nuclear programme would be under the scrutiny of the National Congress and the final word over key decisions would be left to the President.³³ In a context of dismantlement of the institutions of the military regime, pacifist and environmentalist movements obtained more transparency over nuclear issues, even if, at least temporarily, the military would keep their projects and the 'parallel' activities not covered by international safeguards for guaranteeing the peaceful use of nuclear energy.

The newly stated limitations on the use of nuclear energy allowed Brazil to project itself to the world as a peaceful country, but without ambiguous intentions. Doubts over the government's future intentions in the nuclear

realm continued in the following years. The situation changed abruptly in 1989, when the young politician Fernando Collor de Melo won the first free general elections in thirty years. Collor did not conform to the previous nuclear authorities and picked two anti-nuclear heavyweights for his new cabinet. José Goldemberg was appointed Secretary of Science and José Lutzemberger, the recipient of the alternate Nobel Prize for his environmentalist fight, the Secretary of the Environment. The newly elected President openly attacked Brazil's nuclear past and definitively lifted international suspicions, when he closed the nuclear test shafts in Serra do Cachimbo in September 1990. In a few years, the Latin American country established a bilateral nonproliferation agency with Argentina, accepted the Treaty of Tlatelolco along with full scope safeguards, and eventually signed and ratified the NPT. Despite the continuation of key military centres (above all the Navy's capability for uranium enrichment and nuclear submarines), the nuclear sector would be under the control of civilian authorities. It was a victory for the opposition and anti-nuclear movements that had been voicing their concerns since the early 1970s.

Conclusion

Before embarking on its road to democracy, Brazil did not have an anti-nuclear movement. The scientific community initially voiced its concerns over Brazil's weaponisation and the possible threats of nuclear energy on the environment, and gradually different segments of civil society joined the cause. The anti-nuclear movement in the country echoed similar concerns to other global peace protests opposing nuclear war, but its evolution and demands followed a different trajectory. Although the movement never reached the heights seen in West Germany and the United Kingdom, Brazil's anti-nuclear movements were the strongest in South America. In Argentina, the only other country with a significant atomic programme in the continent, there was almost no criticism against nuclear energy until the mid-1990s.³⁴

Opposition to the Brazilian nuclear programme was multifaceted. It began not as a critique of atomic energy, but as a protest against the government's decision to depend on cooperation with other countries. From the 1950s to the 1980s, many scientists aimed for autonomy in the context of expanding research activities in the country. A small atomic programme was contested alongside the decision not to develop national technologies. In agreement with scientists from other developing countries, the Brazilians rejected dependency on external supplies of nuclear fuel and technologies. Additionally, part of the scientific community sought to avoid external

interference that would force to accept nonproliferation agreements. This stance was evident even before the military regime and persisted in the subsequent years.

During the dictatorship, any opposition to nuclear choices, particularly the nuclear agreement with Germany, was censored. Nevertheless, the criticism from renowned nuclear scientists against the technologies to be provided by West Germany – such as the unproven jet-nozzle unproven enrichment method – led President Geisel to adopt a new strategy that included setting up secret nuclear projects to achieve autonomy. This was a partial victory for scientists who criticised the exclusion of the universities from nuclear decisions. Geisel's decision ignited the collaboration between military and civilian research centres that would ultimately lead to the mastery of an indigenous uranium enrichment technology. However, while autonomy could be reached, the military could keep the door open to a possible nuclear weapon option. The initiation of secret civilian-military autonomous projects in 1979 coincided with Brazil's democratic opening and growing global criticism against nuclear energy, influenced by the resurgence of the Cold War and the Three Mile Island accident. This historical moment gave the scientists, local communities and political movements the opportunity to openly criticise Brazil's nuclear policy, above all for the environmental impact of constructing atomic facilities and power plants. On the one hand, the end of censorship allowed the press to reveal ambiguous aspects of the nuclear programme, such as the existence of nuclear test shafts. On the other hand, it enabled anti-nuclear protests to be included in the local and national political agenda.

This chapter demonstrates how protest against nuclear energy in Brazil prompted positive outcomes for all the actors involved in opposing governmental decisions. The scientific community achieved its goal of mastering indigenous nuclear technology and limiting the use of atomic energy to peaceful purposes. Social movements ensured Congressional control of the nuclear sector, and environmental associations secured more transparent oversight of nuclear-related activities. Additionally, the anti-nuclear movements promoted environmental protection as a policy priority for democratic governments (at least until 2018). Another significant element to consider is that the pressure from opposition to the nuclear programme was among the factors leading to the Brazilian–Argentine nuclear rapprochement.

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Notes

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2. Hurtado, *El sueño de la Argentina atómica*, 264.
3. Cameron, 'Technology, Politics, and Development', 6; Chaves, 'O programa nuclear e a construção da democracia'; Dalaqua, 'Átomos e Democracia no Brasil', 200–8.
4. The first Brazilian attempts to acquire key sensitive technologies from West Germany and uranium refinement techniques from France were constrained. On the first years of Brazil's atomic activities, see Patti, 'The Origins of the Brazilian Nuclear Programme'.
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8. French Embassy Brasília to Paris, 9 March 1974, Lettre n.1357. 185–15-6-2. AMRE-F.
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11. Ibid.
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13. Cameron, 'Technology, Politics, and Development'; Chaves, 'O programa nuclear e a construção da democracia'.
14. Maurício Grinberg, interview with the author, Rio de Janeiro, 12 February 2012.

15. On the issue, see Patti and Mallea, 'American Seeds of ABACC?.'
16. On the Dutch opposition, see Krass et al., *Uranium Enrichment and Nuclear Weapon Proliferation*, 223.
17. Interview with José Goldemberg in Patti, *O programa nuclear brasileiro: uma história oral*, 239–40. On the visit to West Germany, see also *Besuch Brasilianischer Kritiker des deutsch-Brasilianischen Kernenergie Abkommens in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland*. Bonn to FRG Embassy Brasília. 15 September 1978. Deutsch Brasilianische Zusammenarbeit im nuklearen Bereich Nuklearpolitik 1974 1984. Archive of the Foreign Ministry of the Federal Republic of Germany (hereinafter PA/AA).
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20. On the case of the protest against Iguape I and II, see Chaves, 'O programa nuclear e a construção da democracia', 95–104.
21. Loula, A 'Associação Hibakusha Brasil pela Paz' e os sobreviventes de Hiroshima e Nagasaki no Brasil, 46–60; Jacobs, *Nuclear Bodies*.
22. Chaves, 'O programa nuclear e a construção da democracia', 95–104, 86–88.
23. Kucinski, 'Status of Nuclear Development Reported'.
24. Patti, *Brazil in the Global Nuclear Order*, 135–36.
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29. 28 April 1985, 'Para Cerqueira Leite, não existe a 'vontade' de se chegar à arma', *Folha de São Paulo*: 25. Rogério Cerqueira Leite, phone interview with the author, 3 March 2020.

30. On Goldemberg's proposal, see: Patti, *Brazil in the Global Nuclear Order*, 148–49.
31. Deputy Fernando Cunha (PMDB) proposed the amendment on 3 September 1987. See Emenda ES27954-8 in Senado Federal, *Projeto de Constituição. Emendas oferecidas em plenário substitutivo do relator. Volume III. Emendas 27037 a 311127* (Brasília: Centro Gráfico do Senado Federal, 1988), 1743. Other members supporting the proposal were Sarney Filho (son of Brazil's president) and Fábio Feldmann (PMDB). Cunha also proposed a plebiscite over the continuation of the nuclear programme. Emenda ES28346-4 in Senado Federal, *Projeto de Constituição. Vol. III*, 1832. On the debate on nuclear energy in the National Constituent Assembly, see Chaves, 'O programa nuclear e a construção da democracia, 134–39; Lopes Esteves, *A constitucionalização da questão nuclear no Brasil*'.
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North Korea's Anti-nuclear Paradox, 1949–76

Soon-Ok Shin

Introduction

In 1960, on the occasion of the tenth anniversary of the outbreak of the Korean War, the government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (hereinafter DPRK or North Korea) issued a Peace Appeal, which stated that 'contrary to the earnest desire of the whole world at the time of the cease-fire in Korea, Korea has not yet been unified, armistice has not been converted into a lasting peace and the dark clouds of war hovering over the heads of the Korean people have not been dispelled'.¹ More than seventy years on, the Korean Peninsula has still not been unified, nor has the armistice treaty been replaced with an end-of-war declaration, let alone a peace treaty. Meanwhile, North Korea, while pledging a normative commitment to denuclearisation simultaneously emphasised the inevitability of nuclear development in response to a hostile United States.² North Korea crossed the nuclear threshold in 2006 and solidified its status as a de facto nuclear power after conducting five additional tests between 2009 and 2017.³

Given the nature of the regime in the DPRK, it is not possible to identify distinct 'grassroots' anti-nuclear activities, such as those described in other chapters in this volume, from state-sponsored propaganda. Rather, anti-nuclear rallies and campaigns in North Korea were coordinated by the state and, in many cases, with the Cominform-backed World Peace Council. Therefore, 'anti-nuclearism' is preferred in this chapter to describe the characteristics of Pyongyang's state-directed anti-nuclear engagement. The chapter argues that a nuclear-inferior Pyongyang felt it necessary to engage in normative nuclear politics and advocate for the international peace and anti-nuclear movement as a means of condemning and deterring nuclear-armed Cold War

enemies. In doing so, North Korea conveniently legitimised its *Juche* sovereign rule and advocacy of Korean unification.⁴ The chapter investigates the geopolitical conditions in which Pyongyang's discourse of peace and anti-nuclearism were shaped, explores North Korea's framing of 'peace' within the context of the emergent Cold War confrontation and examines how the values, interests and beliefs that Pyongyang attached to peace and nuclear weapons influenced its nuclear choices in the Cold War security dynamic.⁵ It analyses the role of identity in imposing meaning on the material world, noting that identity plays a defining role in ascribing different understandings to nuclear weapons.

As a way of decoding the DPRK's anti-nuclear posture, the chapter draws on a range of sources. Primary sources such as protocols, telegrams, diplomatic cables and memoranda have been accessed through the Woodrow Wilson International Center's Digital Archive, the Archives of Korean History and the Korean History Database. Secondary sources, such as news articles, reports of official statements and speeches from state-owned news agencies – the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) and Rodong Sinmun – help elaborate Pyongyang's stance.

The chapter is divided into three main sections focusing on how the DPRK came to conceive its strategic nuclear interests vis-à-vis key neighbouring countries in the emerging multi-layered Cold War security complex. The first section examines how Pyongyang's anti-nuclearism at the global level was fashioned in a Cold War antagonism towards the United States, specifically in response to the existential threat posed by Washington in the midst of strategic competition with the Republic of Korea (hereinafter ROK or South Korea). The second section discusses the impact of the 'inequitable' nonproliferation norm enforcement by Washington and Moscow. In the 1960s, Pyongyang's anti-nuclearism conveyed strong anti-imperialist messages, targeting the nuclear club and embracing the idea of inevitable nuclear acquisition (as evidenced by China's 1964 test) to counter the nuclear oligarchy. Its search for 'justice' in the nuclear order led it to rationalise nuclear armament as an interim response to 'injustice'. Lastly, the third section focuses on regional security dynamics, specifically the Pyongyang-Moscow-Beijing security nexus. It examines how Pyongyang's anti-nuclearism was intertwined with Sino-Soviet rivalry and fear of abandonment. These interactions are not mutually exclusive, but come together in shaping the DPRK's seemingly counterintuitive anti-nuclearism.

Nuclear Dualism in Early Cold War Confrontation

The Japanese imperial order in East Asia ended with the US nuclear bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945, precipitating the emergence of a

new regional order. Moscow and Washington soon began to compete to fill the power vacuum left by Japan's defeat. This competition was evidenced by the Soviet southward advance to Manchukuo and the northern part of the Korean Peninsula and the US occupation of Japan and the southern Korean territories. As the great powers pursued the expansion of their respective spheres of influence, a newly liberated Korea underwent a turbulent transformation, with a division imposed along the 38th parallel in 1945.⁶ Subsequently, two rival governments were established in 1948: the ROK led by Syngman Rhee under US occupation and the DPRK by Kim Il Sung under the auspices of the Soviet Union. The civil war thus became an international conflict, with the two Koreas subject to the impulses of great power politics, becoming the focal point of Cold War confrontation.

In this Cold War antagonism, Moscow engaged in an anti-nuclear campaign whose objective was to delegitimise US nuclear weapons through the establishment of a 'world peace movement'. In support of the Kremlin's strategy, Pyongyang robustly advocated for nuclear prohibition, actively participating in global peace and anti-nuclear campaigns. Under Soviet leadership, the Cominform, established in 1947, divided the world into a US-led 'war camp' and a Soviet-led 'peace camp', with Pyongyang firmly aligning itself with the 'world peace movement'.

However, Pyongyang also had its own agenda. Jeong's study provides insight into the rationale for the DPRK's active engagement in the peace movement at the turn of the 1950s.⁷ Domestically, state-organised mass rallies for peace provided an opportunity for the newly established regime to organise social associations and facilitate Workers' Party of Korea (WPK) propaganda, thus mobilising public opinion in favour of the state-led socio-economic, political and unification campaign.⁸ Nationwide rallies took place under the slogan of world peace and nuclear prohibition, culminating in a Korean National Peace Conference in Pyongyang in March 1949. Over 1,500 participants, representing thirty-one DPRK professional organisations, including women's leagues, religious federations, workers' leagues and artists' associations, founded the Korean National Peace Committee (KNPC).⁹ The KNPC operated under the auspices of the ruling WPK, facilitating a close working relationship throughout the Cold War with international peace organisations, actors and partners, such as the Cominform-linked World Peace Council.¹⁰ In addition, a 'DPRK-Japan Association' was established against the backdrop of increasing joint peace and anti-nuclear activities in the Asia-Pacific Regional Peace Movement in the early 1950s.¹¹ The 1949 Conference selected delegates to attend the Paris World Peace Congress the following month.¹² A novelist, Han Sol Ya, representing the Federation of Literature and Art, was elected as chair of the KNPC, and Pak Chong-ae

of the Korean Democratic Women's Union and Kim Chang-joon of the Christian Democratic Alliance were also chosen to attend the meeting.

Throughout, while affirming the universality of the global peace movement, the DPRK's peace discourse was expanded to reflect the reality of the division of the Korean Peninsula, and the movement's goals were conflated with the national unification imperative. On his return from Paris, in June 1949, Han Sol Ya argued:

The urgency of the peace movement in our country is to force out the US troops and to eradicate reactionaries for unification and independence ... The absence of sustainable peace in Korea implies an incomplete peace in the world. Therefore, if each nation endeavours to crush those who would oppose peace and conspire to invoke a war in their respective lands, this will effectively constitute the achievement of world peace.¹³

Han was speaking just one year before the outbreak of the Korean War, and his statement indicates that Pyongyang had not ruled out the use of force to achieve peace. Here was an apparent contradiction: war for the sake of peace. The North was attracted by the logic of a just war in which the struggle against imperialism was a prerequisite for unification and a condition for a sustainable peace on the Korean Peninsula. This was the rationale behind Pyongyang's preparations for a civil war against the South, while continuing to call for peace. Indeed, throughout the Korean War, the KNPC continued to participate actively in the anti-nuclear and peace movement, both globally and regionally.¹⁴

The 'Stockholm Appeal', launched by the Permanent Committee of the Partisans of Peace (PCPP) of the World Peace Council in March 1950, called for the prohibition of nuclear weapons (nonuse, nondevelopment and nonpossession) and condemned all forms of nuclear intimidation.¹⁵ But the Appeal was appropriated differently in Pyongyang, where a peninsular unification message was inserted into the universal anti-nuclear message. Campaigns delivered by the party's official newspaper, *Rodong Sinmun*, in late April 1950 indicated how the Appeal was understood and localised in the North Korean context. For example, an editorial on 23 April calling for 'peace and national reunification' focused strongly on the latter.¹⁶ In this sociopolitical milieu, the DPRK arranged for millions of signatures in support of the Appeal, even during the war.¹⁷

The focus of the DPRK's early anti-nuclear activism was intended to legitimise its war efforts in the eyes of domestic and international audiences through association with the peace movement. However, as the war unfolded,

Pyongyang was beginning to perceive a genuine need for the Appeal. The successful UN landing in Incheon in September 1950 precluded the possibility of a DPRK victory and exposed Pyongyang to a direct US nuclear threat.¹⁸ Thus, with the intervention of both United Nations (UN) and Chinese troops, the nature of the war was transformed into an international conflict: Pyongyang was no longer able to assert its actions as a 'just' civil war to unify the Korean people. In the midst of increased war devastation, Pyongyang became increasingly resolved to seek a ceasefire.

The Allure of Nuclearism

However, Pyongyang's anti-nuclearism was to change in response to the Soviet Union's acquisition of nuclear weaponry. Amid increasing strategic competition, the Soviet Union had conducted a first test in August 1949, effectively establishing a new nuclear order and ending the US nuclear hegemony. Pyongyang was happy to endorse the developments in Moscow. *Rodong Sinmun's* editorials and front-page stories in late September 1949 waxed positive, conveying with satisfaction a TASS report of the 1949 Soviet test.¹⁹ Park Chang-ok, director of the WPK Propaganda and Agitation Department and a well-known pro-Soviet cadre, declared that the test would contribute to world peace.²⁰

Meanwhile, Pyongyang's support for Moscow's nuclear armament contrasted starkly with its relentless anti-nuclear narratives against Washington. The regime was to elaborate a complex understanding of the dilemma presented by the dual nature of nuclear weapons. On the one hand, the weaponry was a symbol of mass destruction and fear, to be condemned and deterred in the interests of security; on the other hand, it was a symbol of the ultimate power to deter an adversary's aggression and a powerful means of ensuring peace and pursuing unification. While the first characterisation stigmatised proliferation, demanding nuclear restraint and disarmament, the second was deemed legitimate in ensuring national security. Pyongyang's position was now to differentiate, depending on whose finger was on the trigger, between *good* bombs that facilitated peace, in Soviet hands, and *bad* ones, to be condemned, belonging to the United States.

The Anti-nuclear Bloc: A Regional Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone

The rivalry of the Cold War intensified between Moscow and Washington in the 1950s, with both superpowers focusing on strengthening their respective

blocs and securing allies and strategic partners to consolidate their geopolitical postures. Both began providing nuclear technology and training for technicians and scientists to their allies. For example, in response to Moscow's nuclear tests, Washington shared technology and data with London, enabling the United Kingdom to join the nuclear club in 1952. A year later, Moscow launched joint nuclear research projects with Beijing, while President Eisenhower initiated the ambitious 'Atoms for Peace'.²¹ Towards the end of the decade the United States began deploying nuclear weapons in Europe to counter the threat from superior Soviet and Warsaw Pact conventional forces. Likewise, in the Asia-Pacific region, Washington extended its nuclear umbrella to Japan, South Korea, Australia and New Zealand. The Soviet Union's response, constrained by an inferior nuclear capability, was to play the anti-nuclear card, condemning US nuclear deployment in both the European and Asian theatres and, in 1959, proposing Nuclear Weapon-Free Zones (NWFZs) in Central Europe and the Asia-Pacific region.²²

In alignment with Moscow, the focus of Pyongyang's anti-nuclearism shifted from the World Peace Council towards the creation of a NWFZ and a zone of peace (ZOP) in the Asia-Pacific region, not least in the aftermath of the US nuclear deployment in South Korea in 1958. This deployment was a seismic event for Pyongyang as it coincided with the withdrawal of the remaining Chinese troops from the North, exacerbating its sense of vulnerability. It immediately responded by denouncing the presence of US nuclear weapons in the South and condemning this as a violation of the Armistice Agreement. It declared paragraph 13(d) null and void, which had banned the introduction of additional weaponry on the Peninsula and tightly constrained the replacement of damaged armaments, noting that this could only proceed 'on the basis of piece-for-piece of the same effectiveness and the same type'.²³ To underline this point, Pyongyang submitted an official complaint to the UN Military Armistice Commission.

The Korean National Peace Congress – comprised of the KNPC, the Korean Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee, the General Federation of Trade Unions of Korea, the Korean Democratic Youth League, the Korean Democratic Women's Union and the Korean Students' Committee – joined in condemning the enhanced US military posture in its lengthy Peace Appeal, published in May 1960 to commemorate the tenth anniversary of the Korean War:

When we exerted every effort to abide by the armistice agreement and unilaterally reduced the numerical strength of our armed forces by 80,000, the US imperialist increased the South Korean puppet army from 16 divisions to 31, expelled the inspection teams of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission from South Korea and

unilaterally abrogated the relevant provision of the armistice agreement prohibiting the introduction of reinforcing combat materials into Korea. The US army reorganized into pentomic units has incessantly staged provocative 'atomic mobile operations' exercises near the military demarcation line and conducted the firing of 'matador' and various other illegally introduced guided missiles ... The US government must immediately withdraw its army from South Korea together with atomic and rocket weapons and all other lethal weapons illegally introduced into South Korea.²⁴

Preoccupied by the US nuclear threat, the DPRK increased its anti-nuclear propaganda campaigns and proposed the establishment of a ZOP, stressing the 'anti-imperialistic solidarity of the Asian people'.²⁵ The ZOP concept manifested Pyongyang's ideational as well as strategic struggle against US imperialism. According to Koo's study of DPRK nuclear discourse, the 1957 edition of the *Glossary of Mass Politics* defined a ZOP as an 'area inhabited by those who oppose imperialist aggression and war, and fight for peace, security, and goodwill among people'.²⁶ Pyongyang had extended the concept, incorporating the notion of an 'area without nuclear and rocket weapons'. In the 1959 edition of the *Glossary*, the idea that the 'expansion of the peace zone and the strengthening of the peace capacity is the spiritual and material capability to defeat imperialism' was added.²⁷

Pyongyang was facing significant challenges at the close of the decade. The Sino-Soviet split had seriously undermined the unity of the communist camp. China, sensing a threat from the Soviets as well as the United States, proposed an Asia-Pacific NWFZ in the late 1950s, with support from Kim Il Sung. Adding to the uncertainty, a new military regime emerged in Seoul following Park Chung-hee's 1961 coup. These developments meant that Kim Il Sung had to assess very carefully their potential implications for the country. Thus, Pyongyang's endorsement of the NWFZ initiatives was aimed at challenging and pressuring Washington to remove its tactical weapons from the region and withdraw its forces from the ROK. However, US nuclear deployments *increased* steadily throughout the 1960s, further adding to Pyongyang's sense of insecurity. The DPRK had become 'increasingly attentive to US nuclear capabilities and to its own potential vulnerabilities'.²⁸

Nuclear Dependence

To offset its nuclear disadvantage in the aftermath of the introduction of nuclear weapons in the South and fearing a US attack, Pyongyang turned to

realpolitik. Its close alignment with the newly nuclear-armed Soviet Union and later with China was a response to the US threat and extended nuclear deterrence to the South. The DPRK pursued a twin track: strengthening its conventional defence posture while relying on nuclear-equipped allies to counterbalance the US threat. From a balance of power perspective, Moscow would provide Pyongyang with a 'nuclear umbrella' in the form of a military alliance.

To counterbalance the expanding US nuclear deployment and the US–ROK alliance, Pyongyang sought a formal security guarantee from Moscow. Its intention was for a USSR–DPRK alliance to mirror the US–ROK alliance and neutralise the presence of US tactical weapons in South Korea. However, Khrushchev initially disappointed Pyongyang by promoting peaceful coexistence with the West and joining Eisenhower in a September 1959 summit at Camp David.²⁹ The message to the DPRK was that 'improved Soviet-American relations' invalidated the necessity for such a commitment.³⁰ However, the deteriorating relationship between Beijing and Moscow created an opportunity, and Kim Il Sung shrewdly sealed treaties with both Moscow and Beijing in July 1961, skilfully playing the two sides off against each other.³¹ Both treaties included an automatic intervention clause in the case of third-party attack. Article 1 of the USSR–DPRK treaty, for example, stated that each party would provide military assistance to the other using all means available. This was formal confirmation that the USSR would provide extended deterrence to the DPRK.

At the same time, Pyongyang felt the need to explore its own access to nuclear technology. Andrei Gromyko, then Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs, reported that in his meeting with the North Korean Ambassador Ri Sin-pal in April 1958, the North proposed the development of a civilian nuclear programme and asked for financial and technical aid from Moscow. Gromyko added that Pyongyang insisted that the programme would be for 'peaceful purposes'.³² While it is not clear exactly when the DPRK decided to pursue a nuclear weapons programme, declassified archives from the USSR and former European communist countries suggest that it was during this period of increasing uncertainty in the late 1950s that North Korea began to make more active inquiries. It investigated technology transfer, training engineers, and speculated about the underlying value of possessing a nuclear capacity.³³

Once again, Pyongyang exploited the growing Sino–Soviet split. While Moscow grew tougher on Beijing, its attitude towards nuclear cooperation with Pyongyang softened, leading to the signing of a nuclear collaboration treaty in September 1959. This treaty committed the Soviets to providing technical assistance to build a research nuclear reactor in the DPRK.³⁴

This was only three months after Khrushchev's unilateral termination of nuclear weapons assistance to China.³⁵ In due course, the DPRK's nuclear research programmes were launched with Soviet assistance, with Soviet scientists heavily involved in the development of the Yongbyun nuclear facility.

Nuclear 'Injustice' in the 1960s

In the early 1960s, the balance of nuclear norms between taboo and myth clearly shifted, favouring the constraint of proliferation. This shift culminated in the 1963 Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT) and the 1968 Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). As the nuclear powers, especially the United States, increasingly pushed to impose a nonproliferation regime, this troubled the DPRK, with its strong sense of sovereignty, pride and *Juche*-inspired sense of autonomy.

Between 1962 and 1964 the Sino–DPRK relationship strengthened, paralleled by a decline in USSR–DPRK relations.³⁶ Beijing and Pyongyang signed a border agreement in 1962 that was favourable to the latter, ceding significant territory to North Korea. Despite the economic hardship resulting from the Great Leap Forward, China continued to provide Pyongyang with economic aid, including a long-term loan and support for the building of light industries.³⁷ Amid growing Sino–Soviet tensions, Choe Yong-geon, President of the Supreme People's Assembly Presidium of the DPRK, visited Beijing in June 1963 to meet his counterpart, Liu Shaoqi, Vice Chairman of the Communist Party of China. The subsequent Joint Statement criticised Khrushchev's revisionist line arguing that it was generating friction within the Communist Bloc.³⁸ The following September, Liu Shaoqi made a return visit to the DPRK to meet Kim Il Sung, during which both leaders shared their criticism of Khrushchev's anti-Stalin campaign.³⁹

Beijing was increasingly frustrated with Moscow's reluctance to extend its deterrence during the Taiwan Strait crises of 1955 and 1958 and its abrupt cancellation of nuclear cooperation protocols with China in the late 1950s. For the Chinese elites, the Soviet Union could no longer be counted on as a reliable ally. For Moscow, the primary concern was China's potential acquisition of nuclear weapons, leading the Kremlin to accelerate the nonproliferation agenda in concert with Washington. This led to Moscow's August 1962 proposal to Washington of an accord to 'prohibit any transfer of nuclear weapons or know-how to non-nuclear states, including states allied to a nuclear-armed power'.⁴⁰

As Sino–Soviet tensions escalated, the DPRK's response was to welcome China's nuclear development, which Pyongyang saw as furthering

its interests. The August 1962 memorandum of DPRK Foreign Minister Pak Seong-cheol's conversation with Soviet Ambassador Vasily Moskovsky reveals Pyongyang's position:

The Americans hold on to Taiwan, to South Korea and South Vietnam, blackmail the people with their nuclear weapons and, with their help, rule on these continents and do not intend to leave. Their possession of nuclear weapons and the lack thereof in our hands, objectively helps them, therefore, to eternalize their rule. They have a large stockpile, and we are to be forbidden even to think about the manufacture of nuclear weapons? I think that in such case the advantage will be on the Americans' side.⁴¹

Pak explicitly criticised US nuclear hegemony, expressing discontent at Moscow's imposition of a nonproliferation protocol on other communist countries: 'I think – why, indeed, wouldn't the Chinese comrades work on this (i.e. nuclear weapons)?'⁴²

In the memorandum, a frustrated Pyongyang protested against nuclear 'injustice' – i.e. the imposition of a nonproliferation doctrine on non-nuclear weapons countries, especially socialist countries. The ruling *Juche* ideology demanded a 'rightful place' for the DPRK at the international table, challenging the emergent nuclear order dominated by the nuclear-armed states. The United States was seen as preserving its superior position through the imposition, with Soviet support, of an 'unfair' nuclear safeguard protocol and a nonproliferation regime. The imposition of this nuclear order signified a privileged status for the nuclear states, which Pyongyang perceived as a rerun of the struggle for independence that took place during the colonial period. The combination of a strong anti-US imperialist narrative and an equally strong sense of the DPRK's *Juche*-based sovereignty and autonomy created conditions that legitimised Pyongyang's ambition to acquire 'righteous' nuclear weapons.

'Inevitable' Proliferation: China's 1964 Test

In August 1963, collaboration between Moscow and Washington was solidified with the signing of the PTBT, which sought to constrain future nuclear testing by banning underwater, atmospheric and outer space testing, leaving underground testing as the sole exception.⁴³ A *Rodong Sinmun* editorial immediately condemned the treaty, arguing it was aimed at preventing 'socialist states' from acquiring nuclear weapons. The editorial criticised Washington, which was no surprise, but also took a robust stance against

Moscow.⁴⁴ By this time, North Korea had recognised the right of other socialist states to acquire nuclear weapons.

This joint effort by Moscow and Washington was unable to constrain China, which successfully detonated a nuclear device in October 1964. China declared the test to have been undertaken to break the existing nuclear oligopoly and pledged a commitment to a no-first use policy. China committed itself to not being the first to use the bomb ‘at any time or under any circumstances’ and would continue to support the idea of nuclear-free zones.⁴⁵ Beijing was content to adopt minimalist deterrence, while continuing to assert the ultimate goal of global disarmament.

For Pyongyang, China’s nuclear acquisition was a desirable strategic outcome. Beijing would proceed to transfer technology and/or provide a nuclear umbrella, and Kim robustly supported the Chinese breakthrough. A Chinese Foreign Office cable reported Pyongyang’s reactions, including Vice Premier Jeong Il-yong’s remarks that the ‘successful nuclear test makes a great contribution to the maintenance of world peace and to the world revolution’, and noted that the Korean Central News Agency had broadcast the news.⁴⁶ Kim Il Sung and Choe Yong-geon also sent congratulatory telegrams, while *Rodong Sinmun* concluded that China had taken an ‘inevitable’ step in its self-defence and towards a more peaceful world.⁴⁷

Nevertheless, Katsuchi Tsukamoto, a senior Japanese military expert, notes that Pyongyang’s request that ‘North Korean scientists be included in the Chinese programme’ in 1961 was rejected.⁴⁸ Moscow’s subsequent handling of the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis left no option for Pyongyang but to further rethink its security posture.⁴⁹ Pyongyang had come to the conclusion that Moscow could not be relied upon to protect DPRK strategic interests and was convinced that China’s nuclear development was in the DPRK’s interests. Additional DPRK requests for assistance followed almost immediately after China’s 1964 test, with Kim sending a personal letter to Mao asking for datasets and uranium samples, a request that was, however, again turned down. Don Oberdorfer has explained that China’s negative response was due to the significant expense associated with nuclear development, an outlay that was ‘unwarranted for a very small country [like the DPRK]’.⁵⁰ Beijing preferred instead to persuade Pyongyang that China would provide security assurance – a ‘fuller security’.⁵¹

Failed Nuclear Hedging

A series of events in the 1960s led Pyongyang to become increasingly concerned about the credibility of Moscow’s security commitment. The Soviet

row over the Albanian leader Enver Hoxha's personality cult exacerbated fears that the Kremlin might eventually abandon the DPRK.⁵² And as we have seen, Pyongyang was also troubled by Moscow/Washington collaboration over the emerging nonproliferation regime. Pyongyang's growing lack of confidence in Moscow led it to shift its focus towards strengthening its conventional military posture at home and, externally, to pivot towards Beijing.

At the December 1962 Party Plenum, Kim Il Sung announced the 'Byungjin Policy', often (awkwardly) translated as 'Simultaneous Line'. This set out dual-purpose policy objectives of 'simultaneously building up the economy and defence'.⁵³ The Byungjin strategy was a response to the security challenges of the early 1960s, in particular the growing threat associated with the deployment of US strategic nuclear weapons in the South⁵⁴ and Pyongyang's falling out with its Soviet nuclear patron.⁵⁵ Meanwhile, notwithstanding the Byungjin rhetoric of strengthening the economy *and* defence, resource constraints meant that the DPRK focused more on strengthening its conventional military capability, at the expense of economic development.

For Pyongyang, weighing the US-USSR nonproliferation protocol and Beijing's refusal of nuclear cooperation aggravated its sentiment of socialist 'betrayal'. The acquisition of nuclear weaponry came to symbolise national prestige and status, as well as a refusal to be confined by the nuclear establishment. In this evolving 1960s posture, Pyongyang was beginning to reveal a nuclear agenda that would lead to a strategic course independent of both Moscow and Beijing.⁵⁶

The Anti-nuclear Front of the 1970s

A dramatic dose of diplomatic pragmatism saw Nixon and Kissinger breaking the mould to reach out to Beijing in the early 1970s, a critical turning point in geopolitics. This Sino-US détente troubled both Koreas as it implied changes in the delicate regional balance of power, especially the nuclear dependence structure upon which both relied. Both Seoul and Pyongyang followed the development of this rapprochement closely, and their shared sense of anxiety was to result in a Korean reconciliation, yielding the historic first communique in 1972, the 4 July South-North Joint Statement. But the inter-Korean entente did not last long.

Fears of Abandonment

Increased security uncertainty surrounding the peninsula in the early 1970s also encouraged the nuclear aspirations of both Koreas, driven by doubts over the credibility of their patrons' commitment to nuclear protection. Of course, an extended deterrence need not inhibit a non-nuclear state's quest for nuclear weapons as the ultimate insurance. Given the nature of asymmetric nuclear relations between a nuclear and non-nuclear weapons state, the latter may well find itself questioning whether its patron's commitment can be relied upon.⁵⁷ Thus, South Korea's nuclear exploration was reported in US diplomatic cables in 1974 and 1976.⁵⁸ Park Chung-hee embarked on a clandestine nuclear research programme as a contingency against this fear of abandonment.⁵⁹ Likewise, the exploration of nuclear technology cooperation was a priority for Kim Il Sung. The difference was that while Washington succeeded in pulling Seoul back into the nuclear nonproliferation orbit, Moscow was unable to similarly reassure Pyongyang. In the face of mounting pressure from Washington, South Korea not only ratified the long-overdue NPT in April 1975, but also cancelled a reprocessing deal with France in January 1976.⁶⁰ In return, Seoul benefited from a nuclear energy cooperation deal with Washington in June of the same year. In contrast, despite pressure from Soviet and Eastern European allies, North Korea resisted signing the NPT until 1985. Meanwhile, the presence of US nuclear weapons in the South continued to motivate Pyongyang to search for nuclear cooperation deals with its allies and to build reactors and nuclear power plants, but its requests were declined.⁶¹

Thus, while Pyongyang's efforts in the 1960s and 1970s to acquire nuclear knowhow were consistently rejected by Moscow and Beijing, its sense of socialist betrayal and fear of abandonment increased. *Juche*-inspired ideas fuelled Kim's obsession that the regime's survival was threatened, increasing the urgency to secure an independent deterrent. The DPRK's nuclear choice derived from a mixture of 'fear' and 'pride', which generated a desire for security, autonomy and power.⁶²

These peculiarities of the external and internal environment conditioned Pyongyang's nuclearism. In the strategic competition with Seoul, the readiness of powerful allies to provide extended security had been the primary driving force in the 1950s and 1960s in shaping Pyongyang's anti-nuclearism. However, by the early 1970s, it was not evident to Kim that Moscow and Beijing could be relied upon, leading to a re-evaluation of its security posture towards strengthened conventional military capacity at home as well as the promotion of a NWFZ and a ZOP on the peninsula.

Localised Anti-nuclearism: A Peninsular NWFZ

Tensions escalated on the peninsula in the mid-1970s. To compensate Seoul for its decision to forgo nuclear projects and to ease Park Chung-hee's suspicions, the United States renewed its military commitment. In a display of Washington's willingness to provide a nuclear umbrella, the allies staged a massive first joint Team Spirit military exercise in June 1976. These war games led, in part, to Pyongyang's August DMZ (demilitarised zone) provocation, when an ostensibly routine US tree-trimming exercise turned into a murderous clash between US and DPRK troops that could have provoked a second Korean War.

Given the perceived uncertainty of nuclear deterrence from Moscow and Beijing, the immediate existential threats posed by the Team Spirit exercise conditioned Pyongyang's strategic posture. An increasingly vulnerable North Korea now engaged in further normative nuclear politics, calling for the nuclear disarmament of the Korean Peninsula. There was a shift in the focus of the NWFZ from its earlier 1960s advocacy of a wider NWFZ across the Asia-Pacific region to a narrowly focused NWFZ on the Korean Peninsula, aimed specifically at the withdrawal of US nuclear weapons from the South. In promoting this anti-nuclear campaign, Pyongyang moved beyond its Socialist Bloc diplomacy to expand its foreign relations reach to the Third World, engaging with the non-aligned movement (NAM) and supporting the NWFZ activism proposed by NAM member countries.

The DPRK's attendance at the 5th NAM conference in Sri Lanka in August 1976, at a time of heightened tensions over the DMZ tree-trimming incident, was successful in attracting support from NAM members. The conference adopted a resolution on Korea that essentially supported Pyongyang's position:

The fifth Conference ... paid deep attention to the fact that Korea remains divided for a long time, where tension is aggravated every day and a critical situation in which a new war may break out any moment has been created. Today the imperialists have turned South Korea into a military base for aggression and a base for nuclear attack, by extensively introducing into South Korea more and more armed forces and mass destruction weapons, including nuclear weapons, and have created a threat of aggression against the DPRK, by stepping up war preparations and incessantly committing dangerous military provocations, saying that they will not hesitate to use even nuclear weapons ... The Conference holds that the imperialist manoeuvres to provoke a war in Korea should be stopped

immediately; all the war equipment and weapons, including nuclear weapons, introduced in South Korea be removed; all the foreign troops be withdrawn from South Korea; the foreign military bases be dismantled and the Korean Military Armistice Agreement to replace by a peace agreement.⁶³

In setting out three conditions, this resolution hinted at what the establishment of a peninsular NWFZ might look like: (i) the removal of tactical nuclear weapons; (ii) the withdrawal of US forces from the ROK; and (iii) the replacement of the armistice treaty with a peace agreement. With Pyongyang unable to progress its nuclear ambitions because of technological obstacles and financial weakness, it proactively engaged in normative nuclear politics in its Third World diplomacy to denounce US nuclear strategy.

Conclusion

This chapter has investigated the emergence of the DPRK's early Cold War anti-nuclearism. At the dawn of the nuclear age, a newly established DPRK engaged with the global peace movement, particularly the Cominform-backed World Peace Council. This movement provided a useful platform for Pyongyang to publicise the Korea question and propagate the logic that peninsular unification would be inevitably contribute to world peace. Through its active participation in this peace movement, the KNPC endeavoured not only to legitimise the DPRK's unification ambitions but also to attract international support. This 'unification' logic was used to justify the invasion of South Korea: an inevitable 'war for peace'.

After the Soviet nuclear tests, the DPRK aligned closely with the USSR and China to counterbalance US extended deterrence to the South, while internally focusing on strengthening its conventional forces, as set out in the Byungjin Policy. During the late 1950s and 1960s, when Washington actively increased its tactical nuclear weapons in Asia, Pyongyang concentrated on building a regional NWFZ/ZOP, denouncing US nuclear deployment in the region. However, geopolitics became more complex as Sino-Soviet relations deteriorated in the late 1960s. Growing mutual distrust between Moscow and Beijing created an opportunity for Pyongyang to exploit the rupture.

At the turn of the 1970s, Pyongyang was provoked by a series of events that raised questions about its allies' commitment to extended deterrence. Sino-US rapprochement and the nonproliferation regime were strategically suffocating for Pyongyang. Its efforts to acquire nuclear knowhow from its allies were constantly thwarted. Given its suspicion of its patrons'

commitment, Pyongyang's balancing act – extracting strategic advantage by not fully embracing either side – foreshadowed what would become an aspect of its characteristic anti-nuclearism, shifting the focus from regional NWFZ/ZOP projects to the peninsular dimension. Additionally, it extended its diplomatic horizons by reaching out to the Third World during the mid-1970s, embracing the anti-nuclear movement of the NAM.

To conclude, this chapter provides historical contextualisation for North Korean anti-nuclear engagement – typically seen as camouflaged realist behaviour – in the early Cold War security complex. Understanding Pyongyang's ever-fluid nuclear rhetoric is more important than ever, and this historical analysis seeks to offer a nuanced insight into the Pyongyang psyche. Reacting to chronic existential threats, it actively engaged in normative peace and anti-nuclear campaigning with the aim of delegitimising and deterring the adversary. The establishment of NWFZs/ZOPs would have provided psychological comfort to the DPRK, implicitly delivering the same result as extended deterrence: a nuclear inferior Pyongyang would be shielded from nuclear-armed enemies in a NWFZ/ZOP. However, its advocacy took the form of heavy-handed, state-sponsored 'public diplomacy' that operated within the frame of normative nuclear politics, i.e. psychological warfare against US domination, calling for anti-imperialist solidarity to challenge and undermine the legitimacy of US nuclear strategy. Pyongyang's noisy justification of 'inevitable' war on the Korean Peninsula and 'inevitable' nuclear arming of those states engaged in resisting US hegemony proclaimed the imperative of 'arming, to disarm'.

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Notes

1. Korean National Peace Congress, 'Appeal to World Peace-Loving People', 1. The author discovered this document written in English, dated 25 November 1960, and signed by Chairman Han Sul Ya in the Archive of Korean History. Han's name has been variously transliterated as Han Sorya, Han Seol-ya or Han Sol-ya in the literature. However, it is confirmed by this document that he spelled his name 'Han Sul Ya'.

2. Historically, Pyongyang's nuclear path has been justified as an 'inevitable' response to US hostility; this nuclear armament discourse continues under Kim Jong-un. See KCNA, 'DPRK Delegate Calls for Nuclear Disarmament'; Park, 'North Korean Strategies', 75–114.
3. Notably, Pyongyang announced that it had already developed a nuclear arsenal in 2005, prior to its first test in 2006. As of November 2023, six tests have been conducted, in 2006, 2009, 2013, 2016 (twice) and 2017. See Shin, 'Arm, to Disarm', 813–14; Pritchard, *Failed Diplomacy*, 1–21; Huntley, 'North Korea's Nuclear Program', 13–33.
4. 'Juche' is the fundamental ruling political ideology of the DPRK, often translated as self-reliance or self-determination. It emphasises state independence, autonomy and sovereignty. Juche ideology underpins and defines foreign policy as well as domestic political, economic and social activities.
5. A new trend of research, with heightened focus on the impact of ideational structures such as identity, culture and discourse, provides a useful template for the examination of DPRK nuclear behaviour. For example, Jacques Hymans, informed by social psychology, asserts the important role of 'nonrational factors' in the assessment of DPRK nuclear intentions – 'the nuclear ambitions of any state are thus better understood as the product of emotions' –and contends that the combination of the leaders' conception of identity vis-à-vis key countries and associated emotions (fear and pride) has shaped nuclear choices; see Hymans, 'Assessing North Korean Nuclear Intentions', 260–64.
6. Hastings, *The Korean War*, 15–16.
7. Jeong, '6.25 Jeonjaeng Ijeon', 69–93.
8. Ibid, 79–82.
9. The KNPC still operates. It participates in various international civil society peace-building events and attended Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict (GPPAC) events in 2018–19. For further information, see the GPPAC website: <https://gppac.net/taxonomy/term/64> (retrieved 25 September 2024).
10. The KNPC also played an important role in facilitating the expansion of the DPRK's diplomatic relations with newly independent countries in Asia and Africa. In tandem with its newly minted *Juche* ideology, highlighting national independence, solidarity with these countries was strengthened.
11. The KNPC's working relationship with Japanese peace movement associations was later extended to Japanese civic groups in supports of Korean Hiroshima nuclear victims; see Yang, "'Hiroshimayeon Joseon-in Pipokja Hyeopuihoe'", 232–34.
12. Park, 'East Asian Cold War', 122–24.
13. Quoted in Jeong, '6.25 Jeonjaeng Ijeon', 76–77.
14. However, towards the end of the 1950s, fewer large-scale peace rallies took place in the DPRK. The nature of the KNPC operation, as a nongovernmental institution, evolved into an external liaison agency to assist diplomatic activities that were difficult to pursue at the 'official' governmental level.
15. This anti-nuclear appeal was issued at the 3rd Permanent Committee meeting of the World Peace Conference in Stockholm on 19 March 1950. It was a turning point for the peace movement as it was able to reach wider global audiences. Its powerful,

- unambiguous anti-nuclear message outweighed scepticism that it was propagandistic. This was reflected in the significant increase in signatories achieved after the outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950.
16. Jeong, '6.25 Jeonjaeng Ijeon', 83–84.
 17. See Jeong, '6/25 Jeonjaeng-1950nyeondae Huban', 293; Roberts, 'Averting Armageddon', 326–27.
 18. The US nuclear threat felt very real for Pyongyang. General Douglas MacArthur argued in favour of a nuclear intervention. This was only rejected in the face of international anti-nuclear pressure and China's participation in the war; the crossing of the Yalu River in November 1950 changed the war dynamics. See Dingman, 'Atomic Diplomacy', 65–69.
 19. Rodong, 'Soryeoneseoui Wonjapogbal', at 4.
 20. Rodong, 'Soryeonui Wonjamugisoyuneun Jeonsegyeui', at 1.
 21. The initiative aimed to provide technical assistance for the civilian application of nuclear technology to allies and strategic friends such as Israel, India, Pakistan, Taiwan, South Korea, Iran and South Africa. See Szalontai and Radchenko, 'North Korea's Efforts to Acquire Nuclear Technology', 2.
 22. Hamel-Green, 'Nuclear Deadlock', 216.
 23. Rodong, 'Joseon Minjujuui Inmin Gonghwagug', 1.
 24. Korean National Peace Congress, 'Appeal to World Peace-Loving People', 5, 7.
 25. Rodong, 'Asianeun Haek Mit Roketeu Mugiga'.
 26. Koo, 'A Prototype of Nuclear Discourse'.
 27. Ibid, 230–31.
 28. Pollack, *No Exit*, 47.
 29. See the 1959 foreign affairs article: Khrushchev, 'On Peaceful Coexistence'.
 30. Pollack, *No Exit*, 41–42.
 31. Armstrong, *Tyranny of the Weak*, 124–25.
 32. See 'From the Journal of Gromyko'.
 33. See 'Journal of Soviet Ambassador'; 'From the Journal of Gromyko'.
 34. Zhebin, 'A Political History of Soviet-North Korean Nuclear Cooperation', 28–30.
 35. Pollack, *No Exit*, 40.
 36. Sino-Soviet conflict had become more evident when Moscow abruptly pulled Soviet nuclear scientists from China in 1960. Both countries, for strategic reasons, did not wish to lose Pyongyang to the other side and Kim was able to play each off against the other in pursuit of DPRK strategic and economic interests. The result was a micro-triangular dynamism with periodic peaks and troughs in Pyongyang's relationship with Moscow and Beijing. For an account of the complex Moscow-Beijing-Pyongyang nexus, see Shimotomai, 'Kim Il Sung's Balancing Act', 122–51.
 37. Cheng, 'The Evolution of Sino-North Korean Relations', 180.
 38. See 'Choe Yong-Geon and Liu Shaoqi Joint Statement'.
 39. See 'Minutes of Conversation between Liu Shaoqi and Kim Il Sung'.
 40. Pollack, *No Exit*, 55.
 41. See 'Conversation between Moskovsky and Pak'.
 42. Ibid.

43. The United States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union began negotiations over a test ban in Geneva in 1958. The initial proposal, to prohibit nuclear production for military purposes as well as deter nuclear competition, did not succeed because of disagreement on verification procedures.
44. Rodong, 'Mijeui Haekjeonjaeng Dobalchaekdongeul', 1.
45. Mulvenon, 'Chinese and Mutually Assured Destruction', 248.
46. 'Cable from the Chinese Embassy'.
47. Rodong, 'Pyeonghwareul Wihan Tujaengeseo'.
48. Pollack, *No Exit*, 56.
49. Pyongyang interpreted Moscow's approach to Washington in the Cuban missile crisis as submissive. And Moscow's rejection of Pyongyang's request that same year for extra military aid (missiles) put further stress on the bilateral relationship.
50. Oberdorfer, *Two Koreas*, 252–53.
51. Pollack, *No Exit*, 56.
52. Khrushchev criticised the Albanian leadership in November 1961 at the 22nd Party Congress, withdrawing Soviet diplomats the following month. For Kim Il Sung (and, presumably, Mao), this criticism of the personality cult surrounding the Albanian leader was too close to home. For further details, see Armstrong, *Tyranny of the Weak*, 125.
53. KCNA, 'Joseon Rodongdang Jungangwiwonhoe', 157–62.
54. Different views exist about whether the US military posture vis-à-vis North Korea hardened in the early 1960s. Reflecting on Khrushchev's campaign of peaceful coexistence towards the West, some East European diplomats stationed in Pyongyang in the 1960s believed that Pyongyang's threat perception was inflated by the Kim regime as an instrument for Kim to consolidate power in the WPK as well as secure aid from Beijing and Moscow.
55. Armstrong, *Tyranny of the Weak*, 131, fn. 167.
56. Pollack, *No Exit*, 42.
57. This can be seen in the case of France, which conducted a nuclear weapon test in 1960 and developed an independent nuclear force because it questioned the credibility of US extended deterrence, sceptical of Washington's readiness to risk New York for Paris. For a brief explanation of de Gaulle's scepticism about a US extended deterrence to Europe, see Gordon, 'Charles de Gaulle', 225–26.
58. Unclassified US intelligence assessments of the ROK nuclear programme in 1974 suggested that Seoul was proceeding with the initial phases of nuclear development. See 'US Cable, ROK Plans'; and 'US Cable, ROK Nuclear Reprocessing'.
59. Nixon's decision to pull the US Seventh Division out of the ROK in 1970 was a watershed moment for Park Chung-hee, who was then determined to develop nuclear bombs. Later in the mid-1970s, Park was faced with another withdrawal programme, this time under the Carter government. Without appropriate consultation with Seoul, Carter had developed plans to withdraw substantial numbers of US troops and reduce the number of tactical nuclear weapons. For further details of the ROK's clandestine nuclear programme and Carter's USFK reduction programme, see Oberdorfer, *Two Koreas*, 68–74, 84–108.
60. See 'Telegram from the Secretary of State'.

61. See 'Report, Embassy of Hungary'; 'Telegram, Embassy of Hungary'; and 'Memorandum'.
62. Hymans, 'Assessing North Korean Nuclear Intentions', 260, 263.
63. See 'The Question of Korea', 139.

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Epilogue

Global Histories of Anti-nuclear Activism

*Luc-André Brunet, Eirini Karamouzi and
Alicia Sanders-Zakre*

How can the history of peace activism aid in current debates on the perils of nuclear proliferation? The *New York Times* dedicated a section to discussing the perils of nuclear weapons, drawing upon seventy years of ‘modeling, research and hundreds of hours of interviews with people who have lived through an atomic detonation’. Poignantly, the article underlines that nuclear war ‘is often described as unimaginable. In fact, it’s not imagined enough’.¹ Our volume offers a glimpse into how Cold War activists envisioned a possible war, agonised to educate public opinion on nuclearism, and galvanised people to mobilise against the nuclear arsenals of their governments. Peace movements aimed to spur civil society to mobilise against proliferation by adapting transnationally interconnected modes of protest. However, their demands were far from monolithic. Protesters constantly tried to position and reposition their arguments, considering specific national and cultural peculiarities as well as international geopolitical realities. Nuclear literature would be enriched if it distanced itself from hierarchical historical narratives and understood the growth of anti-nuclear mobilisation as a hybridised event. Diversity, rather than uniformity, galvanised the global peace movement not only in terms of messaging but also membership.

This volume does not claim to be comprehensive; indeed, the very nature of the topic renders it beyond the scope of a single volume. By broadening the geographical scope of the history of anti-nuclear activism, questioning the familiar Cold War chronology and suggesting new research agendas, we hope this volume stimulates further research into the myriad aspects of global nuclear histories. Much more work is needed to understand the entanglements of nuclear protesting with multiple stakeholders and the impact on

national elites and societal understandings of the world order. Anti-nuclear protest carries a complex array of cultural meanings and offers an alternative glimpse on the societal and political developments of the world in the late twentieth century. A Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) report assessing the nuclear order concluded that ‘political rather than economic and technical factors restrain most of the nations which can develop nuclear weapons from doing so’.² Protesters against nuclear weapons shared the assessment that political factors, rather than economic and technical ones, restrained most nations from developing a nuclear arsenal. They believed it was their mission to change domestic and, if possible, international perceptions of the utility of maintaining or acquiring nuclear weapons. For most activists, their anti-nuclear message was universalised to create a new normative framework. Examining anti-nuclear mobilisation in the 1970s and 1980s from a global perspective tells a story that is substantially different from the traditional, geopolitically driven narrative.

The severity of the Euromissile Crisis and the heightened possibility of a nuclear strike resemble the current risk of nuclear escalation. Back then, the quantitative nuclear arms race was temporarily cooled because of the policies of leaders like Gorbachev and Reagan, numerous arms control agreements and the world’s largest grassroots transnational peace movement.³ As the Cold War ended, the perceived threat of nuclear weapons diminished in the public sphere. People became disengaged and nuclear civil society ‘struggled to be seen as a key stakeholder in areas increasingly dominated by security policy discussions’.⁴ Today, the hotspots of Ukraine, North Korea, India and Pakistan, along with the aggressive build-up by certain states, highlight the terrifying predicament the world faces. The challenge for both past and present activists is how to find the most effective message, what to focus on and how to make sense of disarmament for the public. This research offers insights into how different grassroots movements made their demands legible to the public and other activists, and what transnational practices they adopted. However, the focus is not only on protests, but also on nongovernmental organisations (NGOs) and academic institutions that provide expert analysis and a forum for discussion. There is much to be gained in both intellectual and practical terms in shifting the history of anti-nuclear activism away from solely looking at protest and including other forms of advocacy.

The volume emphasises the value of focusing less on the nuclear-armed states and more on the contributions of non-nuclear-armed actors. The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW), which entered into force on 22 January 2021, exemplifies this approach. The Treaty is the first multilateral, legally binding agreement to ban the development, production, testing, stockpiling, use and threat of nuclear weapons. While at time of

publication it has ninety-three signatory states and seventy states parties, like other multilateral instruments, it is not universally accepted, and the nine nuclear-armed states powers are among the states that have not yet joined. What is worse, the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN's) 2024 report reveals that nuclear spending has surged to \$91.4 billion.⁵ As the only globally applicable instrument prohibiting nuclear weapons, 'the new agreement fills a significant gap in international law'.⁶ The politics of activism surrounding the TPNW highlight the ongoing struggle of activists to pursue nuclear disarmament. As with past efforts, there is a battle of discourses, with TPNW proponents believing that international law can 'foster and diffuse norms that stigmatize and delegitimize nuclear weapons'.⁷ In his latest work on French nuclear history, Benoît Pelopidas moves along the same normative lines, criticising scholars and experts for their preoccupation with nuclear nonproliferation, which he argues 'reflects the official orientation of the nuclear-armed states' and thus hinders public understanding of nuclear risks.⁸

While global attention on the perils of nuclear build-up has increased due to geopolitical crises, it is equally vital to understand how public opinion has historically engaged with and disengaged from the nuclear issue both internationally and nationally. This work offers insights to support the work of researchers and activists alike in pursuit of a world without nuclear weapons.

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Notes

1. 'Nuclear War: The Rising Risk, and How We Stop It', *New York Times*, 7 May 2024.
2. Quoted in Levite, 'Never Say Never Again', 93.
3. Mulas, 'Strategies of Disarmament'.
4. Lovold et al., 'Humanitarian Perspectives and the Campaign for an International Ban on Nuclear Weapons', 146.
5. https://www.icanw.org/global_nuclear_weapons_spending_surges_to_91_4_billion (retrieved 25 September 2024).
6. https://www.icanw.org/the_treaty (retrieved 25 September 2024).
7. Vestner, 'Treaty Law to Signal to Outsiders'.
8. Pelopidas, *Repenser Les Choix Nucléaires*.

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