<a> 1. RETHINKING BIOPOLITICAL IMAGINARIES: STYLES AND PLANETARY FLOWS OF LIFE

Rodanthi Tzanelli

ORCID id: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5765-9856

Abstract: The first chapter introduces the book's thematic (the state of permanent and multiple crisis in which our planet and its multispecies communities live in the dawn of the twenty-first century) and *problématique* (the ways different communities organise themselves to reflect upon and respond to current challenges, especially in academic and professional tourism and events staging contexts). It is argued that currently the future of our planet is dominated by human interests which have acquired in critical academic fora their own genealogy and styles. The term 'biostyles' is introduced to discuss the development of a sort of biographical signature that different reflexive communities produce for themselves to reconfigure the ways our planet is and/or may be in future templates of development. Thus, such biostyles stem from approaches to the ways life flows through living beings and is recorded in different contexts.

Key words: Anthropocene; biopolitics; biostyles; crisis; critical theory; vitalism

Planetary Mobilities after Simmel: Vitalism in the Anthropocene

Life on planet Earth faces extinction. The COP28 meeting in late 2023 reiterated concerns about the acceleration of climate change, noting that at this stage, regardless of our attempt to curtail carbon emissions, global temperatures may continue to rise. Redrafting climate deals became the order of the day in this summit, with civil society groups and developing countries not always standing on the same sides: the poor world considers the obligation to phase out fossil fuels economically unsustainable. It seems that global dependencies – sardonically styled as 'interdependencies' among the richer partners in such prospective deals – continue to do the work of development.

Of great interest here are the styles of collective engagement with such matters, which are never just about aesthetically pleasing, or appeasing ways to 'break the bad news' to audiences. We should consider such styles of public persuasion as the first layer of stylistic organisation in a deeply stratified territory of planetary sovereignty, which is governed by those who have the money, the global networks and the power to administer the lives of whole nations and ecoregions. Simply put, these styles inform and are informed by imaginaries of governance. It may be time to set aside the study of these imaginaries in their formal (and fully formalised) versions and think about the ways they are rooted in free-flowing relations between different beings and groups inhabiting our planet. This book is a statement on the formation of planetary 'biostyles' at the radical end of the spectrum. I stress 'formation', to clarify that I will not be conducting a neat methodological destratification of governance. Instead, I will explicate that, where contemporary life appears to be derailed due to planetary crises, we may find alternative viable ways to build collective futures.

Each of us may conjure different ways to address planetary crises. However, what does not meet the eye may end up defining the aesthetic contours of our material worlds. My approach to aesthetics rejects a positivist approach to *aísthesis qua* sensory apprehension. Instead, I consider it a rhizomatic complex of spirited, cognitive and emotive happenings that emerge beyond what can be sighted. This eventually enters what Seigworth and Gregg (2010, p.10) dub after Roland Barthes (1981) an 'inventory of shimmers'. Inventories of this kind reside between the invisible domains of what humans feel in the company of other humans and non-humans, and what integrates individual bodies into a visible 'pathological archive'. By this I refer to the true meaning of *páthos + lógos* as resonating affect, a socially and culturally conditioned emotive response to outer-world challenges that becomes materialised in action. The pathological archive of our planet is created through relational narratives or what both Georg Simmel ([1911] 1919, par.13) and Hartmut Rosa (2019, p.125) see in the unfolding adventures of its sentient beings in the life-worlds that they occupy and/or traverse. *Ad-vēnirē* is what befalls the adventurer, and this is what life itself brings to/upon them in the form of 'shimmers'. Shimmering gradations and intensities integrate individual bodies into collective subjectivities in living environments. If the opposite of being a-body is being dead, and if we concede that life ceases without a body, then to have one is to learn to be affected – or, better, as Latour (2004, p.205) clarifies, 'affectuated, moved, put into motion by other entities, humans or nonhumans'.

But this book is also more-than a sociology of relationality. I propose that it is read as a pliable diagnostic manual on the ways relationalities are assessed through many

different disciplines. These disciplines address the experience and response to crisis that befall planet earth and its more-than-human ecologies. Let me start small: the primary element through which I have always engaged with natural environments is water – more specifically, marine waters. Seas, oceans and beaches crowd my academic work, whereas salt seasons my palate, and fish and shellfish remain my favourite flavours. My current attention to climate change news items seems to retain an Archipelagic arc. Moving from Greece, an archetypal islandic complex, to the UK, another of the same, fed into this habitual elemental attention, honing my styles of seeing, sensing and comprehending the world 'out there'. In a more self-reflective manner in this book, I talk about what I dub 'economies of attention' to highlight how sentient beings such as humans organise how they perceive and understand things in *oiko*-nomic terms. I do not refer to the 'economy', but the habit of drawing on some steady 'laws' (*nómos* as law and cognition) that appease or challenge our need to maintain familiarity, experience and homeliness (*oìkos* as home).

'Home' is also a slippery term here, which deceptively overlaps with the likes of 'heritage' in the fields of tourism, from which I draw to exemplify theory. My hypothesis considers the Anthropocene as its ever-expansive field over the social fields in which sociologists such as Pierre Bourdieu and other post-Marxists (Bourdieu et al., 1999) prompt us to carry the weight of the world. Because the Anthropocene preserves the centrality of human life over planetary matters (something which I contest), my understanding of 'heritage' transcends the old meanings of kinship and civic-ethnic filiation. Investigating immaterial immanence instead, to consider the past and the future as two co-constituted temporal dynamics of life unfolding exponentially

(Braidotti, 2019, p.65), allows us to move beyond the representationalist dualisms involved in most forms of active violence on our planet: against environments and nonhumans, but also socially, physically and culturally different human groups. This posthuman conceptualisation of difference steps into the shoes of the neat 'epistemic disobedience' crafted by decolonial theorists (e.g., Mignolo, 2009), to further refine the thesis, but not discard its teachings. All the same, its ambition is to craft a new disobedient relation that exposes the falsity of external forms as reified, static and permanent (Atkinson, 2017, p.199). However, by replacing the substantialist approach to experience with common-sense relationalities, we do not resolve especially sociology's attention to surfaces (e.g. Emirbayer, 2013, p.210; Pyyhtinen, 2021, p.30). Surface is a non-Western philosophy of relationality. It can facilitate an alternate aesthetic critique of planetary relationalities in the form of virtual community-building (Tzanelli, 2011, 2018). It is also part of a particular feminist aesthetic of sharing, which produces network hospitalities (Germann Molz, 2018).

With old conceptions of heritage out of the way, we may also need to revise what we often take for granted as 'reflexivity' – although I would also caution that we tread softly all the domains in which we apply radical revisions. Rantala et al. (2020) craft a genealogical journey of the Anthropocene in the male scientific diagnosis of human domination over natural resources and environments, leading to their depletion. They suggest that conceptual and pragmatic ways out of this epochal habitus sprang from the feminist cultures of new materialist philosophy, which suggest a focus on 'matter', as 'a dynamic and shifting entanglement of relations' (Barad, 2007, p.30). Their counter-proposition is to turn attention to mattering processes in which walking the earth takes

precedence. Where they discuss processes of geotourism and locavism as leisurely

entanglements of humans with their local environments in distant tourism's stead, I see

an opportunity to reconceptualise homeliness as a new ethic of belonging anywhere and

everywhere on this planet through the development of multiple rhizomatic

connectivities. Such connectivities reject established theoretical propositions on critical

cosmopolitanism in favour of a new vitalist ethos of acknowledging complexity in

mattering life (Bennett, 2010).

New materialism suggests that the world 'out there' is filtered through much more than

my own elemental apprehension and comprehension. It is the product of an ever-

expanding field of movement, in which nature and culture, machines and technologies,

animated bodies and environments constantly collaborate to matter in spatiotemporal

frames (Coleman at al., 2019). Water alone as an element enters plural registers of

comprehension, use and abuse in current planetary matters: as a source of trade

implicated in the law of cultural, economic and social mobility and international

security (Schmitt, 1996; Urry, 2011; Selby et al., 2022); as an ecstatic engagement with

the natural environments of such mobilities, as is the case with manifestations of a

connection between wind and water in the fluidity of sailing (Griffero, 2017, p.9) that

propelled humanity to the expansion of trade and knowledge; as a source of artistic

inspiration, which localises marine life (Tzanelli, 2020b); as a symbol of relaxation and

conviviality, as is the case with what holidaymakers pay for to enjoy in family and

friend groups every year (Edensor, 2023); but also as a source of fear of an impending

disaster, as is the case with those living in places, slowly sinking under water due to

climate change (Dobraszczyk, 2017). The list of examples can increase exponentially

without any apparent focus, so, I must provide one: the puzzle of configuration in the Anthropocene.

To con-figure is to make visible the invisible worlds of affects, atmosphere and sensation in the company of others, at times for the benefit of others. In our worlds of speedy automobilities, technological and global financial networking, configuration is a multiscalar phenomenon, embracing written, audio-visual, virtual-digital and performative styles of engagement with what is externalised. Configuration helps us to separate and externalise life forms, giving shape to what resides an invisible limbo. Classical sociology used configuration to explain how science breaks away from common sense to both advance knowledge and less desirably intensify social inequalities through an ever-complex intensification of networked power relations, into which certain social groups are not invited to participate. We trace this trajectory back to Marxist theory and its particular reinvention in Pierre Bourdieu's (1977) practice field, which can and has been applied to various domains of human action, such as education, art and the media. But fields in Bourdieu and Wacquant's (1992, pp.27-28) terms are realised through the connections humans make with others, so they are de facto anthropocentric: born of and developed in favour of human interests (Fuller, 2011, 2018), which are managed by white able-bodied and male privilege. What can a social researcher do to not just enlarge but rectify the injustice of this web of relations so that it embraces all human communities and non-human life in fair configurative styles? This project would require that we trace meaningful patterned forms of action (Capra, 1997, pp.7–8) in ever-expansive human/non-human webs of interaction. Such webs would involve various non-human intermediaries from media networks and the neural

networks of natural habitats alike. We cannot explore such matters through established practice theory only; we need a scholarly vocabulary that facilitates the organisation of a 'planetary practice theory' of sorts.

To return to my example, human communities learned to treat waters in different ways, but on the whole, modern humanity is yet to learn to recognise that its relationship with water will always oscillate between objectification (as a resource scarce in some parts of the world and in unwanted abundance elsewhere) on the one hand, and immanency, holism and subjectivation on the other. Here, configuration is not a human property or habitus, but the product of an organic and pulsating socio-ecological assemblage in which non-human entities become entangled with human infrastructure projects, such as those involved in making a tourist resort, developing a network of hospitality relations and thus bringing a whole area to life as an ecological sphere (Tsing et al., 2021). Enter climate change and, on immanence alone, one may move past the usual comments on experiencing water for a novel para-realist observation. First, the human/non-human assemblages of this field transcend matters of 'class' as the will to representation: what is reconfigured is a posthuman relation, in which natural elements, marine creatures and humans and their infrastructures produce a new whole. This whole is not a *corporatio* or 'constituted body' through human demonstrations of power and will (i.e. Bourdieu, 1999, pp.249-250) but an entanglement of anthropogenic actions, natural feedback, semantic biocoding that humans may not be able to decipher, and other symbolisms now lost in a forest that anthropologists cannot treat as a separate context (Turner, 1967, p.20). Humans may try to forget that as physical beings, they are mostly made of water,

but this forgetfulness will always be superseded by its absence or vengeful overabundance.

The irony assumes planetary significance in Karl Schmitt's *magnum opus* on the 'nomos of the sea', in which human governance turns water into a use-value in human affairs (Schmitt, 2006). Until recently, the modern human assumed that different aquatic formations exist to be used, discarding for example the indigenous cosmological mandate to both metaphysicalise them and treat them as more-than extensions of human life. Currently, this attitude is politically challenged in the domain of law, where academic and policy experts call for a dissolution of the old legal boundaries between 'persons' and 'things', as only the former is legally endowed with rights. This line of argument has gained enough traction in United Nations cycles to advance environmental law enough to: allow Ecuador to recognise the rights of nature in its constitution in 2008; grant the Whanganui River in New Zealand legal personhood in 2017; stop the industrial pollution of lake waters in Toledo, Ohio through the Lake Erie Bill of Rights in 2019 when blue-algal blooms made the city's water supply undrinkable; and now also involve The Hague in talks regarding whether the North Sea should be considered a legal person (Gilbert, 17 February 2023).

Nevertheless, I do not want to discuss environmental law developments. The traditional anthropological division between a person and an individual, with the former representing the unruly public space of non-classification, and the later that of domestication and thus social recognition is too anthropocentric (DaMatta, 1991). Even anthropological research on the environment, began to replace such ritual-based notions

of kinship with rhizomatic theories of belonging. For example, new materialist arguments have challenged traditional notions of kinship through debates on survivalism and multispecies conviviality (Pacini-Ketchabaw et al., 2016; Van Bommel and Boonman-Berson, 2022). Be as it may, the legal conundrums of natural personhood as such are not the issue at stake in this book. I prefer to refocus this new iconoclastic movement, to an aspect to which lawyers and policy makers remain blind: the endowment of personhood as a category of being, which we do not know if it feels, communicates or acts on the worlds that humans inhabit, already assumes nature's ability to produce atmospheres in sentient and meaningful ways.

Atmospheres are not pure physical events that are measured barometrically. In this book, they are mostly approached as the residue of interactions between subjects, which for centuries could only be humans, and objects, which for the same duration of time included animate beings, such as forests, birds and fish ((Böhme 1993, p.121). This basic definition showcases atmospheres as configurative 'artforms' of sort (Chandler, 2011). To reframe Morton's recent dictum that 'all art is ecological' (Morton, 2018, pp.18-20), our current engagement with the futures of environments is a way to rethink about who actually produces the script for this grand Anthropocenic play and to what ends. Environmentalist thought has a strong ecological dimension, which is bound to organise our attention to events. Morton's *oìko*s-*lógos* is a meaning-making master hiding behind the global parapet. We would like them not to be human, but from our perspective they always prove to be just that.

The legal endowment of nature with rights and the concomitant recognition of it in the public cultures of academia, policy and mediatisation as at least sentient (Van Dooren and Rose, 2012; Searle et al., 2022) adds more questions to my social philosophical bucket. Among them, I recount one that acts as an umbrella of relevant queries in this book: what is the relationship between human, and environmental rights? To further calibrate my aesthetic thesis, I model this generic query after Georg Simmel's sociological observation on style, of all matters of social life. At the time filtering his analysis through art, Simmel had concluded that the recognition of stylistic constants in paintings, tends to subject individual uniqueness to the general laws of form (Simmel, [1908] 1991). Simmel used baroque and naturalistic examples alike in this essay, thus connecting style to the origins of modern cultural innovation in configurative domains. However, Simmel's style and work on life-form remained examples of Eurocentric and anthropocentric philosophy, never addressing the struggles of life outside Western Europe. For example, his *Lebensanschauung* (published in 1919 after his death), a book advocating a life-philosophy, does not engage with any worlds or forms outside the familiar Western economies of perception. The stylistic logic of naturalism and baroque would become central to the development of New Objectivity and Magical Realism, two interwar artistic movements that would develop into statements on cultural-political identity in the age of manmade disasters. Where the conservative classicists of the movement incorporated them into their discussions about civilisational origins to embrace Eurocentric Aryanism or fascistic principles, resurgent artists and intellectuals from Europe and mostly non-Western domains used them as fundamentals in their claim to national autonomy from the erstwhile colonial masters of their countries (Guenther, 1995).

The foundational stylistics of both camps often advocated similar dissolutions of the principles of living well and belonging into fundamentalist manifestos, in practice refuting pacifist and inclusive futures alike. Simmel already predicts this in his argument that the suspension of artistic uniqueness occurs when general audiences and experts seek ways to deduce the general character of a cluster of works, further noting that this is allegedly prevalent in the sensibility of 'oriental art' (Simmel, 1991, pp.63-64). Therefore, ironically, according to Simmel, the vital 'law' buds outside the self-perceived origins of Western civilisation, in an extopian world that Europeans conquered to cultivate. In my critical reading of Simmel's thesis, the travesty of Euro-Western modernity is revealed to be rooted in its conscripts' inability to recognise that their values set to cultivate the farmers of its modern nature: the 'Orientals'. Although the basic meaning of 'colonialism' as cultivation is rather simplistic when we deal with the crises of the Anthropocene, Simmel's contradictory thesis is central to this book: when you belong to a group and its discursive apparatus, sighting and sensing its limitations should treated as a datum. To recognise the problem, you have to turn yourself into a subjective-object of investigation, a specimen of a hidden whole. But before you get there, you must decide not what your nature is, but what 'nature' accounts for in the current planetary mess of multiple collectivities. I frequently use 'mess' to examine 'meshworks' (Ingold, 2011, pp.62-64), 'textures' of interwoven propositions about how to live and thrive in such communities.

Evidently, my project's focus extends far beyond the idea of environmental personhood, to explore whether the *ability* of different beings to make worlds of society, culture and

politics is *a natural inclination*. If indeed persons create not just societies but also natures in the form of environments that *do* things, then we must reassess all figurative action in terms of posthuman rights and be clear about what these involve. I am not just talking about the right to exist, but also the right to coexist, be recognised and create in peaceful habitats (Braidotti, 2008, 2013). To answer this question, I will reassemble Jacques Derrida's understandings of hospitality as a law, a right, a condition and a contextual practice (Derrida and Düttman, 2005), through Bruno Latour's (2005) work on the making of the social as the right of co-existence, co-habitation and imaginative creation in secular worlds. The godless terrains of the Anthropocene are an intentional assumption in this argument: it goes without saying that many human communities still practice some form of religion or subscribe to metaphysical beliefs. But this is not my focus. Likewise, I do not adopt Haraway's (2017, p.M45) 'venturesome' and 'experimental' approach to the Anthropocene without any ontological and epistemological compass as she does – if anything, I think that her brand of 'sensible materialism' is a methodological statement. Also, the present book is not an ethnographic 'venture' – its innovation rests on my suggestion that the con-figurative has entered a new era of digitality, in which life is both organised and diffused via new styles of mediation (Clough, 2010). Concomitantly, I am assuming the prevalence of industrial godlessness in the economic management of hospitality, which forms the external environment in which humans and natural beings are placed in the Anthropocene.

The book is divided into three parts, beginning with an introduction and contextualisation of schools of thought focusing on planetary crises (Part I). Thereafter,

I proceed to implement and 'sort' the development of planetary thought into contexts of deferred human flourishing (Part II) and deferred or enhanced multispecies conviviality (Part III). Part I (FOUNDATIONS AND ORIENTATIONS) discusses the thesis' analytical foundations. It introduces a classification of different approaches to crisis and cognition from the birth of critical theory in Frankfurt, all the way to the development of planetary analysis of contemporary crises, especially those associated with climate change. This classification is subsequently used to propose new epistemo-methodological approaches to the ways communities understand and respond to such crises. Chapter 2 introduces scholarly future-making through two schools of thought, which share in biostylistic motifs: the critical tourism studies and the new mobilities paradigm. I investigate both schools' 'affective refrains': recurring scholarly discourses about crises, which are endowed with affective qualities (Felix Guattari's postmodern approach to preconscious formations of feelings). Specifically, I argue that such refrains, which are first pre-personal and eventually structured like collective imaginaries, shed light on their proponents' ethical universes.

PART II ('DAMAGED' HUMANITY) proposes that the impossibility for certain travellers to enjoy relocation to alien territories via the auspices of organised tourism is approached as a particular social-scientific 'problem' of planetary proportions. This recurrence is clustered under the category of 'travel syndromes'. These involve the traveller's psychosomatic breakdown upon arrival at the tourist destination, which is always a heritage tourist site (Paris, Jerusalem, Florence). In Part II, 'crisis', and the responses to it are reconfigured by experts and lay subjects as existential and cosmological and thus structured in the cultures of human nature. Chapter 3 treats travel

syndromes not as a scientific reality but an attentional/orientational controversy. This questions the foundational logic used to justify who is positioned as a damaged or anomalous/abject subject in contemporary urban environments of heritage mobility. Chapter 4 introduces new methodological tools to study travel syndromes. The aim is to challenge diagnostic motifs in two interlocked expert spheres – of mental health and tourism design. I conclude with a methodological reconfiguration of the said syndromes as examples of ecological dissonance in urban environments, which work as world heritage nodes. Redesigning the ways that we approach these sites as studies in expert and popcultural (mass tourism) perception can help us to understand how particular human groups are identified as ecological 'anomalies'. This methodological scaffolding is a planetary meta-theoretical proposition, which I use to explore four different approaches to travel syndromes by critical academic scholars. In Part III, I repurpose these tools. Subsequently, Chapter 5 produces four different critical-analytical 'readings' of the planetary recurrence of syndromes, to exemplify the analytical categorisations proposed in Part I and Chapters 3 and 4.

Part III ('DAMAGED' EARTH) shifts the contemporary planetary analytic from discourses on violence inflicted upon human subjects in contexts of mobility to discourses of human violence on environments and multispecies ecologies. With an emphasis on earth systems and environmental pollution, Part III discusses the ways mediations of especially non-human lifeforms are managed in new audio-visual environments via new technologies. It mobilises especially late planetary theoretical paradigms (posthumanist biostyles) to problematise the role of human leisure, wellbeing and pedagogical development in debates on multispecies survival and human/non-

human conviviality. Chapters 6 and 7 ask who speaks on behalf of non-human species, environments and floral/faunal ecosystems at the risk of extinction in urban consumer zones. The chapters generate two transdisciplinary connections to the analysis of planetary crisis landscapes: the first addresses how 'technology' can both accelerate extinction and contribute to the design of sustainable multispecies futures. The second discusses how different communities respond to both. The explored technological complexes extend to large infrastructural installations resembling museums, or atmospheric enclosures, where living lifeforms can thrive. I adopt a planetary theorist's perspective on the ways the displayed environments enter the realm of the artifice to be taxonomized as living compositions of nature (what is termed 'biomediations'). Symmetrically to Chapter 5's contextual and applied analysis, Chapter 8 exposes the reader to various positions or approaches to this new phenomenon, emphasising placemaking, environmental dissonance, pedagogy and the uses of popular cultural aesthetic as resources in the design of viable planetary futures.

The last chapter of the book (9) returns to the present chapter (1) to ascertain the contribution of different biostylistic approaches to the design of viable futures for the human and non-human communities dwelling our planet. The right to living and flourishing is placed in temporal and spatial contexts and the question of designing is configured as one such right to participate in a 'planetary commons'.

<b> Transdisciplinary Meshworks: A Planetary Proposition

Overall, it is not injudicious to argue that the twenty-first century is characterised by extreme conditions that threaten multispecies existence and human societies alike: it

presents all the features that we associate with 'extreme' events. Three decades ago, Eric Hobsbawm's *The Age of Extremes* (1994) concluded, in a rather dystopian tone, that global political futures are doomed by the disastrous failures of state socialism, capitalism, and nationalism. He also adopted a sceptical take on the role of popular and public cultures in the development of viable solutions to these problems. In *Mobility Justice: The Politics of Movement in the Age of Extremes* Mimi Sheller (2018) uses a political-economic spyglass to address current planetary priorities. Aside from the obvious problems connected to climate change, extreme urbanization, the breakdown of social order in regions of the Global South and North alike, a rise in fundamentalist anti-immigration sentiment and the capitalist destruction of ecospheres and socio-spheres, continue to threaten viable planetary futures.

Unlike Hobsbawm, Sheller (2020) sees hope for a better future (or better futures) in the ways scholars, artistic communities and grassroots networks address current problems through tacit forms of activism and the cultivation of critical pedagogies. Such communities are mobile in physical and/or virtual styles. In her thesis, different types of travel movement can act as responses to extremism and passive pessimism – an observation also guiding the work of tourism theorists (Hollinshead and Vellah, 2020). Her approach posits broader questions regarding two at times competing interpretations of biopolitics: one addressing the management and institutional control of 'populations' of human and non-human life (which may produce inhospitable conditions – as also explored by Minca, 2007, 2010); and another proclaiming the formation of collaborative socialities driving viable future-orientated projects (Tzanelli, 2022a, 2022b; Salazar, 2022). Let us concede at this stage that such projects can both challenge harmful

regimes controlling migration mobility (Salazar and Glick Schiller, 2016) and tourism (Lapointe et al. 2019; Lapointe et al., 2020) and propose new forms of 'network hospitality' and togetherness (Germann Molz, 2014).

I draw on theory and case studies from tourism and hospitality scholarship to organise my methodological heuristics. However, readers may be confounded by this decision, if I do not clarify why: first, both tourism and hospitality allow for the trans-thematic analysis of contemporary industrial formations (for materialists, both are industries), values (for idealists, both organise contemporary life on the rules and norms of mobility, class, gender, race, disability and more) and practices (for materialist phenomenologists, both afford spatial and temporal movement). Second, the two multi-fields' contemporary evolution into (un)ethical aggregates (here supporting peace and sustainability and battling poverty, there amplifying problems of pollution and exploitation), allows me to explore the articulation of critical reflexivity in contemporary *inter* and *trans*disciplinary terms. Where interdisciplinarity affords a panoramic view of deliberative landscapes of crisis, tourism, hospitality and posthumanist scholarship, transdisciplinarity equips this view with ethical coordinates. As an interdisciplinary journey, the overall project's applications may reach social scientific disciplines, such as sociology, human and non-human sciences, such as geography, and new area studies in planetary theory such as those placed in the so-called 'environmental humanities.'

The transdisciplinary aspects of the project are more focused on social-scientific ways of learning about ontology. I use 'learning' in 'knowing's' stead to emphasise the

emergist nature of my inquiry, which refuses to neatly separate epistemology from ontology. Part II, which uses travel syndromes as a case study on which interdisciplinary theses on crisis are applied also provides further information on my suggestion to transform transdisciplinarity into a planetary ethics. This shift elucidates an angle in critical tourism studies of 'worldmaking' as a human/institutional force, which was never made explicit in Keith Hollinshead's *magnum opus* (this goes as far back as his doctoral thesis on constructions of heritage in Texas by different interests groups – Hollinshead, 1993). My 'ethics' of planetary mobility is not meant as a fixed and prescriptive nexus of 'musts' and 'oughts'. This formula seems to dominate contemporary planetary ethical thinking, which attempts to restore a lost pluriversal order on earth. For example, both Isabel Stenger's (2018, pp.97-99) and Clark and Szerszynski' s (2021, pp.164-168) call to pursue a new political ontology to resolve the dilemmas of the Anthropocene out of a blend of autoscopic critique (i.e., reflecting upon the human species' knowledge, imagination, errors, and habits) and indigenous geo-spiritual knowledge, comes with its own assumptions. An important one is the silent bestowing of practical virtuosity and alternative cosmopolitan virtue on indigenous cosmologies, which may also inflect violence in their native knowledge enterprise.

My own oscillation between critiques of critiques and acknowledgment of such epistemic ethical problems is representative of a dominant planetary biostylistic trend. This stylistic sensibility is not a stranger to critical theory, but part of its global analytical family. It conflates empathy with sympathy, filtering both through a sociology of loss, grief and misery, which guides the utopian postindustrial imagination. As early as 1990, Krishan Kumar (1991, pp.1-19) proposed that the romanticisation of

indigeneity and the discovery of civilizations on other planets would frame the sentimental, imaginary and iconological aspects of millenarian discourses about ideal societies, but added that this may lead to cynicism, pessimism or optimism. This habitual intellectual sensibility overrides Kantian approaches to faculty partitioning, elevating the production of alternative geo-historicities guiding the work of Chakrabarty (2009) to indisputable realities, when they are just one possible interpretation of the current state of affairs.

For those not familiar with this thesis, Chakrabarty hypothesises that in the Anthropocene, geological/scientific time collapses into human time to produce the 'climate of history'. I am anything but a realist or a critical-realist methodologist. However, Chakrabarty's thesis does not explicate the transition from a metaphor to configuration (as a critical realist would demand). Instead, he elevates a romantic critique of historicism to a master writing of planetary analysis, by idealising our respect for (racial) difference. Bringing to light such analytical limitations to which I myself have subscribed, is not easy. For the methodological value of my transition, I am indebted to John Urry's (2016) tendency to pluralise futurist design and thus potential futures without valorising them. In a silent and unacknowledged agreement with Latour's (2005) observation on the collective affectuation of bodies, Urry (2016, p.190) also observed after Marx that we tend to associate innovations that inform our futurist planning with various pasts. However, Urry was all too aware that by putting perceived ancestral realities in the service of what the future may be(come) can also become a burden that the following generations will carry. His work was a practical manual to selecting what is still viable and transforming it with the help of technology.

The use of 'industry' and 'industrial condition' in my work is somehow deceptive, given my argument that the current episode of the Anthropocene is organised on the principles of virtuality, immateriality and networking. The 'virtual' is used here in a Deleuzean fashion, to address especially the ways belonging, subjectivity and identification are realised - how for example, academic communities assemble themselves to organise their social action (Deleuze and Guattari, 1988). I expand this point in Chapter 2, where I investigate the normative organisation of scholarly responses to contemporary permacrises affecting especially the sector of tourism. The 'immateriality' of the contemporary postindustrial condition is explored across Parts II and III to address how contemporary designers of leisure, tourism and total institutional policy (i.e., those addressing matters of mental health and environmental survival, as well as problems of representation) organise their interventions in configurative styles that impinge upon the planet's multispecies futures. Such interventions cut across the design of mass tourism and the commercialised design of mental health for international tourists in heritage destinations; attempts to conserve and protect natural environments from extinction by enclosing them into scientifically monitored spaces; and the articulation of futural imaginaries of extinction and survival in popular culture.

'Networking' permeates my study of the styles in which both human and non-human groups create planetary meaning within capitalist contexts. Specifically, I use networks in two distinctive ways: the first refers to the material and financial associations established across different collectivities, including regions, nation-states and transnational organisations (Wellman, 2001, 2003; Jacobs et al., 2009; Fisher, 2010).

This approach has often been connected even to Bourdieu's theory of habitus and field to establish links between material gains and immaterial values in the ways groups choose to globalise themselves (Boltanski and Thévenot, 2006; Larsen and Urry, 2008; Vandenberghe, 2013). More important is my immaterial definition of networks, as affective extensions of these human worlds (Larsen and Axhausen, 2006; Larsen et al., 2006; Tzanelli, 2021b, 2021c). This second definition utilises the micro-temporal dynamics of affects as analogues of the ways collectivities organise their normative agendas. I will discuss this dimension in relation to vitality affects, which enable the formation of associative networks in academia, artworlds, and professional creative worlds. Crossing and linking the micro-experiences of crises provides insight into the macro-existential territories in the Anthropocene (see also Guattari, 1995, p.28; Massumi, 2002, pp.23-25; Stern, 2004, 64-65; Merriman, 2019, pp.65-66).

Altogether, these organising principles promote my postindustrial and posthumanist approach to the Anthropocene to a life project. By this I do not refer to Rose's (1999) 'life politics' but a radical view of what both 'life' and the political stand in our turbulent era of the extremes. 'Life' is not abstractly understood, but temporalized and spatialised in the bodies, minds and affective capacities of those who demonstrate its existence in practice. Herein emerges another line of inquiry: should we understand the vitality of active beings on earth as a *Lebensphilosophie* in Henry Bergson's terms (the *élan vital* or spontaneous creative force in living organisms, and humanity's main drive for creative growth that contributes to higher levels of organisation – Bergson, 1941), or should we promote a social philosophy of holism in Ernest Cassirer's approach to Heideggerian worldmaking (Chirimuuta, 2023)? Some contemporary scholars of urban

mobilities oscillate between these two options, when they look for ways to equip their projects with a generalised methodological framework. Slides to positivism aside, the holistic controversy dominates environmental theory, whereas planetary theory often subscribes to the vitalist thesis. Holistic paradigms that side with universalist approaches to environmental biographies or one-size-fits-all 'cosmopolitan fixes' for human communities repeat the mistakes of critical theory that speaks about radical change without considering the complexities of difference (Young, [1990] 2011; Bennett, 2010). In some respects, this is also repeated in Simmel's ([1918] 2010) *Lebensanschauung* or life-view, which refutes the duality of life and form without addressing the qualities of *formation* as a process of reconfiguring life and thus relating its qualities to other beings.

Planetary thought is better attuned to communicative styles adopted by new social movements that prioritise connective action (Bennett and Segerberg, 2013). Such overwhelmingly digital interventions on environmental neglect and pollution allow for a rhizomatic expansion of the cause and their success does not always depend on face-to-face interactions. In this book connective action incorporates peaceful stylistic activism, which is associated with some polemical variants of ecocritical art (Harrebye, 2016, p.194). These trends preserve the aesthetic sensibilities of older movements such as that of New Objectivity in Europe. Deceptively framed as an artistic movement, it addressed the wrongs of totalitarianism and resulting social inequalities associated with the budding of European industrialisation and bourgeoisiefication after the end of the Second World War (Makela, 2007). Its subsequent development in newly decolonised national cultures outside Europe produced novel pararealist renditions of local culture

and its indigenous environments (Huntington and Parkinson Zamora, 1995, p.75; Guenther, 1995), which to date are not problem-free. In Part III of this book, I address contemporary mutations of New Objectivity (commonly known as 'Magical' or 'Magic Realism') through a discussion on 'bioregionalism'. Like environmentalism, bioregionalism proposes an organisation of life on regional norms, values and priorities, but its proponents' values are more anthropophilic than those upheld by most environmentalist activists'. At all times, I highlight how vitalist styles should not be reduced to variations of holism. The latter is currently favoured in marketisations of the environment for its ability to divorce multispecies biographies from climate emergency agendas – another ironic twist, which sides climate activism with the objectives of climate sceptics and denialists. All in all, vitalism should be understood in this project as the *operative* aspect of action styles, which do not solidify hidden wholes or pretend to resolve general problems but may help us to deliberate about viable ecosystemic futures. At the same time, we should also not forget that the degeneration of *Lebensphilosophie* to a positivist-naturalist politics of ethnic purity justified the elimination of thousands of humans in concentration camps.

To conclude: vitalism in this book is inflected through the virtuality, immateriality and networking practices and principles of the Anthropocene (Bennett, 2010). This enables me to investigate contexts in which life enclaves move, interact and develop or die in the current critical entanglements of climate emergency. 'Critical entanglements' refers to the ways particular crises associated with climate change trigger or amplify other, non—climate crises: the militarisation of societies (what Urry (2007, p.287) discusses as 'warlordism' in African tribe-controlled regions), migrations (e.g., due to water

shortages, wars and infrastructural destruction) or uncontrolled urban expansion (contributing to the depletion of natural resources and air pollution). The book's explored vitalist moments emerge and are recorded through the case studies that I develop in it. This approach borrows from Maurice Merleau-Ponty's, Georges Canguilhem's and Henri Bergon's theses only up to the point. We cannot make do with classical phenomenology any more to study aggregates of human, matter, technology, floral, faunal and environmental mobilities. To live in the Anthropocene is to worldmake as crises evolve to endlessly create and modify our horizons of expectations (Tsing, 2015). But this should not mean that we discard epistemic and methodological archives to make space for fashionable theories without temporal depth.

From Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology of perception, I borrow the interdependency of bodily performance of everyday tasks with the instruments/tools used to navigate the field of movement (Merleau-Ponty, 1962, p.143). This dissolution of the inside-outside in embodied action is also present in the agential realist thesis developed by Karen Barad (2007, p.358) and in Dona Haraway's (2017, p.M45) 'sensible materialism'. Canguilhem's (1991, 1992) distinction between the normal and the pathological helps me to unpack processes of assembling (i.e., reaching the stage of configurative production) versions of a future for humans and environments alike, who are interpellated as 'ailing', 'disabled' and thus 'damaged'. I recognise in this 'diagnostic catastrophism' a biopolitical style, which is reproduced in contemporary leisure markets and total state institutions in the Anthropocene. This is coupled with my take on Bergson's (1941, p.332) epistemological dualism between intellect and intuition, processed/composite and immediate knowledge of an event.

This divide, which I also filter through Charles Saunders Peirce's (1998) 'phenomenalism' and Nelson Goodman's (1978) 'worldmaking', informs catastrophist and hopeful diagnoses in planetary matters and intellectual theories. If anything, it shows how both experts, resurgent human communities and the species pronounced as 'damaged' still actually compose realities endowed with a temporality (*durée*, or duration – Bergson, 1946). My critical take on Bergson's philosophy of movement benefits from discussions on the methodological value of vitalism in the humanities and the social sciences, which preserve his cinematographic realist ethos. I use visual/film theory to elucidate differences and convergences between expert and common knowledge in diagnostic catastrophism and optimism. Overall, my contribution to knowledge is a redefinition of biopolitics through styles that inform human and posthuman action in the Anthropocene. I term this 'biostylistics' or 'biostyles' and test the thesis's analytical value in contemporary contexts of mobility.

<b> Biostylistic Mapping and the Critical Archive

Talking about planetary 'biostyles' in contexts of contemporary mobility such as those of travel/tourism and hospitality suggests a radical tweaking of biopolitical theory. My definition is cross-generational in terms of social and cultural theory, and synthetic in transdisciplinary ethico-political terms. I will not simply discard Arendt's thinking of biographical life as the basis of participation in the commons but pluralise the commons as spheres of participation in multi-species happenings. I will borrow from the new vitalisms of neo-Bergsonian, science and technology (STS), postphenomenology and new materialism, to address *bìos* as the sum of transitions between states in which

affects become virtualised (Guattari, 1996; DeLanda, 2002, 2006) to carry the capacities of collective bodies to a common future. Virtuality refers to a 'not yet' formed reality of collective participation, which will (hopefully) be actualised as a state in the future. In the chapter 2 I draw on utopian theory to further situate this process. At this stage, I contain my definition to biostylistics as capacities to affect and be affected that draw on sensations-and-emotions in transition (Massumi, 2002, p.207). The transitions themselves leave traces on the planetary body, in the form of 'shimmers'. These are the ways scholarship on planetary futures capture visually and intuitively, but also cognitively, ancestral power, as it moves across the world (or as we move it, consciously or not) (Bird Rose, 2017, pp.G53-G56).

As a term biopolitics was first used under the label of 'geopolitics' by political scientist Rudolf Kjellén, to develop a biological-etiological thesis concerning the nature of civil conflict between state-representing social groups. The term's subsequent bifurcation in intellectual and policy circles into (a) a revolutionary philosophy (what Urry [1978] studied under the auspices of *ressentiment* and Hardt and Negri [2004] under 'multitude') and (b) a conservative romantic resurrection of the body as a metaphor of collective political bonding (what the political proponents of German and French variants of 'organic materialism' would use to conflate philosophies of *Lebenskraft/craft* or life force with statescraft, and finally racecraft – Esposito, [2002] 2011 pp.128-131).

This conflation allowed the descendants of left-wing and right-wing revolutionary utopians to share the same philosophical foundations: we are not to find the collective life force in the unitary power of a singular body-state, but in *Zellenstaat*, the difference

of its parts (Esposito, [2002] 2011, p.132). Even the social ontologies of Deleuze and Guattari (1988), which inspired the nomadic biostyle of the new mobilities paradigm (e.g., Urry, 2000; Merriman, 2018) are based on a split between 'molar' (highly organised, easily represented and expressed and aligned with state or non-state actors) and 'molecular' assemblages (disorganised, vital, operating below the threshold of perception and associated with 'becomings') Long before Deleuze and Guattari's (1988) thesis on the schizophrenic nature of capitalism, the original functionalist thesis of the first biopolitical Romantics would give birth to numerous communitarian and pluriversal offsprings, with each of them set to become an equally despotic master in its domain of interest. In Part III I explain that even the programmatic environmental biostylistics of bioregionalism, often regress to planetary imaginaries of multispecies belonging without always having a clear justice plan, often endorsing inequalities.

Today the term biopolitics is mostly associated with Michel Foucault's series of lectures *Society Must Be Defended*, which he delivered between 1975 and 1976 at the Collège de France. In these lectures he introduced the notion of 'biopower' as a new multi-scalar and multi-layered technology of control and organisation of a population (Foucault, [1975] 1997). The said population is regarded as a 'global mass' that must be disciplined: made intelligible and visible to state institutions for the purpose of its smooth governing (Foucault, [1975] 1997, p.242). This 'mass' retains a symbolic ambiguity in governance studies, the art of governing. As an associative term, biopolitics had already travelled across different approaches to subjection and subjectivity. Its spirit, rather than literal presence as a word, would influence the postcolonial theories of recognition developed by Frantz Fanon ([1958] 1970) and Paul

Gilroy (1993), abjection/domination/othering pioneered by Edward Said (1978) and subalternity introduced by Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak (1988, 1999). Indeed, postcolonial and decolonial theory took the first major step toward succinct thematic and contextual analyses of the fates of subjectivity and identity in environments dominated by the interests of biopower. This shifted emphasis away from Foucault's original focus on the structure of power itself. Examples of biopolitical control used by Foucault himself include anything that allows power to manage the rates of human death and life – fertility, crime, insurance, safety and security, mental health and industrial labour (Foucault, [1975] 1997, pp.240-245).

Foucault's thesis produced comprehensive genealogies of this phenomenon dating as far back as the Middle Ages, when pandemics introduced the realities of morbidity and mortality in understandings of life. The inevitability of death has been the hidden partner in biopolitical organisation: it permeated the stylistic and sociocultural aspects of Western modernity, haunting the industrialisation of human populations in cities and the emergence of biological sciences (Foucault, 2007, pp.60-86). Foucault's contribution to the archaeology of knowledge and the management of life, which on occasion borrows from Georges Canguilhem's work (Foucault, [1969] 1997, p.144, p.173), remains important in my analysis. Eventually, however, I replace it with a more open approach to the futures of multispecies to revise the original biopolitical controversy via planetary theory.

My frequent uses of the term 'heritage' and 'inheritance' in this book are not meant, as is the case with my previous work, to invoke the mandate of dark or heritage tourism.

Dark tourism or thanatourism as the human engagement with material and symbolic sites in which collectively significant events involving suffering and death took place (Stone and Sharpley, 2008; Stone, 2013), is replaced with a broader understanding of biostylistic imaginaries in the Anthropocene. I mentioned that different activist contingents in the Anthropocene tend to replace the organisational certainty of biopolitical planning with the design of imaginaries of the future. The replacement of set objectives and clear intentions with 'protentions' (Husserl's [1960] argument that action is always oriented towards the potential consequences it may have in the future) is a feature of contemporary social movements, which tend to spread and grow spontaneously and often unpredictably in digital networks. The Anthropocene is an era of amplified risks, crises and uncertainties, here prompting us to look back to the comfort of utopias that never existed, there to adopt new habits of action that renegotiate experience (Koselleck, (1979] 2004). The biostyles of contemporary social movements present two important and recurring features: the first is their reassignment of mobilities with a new mission, to make sustainable futures. The second feature is their attempt to establish an ongoing imaginative dialogue between the past (especially dark pasts of disaster and harm) and the future as new events unfold (Emirbayer and Miche, 1998). Hence, my study of Anthropocenic biostyles points not to postindustrial organisations of life as such, but the ways these are imagined and thus interpreted for the (un)foreseeable futures of the planet (Szerszynski, 2015; Bazzani, 2023).

Established paradigms of globalisation are reassigned in planetary theory to the scalar analysis of events. Given the epochal span of the Anthropocene, globalisation can only stay relevant when it becomes associated with debates on industrialisation, automation

and the so-called Great Acceleration (Clark and Szerszynski, 2021, pp.59-61). Beyond this temporal pocket, its geopolitical significance wanes, today prompting planetary theorists to replace it with *la longue durée* (Fernand Braudel's [1972, 1981, 1982, 1984] long temporal duration) or 'deep time' (in Chakrabarty's (2021) blending of geological with historical timescales) or 'planetary multiplicity' (in Clark and Szerszynski' s [2021] reading of the new materialists' biospheric changes). The shift from space to time is key in biostylistic formations of the Anthropocene. Because of the Anthropocene's vastness and unpredictability, it is argued that it becomes increasingly difficult to neatly typify and classify geo-contexts in a coherent archive equipped with temporal clarity (Bazzini, 2023, p.389). However, we can always transition from metaphor to configuration of what is going on and what will follow in our everyday lives, by inferring a hidden whole from its parts. Similarly to my thesis on the Virocene, here I contend that the 'aesthetic realness' of this hidden whole may be dependent on the extreme conditions in which it makes its appearance – what Morton (2013, pp.52–53) dubs 'extremophilia' and I explore in atmospheric terms as dystopian or utopian mobilities (Tzanelli, 2021b, p.27).

Extremophilia refers to the inhospitable environments in which ontological processes occur as responses to external problems (as in the case with both good and bad bacteria, viruses and vaccines) but also the skills with which they were engineered (if we talk about science and technology). The extremophilic biostylistics of climate futures studies predate the problem they currently address. Their history begins with the recordings of the human imagination in manuscripts, artistic audiovisual and architectural forms. Unlike Morton's, my take on extremophilia also includes (a) variations of 'extreme

arcadianism', visions of pastoral coexistence between humans and animals recorded in idyllic paintings since the Renaissance and bucolic poetry since the eighteenth century, but also (b) the prevalence of Edenic imaginaries of natural habitats restored in their alleged original pristine condition in contemporary academic discourse on planetary extinction. Setting aside for a while their association with the original human sin in apocalyptic literatures (see Buell, 2010, p.17), the modernist sensibility of extremophilic biostylistics is rooted in imaginaries of the great and total wars of our planet, which set the scene for the nuclear variations of planetary extinction and pollution (O'Brien, 2008). To relate this to Sabu Kohso's (2020) argument that nuclear power effectively immortalises capitalism's peak catastrophic powers, apocalyptic extremophilias in public domains are being configured as axiomatic extensions of the scientific conclusion that we march to our end. World History, Kohso explains, has become a failed experiment in 'achieving a synthetic unity with the planetary environment by its dialectic logic, and instead it forces us to share all its messes. Thus, the said question illuminates the ontology of messy entanglements in the World expanding continually over the planetary body' (Kohso, 2020, pp.87-88).

Extremophilia fuses the humanist imagination of embodiment with the social-scientific of political action. In both instances, scholarship has to regress to a methodological optics I explore later. First, we must concede that we cannot avoid asking questions regarding the obstacles posited by humanly inconceivable temporal stretches so that we explore what it means to live in an age of extremes. But the temporal is hybridised with spatial symbolism. Even when scholars equip contemporary extremophilic discourse with historical precedents, the new apocalyptic biostyles of planetary theory consider

the twenty-first century as the zero *ground* in the age of *extremes*. The popular and publicly 'accessible' variants of this biostylistic predicament are not so much about the historical antecedents of extremes but the moments we realise that life-threatening happenings define our world at the most basic level of everyday experience. Hulme (2010) has already devised a stylistic-discursive repertoire to explain how different constituencies, including publics, policymakers and scientists, talk about climate change. These include a style of lamenting the lost Eden of natural/ecosystemic balance, presaging the Apocalypse, constructing the Babel of policy communications, and using the language morality and ethics to merge past human crimes, such as slavery and colonisation, into current climate denialism (Hulme, 2010, pp.40-51). Unlike Hulme, I purport that 'the age of extremes' is a rather flexible temporal stretch in cultural imaginaries of disaster. It is intuitively characterised by extreme conditions that threaten multispecies existence and human societies alike, thus presenting all the features we associate with 'extreme' events. But these events are chameleon-like; like chameleons, they can change location depending on who imagines what.

There we are then: extremophilic imaginaries shrink the 'age' to events to activate Haraway's (2017) 'sensible materialism 'in democratic ways (i.e., explore and/or release it in public spheres not managed by experts alone, with all the consequences this may have on democracy). In this study I filter popular-cultural discourses through the ways different professional groups rework them into scholarship. I mostly discuss academic paradigms and the biostyles of groups that belong to cultural industrial and artistic institutions, so that I do not venture outside the respective institutional theories that inform scholarship in all of them. Note for example that especially academic

constituencies tend to revise popular-cultural approaches to extremophilia to earmark extreme happenings as parts of more clearly defined 'ages', like the Anthropocene (Wermuelen, 2020), the Capitalocene (Moore, 2016) and the Plantationcene (Davis et al., 2019; Murphy and Shroering, 2020). In all these arguments, the natural worlds emerge as 'victims' – of human, capitalist and extractivist violence (Haraway et al., 2016). Let me now restore the academic language: the age of extremes is an age comprehended through its partial manifestations in events. Events are the smallest units of time in *coenic* (new, epoch-worthy) temporalities and our only friend when we try to comprehend the mess in which we find ourselves as a species (Tzanelli, 2021b). But my priority is not to validate event theory, only to consider the temporal nature of planetary biostyles – to ascertain whether 'writing history' is the best way to do planetary theory.

Let me return to the two examples of planetary biostyles with which I opened the previous section, noting that Hobsbawm's argument stays true to historical discourse on crises, whereas Sheller's ventures into a more nuanced archaeology of planetary justice, which introduces multispecies axiologies, but eventually prioritises humanitarian visions. Both Sheller's and Hobsbawm's arguments are examples of ecological directedness: aside from the fact that they draw on realist traditions, which they hybridise with phenomenology and constructivism, their pool of data and examples (from wars and environmental disasters to projects of activist recovery, philanthropy and aid) take for granted the positive value of community and other-directedness, thus tying utopianism to variations of externalism. The assumption, which is treated as a precondition for social, cultural and environmental recovery, celebrates the values of collective effort and action – a matter I address in depth across the book.

It goes without saying that talking about crisis is not just about what is going 'out there', in the world, but how we exercise our judgement, thus shaping up responses to events. Talking about *an age of extremes* grants our analysis with the twin symbolisms of temporality and spatiality. However, talking about justice may prove trickier: in the social and the political sciences, justice is discussed as the governance of justification, or how we enunciate as 'fair' and 'just' (Beard, 2007; Agamben, 2009). Justice may also be approached as a network of institutionalised rules and regulations (Schmitt, 2006). Realist sociologies interested in justice may filter the same through a series of tests that make one version of events truer and more real than the rest (Boltanski and Thévenot, 2006; Thévenot, 2014). Others consider justice as a plural(ist) project, which is actualised only in particular situations, through considerations of individual or collective records of living (Young, [1990] 2011). The latter approach, earmarks alternative emancipatory projects within and without academia (i.e., feminism, decolonialism, deep environmentalism and the degrowing movement) that advocate difference in ecological and biopolitical matters.

The critical archive of biostyles is vast and can easily confuse someone who is interested in hybridising established understandings of interdisciplinary, postdisciplinary and transdisciplinary analysis. I have already used the notion of imaginary regression to explain the replacement of certain programs of planetary recovery with variations of speculative realism. The difference between performative and speculative scenarios of recovery are not to be found in their ergonomic nature, as both network the human body across technologies and cultural political projects (Tzanelli, 2021b, p.136). Their first

difference is in where their design locates agency. Performative futurist scenarios assign intentionality in the human actor whereas speculative futurist design may hypothesise networks of action, activated through situated interactions between actors/actants and correspondingly distributed across centres of mediation ((Yusoff and Garbys, 2011; Urry, 2016; Tutton, 2017; Coleman and Tutton, 2017). Part III engages with such speculative realist scenarios as narratives and networks of intra-action (Barad, 2007), to reconsider ergonomic output in relation structural violence. There, I revise Iris Marion Young's ([1990] 2011, chapter 1) thesis of inequality specifically in relation to disempowerment as an anthropocentric situation. My somehow unconventional focus will involve a critical immersion in the products of a contemporary para-technological and para-scientific discourse, which appears to objectify natural environments and landscapes. Appearances matter here as speculative futuristic cases put under truth and reality and tests. I will perform these truths and reality tests by using speculative realism instead of Boltanski and Thévenot's (2006) original methodological design, to mediate between accusations of violence and indifference toward multispecies life on the one hand, and care on the other. Both of these biosylistics of action reproduce the bipolarities of extremophilic discourse, not actually resolving the problems of the Anthropocene.

<c> A. The Modern Birth of Biostylistics

Often, extremophilia emplaces older frameworks of making the future in today's worlds. Against any pretensions to objectivity as impartiality, the biostylistic archive of planetary thought axiologically maps potential futures for the human species and other species. I hope that my ethical understanding of transdisciplinarity makes more sense

now. But first I must inspect the beginnings of critical catastrophic imaginaries to explain why 'writing history' is not a suitable gateway into planetary thinking in the Anthropocene's destabilised temporalities. A worthy starting point for this is Walter Benjamin's suicide in the Spanish border town of Port Brou on 26 September 1940 after his failed attempt to escape Axis control via the Pyrenees. Unlike him, in June 1941 Hannah Arendt would manage to cross the French-Spanish border at Port Brou, carrying Benjamin's manuscript on 'Theses on the Philosophy of History' with her to eventually pass it on to Theodor Adorno who was already in exile. In his elegiac communique to Max Horkheimer on the dismantling of critical community at Frankfurt, Adorno would identify in Benjamin's 'conception of history as permanent catastrophe, the critique of progress and the place of culture' the entire project of critical theory (Wiggershaus, 1994, p.311). Few consider Benjamin's death as a birth of a heritage icon, which future critical theory generations reinterpreted both as a critic and an endorser of mobilities.

In what started in ca.1950 as a war of attrition between the Vienna Circle of positivists and the Horkheimer Circle of critical theorists, Benjamin's recognition as the first generation of Frankfurt School's spiritual leader escalated in an open epistemic-axiological conflict. Benjamin's conception of the future as both constrained and informed by past atrocities – a biostylistic *motif* that Arendt herself would curate in *Illuminations* (1968 edition) – introduces the drama of action and spectatorship as one-body-ness, which for some is fictional, and intersubjectively assembled (i.e., con-figurative), rather than real as materially evidenced (Tzanelli, 2011). The Horkheimer Circle stayed true to its blended left-wing phenomenological roots to the end, questioning the factualities of events, without discarding their material makeup. Enter

second generation critical thinking, and this matter would reintroduce matters of rationality vis-à-vis positivism: Jürgen Habermas' (1988) subsequent study of the relationship between theory and praxis in the social sciences did not simply widen the rift between these two circles but challenged the nature and role of sociology in turbulent times. In his collection of essays *Theory and Practice* published after his Marburg inaugural lecture (1961), he drew on Hannah Arendt's (1958) *The Human Condition*. Arendt's Benjaminian biostylistics suggested to Habermas a clear distinction between Aristotelian *téchne* or art or theory and *práxis* or action to address the status of critical theory (Wiggershaus, p.563). But note that Habermas's subsequent location of systemic and lifeworld action under the auspices of rational action (Habermas, 1989a, 1989c), would also include a differentiation between human and animal existence. For Habermas, only humans are endowed both with the skill of adapt to new natural environments and re-adapt to systems of social labour (Wiggershaus, 1994, pp.574-575).

It is worth highlighting commonalities between the Habermassian critique of historical amnesia in the context of the *Historikerstreit* (a debate on whether Germany and its intellectuals should remember the atrocities of the Third Reich), the new posthumanist debates on geological haunting as a novel necropolitics (governing regimes of multispecies death and dying – Bubandt, 2017; Matthews, 2017; Parker, 2017) and a new reparatory regime of addressing climate change as a capitalist kinopolitical crime (Sheller, 2024). The first and second generations of critical theory, if not also some influential members of the third generation, had no understanding of multispecies worldmaking – or at least, not one transcending nature as an extension of human labour.

<c> B. Humanist Biostyles after Benjamin

In terms of biostylistic positionality, the classical critical tradition that we associate with the work of Arendt and Giorgio Agamben, deliberates on the differentiation of *bìos* or biographical life, which makes us recognised subjects in a polity, from *zoē*, the purest but also most vulnerable form of life. The distinction does not simply humanise time, it also introduces a split between constructivist understandings of it (what we find in Marcel Proust's perspectivism) and experiential ones (the *durée* of Bergson – see above). Arendt (1978, p.122) rejected the latter in favour of the former, thus setting in motion what Jay (1994) identifies as the modern denigration of vision in European social thought. In fact, Jay (1994) also notes that Marcel Proust's 'stereoscopic' thesis would aestheticize his examples as 'works of art', rather than 'in life', thus advocating a spatiotemporal vision that resisted not just motion, but the embodied experience of kinaesthesia (Jay, 1994, pp.183-186). Arendt's endorsement of such a portrayal of motion that resists time, casts her political attachment to biographical time as a biostylistic extension of constructivist state institutions adjudicating on citizenship rights. Contrariwise, her conclusion that power transforms into domination when will and action are removed from the living people, introduces an ambiguity in her approach to secrecy (i.e., Arendt, 1951). As the sinister end of power – a thesis obstructing transparency that she shared with Simmel (1906) and Schmitt (2006) – secrecy removes spectatorial participation from the commons. In Part III I explain that when it comes to widening participation in environmental education via forms of speculative realism, this approach becomes contentious.

This would also become one a point of contention in Agamben's thesis, which reconsiders the Marxist humanism informing Arendt's *Homo Faber* or working human. Agamben stands between the humanist polemics of the Frankfurt School and the anti-humanist traditions of poststructuralism and new materialism. Regressing to autoscopic rituals (self-inspection, contemplation of one's own power to act – Agamben, 2011, p.251), Agamben's approach to political participation clashes with Arendt's because it locates political humanisation in *katapausis* or the sacred seizing of all work we find in the Jewish sabbathism. For Agamben, humans are the planet's 'sabbatical animals par excellence' (Agamben, 2011, p.246) – a thesis coming remarkably close to the original definition of tourism as the spatiotemporal separation of humans from work and home (Lanfant, 2009). As much as Agamben's thesis may offend classical Marxist anarchists, its suggestion that power and economics can be deactivated in play and thus in desisting engagement with their institutional grip over human happiness (Agamben, 2007, p.73; Dean, 2013, pp.213-218) produces an alternative ecology of participation in collective projects. In the age of extremes and extinction, this desisting posits novel questions concerning how we direct our attention to which matters, and whether our priorities can always be to restore environmental balance. I repeatedly return to Agamben's critique of politics as the ultimate profanation of life, which returns action to the instrumental domain of *oikonomìa* (Agamben, 2011, p.246). Combining his thesis with Hartmut Rosa's (2019) magnum opus on resonance, I introduce the logic of the 'economies of attention' in how we speculate about collective futures. This thesis will be refined further in Part II, where I develop a more complete methodological thesis on resonance and profanation in the design of viable futures via a critique of Hollinshead's 'worldmaking'.

<c> C. Antihumanist Biostyles and Governmentality

Biostylistic economies of attention are revolutionised in contemporary critical theoretical domains, which are dedicated to the study of human existence, and the very nature of human-ness as a process of emergence. I have already discussed extensively the epistemological birth of antihumanism through the works of Foucault, Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari. I also highlighted the trend's latent, if weak, appearance in some of Agamben's later analysis of human nature. The antihumanist agenda stemmed from new readings of traditional critical humanist theses and was consolidated in the argument that 'philosophical anthropology' (i.e., a focus on the historical, ideological and/or metaphysical dimensions of humanity) is irrelevant in investigations of action and essence. Central to antihumanist philosophical investigations became questions of agency, freedom, and the possibility of autonomous and self-controlled existence (Soper, 1986). Antihumanists drew extensively on the key psychological and psychoanalytical tenets that human action is dominated by irrational desire but also the works of Arthur Schopenhauer, Friedrich Nietzsche and Martin Heidegger. These thinkers rejected the pursuit of human rights and justice as absolute categories and debated the essentialisation of human existence from different perspectives (Joas, [1996] 2005, pp.116-126). The shift from existentialism to essentialisation consolidated in the contemporary methodological biostyle of social thought interested in carcerality and the impossibility of absolute (human) freedom. To date, antihumanists are interested in political identity but have a more to say about the production of subjectivities in new institutional cultures of discipline and control. Ultimately, among their queries one always finds matters of life and will as well as intelligence and reconstruction. Thus,

antihumanism is never far from what we find in as competing action theories as those we associate with the schools of European *Lebensphilosophie* and American pragmatism.

Antihumanists with an interest in pragmatism contributed to the development of this type of research on science and technology that would later bloom as a version of posthumanism. For example, Bruno Latour's early actor-network theory (heretofore ANT) debated extensively the possibility of productive collaboration between humans and inanimate technologies for the making of the social (Latour, 2005). Without it being traditionally emergist in the footsteps of Merleau-Ponty or Bergson's life philosophies, Latour's framework would suggest that collaborative clusters ('assemblages') support and/or produce life regardless of whether individual actants possess natural vital properties. A similar, if closer to Foucault's biopolitical thesis was developed by Michel Callon and John Law (1995), who suggested that assemblages of things and beings demonstrate emergist properties, pushing us to decentre human agency from concrete outcomes within them. Comprising both technical and non-technical elements, such networks are heterogenous and posthuman in their assembling nature, behaving like *collectifs* or interactions carrying sociopolitical potency. I use the argument on the installation of action in the form of actancy in human-technological formations in chapters 1 and 2 as an entry point into discussions of crisis biostyles in the age of extremes.

<c> D. Posthumanist Biostyles: Agency, Actancy, 'World(s)'

Posthumanist biostylistics are more challenging and difficult to classify because the scholars who adopt them may centre their investigations on animate worlds that are not human but may also recognise nonhuman intelligence (Pyyhtinen and Tamminen, 2011). Materially, these worlds are highly heterogenous and multiscalar, as they range from isolated living parts, such as human organs (Nancy, 2024) and viruses (Nancy, 2021), to floral and faunal ecosystems, acting in unison with, or reacting to human action upon them (Margulis, 1991; Margulis and Sagan, 2002)). The question of action is central here as a genetic principle – i.e., as something that 'makes' new worlds (Munar and Doering, 2022). Among the new posthumanists, one may include some scholars that I discussed as antihumanist ANT proponents (i.e., Haraway, 2016, 2017), ecocritics from the environmental humanities (i.e., Bird-Rose, 2017), political theorists who consider agency as an ad hoc configuration of human and nonhuman forces (Bennett, 2010), and anthropologists whose work presents similarities with pragmatism (i.e., Tsing, 2015). The latter tend to subscribe instead to materialist, agential realist or other para-realist frameworks, which destabilise the relationship between intentions, goals and outcomes (see for example Barad, 2007). Later I explain in more detail how these theses modify older approaches to inequality as something rooted in social conflict.

Archaeologists of knowledge may even read some of the aforementioned theses as offspring of older radical artistic movements such the New Objectivity and Magical Realism (see discussion in first section of the chapter). Others may argue that posthumanist thought get us to think beyond anthropocentric action in contexts of crisis. However, it is telling that posthumanists borrow amply from the critical traditions of feminism, postcolonialism and decolonialism, to establish continuities or discontinuities

with them or stress contemporary changes within these traditions (Braidotti, 2013; Sheller, 2020). My uses of posthumanist theses are often filtered through Jaques Derrida's work on hospitality, a scholar, who frequently features in them (i.e., Barad, 2010; Tzanelli, 2021b, 2022a). If the ethics, aesthetics and politics of hospitality feature so prominently in what I have to say, then this book's thesis is not hostile the archives of planetary memory. I wish to enhance the planetary archive, by exploring what Povinelli discusses as circular and shifting relations between geology and biology. For her, because the geological and the biological exist as composite, non-sovereign beings they can help us to diagnose current crises from alternative ontological perspectives (Povinelli, 2016, p.19).

Note also that particular posthumanist biostyles with an interest in climate futures share in ontological ethics with some political immunological theses (i.e., Esposito, [2002] 2011), which sociologically prompt us to move away from established conflict theories (i.e., Marx's focus on class, Foucault's focus on power/knowledge). Among the key objectives of these new posthumanist biostyles is to replace Emile Durkheim's functionalist binary of organic vs. mechanical solidarity with a new ethic of symbiotic survival and potential flourishing in the hostile environments of the Anthropocene. But I do not want to discard the social in favour of bio-survivalism. I am also not interested in validating lapses from metaphors to the empirical and reality (Büscher and Urry, 2009). I am only examining when metaphors of life and death acquire synecdochic value in real contexts. By this I mean that my focus will remain that of making imaginaries of tomorrow *together*, con-figuring, humanly and posthumanly, and not valorising artistic metaphors of birth, death and the likes as real (if anything, these are my objects of

critical investigation). I test these posthumanist arguments on mobility examples and contexts in Parts II and III, to determine not their 'efficacy', but their creative assemblages' ability to craft *imaginaries* – i.e., open new horizons of possibility in the design of viable planetary futures.

<c> E. Meta-Theoretical Biostyles: (Post)Historical Planetarianism

In the fifth biostylistic category I include 'meta-theories' that challenge historicist planetarian analysis. This category is not organised paradigmatically but axiologically, where axiology does not actually stand for a particular course on ethics or moral principles but embraces a variety of ethical approaches. If one insists on specifying my methodological outlook, it is better that they consider this study as a posthumanist update on Goodman's worldmaking. This recognises the rightness of an argument as a reality in its (social)scientific environment, but not as an absolute ethics. Axiologically, I explore a variety of transdisciplinary approaches on past, present and futural outlooks with a focus on the life, development and/or decline of our planet. Respecting pluralism to address justice returns us to a particular reading of Young's thesis as polyvocal, pluralist and mereologically operative (i.e., it yields diagnostic results only when we focus on the particular before placing it in the general, which we cannot understand as such anyway). Meta-theoretical planetarianism may mobilise, adapt and/or rethink previous paradigmatic theses on development, globalisation, adaptation and more in the new contexts of permacrisis. Planetary meta-theorists tend to acknowledge that new hospitable worlds can only be built on our planet through networks and entanglements of humans, animals, ecosystems and technologies. But they do not speak about the social or the global conditions of crisis as isolated 'events'. Instead, they prefer to

address the vicissitudes of planetary order or disorder and may also discuss the futures of cosmopolitics.

I place myself in this category, without claiming the 'badge' of a traditional social theorist but that of a planetary analyst with a blended popular and public cultural perspective. Hence, I traverse all the biostylistic categories I present here, lending a keen ear to the nuances and timbers of their rumours. The atmospheric pun is intended. However inclusive of different approaches though the fifth category may be, it still needs conceptual organisation. Although at times there is an implicit disciplinary typification in what I proceed to discuss, I elect to base this category's overall logic on transdisciplinary themes, which are inherently axiological in nature. Overall, planetary meta-theorisation concentrates on the following themes, which are at the same time the field's axiological *problématiques*:

1. The first cluster of planetary meta-theories addresses the place of history, historicization and memory in the design of future worlds. Under this cluster of debates, we may find older discussions on cosmopolitics and cosmopolitanism. Such theses may retain the anthropocentrism of the older paradigms on which they draw or may attempt to adapt to philosophies of multispeciesm. One such approach was developed by Dipesh Chakrabarty (2009), who proceeded to argue across a series of publications that in the current age of extremes, historical time has progressively merged with geological time (Chakrabarty, 2021). The argument develops between metaphor and historical realism, often interjecting historicist comments on the ways human communities 'cope' with the gigantic events of the Anthropocene. But it is

worth noting that enmeshing human time in planetary temporal scales is a theme that cuts across different approaches to the Anthropocene, shared mostly among scholars in the humanities. From Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak's (2003) acknowledgment that these new temporalities escape direct comprehension, to Timothy Morton's (2013) discussion of 'Hyperobjects' as massive phenomena emergent only through their partial manifestations, to new mergers between geological and social stratigraphy in Szerszynski' s environmental ethics (Szerszynski cited in Clark and Szerszynski, 2021), Anthropocenic and human temporalities become scrambled to help scholars to make sense of what is materially unavailable. Obviously, nevertheless, all these scholars recognise that we cannot do history the way Hobsbawm did in his globalisation thesis anymore.

The problem with historical analysis is that it cannot completely escape the objective ordering of events we associate with historicism or empiricism. It is also exceptionally difficult to dissociate historical development from planetary memory, which is always localised in practice, but is not history as such. When we acknowledge that Anthropocenic temporality is massive, but proceed to write histories of the planet, we regress to micro-objectivities. For this reason, only, I would argue that history writing becomes redundant in planetary meta-theory; we would do better to address matters of memory and amnesia in ways that may allow us to revise cosmopolitan theory. On this, Isabelle Stengers (2018) call to adopt alternative posthumanist approaches to recognition, which acknowledge the intrinsic value of other-than-human life may be a good example. A less radical approach is developed by Marta Nussbaum (2013), whose recent work on climate justice

contemplates the need for the development of a new planetary axiological discourse on duties, entitlements and plural ends by institutions, such as the nation-state. Because she views the nation-state as a moral agent, her thesis is one that adjudicates on planetary memory and justice.

2. An adjacent recurring theme in planetary meta-theories is the discursive treatment of development as violence. This is explicitly or implicitly associated with older theoretical frameworks on emancipation, so it draws on feminism, postcolonialism, decolonialism, polemics on class and poverty and even disablism. The shift from historical to discursive analysis contemporalises further the methodological basis of such analyses but does not always excise them from debates on the fallacies and crimes of modernity. Achilles Mbembe's (2017) thesis on the allegorical fossilisation of non-European races as an explicit inscription of racial violence on scientific models of planetary development; David Tyfield's (2014) discussion of derogatory configurations of working-class manual labour in the conflation of geological with civilisational capital; and Mimi Sheller's (2024) condemnation of extraction policies in economically and politically marginalised regions of the world as the so-called 'First World's' wilful forgetting to engage in climate reparations; all three theses contemporalise earlier arguments, granting them with an extended decolonial life.

The critical logic on which these arguments develop acknowledges the European invention of a fracture within the temporality of the Anthropocene, which allows for the allocation/sorting of different human/nonhuman categories across different axiological domains (on this, see Mignolo's [2011] critique of European rationality).

Naturalising the presence of this fracture in Anthropocenic discourses on wealth and development, can justify in turn the acceleration of capital accumulation, the exploitation of human resources and further extraction of raw materials from weaker regions (Moore [2015] views such processes as key characteristics of the Capitalocene). It goes without saying that such theses may promote utopias of degrowth/sustainability to the status of an absolute virtue, without paying attention to the realities of difference, and how differences may play against each other. I discuss categories 1 and 2 in Part II, where successive historicizations and discursivities of memory in tourism and hospitality industries become internalised by tourists and contribute to fundamentalist designs of tourism futures. These fundamentalisms produce novel rhizomes of prejudice about mental health, renewing postcolonial racist violence via spatialised discourses of sanity, sanitary symbolism, order and civilisation.

3. The third meta-theoretical category includes debates on 'interests' as well as the place of science and the social sciences in futural orderings on our planet. These theories further split between those that prioritise human agencies and those that envisage planetary action in terms of multispecies entanglements, human-technology assemblages and hands-on projects of environmental recovery, conservation and preservation. I do not wish to repeat arguments I have already covered, nor do I wish to turn this section into an exhaustive literature review. Possibly the strongest strand within these approaches, debates the rise of what Clark and Szerszynski (20121, pp.186-187) dubbed 'new planetary and earthly multitudes': the accumulation of collective knowledge on environmental stewardship and the nurturing of alternative

ecologies, indigenous ways of life and environments at risk of extinction. Such multitudinal-planetary propositions may also comprise a strong element of human expertise across policy, scholarship and other professional networks, but are not limited to these action groups.

Be as it may, Urry's sociological thesis on systemic innovations as the psychomotor of planetary sustainability attempts to restore our faith in human creativity against accusations that the human species is the ultimate sinner of the Anthropocene (Urry, 2011, pp.160-162). Urry's reserved 'expert utopianism' does not omit to discuss the uncertain outcomes of transnational collaborations on geo-engineering projects, which may affect adversely local democratic needs (Urry, 2016, p.186). The analysis bears some resemblance with Steve Fuller's (2011, 2012) charting of human interests across the ecological, biomedical and cybernetic domains. Like Urry's exploration of techno-scientific futures, Fuller specifically pronounces the emergence of 'Humanity 2.0' – a humanity neatly organised around clusters of problems and interests in rational ways (Fuller 2012, p.122). Unlike Latour's (2018) fusion of actors and networks in posthuman agential frameworks that produce a 'Critical Zone' of groups with different positions on how our planet is or how we should act, Fuller is keen to dissociate nonhuman species from human actors. I have already covered Latour's thesis elsewhere and will return to it many times in the book as one of my inspirations.

Although Fuller subscribes to a version of planetary development that is based on human interpretation, he proffers a rigorous critique of the new multispecies ethics of

care (see biostylistic categories two and three above). In many respects, Fuller's argument is a critical reversal of Stenger's (2012) critique of Western anthropocentric cosmopolitics: the elimination of human biopolitics, he says, may unwitting adopt the so-called 'Rapoport's Rule', which suggests that if a species such as the human lives or travels in biodiverse environments in temperate climate zones (read: the new Global South), they are de facto Anthropocenic neo-colonisers, putting at risk local ecosystems by crowding and eliminating other local species (Fuller, 2006, pp.184-135). For Fuller this is an unfortunate reading of natural economy as a disturbed equilibrium between species and individuals (in Foucault's terms). Ultimately, this turns the possibility to foster posthuman collaborations into guilt games targeting particular human groups, usually from the middle social strata. As much as such groups may engage in pollution or inhospitable behaviour, they are also the only ones with clout who act in tourism networks as supporters of various local causes, promoting development (in fact, Part II reveals their vulnerabilities in global markets). In addition, some strands of posthumanism may end up forgetting that there is no ideal/universal human subject to identify as the enemy of the environment tor natural ecosystems.

If we think smaller for a while, human populations display such 'superdiversity', that 'saving nature' may result in a new Holocaust for the old and the disabled (who admittedly produce more carbon footprint), or the even the developing world, (which relies for example on tourism revenues and thus does not seek to degrow). There is such a thing as mindless moralisation of 'problems', which traps those in real need in a world of rules without practical solutions. Hence, a problematic meta-theoretical

sub-category in this fifth biostylistic iteration is informed by ideological extremism. This sub-category thrives on a reformed style of positivism, supported by tropes of scientific salvation, or, alternatively, postsecular ontologies of alterity that do little to support semantically-rich frameworks of conviviality, mutual understanding and collective flourishing. I discuss this conundrum in Part III, which is dedicated to new projects of ecological conservation, staging and rescuing that problematise straightforward critiques concerning the institution of natural theme parks.

4. The fourth meta-theoretical sub-category is based on hybridisations between the expert domain of socio-technics, and the popular-cultural domain of climate futurism. The fusion is partly inspired by Urry's (2016) call to use popular cultural techniques in planetary diagnostics, and partly influenced by Sheila Jasanoff's (2010, p.237) distinction between impersonal scientific imaginaries of climate change and the subjective, situated and normative imaginations of human actors directly engaging with nature. Unlike Nussbaum's faith in cosmopolitical institutions, the thesis considers what institutions refuse to include in their abstracted portfolios on climate mitigation (see also Szerszynski, 2015). But much like her focus on planetary justice and Fuller's critique of romanticised multispecies philosophies, Jasanoff warns us that impersonal/moralised policy imaginaries modify and delete communal memory archives (Jasanoff and Martello, 2004) and civic epistemologies (i.e., public knowledge-making based on aggregates of tacit apprehension and experience – Jasanoff, 2005). The thesis also draws on understandings of immutability as a fluid and flexible category that scientific crypto-moralism may use to create boundaries between nature, culture, art, technology and such (Latour and Woolgar, 1986; Mol

and Law, 1994). In fact, Jasanoff, Law and Latour's observations communicate with those developed by other scholars' from the second meta-theoretical subcategory (Mbembe, Tyfield, and Sheller).

This meta-theoretical subcategory notionally traces the beginning of climate change diagnostics in the popular imaginaries of Gaia. It subsequently connects them to current arguments that: (a) STS alone cannot design sustainable and flourishing futures, and/or (b) science can also be inspired by free-flowing popular imaginations without turning them into expert proxies. It is far more important to acknowledge the qualitative difference in the capabilities and imaginary styles these groups bring to the table. The very thesis on the imaginary institution of society suggests that radical propositions standing outside the status realm modify structured social imaginaries (Castoriadis, [1975] 1987, pp.44-45). Again, biostyles that favour imaginary innovation split into artistic uses of scientific experimentation in the public cultures of climate change (i.e., to inform literary publications and installations – i.e., Hulme, 2017; Milkoreit, 2017), and fictional scenarios about the end of the world and/or future utopias of greenery in cinematic and documentary releases (Tzanelli, 2021a, 2021b).

Drawing again on Povinelli's (2016) elevation of circulation and relationality to transhistorical occurrences that help in the cross-fertilisation of human, technical, biological and virological phenomena (see also Gaonkar and Povinelli, 2003), I revise understandings of planetary worldmaking in two ways. The first takes place in the spaces of *biomediation* (the fabulist-virtualised relaying of bio-forms in media

channels and institutions) and the second in those of *biostylistic configuration*.

Thacker's (2004) work on 'biomedia', Patricia Clough's (2010) reinterpretation of it, and Mark Hansen's (2004) discussion on technology, digitisation and the body add to my approach's communicative depth. In the biomedial spaces of the Anthropocene, adulations of travel as a sustainable ethic of mobility, extends beyond the contentious argument on sensible monitoring of carbon footprint. Biomedia are infrastructural composites of media forms and platforms, dedicated to communicative installations and global public dissemination of climate change discourses. There is no doubt that biomedia may contribute to the sovereign right to kill what is dubiously regarded as 'ecological waste', by using soft, representational forms of silencing and stylisation. However, the narratives of sustainability upheld in these biomedia may also craft alternative visions of hospitality and thus a new biostylistic of planetary engagement.

These installations free the human body from specific forms of affective labour (i.e., emotional labour expended by workers in the hospitality industry), while simultaneously intensifying other forms of the same (i.e., an invitation to mass audiences to develop new economies of attention that are more appropriate to the reception of distant pedagogy). Part III discusses such designs as intermediary propositions between the biostyles of *collectifs* (i.e., sustainable planetary futures can be achieved only through a cyborgisation of environments, in which humans, technologies and other species assemble to survive and thrive) and the biostyles of posthuman agency (i.e., collaborations between groups of sentient and living beings, who will eventually form an earthly multitude – see also Szerszynski and Clark, 2021 on earthly multitudes above).

<b> Postscript on Chapter 1

I promised to contextualise all the above debates by using examples from the vast repository of tourism and hospitality events, themes and problems of development and sustainability. Evidently, a shift from anthropocentric to posthumanist and symbiotic agendas for the design of planetary futures comes with its own questions. For example, extreme mass tourismification (what we call 'overtourism') may actually prompt one to ask whether lumping together human labour and animal and environmental rights can forge better justice frameworks and how. Or, what new technologies can improve in hospitality relations, which are fundamentally interpersonal, face to face ventures. Likewise, the new vitalists and agential realists of the posthumanist turn in tourism studies may retort that nothing good comes out of treating living natural ecosystems as human properties and state territories. I invite readers to treat such questions also as perspectives, stressing that the old perspectival judgements on 'good' and 'evil', 'action' and 'spectatorship' (in Hannah Arendt's and Zygmunt Bauman's terms) may not be enough in our destabilised Anthropocenic temporalities and spatialities. At the same time, some old questions linger in current critical planetary scholarship and should not be ignored.

Ultimately, since their appearance in contexts of human-made emergency in planetary conflicts, critical theories have been revising and amending the same themes: the nature of nature, entanglements of agency, structure, system and power and their subjects (humans, other species and inanimate technologies), and the styles that communities mobilise to engage with challenges in the ecological contexts in which they operate. So,

let me unpack some of these aspects in their respective ecological 'homes', beginning with those in academic fora. The second chapter discusses two critical paradigms in more detail to implement my argument on the presence of distinctive biostyles: the first is thematically situated in tourism theory (critical tourism analysis) and the second attends to matters of planetary hospitality theory (new mobilities paradigm).