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Translating with Heidegger: worldliness, disclosure and disruption

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ABSTRACT

There is major interest in contemporary translation studies in relational approaches inspired by thinkers including Latour, Bourdieu, Derrida and Gadamer. These thinkers were heavily influenced by Martin Heidegger; nonetheless, there has been little explicit consideration of Heidegger within translation studies. This is a serious omission because an understanding of his thought can help us to better understand later relational approaches and because Heidegger's thinking itself offers a powerful set of tools for thinking about translation relationally. Drawing on his early and most influential work Being and Time, my argument moves through four stages: first, I propose that the concept of 'being-in-the-world' can help in thinking about the existential embedding of translators and meaning within a significant world; second, that Heidegger's concepts of 'Articulation' and 'articulation' can help us understand how those relationships work; third, that thinking in terms of 'world disclosure' offers a valuable path between naïve realism and strong constructivism; and fourth, that the existential importance of translation lies in its capacity to redisclose the relationships which make up the world, allowing us to see them in new ways. In so doing I aim to both draw attention to a neglected thinker and situate translation on a basic, ontological level.

Introduction

As this special issue attests, the notion of relationality occupies a key position in contemporary translation studies, with a now substantial body of work inspired by relational thinkers including Pierre Bourdieu (Gouanvic 2005; Hanna 2018), Jacques Derrida (Davis 2001; Foran 2016), Paul Ricoeur (Foran 2015; Maitland 2017), Bruno Latour (Buzelin 2005; Wenyan 2020), Hans-Georg Gadamer (Alfer 2020; Blumczynski 2016), and Gilles Deleuze (Godard 2000; Kelly 2017). For all these thinkers, Martin Heidegger's ontological hermeneutics are a central influence – whether as a foundation on which to build or a set of ideas to be vigorously opposed. It is striking, nonetheless, that Heidegger's thought has received little direct attention within translation studies. Philosophically oriented work linking Heidegger's ideas to translation typically has the translation of Heidegger's own idiosyncratic writing style in German as a key concern (e.g. De Gennaro 2000; Groth 2017; Schalow 2011) and

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addresses a different set of questions to those of translation scholars. What has been written within translation studies focuses mainly on Heidegger's late work and explicit discussion of translation (Steiner 1998, 313–317; Foran 2016, 24–50; Robinson 2001, 77–115; Venuti 1996). Engagement with Heidegger's early and most influential work *Sein und Zeit* (1927) – Published in English translation as *Being and Time* in 1962 – has remained limited (Foran 2016, 13–24; Robinson 2017, 113–26) and it is largely unknown among translation scholars.

My basic suggestion is that the ideas put forward in *Being and Time*, nonetheless, can help in understanding the stakes of translation at their most fundamental and contribute to several current debates in translation studies. His ontology provides a detailed account of both how the relationships underpinning relational thinking function and how they come to be recognised by those situated within them. It can further deepen our understanding of what translation is and how it relates to other practices, contributing to longstanding debates on the limits of translation, providing an ontological perspective that complements previous work on the topic (e.g. Cheung 2005; Hermans 2013; Kaisa and Dam 2016; Sadler, Baker, and Engebretsen 2023). The early Heidegger's emphasis on practical engagement and equipment as ontologically constitutive, meanwhile, intersects with work on extended cognition (Risku and Windhager 2013), conceptualisations of translators as 'cyborgs' (Cronin 2003; Robinson 2003), translator/technology interaction (Olohan 2016, 2017), and posthumanism (Cronin 2020; O'Thomas 2017; Naderi and Tajvidi 2023). In different ways, all see the being of the translator as extending beyond the physical body and Cartesian ego in ways that run parallel to key ideas in Heidegger's account of being-in-the-world.

Heidegger's concern with environmentality complements work on materiality, in terms of both translation's supporting infrastructure (Littau 2016) and the physicality of what is translated (Blumczynski 2023). His account of ontological disclosure complements work within translation studies that sees translation as construction (e.g. Baer 2023; Baker 2006; Van Doorslaer 2013) as well as approaches exploring the constraints on the creativity of the translator in terms of language, discourse, and norms (e.g. Boase-Beier and Holman 2016; Loffredo and Perteghella 2006). Heidegger's ontology of 'Dasein' – the distinctly human way of situated being – gives a nuanced set of tools for thinking on the most fundamental level about what it means to be in one place rather than another, this 'there' rather than that 'there', while avoiding the pitfalls of thinking in terms of isolated subjects or monolithic cultures. This can contribute to recent debates on experiential knowledge (e.g. Henitiuk and Antoine Mahieu 2021; Susam-Saraeva 2021), and compliment other approaches to the situatedness of the translator (Hanna 2018; Wei and Jiawei Li 2024) helping us to better understand the intimate interconnections between being and knowing, as well as drawing attention to everyday existential modes of understanding that have little in common with focused scholarly interpretation. More broadly, thinking with Heidegger contributes to the small but growing movement within translation studies to engage more deeply with philosophical approaches (Kokkola 2023; Leal and Wilson 2023; Rawling and Wilson 2019).

My aim here, then, is to introduce key ideas in Heidegger's early thought and use them to think about translation. My argument proceeds as follows: 1) Heidegger's account of being-in-the-world and Dasein offer a powerful framework for thinking of things, people and activities in terms of a relational 'world'. 2) His notions of 'Articulation' and 'articulation' account for how the connections between worldly

things are defined and recognised through linguistic and non-linguistic means. 3) His concept of 'world disclosure' opens a path between constructivism and materialism, whereby human activity is understood as the condition of the disclosure of meaning, but not always its origin. 4) Translation is therefore revealed as finding its initial possibilities in the way in which the world has already been articulated prior to the translator's entry into it, while also being able to contribute to 'second-order disclosure' (Kompridis 1994) in which the world and its articulation are disclosed anew.

Dasein's being-in-the-world

Two concepts at the heart of Heidegger's hermeneutic ontology are 'worldliness' and 'Dasein'.[1] While Heidegger acknowledged various ways of defining the world, he was interested principally in the 'ontico-existential concept of *worldhood*' (1962, 93). The 'ontico-existential' label brings together two major ideas: the world is 'ontic' in that it consists first and foremost of material things rather than ideas or concepts. The world is 'existential' in that it is also defined by how it is lived in by, and disclosed to, the specific class of beings which 'exist' in the distinct mode of humans. The ordinary way to encounter things is in terms of the world. As Heidegger puts it, we should 'take as our clue our everyday being-in-the-world, which we also call our "*dealings*" in the world and *with* entities within-the-world' (1962, 95). The basic way of doing this is to encounter things as 'ready-to-hand' in the context of using them to do something. This is a fundamentally relational concept with several interlocking elements. First, ready-to-hand things are characterised by their 'equipmentality' and position within 'significant' relational networks in which things 'refer' to one another as part of a 'totality'. For instance, when translators sit down to work, they encounter their computer in terms of an equipmental whole, consisting of screens, docks, mice, keyboards, CAT tools, dictionaries etc. The relationships between pieces of equipment are not grafted onto a set of objects which otherwise fill up a room but are ontologically constitutive – their way of being in the world is defined by these relationships in the first instance. Second, ready-to-hand things are recognised in the context of a 'towards which' which lies beyond the equipment itself. As Heidegger argues (1962, 99),

> that with which our everyday dealings proximally dwell is not the tools themselves. On the contrary, that with which we concern ourselves primarily is the work—that which is to be produced at the time … The work bears with it that referential totality within which the equipment is encountered.

Using a computer means encountering it in terms of the work towards-which we direct ourselves. The towards-which is meaningful in relation to an 'in-order-to': translators translate texts in order for them to be used in some way whether they explicitly reflect on that use or not.

This chain of 'involvements' culminates in a 'for-the-sake-of-which': a possibility of Dasein's being. For Heidegger, the whole chain, with its existential implications, is simultaneously present in all dealings with equipment even if it is never directly considered:

> in understanding a context of relations such as we have mentioned, Dasein has assigned itself to an 'in-order-to', and it has done so in terms of a potentiality-for-Being for the sake of which it itself is-one which it may have seized upon either explicitly or tacitly - (1962, 119)

Translators have a sense, grasped explicitly or not, of what it means to be a translator in relation to which they orient themselves in going about their work. Journalists who translate, on the other hand, do so in reference to what they understand it to mean to be a good journalist. These differences have implications for how they relate to the entire equipmental contexture – the equipment they write with, the work towards-which they use it, that in-order-to they do the work and the possibility of being for-the-sake-of-which they do what they do. Consequently, Dasein's own being is always at stake: a fundamental idea for Heidegger that he expresses repeatedly with variations on the phrase that Dasein is an entity 'for which in its Being this very Being is an issue' (Heidegger 1962, 180). This should not imply, nonetheless, that Dasein is fundamentally goal oriented in the manner implied, for instance, in functionalist translation theory; rather, a for-the-sake-of-which is a 'self-interpretation that informs and orders' the translator's activities (Dreyfus 1991, 94/95).

　　Worldliness is so central for Heidegger because he argues that human existence should be understood first and foremost as 'being-in-the-world': we only are what and how we are in and through our being-in-the-world. The notion of 'Dasein' – literally 'being-there' – attempts to capture this by situating the human mode of being as its position within the world. He explains this with the strange sounding expression that Dasein *is* its 'there' (Heidegger 1962, 171). This encompasses a spatial dimension (346) but is not limited to it, with the 'there' signifying 'the leeway of the range of that equipmental whole with which [Dasein] is most closely concerned' (420). The world is not a container for Dasein but fundamentally constitutive:

> It is not the case that man 'is' and then has, by way of an extra, a relationship-of-Being towards the 'world'—a world with which he provides himself occasionally. Dasein is never 'proximally' an entity which is, so to speak, free from Being-in, but which sometimes has the inclination to take up a 'relationship' towards the world. Taking up relationships towards the world is possible only *because* Dasein, as Being-in-the-world is as it is. (Heidegger 1962, 84)

Dasein, then, does not first exist and then, or only sometimes, encounter the world as something external. In an important sense, Dasein *is* its world. Heidegger is at pains to emphasise, however, that although Dasein belongs to its world, that world is not a private one, individual to each Dasein. Rather, each Dasein exists and finds its own possibilities of being in its unique position within the common public world (c.f. Dreyfus 1991, 25–28).

　　Heidegger summarises Dasein's mode of being as 'thrown projection'. Dasein is 'thrown' in that it always finds itself in a world *already* defined by meaningful relations which Dasein did not create. At the same time, Dasein 'projects' since it is not contained within itself but rather dependent on the world: a world which Dasein both is and which lies beyond Dasein. Thrown projection is nonetheless specific to Dasein and does not characterise the being of extant things in and of themselves. Heidegger argues that being-in-the-world 'has to be differentiated from being within the world, intraworldliness, which is a possible determination of nature. It is not necessary ... that nature be uncovered, that it should occur within the world of a Dasein' (1982, 174). Extant things, then, first come into view for Dasein as worldly but do not require Dasein in order to be. In

this sense, more of the richness of Heidegger's ontology comes into view. On the one hand, he explicitly recognises the material existence of extant things, independent of their being interpreted by humans, and does not subordinate it to the world. On the other, their specific way of being, as recognisable to humans, is defined by, and only comprehensible in terms of, the world. His approach thus offers a powerful combination of ontic realism and ontological idealism (c.f. Nulty 2022).

Articulation and articulation

Heidegger argues that the world, while relational, is also 'articulated' into distinct things and involvements. The question thus arises as to how we come to recognise and work with these distinctions. To answer this, Heidegger argues for 'articulation' in two senses: articulation (with lowercase 'a') and Articulation (with uppercase 'a').[2] articulation refers to the fact that the distinctions between things are always already grasped – albeit not explicitly – as part of everyday being-in-the-world: 'the intelligibility of something has always been articulated, even before there is any appropriative interpretation of it' (Heidegger 1962, 203). I am thrown into a world in which dictionaries are already separate from thesauruses and translating is already separate from original writing. These connections, nonetheless, are not explicitly recognised in the context of everyday life. Just as there is never a time that we look at the world without first recognising it as a referential whole, there is never a time when that whole is not encountered as already articulated into different things.

At this stage, articulation typically remains unthematized: 'articulation must not be confined to entities within-the-world which we cognize by considering them theoretically, and which we express in sentences' (Heidegger 1962, 209). This matters because it highlights that in Heidegger's early work he saw the 'prelinguistic articulation of the world' as the 'basis on which entities can be unconcealed and linguistic acts can be performed' (Wrathall 2011, 130; c.f.; Heidegger 1962, 204). To speak of Articulation, on the other hand, refers to the taking up of interpretive possibilities given in articulation. Articulation can be linguistic: a translator rendering the Arabic term 'duʿāʾ' as either 'dua' – borrowing an Arabic term to reference a specifically Muslim type of prayer distinct from the obligatory daily five prayers of ṣalāh – or 'prayer' – less religiously specific but retaining the sense of seeking divine aid – is to Articulate different sets of distinctions. The distinctions in question are partly linguistic – using one word or another. In this sense, Heidegger's notion of articulation is broadly compatible with the sense of 'expressing through signs' often seen in references to 'articulation' by translation scholars, albeit without the emphasis on deliberate choice that often comes attached (Hawkins 2018; Song 2021; Weissbrod and Kohn 2023).[3]

Yet, for Heidegger, Articulation is also practical and need not be semiotic at all; we do it any time we take anything *as* something (c.f. Foran 2016, 14–19). To perform duʿāʾ as a Muslim is itself to Articulate a specific possibility previously grasped in articulation while to do ṣalāh is to Articulate another, even if these labels are never used. Both involve everyday practical activities based on a prior understanding of a set of differentiated involvements. It is not even immediately possible to Articulate every possible articulation in language. Skilled translators neither have, nor need, specific names for all the procedures they follow in translating (c.f. Dreyfus 1991, 215). Nonetheless, the different

techniques they use are still Articulations of possibilities given in the articulations which characterise their background understanding. These Articulations can be given linguistic form as the many taxonomies of translation techniques attest (e.g. Dickens, Hervey, and Higgins 2017; Vinay and Darbelnet 1995). These lists are, however, linguistic descriptions of Articulations identified after the fact, rather than pre-requisite requirements for the techniques to be used in the first place. This relegation of language and deliberate thought illustrates more broadly that Heidegger sees Articulation as intentional in the phenomenological sense of being directed towards the world rather than 'intentional' in the functionalist sense of making deliberate and free choices between alternatives (Nord 1997, 26–27).

First- and second-order disclosure

I have followed Heidegger in arguing that the basic mode of human existence is being-in-the-world and that, rather than individuals first existing and then interpreting the world, Dasein finds itself from the first in relation to the world. This may seem to preclude agency, innovation and critique and all appear rather conservative – allegations also made by thinkers including Habermas (1989, 1990) and Bourdieu (1991). These fears seem to be supported when Heidegger makes strong claims such as, 'Dasein is … determined in its possibilities by the beings to which it relates as to intraworldly beings. The Dasein understands itself first by way of these beings' (Heidegger 1982, 171) which suggest that we cannot go beyond the understanding we already have of things. Rather than speaking of human agents constructing or even critiquing worlds or social structures, he talks about the world and things within it as being 'disclosed' to Dasein who 'discovers' them. This happens, for Heidegger, through the operation of 'aletheia' or 'unveiling' – the possible meanings are presented as already there, lying hidden within the essence of things, substances, practices and so on waiting to be found.[4]

The priority of Dasein's finding itself in an already-articulated world is clearly central for Heidegger. Yet he also argues repeatedly for the possibility of coming to see things in new ways. He proposes that this requires that something make the world or some worldly thing 'conspicuous' (Heidegger 1962, 405). In *Being and Time*, he illustrates this primarily through reference to everyday equipment – most of the time we use doorknobs, there is no need to go beyond our existing awareness of their significance and articulations. If a doorknob does not work as expected, however, it is rendered conspicuous. We look at it in a different way and, while its ontic properties remain unchanged, it is disclosed anew. The significant relationships within which the doorknob is embedded, furthermore, also become apparent: 'if there is something conspicuous in the totality of such entities, this implies that the equipmental totality as such is obtruding itself along with it' (405).

Kompridis (1994, 2006) clarifies and expands Heidegger's stance on disclosure in two important ways. The first is to differentiate more clearly between the initial disclosure of the world in relation to which 'Dasein understands itself first', which he terms 'first-order' disclosure, and the disclosure which follows some form of conspicuousness, which he terms 'second-order' disclosure. The second is to observe that second-order disclosure can follow two distinct paths. On the one hand, the opening it creates allows things to be discovered in new and previously impossible ways. He terms this 'world de-centring' since it entails the redisclosure of Dasein's world as a relational totality. On the other, second-

order disclosure can also re-affirm our existing understanding of the world in which case it is 'unifying-repairing'. A broken doorknob throws the doorknob and its position within a relational whole into relief. That opens the possibility of rethinking those relationships, unveiling alternative articulations and thus Dasein's discovery of new Articulatory possibilities. But it may also simply re-affirm the previously unrecognised articulation given in first-order disclosure, bringing it briefly into view while leaving Dasein's awareness and relationship to the underpinning significations unchanged.

The concept of disclosure seems to have caused issues for the translation scholars Douglas Robinson and Lawrence Venuti. Venuti dismisses the entire 'German tradition of hermeneutics – notably the work of Heidegger and Hans-Georg Gadamer' on the grounds that their 'aim is to disclose an essentialist meaning in the source text' (Venuti 2013, 4) which he seems to understand as a single, final meaning. Alfer (2020 , 267–69) shows that this claim is a serious misrepresentation of Gadamer's approach. It is also a serious misrepresentation of Heidegger's. As noted briefly above, Heidegger does think that things have essences which are revealed through disclosure. Nonetheless, he adopts a 'hermeneutic realist' (Dreyfus 2017) stance and understands essences as incorporating both ontic and ontological dimensions (Grieder 1988; Nulty 2022). On the one hand, things' essences lie in their ontic properties in that, however they are understood, stones cannot be made into samosas. Yet, for Heidegger, the essence of a thing includes not only its 'whatness' but also its way of 'essencing' or disclosing what it is (c.f. Capobianco 2014) – what Blumczynski (2016) calls 'howness'. This is not grounded in subjective experiences but rather in the world. That the world is not static but rather in a constant state of renewal means that, for Heidegger, both essences themselves, and what any concrete Dasein can discover about them, cannot be static either (Nulty 2022, 49). Essences are thus characterised by both the finitude of ontic things and the infinitude of their revealing themselves (c.f. Sartre 1957, xlvi – xlviii). Heidegger did believe that we could, and should strive to, discover the essences of things. Nonetheless, his understanding of essences coupled with the priority he afforded to non-linguistic signification meant that he did not suggest that any text could have a single essential meaning.

Robinson (2001) offers a more detailed engagement with Heidegger's thought which, in parts, accords with the account of disclosure given here. He summarises Heidegger's stance on disclosure by saying that words help us "to 'see' *things* that existed before but might as well not have because we were 'linguistically' or 'conceptually' or 'philosophically' blind to them" (Robinson 2001, 80 emphasis mine). This is clearly a possibility: we can come to be aware of extant things that we previously did not know about. Heidegger's account of disclosure, nonetheless, is concerned less with encountering wholly new extant things and more with discovering new possibilities of the being of things and of being itself. Borrowing terms from Blumczynski (2016) once again, this shows how Robinson – like Venuti – shifts the emphasis from howness back towards whatness.

Robinson goes further to claim that, for Heidegger, language 'is also more. It is literally creative. It brings things into being – not just into presence for us; into presence. Into *ousia/Sein*' (Robinson 2001, 80). Robinson does not expand on what he understands this to mean or give a specific supporting reference. It seems to suggest, however, that Heidegger believed that things are created by the language we use to talk about them. This turns Heidegger into a sort of linguistic

constitutionalist and is a stance difficult to reconcile with his own writings (c.f. Wrathall 2011, 118–55). Heidegger views the relationship between being and language, rather, as one in which language is involved in 'bringing forth'. Rather than creating things, it allows us to recognise aspects of their being. In *Being and Time*, for instance, he argues that 'the λόγος [logos, i.e. language] is a letting-something-be-seen' and in using language 'the entities *of which* one is talking must be taken out of their hiddenness [i.e. discovered]; one must let them be seen as something unhidden [i.e. disclosed]' (Heidegger 1962, 56). He revisited this idea many times throughout his career (e.g. Heidegger 1971, 2013) but the core tenets of his approach remained the same.

Robinson freely admits that he and other 'poststructuralist readers . . . have a very hard time getting . . . [their] understanding around Heidegger's [supposedly] flagrant universalism, foundationalism, and essentialism' (Robinson 2001, 79). Venuti, also strongly influenced by poststructuralism, seems to have struggled with the same issue. Perhaps the biggest apparent conflict is that in poststructuralism, especially in its Derridean form, the absence of a transcendental signified is a key idea. For Heidegger, on the other hand, being ultimately lies behind all meanings. Yet, for Heidegger, being, as the final transcendental signified, is itself open and dynamic. Rather than sitting there like a substance, it endlessly 'gives' (c.f. Capobianco 2014). Spivak captures this dynamic in the introduction to her English translation of Derrida's *Of Grammatology* (Derrida 1974, xvi):

> when Heidegger sets Being before all concepts, he is attempting to free language from the fallacy of a fixed origin, which is also a fixed end. But, in a certain way, he also sets up Being as what Derrida calls the 'transcendental signified'. For whatever a concept might 'mean', anything that is conceived of in its being-present must lead us to the already answered question of Being. In that sense, the sense of the final reference, Being is indeed the final signified to which all signifiers refer. But Heidegger makes it clear that Being cannot be contained by, is always prior to, indeed transcends, signification. It is therefore a situation where the signified commands, and is yet free of, all signifiers.

Dasein is finite and specific factical beings have multiple but not entirely unlimited meanings. As discussed earlier, this is the 'ontico' part of his 'ontico-ontological' account within which he holds the 'largely commonsense view that there are culture-independent causal properties of nature which explain why it is that you can make missiles out of rocks or branches, but not out of air or water' (Wheeler 2020). Yet being itself remains open and unlimited and no Dasein can ever discover all possible and essential significations of any thing.

Translation as re-articulation

I suggested above that all concrete translation activity is Articulatory in that it involves taking up possibilities articulated in first-order disclosure. This sees translation as a practical activity like any other and therefore grounded in the translator's being-in-the-world. To translate, rather than localise or transedit, is already to Articulate specific possibilities pre-given in articulation. The translator's use of equipment within their 'there' must also be seen as Articulations. Every time a translator consults a dictionary, asks a question on a forum, or sends translation memory data to an agency, they are

Articulating possibilities that have already been articulated within and have their meanings in terms of a relational whole.

The translator's own being *as* a translator is also defined by their position in that relational whole. Re-articulation of the equipmental contexture is therefore existentially significant, affecting the possible ways of being a translator. This is apparent in the evolution of translation technology over recent decades which has brought not merely changing practices but a fundamental re-articulation of the equipmental contexture. The shift to CAT tools with integrated machine translation (MT) central to many translators' daily work, for instance, has been world decentring. The equipmental contexture within which translators work now offers a different set of Articulatory possibilities. It was already possible to use MT but its integration into mainstream CAT tools has redefined and re-articulated the relationship of the human translator to non-human nodes in the wider context. Heidegger's approach encourages us to see this in existential terms – as the equipmental contexture shifts, what it means to *be* a translator also changes and is revealed in new ways. The fact that technological change is constant, meanwhile, points to the fundamental ontological unsettledness of the translator as the environment within which they find themselves and from which they initially take the possible range of Articulations also shifts and changes.

The specific linguistic choices translators make are also Articulations, with the range of possibilities ultimately defined by the articulation of the world of practical engagement even before the affordances of the particular language(s) with which they work come into play. This emphasises that the range of choices open to the translator is wide but limited even before asking, for example, if a given language has an existing lexical term to precisely refer to a given thing or practice or whether moral, cultural or professional norms require one translation strategy or another. As discussed above, the challenge of translating a term like duʿāʾ lies not in the availability or not of a standard lexical equivalent, but rather on whether the articulatory distinction which separates it from other modes of prayer has been disclosed so as to allow that distinction to be linguistically Articulated by the translator. It depends on the articulation of the 'joints' in the relational whole within which the word and practice have their particular significance.

To translate is also to re-Articulate. Any text is itself an Articulation and a textual translation hence an Articulation of an Articulation. But then all Articulations are, to a significant degree, also re-Articulations. They are not points of origin but what Heidegger (1962, 437) calls 'repetition', reappropriations of specific Articulations from the past. The idea of translation as re-Articulation then comes into view as a kind of positive and productive repetition, rather than simple transmission or second-order imitation. Venuti (1998, 43) claims that 'Authorship is not *sui generis*; writing depends on pre-existing cultural materials, selected by the author, arranged in an order of priority, and rewritten (or elaborated) according to specific values'. Without disputing this idea, it can be developed further by saying that those 'cultural materials' are themselves dependent on the more fundamental level of the articulation of the world. Presenting translation as *re*-Articulation may, nonetheless, give the idea that translators do not make anything new. Venuti is right when, referencing the ancient Greek notion of *poiesis*, he argues that 'translation involves a particular act of making, of creativity or invention' (Venuti 2013, 35). From a Heideggerian perspective, the primary kind of creativity in translation is bringing about the redisclosure of the world –

bringing things forth in Heidegger's sense of poiesis. On the existential level, translation's most fundamental importance thus lies not immediately in the instrumental value of the thing that the translator makes, but in the embeddedness of that thing within the relational world and the possibilities opened by the act of making for bringing about second-order disclosure.

Translation brings about second-order disclosure by making things conspicuous. This can happen on the level of language. Exposing incongruities of language or style between languages may reveal new ways to Articulate the possibilities within those languages – the King James translation of the bible, for instance, famously influenced perceptions of good style in English for centuries (Hamlin and Jones 2010). Part of that influence was through introducing new expressions and idioms that had not previously been used in English. Another part of its influence, though, lay in Articulating the existing, latent possibilities of English in new and previously unrecognised ways, simultaneously making the linguistic articulations of the time conspicuous and decentring them. The non-standard syntactical and lexical choices of the translators in turn seeped into the everyday articulation of the language, redefining the repertoire of Articulatory possibilities.

More broadly, translation can bring about second-order disclosure in other ways discussed in the existing literature such as poetry (Heidegger 1971), critique (Kompridis 2006; Ricoeur 1981, 23–60) and dialogic/quasi-dialogic interaction (Frosh 2019; Gadamer 1989; Thompson 1995). Yet while translation as traditionally understood operates in and through language, its re-articulatory effects also bear on the practical and everyday. As with all second-order disclosure, translation can produce both unifying-repairing and decentring effects. This is powerfully shown in work on translation in colonial and postcolonial contexts. Classic work from the 1990s, for example, shows that translation played an important role in holding the colonised in a subordinate position by making the hierarchy between coloniser and colonised seem fixed and eternal (Cheyfitz 1997; Niranjana 1992, 1998). On the ontological level, this was translation re-Articulating an established set of articulations, disclosing highly unequal relationships between colonisers and colonised and producing unifying-repairing effects. This, in turn, was significant for the preservation of the articulations Articulated through the everyday racist and discriminatory practices of colonialism.

The literature on postcolonial translation as a resistant act also shows how translation can bring about decentring effects (Gamal 2012; Robinson 1997, 88–103; Bandia 2008, 2014). Thought of in terms of power, such translation aims to challenge relations of domination as seen, for example, in political and economic structures. On the existential level, we can think of such inequalities as part of the human way of being-with-others that can be made conspicuous through translation, bringing them out of unreflective first-order disclosure. Such translations then explicitly aim at decentring unequal relations, re-articulating them in such a way as to allow both former colonisers and colonised to Articulate their existential relationship with one another in new ways. This may, in turn, re-articulate the reading Dasein's way of being-in-the-world more broadly – it is difficult to maintain the same relationship with the digital technologies which saturate daily life, for instance, after becoming aware of the frequently high environmental and human costs of their production in formerly colonised territories. Re-articulation then comes into view as both a prerequisite for translation activism – revealing the possibilities Articulated by translators through the linguistic choices they make and activist goals they explicitly

adopt – as well as its objective – revealing new possibilities to readers in ways that then influence the meanings they Articulate in their daily lives.

Translation is also involved in bringing about unifying-repairing and decentring disclosure in the most mundane of contexts. Reading the (translated) assembly instructions for a wardrobe for my toddler recently, for instance, I became aware that I needed a 4 mm masonry drill bit. Unfortunately, I had melted my 4 mm drill bit days earlier. This made my lack of the necessary drill bit conspicuous, but also made me aware of the other drill bits and tools that I did have which were not suitable for drilling a 4 mm hole in a wall. In other words, it revealed the wider equipmental contexture within which the drill bit was meaningful and allowed me to discover the other useful equipment that I did have in a way that I previously could not. This, in turn, made the wider set of involvements conspicuous: the towards-which of drilling a hole in the wall, in-order-to secure the wardrobe to the wall, for-the-sake-of being a good father who keeps their child safe and provides an environment that they can use freely. In revealing the involvement whole, it unveiled the fundamental ungroundedness of my own (relational) being in anything beyond being-in-the-world.

Presumably, few people have an existential crisis when they do not have the appropriate drill bit. The important point, nonetheless, is that first- and second-order disclosure happen continuously with or without explicit reflection. Heidegger tells us that it is Dasein's anxiety, arising from its being-its-own-possibilities rather than anything fixed and solid, that reveals its being-in-the-world:

> Being-anxious discloses, primordially and directly, the world as world. It is not the case, say, that the world first gets thought of by deliberating about it, just by itself, without regard for the entities within-the-world, and that, in the face of this world, anxiety then arises; what is rather the case is that the *world as world* is disclosed first and foremost by anxiety, as a mode of state-of-mind. This does not signify, however, that in anxiety the worldhood of the world gets conceptualized. (Heidegger 1962, 232)

Disclosure can be big and dramatic – for example reading a translated religious text for the first time and experiencing a 'road to Damascus moment' that unveils a radically new way of being-in-the-world. It can also be small and everyday, involving subtle shifts in how the articulation of the world is disclosed and thus to our own way of being-in it. Translation itself may seem incidental in a case like this. In one sense, it is – the same effect could have been brought about by a set of non-translated instructions. Nonetheless, it highlights that many of our encounters with translation take place precisely in the context of everyday practical activity and in relation to the useful things that make up the equipmental contexture which is existentially nearest to us. Heidegger's ideas show that these translations are still existentially important for a Dasein whose being is an issue for it and who finds itself first and foremost in relation to the world, whether or not a radical, experimental or activist translation approach is adopted.

Conclusions

I have introduced some major elements of Heidegger's early thought and explored their implications for how we think about translation. I began with the notions of worldliness and being-in-the-world, before considering how the world is articulated

and Articulated. I then introduced Kompridis' notions of first- and second-order disclosure before, finally, beginning to set out a view of translation as an articulatory and Articulatory practice. I have sought to show that the analytic of Dasein in Heidegger's early work offers a powerful and profoundly relational way of thinking about translators' being-in-the-world, including how their way of existing is bound up with the tools that they use and defined by their embeddedness within the world. This perspective can also help us to better understand the relationship between translation and wider realities. Part of translation studies' 'linguistic bias' (Marais 2019) is a tendency to overemphasise text and language both in themselves and in terms of their role in defining non-linguistic realities, for example in some work informed by narrative theory and critical discourse analysis. In this regard, Heidegger's hermeneutic realism offers a useful alternative, seeing the world as constituted by complex interactions between the material and the ideal, practices and thought, the individual and the collective. Translation is shaped by how the world has been disclosed and also plays an important role in re-disclosing the world, both limited and enabled by the factical situation of the translating Dasein. It shows that language is important as an Articulatory practice but not the only or even primary way that Articulation happens – even in the context of translation.

Finally, there is much more that a Heideggerian approach can offer translation studies beyond the ideas discussed here. The notion of anxiety, briefly mentioned here, can help in thinking about the translator's unachievable, yet existentially crucial, quest for authenticity. His thinking on temporality offers a way of thinking about the temporal embedding of translators and translation within timescales ranging from that of an individual task, to the 'stretching along' of entire lives from birth to death, to the historicity of being *in* history and a succession of generations. His later work includes more extensive reflection on disclosure, contrasting 'gathering' and 'dissemination' as divergent possibilities. His shift in emphasis, meanwhile, from the ontology of Dasein in *Being and Time* to his later consideration of phusis as the being of nature established a non-anthropocentric approach to thinking about being complementary to contemporary thought in translation studies. All these ideas can greatly enrich our understanding of the interplay of translation and being and, in particular, attempts to think about their interweaving relationally.

Notes

1. I do not engage here with Heidegger's concept of 'mitsein' – the existential dimension of human 'being-with-others'. This is partly due to limitations of space and partly because mitsein remained underdeveloped throughout Heidegger's career (Nancy 2008; McMullin 2013).
2. This follows Macquarrie and Robinson's translation of *Being and Time* (Heidegger 1962, 195n1).
3. 'Articulation' has also been used as a technical term by translation scholars working from a range of philosophical traditions (Sadler, Baker, and Engebretsen 2023; Scott 2023). This work is not directly relevant to present concerns.
4. This idea of 'veiledness', nonetheless, has no overtones of repressed knowledge or memory, as in work inspired by psychoanalysis (Ingram 2003; Robinson 2001; Venuti 2013).

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