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Sir Walter Ralegh and the Art of War by Sea: Military Humanism and the Uses of the Early Modern Soldier-Scholar

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Abstract
This article establishes the intellectual origins and underpinnings of the early modern soldier-scholar in order to better understand the military humanist tradition within which Sir Walter Ralegh's writings on naval warfare and logistics were conceived and composed. By locating Ralegh within this tradition, the article provides a new critical framework for examining his dual identification with both the military and scholarly spheres. After discussing how the soldier-scholar figure is indebted to the early modern intellectualisation of the art of war as an object of humanist discourse, this article examines how Ralegh adopts this figure as a means to seek preferment at court, beginning in the mid-1590s following his fall from royal favour. Focusing on three distinct groups of naval writings, it argues that Ralegh positioned himself as an expert in the art of war by sea as a means of effacing differences in social status between himself and his contemporaries at court. It discusses his relationship with contemporary soldier-scholars—including Sir Humphrey Gilbert, Robert Devereux, earl of Essex, and Henry Percy, earl of Northumberland—and demonstrates how Ralegh's expertise in naval matters combined personal experience, first-hand information from well-travelled mariners and extensive reading in classical and early modern military science.

I

It has long been customary to introduce Sir Walter Ralegh by attaching his name to a varying epithetic list of roles and identities that he held or assumed during his life. Thomas Fuller offered an early example when lauding Ralegh's dexterity 'in all his undertakings, in Court, in Camp, by Sea, by Land, with Sword, with Pen'.[1] Three centuries later, Suzanne Gossett characterised Ralegh as an 'explorer, courtier, sea-captain, nationalist, incidental author […] competing only with [Sir

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[1] Thomas Fuller, *The History of the Worthies of England* (London, 1662), p. 262. See also Pierre Lefranc, *Sir Walter Ralegh Écrivain* (Paris, 1968), p. 25.

Philip] Sidney for the post of *the* Renaissance Man'.[2] It is of course the polymathic aggregation of roles that typifies the figure of the so-called 'Renaissance Man', and that informs Stephen Greenblatt's monograph on the multiple roles Ralegh 'performed' until his execution on 29 October 1618.[3] This is the point at which Ralegh himself inaugurated that multi-faceted epithetic tradition by enumerating in his scaffold speech the 'sinful Callings' of his life, 'having been a Souldier, a Captain, a Sea-Captain, and a Courtier'.[4] Far less critical attention gets paid, however, to relationships between these roles or to the implications of their simultaneity and complementarity. How did Ralegh's expertise as a soldier and sea captain, for example, inform his activities as a courtier and scholar?

Historians traditionally approach Ralegh's life-long interest in military matters either by reviewing his field experience on land and sea in one or other of the 'callings' mentioned above or by examining his preoccupations with war and naval combat in his writings, in particular *The History of the World* (1614)—hereafter cited as *History*—and 'A Discourse of the Original and Fundamental Cause of Natural, Arbitrary, Necessary, and Unnatural War' (1616).[5] As his biographers have rehearsed, Ralegh first saw combat as a teenager in 1569 serving as a gentleman volunteer fighting for the Huguenots alongside his cousin Henry Champernowne. He later wrote candidly in *History* about several violent episodes witnessed during the third French War of Religion.[6] His field experience in Ireland during 1580–81 is well-documented, particularly that involving his part in the Smerwick massacre of November 1580, in which he appears to have supervised the killing of several hundred Spanish, Italian and Irish mercenaries.[7] The Tudor historian John Hooker presented a more positive account of Ralegh's Irish service when describing how he emerged victorious from various encounters across Munster.[8] Ralegh's initial rise at Elizabeth's court is often credited to his links with military men during the late 1570s and early 1580s, including his half-brother Sir Humphrey Gilbert, Robert Dudley, earl of Leicester, and Arthur Wilton, Lord Grey.[9] He also made a positive early impression at court in December 1580 when bearing secret

[2] Suzanne Gossett, 'A new history for Ralegh's *Notes on the Navy*', *Modern Philology*, 85 (1987), p. 12.

[3] Stephen Greenblatt, *Sir Walter Ralegh: The Renaissance Man and His Roles* (New Haven, 1973).

[4] Mark Nicholls and Penry Williams, *Sir Walter Ralegh: In Life and Legend* (London, 2011), p. 319.

[5] Lefranc, *Ralegh*, pp. 171-95; Nicholls and Williams, *Ralegh*, pp. 265-71; Nicholas Popper, *Walter Ralegh's 'History of the World' and the Historical Culture of the Late Renaissance* (Chicago, 2012), pp. 221-39; Andrew Hiscock, '"Most fond and fruitlesse warre": Ralegh and the call to arms', in Christopher Armitage (ed.), *Literary and Visual Ralegh* (Manchester, 2013), pp. 257-83; Nicholas Popper, 'Virtue and providence: perceptions of ancient Roman warfare in early modern England', *Huntington Library Quarterly*, 83/3 (2020), pp. 519-41.

[6] [Ralegh], *The History of the World* (London, 1614), 5.2.3; 5.2.8 (citations are to book, chapter, and section).

[7] Raleigh Trevelyan, *Sir Walter Raleigh* (London, 2002), pp. 32-45; Hiscock, '"Most fond"', pp. 270-72; Alan Gallay, *Walter Ralegh: Architect of Empire* (New York, 2019), pp. 38-47.

[8] Nicholls and Williams, *Ralegh*, pp. 14-18.

[9] Trevelyan, *Raleigh*, pp. 19-20; Nicholls and Williams, *Ralegh*, p. 11.

documentation captured at Smerwick back to London and was the only major Elizabethan favourite who entered court circles directly from the field.[10] Ralegh's early achievement of preferment through military activity established a pattern he would attempt to follow throughout his life. As discussed further below, his martial expertise soon served as a currency that enabled him to both maintain royal favour and position himself advantageously when interacting with those of higher social rank.

Ralegh's earliest naval experience was on Gilbert's Atlantic expedition that departed in November 1578 (returning May 1579), a voyage Hooker claims had involved 'fights on the sea'.[11] He was never entirely happy at sea thereafter but during the 1590s engaged in actions involving both naval and land-based service.[12] In February 1595, he made his first voyage to 'Guiana' (modern Venezuela). After engaging in some mid-Atlantic privateering, before journeying into the Orinoco delta, he landed at Trinidad and took the strategic decision to attack the Spanish settlement at San José de Oruña.[13] As discussed below, in 1596, Ralegh participated in the Cadiz raid, at which he was injured in the leg, and the following year had modest success in an amphibious assault at Fayal, in the Azores, during the otherwise disastrous 'Islands' voyage. Between June 1617 and June 1618, he made his second voyage to Guiana, though was too weak to journey upriver and thus unable to participate in—or prevent—the clash with the Spanish at San Thomé on 2 January led by Lawrence Keymis.

One can also discuss Ralegh's martial identity in relation to the military offices he held. In September 1585, he was appointed Lord Lieutenant of Cornwall—the queen's military representative in the county—and made Vice-Admiral for Devon and Cornwall that November. In spring 1587, he replaced Sir Christopher Hatton as Captain of the Guard, a role combining ceremonial duties with responsibility for the queen's person. He retained the post until 1592, when he fell from favour after revelation of his marriage to Bess Throckmorton. It was restored in June 1597 following his post-Cadiz rehabilitation at court. In November 1587, Ralegh was appointed to the Council of War charged with preparing England's defences against the inevitable attack from Spain.[14] When the Armada sailed the following summer, he organised land defences in south-west England, though there is no evidence corroborating Richard

[10] Steven W. May, 'How Ralegh became a courtier', *John Donne Journal*, 27 (2008), pp. 132, 135-7. See also Anna Beer, *Patriot or Traitor: The Life and Death of Sir Walter Ralegh* (London, 2018), p. 21.

[11] Nicholls and Williams, *Ralegh*, pp. 12-13.

[12] Agnes Latham and Joyce Youings (eds.), *The Letters of Sir Walter Ralegh* (Exeter, 1999), p. xl (hereafter cited as *Letters*); Lefranc, *Ralegh*, p. 181.

[13] Charles Nicoll, *The Creature in the Map: A Journey to El Dorado* (Chicago, 1997), pp. 89-91; Trevelyan, *Raleigh*, pp. 226-7.

[14] By the end of 1587, Ralegh had provided Lord Burghley with details of forces available for defending south-west England and, with his fellow councillors, furnished Sir Francis Walsingham with recommendations on how to resist an invasion attempt. See TNA, SP12/206, fol. 63; British Library [hereafter BL], Add MS 48162, fols. 4r-5v. I am grateful to one of the anonymous peer-reviewers for these references.

Hakluyt's claim that Ralegh engaged Spanish ships offshore on 2 August 1588.[15] After the raids and invasion scares of the 1590s, in 1600, Ralegh was appointed Governor of Jersey, a post he held until 1603 when he was accused of involvement in the treasonous Main Plot and stripped of all offices following his arrest on 19 July that year.[16]

The approach of this article differs, however, from those taken previously in biographical or literary studies on Ralegh. It does so by examining a conjunction of two of the most commonly evoked roles attached to Ralegh—the soldier and the scholar—and a particular kind of hybrid figure termed here the 'soldier-scholar'. The term 'soldier-scholar' is a convenient shorthand characterisation of a complex, though certainly not unprecedented role that Ralegh consciously adopted, cultivated and propagated throughout much of his life. It will be argued that he made resort to the role of the soldier-scholar, who combined field experience with appropriate reading and study, as he continued to offer military counsel—particularly in naval matters—to a succession of individuals at the Elizabethan and Jacobean courts. This article focuses on a number of key points over the course of Ralegh's career at which he actively presented himself as a naval authority in order to seek preferment, beginning in the mid-1590s when he had fallen from royal favour.[17] It argues that Ralegh continued to fashion and position himself as a naval authority as a means of effacing differences in status between himself and his contemporaries at court and that he did so by using his martial expertise and knowledge as a form of privileged social currency. As shown below, the soldier-scholar is one of the most enduring roles Ralegh cultivated for himself and one that he genuinely occupied as a composite 'calling' or vocation rather than merely 'performed' provisionally in the manner characterised by Greenblatt.

The term 'soldier-scholar' requires further definition from the outset, not least since it collapses Ralegh's extensive naval expertise together with his land-based experience as a soldier and broader interests in military affairs. And because by 'scholar', rather than imagining any sort of withdrawn contemplative figure, I mean one who is concerned with the practical, public application of their knowledge and scholarship, as is the familiar, much-discussed humanist model, to which I return below. 'Soldier-scholar' is preferred here to a more functional-sounding equivalent such as 'military counsellor' or 'naval advisor', not only as it retains an emphasis on study and the knowledge used to inform proffered counsel but because of the element of hybridity signified by that connecting hyphen. As will be shown, it was the simultaneous

[15] Trevelyan, *Raleigh*, pp. 129-33.

[16] As his extant correspondence records, Ralegh also demonstrated a sustained commitment to brokering naval intelligence between the early 1590s and his 1603 incarceration: *Letters*, p. xlii. I examine Ralegh's intelligence work in a separate, forthcoming study.

[17] Leonard Tennenhouse, 'Sir Walter Ralegh and the literature of clientage', in Guy Fitch Lytle and Stephen Orgel (eds), *Patronage in the Renaissance* (Princeton, 1981), pp. 235-58, discusses how Ralegh sought preferment through his writing, though focuses on his poetry and *History*.

identification with both the martial and scholarly spheres that was critical for Ralegh, as it was for those whose roles he emulated, and indeed for the wider tradition of military humanism within which his life and works can be located.

This article has two aims. The first is to establish the intellectual origins and humanist underpinnings of the soldier-scholar figure in order to better understand the tradition within which many of Ralegh's military writings were conceived. It locates Ralegh within this context in order to provide a new critical framework for examining his dual identification with both the military and scholarly spheres. The methodology employed here builds on the growing body of scholarship that has analysed early modern soldier authorship in its many forms using sources from continental Europe and the British Isles.[18] Although 'soldier-scholar' is a modern critical term, the kind of figure it signifies would have been readily recognisable to Ralegh and his contemporaries, amongst whom—as shown below—one finds many other significant exemplars. Indeed, this article discusses several influential role models among Ralegh's immediate peers who also cultivated this military identity, including Gilbert, Robert Devereux, earl of Essex, and Henry Percy, earl of Northumberland. To date, however, Ralegh himself has yet to be examined as a beneficiary or exemplar of this military humanist tradition. This article's second aim therefore is to examine Ralegh's adoption of the soldier-scholar figure in three groups of practical and petitionary military writings that each demonstrate his extensive interest in naval warfare: the policy papers written between 1596 and 1598 in the aftermath of the Cadiz and Islands voyages; the anti-Spanish overtures he made to King James I in 1603; and the naval texts produced between 1608 and 1612 when Ralegh was writing to and for Prince Henry. Reference made to the 'art of war by sea' in this article's title alludes both in general terms to Ralegh's broad-ranging interests in naval policy, combat, logistics and engineering and to a now-lost treatise on 'the Art of War by Sea' that he composed in the Tower, part of the third group of texts identified above. The article's conclusion discusses the efficacy and legacy of Ralegh's cultivation of the soldier-scholar figure.

II

The intellectual underpinnings of the soldier-scholar lie within early modern humanist discourse concerning the roles that offered an

[18] John Rigby Hale, *Renaissance War Studies* (London, 1983); Frédérique Verrier, *Les armes de Minerve. L'Humanisme militaire dans l'Italie du XVIe siècle* (Paris, 1997); D.J.B. Trim, 'The art of war: martial poetics from Henry Howard to Philip Sidney', *The Oxford Handbook of Tudor Literature, 1485-1603*, ed. Mike Pincombe and Cathy Shrank (Oxford, 2009), pp. 587-605; David Lawrence, *The Complete Soldier: Military Books and Military Culture in Early Stuart England, 1603–1645* (Leiden, 2009); Adam McKeown, *English Mercuries: Soldier Poets in the Age of Shakespeare* (Nashville, 2009); Paul Scannell, *Conflict and Soldiers' Literature in Early Modern Europe* (London, 2015); Matthew Woodcock, *Thomas Churchyard: Pen, Sword and Ego* (Oxford, 2016), ch. 15; Miguel Martinez, *Front Lines: Soldiers' Writing in the Early Modern Hispanic World* (Philadelphia, 2016).

individual the best opportunities for serving the state. As Quentin Skinner and others have shown, underlying 'virtually the whole framework for civic humanist discussions of the active life' was Cicero's *De officiis*, which propounded at length the primacy of the active, public life of *negotium* over the solitary life of scholarly, contemplative withdrawal (*otium*).[19] A plethora of treatises and dialogues were produced throughout the sixteenth century that prioritised the active life. One area into which debates about the active life extended concerned how military service constituted a way of demonstrating virtuous character and advancing the common good.[20] *De officiis* made an authoritative, influential case for prioritising civic aspects of the active life (i.e., service as a governor, law-maker or counsellor) over the military, and the greater rewards the former carried over the latter, following Cicero's dictum 'cedant arma togae concedat laurea laudi' ('let arms unto the toga yield the laurel to men's praise').[21] The predominantly irenic discourse of early sixteenth-century humanists such as John Colet, Sir Thomas More and Erasmus affirmed this principle by arguing against a martial conception of the active life and actively distancing the spheres of arms and letters. Erasmus's essay on the adage 'Spartam nactus es, hanc ora', for example, lamented the falling at Flodden in 1513 of his former pupil Archbishop Alexander Stewart and scornfully rejected any conjunction of arts and arms: 'Tell me, what had you to do with Mars, the stupidest of the poets' gods, you who were consecrated to the Muses, even to Christ? […] Why should a scholar be in the front line, or a bishop under arms?'[22]

Far more widespread, however, was the tradition that juxtaposed the relative merits of arms and letters, which became an established discursive trope in scholarship and literature across early modern Europe.[23] Within this debate arguments frequently contrived opposition between each sphere only to conclude with reconciliation and compromise, restating that both were necessary for society's well-being. When crafting his ideal courtier, Baldesar Castiglione, for example, emphasised the necessary compatibility of arms and letters (voiced through Count Ludovico): 'I

[19] Quentin Skinner, *Visions of Politics—Volume 2: Renaissance Virtues* (Cambridge, 2002), p. 218; Markku Peltonen, *Classical Humanism and Republicanism in English Political Thought, 1570-1640* (Cambridge, 1995), pp. 21-33; T.M. Pearce, 'The ideal of the soldier-scholar in the Renaissance', *Western Humanities Review*, 7/1 (1952-3), pp. 43-52. Early modern debates (and their classical antecedents) concerning the relationship of arms and letters also underpinned an array of literary writings composed by soldier-authors during this period, as demonstrated in Matthew Woodcock, 'The making of the Tudor soldier-poet', in Jason Scott-Warren and Andrew Zurcher (eds), *The Oxford Handbook of Renaissance Poetry* (Oxford, forthcoming).

[20] Peltonen, *Classical Humanism*, pp. 40-44.

[21] Cicero, *On Obligations*, trans. P. G. Walsh (Oxford, 2000), p. 27.

[22] Dominic Baker-Smith, '"Inglorious glory": 1513 and the humanist attack on chivalry', in Sydney Anglo, (ed.), *Chivalry in the Renaissance* (Woodbridge, 1990), p. 139; Rory Rapple, *Martial Power and Elizabethan Political Culture: Military Men in England and Ireland, 1558–1594* (Cambridge, 2009), pp. 29-30.

[23] Robert J. Clements, 'Pen and sword in Renaissance literature', *Modern Language Quarterly*, 5 (1944), pp. 131-41; James Supple, *Arms versus Letters: The Military and Literary Ideals in the 'Essais' of Montaigne* (Oxford, 1984), pp. 72-7; Verrier, *Les armes*, pp. 87-101.

maintain myself it is more fitting for a warrior to be educated than for anyone else; and I would have these two accomplishments, the one helping the other, as is most fitting, joined together in our courtier'.[24] Michel de Montaigne held administrative offices traditionally associated with the so-called 'robe nobility' though considered himself to be a member of the military class or 'sword nobility'.[25] Throughout his *Essays*, he evinces particular interest in bookish classical fighting men like Julius Caesar and Scipio Africanus. Comparison of an individual to Caesar or Scipio became used in this period as laudatory shorthand for the learned qualities of a fighting man.[26] Ralegh contributed to this tradition in his elegy for Sir Philip Sidney, referring to the fallen soldier-poet as the Scipio 'of our time'.[27]

The conjunction of arts and arms was also vital to the very act of conceiving, describing and analysing early modern warfare itself as an 'art', that is, when we speak of the 'art of war', be it on land or sea. As Frederique Verrier discussed, an unprecedented intellectualisation of military matters came about in Europe during the sixteenth century, beginning in Italy—partly in response *to* and partly as a driver *of*—the revolution in military affairs that took place throughout this period.[28] The effect of this is that war and soldiery became objects of scholarly study and discourse and are integrated into those debates referred to above concerning the ideal government of a commonwealth. This is what Verrier called 'military humanism'.[29] One of the instrumental figures in this intellectualisation process was Niccolò Machiavelli. First printed

[24] Baldesar Castiglione, *The Book of the Courtier*, trans. George Bull (Harmondsworth, 1967), p. 93.
[25] Roger B. Manning, *War and Peace in the Western Political Imagination: From Classical Antiquity to the Age of Reason* (London, 2016), pp. 200-3; Warren Boutcher, *The School of Montaigne in Early Modern Europe*, 2 vols. (Oxford, 2017), 2: pp. 221-2.
[26] Miriam Griffin (ed.,) *A Companion to Julius Caesar* (Chichester, 2009), chs. 22-24; Matthew Woodcock, '"The Brevarie of Soldiers": Julius Caesar's *Commentaries* and the fashioning of early modern military identity', in Matthew Woodcock and Cian O'Mahony (eds), *Early Modern Military Identities 1560-1639: Reality and Representation* (Cambridge, 2019), pp. 62-7.
[27] [R.S.], *The Phoenix Nest* (London, 1593), sig. C1v.
[28] Verrier, *Les armes*, p. 32. On the early modern military revolution: Michael Roberts, *Essays in Swedish History* (London, 1967); J. R. Hale, *War and Society in Renaissance Europe, 1450-1620* (London, 1985); Jeremy Black, *A Military Revolution? Military Change and European Society* (Basingstoke, 1991); Geoffrey Parker, *The Military Revolution: Military Innovation and the Rise of the West, 1500-1800* (Cambridge, 1996); David Eltis, *The Military Revolution in Sixteenth-Century Europe* (New York, 1998); James Raymond, *Henry VIII's Military Revolution: The Armies of Sixteenth-Century Britain and Europe* (New York, 2007); Frank Jacob and Gilmar Visoni-Alonzo, *The Military Revolution in Early Modern Europe* (Houndmills, 2016). The early modern maturation of military humanism does not mean antique military science was unknown or disregarded during the medieval period; see Christopher Allmand, *The De Re Militari of Vegetius: The Reception, Transmission, and Legacy of a Roman Text in The Middle Ages* (Cambridge, 2011).
[29] Verrier, *Les armes*, ch. 2. D. Alan Orr, 'Protestant military humanism in early Stuart Ireland', *Historical Journal*, 6 (2019), pp. 77-99, uses the term 'military humanism' differently to mean 'the need for martial prowess both in a people and their prince […] for the preservation of the commonwealth against the threat of foreign domination' (pp. 80-81). Usages of the term rooted in early modern humanist scholarship are distinct from that of Noam Chomsky in *The New Military Humanism: Lessons from Kosovo* (London, 1999), where it describes deployment of military forces for humanitarian ends.

in 1521, Machiavelli's *Libro dell'arte della guerra* (*The Art of War*) is often credited as being foundational for early modern military science.[30] It was of vital importance in establishing a model for the numerous treatises composed across early modern Europe that propagated and evaluated lessons drawn from classical military theorists such as Vegetius, Frontinus and Polybius.[31] Ralegh's conception of military science and its uses was significantly influenced by Machiavelli.[32] He cites *Dell'arte della guerra* three times across his works—quoting from the 1546 French translation—and returns repeatedly in his naval writings to Machiavelli's observations concerning the inadequacies of a purely defensive approach when confronting a determined invader.[33] Machiavelli was certainly not the first writer of this period to rehearse tactical or technical military information, but his *Arte* does move beyond earlier vernacular and translated treatises—which often took the form of collected precepts and anecdotes—in that it intellectualises the practical and political business of warfare by framing it as an art, that is, as a discipline and body of knowledge that can be treated as an object of study.

Machiavelli's *Arte* implicitly endorsed the figure of the soldier-scholar from the preface's opening line by challenging the distinction between the spheres of arts and arms and the common opinion 'that there are no things less in agreement with one another or so dissimilar as the civilian and military lives'.[34] The treatise proper takes the form of a dialogue, set in 1516, between the aged *condottiere* Fabrizio Colonna and several interlocutors concerning applications of classical military authorities to the organisation of a modern state. The premise for the ensuing dialogue is especially significant here as it concerns the ethical necessity of distinguishing between those who merely practised the art of war and those who studied it as an object of discourse. As Fabrizio states:

> [war] is an art by means of which men cannot live honestly in every time, it cannot be used as an art except by a republic or a kingdom. And the one and the other of these, when it was well ordered, never consented to any of its citizens or subjects using it as an art, nor did any good man ever practice it as his particular art.[35]

Machiavelli criticised those who made war their profession, especially mercenaries, in order to defend the concept of a citizen militia: that is,

[30] Felix Gilbert, 'Machiavelli: The renaissance of the art of war', in Peter Paret et al. (eds), *Makers of Modern Strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age* (Princeton, 1986), pp. 11-31; Niccolò Machiavelli, *Art of War*, trans. and ed. Christopher Lynch (Chicago, 2003), pp. xxvi-xxvii.
[31] Maurice Cockle, *A Bibliography of English Military Books up to 1642 and of Contemporary Foreign Works* (London, 1900); Henry J. Webb, *Elizabethan Military Science: The Books and the Practice* (Madison, 1965); Hale, *Renaissance War Studies*.
[32] Lefranc, *Ralegh*, pp. 222-53. Ralegh evinces a particular debt to Machiavelli's *Arte* in the section of *History* (5.211.18) devoted to 'The Dangers of the Use of Mercenary Soldiers and Foreign Auxiliaries'.
[33] Lefranc, *Ralegh*, pp. 236, 237n37.
[34] Machiavelli, *Art*, p. 3.
[35] Machiavelli, *Art*, p. 13.

those who engage in the art of war collectively in service to the state in time of war (only). His aim in this formative part of the dialogue is to replace the whole idea of an individual's 'particular' exercise of the art of war as a profession or vocation with its reconceptualisation as a body of knowledge used as a tool of statecraft by republics or kingdoms. This body of knowledge can then be used to form a civilian population into a force for military action and make it tactically effective. Through prioritising the art of war as a collectively deployed discipline and tool, Machiavelli implicitly defended writing about military matters and of codifying this body of knowledge as a credible object of study. As Christopher Lynch identifies, through his advocacy of the superiority of the active life over the contemplative, and of the military commander who masters the art of war and applies reason and expertise in the field, Machiavelli provides an influential foundational model for the soldier-scholar.[36]

III

Martialists and scholars in Elizabethan England continued to explore the relative merits of military and scholarly manifestations of the active life and to laud those displaying excellence in both. From the mid-sixteenth century onwards, successive generations of writers including Thomas Elyot, Roger Ascham and Gabriel Harvey formulated pragmatic models of how the spheres of arms and letters might be aligned in the service of the commonwealth.[37] Military humanism and the early modern soldier-scholar can therefore also be understood in relation to Lisa Jardine and Anthony Grafton's essay on studying for action that provided a foundational model of how scholarly activity was used as a vital preparatory resource for military and colonial enterprises.[38] Grafton and Jardine examined how 'erudite facilitators' such as Harvey, John Dee, Henry Cuffe and Henry Savile were employed by Leicester, Essex, Edward Dyer and others as professional readers and provided a form of 'transactional reading' in which extracted military knowledge from classical and contemporary sources became an important transferable commodity with practical applications.[39] Ralegh employed Thomas

[36] Christopher Lynch, *Machiavelli on War* (Ithaca, 2023), pp. 233-53.
[37] Baker-Smith, '"Inglorious glory"', pp. 129-44; Manning, *War and Peace*, pp. 181-94.
[38] Lisa Jardine and Anthony Grafton, '"Studied for action": how Gabriel Harvey read his Livy', *Past and Present*, 129 (1990), pp. 30-78. This was republished in a collection that begins to realise Jardine and Grafton's original book project on early modern reading practices: Anthony Grafton, Nicholas Popper, and William Sherman (eds), *Gabriel Harvey and the History of Reading: Essays by Lisa Jardine and Others* (London, 2024). The essay is cited here from this edition (pp. 21-76).
[39] Jardine and Grafton, '"Studied"', p. 23. On similar transactional reading practices: William H. Sherman, *John Dee: The Politics of Reading and Writing in the English Renaissance* (Amherst, 1995); Paul E.J. Hammer, 'The uses of scholarship: the secretariat of Robert Devereux, second earl of Essex, c.1585-1601', *English Historical Review*, 109/430 (1994), pp. 26-51, and *The Polarisation of Elizabethan Politics: The Political Career of Robert Devereux, 2nd Earl of Essex, 1585-1597* (Cambridge, 1997), pp. 306-9, 401; Jeanine de Landtsheer, 'Justus Lipsius's *De Militia Romana*:

Harriot in a similar role in the 1580s. As Hakluyt recorded, under Harriot's guidance Ralegh and his 'collaborating sea captains […] might very profitably unite theory with practice, not without almost incredible results'.[40] During this period Ralegh devoted himself to reading and learned discourse, gaining practical advice first-hand from expert soldiers and sailors, and building an intellectual coterie at Durham House in London alongside Harriot and the earl of Northumberland.[41]

The concept of the soldier-scholar, however, represents a specific extension of this practice. Whereas Jardine and Grafton's studying for action involved professional readers drawing out practical knowledge for use by others, the soldier-scholar could put the fruits of their own reading and humanist training directly into practical use (or 'action') themselves. Moreover, in its idealised form, the relationship between reading and practice entailed a circular operation in which the lettered soldier's practical knowledge of military science subsequently fed back to the scholarly sphere in the form of recorded experience and expertise. For early modern soldier-scholars, letters remained a vital supplement to arms, as Ralegh's martial contemporaries—including Barnabe Rich, Thomas Churchyard, Robert Barret and George Whetstone—continued to argue.[42] Sir Clement Edmondes made the case for the lettered fighting man in a prefatory essay to his translation of Julius Caesar's *Commentaries* (first published 1600), entitled 'Reading and Discourse are requisite to make a souldier perfect in the Arte militarie, how great soever his knowledge may be, which long experience and much practise of Armes hath gayned'.[43] Edmondes's translation—which Ralegh knew and cited in his *History*—consciously constructed Sir Francis Vere as a soldier-scholar

Polybius revived, or how an ancient historian was turned into a manual of early modern warfare', in Karl A.E. Enenkel, et al. (ed.), *Recreating Ancient History* (Leiden, 2002), pp. 101-22; Fred Schurink, 'War, what is it good for? sixteenth-century English translations of ancient texts on warfare', in S.K. Barker and B.M. Hosington (eds), *Renaissance Cultural Crossroads* (Leiden, 2013), pp. 121-38; Popper, 'Virtue', pp. 531-3; Grafton et al, *Gabriel Harvey*.

[40] Quoted in John W. Shirley, 'Sir Walter Ralegh and Thomas Harriot', in John W. Shirley (ed.), *Thomas Harriot: Renaissance Scientist* (Oxford, 1974), p. 18.

[41] Trevelyan, *Raleigh*, pp. 118-19; G. R. Batho, 'Thomas Harriot and the Northumberland household', in Robert Fox (ed.), *Thomas Harriot: An Elizabethan Man of Science* (Aldershot, 2000), pp. 28-47. Writing in the 1630s Robert Naunton noted that Ralegh 'was an indefatigable Reader, whether by Sea or Land'; John Aubrey wrote that Ralegh always carried a 'Trunk of Bookes' on long voyages: Nicholls and Williams, *Ralegh*, p. 7. Andrew Fitzmaurice, *Humanism and America: An Intellectual History of English Colonisation, 1500–1625* (Cambridge, 2003), pp. 50-57, discusses the humanist underpinnings of Ralegh's Durham House network. Anna Beer and Nicholas Popper locate Ralegh's *History* within the broader humanist culture of studying for action: of applying one's reading—in this case, histories—to the public good: Anna R. Beer, *Sir Walter Ralegh and his Readers in the Seventeenth Century: Speaking to the People* (London, 1997), pp. 36-59; Popper, *'History'*, pp. 209, 237; Popper, 'Virtue'. None of the above discuss Ralegh's naval texts.

[42] Barnabe Rich, *A Right Exelent and Pleasaunt Dialogue, betwene Mercury and an English Souldier contayning his Supplication to Mars* (London, 1574), sigs. B8r-8v; George Whetstone, *The Honorable Reputation of a Souldier* (London, 1585), sigs. E4r, F1r-F1v; Robert Barret, *The Theoricke and Practicke of Modern Warres* (London, 1598), sig. A3r; Woodcock, *Thomas Churchyard*, pp. 208-9.

[43] Woodcock, '"Brevarie"', pp. 56-78. See also Paulina Kewes, 'Roman history, Essex, and late Elizabethan political culture', in R. Malcolm Smuts (ed.), *The Oxford Handbook of the Age of Shakespeare* (Oxford, 2016), pp. 250-68.

who applied lessons from Caesar's *Commentaries* on the battlefield.[44] In his *History* (3.6.2), Ralegh characterises the defeat of the 1588 Armada as Philip II's failure to apply lessons from Xerxes's abortive naval invasion of Greece in 480 BCE; bad readers make for poor generals.[45] *Pace* Erasmus, the scholar had a place on the frontline.

One particularly significant role model of a soldier-scholar for Ralegh was his older half-brother, Gilbert. Like Ralegh, Gilbert combined military experience—in Ireland and the Low Countries—with scholarly and practical interests in overseas exploration and colonisation. Although his ruthless tenure as Munster's military governor exhibited all the negative characteristics of a practitioner of the art of war scorned in Machiavelli's *Arte*, Gilbert found favour at Elizabeth's court through his erudition.[46] In 1571, he participated in a scholarly debate with Harvey, Sir Thomas Smith and Dr Walter Haddon about how best to govern Ireland using lessons drawn from Livy.[47] Two years later, he presented Elizabeth with a tract proposing a new kind of academy offering education in a progressive combination of scholarly and practical disciplines relevant to warfare.[48] The soldier-author George Gascoigne visited Gilbert in 1575/6 and discovered him making scholarly preparations for actions overseas, putting humanist training to the service of colonial enterprise.[49] In 1577, Gilbert submitted another tract to Elizabeth, 'A Discourse on how hir Majestie may annoy the K. of Spayne', which proposed aggressively eroding Spanish power in the Americas by seizing the Newfoundland fisheries and then establishing a base in the West Indies from which to attack enemy shipping and ultimately dispossess Philip II of his New World riches.[50] Even though England was not then at war with Spain, Gilbert maintained that a pre-emptive offensive strategy targeting Spanish colonial resources was the best way to defend the kingdom. Such principles would underpin Ralegh's own proposals and initiatives for colonial enterprises, and his military writings and counsel returned to this theme throughout his career.

Ralegh himself likely knew Gascoigne either through Gilbert or the Inns of Court.[51] Gascoigne cultivated a distinct self-promotional identity based around his dual facility in arms and letters, which he adverted using the motto *Tam Marti Quam Mercutio* ('as much for Mars as for Mercury'), signalling simultaneous allegiance to the gods of war and

[44] Woodcock, '"Brevarie"', pp. 76-8.
[45] Popper, 'Virtue', p. 524.
[46] Fitzmaurice, *Humanism*, p. 39.
[47] Jardine and Grafton, '"Studied"', pp. 32-5.
[48] Humphrey Gilbert, *Queene Elizabethes Achademy*, ed. F.J. Furnivall (London, 1869); Rapple, *Martial*, pp. 79-81.
[49] Gillian Austen, *George Gascoigne* (Woodbridge, 2008), pp. 150-52; Fitzmaurice, *Humanism*, pp. 39-50.
[50] D. B. Quinn (ed.), *The Voyages and Colonising Enterprises of Sir Humphrey Gilbert*, 2 vols. (London, 1940), 1: pp. 170-80; Gallay, *Ralegh*, pp. 31-3.
[51] Austen, *Gascoigne*, p. 152.

communication, respectively.[52] He used the motto in several printed and manuscript sources, and it featured beneath his woodcut self-portrait as a frontispiece to his satire *The Steele Glas* (1576). The image shows Gascoigne framed by the tools of his twin professed trades: on the left a handgun; to the right a shelf of books. Ralegh's first printed poetry—dedicatory verse addressed to the author—appears in the same volume.[53] In its endorsement of an influential model of balance and equivalence between the spheres of arms and letters, Gascoigne's motto can be viewed as just as significant a humanist principle as Cicero's 'let arms unto the toga yield'. The motto certainly encapsulated Ralegh's own worldview, but although his biographers insist that he made it his own after Gascoigne's death in 1577, such claims require further qualification as this article's final section demonstrates.

IV

Attention now turns to the first of three distinct groups of Ralegh's writings in which he adopts the role of soldier-scholar and actively presents himself as an authority and counsellor in naval matters, beginning with those he composed following the Cadiz and Islands voyages. Fallen into disgrace and briefly imprisoned in the Tower of London during the early 1590s due to his marriage to Bess Throckmorton, Ralegh was compelled to realise that 'his comparatively modest antecedents made him dispensable' and that his survival at court was entirely dependent on royal favour.[54] This precarity obviously placed a premium on his own resources and powers of petition, and it was within this context that his employment of naval expertise came to provide the means by which he could slowly rehabilitate his reputation at Elizabeth's court. This process began when he was released from imprisonment in September 1592 and sent to Dartmouth at the request of Sir John Hawkins to organise the dispersal of the prize cargo from a captured Portuguese carrack worth over half a million pounds. Ralegh's kinship links to the West Country sea-faring community, combined with practical experience in naval administration, ensured that Elizabeth received a generous financial return on her initial investment in the expedition that captured the carrack.[55] By 1593, he was at liberty permanently and elected to Parliament. On 7 March that year, he used the opportunity to warn his peers that Spain now posed a greater danger than it had in 1588 and of the need to conduct offensive military operations against enemy shipping, necessitating a large financial subsidy from Parliament.[56] Following a Spanish raid on Penzance in July 1595, Ralegh provided the Privy Council

[52] Austen, *Gascoigne*, pp. 139-42, 153-9; McKeown, *English*, pp. 31-3; Richard A. McCabe, *Ungainefull Arte: Poetry, Patronage, and Print in the Early Modern Era* (Oxford, 2016), pp. 229-39.
[53] George Gascoigne, *The Steele Glas* (London, 1576), sig. A4r.
[54] Nicholls and Williams, *Ralegh*, pp. 86-7.
[55] *Letters*, pp. 77-85.
[56] Stephen Coote, *A Play of Passion: The Life of Sir Walter Raleigh* (London, 1993), pp. 215-16.

with a detailed account of land defences in Devon and Cornwall that restated his views on how disadvantaged England would be in a defensive war against Spain.[57] Thereafter, the Privy Council were finally persuaded to take action and endorsed the kind of expedition long advocated by Ralegh.

In late June–early July 1596, an Anglo-Dutch force of 150 ships and nearly 10,000 soldiers and sailors attacked and sacked the port of Cadiz in southern Spain. Jointly led by Essex and Lord Admiral, Charles Howard, with Ralegh serving as rear-admiral and Sir Francis Vere commanding land forces, the plan was to capture the town and apprehend the West Indies treasure ships in the harbour. Excepting the Armada victory, it was one of the greatest military successes of the Anglo-Spanish war and brought its commanders glory and wealth, even though they failed to capture the treasure fleet itself.[58] Early reports from Cadiz identified, though likely exaggerated, divisions between Ralegh's 'sea faction' and Essex's 'land faction', translating court rivalries between Elizabeth's former and rising favourites into the theatre of war.[59] The raid prompted multiple textual rehearsals of what took place, none of which made it into print straightaway since Elizabeth suppressed any published responses to Cadiz to limit her commanders' hawkish personal propaganda. Manuscript responses circulated nevertheless.[60] Ralegh's accounts of the raid offered vivid, first-person details, and described the 'greevous blow' to his leg and a moment where he countermanded Essex's orders for a dangerous amphibious landing in rough seas, effectively taking command of the attack; naval experience trumped rank.[61]

As Rosalind Davies demonstrated, contrary to expectations, accounts written by both the sea and land factions were frequently complimentary about each other's conduct and achievements at Cadiz, with Ralegh and his supporters praising Essex and the earl's men lauding Ralegh.[62] The collective manuscript responses to Cadiz endeavoured to establish Ralegh and Essex's successes equally, emphasizing unity and empathy between commanders to impress upon Elizabeth and the Privy Council both men's leadership abilities and adherence to models of ideal soldiery. This was part of an ongoing drive, it is argued, 'to alleviate official and popular scepticism about the quality of the forces at this time'.[63] Reciprocated praise demonstrated the Cadiz commanders' exercise of

[57] *Letters*, pp. 128-32.
[58] Robert Lacey, *Sir Walter Ralegh* (London, 1975), pp. 224-33, Trevelyan, *Raleigh*, pp. 268-84; R.B. Wernham, *The Return of the Armadas: The Last Years of the Elizabethan War Against Spain, 1595-1603* (Oxford, 1994), pp. 55-106.
[59] On Ralegh and Essex's rivalry: Lacey, *Ralegh*, pp. 137-40; Nicholls and Williams, *Ralegh*, pp. 72-5.
[60] Paul J. Hammer, 'Myth-making: politics, propaganda and the capture of Cadiz in 1596', *Historical Journal*, 40 (1997), pp. 623-42.
[61] *Letters*, pp. 145-53; Lacey, *Ralegh*, pp. 228-9.
[62] Rosalind Davies, '"News from the fleet": characterizing the Elizabethan army in narratives of the action at Cadiz', in Bertrand Taithe and Tim Thornton (eds), *War: Identities in Conflict, 1300-2000* (Stroud, 1998), pp. 24-5.
[63] Davies, '"News"', pp. 25-31.

martial discipline drawn from the classical models on which Elizabethan military science was based. There is nothing especially scholarly about the commanders' respective accounts, but the operation and its aftermath form a vital context for the policy papers that Ralegh and Essex composed immediately afterwards and for the former's emulation of the latter in the months following the raid. By the mid-1590s, the earl was well-established as the leading military figure and authority at Elizabeth's court. Essex had cultivated his martial identity since his early tiltyard appearances and through inheritance both of Leicester's circle of military clients and Sidney's place as champion of international militant Protestantism. He was also a keen student of early modern military science, was noted by contemporaries as being well-read in martial literature and was himself the dedicatee of several late Elizabethan military books.[64] Essex would therefore appear to have served as another significant role model for Ralegh, who would have seen how successful the earl had been through his self-identification as a man of war.

Despite the earl's aggressive post-Cadiz propaganda, there was a rapprochement between Ralegh and Essex, with the latter helping to effect the former's re-entry to royal favour. Recognising Ralegh's expertise in such matters, Essex made the point of including him at a meeting of a special war council called by Elizabeth for 3 November 1596 for 'such persons as were experienced in martial courses, [so] that by them some advice might be given her, as was in the year '88'.[65] The immediate context of this council was the sailing of a new Spanish fleet in early October 1596. Ralegh's role on the council was given additional impetus by interaction with Essex.[66] The earl presented articles to the meeting concerning 'Alarm of an Invasion from Spain', to which each council member responded.[67] Ralegh's point-by-point response, commonly cited as the 'Opinion of Sir Walter Ralegh upon the same Articles', offered measured considerations of the initial questions and addresses topics to which he returns repeatedly in subsequent works, especially regarding logistics, defences and how best to prepare against invasion.[68] Ralegh held the lowest social rank of the council members but his was by far the best-researched response. 'Opinion' saw him deploy the full range of a soldier-scholar's resources in a combination of personal experience, received wisdom concerning winds and tides, copious historical precedents, and evidence of a ready familiarity with contemporary martial authorities as

[64] Hammer, *Polarisation*, pp. 199-268; Janet Dickinson, *Court Politics and the Earl of Essex, 1589-1601* (London, 2012), pp. 5-23.
[65] Nicholls and Williams, *Ralegh*, p. 124.
[66] Gossett, 'New', pp. 14-15.
[67] See *The Works of Sir Walter Ralegh, Kt*., vol. 8 [hereafter *Works*] (Oxford, 1829), pp. 675-6; Wernham, *After*, p. 137; W.H. Blaauw, 'The defence of Sussex and the south coast of England from invasion considered by Queen Elizabeth's Privy Council, A.D. 1596', *Sussex Archaeological Collections Relating to the History and Antiquities of the County*, 11 (1859), pp. 154-68. The war council was ultimately a largely intellectual exercise as the fleet to which it responded had been wrecked on 18 October though news only reached England later in November.
[68] *Works*, pp. 676-81.

exemplified by his quotation from Machiavelli's *Dell'arte della guerra* to illustrate the importance of prudent provisioning.[69]

Covering similar ground to the 'Opinion' is a longer, undated document presented as a 'Discourse' on the strategic disadvantages of defensive warfare and merits of conducting an offensive war against Spain.[70] Lefranc contended that this was a policy paper intended for Cecil and/or the Privy Council composed between December 1596 and January 1597—possibly for a council meeting on 27 January concerning 'projects for the attempt against the Spanish navy by sea'.[71] Its title just visible in the fire-damaged manuscript, the Cotton Otho 'Discourse' is doing different work to 'Opinion', advancing an argument in its own right, rather than reacting to given points. It is Ralegh's longest exposition of a position he maintained in all of his writings and public statements on military matters.[72] He uses his experience at Cadiz to argue for a more decisive second strike against Spain, though never gives specifics about the desired offensive's objectives. His methodology involves building an argument based on personal observation and experience interlarded with aphorisms and principles drawn from his reading in military science.[73] It is important to stress that the 'Opinion' and 'Discourse' both demonstrate that Ralegh's naval experience was only one constituent of his overall body of expertise, which also drew heavily upon his extensive reading and information imparted by those 'collaborating sea captains' mentioned by Hakluyt. Ever the soldier-scholar, he applies quotations from Livy, Martin and Guillaume du Bellay's 1569 military memoirs and Machiavelli's *Arte*, together with a similar list of historical precedents for successful invasions to those cited in 'Opinion', affording the 'Discourse' a learned, authoritative register.[74] Attention is drawn too to the transmission of specialised knowledge and the author's own role; Ralegh's subject is as much the act of providing counsel itself. There remains a level of self-consciousness about the role being played by the learned veteran. His rhetorical pose in the 'Discourse' is that of the loyal subject proffering unsolicited, yet valuable, urgent counsel, to the possible cost of a favourable reception: '[I] only desire the gratious acceptance of my dutifull affection, seeing love chooseth rather Reprehention by dilligence, then safetie by Idlenes or sylence'.[75]

[69] *Works*, p. 680.
[70] BL, MS Cotton Otho E XI, fols. 377r-81v.
[71] Lefranc, *Ralegh*, p. 52. Wernham, *After*, p. 148.
[72] In *History*, 5.1.9, Ralegh revisits the issue of whether England could defend against invasion without a vigilant, pro-active naval presence by responding to Edmondes's conclusions on this point from his *Observations upon Caesar's Commentaries* and referring to contemporary French martialists Blaise du Monluc and Guillaume du Bellay.
[73] Ralegh exhibits here the fruits of a mode of reading practice also used by Harvey in which extracted knowledge takes the form of *sententiae* and aphorisms rather than large portions of text or digested summaries: Jardine and Grafton, '"Studied"', pp. 55-6.
[74] Cotton Otho E XI, fols. 370v-71v.
[75] Cotton Otho E XI, fol. 371r.

Ralegh proffered strategic counsel at the same time that Essex was writing his own evolving policy document drawing on the lessons of 1596, now preserved in the so-called Hulton manuscript at the British Library. Presented in epistolary form and composed while sailing home from Cadiz, this untitled document contained arguments for reform of the Elizabethan army, including greater co-ordination between naval and land forces.[76] Like Gilbert and Ralegh, Essex strongly advocated offensive war against Spain, highlighting both the limitations of Spanish naval provision and the benefits to be gained in the European conflict by compromising their traffic with the New World:

> by sea [King Philip] neither hath store of shippes and great numbers of mariners nor meanes to supply himself of furniture and provisions for his shipping but out of the East countryes, such as his shippes and mariners being loth will be long in supplying and his provisions that shold come dayly to him wilbe quickly cutt of. Allso yt [offensive war by sea] is more anoyance because we shall not only impeach and interrupt his trafique with all other countryes of Christendom wherby we shall impoverish his merchants butt stop and divert his golden Indian streames wherby […] and lett out the vitall spirites of his estate.[77]

Ralegh says similar things about Spanish naval strength and their need to 'take up and embark in the shipping of all nations […] and press the mariners of other nations' in his 1603 'Discourse touching a War with Spain'.[78] Essex's observation about the importance of Indian gold for Spain's ability to subsist and fight also echoes Ralegh's *Discourse of Guiana*.[79] Again like Gilbert, Hawkins, and Sir Francis Drake before him, Essex proposed that England needed a base in Spanish territory from which to attack enemy shipping and curtail the supply of wealth from South America. Ralegh's post-Cadiz writings were thus conceived in lockstep with Essex's formulation of strategy documents, although the more learned register of the Cotton Otho 'Discourse' exemplifies how his approach differed from the earl's. Most importantly, Essex confirmed for Ralegh that military enterprise and well-informed counsel could serve as a means to rehabilitate and advance his own fortunes at Elizabeth's court. While Essex was predominantly associated with the land faction and strategies involving combined land and sea operations aimed at the strategic occupation of Spanish territory, Ralegh vaunted his particular expertise in the art of war by sea.[80] With Hawkins and Drake having died in 1595 and 1596, he was one of the last Armada-era naval authorities to whom Elizabeth's Council—or at least her hawkish courtiers—could turn.

[76] L.W. Henry, 'The earl of Essex as strategist and military organizer (1596-7)', *English Historical Review*, 86/268 (1953), pp. 363-93; Hammer, *Polarisation*, pp. 255-60.
[77] Henry, 'Essex', p. 364.
[78] *Works*, p. 303.
[79] Walter Ralegh, *The Discoverie of the Large, Rich, and Bewtiful Empire of Guiana* (London, 1596), sig. ¶3v.
[80] Hammer, *Polarisation*, pp. 258-61.

By early 1597, observers at the court noted the growing friendship between Ralegh, Essex and Robert Cecil. One outcome of this association was Ralegh's restoration, from June 1597, to captaincy of the Queen's Guard. Essex was made Master of Ordnance three months earlier and that spring, aided by Ralegh, actively planned for an offensive strike on the Spanish mainland at Ferrol.[81] The subsequent 'Islands' voyage was a disaster: a perfect storm of tempestuous weather, miscommunications, shifting objectives (from Ferrol to the Azores), logistical shortcomings and renewed rivalries.[82] Essex's response to the voyage was to continue reworking the policy document in the Hulton manuscript, part of which formed the basis for his better-known *Apology* penned in January 1598 (published 1600).[83]

Ralegh too composed textual responses prompted by participation in the Islands voyage—seizing the opportunity, not only to emulate Essex's past and present practice, or to build on what he had presented post-Cadiz, but to exploit the disfavour into which the earl had subsequently fallen.[84] One result was the tract discovered by Suzanne Gossett in the Folger Shakespeare Library, 'Especiall Notes concerninge her Ma*jes*ties Nauie and Sea-seruice', an early version of what was presented to Prince Henry in 1608 as 'Excellent Observations and Notes, concerning the Royall Navy and Sea Service'.[85] Unlike the reports from Cadiz (his own included), which were largely narrative and defensive, and distinct too from Arthur Gorges's later prose account of the Islands voyage, Ralegh's 'Especiall Notes' are framed as practical counsel and recommendations born of recent 'painfull' experience—a presentational gift from the returning voyager.[86] The core of 'Especiall Notes' (and 1608 'Observations') is a series of headings under which Ralegh discusses the building, commanding, provisioning and arming of ships. All, Ralegh maintains, were in need of reform—as was demonstrated, not least, by the Islands voyage. Comments on over-arming ships with too many guns, for example, allude back to the damaging effects of excessive, heavy ordnance onboard ship in the stormy weather experienced on that voyage.[87] Several of the Islands fleet had sprung a leak (including Essex's flagship and Ralegh's vessel the *Warspite*), which surely prompted Ralegh's recommendations concerning improved caulking of ships' hulls.[88] Attention to quotidian details regarding victualling, the

[81] *Letters*, pp. 166-8.
[82] On the Islands voyage: Wernham, *After*, pp. 143-78; Trevelyan, *Raleigh*, pp. 296-309.
[83] Hugh Gazzard, '"Idle papers": an apology of the earl of Essex', in Annaliese Connolly and Lisa Hopkins (eds), *Essex: The Life and Times of an Elizabethan Courtier* (Manchester, 2012), pp. 179-200.
[84] Essex's mismanagement of the Islands voyage was compounded by the fact that a Spanish fleet had sailed to England unopposed in October 1597 but was fortunately scattered before Essex's ships returned; both events prompted Elizabeth's ire at the earl; see Trevelyan, *Raleigh*, pp. 306-8; *Letters*, pp. 168-70.
[85] Washington DC, Folger Shakespeare Library MS J.a.1, fols. 161r-165v; Gossett, 'New'.
[86] MS J.a.1, fol. 161r.
[87] MS J.a.1, fol. 163v.
[88] MS J.a.1, fols. 163v-64r; Trevelyan, *Raleigh*, pp. 296-8, 306.

quality of beer casks and positioning of ships' 'cook-rooms' all speak to Ralegh's experiences of when such matters were overlooked.[89] The greatest differences between the 'Observations' and the Folger version are in the preface and conclusions. The latter version again reveals a self-consciousness about the act of conveying specialist knowledge concerning the art of war by sea. Its preface demonstrates the tract's petitionary nature as it attempts to fashion a reciprocal relationship with its ultimate intended reader, Elizabeth—most likely via Cecil:

> out of these trauells, and miseries, having gotten the practise and confirmation, of some knowledge, which in former Iornyes I had observed, I haue desired humbly to present to the diuine iudgement of hir sacred Ma*jes*tie the notice and consideration of such especiall and particular point*e*s as by painfull and diligent observacion; I haue gathered concerninge the state, and condic*i*on of her Royall Navye. The w*hi*ch although it be not such, as is worthy of her Princely vewe, yett at least, such as may manifest my dutifull indeavours: who lovinge vertue for it selfe: doe onely desire, that vertue her selfe should mee zealous & deuoted to her service: with a harte, then most springinge in loyaltye, when most disgraced & suppressed.[90]

While Essex spiralled into fury at Lord Admiral Howard being given the principal credit for the Cadiz expedition, Ralegh at this time appeared through the 'Especiall Notes' as a sober administrator and advisor to the queen. Indeed, 'Especiall Notes' would have looked particularly methodical and constructive when compared to the hawkish, embittered tone of Essex's immediately contemporaneous *Apology*.[91] Ralegh spoke to several naval bills in Parliament in early 1598 and was regaining his stride again as a courtier and statesman. Although a position on Elizabeth's Privy Council ultimately always alluded him, Ralegh's success in applying his learning and experience in naval matters, and in using his adoption of the soldier-scholar identity as a self-promotional strategy, came to form the basis for a personal paradigmatic model of how to attain preferment to which he made resort repeatedly during James I's reign.

V

Ralegh had a portrait painted of himself soon after his return to favour that encapsulates that moment in which he recovered his reputation through displays of proficiency in arms and letters post-Cadiz. It contains elements signalling the painful route by which he achieved this success: a cane in one hand betokening his war wound, his sword in the other

[89] MS J.a.1, fols. 164r-164v.
[90] MS J.a.1, fol. 161r.
[91] Essex's experience on the Islands voyage did also prompt him to begin composing a more practical advisory document for 'he thatt shall inable himself to commaund a fleete': Hammer, *Polarisation*, p. 313.

and over his right shoulder a chart of Cadiz.[92] This portrait celebrates the success of Ralegh the soldier-scholar and counsellor in naval matters and embodies that paradigmatic model of how he might continue to secure preferment. Such a model was clearly in his mind during the early months of James I's reign when he once again cultivated a role for himself as an irregular, though knowledgeable military counsellor.

In spring 1603, Ralegh presented to the king his 'Discourse touching a War with Spain' in which he advanced the case for continuing to support the Netherlands by maintaining the war effort against Spain.[93] Focusing initially on the art of war by sea, he argued that if England withdrew support from their ally (or made peace with Spain), then the powerful Dutch fleet would fall into enemy hands and represent a greatly enhanced threat to James's kingdom. On the face of it, Ralegh utterly failed to gauge his audience or recognise James's well-known abhorrence of war and self-presentation as 'Rex Pacificus'.[94] He seems determined instead to see his royal reader as a fellow scholar and the 1603 'Discourse' is the most overtly learned of Ralegh's military writings discussed so far. The scholarship on display throughout, and the Latin and French quotations with which Ralegh supplies axiomatic substantiation for his argument, work hard to impress upon their learned reader that the author can engage with the theme of international conflict, not as an impassioned remnant of the Elizabethan war party but as a rational, well-read authority on the underlying principles of warfare. English translations accompany the majority of the quoted precepts ensuring that such material remains functional and not merely decorative. Along with references to Aristotle and Livy, Ralegh cites precepts from several early modern military sources: Machiavelli, Marshal Biron, Monluc and—more than any other—*De discorsi di guerra* (1582) by the Italian soldier-author Bernardino Rocca.[95]

Another significant feature of the 'Discourse' is the emphasis Ralegh places on the concept and virtue of good counsel, acknowledging that continued prosecution of the war is a major undertaking and responsibility for a ruler. He brings his text to a close by encouraging a considered response to his proposals and lauding the value of counsel: 'for a prince to adhere to the advice and counsel of wise men, is the

[92] Ralegh's Cadiz portrait, by William Segar, now hangs in the National Gallery of Ireland, Dublin: Trevelyan, *Raleigh*, plate 24. Essex used his own Cadiz portrait to project his military identity: Hammer, *Polarisation*, p. 211.

[93] *Works*, pp. 299-316.

[94] R. Malcolm Smuts, *Political Culture, the State, and the Problem of Religious War in Britain and Ireland, 1578-1625* (Oxford, 2023), ch. 9; Pauline Croft, '*Rex Pacificus*, Robert Cecil, and the 1604 peace with Spain', in Glenn Burgess, et al. (eds), *The Accession of James I* (Basingstoke, 2006), pp. 140–54.

[95] The 'Marshal Biron' to whom Ralegh refers is Charles de Gontaut, first duke of Biron whom Ralegh had hosted in London in September 1599: Trevelyan, *Raleigh*, p. 341. *De discorsi di guerra* consisted of Latin precepts accompanied by Rocca's Italian commentary; Ralegh's use of this text further illustrates his reading for extractable aphorisms that could be reapplied in his own writings.

greatest argument of his own wisdom'.[96] He gestures to the role that he has just played in furnishing James with advice; again, his subject is as much the provider of knowledge as it is said knowledge itself. He also offered his reader the possibility of furnishing a favourable response when mentioning a second tract on a similarly martial theme, a now-lost 'Discourse how War may be made against Spain and the Indies', to be presented if James 'will vouchsafe the reading thereof', which appears to have supported its case through rehearsing the ruthlessness of successive Spanish monarchs.[97] It may be that the extant 'Discourse' was an attempt to present a more reasoned, scholarly, face-saving version of an argument put to James in person more vociferously during the royal visit to Bess's uncle at Beddington in May 1603.[98] As it transpired, it seems neither text was actually presented to the king. At his trial later that year, he defended himself against accusations of making treasonous overtures for peace with Spain by referring to a document that he had 'intended to present unto the king', which is clearly identifiable as his 1603 'Discourse'.[99] The advice contained therein ran counter to the direction of government policy; the Treaty of London ending the Anglo-Spanish war was signed the following year. Ralegh's lack of success as a scholarly, early Jacobean martial counsellor did not, however, dissuade him from cultivating a similar role during perhaps the most challenging period of his life.

VI

The final group of texts in which Ralegh cultivates the soldier-scholar identity and draws upon his previous successes of doing so post-Cadiz are the naval writings he produced between 1608 and 1612 while imprisoned in the Tower. These were composed within the context of Ralegh's evolving relationship with Prince Henry. James's heir was looked to eagerly by many during the first years of Jacobean rule as representing a new hope for militant Protestantism and became a rallying point for statesmen and soldiers committed to more aggressive foreign policy.[100] Henry was the natural focal point for Ralegh's petitionary writings during his first decade in incarceration and naval expertise again proved to be an expedient currency for the otherwise powerless prisoner. By around November 1607, Ralegh was advising Henry on ship-building in a long, technical letter incorporating many details about the ratio of guns to tonnage and positioning of cannon ports used elsewhere in the 'Especiall Notes' and 'A Discourse of the Invention of Ships, Anchors, Compass, etc' (1608-10?).[101] As noted above, Ralegh also revised 'Especiall Notes'

[96] *Works*, p. 315.
[97] *Works*, p. 308.
[98] Nicholls and Williams, *Ralegh*, pp. 193-4.
[99] Steven W. May, *Sir Walter Ralegh* (Boston, 1989), pp. 66-7.
[100] Roy Strong, *Henry, Prince of Wales and England's Lost Renaissance* (London, 1986), pp. 220-25; Lawrence, *Complete*, pp. 105-26; McCabe, *Ungainefull*, pp. 302-13.
[101] *Letters*, pp. 301-4.

for presentation to Henry in 1608. Its preface indicates an established relationship and mentions that the author had already discoursed of 'a maritimal voyage, and the passages and incidents therein'—no doubt a reference to the Islands voyage. Ralegh added new material on the inadequacies of ill-trained officers, which by implication advertised the value of specialised naval expertise. He reworked the conclusion to emphasise the need for maintaining vigilance and investment in naval reform, even though England was now at peace with Spain, and re-used a quotation from Livy employed previously in the 1603 'Discourse' to signal his continued caution.[102]

Beer has warned against overstating the extent to which Henry was the sole inspiration for Ralegh's Tower writings or, indeed, was influenced by Ralegh on naval matters.[103] Nevertheless, his petitionary relationship with Henry formed the basis for a number of prose works including the compendious *History* and the unfinished, now-lost treatise on 'The Art of War by Sea', which appears to have been equally as ambitious and capacious. The latter work was the perfect project for the imprisoned soldier-scholar seeking to direct his research and experience towards the public good or active life. Ralegh mentions this work in his *History* following an excursus on contemporary naval combat:

> Of the Art of Warre by Sea, I had written a Treatise, for the Lord Henrie, Prince of Wales: a subject, to my knowledge, never handled by any man, ancient or moderne: but God hath spared me the labour of finishing it, by his losse.[104]

Just over a fortnight before he was executed, Ralegh identified such a work again, writing to Bess on 4 October 1618:

> ther is in the bottome of the sedar cheist some paper bookes of myne. I pray make them up alltogether, and send them me. The title of one of them is The Art of War by Sea. The rest are notes belonging unto it.[105]

The paper book named by Ralegh has never been located but was begun as early as 1607, following the commencement of his relationship with the prince, and it was at least partly completed, though apparently awaiting further post-Henry revisions. Writing to the king two weeks after the execution, Sir Thomas Wilson, Keeper of State Papers, recorded that Ralegh

> saith also that amongst the papers w*hi*ch eyther S*i*r George Caluert or Sir W*illia*m Cockin tooke from his howse there was a booke of his owne writting teaching the art of warr by sea w*hic*h hee told mee if hee cold have recouered his papers hee wold haue made it perfect & haue dedicated it

[102] *Works*, p. 349.
[103] Beer, *Ralegh*, pp. 24-8. Henry largely ignored Ralegh's advice when it came to the design of his ship, the *Prince Royal*: *Letters*, p. 304n13.
[104] *History*, 5.1.6.
[105] *Letters*, p. 372.

> to my lord Marquis of Buckingham when hee heard hee shold bee lord Admirall. These things wold bee also brought into the said office [of the 'papers for busines of state'] for your Ma*jes*tyes seruice.[106]

Ralegh wrote to Buckingham in August 1618 pleading for intercession with the king, but it looks as if he had intended making one final, eleventh-hour attempt at using military counsel to garner support at court from James's favourite.[107] The cedar chest was acquired by the merchant Sir William Cockayne ('Cockin'), and it seems likely that Ralegh's treatise was destroyed in a fire at Cockayne's house in 1623.[108]

Some indication of this treatise's contents remains preserved, however, in two lots of manuscript notes—perhaps those from the cedar chest—outlining inconsistent sets of chapter headings to which Ralegh would have written. Holograph headings from BL, Cotton Titus B VIII reveal that Ralegh combined historical coverage of ancient marine warfare with consideration of the characteristics of contemporary foreign navies and points of detail on logistics, ordnance and combat tactics.[109] Many elements in the plans overlap with subjects explored in the *History* and 'Observations' and that demonstrate a nuanced understanding that naval warfare entailed not only battles but careful management of personnel, materiel, provisions and ports. Several headings indicate incorporation of extant material on familiar topics—'Of the king of Spaynes weakness in the West Indies' or 'The building & vitling of shipps'—while others summarise lessons Ralegh never tired of submitting to Elizabeth and James: 'That the Inglish who might haue mastred ye world by sea, have lost that aduantage by the negligence, ignorance, & covetousness of private persons'; 'That the wisedome of all Princes & states is best decerned in their enterprises'.[110] A further set of notes in MS Jones B 60 reads more like ideas for additions to several chapters of the 'Art', Ralegh's mind shifting quickly between topics.[111] On the subject of ports, for example, he moves from the material to the geopolitical in a handful of lines and in so doing asserts the superiority of the art of war by sea to that on land:

> What Prince or State soeuer, that hath the mastering power by sea may (if it be not their owne falt) obtaine the maistering power by land, This was *Themistocles* opinion long since, and it is true, That hee that com*m*aunds the sea, com*m*aunds the trade, and hee that is lord of the Trad*e* of the world is lord of the wealth of the worlde and hee that hath the wealth hath the dominion.[112]

[106] TNA, SP 14/103, fol. 107; *Letters*, pp. 372-3.
[107] *Letters*, pp. 368-9. Ralegh earlier credited Buckingham with putting him 'into the world again' for the second Guiana voyage in a letter of 17 March 1616: *Letters*, p. 337.
[108] *Letters*, pp. 372-3; Lefranc, *Ralegh*, p. 43.
[109] BL, Cotton Titus B VIII, fols. 226, 228; reproduced in Lefranc, *Ralegh*, pp. 597-9.
[110] Lefranc, *Ralegh*, pp. 598-9.
[111] London, Dr Williams's Library, MS Jones B 60, pp. 229-34; Lefranc, *Ralegh*, pp. 599-601. The notes appear to be copies from Ralegh's own papers; the manuscript was compiled c.1620.
[112] Lefranc, *Ralegh*, p. 600.

The treatise's remit expands over the course of the fifteen or so proposed chapters to encompass broader issues of trade, international relations and the responsibilities of rulers. It is likely that another of Ralegh's Tower writings, 'A Discourse of the Invention of Ships'—which he refers to as a 'chapter'—either shares material with the 'Art' or represents an early condensed form of the kind of tract it would or could become.[113] Indeed, this manuscript tract probably offers us the best indication of how the 'Art' would have read. Like the plans in Ralegh's notes, the 'Invention of Ships' combined elements of a universal history of shipping constructed from a host of learned authorities (Strabo, Ovid, Tacitus, Livy, Lucan, Diodorus Siculus, Polydore Vergil, Isidore of Seville), with contemporary geopolitical commentary and exposition of technical and logistical matters—not all of it following an especially logical structure.

The 'Art of War by Sea' would have been the most extensive *summa* of Ralegh's scholarship on naval matters, and even from the extant notes, one sees again the deployment of the soldier-scholar's characteristic synthesis of historical and technical scholarship, political analysis, personal experience and practical wisdom gleaned from his 'collaborating sea captains'. As identified above, Ralegh had been writing about the art of war by sea for over a decade prior to the conception of this collective work during his confinement. Regardless of the degree to which this particular work was prompted by associations with Henry, the structure and methodology were Ralegh's own. Just as he did when writing his *History*, he would have researched the 'Art' using his large personal library of over 500 volumes that included many classical military books in addition to contemporary martial authorities, particularly French and Italian sources like Machiavelli, Rocca, Monluc and Francois de la Noue.[114] He may have drawn too on military books owned by his friend and (from November 1605) fellow prisoner Northumberland.[115] The earl himself served as yet another model of a military humanist for Ralegh, and, as noted above, the two men shared a scholarly based relationship dating back nearly twenty years. Northumberland could have provided inspiration as much as bibliographic assistance while Ralegh planned his treatise since he too was writing on the art of war drawing on his own field experience.[116] The Percy archives at Alnwick in Northumberland and Petworth House, Sussex, contain at least five manuscripts of drafts and chapter headings for a work on military affairs, including 'A book of

[113] *Works*, p. 334. The lines about sea-power ascribed to Themistocles (quoted above from 'Art') also appear in 'Invention': *Works*, p. 325.
[114] Walter Oakeshott, 'Sir Walter Ralegh's library', *The Library*, 5th series 23 (1968), pp. 285-327.
[115] G. R. Batho, 'The library of the "Wizard Earl", Henry Percy, ninth earl of Northumberland (1564-1632)', *The Library*, 5th series 23 (1968), pp. 254-5; Oakeshott, 'Sir Walter Ralegh's library', p. 288.
[116] Northumberland had experience of campaigning in the Low Countries and was admired by contemporaries for applying military scholarship in the field: Nina Taunton, *1590s Drama and Militarism: Portrayals of War in Marlowe, Chapman and Shakespeare's Henry V* (Aldershot, 2001), pp. 15-18, 39-40.

memorials of things belonging to the wars' of 638 folio pages.[117] Both prisoners' expertise, although rooted in experience, was now indebted more to books than the battlefield.

As May notes, judging from its title, the 'Art of War by Sea' may have been conceived as an attempt to emulate with an eye to naval warfare, Machiavelli's *Dell'arte della guerra*.[118] The extant fragments suggest that this was not, like the Italian text, intended as a dialogue. Nevertheless, they indicate a comparable commitment to putting the fruits of book-based and practical knowledge into the service of the state, as do those tracts (e.g., the 'Invention of Ships') that may have supplied material for Ralegh's great naval treatise. Although thoroughly familiar with the classical sources underpinning early modern military science, he remained practical and forward-thinking about the efficacy of contemporary practice.[119] At the start of 'Observations', Ralegh calls for reformation of current naval practices by looking to rapid developments of 'late years' in the 'circumstances of Land-service by the change of Armes, diversities of Fortifications, and alteration of Discipline'—an acknowledgement of what historians have seen as indices of the early modern military revolution.[120] His combined writings on the art of war by sea can be read as a call for a similar revolution in naval warfare. Ralegh's intellectual ambition and the pioneering role he perceived he was assuming when composing the 'Art of War by Sea' is therefore significant. In what turned out to be the only published mention of his treatise, Ralegh again assumes the part of the specialist and of the scholar of an unmined seam of learning, claiming in the *History* that his subject—to his knowledge—was 'never handled by any man, ancient or moderne' (*History*, 5.1.6). Naval warfare was indeed comparatively under-discussed and under-theorised when viewed alongside contemporary scholarship on land service and the humanist interest in military science discussed above.[121] Vegetius had, however, appended sixteen chapters on this topic to book four of *De re militari*, a work Ralegh cites in the *History* (4.2.2).[122] There are several examples of late medieval naval manuals, including

[117] Alnwick Manuscripts, 511 and 512 (the 'book of memorials'); Leconfield Manuscripts at Petworth House, 96, 137/1, 137/2; Batho, 'Library', p. 250; *The Appendix to the Third Report of the Historical Manuscripts Commission* (London, 1872), p. 54.

[118] May, *Ralegh*, p. 73.

[119] Ralegh argued in *History*, 5.1.1 for the superiority of contemporary English soldiery to that of the Macedonians or Romans. The relative merits of classical and contemporary military practice were hotly debated throughout this period: Webb, *Elizabethan Military Science*, pp. 17-50; Mark R. Geldof, 'The pike and the printing press: military handbooks and the gentrification of the early modern military revolution', in Matthew McLean and Sara Barker (eds), *International Exchange in the Early Modern Book World* (Leiden, 2016), pp. 147-68.

[120] *Works*, p. 335; on the military revolution, see Footnote 28 above.

[121] See however: N.A.M. Rodger, 'From the military revolution to the 'fiscal-naval state', *Journal for Maritime Research*, 13/2 (2011), pp. 119-28; John F. Guilmartin, 'The military revolution in warfare at sea during the early modern era: technological origins, operational outcomes and strategic consequences', *Journal for Maritime Research*, 13/2 (2011), pp. 129-37.

[122] Vegetius, *Epitome of Military Science*, trans. N.P. Milner (Liverpool, 1993), pp. 132-42.

Philip of Cleves's *Instruction de toutes manieres de guerroyer*.[123] More recently, during the 1570s, the gunner and mathematician William Bourne published several books on nautical matters, two of which—*The Arte of Shooting in Great Ordnance* and *Inventions, or, Devises* (both 1578)—included extensive treatment of naval warfare. Ralegh also owned a copy of John Montgomerie's 1570 manuscript 'treatise concerning the nauie of England' with post-Armada additions made in 1588 advocating reforms to prevent further attacks.[124] Ralegh's coy comment concerning his treatise's innovation is therefore curious, given the breadth of his reading and contents of his library, but it was surely motivated by his recognition of the continued value of his naval expertise and a proprietorial need to stake a claim to this body of learning.

VII

This article has sought to reappraise Ralegh's naval writings by viewing their author, not only as a soldier and a scholar but as an individual who consciously embraced the conjunction of these two roles. It has been shown how Ralegh modelled a form of identity in which the fruits of martial expertise could potentially shape future practice and policy, and the texts propounding that identity have—for the first time—been located within the context of early modern military humanism, in which scholarship combined with records of experience could be read as preparatory to subsequent action for the public and national good. Ralegh's relationships with contemporary soldier-scholars like Gilbert, Essex and Northumberland had a significant bearing on what he wrote, what he attempted to do with his writing and on the kind of role he assumed to write and present such material. It is also proposed here that Ralegh cast himself in the identity of the soldier-scholar as a means to re-establish and advance himself at court, or in royal favour, at moments where he had suffered setbacks, disgrace or disenfranchisement. The relative success he achieved in regaining favour after the Cadiz raid naturally compelled him to adopt this strategy again when attempting to ingratiate himself with the new king in 1603 and during the years spent courting Henry's patronage. Even in his final weeks, Ralegh hoped to use his 'Art of War by Sea' to advertise his continued utility to the new Lord Admiral once Buckingham assumed that office. Ralegh would appear to have remained enthralled by the figure represented in his Cadiz portrait and by his personal achievements in the mid- to late 1590s.

Although determined to employ his naval expertise as currency for self-advancement, Ralegh's ambitions were subject to the confounding forces of court factionalism, royal favour and personal prejudices. He

[123] N.A.M. Rodger, *The Safeguard of the Sea: A Naval History of Britain* (London, 1997), p. 205.
[124] Sotheby's sold Ralegh's copy (produced c.1610) on 19 July 2022 (Lot 298); Montgomerie's treatise is on fols. 62r-73r. See also BL, Add MS 20042. Northumberland owned a 1574 copy: Harvard, Houghton Library, MS Eng 706.

never sat on the Privy Council, urged James from a pro-Spanish outlook or established a patronal relationship during the Tower years that would prevent his execution. Proffering counsel never guarantees that its recipient will act upon it. Ralegh compared himself to the ignored Trojan soothsayer Calchas in a 1593 letter complaining of how his advice on Irish affairs went unheeded.[125] Years later, he lamented to Henry 'if the late Queen would have believed her men of war, as she did her scribes, we had in our time beaten that great empire [Spain] in pieces'.[126] The naval texts discussed in this article are valuable, however, in allowing us to recover some sense of what Ralegh imagined he was doing in adopting the role of soldier-scholar, and of how he persisted in believing for at least two decades that this role would advance him at court or secure release from prison. There remained to the end a belief in the efficacy and utility of the soldier-scholar and in the political value of military humanism.

As a coda to the argument above, this article concludes by acknowledging that the figure of Ralegh the soldier-scholar certainly endured long after the 1618 execution. Ralegh's posthumous reputation as the 'military hero destroyed by a vindictive monarch' has been examined extensively by Beer and others, as has his utility as a touchstone for seventeenth-century militant nostalgia for Elizabeth's reign.[127] One of the first posthumous editions of his selected works responded to the author's self-construction as a soldier-scholar and served to perpetuate this figure for subsequent generations of readers and historians. In 1650, Humphrey Moseley published *Judicious and Select Essayes and Observations by that Renowned and Learned Knight, Sir Walter Raleigh*, comprising the 'Invention of Ships', the 1616 'Discourse' on war, 'Observations' and the 1618 *Apologie* for the second Guiana voyage. As he did in many such editions, Moseley included paratexts to attract his readership and added an authorial portrait as an eye-catching frontispiece in a new, but derivative design by Robert Vaughan.[128] The portrait is based on that by Simon Passe used in the 1621 *History*, but over his subject's right shoulder, Vaughan adds a sword and shield (bearing Ralegh's cognizance); over his left is a bookshelf displaying works by Plutarch, Pliny and his own *History*. The frontispiece evidently drew inspiration from that used for the book in which Ralegh's first published work appeared—Gascoigne's *Steele Glas*—although the more courtly sword and shield replace the gun accompanying the self-portrait in the earlier text. Appropriately enough, given his volume's military content, Moseley also appended Gascoigne's motto, *Tam Marti Quam Mercurio*. The editorial decision to frame the author by re-using this motto has been widely interpreted ever since as an indication that Ralegh adopted this as his own, starting

[125] *Letters*, pp. 93-5.
[126] *Works*, p. 246.
[127] Beer, *Ralegh*, pp. 118-92; Beer, *Bess: The Life of Lady Ralegh, Wife to Sir Walter* (London, 2004), p. 233; Nicholls and Williams, *Ralegh*, pp. 325-42.
[128] Margaret Ezell, *The Oxford English Literary History, Volume 5: 1645-1714* (Oxford, 2017), pp. 45-7.

with his early biographer John Shirley, writing in 1677.[129] The motto does not appear with the portrait used in the 1621 *History*, and there is no evidence of Ralegh ever employing this himself in extant printed or manuscript works or in any of his correspondence. Biographers claiming Ralegh used Gascoigne's motto as his own habitually do so without referencing any corroborating contemporary source.[130] It appears instead that this motto was only latterly ascribed to Ralegh as it was in posthumous characterisations of (amongst others) Sidney, Essex, Gervase Markham and Richard Lovelace.[131] Like Thomas Fuller's story about Ralegh spreading his cloak to allow Elizabeth to traverse a 'plashy place' at Greenwich, the motto has become part of the anecdotal tradition from which historians continue to construct narratives about Ralegh's rich and complex life.[132] As this article has demonstrated, however, the motto's posthumous ascription to Ralegh aligns with the instrumental role and enduring investment that he himself had in perpetuating the narrative concerning his simultaneous commitment to Mars and Mercury.

[129] John Shirley, *The Life of the Valiant & Learned Sir Walter Raleigh, Knight with his Tryal at Winchester* (London, 1677), p. 12.
[130] See, for example, William Oldys in *Works*, 1: p. 22; Walter Oakeshott, *The Queen and the Poet* (London, 1960), p. 33; Lacey, *Ralegh*, p. 25; Trevelyan, *Raleigh*, p. 19.
[131] Richard Hillyer, *Sir Philip Sidney, Cultural Icon* (New York, 2010), ch. 6.
[132] Fuller, *History*, p. 262