Pride and Investment*

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We can feel proud of a great deal many things. But pride has its limits; I can be proud of myself or of my spouse for publishing a book, but not of a complete stranger for achieving the same. These observations reflect two central features of pride: its *Promiscuity* and its *Positionality*. Many accounts struggle to accommodate both. I diagnose this struggle as a symptom of a long-standing tendency to focus on self-directed pride to the exclusion of other-directed pride. Correcting for this, I develop an investment account, which smoothly handles pride's Promiscuity, Positionality, and many other features besides.

I. PRELIMINARIES

Pride is impressively promiscuous; we can extract it from just about anything. I'm proud of myself for finally getting to the writing of the opening paragraph of this article. But I'm also proud of my collection of manga paraphernalia and of the fact that I've managed to build up a modest tan during the Yorkshire "summer." This isn't, to be sure, an article about me. But you'll forgive the egocentrism, for while pride is promiscuous in its grounds, it is curiously parochial in its focus. That is to say, pride always directs its attention squarely on a particular individual: oneself. It is a characteristically "self-directed" emotion.[1]

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1. See Lisa A. Williams and Joel Davies, "Beyond the Self: Pride Felt in Relation to Others," in *The Moral Psychology of Pride*, ed. J. Adam Carter and Emma C. Gordon (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2017), 43–68, 43; Neil M. McLatchie and Jared Piazza, "Moral Pride: Benefits and Challenges of Experiencing and Expressing Pride in One's Moral Achievements," in *The Moral Psychology of Pride*, ed. J. Adam Carter and Emma C. Gordon (Lanham,

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Or is it? Some of us are fortunate (or unfortunate, depending on how one sees things) to have parents who never tire of reporting how proud we make them. More generally, we can be proud of a spouse for quitting smoking, of a sibling for earning a promotion, or of a child for learning to read. Indeed, pride can extend outward further still—to people whom we've never met. I can be proud of my football team for winning the league. And I was proud of my fellow Australians when the nation legalized same-sex marriage. Here, pride isn't self-directed—or at least not purely self-directed—but seems other-directed in a significant way.

Not anything goes, mind you. Perhaps pride can comfortably latch on to a friend's accomplishments or a football team's victory. But one surely cannot be proud of Jupiter for being the largest planet in our solar system, or of one's office door for being sturdy. (Pride may be promiscuous, but it is not that promiscuous.) These sound like something approaching category errors. One is tempted to respond, in the immortal words of Inigo Montoya, "You keep using that word. I don't think it means what you think it means."[2] The more interesting errors aren't quite so egregious. While I can be proud of my spouse for quitting smoking, it seems suspiciously odd for me to be proud of the actor John Hamm for doing the same. I can take pride in my sister's promotion. But if a deserving stranger secured it instead, then something has surely gone awry if I declare myself proud of them.

Most discussions of pride focus on self-directed pride. To my mind, however, they overlook other-directed pride to their own detriment.[3] We can gain a better understanding of what pride is by expanding our focus to include other-directed pride—or so I contend. After having pinned down the phenomenon of interest (Sec. II), I explain why an account of pride would seem to do better insofar as it is capable of accommodating pride in both its self-directed and its other-directed forms (Sec. III). I then show that many otherwise promising accounts of pride are unfit for this task (Sec. IV). In Section V, I develop an investment account of pride. Unlike previous analyses, which begin with self-directed pride and then work

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MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2017), 143–67, 144; Eva. M. Dadlez, "The Practical Advantages of Pride and the Risks of Humility: The Defence of Pride Occasionally Found in the Work of David Hume and Jane Austen," in *The Moral Psychology of Pride*, ed. J. Adam Carter and Emma C. Gordon (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2017), 235–48, 238; Jessica L. Tracy, Eric Mercadante, and Ian Hohm, "Pride: The Emotional Foundation of Social Rank Attainment," *Annual Review of Psychology* 74 (2023): 519–45, 520.

2. William Goldman, *The Princess Bride: An Illustrated Edition of S. Morgenstern's Classic Tale of True Love and High Adventure* (New York: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2013), 114. For those who haven't had the pleasure, Inigo Montoya is among the most memorable characters from Goldman's book (played by Mandy Patinkin in the film adaptation). Montoya takes issue with another character's frequent misuse of the word 'inconceivable'.

3. A notable exception is Williams and Davies, "Beyond the Self," who explore other-directed pride from an empirical perspective.

their way outward, my methodology begins with other-directed pride and works its way inward. In Section VI, I argue that this unconventional methodology bears fruit; the *Investment Account* accommodates pride's many manifestations in ways that its rivals cannot.

II. PINPOINTING THE PHENOMENON

Let me begin by sharpening my focus. Philosophers traditionally distinguish between pride as a feeling and pride as a character trait.[4] My focus here will be restricted to the former—to pride as an episodic emotion.

Since it is the emotion of pride that is my focus, one might think that I had better specify how exactly I am understanding this category. One important assumption that I'll be making—a plausible one, even if not unchallenged—is that emotions like pride involve representational content of some kind, that is, they present the world as being a certain way. This representational content is, moreover, a necessary feature of the relevant emotion (without it, one is not properly classified as experiencing that emotion) and a distinctive one (individuating it from other emotions). In order to experience fear, for instance, one must represent some threat of danger, and it is this representation (in part) that explains why it is indeed fear that one is experiencing, rather than, say, anger or joy.[5]

On some ways of seeing things, an emotion's representational content is simply the propositional content of a judgment or belief. In feeling fear, for example, one thereby judges or believes oneself to be in danger.[6] On other approaches, the representational state need not aspire to anything so grand; perhaps to feel fear is simply to perceive or to construe some threat of danger.[7] I won't take a stand on which representational state is the right one; I'll only assume that some such state is implicated in emotions more generally.[8] In the interests of keeping my language neutral, I'll

4. Christopher Morgan-Knapp, "Comparative Pride," *Philosophical Quarterly* 69 (2019): 315–31, 318; Antti Kauppinen, "Pride, Achievement, and Purpose," in *The Moral Psychology of Pride*, ed. J. Adam Carter and Emma C. Gordon (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2017), 169–90, 170–71; Dadlez, "Practical Advantages of Pride," 235.

5. I say "in part" because we need not take this representational element to be the only defining feature (let alone the only component) of an emotion.

6. See Robert Solomon, *The Passions* (New York: Doubleday, 1976); Joel Marks, "A Theory of Emotion," *Philosophical Studies* 42 (1982): 227–42.

7. Robert C. Roberts, *Emotions: An Essay in Aid of Moral Psychology* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003); cf. Patricia S. Greenspan, "Subjective Guilt and Responsibility," *Mind* 101 (1992): 287–303.

8. I am here aligning myself with what has come to be known as the judgmentalist tradition. (I construe this broadly so as to include neo-judgmentalist views as well.) For a well-known critique of this tradition, see Justin D'Arms and Daniel Jacobson, "The Significance of Recalcitrant Emotion (or, Anti-quasijudgmentalism)," in *Philosophy and the Emotions*, ed. Anthony Hatzimoysis (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 127–45.

often default to speaking of an agent's taking something to be the case. By 'taking' I simply mean to denote whichever representational state is implicated here.

There are different sorts of questions that we might ask about the emotion of pride. Many focus on a normative question: under what conditions is pride appropriately felt? One suggestion is that pride is only fitting to the extent that it is directed at objects of genuine value.[9] We might on these grounds dismiss as inappropriate the pride that the mafioso feels whenever he respects the Omertà code, or the pride of the omnicidal villain as she edges us closer to the apocalypse. It isn't hard to deny that pride is appropriate in such cases. But it is hard to deny that what these people experience is pride. It is precisely because we suppose that people can be proud of such things that we take issue with their having done so; these aren't things of which one cannot be proud but things of which one shouldn't.

The latter point ushers us into the territory of a descriptive question that Fischer identifies: under what conditions is it intelligible to attribute pride—as opposed to some other emotion—to someone?[10] (Note that we shouldn't permit the language of 'attribution' here to lead us astray. The question is a metaphysical one about what pride is—not merely an epistemic question about when we're justified in believing it to be there.) My ambition will be to make progress on this descriptive score: to seek a better understanding of what pride fundamentally is.

There are four core features that are traditionally taken to be important in this regard. The first, already registered, is pride's *Promiscuity*: its objects are wide and varied.[11] As Kauppinen observes, pride can attach to anything "from having a full head of hair . . . to writing a hit song."[12] Hume's list is more extensive still:

> Every valuable quality of the mind, whether of the imagination, judgment, memory, or disposition; wit, good sense, learning, courage, justice, integrity; all these are the causes of pride, and their opposites of humility. Nor are these passions confined to the mind, but extend their view to the body likewise. A man may be proud of his beauty, strength, agility, good mien, address in dancing, riding, fencing, and of his dexterity in any manual business or manufacture. But this is

9. See Arnold Isenberg, "Natural Pride and Natural Shame," *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 10 (1949): 1–24, 4; Samantha Vice, "White Pride," in *The Moral Psychology of Pride*, ed. J. Adam Carter and Emma C. Gordon (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2017), 191–210, 196. This is only an example; we may well prefer to build moral or prudential considerations into pride's "external propriety conditions" rather than its fittingness conditions. See Jeremy Fischer, "Pride and Moral Responsibility," *Ratio* 30 (2017): 181–96, 183–84.

10. Fischer, "Pride and Moral Responsibility," 183–84.

11. Fischer refers to this feature as pride's "heterogeneity"; ibid., 182.

12. Kauppinen, "Pride, Achievement, and Purpose," 169.

> not all. The passion, looking further, comprehends whatsoever objects are in the least allied or related to us. Our country, family, children, relations, riches, houses, gardens, horses, dogs, clothes.[13]

The second feature is what we might call pride's *Positionality*.[14] Whereas Promiscuity lets pride run free, Positionality tightens our hold on the reigns; it introduces limits on what can intelligibly serve as a basis for pride.[15] I can be proud of myself for writing a novel—but I cannot, it seems, be proud of a stranger for achieving the same. And while I may be proud of my home, it's difficult to make sense of the suggestion that I might be proud of a stranger's when I see it being flaunted on Instagram. These other people's accomplishments and possessions just don't seem positioned to me in the right sort of way to render pride intelligible. In this vein, it is often observed that the object(s) of pride must "stand in some special relation" to us,[16] bear some sort of "closeness to"[17] or "affiliation with" us,[18] or else be viewed as "connected to"[19] or as "reflecting" on us in some way.[20]

Spelling out precisely what this relation amounts to is far from straightforward. But doing so is important, for whatever this relation is, it seems to play an important role in the individuation of pride, helping us to distinguish it from other nearby emotions and attitudes. Even if I cannot feel proud of the stranger for writing a novel, I can still esteem them for it. And while I cannot be proud of the Instagram house, I can certainly admire it. In all such cases, pride seems less easily attributable than these other emotions or attitudes, and this seems to be due to the absence of a relation that is central to it.

Moving on to the third feature, pride constitutively involves *Positivity*—some form of positive evaluation. But it is up for debate precisely how that evaluation ought to be understood. Some may want to say that pride

13. David Hume, *A Treatise of Human Nature* (1739), T 2.1.2.5, https://davidhume.org/texts/t/full.

14. Or "partiality," in Fischer's language; see Fischer, "Pride and Moral Responsibility," 182.

15. As Árdal observes, it is here that Hume starts to become less permissive, proposing that the object of pride must be not only "closely related, but also peculiar to ourselves, or at least common to us with a few persons"; Pall S. Árdal, *Passion and Value in Hume's Treatise* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1966), 30. This strikes me as too restrictive; accomplishments like obtaining a driver's license are shared by many people, but they can still surely serve as sources of pride.

16. Fischer, "Pride and Moral Responsibility," 181; Árdal, *Passion and Value*, 28.

17. Jerome Neu, "Pride and Identity," *Midwest Studies in Philosophy* 22 (1998): 227–48, 232.

18. Dadlez, "Practical Advantages of Pride," 238.

19. Vice, "White Pride," 205.

20. Kauppinen, "Pride, Achievement, and Purpose," 169.

essentially comprises pro-attitudes such as approval,[21] or valuing.[22] Others may prefer to explain Positivity by appealing to beliefs with particular content. For instance, perhaps pride requires "the belief that we have achieved something that is worth achieving,"[23] or simply the belief that its object has value. (The latter reflects Árdal's interpretation of Hume.[24]) Or we might propose to keep things suitably vague; perhaps one need only in some sense "see" the object of pride as valuable,[25] "consider" it "desirable,"[26] or "judge" it to be "valuable, noble, or worthy" in some way.[27] Whichever path one chooses, the upshot is the same: pride must apprehend its object as having value of some kind.

Finally, pride involves feelings of *Pleasure*. Indeed, for Hume, it always implicates such feelings.[28] Whatever one makes of this suggestion, it should at least strike us as plausible that pride characteristically involves pleasurable experiences—even if it doesn't always or necessarily involve them.[29] It's not uncommon to see theorists speaking of pride's "uplifting affective element or bodily feeling."[30] We arguably refer to these feelings whenever we speak of hearts "filling with pride," of a person "swelling" with it, or of chests "bursting with" the stuff.[31]

As we shall see, satisfying all four desiderata is no easy business—and it is less easy still if we are concerned to accommodate both other-directed pride and pride of the self-directed sort. The account that I ultimately arrive at is, to my mind, capable of satisfying all four desiderata (see Sec. VI.*B*). However, my primary focus throughout the article will be on the second, which continues to elude a satisfying analysis. My foremost aim, then, will be to develop an approach that gets Positionality right—in a way that appropriately constrains Promiscuity without reigning it in too much.

21. Donald Davidson, "Hume's Cognitive Theory of Pride," *Journal of Philosophy* 73 (1977): 744–57, 748.

22. Gabriele Taylor, *Pride, Shame, and Guilt: Emotions of Self-Assessment* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1985), 41.

23. Kristján Kristjánsson, "Pridefulness," *Journal of Value Inquiry* 35 (2001): 165–78, 167–68.

24. Pall S. Árdal, "Hume and Davidson on Pride," *Hume Studies* 15 (1989): 387–94, 391; Árdal, *Passion and Value*, 27.

25. Neu, "Pride and Identity," 232–33.

26. Isenberg, "Natural Pride," 1–2.

27. Morgan-Knapp, "Comparative Pride," 318–19.

28. Hume, *Treatise of Human Nature*, T 2.1.5.1.

29. See Davidson, "Hume's Cognitive Theory," 745, 754.

30. Michael S. Brady, "The Appropriateness of Pride," in *The Moral Psychology of Pride*, ed. J. Adam Carter and Emma C. Gordon (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2017), 13–30, 14.

31. Isenberg, "Natural Pride," 1. Indeed, it is partly in virtue of this "feel-good" element that pride is thought to motivate achievement. Pride's pleasurable dimension is often said to be reinforcing, motivating us to engage in activities that elicit it. See Tracy, Mercadante, and Hohm, "Pride," 529.

III. PROVIDING FOR OTHER-DIRECTED PRIDE

My task in Section IV will be to establish that many accounts of pride—fixating on the self-directed variety, as they do—are ill-suited to accommodate other-directed pride. But this is presumably a moot point if we lack any reason for thinking that the two merit unified treatment. Perhaps these simply reflect distinct emotional experiences. I now want to argue against this way of seeing things.

Let me first qualify what I intend exactly by "other-directed" pride. The clearest cases are, of course, found in personal relationships. Parents take pride in their children's accomplishments, as do friends and spouses in one another's. But what of "group pride," whereby one feels pride for some group with which one bears some close affinity, or of which one forms a part? That's more complicated. One wonders whether there isn't perhaps a tendency to lump diffuse phenomena together under this heading—for instance, family pride, sports team pride, political party pride, national pride, ancestral pride, and LGBTQ pride.[32]

Group pride can certainly take on other-directed forms. I might be proud of my football team for a good showing, or of my family for keeping the house clean in my absence. Here, I am proud of others rather than myself. But our sense of self is often tied up with these associations, and so group pride can sometimes transform into something that is at once self- and other-directed. (Consider the football fan exclaiming, "We did it!") Here, I am not merely proud of me, or of you, but of us. The same is true of ancestral and national pride. I can be proud of my Jewish heritage or proud to be Australian (self-directed). But I can also be proud of Australians for voting Scott Morrison out of office, or of my Jewish ancestors for their persistence in the face of adversity (other-directed).

Complicating matters further is that not all theorists take group pride to be deserving of the name. Some prefer to interpret "Black pride" or "Gay pride" along the lines of "self-respect."[33] Others distinguish "identity-pride" from "achievement-pride" and attach distinct fittingness conditions to each.[34] I don't want to take a strong taxonomical stand on these issues here. So, I will set group pride aside for the purposes of the critical discussion; while I will ultimately claim it as a virtue of my own proposal that it accommodates group pride, I won't hold it against other accounts if they cannot. This isn't because I believe that a plausible account of pride can get away with simply leaving group pride by the wayside. (I don't.) It's purely in the

32. See Jeremy Fischer, "Why Are You Proud of That? Cognitivism about 'Possessive' Emotions," *Southwest Philosophy Review* 36 (2020): 87–104, 92–93; Williams and Davies, "Beyond the Self," 47.

33. Kristján Kristjánsson, *Justifying Emotions: Pride and Jealousy* (London: Routledge, 2002), 125. Cf. Vice, "White Pride," 205.

34. Morgan-Knapp, "Comparative Pride," 320.

interests of focusing my criticisms: my evaluation of rival accounts will be restricted to the manner in which they attempt (and, to my mind, fail) to accommodate other-directed pride within personal relationships.

But why should an account of pride be in the business of accommodating such other-directed pride? One supporting consideration is ordinary usage. We switch seamlessly between talk of being proud of ourselves for our hard work and being proud of others—a spouse, a sibling—for theirs. Moreover, all four of pride's core features are found in other-directed pride as well. Other-directed pride is certainly promiscuous. I can be proud of my karaoke performance, or of some novel that I may have written. But I can also be proud of my sister's karaoke performance, or of my spouse for having recently published a book. Positionality can be observed in other-directed pride too; if we imagine a stranger in place of my spouse, then it's difficult to make sense of my claiming to be proud of them for their novel writing. Positivity also comes into play here: if I am a dedicated hater of the arts, then it's hard to see how I could conceivably extract pride from my or my sister's karaoke skills. Moreover, the Pleasure that is characteristic of self-directed pride is easily identifiable in its other-directed counterpart; parents often find themselves "beaming" or "swelling" with pride in response to their children's achievements. Indeed, Yiddish even has a word for this kind of prideful joy: *nachas*.

Some readers may find themselves wondering whether I haven't perhaps made matters more difficult for myself here than they needed to be, for some may want to say that there is really no distinction, at bottom, between self- and other-directed pride. For these people, I am not proud of my sister for her karaoke performance; rather, I am proud of myself for this fact.[35] That is to say, I am proud that I have a talented sister. QED; why fuss with the above?

The simple answer is that I want to resist this way of seeing things, for it seems to me to offend against phenomenology—or, at least, the phenomenology of cases where all is well. If my sister wins a karaoke contest, then it is not I but she who is in the emotional foreground; we expect my pride to be focused on her and on the value of what she has accomplished. This is meaningfully different from my experiences in a scenario where I win a karaoke contest.

Of course, there are cases where all is not well in a relationship. We are all familiar with parents attempting to "live through" their children, pushing them into competitive sports contests or beauty pageants. It takes no great stretch of the imagination to suppose that these people's prideful feelings may be directed more squarely at themselves than at their children. More often than not, one suspects that their true interest lies with

35. Cf. Árdal's discussion of Hume's idea that pride is "directed to oneself" (Árdal, *Passion and Value*, 18).

how their loved ones' achievements reflect on them. In a related vein, we might call to mind those who "bask in reflected glory," publicizing their connections to achieving others in order that some of the glory might "rub off" on them too.[36] To put the point as Hume did, "Nothing causes greater vanity than any shining quality in our relations."[37]

In denying that all other-directed pride reduces to self-directed pride, then, I don't mean to deny that the two often blend into one another. What I am suggesting is that in certain contexts we hold it up as something of an ideal (and an achievable one) when people manage to avoid such slippage. So I'm inclined to think that authentically other-directed pride is possible.[38]

Even if it's not, though, this is not ultimately a fight that I am forced to pick. Either way, the desired upshot is the same: an account of pride would seem to do worse inasmuch as it cannot accommodate (what I am calling) pride of the other-directed variety. Other-directed pride and self-directed pride do, after all, very much appear to be something of a unified phenomenon. What stands before us is one and the same emotion directed at different objects (or at the same object, if one really prefers, viz., oneself)—not two emotions that call out for separate analysis. This, in turn, motivates the search for a unified account.

IV. PICKING ON PREVIOUS PROPOSALS

My business now will be to show that many accounts of pride, in virtue of their tendency to focus primarily on self-directed pride, fail to smoothly accommodate pride in its other-directed forms. Sometimes, this result is downstream of problems with the account's treatment of self-directed pride; its awkward handling of other-directed pride turns out to be a symptom of the same underlying disease. In other cases, however, raising the subject of other-directed pride does not merely reinforce our sense that all is not well with a particular proposal but exposes problems with what looks to be an otherwise promising account.

A. The Responsibility Account

Let's begin with the Responsibility Account (RA). On this view, pride differs from gratitude or joy in virtue of implicating our agency in some deeper

36. Robert B. Cialdini et al., "Basking in Reflected Glory: Three (Football) Field Studies," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 34 (1976): 366–75.

37. Hume, *Treatise of Human Nature*, T 2.2.2.13.

38. For a distinct but complementary argument against the idea that the partial concern underwriting these experiences "in fact reduces to a special kind of self-concern," see Rosalind Chaplin, "Personal Reactive Attitudes and Partial Responses to Others: A Partiality-Based Approach to Strawson's Reactive Attitudes," *Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy* 25 (2023): 323–45, 335.

way.[39] A person may understandably be grateful or pleased at having been gifted with a naturally attractive or symmetrical face. But she cannot be proud of such things—in the way that, say, she might be proud of having achieved a sculpted body from a rigorous exercise regime. In order to feel pride, one must be responsible for the object of one's pride.

The "special relation" that Positionality demands, then, is for RA's supporters a relation of responsibility. The responsibility at issue may be moral; so construed, RA's core thesis is that agents can only be proud of something if they could conceivably be liable to moral blame or praise for it.[40] Alternatively, we might interpret RA's core thesis in terms of agential responsibility—say, in terms of an agent's being liable to broader normative reactions like credit or discredit.[41] Given their emphasis on responsibility, it's unsurprising that RA's proponents tend to describe pride as a joyful reaction to achievements.[42] These are, after all, the sorts of things that one can paradigmatically claim responsibility for.

Even as an account of self-directed pride, RA is controversial. The most common complaint pertains to the proposal's handling of Promiscuity.[43] It is not merely our achievements of which we can be proud; we can also be proud of our nonagential attributes—of our "gifts," as they are sometimes called.[44] These are features of ourselves for which we bear little if any responsibility, for instance, a "good memory,"[45] a "booming voice,"[46] or our "physical stature."[47] People can—and often do—plausibly extract pride from these nonagential features of themselves. Complementing this thought is empirical research which suggests that we acknowledge two species of pride. The first, "authentic pride," is indeed associated with effortful achievements. But people also recognize "hubristic pride." The latter reflects an agent's pride in her "global self" and is linked to a tendency to attribute accomplishments to "uncontrollable causes," such as one's natural abilities rather than effort or hard work.[48]

RA's supporters, then, seem to find themselves in the uncomfortable position of attributing a widespread error to ordinary language users—either the conceptual error of systematically misapplying the term 'pride'

39. Solomon, *Passions*, 345; Kristjánsson, "Pridefulness," 167–68; Kristjánsson, *Justifying Emotions*, 104, 125.

40. Fischer, "Pride and Moral Responsibility," 185.

41. Daniel Telech, "In Praise of Praise" (PhD diss., University of Chicago, 2018), 51–52.

42. Solomon, *Passions*, 345; Kristjánsson, "Pridefulness," 167–68.

43. Fischer, "Pride and Moral Responsibility," 187.

44. Fischer, "Why Are You Proud," 92; Neu, "Pride and Identity," 231; Isenberg, "Natural Pride," 4–6.

45. Telech, "In Praise of Praise," 55.

46. Fischer, "Why Are You Proud," 92.

47. Brady, "Appropriateness of Pride," 17–18.

48. Jessica L. Tracy and Richard W. Robins, "The Psychological Structure of Pride: A Tale of Two Facets," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 92 (2007): 506–25, 507.

(this seems unappealing) or the factual error of repeatedly judging themselves responsible for qualities like their stature (this is arguably worse still).[49]

What I now want to argue is that these problems become even more pronounced when we try to extend RA to other-directed pride. Even if we are responsible for our achievements, we are not always responsible for those of our loved ones. And yet, it seems not merely possible but fitting to take pride in a child's or a partner's accomplishments. RA's supporters are, of course, alive to this problem. Kristjánsson makes some effort to accommodate the pride felt by football fans; he proposes that they may claim "partial" responsibility for their team's victory, insofar as they have supported it along the way.[50] Some may want to question whether this might not be too flimsy a basis for a responsibility attribution.[51] But fortunately for Kristjánsson, it seems far less flimsy once we turn our attention to personal relationships (which are, recall, my critical focus). Insofar as I have supported my partner in various ways, perhaps I can reasonably claim some degree of responsibility for whatever they accomplish—and perhaps it is in virtue of this that my pride makes sense.

The problem with this accommodation maneuver is that pride also seems to make sense even when one fails to give any support to a loved one in their endeavors. Those who find this suggestion peculiar have, I submit, simply not kept up to date on their Disney movies. Mulan's parents are horrified by the idea of her fighting in battle and discourage her from pursuing any life that departs from tradition (*Mulan*). Remy finds himself the subject of mockery and ridicule whenever he expresses his passion for food to his friends (*Ratatouille*)—as does Judy Hopps whenever she shares her dream of becoming a police officer with her family (*Zootopia*). What these protagonists achieve they achieve in spite of rather than because of their loved ones' actions. It would be not merely infuriating but implausible from Mulan's perspective if her parents were to claim any responsibility for her wartime heroism. But even so, they do not appear guilty of a conceptual mistake when they ultimately do take pride in what she has accomplished.[52]

It is, of course, open to RA's supporters to push back here; perhaps Mulan's parents *are* guilty of a conceptual mistake. They may want to say that it is precisely because responsibility is required for pride that we resist attributing it in cases like the following:

49. See Telech, "In Praise of Praise," 59–60; Fischer, "Pride and Moral Responsibility," 187; Neu, "Pride and Identity," 231.

50. Kristjánsson, *Justifying Emotions*, 125.

51. See Árdal, *Passion and Value*, 30.

52. The pride that Mulan's parents ultimately come to feel may seem to conflict with Positivity; didn't they attach considerable disvalue to Mulan's escapades? My own reading of the film is that the parents come to value something that they didn't value before.

> *Absent Father*: In 1994, Abe's ex-flame Abby informs him in a letter that she gave birth to his son Archie two years ago. Abe ignores the letter. He doesn't give his son any further thought until 2024, when he encounters him at a New Year's Eve celebration. Abby introduces Abe to Archie, whom Abe learns is now an accomplished scientist who helped to develop one of the COVID-19 vaccines. Abe raises a hand to Archie's shoulder and declares that he is proud of him.

Now, it's debatable whether pride really is unattributable here—as the responsibility theorist would have it—as opposed to simply unfitting. (I return to this thought in Sec. VI.*A*.) Still, one can understand why someone might struggle to make sense of it. The young man who stands before Abe is, after all, by all accounts a stranger to him. And Abe has barely given any thought to Archie or his whereabouts for three decades. Perhaps Abe can be pleased that Archie grew into a well-functioning and accomplished adult—but pride is another matter altogether.

Let's grant all of this to RA's supporters (at least for now), for I do not believe that it is ultimately of much help to them. We should be wary of inferring what they want us to infer here: that it is Abe's lack of responsibility for Archie's achievements that explains any reluctance we might have to attribute pride to him. To see why, consider the following:

> *Somewhat Absent Father*: In 1994, Sam's ex-flame Sally informs him in a letter that she gave birth to his son Sunny two years ago. Sam requests to meet his son. Sally refuses; she's still bitter about how their relationship ended and forbids Sam from ever meeting Sunny. Though Sam respects Sally's wishes, he cannot stomach the idea of forgetting about his son. And so, every week, Sam dons a disguise and watches Sunny from a distance; he observes his son in public playgrounds, at sports days, and at graduations. In 2024, Sam sees Sunny at a New Year's Eve celebration and is delighted when Sally reports that she's finally ready to introduce them. Sunny tells Sam what he already knows from careful observation: he is an accomplished scientist who helped to develop one of the COVID-19 vaccines. Sam raises a hand to Sunny's shoulder and declares that he is proud of him.

Whatever one has to say about these fathers' respective moral track records, the degree of support that they offer to their child is the same; Sam is no more responsible for Sunny's achievements than Abe is for Archie's. And yet, Sam's pride seems more intelligible than Abe's. Of course, it may well be equally unintelligible from Sunny's perspective. From our perspective, however, there is less temptation here to retort, "Who is this boy to you?" or to doubt whether something approaching pride's special relation can here be found.

This suggests to me that it isn't responsibility per se that explains our reluctance to attribute pride in Absent Father (even assuming that we are so reluctant). And so, I am inclined to stick with my initial verdict: RA's emphasis on responsibility leaves it unable to accommodate not merely pride's multiplicity of objects (that is, its Promiscuity) but its multiplicity of directions as well. Insofar as we align ourselves with RA, we must deny that many instances of other-directed pride are properly deserving of the name.

But perhaps a proponent of RA will want to revise her account to accommodate these cases. She may want to say that both Abe and Sam are in fact responsible for Archie's and Sunny's respective accomplishments, for they are causally responsible for them. If not for Abe's and Sam's biological material, then these individuals would never have been born.[53] This would, of course, be to backtrack on the claim that it is only moral or agential responsibility that is relevant to pride. But perhaps such backtracking is warranted.

One concern with this move is that it surrenders much of what is distinctive about RA. In contrast to proponents of other views (see below), the proponent of RA wants to deny that I can be proud of such things as my height. But I am presumably causally responsible for my height; I ate plenty of nutritional food as a youngster, after all. Reverting to the idea of causal responsibility may therefore leave very little daylight between RA and its rivals. Moreover, it's far from clear that causal responsibility really is needed for pride—a point that will become clear when we visit stalking cases below (Sec. IV.*B*).

Perhaps another way to partially salvage RA would be to present it as an account of pride's fittingness (rather than attributability) conditions.[54] "Authentic pride" (the more agency-focused variety, recall) is not only in keeping with RA; it is also associated with positive evaluations such as the agent's being "accomplished" and "confident." "Hubristic pride," by contrast, tends to invite negative associations, such as "arrogant" and "conceited."[55] Even if people recognize both as pride, there is a case to be made that they only take the former (responsibility-implicating) one to be fitting. Of course, this resolution is not uncontroversial. Many (myself included) will want to say that nonagential pride can be both fitting and intelligible.[56] Perhaps a potential compromise would be to say that while both agential pride and nonagential pride can be fitting, the former is more fitting insofar

53. I thank an associate editor at *Ethics* and Frans Svensson for pointing out this possibility.

54. See Henry Sidgwick, *The Methods of Ethics* (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1981), 336; Norvin Richards, *Humility* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1992), 202, 204; Neu, "Pride and Identity," 231.

55. Tracy, Mercadante, and Hohm, "Pride," 522.

56. See Fischer, "Why Are You Proud."

as its objects (achievements) are more valuable.[57] That compromise is a possibility left open by the descriptive account of pride that I develop and defend below.

B. The Belonging Account

Unlike RA, Taylor's BELONGING ACCOUNT (BA) is crafted with an eye to accommodating pride's Promiscuity. Taylor achieves this by way of adopting a fairly permissive understanding of pride's Positionality relation, which she glosses as a kind of "belonging." I say "permissive" because "belonging" doesn't merely extend to traditional forms of ownership. I can be proud that some grand house belongs to me, sure. But I can also be proud of my nonagential qualities; a "handsome face or . . . sense of humour" also qualifies as a belonging for Taylor.[58] I can be proud that I belong to some group too—to a nation, for example. The relation is thus multidirectional. It is also wide-ranging. For Taylor, our achievements belong to us as well: "We may treat the case of 'being responsible for' as falling under the relation of belonging: where an agent is proud of something he has brought about, that which he has brought about would then be regarded as an event which 'belongs' to the agent in the sense that he is at least partially responsible for its existence."[59] But even if the belonging relation is broad, it is normatively constrained. Indeed, Taylor effectively builds Positivity into Positionality. On her view, we feel pride when we value or regard as desirable whatever stands in the belonging relation to us and, moreover, when we regard our standing in this relation as itself valuable—as a basis for our sense of self-worth or self-esteem.[60] The latter conjunct is important for Taylor; it is in virtue of this relation holding between an agent "and the desirable object that she believes her worth to be increased. This belief is constitutive of the feeling of pride."[61]

There has been some criticism of BA's belonging relation. Some worry whether this might not make things a little too promiscuous—even by pride's standards. Fischer registers the concern that "'belonging' has come down to merely predicating some quality or attribute of oneself. . . . Suppose I am proud of the fact that I don't own a house (being a communist). On Taylor's analysis, the quality, 'not owning a house,' belongs to me. Even the property of living in the same world as Mark Rothko's paintings belongs to me. These examples suggest that 'belonging' excludes little, if anything."[62] I won't dwell on this point further here, though; I add it into the

57. See Isenberg, "Natural Pride," 4–6; Dadlez, "Practical Advantages of Pride," 238.
58. Taylor, *Pride, Shame, and Guilt*, 32.
59. Ibid., 32.
60. Ibid., 41.
61. Ibid., 42.
62. Fischer, "Why Are You Proud," 91.

mix in order to preempt later parts of the discussion, where it will be useful to keep in mind that we have reasons to resist making pride's special relation too broad. My primary focus in this section concerns how well-positioned BA is to accommodate other-directed pride.

Not very well, I think. One concern that has been raised in this regard is that, *pace* Taylor, pride need not involve any belief to the effect that one's own worth has been increased. Indeed, it often doesn't in cases of other-directed pride. To modify an example given by Kittlaus, suppose that I am proud of my father for improving his health by losing ten kilograms.[63] Must I, qua proud daughter, regard the relation in which I stand to my father and his accomplishment as valuable in the sense that Taylor has in mind—namely, as a basis for thinking that my own self-worth has been enhanced? It's hard to see why this need be so; it seems perfectly conceivable that I could regard my father's worth as having been enhanced by his achievement while remaining quite neutral about my own.

We can go further still: pride seems attributable even in cases where its special relation is cause for diminished self-worth. Consider the following:

> *Smoker's Stalker*: Jane has been stalking the actor John Hamm for five years. She does not merely keep up to date with his film and television appearances and his comings and goings in the tabloids; she also regularly follows him places and observes him shopping and going on dates from a distance. Throughout this time, she has witnessed John undergo all of the trials and tribulations of quitting smoking. And she has cheered him on, unseen, from the sidelines. When John finally manages to kick the habit, Jane feels incredibly proud of him.

It's difficult to imagine that Jane values the relation in which she stands to John, namely, being his stalker—that she views this as a source of self-esteem. Presumably, Jane won't see the relation in this way at all, especially if her stalking habits reflect something on the order of morbid fascination (as opposed to the outright delusion that she and John are engaged in a romantic partnership). But for all that, her pride is arguably intelligible.[64]

In general, then, other-directed pride seems possible even when we attach disvalue to the relation in which we stand to the person of whom we are proud, or when we view this relation as a source of conflict or shame

63. Jennifer D. Kittlaus, "The Natures of Pride and Shame" (PhD diss., University of Kansas, 2016), 42.

64. I don't mean to claim that all stalkers are like Jane; many presumably do have seriously mistaken beliefs about the nature of their relationships. My claim here is simply that insofar as a stalker isn't laboring under any such delusions, she may well feel ashamed of the relation in which she stands to the person whom she stalks. The reader is free to substitute "morbidly obsessed fan" for "stalker" if they prefer.

rather than as a source of self-esteem. I am therefore skeptical that BA can capture all instances of other-directed pride, even if it captures many more instances of it than RA promised to.

C. The Normative Ideals Account

As was the case with BA, the NORMATIVE IDEALS ACCOUNT (NIA) developed by Fischer builds Positivity into Positionality. On this proposal, we can only take pride in something when we take our relation to that thing as evidence that we are living a life that is in keeping with our personal ideals. More specifically, Fischer sees pride as comprising three core elements:[65]

1. The descriptive judgment(s) that
   - *a)* some object exists, did exist, or will exist;
   - *b)* some proposition is true;
   - *c)* some event occurred, is occurring, or will occur;
   - *d)* some relation obtains, obtained, or will obtain; or
   - *e)* some object had, has, or will have some property.
2. The normative judgment that the content of the descriptive judgment(s) provides evidence that one is living in accordance with some of one's personal ideals.
3. The normative judgment that the relevant personal ideals are worthy of one's adoption or pursuit.

As was the case with BA, NIA is tailor-made to accommodate pride's Promiscuity. It can easily account for pride taken in one's achievements; writing a novel, raising a family, and running a marathon often feature among people's personal ideals, after all.[66] So too might owning expensive jewelry for a materialistic person, or being attractive for someone who values beauty. The ideals that each of us have for a life well lived are rich and varied. And so too, therefore, are the possible objects of our pride.

Yet Fischer's account seems to wander into similar trouble to that of Taylor's—and for similar reasons: like Taylor, Fischer folds Positivity into Positionality in a manner that is too self-regarding to accommodate other-directed pride. Sam can be proud of Sunny's achievements, but Sam need not regard those achievements as evidence that he (Sam) is living a life that accords with his personal ideals; indeed, they may make for a painful reminder that he isn't living such a life. Our case studies of Disney doubters (Sec. IV.*A*) drive the point home well: the pride that they ultimately come to feel is mixed in with a painful regret at their having failed to support their loved ones. In general, it seems possible to feel pride for others even

65. Fischer, "Why Are You Proud," 95.
66. Ibid., 93.

when their accomplishments reveal to us that we have failed to live up to our personal ideals.

One could perhaps respond on Taylor's and Fischer's behalf by pointing out that agents will tend to have a multitude of personal ideals. Sam's pride in his son may well signal a failure to live up to one of his personal ideals while also signaling that he has managed to live up to another, for instance, the ideal of being a parent with an impressively accomplished child.[67] I don't want to deny that this is possible. My point is that it seems utterly unnecessary: even if we were to suppose that Sam had no such self-regarding ideal about his parenthood status, his pride would still surely strike us as intelligible. As I argued in Section III, authentically other-directed pride reflects both a familiar and an achievable ideal; Sam's pride in Sunny need not be traced back to anything about himself in order to be deserving of the name.

V. PRIDE: A PROPOSAL

As we've seen, philosophers traditionally set out by focusing on self-directed pride. They then expand their analysis outward in an attempt to incorporate pride of the other-directed sort. But what if we were to approach things from the other direction? What if, that is, we were to begin by focusing on other-directed pride and then proposed to work our way back inward? Given that the standard method of operations hasn't gotten us very far, I submit that the latter is at least worth a shot. I now apply this unconventional methodology to develop an investment account of pride.

A. Pinpointing Positionality

Consider a parent who declares themselves incredibly proud as they watch their child's performance at a musical. Presumably, such a declaration of pride makes sense. Yet it would surely make far less sense coming from some random onlooker. That onlooker may find the performance pleasurable, sure—but their beaming with pride would strike us as odd. Some may feel the same about Abe in Absent Father. If he were to report being overcome with pride by Archie's accomplishments, this might also seem amiss. "Who's he to you?" we might be tempted to ask.

In between these two extremes, we have cases like Sam (Somewhat Absent Father) and Jane (Smoker's Stalker). These cases aren't quite as clear-cut as the parent at the musical. Still, a prideful reaction on Sam's part as he watches Sunny graduate does not seem nearly as out of place as a parallel reaction from Abe (toward Archie) would be. The same seems true of Jane; it would be easier to make sense of her pride when John Hamm quits smoking than it would be to make sense of any old fan having

67. I thank an anonymous referee for this suggestion.

that reaction. We are at least less inclined to respond with puzzlement in these in-between cases—less likely to retort, "What do you care?"

Why do these cases occupy the places that they do on our spectrum? Follow the clues, and I think we'll find that Positionality holds the answer. Observe to begin with that there is a thought that is available to the proud parent that isn't available to the onlooker: the parent's pride is best captured not by the thought "this is a wonderful performance" but by the thought "my child's performance is wonderful." In these more intelligible cases, the other person of whom one feels proud seems nonfungible in an important way. Abe doesn't know Archie from Adam; he should be equally pleased upon finding out that any young accomplished scientist at the party is his son. Not so for Sam, who has been following Sunny closely for years. It's far easier to make sense of the pride that he feels in reaction to his son's accomplishments. And it's easier still to understand the pride that the parent feels in reaction to her child's musical performance (and to understand why her pride would swiftly dissipate were she to put on her glasses and discover that the musical afficionado on the stage was in fact someone else's child). Contrasting Jane with any old John Hamm fan (like myself) is also instructive; I would be equally pleased to discover that any actor I admire had quit smoking. Pride in response to John's achievement, however, seems available to Jane in a way that it is not available to me. But why?

B. Pride and Investment

One obvious distinguishing feature between Sam and Abe, between the parent and the stranger, or between Jane and any old John Hamm fan is history; the richer a history we build in, the more intelligible the pride seems. One finds something like this hypothesis in Hume, who remarked, "What is casual and inconstant gives but little joy, and less pride."[68] Perhaps it is our historical relationship with a person that explains why we are able to feel pride in response to their valuable qualities in particular.

I do not doubt that some history of interaction is important here. But I also want to propose that it is not merely history that is important to pride's Positionality. What is important is what we do with it. If other-directed pride is to be attributable to me, then perhaps I must have some history with the relevant other. But this person must also matter to me in some way.

Building on this thought, let me introduce the analysis of pride that I want to defend:

> The Investment Account (ia): Pride is an emotion (typically pleasurable) that an agent is liable to feel insofar as she takes someone (or some group) that she is invested in to realize or manifest a quality (or qualities) that she values.

68. Hume, *Treatise of Human Nature*, T 2.1.6.7

The remaining work will be to spell out what exactly this means. Let me begin by clarifying that I take the above to be a constitutive claim about pride. That is to say, I take it to be constitutive of pride that to feel it is to take someone (or some group) in whom one is invested to realize or manifest a quality that one values. An agent may, of course, equally well feel esteem or delight when she takes someone in whom she is invested to manifest some quality that she values. But this feature (viz., the investment relation) is not constitutive of these other emotions in the way that it is constitutive of pride. (Compare: a thrill seeker might experience delight whenever they find themselves in mortal peril, but that is no threat to the idea that fear constitutively involves taking oneself to be in danger.[69])

Now onto 'liable'. Here, I mean to build in the observation that pride may not always be felt even when the conditions that make it available are in place. Just as anger may not always be felt when one is slighted and shame may not always be felt in the face of failure, so too may pride be absent from the scene even when someone in whom we are invested realizes or manifests a quality that we value. But one is still liable to feel anger insofar as one takes oneself to have been slighted and liable to feel shame inasmuch as one takes oneself to have failed in some endeavor. The same lesson carries over to pride.[70]

By 'takes' I simply mean to denote the representational element that is implicated in emotions more generally (see Sec. II). Some may prefer to speak of the agent's perceiving or construing herself as invested in another. But I need not take a stand here as to whether this representational state is best spelled out in terms of beliefs, judgments, construals, or some other representational state altogether. And in case it needed saying: it certainly need not take the form of anything approaching an explicit thought or conscious belief. Indeed, we need not even assume that, prior to experiencing this pride, the agent took herself to be invested in that person or group at all. (Pride might sometimes be the means by which we come to discover that we are more invested in someone than we had realized.[71]) My key claim is simply that, in feeling proud of someone, one thereby

69. I thank associate editors at *Ethics* for helpful feedback on this point.

70. It's debatable how we ought to understand the term 'liability' itself, though. One option would be something like "eligibility," which is arguably close to "fittingness." So construed, the account on offer analyzes what pride is by way of specifying the conditions under which it would be fitting or appropriate to feel it. Another option would be to interpret 'liability' dispositionally. On this framing, the account analyzes pride in terms of what some individual would be disposed to feel—perhaps an idealized or even a "species-typical" individual. On the latter, see David Lewis, "Mad Pain and Martian Pain," in *Philosophical Papers* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983) 1:122–29. I thank an associate editor at *Ethics* and Edward Elliott for helpful feedback on this point.

71. I thank an anonymous referee for this observation. Cf. Chaplin's suggestion that other-directed pride and shame might "reveal the depth of [one's] concern" for others (Chaplin, "Personal Reactive Attitudes," 331).

(i) represents oneself as invested in that person and (ii) represents that person as having realized or manifested a quality that one values.

While this is my preferred way of spelling things out, I don't want to insist on it. Some variations are possible without deviating from the core spirit of the account. For instance, some might prefer to say that it is actually being invested in someone (rather than taking oneself to be invested in them) that is needed to feel pride.[72] But recall the parent at the musical whose pride swiftly dissipates upon discovering that the musical aficionado on stage is in fact someone else's child (Sec. V.*A*). It seems plausible to me that prior to this discovery what she was feeling was indeed pride.[73] Indeed, her own experiences of pride will presumably be the very same in this case of mistaken identity as they are in the veridical case. (I take this last observation to be suggestive, though I admit it's not dispositive.) This is (part of the reason) why I myself want to resist saying that actual investment in a person is required to feel pride. That would imply that pride in the mistaken-identity case isn't pride at all, for the parent is not invested in someone else's child. My account does, however, suggest that actual investment in a person is required for fitting pride.[74]

Let me now move on to 'investment', which reflects my attempt to fill in the Positionality relation. The investment that I have in mind here involves taking on a particular sort of orientation toward another person or group. Ordinarily, when we speak of being "invested in" other people, we mean to signal that we care about them or that we have some stake in their lives going well for them. And this is certainly close to what I mean to get at. But investment on my understanding doesn't merely involve an attitude of care. Indeed, in many contexts the investing strikes me as downstream of the caring; it is usually because we care about particular people that we come to be invested in them.

'Investment' as I conceive of it is more readily amenable to a paradigm-based explanation than an analysis in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions. In that vein, let me provide more insight into what I take its paradigmatic form to involve. One characteristic cluster of dispositions that attaches to an orientation of investment is related to a willingness to devote certain kinds of resources to another—and to do so for particular sorts of reasons.[75] One will, for instance, be disposed to devote material, emotional, and attentional resources to the other person with an aim to

72. I thank an anonymous referee for suggesting this possibility.

73. See Árdal, *Passion and Value*, 28, for a similar assessment.

74. I assume here an alethic understanding of fittingness, on which an attitude is fitting inasmuch as it represents things accurately. If pride represents oneself as invested in some particular person, then it will be fitting only if one actually is invested in that person.

75. The latter is important. Some may want to say that Lex Luthor is invested in his archnemesis Superman, for he is willing to devote substantial resources to taking him

maintaining ties, or to promoting their well-being or interests. These dispositions—like investment more generally—admit of degrees; there are both ways to stray from the paradigm and ways to instantiate it. At the paradigmatic center, we might expect to find someone like a die-hard Tottenham Hotspurs supporter. One expects that they'd be willing to devote considerable attentional resources to the club (following the Premier League tables), as well as temporal resources (watching games), emotional resources (experiencing the team's victories as occasions for celebration and its losses as occasions for sorrow), and material resources (purchasing tickets). These dispositions to devote resources are part and parcel of the supporter's investment in the team.

Another characteristic feature of investment—in its paradigmatic forms—is that the party in whom we are invested informs our sense of self and our place in the world. Consider those who play a central role in our life projects: a spouse or a child for a family-oriented person, or members of a football team for a die-hard sports enthusiast. We are highly invested in such people and groups insofar as (even if not only insofar as) they form an essential part of our identity and of the projects that bring meaning to our lives. As was the case with the resource element of investment, this identity element can tolerate some deviations from the paradigm. Consider a less avid Tottenham Hotspurs supporter now—someone who is at least inclined to closely follow the team's progress and attend many of its games. Football need not be this person's reason for getting up in the morning. Still, being a Hotspurs supporter may form some meaningful part of who she takes herself to be. Were the team to disintegrate, she might very well feel that she'd lost a part of herself. But it need not be an especially central part of herself in the way that, say, her family or career might be. Some recalibration might be needed, but nothing on the order of radically reconfiguring her identity or her place in the world.[76]

Investment as I have characterized it is not dissimilar to what Scheffler calls "evaluative attachment."[77] Attachments more generally characterize our relations to certain persons or groups, as well as to particular purposeful

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down. And perhaps this is picking up on some sense of investment. But it is not the sense of interest to me here.

76. In many cases, we should expect the resource element and the identity element of investment to be mutually supporting. If parenthood is central to a father's identity, then he should presumably be willing to devote substantial resources to raising his children.

77. However, there are some dissimilarities. I don't, for instance, think that investment needs to be "mediated by a conviction that the object of one's attachment is valuable" (particularly not an explicit conviction) in the way that Scheffler thinks evaluative attachment must be. It's also unclear to me to what extent evaluative attachment comes in degrees, or tolerates deviations from the paradigms that Scheffler focuses on. See Samuel Scheffler, "Partiality, Deference, and Engagement," *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society* 122 (2022): 319–41, 321.

activities or projects.[78] Evaluative attachment for Scheffler involves both "emotional vulnerability" toward its object and "a disposition to treat considerations pertaining to [it] as providing one with distinctive reasons for action."[79] Scheffler also makes an important qualification about evaluative attachments that will be helpful for precisifying the notion of investment as well: this relation cannot be a merely instrumental one.[80] One may want to say that one can be invested in another person in a purely instrumental way, for instance, if one has placed a large bet on that person's success, then one may be more than willing to devote resources to assisting them and have a vested interest in how well they fare.[81] But notice that this would not be investment in the person; it is really an investment in oneself (namely, in one's winning the bet) that underwrites this orientation. One does not value that person for their own sake—and such noninstrumental modes of valuing are important for investment as I am conceiving of it.

In summary, then, I want to propose that we ought to understand Positionality in terms of investment. We must take ourselves to be to some degree invested in another person in order to feel proud of them. One cannot feel proud of another person insofar as one does not take oneself to be invested in them in any sort of way.[82]

As I noted earlier, my foremost concern in this article is to get Positionality right; I have no intention of leading any philosophical expeditions into the Positivity condition. Indeed, I've been intentionally vague on this score; I haven't deigned to say much of anything about what it is for us to value certain qualities. However, and on the strength of my earlier arguments concerning RA's failure to do proper justice to Promiscuity (Sec. IV.*A*), I have snuck in certain (permissive) assumptions about what these qualities could be. My talk of "manifesting" and "realizing" qualities that we value is intended to mark a divide between nonagential qualities and agential ones, respectively: between gifts and achievements. Those of whom we are proud may manifest nonagential qualities that we value, for instance, a good sense of humor or a calm temperament. In calling these qualities "nonagential," I don't mean to suggest that they are in no

78. Ibid., 320.

79. Ibid., 321.

80. Ibid., 322–23. See also Chaplin, "Personal Reactive Attitudes," n. 24.

81. I thank an anonymous referee for this point.

82. It's an interesting question whether this analysis can be extended to other emotions or attitudes. Chaplin has recently defended a "bipartite taxonomy" of reactive attitudes, according to which "what distinguishes attitudes like pride and shame from attitudes like admiration and disapproval is that the former, but not the latter, are manifestations of *partial concern* for the agency or character of the attitude's target" (Chaplin, "Personal Reactive Attitudes," 332; emphasis mine). What I have called "investment" could be interpreted as one possible development of Chaplin's notion of "partial concern." If so, then investment could potentially also help us to understand other emotions and attitudes that likewise seem positional in character.

way relevant to the exercise of our agency. It is, however, debatable to what extent they are products of our agency. Achievements, by contrast, are paradigmatically products of our agency; running a marathon and writing a book are goods that we realize, that we actively bring about. As I have formulated IA, it says that both agential qualities and nonagential ones can intelligibly serve as sources of pride. But, of course, IA need not be formulated in this way. One could agree with my arguments for understanding Positionality in terms of investment while disagreeing with me on this score.

Still, having some understanding (even if only a working one) of these other conditions is useful, for investment cannot shoulder all of the burden when it comes to accounting for the intelligibility of pride. According to IA, the degree to which an agent is invested in a particular person or group (call this the "investment parameter") is important for attributing pride. But the degree to which an agent values certain qualities (call this the "value parameter") is surely important too. Sometimes one parameter appears to do more work than the other. I was proud of my fellow Australians on the day that the nation legalized same-sex marriage. But I'm not that invested in them; my nationality isn't so central to who I am, and there are only so many attentional and material resources that I'd be willing to devote to my country. It is, then, really the degree to which I value marriage equality that does most of the heavy lifting here. But it does not do all the lifting, for it is my investment in Australia and its citizens that allows me to feel pride—rather than happiness or admiration, as a non-Australian would. On the flip side, a father might not value artistic creativity all that much, but he might nonetheless find himself feeling rather proud of his daughter's sad attempt at drawing a tree. In cases like these, our degree of investment does far more work in making pride possible than does our degree of valuing.

Importantly, IA makes a prediction: the higher one's score on the investment and value parameters, the more intelligible one's pride will be. I will test these predictions shortly (Sec. VI). (I shall mostly do so by holding the value parameter fixed and seeing what happens when we tinker with the investment parameter.) Before getting to that, however, we must first attend to an important loose end that we've left hanging.

C. Pride of the Parochial Kind

In keeping with my heterodox methodology, I have first sought a plausible account of other-directed pride. It is therefore unsurprising that IA does a better job of accommodating other-directed pride than its predecessors. A notable benefit of IA is that it explains why paradigmatic instances of other-directed pride are found in close personal relationships; if there's anyone in whom we're invested, then it's surely our loved ones.

Moreover, and inasmuch as we can also be invested in the groups of which we form a part, IA easily accounts for group pride as well.

But haven't we lost sight of our target? What of self-directed pride—the pride that has traditionally occupied the minds of philosophers? There is, however, no real cause for worry on this front, for extending the proposal to self-directed pride turns out to be fairly straightforward. Most if not all people are, after all, invested in themselves. This might seem trivially true as far as the identity element of investment is concerned. (How could I not form an important part of who I am?) But even this admits of degrees. In collectivist cultures, shared pursuits may be more likely to feature among one's life projects, and one's identity may be more intertwined with that of others. Indeed, studies suggest that pride is more likely to take on other- or group-directed forms in collectivist cultures.[83]

The resource element of investment allows for more variation still, for people differ in their willingness to devote resources to themselves—to their own health, happiness, or well-being. Of course, everyone is invested in themselves to at least some degree, so IA delivers what looks to be the correct verdict here: in typical cases, self-directed pride is easily attributable. However, IA doesn't make this truth trivial, for it predicts that the less invested we are in ourselves, the harder pride may be to come by.

And this seems positively right to me. While I have parted ways with BA and NIA in denying that we must value pride's special relation itself, I do believe that this relation is ultimately explained by a kind of valuing; it is precisely because we care about particular people that we invest in them. It would therefore be understandable (though, of course, tragic) if someone who did not properly care about themselves (who grappled with feelings of worthlessness, say) were less motivated to invest in themselves or in their own well-being. A deficiency of self-love or care, then, can explain both a lack of self-investment and the difficulty of experiencing self-directed pride in turn.[84]

VI. PUTTING THE PROPOSAL TO THE TEST

Our remaining task is that of quality assurance testing. With IA having been set out, I now want to examine how well the proposal fares in comparison

83. Agneta H. Fischer, Antony S. R. Manstead, and Patricia Rodriguez Mosquera, "The Role of Honour-Related vs. Individualistic Values in Conceptualising Pride, Shame, and Anger: Spanish and Dutch Cultural Prototypes," *Cognition and Emotion* 13 (1999): 149–79; Anna Ogarkova, Christina Soriano, and Caroline Lehr, "Naming Feeling: Exploring the Equivalence of Emotion Terms in Five European Languages," *Dynamicity in Emotion Concepts* 27 (2012): 253–84.

84. Cf. Chaplin's complementary suggestion about resentment—that "an agent who never resented wrongs done to herself would arguably lack an important kind of concern for herself" (Chaplin, "Personal Reactive Attitudes," 334).

to others. My first order of business will be to test IA against the case studies that raised difficulties for other accounts (Sec. VI.*A*). Following that, I ask whether pride's four core elements have been properly accounted for (Sec. VI.*B*). I conclude by considering several important challenges (Secs. VI.*C*–VI.*E*).

A. Predictions

IA makes an important prediction: the less invested an agent is in some person or group, the less likely we are to attribute pride to her (as opposed to, say, admiration, gratitude, or esteem).

For my part, I think that this prediction is borne out—and, moreover, that it is borne out in the trickier cases that spelled trouble for IA's rivals. Compare Abe (Absent Father) to Sam (Somewhat Absent Father) to start with. Earlier, I suggested that it would be understandable if someone struggled to make sense of Abe's claiming to feel proud of Archie. At the very least, it is easier to attribute pride to Sam than to Abe. IA explains why. Even if both men value their son's achievements equally, Sam is clearly invested in Sunny in a way that Abe has never been invested in Archie, for Sam has devoted considerable resources to keeping track of his son. It is in virtue of this variation in investment that pride makes more sense in one case than it does in the other.

Of course, none of this decides whether Abe does in fact feel pride. That will depend on whether he takes himself to be invested in Archie. And while it is difficult to imagine that he could be so deluded as to represent things in this way, it certainly isn't impossible. (Perhaps he is simply caught up in the moment?[85]) And if we do build this assumption into the case—if we stipulate that Abe is, at this very moment, conveniently construing himself as invested in his son—then Abe's pride is in fact attributable. But even so, it is clearly unfitting, for such pride misrepresents the state of play. Abe is not really invested in Archie at all.[86]

85. It's not implausible that people can be taken away by the moment in such ways. Consider the well-known "Minimal Group Effect": even in the absence of any conflict over resources or any history of interaction, people tend to favor members of their own group and to discriminate against outsiders—even when they've been grouped together momentarily and arbitrarily. See Henri Tajfel et al., "Social Categorization and Intergroup Behaviour," *European Journal of Social Psychology* 1 (1971): 149–78. This was a surprising finding. But it might suggest to us that with the right sort of priming people can come to view themselves as invested in a particular group fairly easily—and be liable to experiencing group pride in a range of surprising contexts in turn.

86. Cf. Na'aman's suggestion that "some special relationship" may be a background condition for fitting pride, just as love is plausibly a background condition for fitting grief. See Oded Na'aman, "The Rationality of Emotional Change: Toward a Process View," *Noûs* 55 (2021): 245–69.

Either way, then, IA can offer a plausible diagnosis for those who can't shake the niggling worry that there is something morally—and not merely categorizationally—amiss with Abe's pride. If Abe does indeed view himself as invested in his son, then we can concede that he does feel pride for Archie but protest that his pride is unfitting. If, on the other hand, Abe does not view himself as invested in his son, then whatever he is feeling is not aptly characterized as pride. But even so, another avenue of censure remains available: for if IA is right, then Abe's claiming to be proud of Archie is a way of suggesting to others that he is (as he sees things) invested in his son. He thereby misleads others into thinking that he is something approaching a devoted parent—when in fact he is quite some distance away from that ideal.

Similar lessons apply when we compare a regular John Hamm fan like myself with Jane in Smoker's Stalker. I admire Hamm's work, but I do not see myself as being invested in him in any real way. I wouldn't take the day off work to see him at my local Comic Con. Nor would I suffer through an otherwise terrible film simply because he happens to star in it. The stalker, by contrast, is highly invested in John Hamm—which is precisely why she can be proud of the actor's quitting smoking, whereas I can only feel esteem.

The thought of Hamm's stalker feeling proud of him may make some readers' skin crawl. But this, too, is predicted by IA. It is, after all, in personal relationships that we expect to see the sort of investment that makes pride possible. It is highly unusual (and, indeed, pathological) to be invested in a stranger in the way that a stalker is. This is, I submit, part of what accounts for our unease; it is uncomfortable to think that a stranger could be invested in us to such a degree that their pride would make sense.

B. Promiscuity, Positionality, Positivity, Pleasure

We can now proceed to ask whether pride's four core features have been properly accounted for. If IA has things right, then the special relation that Positionality demands is a relation of investment. Recall that Positionality was supposed to be important for the purposes of individuating pride, helping us to distinguish it from other nearby emotions and attitudes. The investment relation can rise to the occasion here, for one need not be invested in a person to esteem or admire them. Investment is not constitutive of these other emotions in the way that it is constitutive of pride. To demonstrate, consider the following historical figure:

> Caris Connelly was born in 1981. She was nine years old when she grew her hair out. She did this so that she could donate it to a charity that makes wigs for cancer patients. When she reached her early twenties, Connelly became a regular bone marrow donor. After training as a medical doctor, she founded Health for the World,

an initiative to set up clinics in some of the world's poorest regions. Connelly allocated almost her entire salary to the organisation's budget for several years. She often treats patients herself, sometimes traveling for hours for house calls.

This is the first time that the reader will have come across the tale of Caris Connelly—something that I can guarantee insofar as I simply made her up. When reading her story, however, I wager that many readers will have found themselves admiring Connelly's generosity of spirit, or esteeming her for her altruism. Even if they didn't, these reactions would have at least been understandable. What would have been far less understandable is feeling proud of Connelly. If I am right, this is because pride's special relation is absent here; plausibly, the reader doesn't see themselves as invested in Connelly or in any group of which she forms a part.

Promiscuity is also accounted for. Insofar as IA includes both nonagential features and agential ones among the sources of pride, it does not rule out too much as RA does. Still, not anything goes. According to IA, pride always comes back to people (on which more below) in whom we are invested. It is for this reason that one cannot be proud of Jupiter for being the largest planet. IA, then, explains why pride is promiscuous, but also why it is not as promiscuous as can be.

Moreover, the sources of pride must reflect qualities that are valued by the agent. It is in this way that IA accounts for Positivity. Finally, IA makes the characteristic Pleasure of pride intelligible. Not only does it explain our being pleased that some quality that we value has been manifested or realized—something we are just as apt to experience in cases of esteem, delight, or admiration; it also explains a further feature that seems central to the joy of pride, namely, our being pleased that some particular person or group has manifested or realized that quality. It is because we are invested in such people—whether others or ourselves—that we feel joy when they in particular are the ones doing the realizing or the manifesting.

C. Pride of Place

I'm inclined to agree with supporters of RA that agency is important to pride. It's just not important in the way that they believe it to be. On the proposal that I've developed, pride doesn't always come back to the exercise of agency, but it does always come back to agents: in feeling pride for some person or group, we thereby take ourselves to be invested in them.

But, then, what of cases where pride doesn't appear to trace back to people at all? Consider the following example offered by Fischer, which he borrows from Roth: "Just a little ways from the church are The Oaks, a

pair of two-hundred-year-old oak trees that are the town's pride."[87] People can, of course, take pride in their country's natural landscapes or fabulous beaches. In such cases, however, pride would appear to bottom out in places rather than people. In Roth's example, it is trees which manifest some valued quality, not a person.

No trouble, some may want to say: we need only tweak IA's Positionality relation. We can simply speak of people being invested in trees and landscapes. But this way lies trouble, for what is to stop us from saying, then, that someone could be invested in their office door and proud of its being sturdy, or invested in Jupiter and proud of its being the largest planet? (Recall Fischer's critique of BA: we should not want to make pride's Positionality relation too broad—to the point where the proud agent could be positioned in the right sort of way to just about anything.)

The first step toward a better resolution here is to observe that—ordinary language locutions aside—it's not really accurate to say that the townspeople are proud of the trees. (Indeed, I'm not even quite sure what it would mean to be "proud of a tree.") Presumably, what the townspeople are proud of is that they live in a place that has such old and imposing trees. Yet this is a form of group pride; it is not other-directed pride targeted at any bits of vegetation. Fischer makes the point nicely: "A person might easily be proud of having a garden or owning a nice piece of jewellery; more difficult to understand, and in any case very different, is a person who is proud of the garden or the jewellery itself."[88]

In the above example, each of the townspeople is invested in their community. On my analysis, it is a valued quality that this community manifests or realizes—its having made such a place its home—that accounts for the pride that is felt. I say "manifests or realizes" because these cases—taking pride in natural surrounds—may be thought to occupy a gray area between gifts and achievements. There is an obvious sense in which natural surrounds reflect gifts. (Switzerland's citizens did not build its Alps.) But there is also a sense in which agency must be exercised before one can claim pride in natural surrounds. If I were to migrate to Switzerland tomorrow, then it would be odd if I were to immediately write back home declaring its Alps my pride and joy. It seems as though I must do some work—that I must make Switzerland my home—before pride can be attributable to me.

D. Pride and Prejudice

Much of the critical action in this article has been in Positionality's arena; Positivity has largely escaped our scrutiny. But some may want to inquire

87. Philip Roth, *American Pastoral* (New York: Vintage, 1998), 167, cited in Fischer, "Why Are You Proud," 92.

88. Fischer, "Why Are You Proud," 90.

further into IA's valuing condition. What looks to be particularly troubling are cases where we feel pride for someone despite not valuing the qualities that they manifest or realize.

To demonstrate, suppose that I regard poetry as a load of pretentious nonsense. It seems that I can still be proud of my close friend when she wins a stand-up poetry contest. Or consider a young boy who makes a racist joke. Each of his parents might be invested in him, find the joke funny, and value humor to the same degree, but only one of them may feel pride in response. Of course, these cases are somewhat underspecified; we need to know more about what's going on under the hood. But there are, I think, at least two plausible diagnoses of what is happening here—which diagnosis applies will depend on how we fill in the details.

One possibility is that the pride felt in these cases is more indirect than it may initially seem. It may not be my friend's poetry per se that I value, but rather the achievement of public speaking or her creativity in crafting the work. This seems to get the phenomenology right: if I really do regard the poetry as pretentious bunk, then I'm surely not proud of her for that. Speaking more generally, achievements and creativity—like intelligence or humor—reflect personal excellences that may or may not be put to (what we ourselves judge to be) good use. Given this, one can value these qualities while also disvaluing the purposes to which they are being put. I can value creativity even if I don't value poetry. And one can value humor even if one doesn't value racism.

Another possibility is borne of the observation that many things that we value we do so only conditionally. Consider our prejudiced joker; his mother may only value humor on the condition that it isn't prejudiced, whereas his father may value humor unconditionally. This could explain why one feels pride but the other doesn't. On this construal, the boy isn't manifesting a quality that his mother values at all, for she does not value racist humor.

E. Pride and Personal Dynamics

Certain kinds of relationship dynamics may appear to preclude pride in ways that IA can't quite accommodate. Consider the following: many people are (at least somewhat) invested in their former academic advisor; an advisor may inform one's sense of academic identity, and one may be very much inclined to assist them in whatever ways they can. Nonetheless, some may find it odd to declare oneself proud of the advisor's accomplishments.[89]

89. I thank an anonymous referee for this challenge, which was also raised to me in different formats by Paolo Santorio and Thomas Sinclair during Q&As. I say that "some" people may find it odd to declare oneself proud of an advisor's accomplishments; I personally don't find it odd, and my experience suggests that people differ on this score.

As we've seen (recall Abe's case), the source of these intuitive oddities isn't always immediately clear: is such pride really not attributable, or is it simply unfitting? Or is there perhaps something else going on? Let's begin with the hypothesis that the oddity concerns fittingness. Of course, such pride wouldn't be unfitting given IA. But proponents of RA would disagree, for one isn't plausibly responsible for their advisor's previous accomplishments. And as we've seen, these intuitions about an (exercise of) agency requirement can be fairly stubborn. Indeed, I think it is precisely that stubbornness that holds the key to understanding what is odd about feeling pride for one's advisor (for those who find it so odd): the oddness lies not in feeling it but in expressing it.

It helps to recall that RA has attracted a slew of supporters; there arguably is a strong association between pride and the exercise of agency, even if (as I have argued) there is more to pride than that. Given this, it isn't hard to see why declaring oneself proud of one's supervisor might risk implying that one is somehow partly responsible for their accomplishments. And this, of course, seems odd in the context of a relationship where the opposite tends to be the case.

We can substantiate this diagnosis by observing that prototypical cases of pride tend to go in a particular direction as far as relationship dynamics are concerned; parents are proud of their children, coaches of their athletes, advisors of their advisees. Unsurprisingly, the pattern of guidance here also tends to go in a particular direction; advisors guide their advisees more than advisees do their advisors. Since these are the scenarios that we're used to dealing with, we should expect cases that involve the opposite pattern to raise an intuitive eyebrow, even if they're ultimately intelligible.

VII. CONCLUSION

Many accounts of pride struggle to account for pride that is directed toward others. IA improves on its predecessors in this respect—and this seems to be chiefly due to how it proposes to fill in the Positionality relation. If IA has things right, then the special relation that Positionality demands is a relation of investment. As it turns out, then, supporters of BA and NIA were right to think that we need to forge some sort of connection between this relation and valuing. Their mistake was to think that we must value the relation itself. Instead, the relation is ultimately explained by valuing; it is because we care about particular people—ourselves, our loved ones, the groups with which we identify—that we invest in them.

These accounts also seem to conceive of Positionality in a manner that is a little too self-focused. BA's supporters argue that one must view one's own worth as having been enhanced by this relation. For NIA's supporters, the relation must be seen as providing evidence that one's

own life reflects one's personal ideals. As we have seen, this inward focus prevents such accounts from making sense of a great deal of the pride that we direct toward others. But for all talk of it being a reflexive, self-regarding or self-conscious emotion, pride isn't all about us—at least not always.