



Deposited via The University of Sheffield.

White Rose Research Online URL for this paper:

<https://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/id/eprint/208986/>

Version: Accepted Version

Book Section:

Webb, D. (2024) Hope and the Utopian Impulse. In: Snow, N.E., (ed.) The Virtue of Hope. Oxford University Press. ISBN: 9780190069575.

Darren Webb, Hope and the Utopian Impulse, The Virtue of Hope edited by Nancy E. Snow, 2024, reproduced by permission of Oxford University Press
<https://global.oup.com/academic/product/the-virtue-of-hope-9780190069575>

Reuse

Items deposited in White Rose Research Online are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved unless indicated otherwise. They may be downloaded and/or printed for private study, or other acts as permitted by national copyright laws. The publisher or other rights holders may allow further reproduction and re-use of the full text version. This is indicated by the licence information on the White Rose Research Online record for the item.

Takedown

If you consider content in White Rose Research Online to be in breach of UK law, please notify us by emailing eprints@whiterose.ac.uk including the URL of the record and the reason for the withdrawal request.

Chapter 9 Hope and the Utopian Impulse

Darren Webb

Abstract:

This chapter presents a framework for understanding both hope as a differentiated human experience and the relationship between hope and utopia(nism). Offering a rigorous analysis and synthesis of literature from across various disciplines (including philosophy, theology, psychology, sociology, political studies, and the health sciences), a taxonomy of modes of hoping is developed. While “hope” and “utopia” are often said to go hand in hand—utopias offering visions of hope, hope driving the utopian impulse—the chapter argues that hope is a complex category of human experience that is not always or necessarily aligned with a utopian sensibility. Put simply, different modes of hoping possess different utopian orientations. The chapter concludes with a case study of Occupy Wall Street (OWS) in order to illustrate the utility of the modes of hoping framework as an analytical tool.

9.1 Introduction

There is a strong conceptual link between utopianism and hope...[I]t is clearly impossible to be a committed utopian without some sense of hope. (Bell 2017, 8)

It is often taken for granted that an intrinsic, positive relationship exists between “utopia” and “hope.” They nurture and feed off each other, hope driving the utopian impulse, utopianism inspiring hope. Utopianism has been described as “a vocabulary of hope” (Halpin 2003, 44) and “a form of hope” (Cates 2015, 25). It is commonplace to refer to utopian texts as “visions” of hope (McKenna 2001, 1). Craig Hammond (2017, 6) argues that hope is always already imbued with utopian potential, while Henri Desroche (1979, 23) describes the two as “twin sisters.” David Pinder (2005, vii) suggests that rekindling the utopian imagination is necessary in order “to sustain a sense of hope” amid increasingly hopeless conditions. Indeed, utopianism has been heralded as a means of recapturing the category of hope for critical social theory (Anderson 2006; Browne 2005). For Tom Moylan (2000, 157), “radical hope” operates as “the correlate sociopolitical position” of the utopian genre, and utopian ideas are seen as essential for the cultivation of new “movements of hope” (Fournier 2002).

What I want to do here is dig beneath these surface-level associations. The chapter argues that hope is a complex category of human experience that is not an unmitigated good and is not always or necessarily aligned with a utopian sensibility.¹ In its broadest sense—in the sense that we need to distinguish it from belief, desire, expectation, wish, optimism, faith, etc.—hope can be understood as a positive orientation, open to disappointment, toward an uncertain and (ordinarily) future good. However, the objective of hope (that toward which hope is directed) and the characteristics of its positive orientation (its associated emotional, cognitive and behavioral dimensions) can vary in significant ways. The mode in which hope is experienced at any particular time, in any particular culture, within any particular group, is the result of a complex process of social mediation. What this means is that different

¹ While agreeing with Potkay’s general argument, expressed masterfully in his sweeping survey (this volume), that hope is not necessarily a virtue or a good, I find something amiss in his suggestion that “the satiric aspect of utopian fiction from More to Huxley” is “underwritten” by a sense that “hope is morally corrosive.” The operation of hope within utopian (and dystopian) fiction is complex and fraught and refuses such a simple characterization. For my own reading of how hope plays out in tense and uneasy ways in More’s *Utopia*, see Webb (2008).

individuals and social classes, at different historical junctures, embedded in different social relations, enjoying different opportunities and facing different constraints, will experience hope in different ways. Hope is not a singular undifferentiated experience but a socially mediated human capacity—“an ambivalent capacity” not in and of itself “virtuous” (Swenson-Lengyel, this volume)—experienced with varying affective-cognitive-behavioral dimensions.

The concept of utopia carries with it still some pejorative connotations. Rather than referring to a rigid blueprint that suppresses difference and seeks to impose coercive order on the diversity of human life, utopia here denotes both a mode of immanent praxis and a collectively elaborated guiding vision, each reinforcing the other in an iterative pedagogical process. The term “utopian *impulse*” is neither teleological nor essentialist. I am not implying that a utopian impulse is a “transhistorical anthropological constant” (Papastephanou 2009, 43) or “a defining, constitutive feature of humanity” (Bauman 2003, 11), nor am I presenting this impulse in terms of some inchoate future calling to the present (Bloch 1995). Rather, I suggest that in and through the process of social life (the process of creating and sustaining families, friendships, communities, commitments, and forms of cooperation), imaginary landscapes take shape. These landscapes comprise complex, fluid, and often contradictory patterns of desires, needs, fears, hostilities, dreams, ethical norms, symbolic meanings, etc., and the landscapes emerge through a collective process of engagement, struggle, contestation, and shared learning. The utopian impulse—we might also call it the utopian *moment*, the utopian *shift*, the change in momentum implied by the word “impulse”—arises when utopian desire and a utopian horizon are located and *felt* within these imaginary landscapes. I emphasize the affective dimension because we might describe the utopian impulse as “the discovery of a new structure of feeling” (Williams 1991, 266), a structure of feeling that emerges when the imaginary landscapes born of the processes and struggles of social life point to the reconstitution of the *totality* of material conditions giving rise to experiences of alienation, exploitation, degradation, minoritization and oppression.

If the utopian impulse is best understood as a social process, then one can talk about the ways in which different modes of hoping help nurture, support, constrain or negate such a process. Different modes of hoping possess different utopian orientations. Here I part company a little with Ernst Bloch, the German Marxist philosopher whose work underpins much of the field of utopian studies. Although Bloch (1995) recognized hope as a highly differentiated human experience, he also maintained that “every hope implies the highest good” (108) and constitutes a “cipher” or “attempted signature” (1352) of the Absolute All. For Bloch (1995, 112), even the weakest hope outstrips its mundane limited content and “essentially refers” to the Authentic. While arguing that the *content* of hope is historically and ideologically constructed, Bloch never let go of the association between the *experience* of hope and utopia. In what follows, I develop a taxonomy of modes of hoping and offer some thoughts on their utopian orientation. Contra Bloch, I suggest that we can talk quite seriously about *anti-utopian hope*—about modes of hoping that negate “the utopian impulse”—just as much as we can talk about utopia and hope as twin sisters.² Arguing that hope in its transformative mode most clearly aligns with the utopian impulse, I conclude with a brief

² The significance of Bloch’s work to the field of utopian studies cannot be overstated. Indeed, his three-volume epic *The Principle of Hope* can be considered constitutive of the field itself. For Terry Eagleton, however, Bloch is treated too uncritically by scholars. Eagleton (2015) is right to point out that “[n]ot all hope is a foretaste of utopia” (103) and that Bloch was “too eager to assume that almost every historical phenomenon . . . can be milked for its emancipatory value” (94). Eagleton’s own critique, however, lacks a certain generosity of spirit, both with regard to Bloch himself and to the work of utopian scholars. Jack Zipes (2019, 177) goes as far as to describe Eagleton as a “mud-slinger . . . whose shallow mind reflects a good deal of his knowledge about philosophy, politics, and hope,” and despairs of “his nasty drivel to discredit Bloch and his philosophy of hope.”

excursus on Occupy Wall Street to illustrate how pedagogical intervention is required in order to mobilize transformative hope.

Before exploring each mode of hoping in its specificity, it is important to differentiate at an overarching level between “open-ended” and “goal-directed” hope, between modes of hoping lacking a determinate objective and modes of hoping directed toward a concrete specific goal (akin to the distinction made by Gulliford, this volume, between *hoping-in* and *hoping-that*). Regarding the latter, the proper objective of hope is commonly taken to be a desire that is both significant to the hoper and future-oriented (Waterworth 2004, 5–6).³ What, however, does it mean to hope for such? Here I differentiate three modes of goal-directed hope: “sound,” “resolute” and “transformative.” Regarding the former, the experience of open-ended hope is underpinned by a sense that we as human beings are wayfarers who remain as yet undefined, have within us what we could become, and are traveling the path to ourselves (Dauenhauer 1986; Marcel 1962). Hope is the human attribute which simultaneously reconciles us to our ontological status as a traveler and propels us along the path to ourselves. In broad terms, it is characterized by “an openness of spirit with respect to the future” and offers “an intangible umbrella that protects hoping persons by casting a positive glow on life” (Godfrey 1987, 64; Dufault and Martocchio 1985, 380). There is a profound difference, however—in terms of the way in which this openness of spirit and positive glow are experienced—between what I term “patient” and “critical” hope. While acknowledging from the outset that the taxonomy offered here is an artifice that cannot possibly capture hope in all its complexity, I do regard it useful as an analytical frame.

9.2 Patient Hope

Patient hope is directed toward an objective which lies “beyond our capacity to grasp” (Boscaljon 2015, xv). It is a hope devoid of images. This hope may be characterized as an openness of spirit with respect to the outcome of the ontological journey (Godfrey 1987, 144; Schumacher 2003, 36), or it may be characterized as an openness of spirit with respect to the journey itself, i.e., the general conviction that being en route makes sense and has meaning (Dauenhauer 1986; Havel 1990; Mittleman 2009). Either way, Gabriel Marcel—the French philosopher and dramatist regarded by some as having offered “possibly the most important exploration of hope” (Grady 1970, 56)—captures one of the defining features of this mode of hoping when he states that the nature of its objective “transcends imagination” and “every kind of representation,” so that in hoping “I do not allow myself to imagine what I hope for” (Marcel 1962, 45–46).⁴ To imaginatively represent to oneself the objective of one’s hope implies an illusion open to disappointment. To refuse this temptation is to embrace, in true openness of spirit, the meaningfulness of one’s status as *homo viator*. For Marcel, therefore, hope refuses to lay down any conditions, makes no claims on the future and insists on nothing.

The positive glow cast by hope has three dimensions: it is underpinned by a basic trust in ourselves, others, life and the underlying goodness of the world (Mittleman 2009; Sacks 2000; Schumacher 2003); it affords a feeling of safety and security of and in one’s being (Kast 1994; Marcel 1962); and it instills a patient calm. Precisely because of the security afforded by its positive glow, hope allows one to relax and to let life take its course,

³ In everyday usage, it is true, we often use the word “hope” to refer to objectives about which we could scarcely care less (I hope dinner arrives soon). These mundane uses of hope are probably best characterized as want (Quinn 1976, 61–62). Similarly, while “hope” can be used to refer to retrospective objectives (I hope you had a good journey), such cases are better understood as instances of wishing (Gravlee 2000, 469). And while there are cases (in palliative care, for example) in which hope takes the form of “hope for the present” (Callina, Snow and Murray 2018), hope is ordinarily directed toward an objective that is future-oriented.

⁴ Adrienne Martin thus terms this mode of hoping “unimaginable hope” (Martin 2014, 100).

providing the hoping human with the “freedom to let events unfold in their own time” (Kast 1994, 146). For Marcel hope represents a “positive non-acceptance” of life’s trials and tragedies, a non-acceptance which is to be distinguished from revolt because its characteristics are silence, modesty, timidity, humility, patience, relaxation, and security (Marcel 1962, 38). It is hope in this patient mode that sustained Plenty Coups amid the collapse of Crow culture, enabling him to stand firm and endure disaster guided by a hope directed toward “a goodness in the world that transcends one’s ability to grasp what it is” (Lear 2009, 100).

As one might expect, patience is the key behavioral dimension of this mode of hoping. To hope is to appeal to the existence of a certain creative power in the world, and while it is hope’s “mission” to respond to conditions of adversity, the response requires no “sense of effort” on the part of the hoper (Marcel 1962, 31, 36). In seeking delivery from present darkness, “hope is not interested in the how” and is not searching for a concrete solution to life’s trials, for the “technical question” of ends and means is alien to the character of hope (Marcel 1962, 51–52). To hope is to be patient, “to take one’s time,” to trust in the underlying goodness of the world and to rest assured that a solution to life’s trials just will be found (Marcel 1962, 39). In contrast to the impatient desire for gratification, hoping in this mode demands steadfast patience and fortitude (Boscaljon 2015, xiii). For Lear (2009, 92–94, 100–103), Plenty Coups’ hope was *radical* by virtue of the sheer commitment needed to survive the destruction of a way of life by holding onto the hope that something good will emerge even if this outstrips our current capacity to understand it.⁵

Bernard Dauenhauer (1986) presents the case for secular patient hope. For Dauenhauer, to be human is to be essentially and radically, always and necessarily, *en route*. Rejecting the notion of a human telos, he argues that hope is directed primarily toward other human beings and is characterized by an expectation concerning their efficacious agency. What the hoper looks for in the agency of others is not the realization of a determinate goal, for hope transcends all such goals and the outcome of human action is always indeterminate. Rather, the hoper expectantly awaits transformations in her relationships with other humans and the non-human world, these transformations being valued for their own intrinsic worth. To hope is thus to ascribe intrinsic value to one’s enroute-ness, to place one’s trust in the efficacy of human agents while accepting its contingent indeterminacy, and to possess the conviction that whatever journey we are taken on by ourselves, via others, will be of positive worth. Emphasizing the similarities between his own reading of hope and what he regards as the Old Testament understanding, Dauenhauer (1984, 456) argues that hope is associated with quietness, “standing firm” and “waiting for.” As such, for Dauenhauer (2005, 87), as for Marcel, “hope demands patience.”

Patient hope possesses an anti-utopian functionality. However one conceives it—as system, process, or orientation—utopia is a distinctly imaginative-desiderative phenomenon. Imagination and desire are constitutive of any understanding of utopia. One of the defining features of patient hope, however, is precisely the way in which it “transcends imagination” and “transcends desire.” For Marcel (1967, 278), “Hope is of a different order from desire.” They are qualitatively different orders of experience. It is instructive here to look at Ruth Levitas’ (1990, 8) definition of utopia as “the expression of the desire for a better way of being.” This is possibly the most-quoted and most widely adopted definition of utopia there is, and yet Marcel would have dismissed it as an oxymoron. He would have argued that “a better way of being,” *qua* the objective of hope, transcends desire and cannot find “expression” in its terms. As the activity of the covetous “I” impatiently seeking satisfaction

⁵ Nancy Snow (2019, 11) refers to the hope described by Marcel and Lear as receptivity theories in that “hoping involves forms of receptivity, such as patience, waiting, and openness.”

and fulfillment, desire belongs solely to “the domain of having.” Only hope—the hope of the patient “we” who have abandoned ourselves in unconditional confidence to the mystery of Being, thus entering into loving communion with an Other in whom we trust—only absolute hope of this kind is capable of expressing humanity’s ontological journey toward a better way of being.

Similarly, when Levitas (1990, 199-200) talks of the need for utopias to carry hope as well as express desire if any change at all is to be effected, Marcel would have argued that this was impossible. As phenomena rooted firmly in the impatient imagination—and precisely because they *are* expressions of desire—utopias at best would have been deemed capable of carrying what he scathingly refers to as a “miserable substitute” or “the toxic succedaneum” of authentic hope (Marcel 1962, 56). Rather than grounding and driving utopianism, hope in its patient mode refuses, resists, and negates the utopian impulse. Utopia in both its prescriptive and heuristic forms liberates the imagination and opens a space in which the existing order of things is criticized and challenged. Patient hope, however, transcends the imagination and opens up a space within which the existing order of things is domesticated. Marcel argues that hope cannot ground a movement for social transformation and that it is an illusion to think that readjusting the material, social and institutional conditions of life can alleviate human suffering: “There can be no question here of my attempting to define anything resembling a political line of action. What we have to deal with is rather an inner attitude” (Marcel 1978, 244). Individuals are confronted with a choice; one either welcomes or rejects the gift of hope. To welcome and embrace this gift is to orient oneself toward the world in a spirit of humble, courageous, trusting patience. For Marcel, to hope is not to transform the world itself (either imaginatively or materially) but is rather to transform one’s “inner attitude” toward it.⁶

9.3 Critical Hope

Like patient hope, critical hope is characterized by an openness of spirit with respect to the future. For Protestant theologian Jürgen Moltmann (1970), who came to prominence in the 1960s as one of the leading figures in the “political theology” movement (and whose *Theology of Hope* has been read as a theological parallel to Bloch’s *Principle of Hope*), the proper objective of hope is a new heaven and new earth, a future which is radically new and unpredictable. For Ernst Bloch (1995, 1375), the objective of hope is the *Novum Ultimum*, the Absolute and Authentic human All, the nature of which is “still utterly opaque” and “remains still concealed.” For each, however, the openness of spirit that characterizes hope does not imply that one can say nothing about its objective. Moltmann argues that in the resurrection of Christ one finds God’s promise to humanity that oppression, humiliation and degradation will be overcome. To hope in Christ is thus to demand this. For his part Bloch argues that hope, the human longing born of the No to deprivation and the experience of unfulfillment, is necessarily directed toward a world without degradation, suffering and

⁶ The conservative anti-utopian thrust of patient hope comes through clearly in Charles Péguy’s epic theological poem, *The Portal of the Mystery of Hope*. Péguy (1996) presents hope as the mysterious virtue that enables humanity to endure a life of endless repetition, a seemingly futile procession of trials and disappointments. Its effect is to soothe and console suffering creatures, on whom bad days fall like persistent slanting autumn rain. A key theme of the poem is that Christian hope *demand*s that the trials of life be endured with patient, quiet serenity. To confront life with anxiety, restlessness, disquiet, and protest is to betray hope. Developing this theme, Glenn Tinder (2001) argues that the defining characteristic of hope is “situational obedience.” In submitting through hope to the mysterious creativity of God, we submit also to the harsh demands of the situation in which we find ourselves. The behavioral imperative of hope thus becomes: “To attend to the personal and historical circumstances surrounding us, without trying to see where they are ultimately carrying us, and to do whatever these circumstances require and to acquiesce in whatever sufferings they involve” (Tinder 2001, 89).

anxiety. For both, humans can grasp the future, not in positive terms but as “the negation of the negative” (Moltmann 1970, 114).

Hope’s positive glow offers here no comforting refuge but rather stimulates a restless protest against present suffering. In the cognitive-affective domain, the experience of hope is captured by the phrase “something’s missing.” For Moltmann (1967, 19), hope as an emotional experience is grounded in “the contradiction between the word of promise and the experiential reality of suffering and death.” If the resurrection of Christ promised the negation of suffering, then “[t]hose who hope in Christ can no longer put up with reality as it is, but begin to suffer under it, to contradict it” (Moltmann 1967, 21). As the promise of a future which is not-yet, the objective of hope stimulates in the affective domain a “passionate suffering and passionate longing” which manifests in the behavioral domain as “the criticism of present misery” (Moltmann 1967, 16; 1970, 114–115). For Bloch, hope is experienced as a restless, future-oriented longing for that which is missing. This emotion takes on a cognitive dimension when it is consciously known and recognized as the feeling that draws us on into what is better. In the behavioral domain, conscious-known hope is always critical of that which exists precisely because it comprehends itself as an interior force pushing the hoper toward the not yet discovered and as yet concealed Absolute All. The hoper has no clear idea of what this Absolute All might be, but experiences its lack and its forward pull as the compulsion to critically negate the negative.⁷

Moltmann (1967, 21) tells us that the experience of hope as the protest against lack “stabs inexorably into the flesh of every unfulfilled present.” While for Marcel, a restless, critical conflict with the world would be regarded as a sin against hope, these are the defining features of critical hope. To take a literary example, in George Orwell’s *Nineteen Eighty-Four* Winston Smith is animated by critical hope. His hope is directed toward “the place where there is no darkness” and Winston is stimulated by the pull of this future promised by O’Brien in his dreams. “The place where there is no darkness was the imagined future, which one could never see, but which, by fore-knowledge, one could mystically share in” (Orwell 1949, 107). In the affective domain, what this meant for Winston was that “always in your stomach and in your skin there was a sort of protest, a feeling that you had been cheated of something that you had a right to” (Orwell 1949, 63). This sense that something’s missing, felt in the stomach and the skin as the hoper responds to the pull of a mystical future, stimulates critical protest against the way things are.

Lia Haro (2010) offers an excellent case study of the critical hope underpinning the politics of the Zapatistas. Born of the No to subjugation and suffering, and taking shape in and through the darkness of powerlessness, humiliation, and death, the hope of the Zapatistas expresses a restless, stabbing, agitated rejection of the totality of structures of oppression. The objective of hope assumes no specific utopian content but is rather “something not-yet known, not-yet imaginable within the limits and terms of current horizons,” but nonetheless already inscribed “ahead, in the next step we are going to take” (Haro 2010, 194, 203). While the patient hoper may take refuge in the mysterious unimaginedness of hope’s objective, the Zapatistas restlessly throw themselves deeper into the present world and create “alternative horizons of possibility” through living together in a critical, restless spirit of “Basta!” (Haro 2010, 199).

⁷ In an interesting move, Rochelle Green (2019, 113) draws on both Marcel and Bloch to develop “a hybrid theory of political hope” relevant for contemporary feminist praxis. I am not entirely convinced by the usefulness of Marcel in this regard (Green acknowledges herself that he was no feminist) and rather read Green’s notion of hope as an example of the critical hope presented here. For Green, hope is political praxis “geared toward the alleviation of oppression without necessarily knowing what society would look like post-oppression” (Green 2019, 120).

Critical hope possesses a complex utopian functionality. Moltmann makes it clear that while hope demands a passionate critical engagement with the present, it must avoid becoming fixed on a dogmatic prescription of the positive awaiting humanity. Indeed, he discusses utopianism under the rubric of the sin of presumption, both the presumptuous anticipation of the form to be taken by God's promised freedom and the self-willed praxis which attempts to fulfill this promise within history (Moltmann 1967, 1996). One must be careful here, however, to specify the character of the utopianism being rejected by Moltmann. Philip Wegner argues that utopia performs two pedagogical operations—deterritorialization, or the critical dismantling of existent social norms and institutions, and reterritorialization, or the production of new forms and institutions through the education of desire (Wegner 2002, 17-25). For Moltmann, hope possesses a deterritorializing utopian function but resists the urge to reterritorialize.⁸ To live in the light of hope is to critically engage with the suffering of the present while remaining “open for the coming kingdom” (Moltmann 1975, 188). It is, in fact, to be doubly critical—critical of the unfulfilled present but critical also of any movements of presumption which strive to anticipate and realize the fulfillment promised by and only realizable through God.

Critical hope thus rejects the present in light of a future *novum* which refuses positive representation. This can be seen clearly in Haro's analysis of the hope of the Zapatistas. And this is precisely what utopian scholars find most attractive about Bloch: his provocative use of the *novum ultimum* as “a trope for that which is never fully attained,” his conceptualization of humanity as a process forever open to the future, and his insistence that to settle for any goal along the way is “to pause fatally on the path to a homeland which still lies ahead” (Moylan 1997, 117). Bloch, of course, fell foul of his own proscriptions against foreclosing the future, but Moylan (1997) is right to emphasize the need for will-full utopians with long-range visions to engage in critiques of their own praxis in order to avoid hypostatization. However, the danger here is that utopian projects carried by an open-ended hope might never offer anything *more* than a No! to deprivation and “the criticism of present misery” (Moltmann 1970, 114-115). I have argued this point many times before (Webb 2009, 2013, 2016, 2017) but, as David Harvey rightly emphasizes, utopia shorn of vision and goal—the deterritorializing utopia carried by open-ended critical hope—remains “a pure signifier of hope destined never to acquire a material referent,” an infinitely circulating self-referential process that has “the habit of getting lost in the romanticism of endlessly open projects” (Harvey 2000, 189, 174). I develop this point further in the concluding section.

9.4 Sound Hope

The analytic philosopher John Patrick Day famously told us that “a hope is identical with a desire plus a probability estimate,” where “A desires in some degree that Q, and A believes that the probability of Q is $>0<1$ ” (Day 1969, 89; 1991, 37). This root understanding of hope has formed the basis of much discussion within analytical philosophy. An extensive literature

⁸ Stewart Sutherland suggests that Christian hope stands at odds with “descriptively full” normative systems but shares much in common with “the idea of a changing progressive and processive developing utopia” (Sutherland 1989, 204). In similar fashion I suggest here that critical hope is consistent with an understanding of utopia as an open-ended process of becoming. There is little in, say, Erin McKenna's *The Task of Utopia* (McKenna 2001) that Moltmann would consider alien to the task of political theology. What McKenna understands by utopia—a future-oriented critical thinking which refuses to focus on a static final goal but rather emphasizes the process of seeking meaning—is pretty much what Moltmann has in mind when he talks of the activity of hope. This understanding of utopia as an unsettling process of critical exploration has become the dominant understanding within the field of utopian studies. Moltmann would have little issue with utopian activist-scholars who tell us that “we look to utopia not as a place we might reach but as an ongoing process of becoming” characterized by “a critical attitude towards the present and a political commitment to experiment in transfiguring the coordinates of our historical moment” (Coté, Day and de Peuter 2008, 13).

highlights the dangers associated with “false hope,” an overconfident probability estimate akin to wishful thinking and liable to lead to frustration, disappointment, and despair (Polivy and Herman 2000). In the “hope = desire + probability estimate” model, false hope is likely to develop when the fervor of the desiderative aspect serves to raise the subjective probability estimate beyond that which is warranted by the available evidence (Averill, Catlin, and Chon 1990, 96; Bovens 1999, 678). Macquarrie (1978, 15) refers to this as “the pathology of hope,” in which hope runs riot and loses its grip on reality. Sound hope, on the other hand, requires a careful study of the evidence and an accurate calculation of the likelihood of one’s hoped-for objective coming to pass (Godfrey 1987, 30). Precisely in order to avoid the dangers associated with false hope, Bovens (1999, 678) argues that the strength of the hoper’s beliefs “should be determined by the available evidence.” Sound hope can thus be characterized as a hope directed toward a significant future good involving a probability calculation which, in order to prevent the hoper losing their grip on reality, is based on a careful study of the evidence.

In terms of its associated behavioral response, some argue that sound hope helps counteract risk aversion. Bovens (1999, 672) in particular emphasizes that “the value of hope is that it makes us focus on the possible gains in more than fair gambles.” He also claims that “fear is an antidote to the risk proneness that makes us all too eager to take up less than fair gambles” (Bovens 1999, 672). Sound hope is thus a highly regulated counter to risk aversion. The careful survey of the evidence characteristic of sound hope leads the hoper to identify which gambles are worth taking and which are not. One may hope for the entire set {significant future good the estimated probability of which is $>0 < 1$ } but only a particular subset {more than fair gambles} prompts a behavioral response. The relationship between sound hope and action is thus uncertain and contingent. Some hopes would be considered less than fair gambles and not worth actively pursuing, while those considered more than fair gambles may prompt goal pursuit.

This resonates with the notions of “complex” and “robust” hope that are popular within educational discourse (Arthur and Sawyer 2009; Halpin 2003, 2007; Sawyer *et al.* 2007; Singh 2007). The key characteristics here are that the objective of hope is realistic, is grounded in a sound assessment of the evidence, recognizes the obstacles confronting its realization, and is vulnerable to evidence that counts against it. Objectives that are overly ambitious are dismissed as less than fair gambles. While inspiring hope is presented as the educator’s duty, it is also their responsibility to avoid the kind of hope variously derided as fanciful, naive, unrealistic, and “hokey” (Duncan-Andrade 2009). Even when confronting ecological catastrophe, “our hopes related to planetary health must be generated in the context of what is realistically possible” (Kretz 2019, 163-164). The kind of “sound” hope that educators are called on to embrace and nurture is one that offers no illusions and is grounded in a realistic grasp of structural constraints (Carlson 2005). Hope here has a “steady” role, resisting optimism and presumption while avoiding pessimism and despair (see Michael Lamb’s chapter, this volume). As Aronson (1999, 489) describes it, sound hope has “a lofty sense of possibility” tempered by “a gritty sense of limits.”

Given that sound hope is grounded in a sense of realistic possibility, on the basis of a careful study of “the way things are,” such hopes are unlikely to be transformative. Precisely because such hopes are tapered to reality, subsequent goal pursuit will tend to reproduce this reality rather than transform it (Waterworth 2004, 81). Indeed, Bovens (1999, 674) notes that “it is notoriously difficult to make sense of utopian hopes” because, quite simply, from the perspective of the sound hoper, they make no sense. Having said this, in a recent discussion of the modes of hoping framework Julia Cook (2018, 384) suggests that sound hope may “orient individuals toward utopian forms of thinking by forming the preconditions under which they may occur.” In fact, consistent with this, the educationalists who rally round the

notions of “complex” and “robust” hope do indeed make utopian claims on behalf of their ideas.

I have argued elsewhere, however, that sound hope tames and tempers the utopian impulse, recuperating its radicality in the name of utopian realism (Webb 2009, 2016). Within both the “complex” and “robust” hope projects, a concerted effort is made to redefine the utopian. Utopia is no longer a vision of an alternative state or society but is rather “a vision of utopia which has the possibility of achievement in present socio-economic conditions” (Sawyer et al. 2007, 228). This ideological recuperation of utopia is troubling because its effect is to delimit the range of the possible—the possibilities offered by hope are limited to what, given a sound assessment of the evidence, can reasonably be achieved within existing parameters—and to suppress the critical and transformative modes of hoping that can genuinely be associated with the utopian. As Levitas (2013, 127) rightly notes: “Some overtly positive discussions of utopia privilege particular models of the real and place severe limits on utopia’s alterity that are anti-utopian in effect.”⁹

9.5 Resolute Hope

It is sometimes argued that hope is best understood as hope against the evidence. Presenting the case for such an understanding, Philip Pettit (2004, 159) suggests that “[t]o have hope is to have something we might describe as cognitive resolve.” Given that humans are emotional creatures subject to anxiety, grief, and despondency in the face of brute fact, forming strategies on the basis of evidence-based calculations of “how things are” would often lead us to “collapse in a heap of despair and uncertainty, beaten down by cascades of inimical fact” (Pettit 2004, 160). Hope is precisely that quality which enables human beings to galvanize their cognitions in a way that overcomes the burden of evidence. In many substantial cases, to hope for/that *p* is to desire *p* and to possess the cognitive resolve that enables one to set aside one’s evidence-based belief in the probability of attaining *p* and to organize one’s feelings and actions on the assumption that *p* is attainable. For Adrienne Martin (2014), hope in its fullest sense (hoping against hope) will see the hoper assign a justificatory rationale for engaging in goal pursuit *however small the outcome’s probability* simply because their attachment to the outcome permits it. This mode of hoping is referred to here as “resolute hope.”

The most fully developed model of resolute hope is that offered by psychologist Rick Snyder (see Gulliford’s chapter in this volume for the wider context of Snyder’s hope theory). He defines hope as “goal-directed thinking, in which people appraise their capability to produce workable routes to goals (pathways thinking), along with their potential to initiate and sustain movement via a pathway (agency thinking)” (Snyder 1989, 143). Snyder spends very little time discussing the desiderative-calculative aspects of hope that so occupy analytical philosophers. That the hoper has a desire for some future object that she sees as good but deems difficult is taken for granted as the necessary starting point for hope. It is a

⁹ How one perceives “possibility” is crucial here. When Halpin argues that sound hope deals with “what is possible on the basis of what is perceived to be realizable” (Halpin 2003, 60), the question is: “perceived” by whom? Mannheim long ago made the distinction between “relative” utopias (conceptions unrealizable within the existing order) and “absolute” utopias (conceptions unrealizable within any given order). He also argued that the ruling elites will always strive to designate as “unreal” (and thus absolutely utopian) those ideas that cannot be realized within existing social and political parameters (Mannheim 1940, 175–177). There is a sense in which the sound hoper dismisses as “unrealizable” and absolutely utopian any conceptions that lie outside the social and political parameters of advanced capitalism. There is thus a whole range of alternative systemic possibilities that are precluded from consideration. As Rousseau once noted, “the bounds of possibility are less narrow than we imagine” (Rousseau 1993, 261). The sound hoper “asks too few questions about the world as it is, as it might or as it should be,” such that “anything more demanding than piecemeal engineering belongs automatically to the sphere of obsolete and dangerous revolutionary aspirations” (Papastephanou 2009, xiv, 81).

given rather than the subject of philosophical inquiry. Snyder's reading of hope also downplays its relation to objective conditions and foregrounds the self-referential belief of the hoper. To hope is to perceive oneself as capable of producing plausible routes to one's desired goals and to perceive oneself as capable of achieving one's goals by moving along the identified pathways (Snyder 2000).

Of particular interest is Snyder's emphasis on the way in which hope manifests as action. If to hope is to perceive oneself as capable of deriving pathways to desired goals, and to motivate oneself via agency thinking to use those pathways, then those who are hopeful will tend to be more energetic, outgoing, determined, and less risk-averse than those who are not (Snyder 2002). *Ceteris paribus*, those who are hopeful will be more likely to attain their desired objectives than those who are not. We are moving far away here from the conception of hope as "a desire plus a probability estimate." The activity of hope moves beyond the affective-cognitive domain and inhabits the domain of behavior. There is no uncertainty or contingency regarding the relationship between resolute hope and human action. To hope resolutely is to be a dogged anti-determinist. To hope in this mode is to assume that one has the freedom to initiate events on the basis of goals that one sets oneself, and to assume that the world is fluid, plastic, and capable of being moulded by one's agency as it moves along the pathways one has identified.

Resolute hope is a self-efficacious private hope. When Pettit talks of cognitive resolve, he thinks primarily in terms of the individual hoping resolutely in the face of personal adversity, while Snyder focuses on the kind of hopeful thinking that enables individuals to attain academic, sporting, and occupational goals. The behavioral activities associated with such a mode of hoping can be personally transformative—cognitive resolve may enable the hoper to act in spite of the evidence and overcome adversity, while effective pathways and agency thinking may enable the hoper, against all odds, to achieve excellent academic grades. In broader social terms, however, this mode of hoping helps sustain and nourish the existing order of things. It is well noted that social cohesion requires that individuals within society possess hope. Capitalism requires that individuals study, sell their labor power, consume, save, and invest (Braithwaite 2004; Hage 2002). It therefore requires that individuals possess both future-oriented significant desires and a perception that these can be attained. The sense that one's hopes are being thwarted or are unachievable generates frustration, disillusionment, and despair. Conversely, the perception that one can attain one's objectives, even in spite of the evidence, if one engages in determined goal pursuit premised on effective pathways and agency thinking, is a source of social stability.¹⁰

It could be argued that the pragmatic account of hope offered by Patrick Shade (2001, 2006) addresses the privatized individualism found within Snyder's hope theory. Shade emphasizes the importance of nurturing "habits of hope" (resourcefulness, courage and persistence) that he regards as operating in much the same way as Snyder's pathways and agency thinking. Shade's account, however, is framed from the outset by a sensitivity to the wider social issues that impinge on people's life chances.¹¹ Even here, though, Shade is concerned primarily with nurturing habits of hope within individuals in order that they can

¹⁰ This is an important point. There is a temptation sometimes to see hope as a radical or subversive force when, in fact, "capitalism thrives on hope" (Braithwaite 2004, 84) and "the powerful people in a society have strong interests in fostering hope and its consequent effort" (Nesse 1999, 430). As Ghassan Hage (2002, 152) rightly remarks, "we need to look at what kind of hope society encourages rather than simply whether it gives people hope or not."

¹¹ Han-Pile and Stern rightly note that "hope is not a matter of volitional control: an agent cannot will or instil hope in themselves, any more than an agent can will themselves to love" (this volume). Snyder and his team often come very close to suggesting that becoming a high-hope agent *is* a matter of simple will and volition. Shade, on the other hand, is far more attuned to the difficulties and complexities involved in "cultivating hope" discussed by Han-Pile and Stern in the third section of their chapter.

overcome obstacles and attain their own private goals within society as presently structured. And while Snyder insists that the field of hope should be leveled and all individuals inculcated with a sense of self-efficacy, this is intended to facilitate psychological adjustment, reduce the incidence of disillusionment and despair among certain segments of society, and thus bolster social stability (Snyder and Feldman 2000). Resolute hope, then, while personally transformative, serves a socially conservative function.

9.6 Transformative Hope

Like resolute hope, transformative hope is a mode of hoping against the evidence. Pragmatist philosopher Richard Rorty argues that the activity of striving to ground one's beliefs in the evidence is characteristic of the pursuit of knowledge and understanding and alien to the field of hope. The task of politics, as he sees it, "is a matter of replacing shared knowledge of what is already real with social hope for what might become real" (Rorty 1998, 18-19). For Rorty (1999, 28), "humans have to dream up the point of human life," and our belief in the possibility of attaining the goal we dream up lies not in the evidence but rather in the inspirational qualities of the goal itself, its capacity to "astonish and exhilarate" and thereby expand the horizons of possibility. The proper objective of hope is a "shared utopian dream," and to hope for such is to possess "a sense that the human future can be made different from the human past, unaided by non-human powers" (Rorty 1998, 106; 1999, 208). A hope is not a desire plus a probability estimate grounded in a survey of the evidence, but rather a utopia plus a sense of possibility grounded in a confidence in the powers of human agency. It is "taking the world by the throat and insisting that there is more to this life than we have ever imagined" (Rorty 1998, 138).

For Gustavo Gutiérrez (2001, 217), the Brazilian theologian whose *A Theology of Liberation* is perhaps the defining text of the liberation theology movement, the meaning of human life on earth is to establish justice. This is a utopian project requiring the realization of "a historical plan for a qualitatively different society." Because "[t]he Gospel does not provide a utopia for us," Gutiérrez (2001, 223) insists that "this is a human work." He thus concurs with Rorty that the point of human life is the utopian project of devising a new way of living it. Similarly, for Gutiérrez as for Rorty, hope is the phenomenon that enables human beings to fulfill this project. Hope is characterized as a confident belief in the transformative power of collective praxis and a consciousness that human beings are self-organizing and self-determining historical agents. This profound confidence in the affective-cognitive domain facilitates utopian praxis in the behavioral domain, incorporating both denunciation (the critical repudiation of the present) and annunciation (the positive anticipation of the not-yet).

For Gutiérrez (2001), hope is "the driving force of a future-oriented history" (200) and "fulfils a mobilizing and liberating function" (203). Indeed, hope not only "makes us radically free to commit ourselves to social praxis, motivated by a liberating utopia," but also "simultaneously demands and judges it" (Gutiérrez 2001, 223). To hope is to regard the world as open to human design and history as an "adventure." While the cognitive characteristics of transformative hope are in some ways similar to those of resolute hope (an anti-deterministic perception of the world as malleable), and its behavioral characteristics share something in common with critical hope (the critical repudiation of the present), transformative hope is distinct from each. Whereas the resolute hoper resolves to continue striving for her personal goals within society as presently structured, the transformative hoper critically negates the present and is driven by hope to annunciate a better alternative. This positive annunciation—an act demanded by transformative hope and expressive of the confidence placed in the capacity of human beings to resolve human problems—is an activity

alien to the critical hoper, for whom images of the future never move beyond vague assertions of the negation of the negative.

Transformative hope is a mutually efficacious collective hope. A distinctive feature is the nature of its objective and the manner in which this comes to be shared by the members of a group. The first point is important because theories of goal-directed hope tend to ignore the question of how people come to have the goals that they have. It is simply assumed that people have goals and hope is then presented as a particular way of relating to these emotionally, cognitively and behaviorally. In most cases the goals are taken to be personal ones pertaining to mental and physical health or to things such as material acquisition, academic and financial success. In the case of transformative hope, however, the objective is a qualitatively different organization of society and a new way of being. With regard to how such objectives might develop within a group, and come to be shared as a goal worth collectively striving for, Karl Mannheim remains instructive. According to Mannheim (1940, 187):

[I]t is a very essential feature of modern history that in the gradual organization for collective action social classes become effective in transforming historical reality only when their aspirations are embodied in utopias appropriate to the changing situation.

He suggests that utopias which emerge to shatter the status quo first take the form of “the wish-fantasy” of an individual or movement (Mannheim 1940, 185). These wish-fantasies do not appear out of nowhere, however, but seize on currents present in society, give expression to them, flow back into the outlook of a social group, and are translated by this group into action. Rather than corresponding directly to a concrete body of articulated needs, the active utopia “transmits” and “articulates” the amorphous “collective impulse” of a group. Without the appropriate wish-fantasy of an individual or movement seizing on currents present in society, the “collective impulse” of a group remains just an impulse because it lacks the “situationally transcendent ideas” that alone can guide and direct transformative action (Mannheim 1940, 185-187).¹²

In terms of hope theory, the collective impulse for change is likely to be born of a sense that the shared hopes of a group are unattainable—even allowing for a group-level version of cognitive resolve—within society as it stands. The utopian platform presented by an individual or movement becomes an objective of hope if this articulates the amorphous

¹² I have elsewhere argued that Paulo Freire offers a pedagogy of transformative hope (Webb 2010, 2012). Although he warned against the arrogance of utopian prophets, Freire also stressed the need for a utopian vision that can illuminate and guide the hoping subject along the path toward a transformed future (Freire 1994, 78; 1996, 187; Freire and Shor 1987, 13–14). In the face of a reality that sickens and offends, it becomes the responsibility of the educator to announce their utopian vision and to mobilize support for it, thereby transforming it into a shared utopia dream (Freire et al 1994, 37). For Freire, education is a pedagogic practice through which the impossible, by virtue of the strength and conviction with which it is dreamed and announced, becomes possible. He tells us: “What is implied is not the transmission to the people of a knowledge previously elaborated, a process that ignores what they already know, but the act of returning to them, in an organized form, what they themselves offered in a disorganized form” (Freire 1978, 24–25). The project of “teaching better what the people already know” is a political one aimed at exhilarating, motivating, inspiring, and evoking transformative hope (Freire 2007, 273). The cognitive-affective and behavioral dimensions of transformative hope resonate with Freire’s notion of conscientization as the critical insertion into history of real subjects animated by a profound confidence in the transformative capacities of human agency and committed to confronting and overcoming the “limit situations” that face them (Freire 1972, 71–72). The discourse of conscientization is the discourse of transformative hope, a hope against the evidence that recognizes the obstacles before it and yet grows in strength in spite of these, and a hope experienced by the hoper as “the taking of history into their hands” as they strive for the “untested feasibility” that lies beyond the concrete material data of every limit situation (Freire 1972, 81; 1994, 176; 2007, 71–72).

impulse of the group and is perceived by its members as so doing. Born of the frustrated hopes of a social group, the utopian objective—by means of its exhilarating and astonishing qualities—expands the horizons of possibility and gives rise to a sense that the human future can be made different from the human past, unaided by non-human powers. The cognitive-affective dimension of transformative hope, a profound confidence in the power of collective praxis, thus develops as the objective of hope feeds back into the outlook of the group whose thwarted hopes gave rise to its production. The cognitive dimension of hope in turn grounds and inspires concerted goal-directed action, i.e., the behavioral dimension of hope.

9.7 In Lieu of a Conclusion

In lieu of a conclusion I want to use Occupy Wall Street (OWS) as a brief case study illustration of the sociological application of the modes of hoping framework. Here I will make four claims. The first is that OWS signaled a utopian shift, a utopian moment, the discovery of a new structure of feeling oriented toward the reconstitution of the social totality. In other words, OWS gave clear expression to the utopian impulse. The second claim is that OWS was born of frustrated *patient* hope. One of the things that comes through clearly in the accounts of movement activists is the hope that had been placed in Barack Obama, a patient hope directed not toward some specific concrete objective but directed toward the figure of Obama himself, in whose person so much promise and meaning had been instilled. As Rebecca Solnit (2011, 82) put it, following the financial crisis of 2008 the hopes of so many “focused on a single political candidate to fix it all for us, as he promised he would.” Exactly *how* he would fix it all was unclear and indeterminate, but patient hope is not concerned with the technical question of how. Rather one places one’s hope in the agency of an Other and awaits patiently in the secure trust that, in ways that outstrip our current capacity to fully grasp, it *will* all get fixed.

If this mode of hoping is characterized by a patience born of trust, then by 2011 its foundations began to crumble. As Todd Gitlin (2012) put it, for Occupy activists, after three years of waiting, Obama “had foregone their trust” (193), “[t]heir patience had finally worn out” (27). The third claim I would make, then, is that the patient hope placed in Obama gave way to a critical hope born of refusal, of a resounding No! What is striking, in fact, about the contemporary accounts is how exactly the experiences of movement actors mapped onto the characteristics of critical hope described in this chapter. Expressing her response to the betrayed hope placed in Obama, one activist said, “I felt like I had been hit in the stomach” (Flank 2011, 216). The critical hope of OWS was a guttural hope of protest felt in the stomach and the skin. Key words used by activists at the time were “restlessness,” “agitation,” “unsettling unease,” “indignation and anger,” “discomfort and annoyance” (Mizen 2015). As one put it: “We have no clear idea how life should really feel... We sense something is wrong only through the odd clue... We notice a vague spiritual nausea...emptiness...darkness” (Anon. 2011). This was a hope underpinned by the sense that something’s missing, born in the darkness of the lived moment, experienced as restless, nauseous, passionate indignation and directed toward the negation of the conditions giving rise to profound injustices.¹³

¹³ OWS activists were animated by a mode of hoping rejected by many contemporary commentators. It is interesting to see calls for a renewed patient hope in the face of the conditions confronting humanity. Alan Mittleman (2009), for example, offers “a philosophical reconstruction of biblical hope” (7) as a bulwark against the dangers of “unrestrained secular hope” (10) and the “fanatical” (260) hopes of utopian transformation. For Mittleman (2009, 265, 262-263), the hope required for our age is a hope underpinned by secure trust in both “the goodness of being” and the underlying justice of our social and political institutions. Arguing explicitly against the temptation to “impatience” in the face of injustices, Mittleman (2009, 260, 14) presents “hope as a conservative force within a liberal society” restraining the over-zealous critical impatience born of modern

The core activists within OWS famously rejected the need for a utopian vision of an alternative way of being. They directed their hopes instead toward here-and-now immanent praxis in the firm belief that refusal is a generative act, that a Yes is born of enacting the Nos. What this meant, however, is that the critical hope of OWS never became truly transformative. Occupy remained a “vast, inchoate” movement of “global restlessness” (Solnit 2016, 109), “the site of inchoate, undertheorized encounters” (Chrostowska 2016, 285), but never became a force that took the world by the throat and committed itself to the positive annunciation of a liberating utopia. OWS was, in John Holloway’s (2010, 35) terms, a crack, a momentary rupture in capitalist space-time. As Holloway says of the cracks, “there is always an insufficiency about it, an incompleteness, a restlessness.” Without guidance and direction, however, the cracks do not open out into anything new. As Holloway (2010, 22) remarks, “it also happens that people get tired and the crack freezes over again.” My fourth and final claim then, is that critical hope requires pedagogical direction if it is to transmute into transformative hope.

Within OWS, the utopian impulse was never fully articulated and mobilized. Instead, it circulated at the level of poetic evocation, as an inchoate amorphous collective desire. As Mannheim notes, however, the inchoate collective impulse of a group needs utopian direction if it is to become a historically transformative force. There is a role for utopian pedagogy here in giving clear utopian form to popular aspirations, of turning critical hope into transformative hope. This role involves “convoking” the radical imagination, animating, enlivening, drawing together, and building on the amorphous utopian imaginings of community or movement members. To “convoke” is “to call something which is not yet fully present into being” (Haiven and Khasnabish 2014, 61). Mavis Biss (2013, 937) refers to this as “the specifically imaginative excellence required to bring inchoate experience to conceptual consciousness.” The radical imagination is required to articulate movement actors’ strong if inchoate emotions, to crystallize them and present them back in the form of a vision. This should be seen as a collective endeavor and iterative process within which the pedagogue plays a crucial facilitating role. To my mind, indeed, to commit to a transformative utopian pedagogy is the primary responsibility of the activist-scholar.¹⁴

secular hope. For his part, Daniel Boscaljon (2015) urges us to turn our attention away from the desire to *have* and to *fix* things in the present and to embrace instead our frailty and fragility in a virtuous spirit of hope and “the attendant virtues of patience, fortitude and perseverance” (xiii). Confronting the future as a mystery beyond our grasp, Boscaljon champions hope as “a nonreligious capacity to endure suffering for uncertain ends” (xvi). Terry Eagleton’s (2015, 59) “tragic hope” also has affinities with patient hope as outlined in this chapter. He tells us that “hope is the kind of virtue that involves a cluster of equally creditable qualities: patience, trust, courage, tenacity, resilience, forbearance, perseverance, long-sufferance and the like.” Tragic hope—the hope of Plenty Coups, but also, significantly, the hope prescribed to the radical Left—is a hope in the face of the prospect of defeat; a hope that perseveres in spite of everything; a hope that rejects the impatient tendency on the Left to see revolutionary opportunity everywhere; a hope that dispenses with self-deceptive notions of utopian transformation and manifests as “an irreducible residue that refuses to give way, plucking its resilience from an openness to the possibility of unmitigated disaster” (Eagleton 2015, 114). For Eagleton, the appropriate hope for the Left right now is a steadfast patient hope purged of all delusions, a hope underpinned by the thinnest trust, “not that all will be well, but that all might be well enough” (Eagleton 2015, 133).

¹⁴ The nature, form and role of utopian pedagogy, both within formal educational institutions and beyond, has animated much of my recent research (Webb 2017, 2018, 2019). This is an ongoing project focused increasingly on seeking to understand the pedagogical processes involved in moving beyond critical hope to transformative hope.

References

- Anderson, Ben. 2006. "'Transcending Without Transcendence': Utopianism and an Ethos of Hope." *Antipode* 38(4):691-710.
- Anon. 2011. "Communiqué 1." *Tidal Issue* 1. http://www.e-flux.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/TIDAL_occupytheory.pdf?b8c429.
- Aronson, Ronald. 1999. "Hope after Hope?" *Social Research* 66(2): 471-494.
- Arthur, Leonie, and Wayne Sawyer. 2009. "Robust Hope, Democracy and Early Childhood Education." *Early Years* 29(2): 163-175.
- Averill, James, George Catlin, and Kyum Chon. 1990. *Rules of Hope*. New York: Springer-Verlag.
- Bauman, Zygmunt. 2003. "Utopia with No Topos." *History of the Human Sciences* 16(1): 11-26.
- Bell, David. 2017. *Rethinking Utopia: Place, Power, Affect*. New York: Routledge.
- Biss, Mavis. 2013. "Radical Moral Imagination." *Hypatia* 28(4): 937-954.
- Bloch, Ernst. 1995. *The Principle of Hope*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- Boscaljon, Daniel. 2015. "The Value of Cultivating Longing in a Secularized World." In *Hope and the Longing for Utopia*, edited by Daniel Boscaljon, xiii-xx. Cambridge, UK: James Clarke.
- Bovens, Luc. 1999. "The Value of Hope." *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 59(3): 667-681.
- Braithwaite, John. 2004. "Emancipation and Hope." *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 592: 79-98.
- Browne, Craig. 2005. "Hope, Critique, and Utopia." *Critical Horizons* 6(1): 63-86.
- Callina, Kristina., Nancy Snow, and Elise Murray. 2018. "The History of Philosophical and Psychological Perspectives on Hope: Toward Defining Hope for the Science of Positive Human Development." In *The Oxford Handbook of Hope*, edited by Matthew Gallagher and Shane Lopez, 9-25. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Cates, Diana. 2015. "Hope, Hatred and the Ambiguities of Utopic Longing." In *Hope and the Longing for Utopia*, edited by Daniel Boscaljon, 23-40. Cambridge, UK: James Clarke.
- Chrostowska, S. D. 2016. "Utopia, Alibi." In *Political Uses of Utopia*, edited by S. D. Chrostowska and James Ingram, 269-310. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Coté, Mark, Richard Day, and Greg de Peuter. 2008. "What Is Utopian Pedagogy?" In *Utopian Pedagogy: Radical Experiments against Neoliberal Globalization*, edited by Mark Coté, Richard Day, and Greg de Peuter, 3-19. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
- Carlson, Dennis. 2005. "Hope without Illusion: Telling the Story of Democratic Educational Renewal." *International Journal of Qualitative Studies in Education* 18(1): 21-45.
- Cook, Julia. 2018. "Hope, Utopia, and Everyday Life: Some Recent Developments." *Utopian Studies* 29(3): 381-397.
- Dauenhauer, Bernard. 1984. "Hope and Its Ramifications for Politics." *Man and World* 17: 453-476.
- Dauenhauer, Bernard. 1986. *The Politics of Hope*. London: Routledge.
- Dauenhauer, Bernard. 2005. "The Place of Hope in Responsible Political Practice." In *Interdisciplinary Perspectives on Hope*, edited by Jaklin Eliot, 81-97. New York: Nova Science.
- Day, John Patrick. 1969. "Hope." *American Philosophical Quarterly* 6(2): 89-102.
- Day, John Patrick. 1991. *Hope: A Philosophical Inquiry*. Helsinki: Philosophical Society of Finland.
- Desroche, Henri. 1979. *The Sociology of Hope*. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.

- Dufault, K. and B. C. Martocchio. 1985. "Hope: Its Spheres and Dimensions." *Nursing Clinics of North America* 20(9): 379-391.
- Duncan-Andrade, Jeff. 2009. "Note to Educators: Hope Required When Growing Roses in Concrete." *Harvard Educational Review* 79(2): 181-194.
- Eagleton, Terry. 2015. *Hope without Optimism*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
- Flank, Lenny. 2011. *Voices from the 99%*. St. Petersburg, FL: Red and Black.
- Fournier, Valerie. 2002. "Utopianism and the Cultivation of Possibilities: Grassroots Movements of Hope." In *Utopia and Organization*, edited by Martin Parker, 189-216. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Freire, Paulo. 1972. *Pedagogy of the Oppressed*. Harmondsworth: Penguin.
- Freire, Paulo. 1978. *Pedagogy in Process*. London: Writers and Readers Publishing Cooperative.
- Freire, Paulo. 1994. *Pedagogy of Hope*. London: Continuum.
- Freire, Paulo. 1996. *Letters to Cristina*. New York: Routledge.
- Freire, Paulo. 2007. *Pedagogy of the Heart*. New York: Continuum.
- Freire, Paulo, and Ira Shor. 1987. *A Pedagogy for Liberation*. Basingstoke: Macmillan.
- Freire, Paulo. *et al.* 1994. *Paulo Freire on Higher Education*. Albany: SUNY Press.
- Gitlin, Todd. 2012. *Occupy Nation*. New York: HarperCollins.
- Godfrey, Joseph. 1987. *A Philosophy of Human Hope*. Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff.
- Grady, J. E. 1970. "Marcel, Hope and Ethics." *Journal of Value Inquiry* 4: 56-64.
- Gravlee, G. Scott. 2000. "Aristotle on Hope." *Journal of the History of Philosophy* 38(4): 461-477.
- Green, Rochelle. 2019. "Cultivating Hope in Feminist Praxis." In *Theories of Hope: Exploring Alternative Affective Dimensions of Human Experience*, edited by Rochelle Green, 111-128. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books.
- Gutiérrez, Gustavo. 2001. *A Theology of Liberation*. London: SCM Press.
- Hage, Ghassan. 2002. "On the Side of Life—Joy and the Capacity of Being." In *Hope: New Philosophies for Change*, edited by Mary Zournazi, 150-171. London: Lawrence and Wishart.
- Haiven, Max and Alex Khasnabish. 2014. *The Radical Imagination*. London: Zed Books.
- Halpin, David. 2003. *Hope and Education: The Role of the Utopian Imagination*. London: RoutledgeFalmer.
- Halpin, David. 2007. "Utopian Spaces of 'Robust Hope': The Architecture and Nature of Progressive Learning Environments." *Asia-Pacific Journal of Teacher Education* 35(3): 243-255.
- Hammond, Craig . 2017. *Hope, Utopia and Creativity in Higher Education*. London: Bloomsbury.
- Haro, Lia. 2010. "The Affective Politics of Insurgent Hope." In *Hope against Hope*, edited by Janet Horrigan and Ed Wiltse, 183-206. Leiden: Brill.
- Harvey, David. 2000. *Spaces of Hope*. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.
- Havel, Vaclav. 1990. *Disturbing the Peace*. New York: Vintage.
- Holloway, John. 2010. *Crack Capitalism*. London: Pluto.
- Kast, Vera. 1994. *Joy, Inspiration and Hope*. New York: Fromm International.
- Kretz, Lisa. 2019. "Hope, the Environment, and Moral Imagination." In *Theories of Hope: Exploring Alternative Affective Dimensions of Human Experience*, edited by Rochelle Green, 155-176. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books.
- Lear, Jonathan. 2009. *Radical Hope*. Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press.
- Levitas, Ruth. 1990. *The Concept of Utopia*. London: Allen Lane.
- Levitas, Ruth. 2013. *Utopia as Method*. Basingstoke: Palgrave.
- Macquarrie, John. 1978. *Christian Hope*. London: Mowbrays.

- Mannheim, Karl. 1940. *Ideology and Utopia*. London: Kegan Paul.
- Marcel, Gabriel. 1962. *Homo Viator: Introduction to a Metaphysics of Hope*. New York: Harper and Row.
- Marcel, Gabriel. 1967. "Desire and Hope." In *Readings in Existential Phenomenology*, edited by Nathaniel Lawrence and Daniel O'Connor, 277-285. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall.
- Marcel, Gabriel. 1978. *Man against Mass Society*. South Bend, IN: Gateway Press.
- Martin, Adrienne. 2014. *How We Hope: A Moral Psychology*. Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press.
- McKenna, Erin. 2001. *The Task of Utopia: A Pragmatist and Feminist Perspective*. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield.
- Mittleman, Alan. 2009. *Hope in a Democratic Age: Philosophy, Religion, and Political Theory*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Mizen, Phil. 2015. "The Madness That Is the World: Young Activists' Emotional Reasoning and Their Participation in a Local Occupy Movement." *Sociological Review* 63: 167-182.
- Moltmann, Jürgen. 1967. *Theology of Hope*. London: SCM Press.
- Moltmann, Jürgen. 1970. "Religion, Revolution, and the Future." In *The Future of Hope*, edited by Walter H. Capps, 102-126. Philadelphia: Fortress Press.
- Moltmann, Jürgen. 1975. *The Experiment Hope*. London: SCM Press.
- Moltmann, Jürgen. 1996. *The Coming of God: Christian Eschatology*. London: SCM Press.
- Moylan, Tom. 1997. "Bloch against Bloch: The Theological Reception of *Das Prinzip Hoffnung* and the Liberation of the Utopian Function." In *Not Yet: Reconsidering Ernst Bloch*, edited by Jamie O. Daniel and Tom Moylan, 96-121. London: Verso.
- Moylan, Tom. 2000. *Scraps of the Untainted Sky: Science Fiction, Utopia, Dystopia*. Boulder CO: Westview Press.
- Nesse, Randolph. 1999. "The Evolution of Hope and Despair." *Social Research* 66(2): 429-469.
- Orwell, George . 1949. *Nineteen Eighty-Four*. London: Secker and Warburg.
- Papastephanou, Marianna. 2009. *Educated Fear and Educated Hope*. Rotterdam: Sense Publishers.
- Péguy, Charles. 1996. *The Portal of the Mystery of Hope*. London: Continuum.
- Pettit, Philip. 2004. "Hope and its Place in Mind." *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 592: 152-165.
- Pinder, David. 2005. *Visions of the City*. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.
- Polivy, Janet, and C. Peter Herman. 2000. "The False-Hope Syndrome." *Current Directions in Psychological Science* 9(4): 128-131.
- Quinn, Michael Sean. 1976. "Hoping." *Southwestern Journal of Philosophy* 7(1): 53-65.
- Rorty, Richard. 1998. *Achieving Our Country*. London: Harvard University Press.
- Rorty, Richard. 1999. *Philosophy and Social Hope*. London: Penguin.
- Rousseau, Jean-Jacques. 1993. *The Social Contract and Discourses*. London: J.M. Dent.
- Sacks, Jonathan. 2000. *The Politics of Hope*. London: Vintage.
- Sawyer, Wayne, Michael Singh, Christine Woodrow, Toni Downes, Christine Johnston and Diana Whitton 2007. "Robust Hope and Teacher Education Policy." *Asia-Pacific Journal of Teacher Education* 35(3): 227-242.
- Schumacher, Bernard. 2003. *A Philosophy of Hope*. New York: Fordham University Press.
- Shade, Patrick. 2001. *Habits of Hope*. Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press.
- Shade, Patrick. 2006. "Educating Hopes." *Studies in Philosophy and Education* 25: 191-225.

- Singh, Michael. 2007. "A Sound Research Base for Beginning Teacher Education: Robust Hope, Action Policy Analysis and *Top of the Class*." *Asia-Pacific Journal of Teacher Education* 35(4): 333-349.
- Snow, Nancy. 2019. "Faces of Hope." In *Theories of Hope: Exploring Alternative Affective Dimensions of Human Experience*, edited by Rochelle Green, 5-24. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books.
- Snyder, C. R. 1989. "Reality Negotiation: From Excuses to Hope and Beyond." *Journal of Social and Clinical Psychology* 8(2): 130-157.
- Snyder, C. R. 2000. "The Past and Possible Futures of Hope." *Journal of Social and Clinical Psychology* 19(1): 11-28.
- Snyder, C. R. 2002. "Hope Theory: Rainbows in the Mind." *Psychological Inquiry* 13(4): 249-275.
- Snyder, C. R., and David Feldman. 2000. "Hope for the Many: An Empowering Social Agenda." In *Handbook of Hope*, edited by C. R. Snyder, 389-412. San Diego, CA: Academic Press.
- Solnit, Rebecca. 2011. "The Occupation of Hope." In *This Changes Everything*, edited by Sarah van Gelder, 77-82. San Francisco: Berrett-Koehler.
- Solnit, Rebecca. 2016. *Hope in the Dark*. Edinburgh: Canaongate.
- Sutherland, Stewart. 1989. "Hope." In *The Philosophy in Christianity*, edited by Godfrey Vessey. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Tinder, Glenn. 2001. *The Fabric of Hope*. Cambridge: William B. Eerdmans Publishing.
- Waterworth, Jayne. 2004. *A Philosophical Analysis of Hope*. Basingstoke: Palgrave.
- Webb, Darren. 2008. "Christian Hope and the Politics of Utopia." *Utopian Studies* 19(1): 113-144.
- Webb, Darren. 2009. "Where's the Vision? The Concept of Utopia in Contemporary Educational Theory." *Oxford Review of Education* 35(6): 743-760.
- Webb, Darren. 2010. "Paulo Freire and 'the need for a kind of education in hope.'" *Cambridge Journal of Education* 40(4): 327-339.
- Webb, Darren. 2012. "Process, Orientation, and System: The Pedagogical Operation of Utopia in the Work of Paulo Freire." *Educational Theory* 62(5): 593-608.
- Webb, Darren. 2013. "Critical Pedagogy, Utopia and the Politics of (Dis)engagement." *Power and Education* 5(3): 280-290.
- Webb, Darren. 2016. "Educational Studies and the Domestication of Utopia." *British Journal of Educational Studies* 64(4): 431-448.
- Webb, Darren. 2017. "Educational Archaeology and the Practice of Utopian Pedagogy." *Pedagogy, Culture and Society* 25(4): 551-566.
- Webb, Darren. 2018. "Bolt-holes and Breathing Spaces in the System: On Forms of Academic Resistance (or, Can the University Be a Site of Utopian Possibility?)." *Review of Education, Pedagogy and Cultural Studies* 40(2): 96-118.
- Webb, Darren. 2019. "Prefigurative Politics, Utopian Desire and Social Movement Learning: Reflections on the Pedagogical Lacunae in Occupy Wall Street." *Journal for Critical Education Policy Studies* 17(2): 204-245.
- Wegner, Philip. 2002. *Imaginary Communities: Utopia, the Nation, and the Spatial Histories of Modernity*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Williams, Raymond. 1991. *Writing in Society*. London: Verso.
- Zipes, Jack. 2019. *Ernst Bloch: The Pugnacious Philosopher of Hope*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.