Book Section:

Race and the Media: Beyond Defensiveness[i]

Carl Fox[1]

Abstract

In this chapter, I will explore some of the features of the broad moral duty to eliminate racial injustice. I will attempt to articulate and critique some philosophical errors that someone might make about positive and open-ended moral duties, and which might help us to understand why, in spite of plentiful evidence, many individuals and organisations in the media seem to have formed the belief that they have done enough to discharge their duty to eliminate racial injustice. Ultimately the mistake lies in thinking that this duty is considerably weaker than the related, more straightforward, duty to simply avoid actions that are deliberately and unfairly racially discriminatory. Exposing these mistakes helps to establish precisely why this position is untenable. This is not a weak duty. The demands it makes of us are strong and urgent, and it is incumbent on the media as a whole to do much, much more to meet them.

1. Introduction

In his 2020 MacTaggart lecture, the historian and film-maker David Olusoga excoriated the British television industry for its failure to retain black and brown talent behind the camera.[ii] He cited statistics that, while truly damning, will likely not come as much of a surprise. Even so, one piece of evidence he used stands out. 73% of BAME individuals working in production roles reported having considered leaving the industry.[iii] One might (very) naively ask, if everyone now knows that racism – in the sense of deliberate and conscious acts of

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discrimination on the basis of supposed membership of a particular racial category – is wrong, and media organisations are, at least officially, committed to eliminating it, then how can it be that those groups who have historically suffered from it still continue to underperform so dramatically?

Olusoga identifies the elephant in the control room: culture. It is not only people or actions that can be racist, cultures can be racist too, and the inhospitable environment that exists for racial and other minorities is a critical factor in explaining why it is so difficult for traditionally underrepresented groups of all kinds to thrive and succeed in the media. This is what Olusoga blames for the absence of what he calls a "lost generation" from the sets, studios, and offices of British television. Our naïve question, therefore, needs to be revised. What we really need to ask is why a culture that is demonstrably disadvantageous to certain racial groups continues to be tolerated in the media. Why is it that accusations of explicit racial bias are generally taken seriously while legitimate demands for broad systemic and cultural change are typically ignored, or even resisted? In particular, I want to consider why the first response to such demands is often to go on the defensive.

As an example, take the reaction of the Society of Editors in 2021 to some comments made by Meghan Markle and Harry Windsor during their highly-publicised interview with Oprah Winfrey.[iv] In that conversation they accused the British press of being racist. The Society of Editors promptly released a statement robustly defending the press and asserting that it was "not bigoted" and "certainly not racist".[v] While the ensuing controversy ultimately cost the executive director Ian Murray his job, the initial instinct to push back is what I find most interesting.

There are many contributory factors that we might explore. Clearly, old-fashioned, explicit racism is still with us. Further, those kinds of toxic beliefs and attitudes have a long half-life, and can continue to exert a grip even on those who consciously reject them, for instance in the form of implicit bias.[vi] More prosaically, we might just note that culture is notoriously hard to change, and it is obviously easier to do easy things and harder to do hard ones. And, of course, there is considerable psychological pressure to avoid concessions that might implicate oneself in serious wrongdoing. However, these kinds of explanations are not what I am interested in here. My target in this chapter is the question of how individuals, companies, and even entire sectors might hold that they have done *enough,* or somewhere close to enough, when it comes to bringing about a truly level playing field even though it is apparent that the media as a whole is failing so profoundly to do what, as a matter of basic justice, it is

collectively required to do. How might someone believe that such a wrongheaded view about a highly significant and salient moral duty could be *justified*?

This is not just of academic interest. Olusoga highlights the thoroughly alienating experience of being surrounded by agreement that the current situation is unjust without seeing any tangible change:

> *"Television's lost generation spent their careers in a strange Orwellian world of doublethink. They listened to announcement after announcement, saw initiatives launched and watched training schemes come and go. Yet at the same time their own careers and those of black and brown people around them withered on the vine. Official pronouncements and lived experiences bore little relationship to one another."*

In this chapter, I will explore some of the features of the broad moral duty to eliminate racial injustice and attempt to articulate and critique some philosophical errors that someone might make, and which could lead them to form the belief that the kinds of gestures Olusoga is talking about are sufficient to discharge it. Ultimately the mistake lies in thinking that this duty is considerably weaker than the related, more straightforward, duty to simply avoid actions that are deliberately and unfairly racially discriminatory. In Section 3 I will examine the difference between positive and negative duties, arguing that even if we agree that, other things being equal, the latter take priority over the former, it does not follow that positive duties are therefore weak. Section 4 will consider the distinction between perfect and imperfect duties. Again, I will argue that even though the duty to bring about an end to racial injustice is imperfect in the sense that it is open-ended and indeterminate, this does not mean that it cannot demand a great deal of us. Drawing on this analysis, Section 5 will ask how the media might move beyond defensiveness and embrace its positive, open-ended duty to bring about real and tangible change. Before that, though, it is important to look at the idea of race and racism in a little more detail and that is where I shall begin.

2. Race and Racism

It is clear enough that the practice of using physical traits to sort human beings into discrete racial categories does not stand up to any serious scientific scrutiny.[vii] Though it is a biological fiction, race is nonetheless socially real (Appiah 2006).[viii] So, how then should we understand

the concept of race, and the ways in which it is, and has been, used in our society? In a landmark paper on gender and race, Sally Haslanger (2000) distinguished between three different kinds of inquiry that this question could launch. The first is *conceptual*. We might be trying to spell out, as best we can, the meaning that we would assume to be implicit in the term. The second is *descriptive*. We might be trying to work out an account of race that best fits with the various ways in which people actually use it. The third option is often called *ameliorative*, and it has to do with figuring out the point of having the concept in the first place. What function does it serve? What does it allow us to do? For what problem is it – or could it be – a useful tool?

These different types of inquiry are linked in various ways. Drawing on ordinary usage of a term may help to illuminate a conceptual analysis, and ordinary usage, in turn, may place limits on how far we can go in reimagining and revising a concept, and so on. However, they do pull in distinctively different directions, and Haslanger favours the third project because what she is ultimately interested in is eliminating injustice. In order to combat the systematic subordination of targeted groups, it is important to be able tell who is marked out for unfair treatment and on what grounds. On her (2000, p.44) account of race, it is about how certain groups are marked for differential treatment in particular contexts on the basis of real or imagined physical characteristics which are presumed to provide evidence of genetic links to specific parts of the world. To be marked as, for instance, White, Black, or Asian is to be identified as an appropriate subject for treatment that accords with beliefs and attitudes (many of which may be held unconsciously) about those groups – what they are like, what they are good/bad at, etc…[ix] Individuals are then positioned in a social hierarchy which is brought about and sustained by the patterns of advantage or disadvantage that attach to those classifications.[x]

Tommie Shelby (2007, p.131) argues that these sorts of patterns amount to institutional racism "when the administration or enforcement of the rules and procedures of a major social institution-say, the labor market or the criminal justice system-is regularly distorted by the racial prejudice or bias of those who exercise authority within the institution." He goes on to note that institutional racism can exist "even when the content of the rules and procedures of an institution, when viewed in the abstract, is perfectly just, provided there is pervasive racial bias in the application of those rules and procedures."[xi] Even though there is now general acknowledgment that deliberate acts of racial discrimination are unacceptable, looking across the media it is clear that racial bias remains widespread. We are confronted by a state of affairs in which the ability of some groups to participate in a worthwhile and consequential sphere of activity is arbitrarily sabotaged. As this violates the basic principle of equal moral standing, it

cannot be permitted to endure, and so we are all duty-bound to do something about it, though this is a duty that falls in the first instance on those who benefit from the unjust status quo.[xii]

There is something different about our responsibility to bring about positive change when compared and contrasted with the imperative to simply avoid obviously racist actions. The next sections will show that it is still a mistake to think that one, or more, of those differences in some way lets us off the hook in virtue of making the duty weaker to the point where failing to successfully discharge it is just not very wrong.

3. Positive and Negative Duties

In his famous lecture *Two Concepts of Liberty,* Isaiah Berlin ([1958] 2002) distinguished between negative and positive freedom. The former revolves around the absence of, or protection from, interference by other human beings in one's affairs. If I took one of the jobs you sometimes see going viral when an advertisement is placed seeking to find a caretaker for some idyllic and uninhabited private island, I would come as close as it is possible to get to achieving perfect negative freedom. Positive freedom, on the other hand, depends on one's ability to do or achieve valuable things, and this, in turn, usually requires the cooperation and assistance of others. For instance, if I were dropped on that same uninhabited island as a child and left to fend for myself, it is true that nobody would be stopping me from learning how to code, or becoming a classical guitarist, or developing a wide network of friends. However, because I lack the physical and social resources necessary to achieving these goals it makes little sense to say that I am free to pursue them or to exercise control over my choices about them in any meaningful sense.

This sense of 'freedom from' and 'freedom to' has shaped much of modern thinking about duties.[xiii] Some duties that we owe to others are duties to refrain from certain kinds of actions that will impact them. The duty not to murder is a negative duty in this sense. You discharge it simply by leaving everyone else alive. By contrast, some duties precisely are duties to intervene in order to provide various kinds of assistance and thereby ensure that another person has what they need to pursue some important goal. As an example, we might take the importance of education for living an autonomous life. Most of us think that we should all make some contribution to guarantee a reasonable education for all children so that they can

develop their faculties and skills to a sufficient level that they can decide for themselves from a range of worthwhile options what they would like to do with their lives.[xiv]

Along these lines, we might distinguish between a negative duty to avoid discriminating against another person on the basis of their racial categorisation and a positive duty to give of one's time, energy, and resources to redress the unfair disadvantages that people suffer on account of their race. The first is a classic negative duty because it identifies a responsibility to refrain from interfering with a person's life by injecting racial animus into it in a manner which sets back their interests. The second is a positive duty because it requires the bearer to take action and thereby bring about a better state of affairs for those who are entitled to see their situation improve. The relationship between positive and negative duties has been the subject of much discussion in the philosophical literature. One prominent facet of that discussion has concerned the question of whether negative duties or positive duties should take priority if, and when, they come into conflict. If we decide that negative duties are more important than positive ones, then it might be thought to follow from that conclusion that it is more important, indeed much more important, to avoid violating the negative duty to not actively discriminate against people on the basis of race than it is to discharge the positive duty to eliminate racial injustice.

Philippa Foot's influential work on trolley problems and rescue cases is designed to show that, other things being equal, the negative duty to avoid killing is more stringent than the positive duty to save a life. Foot does this by constructing ingenious thought experiments to draw out our intuitions. Here is one famous example. Imagine that a surgeon has five patients who each need a different transplanted organ in order to survive. A patient is wheeled into the emergency room in need of treatment. Is the surgeon permitted to kill this patient in order to save the five (Foot 2002, p.79)? Almost everyone thinks that this would not be permissible, and the conclusion that Foot draws is that when they come into conflict negative duties take priority over positive ones.

While it seems to me that Foot is right to think both that our very deepest and strongest duties are negative, and that negative duties do generally take priority when other factors are controlled for, it clearly does not follow from either of these claims that *all* negative duties trump *all* positive duties, nor does it follow that all positive duties are, in any sense, weak. Take the duty not to trespass on someone else's land. This is a negative duty that can be discharged simply by staying away and not crossing over onto someone else's property.[xv] Imagine now that as I walk along the boundary of some private estate, I hear someone who is obviously in

pain calling out for assistance. Surely, I can set aside my negative duty for the sake of my positive duty to provide assistance to a person in need.[xvi]

There is a simpler point to make here, which is that while the pairs of duties that Foot considers are brought into conflict in the extreme circumstances that she creates, in most circumstances, they are entirely compatible. Tragic dilemmas, though useful in forensic philosophical analysis, are, fortunately, relatively rare in real life. Coming back to the topic at hand, one can avoid committing racist actions while also taking positive steps to reduce the burden of embedded structural racism.

The drive to establish the superiority of negative rights and duties might also obscure the fact that positive rights duties can themselves be very stringent and very demanding, as, indeed, Foot (2002, p.84) allows. In another well-known paper, Peter Singer (1972, p.231) uses the case of a small child drowning in a pond to illustrate how the positive duty of rescue can demand a great deal of us. His real interest in that paper is in showing that we ought to be prepared to sacrifice far more than we are typically prepared to do in order to save distant people from the ravages of famine and other catastrophes. This point, it seems to me, also holds for the positive duty to eliminate an egregious and shameful injustice that systematically qualifies the scope and quality of citizens' life chances on the basis of race.

Singer (1972, p.235) suggests that part of the problem when it comes to our profound failure to use our abundant wealth and resources to ensure that everyone has enough even to eat is that we draw the line between duty and charity in the wrong place since it is, in fact, morally required to help people in dire need when we can do so without sacrificing something else of comparable moral value. This thought is instructive, though, I think, not in the way that Singer intends. He seems to understand charity as a supererogatory action, which is to say one that is morally good but not morally required. However, charity has been traditionally understood as a duty, though a special kind of duty – an imperfect duty – and this is what I shall discuss in the next section because I will argue that misunderstanding the nature of imperfect duties could also contribute to the problem we are exploring here.

4. Perfect and Imperfect Duties

In his *Metaphysics of Morals* Immanuel Kant (2009, p.32/6:240) divides duties into two categories: perfect and imperfect. For Kant, there are a number of differences between them,

but for our purposes there are two that really matter. The first is that imperfect duties allow a degree of latitude for an agent to decide how and when to discharge them. If we stick with the example of charity from the last section, Kant believed that while it was not optional to be committed to having the happiness and welfare of humanity in general as an end, there is scope for an individual to decide for herself how best to pursue it. Perhaps you studiously avoid making eye contact with the overly friendly charity mugger when you go into town, or you ignore your work colleague's appeal to donate to her once-in-a-lifetime fundraising trek up Kilimanjaro, but you do make a donation to your favoured charity every month by direct debit. For Kant, that is fine. You are required to do something to help your fellow human beings, but exactly how and when you go about it is up to you. This is obviously not the case for paradigm perfect duties. For instance, there is no decision for you to make about when, where, and how to refrain from murdering innocent parties – you simply do not ever do it.

The second difference between perfect and imperfect duties is that imperfect duties are indeterminate, which is to say that it is not clear what precisely you have to do in order to discharge them. There is no specific amount of money, either in absolute terms or as a percentage of your income, that you can give which will then draw a line under your charitable obligations. The reason for this is that it depends not only on the actual needs that people have now and will have in the future, which are not fixed, but also on what other people do to resolve the problem. If Bill Gates finds a spare billion or two down the back of his couch and donates it, then the rest of us will have to contribute less.

This point about indeterminacy is also related to the question of demandingness. While most ethicists hold that individuals retain some permissions to show partiality to their own interests and the interests of those closest to them, and so there is some limit on what we can be reasonably expected to sacrifice for the sake of meeting our moral duties, Singer points out that ethics can still be very demanding indeed, and certainly much more demanding than is comfortable for us. Particularly when lives are on the line, many of us will be inclined to agree that we ought to be prepared to take even quite significant costs on ourselves for the sake of others. So, how much effort or sacrifice is enough for you to count as having done your share? Here's another way of putting it: at what point would you be free of blame? The implication of Kant's account of imperfect duties is that this too is indeterminate and will depend on various factors outside of the agent's control.

Though the positive duty to bring about an end to racial injustice does not neatly map onto Kant's conception of imperfect duties in some significant respects, it is, open-ended in two significant ways that parallel them.[xvii] First, there is a broad spectrum of different options

that we could take in order to pursue it. Ranging from workplace training on phenomena like implicit bias and stereotype threat, through affirmative action, all the way up to concrete monetary reparations, there are a great many policy options that could be developed and deployed.[xviii] We must work out the details and then decide what we think is the appropriate course, or more likely courses, of action to follow. [xix] Second, it is not possible to say precisely how much any individual should do (or be prepared to give up) to eliminate racial injustice, though it will fall differently on different people depending on their relative level of privilege and the ability that they have to enact positive change.

Though these features complicate the task of discharging the duty in the ways we have discussed, it does not follow from that fact that the scope or stringency of the duty should be significantly downgraded. Though this is not quite the conclusion that Singer draws, I think that the main upshot of his argument is that when indeterminate duties arise from core moral values, they can be radically more demanding than we generally acknowledge. Ethics is not only difficult because it often demands that we take considerable costs on ourselves for the sake of others, it is also difficult in the sense that, more often than not, it requires considerable intellectual labour to work out what the right thing to do really is. These costs must be accounted for in our moral deliberations, but when the consideration on the other side of the ledger is the right of all individuals to a fair chance to pursue their chosen plan of life and their ability to participate in their community as full equals, then they do not seem so large.

5. What is to be Done?

I have argued that it is a mistake to think that the positive duty to eliminate racial injustice is a weak duty in the sense that it can be easily discharged. This means that it is not enough simply to do *something*. The kind of well-meaning schemes and initiatives that Olusoga criticises amount to little more than gestures, and are, therefore, insufficient given the gravity and the urgency of the task at hand. Of course, it is easy to say that things must change and to demand more from everyone who occupies a position of relative privilege, but much harder to identify and justify specific actions that could be taken to improve matters. In this section, I will briefly sketch three responsibilities that arise out of the analysis I have offered in this chapter and show how they can make this positive duty more concrete, and, thereby, at least a little more manageable.

The first responsibility that flows from the positive duty to work towards a racially just society is to respond appropriately to moral criticism of the status quo. There is, as I hope to have shown, simply no good reason for the vast majority of us on whom the duty falls to think that we have done enough to satisfy it. It is incumbent on us, therefore, to resist the impulse to defend our conduct to this point. At best, adopting or sustaining such an attitude constitutes a failure to adequately engage with our moral reasons, and at worst it amounts to a form of gaslighting because it projects certainty that the moral situation is acceptable when it is not.[xx]

Defensiveness is also the wrong position to take when it comes to appraising one's professional standing and accomplishments. As Peggy McIntosh (1989) observed, it is a relatively easy and straightforward step to acknowledge that other people suffer unfair disadvantage, but "[d]isapproving of the systems won't be enough to change them." It is much harder to grant that one's own position in the social hierarchy is partially a result of unearned privilege, and even harder still to accept that bringing about a more just situation will involve actually giving something up. However, this is exactly what is required.

Though it is no doubt true that any appreciable level of success in the media requires hard work, dedication, and talent, these are, sadly, not sufficient. The lesson we must draw from our earlier discussion of the meaning of race and racism is that some of us are the beneficiaries of deeply embedded patterns of opportunity and advantage that unjustly distribute the benefits and burdens of social cooperation along racial lines.[xxi] McIntosh (1989) herself lists no less than 26distinct advantages that she carries around with her in her personal and professional lives that have the cumulative effect of, simply put, making things easier. For instance, she notes that as a white person she can "go home from most meetings of organizations I belong to feeling somewhat tied in, rather than isolated, out-of-place, outnumbered, unheard, held at a distance, or feared." Being able to take something like that for granted makes it easier to succeed. Indeed, as Linda Martín Alcoff (2009, p.8) argues: "Part of white privilege has been precisely whites' ability to ignore the ways white racial identity has benefitted them."

The second responsibility I want to discuss follows on from this. Moving beyond defensiveness and embracing the positive duty to eliminate racial injustice involves acquiring the level of understanding of oneself and one's community that McIntosh describes. Interrogating one's own privilege is a demanding task to undertake and there are pitfalls that must be avoided. In particular, it can lead to an overwhelming and debilitating sense of guilt, or even shame. Alcoff (2009, p.7) writes that "'feeling white,' when coupled with a repudiation of white privilege, can disable a positive self-image as well as a felt connection to community and history, and generally can disorient identity formation." This kind of psychological collapse

is obviously detrimental to the individual herself, but is also counter-productive in so far as it hampers her in looking outwards and attempting to take positive action in the world. What we are called upon to do, then, is to develop a sense of perspective about our own place in the social and professional hierarchies that is sufficiently sensitive to the myriad ways in which factors other than individual merit and hard work affect outcomes and accept a reasonable degree of forward-facing responsibility for changing them.[xxii]

Writing about implicit bias, Robin Zheng (2016) deploys a distinction between two approaches to the idea of responsibility to help with this challenge. One approach to responsibility focuses on attributability, and seeks to determine the conditions under which some apparent action (or omission) is genuinely an expression of a person's agency, and is, therefore, autonomous in the sense of substantively reflecting her values and commitments. Ascribing responsibility in this sense is inextricably tied up with evaluative judgments about how morally good or bad a person is. This frame raises the stakes in a way that invites the kind of debilitating introspection we have just described. Not only that, it is unsuitable for analysing omissions and failures for which there may be – up to a point, at least – reasonable excuses. She argues that in thinking about our responsibilities to deal with the manifestations of racial injustice such as unconscious beliefs and negative stereotypes, it is better to think in terms of responsibility as accountability.

On this line, we are "morally responsible for an action in this accountability sense when it is appropriate for others to hold us to certain expectations and demands regarding our duties and tasks— and to sanction us when we fail to carry them out," (Zheng 2016, p.66). When our omissions permit an unjust system to continue to operate, then there are people who suffer avoidable injustice. This is not a fair distribution of benefits and burdens, and so something ought to change. Zheng argues that we can ascribe (or assume) this kind of responsibility without necessarily making any appraisals of the responsible party's character, motivations, or intentions. Though we may want to do this as well for other moral reasons, it is open to us, she thinks, simply to focus on the distribution of burdens and benefits that arise from particular actions, or, as in this case, from omissions, since it is largely our lack of actions that permit an unjust system to continue to operate and so abandon people to suffer avoidable injustice. Since this is not a fair distribution something ought to change. As she says: "We are accountable because it is appropriate for us to clean up after our own actions when a mess has been made— spilled milk has got to be wiped, though we need not impugn a person's character just for having spilled it!" (Zheng 2016, p.74).

Zheng (2016, pp.75-76) concludes that we need to develop "more ways of holding people accountable for their biases without attributing those biases to them—to engage in moral criticism that does not amount to accusations of racism, sexism, or condemnations of bad character." This certainly seems like an approach that is more likely to be successful, though it still requires people to engage in an honest reckoning so that a fair distribution can be designed and implemented.

The final responsibility I will discuss here concerns a positive step that we might take to fulfil our obligations. Marcia Baron (1995) argues that the latitude of imperfect duties is sensitive to contextual factors, and can, in some circumstances, shrink so drastically that there is no wiggle room left for discretion.[xxiii] This happens when it would be implausible to maintain that an agent really is committed to the end in question if they pass up a particular opportunity to pursue it. Imagine a natural disaster strikes one street over from your house, leaving many of your neighbours in desperate need of shelter and other essentials. Were you to sit out this crisis and wait instead for another opportunity to open your home or your wallet, any observer would have to wonder whether you were genuinely committed to pursuing the well-being of other human beings. Where before there was scope for choice about how best to meet your obligation, circumstances have intervened and there is now only one course of action that is consistent with a sincere commitment to pursuing the relevant end.

My thought is that we could, and should, deliberately set out to achieve this effect when it comes to the duty to eliminate racial injustice. Reducing the scope for discretion has two potential effects. First, it makes the selected courses of action more urgent, because a failure to follow through on them becomes much more meaningful. Second, it reduces the cognitive cost of making a practical decision. Complexity is a barrier to action. Faced with it, many of us will, at least sometimes, demur, delay, or even cast about for a different, easier question.[xxiv] As such, it seems reasonable to expect that finding ways to narrow our range of options will make decisive action more likely.

Here is an example of how that might work taken from academia. It is now considered best practice for journals to operate double-blind peer review, in which neither the authors nor the reviewers know each other's identities. Ensuring that reviewers are ignorant of these details removes cues that may trigger biases, and is, for that reason likely to make the process fairer. Because this is now standard practice, everyone expects it. It is just one of the things that you do if you care about diversity and ensuring that underrepresented minorities get a fair shake. Failing to do it would immediately raise questions about a journal's commitment to treating all potential authors justly.

By coalescing around norms and standards, a community can effectively shrink the latitude that exists around a duty that can be pursued in a range of different ways. We could set out to do this in the media by establishing best practice for things like hiring, promotion, resourcing, mentoring, training, and so on with an explicit focus on improving and eventually eliminating racial and other disparities. Of course, this is not an exhaustive list and it is still unhappily vague. There will also be many empirical questions to ask about what policies really are likely to be successful in this respect, and whether there are any costs or consequences that need to be balanced or mitigated. Even so, as a strategy for focusing attention on concrete actions that can make a difference, it stands a chance of moving the media away from paralysis, or from the kinds of empty gestures that are little better.

6. Conclusion

My aim in this chapter has been to consider some philosophical mistakes about positive and open-ended moral duties that might help us to understand why, in spite of plentiful evidence, many individuals and organisations in the media seem to have formed the belief that they have done enough to discharge their duty to eliminate racial injustice. Exposing these mistakes helps to establish precisely why this position is untenable. This is not a weak duty. The demands it makes of us are strong and urgent, and it is incumbent on the media as a whole to do much, much more to meet them.

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[i] I would like to thank Jessica Begon and Joe Saunders for helpful comments and discussion.

[ii] Available here: https://www.thetvfestival.com/festival-overview/past-speakers/mactaggart-hall-fame/

[iii] This is taken from a report written by the Film and TV Charity, which is available here: https://filmtvcharity.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/Film-and-TV-Charity-Covid19-DCMS-Select-Committee-Final-19Jun20-1.pdf

[iv] Susan Notess and Lori Watson discuss this interview in more detail in Chapter 11.

[v] The original statement has been removed from the Society of Editors website, but see https://www.theguardian.com/media/2021/mar/10/society-of-editors-chief-quits-after-row-over-meghan-racism-statement and https://haroon-siddique.medium.com/letter-to-society-of-editors-9aae5ad0cb0d

[vivi] See Saul and Brownstein (2016), Holroyd (2012), and Holroyd et al. (2017).

[vii] As Zack (2017, pp.2-3) points out, some of philosophy's most respected historical figures such as Hume, Kant, and Hegel assumed otherwise and espoused essentialist, and essentially white supremacist, views about race.

[viii] On this point, see also Mallon (2006), Mills (2015, Ch.3), and Zack (2002).

[ix] Haslanger explains how different groups have been racialised at different times and in different contexts. For a particularly interesting case study see Ignatiev (1995).

[x] On the topic of structural injustice see Young (2011).

[xi] Of course, race intersects in myriad ways with other forms of classification such as gender and class, and it is possible to be disadvantaged along one dimension while advantaged by another. On intersectionality see Crenshaw (1989), Nash (2008), and Curry (2017).

[xii] On the question of how to think about the effect of conditions of injustice on the duties that fall on those subjected to it, see Shelby (2007).

[xiii] Though on this point see MacCullum (1967).

[xiv] Berlin (2002, p. 180-181) is wary of the idea of positive freedom. He thinks that, partly for historical and contingent reasons, it has been developed into more concrete ideologies that wave away the heavy moral significance of coercing flesh and blood human beings by appealing to the notion that what really matters is doing right by their higher, truer selves.

[xv] Though for a broader perspective on trespassing, see Hayes (2021).

[xvi] Foot (2002, p.82), drawing on Anscombe, makes the same point.

[xvii] In particular, Kant describes imperfect duties in terms of virtue rather than right. Meaningful action to bring about racial justice is surely something that can be demanded as a matter of right.

[xviii] On the elements of rectification see Roberts (2017).

[xix] I shall return to the question of complexity and demandingness in the next section. On the question of whether more choice is better than less, see Dworkin (1982).

[xx] On gaslighting, see Barnes (2023).

[xxi] On the notion of merit and the problems with the idea of a 'meritocracy', see Sandel (2020).

[xxii] On this subject see Mills (1997), Pohlhaus Jr. (2012), Medina (2012), and Bright (2023).

[xxiii] In particular, see Baron (1995, Ch.3).

[xxiv] The behavioural psychologist Daniel Kahneman (2012) discusses our tendency to substitute easier questions for more difficult ones in Chapter 9 of his influential *Thinking, Fast and Slow.*