

# Panpsychism and God

Joanna Leidenhag 

University of Leeds, Leeds, UK

## Correspondence

Joanna Leidenhag, University of Leeds, Leeds, UK.

Email: [j.leidenhag@leeds.ac.uk](mailto:j.leidenhag@leeds.ac.uk)

## Abstract

Panpsychism is the view, found in ancient and modern, Eastern and Western philosophies, that mind is a fundamental and ubiquitous feature of the universe. This article explores the use of panpsychism to support different views of God. It is seen that as a family of views, panpsychism is a theologically flexible position that has been used to support atheism, pantheism, panentheism, and traditional monotheism. However, the relationship between panpsychism and philosophy of religion is not infinitely flexible. Different versions of panpsychism constrain these models of God, and *vice versa*. The different motivations for linking panpsychism to (dis)belief in God reveals the range of ways of interpreting the spiritual import of positing mentality in nature.

## 1 | INTRODUCTION

Panpsychism is the view, found in ancient and modern, Eastern and Western philosophies, that mind is a fundamental and ubiquitous feature of the universe. The purpose of this article is not to argue for the truth of panpsychism, but to review the ways that panpsychism has been used in philosophy of religion to construct different models of God, or satisfy the religious temperament. Panpsychism is a theory about the mind with undeniable, if malleable, religious significance.

First, this paper will outline what is meant by panpsychism and the different types of panpsychism currently under discussion in the literature. Subsequent sections will then analyse a range of instances where scholars have paired panpsychism with a model of God, including atheism, pantheism, panentheism, and traditional monotheism. The purpose of this survey is to show that panpsychism is a theologically flexible philosophy of mind. Since panpsychism has been associated very strongly with some models of God and not others, I want to stress this flexibility. However, it is not quite right to say that when it comes to panpsychism and belief in God just anything goes. Instead, this paper shows that different types of panpsychism pair with different ideas about God in complex ways. Sometimes the

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pairing between the model of God and the version of panpsychism is a very strong connection, bordering on logical entailment, and sometimes it is much weaker like a structural similarity or fittingness.

## 2 | WHAT IS PANPSYCHISM?

Most simply, panpsychism is the general claim that all things ('pan') have mentality ('psyche'). More precisely, panpsychism is a family of views that all hold that mind is a fundamental and ubiquitous feature of reality. To claim that mentality is fundamental is to say that mind(s) can neither be explained in terms of, nor reduced to, anything non-mental. This is in contrast to physicalists, who claim that the mind can be reduced to physicality, and to emergentists, who claim that minds arise out of the behaviour and structure of non-mental materials and forces. Substance dualists will also claim that the mind is fundamental in this sense, but not that it is ubiquitous or fundamental throughout the universe. Panpsychism could be articulated in a more dualistic way, as a dualism all the way down, or in a more monistic way, whereby the world is made of one kind of stuff that is psychophysical or purely mental (as in idealism). Panpsychists differ on this matter.

Whether to panpsychism is best articulated in a dualist, dual-aspect monist, or idealist form is not the only issue panpsychists disagree with each other about. There are currently three major internal disputes, each of which has broadly two kinds of answers, resulting in eighteen possible varieties of panpsychism. One of the purposes of this paper is to show that, whilst panpsychism is generally a very flexible position theologically, the different types of panpsychism correlate to different models of God. This in turn corresponds to the different motivations that theologians and philosophers of religion have for including panpsychism into their worldview. In order to make this argument, I first need to sketch out the different versions of panpsychism.

The three questions panpsychists dispute are as follows: (1) How should we understand the mentality of fundamental entities? (2) What is the fundamental level of reality? (3) How do fundamental minds relate to human minds?

The range of answers to question one can be split into categories; Subject Panpsychism and Panprotopsychoism. When defining mentality or psyche at the fundamental level, very few panpsychists have ever posited full-blown human self-consciousness, rationality, intentionality, emotion, etc. as fundamental. Even for subject panpsychists, fundamental subjectivity is something much more simple and basic than anything humans enjoy. Following recent trends in analytic philosophy of mind, this is often defined along the view of consciousness put forward by Thomas Nagel, that "there is something it is like to be" a particular organism or, for panpsychists, a fundamental entity (Nagel, 1974, p.435). Leibniz helpfully stresses the negative here. In contrast to the "*consciousness*, or the reflective knowledge of the internal state" which we would call *self-consciousness*, his monads were more than mechanical despite experiencing only a "prolonged unconsciousness", "a profound dreamless sleep" or a "state of stupor" (Leibniz, 1899, pp.224, 230, 231). These phrases helpfully undercut the human fixation with self-conscious rationality, but they are still too anthropomorphic. We simply cannot know what it is like to be an electron or the universe and so our language fails us.

Pan-proto-psychoists think that even basic subjectivity or consciousness (even Nagel's something it is like to be conscious) is too much to posit at the fundamental level, and so instead they posit something that is proto-mental but still non-physical (i.e. qualities, intentions/dispositions, and *dharmas*. Coleman, 2017; Lockwood, 1989, p. 78; Pfeifer, 2016; Chadha, 2022). Panprotopsychoists claim that fundamental proto-mentality does not (yet) amount to subjectivity or consciousness, but may become a conscious subject, or come to constitute conscious experience, under the right conditions. Since panprotopsychoists deny the basic panpsychist claim that mind is fundamental, panprotopsychoism is better seen as a splinter group that has broken off from panpsychism, rather than a sub-type of panpsychism itself.<sup>1</sup>

The second dispute splits panpsychists into Micropsychists and Cosmopsychists. Micropsychists claim that the fundamental level of reality is the parts that make up our (multi)universe, the building blocks of reality, such as electrons, quarks, or quantum wave/particles. Cosmopsychists, often inspired by Jonathan Schaffer's 'priority monism',

claim that the fundamental level of reality is the universe considered as a single whole (Jaskolla & Buck, 2012; Nagasawa & Wager, 2017; Schaffer, 2010). Everything else is an individuation out of and within this larger whole. As we shall see, this second dispute is significant one when it comes to pairing panpsychism with models of God.

Panpsychism, at least within philosophy of mind, is a theory that primarily aims to give an account of human consciousness. (Panpsychism has other purposes in ecophilosophy, philosophy of science, and, as we see here, philosophy of religion. See, for example, Mathews, 2011) Therefore, one of the most important questions facing panpsychists is what kind of explanatory relationship exists between fundamental minds and human minds? Again, there are two broad camps. The first option is constitutive panpsychism where the fundamental minds constitute human consciousness, such that human consciousness is nothing over and above the sum of fundamental consciousness just as a car is nothing over and above the parts organised car-wise. The hope is that constitutive panpsychism (particularly constitutive micropsychism that sees mentality as the internal quiddity of matter) will maintain causal closure and avoid the dualist's interaction problem. The second option is non-constitutive panpsychism where human minds are made from, but exist over and above, fundamental minds. Non-constitutive panpsychism often invokes emergence theory or fusion in order to spell out this relation further (Brüntrup, 2017; Mørch, 2018; Seager, 2010). The hope of non-constitutive panpsychism is to maintain a robust notion of human free will and to keep the kind of mentality posited at the fundamental level as minimal as possible.

Panpsychists must choose a position on each of these disputes, so the six views I have outlined here combine to form eighteen alternative forms of panpsychism (i.e. one might adopt subject constitutive micro-psychism, or a non-constitutive cosmo-proto-psychism, etc.). Much more could be said about what motivates panpsychism in the first place, but I have omitted this since it is not the intention of this paper to argue for the truth of panpsychism. Given the confines of space, this sketch is sufficient for considering how different forms of panpsychism pair with different models of God.

### 3 | WHEN THERE IS NO GOD: ATHEISM AND THE RELIGIOUS TEMPERAMENT

In 1979, analytic philosopher Thomas Nagel, published an essay simply entitled "Panpsychism". More clearly than ever before, Nagel presented the idea that "the basic constituents of the universe have mental properties", without any religious connotations (Nagel, 1979, p.181). Nagel's basic argument is that if we accept that humans are made from one type of metaphysical stuff (matter), that consciousness is real, and that consciousness can neither be reduced to nor emerge out of matter, then the only remaining option is that the matter itself already contains consciousness. Of course, there is another option, to evoke in supernatural divine action to explain the appearance of consciousness in an otherwise material world, but this is not an option that Nagel considers. One way to interpret the recent revival in panpsychism in analytic philosophy is the result of a growing dissatisfaction with currently available positions combined with the refusal to give up on atheistic naturalism, no matter how counterintuitive the result to the Western analytic mind.

This is the main motivation for David J. Chalmers' interest in panpsychism, or what he calls "naturalistic dualism" (1996, pp.xii-xiii). Chalmers writes that he is motivated by a desire to take consciousness seriously", as a phenomenon that cannot be reduced to physical function, but also to "take science seriously" as our best way of understanding the world (ibid.). Chalmers's adopts a fairly reductionist and unificationist picture of natural science as trying to explain the maximum amount of phenomena by appealing to only "a few fundamental entities connected by fundamental laws" (Chalmers, 1997, p.20). He, therefore, thinks that the best way to understand consciousness naturalistically and scientifically is to posit fundamental psychophysical entities and laws. He is keen to emphasise that there is "nothing particularly spiritual or mystical" about these entities or laws (Chalmers, 1997, p.20). Elsewhere he writes, "There is nothing especially transcendental about consciousness; it is just another natural phenomenon... to embrace dualism is not necessarily to embrace mystery" (Chalmers, 1996, p.127). Here panpsychism, and specifically constitutive micropsychism, is used as a way to keep theism in all its guises out of philosophy of mind.

As we track these philosophers further, we see a softening of the line between these recent atheistic explorations of panpsychism and religiosity. This has happened along two different trajectories. The first way that atheistic panpsychism has softened towards broadly spiritual worldviews is by a tentative exploration more holistic and idealist forms of cosmopsychism (Chalmers, 2020; Goff, 2017; Strawson, 2020). As is discussed below, such versions of panpsychism have long been associated with Eastern philosophies and religions (see, Ganeri & Shani, 2022).<sup>2</sup> For Western philosophers the turn to consider cosmopsychism is largely a response to the so-called 'combination problem'. If we cannot explain human consciousness by combining many smaller individual subjects or proto-subjects, then, the argument goes; perhaps human consciousness is one part or aspect of a larger, cosmic subject or proto-subject. Once a philosopher has posited the existence of a cosmic mind, the question inevitably arises— should we call this mind 'god'? Goff (2017, p.243) claims, "Cosmopsychism does not entail pantheism.... The consciousness of the universe is simply a mess". Strawson, similarly describing himself as "a passionate physicalist naturalist atheist" and writes that "If there were such a [cosmic] subject, it wouldn't, I think, be any sort of agent" (Strawson, 2020, p.335). These panpsychist philosophers have seen the bridge from panpsychism to more religious views, such as pantheism, but here they are choosing not to cross it.

The second route is exemplified by (again) Thomas Nagel and Philip Goff. In "Secular Philosophy and the Religious Temperament," Nagel argues that "the question 'What am I doing here?'... doesn't just go away when science replaces a religious world view" (Nagel, 2010, p.8). What is needed, he says, is "a view of the world that can play a certain role in the inner life", a way to feel connected, complete, and live in harmony with the universe (Nagel, 2010, p.4-5). Nagel wonders if there is a secular alternative to, or version of, the "all-encompassing mind or spiritual principle" of the religious temperament that might be grounded in an evolutionary understanding of humanity. In his subsequent 2012 book, *Mind and Cosmos*, Nagel seems to provide an affirmative answer to this question. Here, Nagel uses panpsychism to re-enchant the universe with natural teleology and intrinsic meaning. Nagel does not think that panpsychism and teleological naturalism are incompatible with theism (Nagel, 2012, p. 95). Nevertheless, he attempts to use panpsychism to fill the existential and explanatory void left when belief in God has already been ruled out.

Goff has recently embraced the potential religious implications of panpsychism by speculating on its connection to mystical experiences, cosmic fine-tuning, and morality (Goff, 2018; Goff, 2019, pp.206-07, 213; Goff, 2020, pp.118-121). Goff first considers whether cosmopsychism could provide a non-religious alternative explanation of fine-tuning instead of any form of theism (Goff, 2018). Later, Goff tentatively employs 'God' language to refer to the universal consciousness of his cosmopsychism, but we get a view that is neither pantheism nor panentheism, but more like the reverse, "theosenpanism" (Goff, 2020, p.120). As Goff writes, on such a view "God/universal consciousness is an aspect of the physical universe, but the nature of the physical universe is not exhausted by God/universal consciousness" (Goff, 2020, p.120). Like Nagel, Goff's panpsychism cannot (yet) be associated with any established model of God, but it does seek to satisfy the religious yearnings of humanity. Seeking to alleviate the same "cosmic alienation" that worries Nagel (Goff, 2019, p.216), Goff writes that "On the panpsychist view, the universe is *like us*; we *belong* in it... panpsychism can help humans once again to feel that they have a place in the universe." (Goff, 2019, p.217). I am almost certain that it is inaccurate to group Goff in the 'atheists' in this article, but we await further publications before this can be confirmed.

#### 4 | WHEN MIND IS GOD: PANTHEISM AND POLYTHEISM

Pantheism is, very generally, the view that everything (pan) is God (theism). The most straightforward way to relate panpsychism to pantheism is to claim that 'mentality' is identical to 'divinity'; they are two words for the same substance or set of properties. Then the claim 'everything is God' is synonymous with the claim 'everything is mental'. If mentality is identical with divinity then pantheism and idealist cosmopsychism seem to entail one another, and micropsychism (or any view that posits more than one mind) becomes a form of polytheism (Nagasawa, 2020). But this reasoning is too hasty.

There are different versions of pantheism that define 'everything', 'God', and even the little preposition 'is' in subtly different ways. As Michael Levine correctly notes pantheism and panpsychism do not "entail one another, and the suggestion that pantheism and panpsychism naturally go together is vague apart from specific accounts of the two positions" (Levine, 1994, p. 114). We have already seen that some panpsychists flat-out deny religious or pantheistic interpretations of their position. But even for those who want to interpret panpsychism pantheistically, it is important to bear in mind that not every version of pantheism is compatible with every version of panpsychism.

I will discuss two historically influential combinations of panpsychism and pantheism. The most well-known Western thinker to combine panpsychism and pantheism is Baruch Spinoza. Moreover, Spinoza's pantheism entails, or just is, panpsychism (Lin, 2020). For Spinoza, there is one infinite, eternal, necessary and fundamental substance, which he calls God or Nature. Spinoza's pantheism is radically monistic. God/Nature is self-creating through thought, and in thinking about itself it extends itself physically. In this way, Spinoza's pantheism entails something like a dual-aspect cosmopsychism. Thought and extension are seen as the same activity, or rather as two ways of describing the same one substance. Spinoza is a panpsychist for an additional reason, in that he views every idea that God/Nature has (every derivative mode of God/Nature's being) as a mind and as a living subject. Every star, cabbage, and grain of sand has, to some degree relative to its physical complexity, its own mind. This is because everything in the world is an idea that God/Nature has when thinking of itself; there is no clear distinction between subjects (minds) and objects (ideas). We might note that the purpose of Spinoza's pantheism and panpsychism are the same; to overcome dualisms of various kinds. This is the motivation for many panpsychists, as well as many pantheists and panentheists. This shared ambition is what drives some scholars to combine these positions together.

The second pantheist position to consider is even more radically monistic and idealist; the Advaita Vedanta school of Indian philosophy. The commentaries of Adi Śaṅkara, which give a monistic reading to the Vedic canon, have a soteriological goal (*mokṣa*, spiritual liberation) and identify personal (*saguṇa*) Brahma as God (Īśvara), whose manifestations are the objects of worship and daily devotion. A number of contemporary authors have sought to explore the connection between analytic panpsychism and Advaita Vedanta, and investigated whether this ancient Indian philosophical tradition can aid contemporary panpsychists in resolving the combination problem (Albahari, 2019, 2020, 2022; Ganeri, 2022; Gasparri, 2019; Leidenhag, 2021b; Vaidya, 2020).

Śaṅkara's monism holds that Brahman alone is real (*sat*) and, as the Absolute impersonal (*nirguṇa*) Brahman, is "tranquil consciousness undisturbed by differences." (Bartley, 2015, p.183). There is a metaphysical unity between the self (*Ātman*) and Brahman: "*Brahman* is *Ātman* and *Ātman* is *Brahman*." As such, Advaita Vedanta can be interpreted as a cosmopsychist position, where there is one fundamental, cosmic mind that explains the appearance of human consciousness (see Fasching, 2022). The key difference to most analytic cosmopsychists is that to Śaṅkara the cosmos and the subjects therein, are *mithyā*, neither real nor unreal (Leidenhag, 2021b, p.7-10). There is nothing to be explained by combination or individuation and any such attempt is a product of *avidyā* (ignorance). The goal of Śaṅkara's philosophy is not to explain consciousness, but to liberate us from the illusion of individuality.

What we see in all pantheistic visions of panpsychism is a strong tendency towards constitutive cosmopsychism. This is because of the importance of unity for pantheism. It is not enough for the pantheist to say that everything is divine, since the claim that everything is a divine individual could be a radical polytheism. Instead, pantheism views the world as "an all-inclusive divine unity" (Levine, 1994, p.2) or claims both "that everything that exists constitutes a unity and that this all-inclusive unity is divine." (MacIntyre, 1967, p.34). This all-inclusive unity within the world and between the world and God means pantheists who embrace panpsychism are constrained to adopt a constitutive, rather than non-constitutive, panpsychism as well as affirm cosmopsychism, rather than micropsychism (Leidenhag, 2019).

## 5 | WHEN EVERYTHING IS IN GOD: PANENTHEISM AND PAN(EN)THEOSIS

Panentheism seeks a middle-path claiming that God is more than the world (*contra* pantheism) but not separate from the world (*contra* traditional theism).<sup>3</sup> Several philosophers have noted that panentheism has "astonishing structural

similarities" with panpsychism, as positions that are neither exactly forms of monism or dualism but something in between (Brüntrup & Göcke, 2020, p.1). Indeed, it is this structural similarity and the perceived ability to articulate a robust sense of divine immanence that most often motivates panentheists to incorporate panpsychism into their worldview. Yet, as with pantheism, not all types of panpsychism are amenable to panentheists (Leidenhag, 2020). If panentheists want to use panpsychism to express divine immanence by claiming that fundamental consciousness can be identified with a single omnipresent divine being, then cosmopsychism will be more attractive than micropsychism. In this section I consider three versions of pantheistic-panpsychism; Sāṃkhya-Vedāntic philosophy, Process theism, and more explicitly Christian forms of panentheism, which are better described as pan(en)theosis.

Swami Vivekananda (1863-1902), an Indian monk credited with introducing Hinduism and Vedānta to the West, offers a pantheistic cosmopsychism by combining aspects of two Indian schools; Sāṃkhya's dualist philosophy and the radical monism of Advaita Vedānta discussed above (Maharaj, 2020). Like Śāṅkara, Vivekananda sees Brahman as the one universal consciousness, namely as both apophatic-impersonal (*nirguṇa*) and cataphatic-personal God (*īśvara*). But following his guru Sri Ramakrishna, Vivekananda argues that the Advaitan negation of the world as illusory (*maya*) is only the first stage of liberation, call *jñānī*. The second stage, *vijñānī*, is the realization that all things are real manifestations of Brahman (Maharaj, 2020, p.280). Contemporary philosopher and Ramakrishna monk, Ayon Maharaj, describes this position as a cosmopsychist panentheism because all things are a manifestation of Brahman, the universal consciousness, but do not exhaust Brahman. Brahman is more than her manifestations in the world.<sup>4</sup>

In Western philosophy, perhaps the most influential pantheist-panpsychist system is Whiteheadian Process philosophy. Whitehead wanted to overcome Cartesian dualism by conceiving of a world with "no arbitrary breaks" between mind and matter (Whitehead, 1967, p.73). To do this, Whitehead posited that "the final real things of which the world is made up" are "drops of experience, complex and independent" together forming an "ocean of feeling" (Whitehead, 1978, p.18, p.166). Whitehead's panpsychism is commonly referred to as pan-*experientialism*, because the world and everything in it is a society of fleeting experiences, rather than enduring substances or subjects.

Whitehead never used the term 'panentheism', but his most famous student, Charles Hartshorne (who popularized the term in the English speaking world), considered Whiteheadian philosophy to exemplify panentheism (Hartshorne & Reese, 1953, p.273). As contemporary Process theologian David Ray Griffin describes, Process thought is a pantheistic position because, "What exists necessarily is not God alone, but God-and-a-world" (Griffin, 1989, pp.48-49). Whitehead's God actualizes the world by offering possibilities for actual occasions to choose, and then receives all actual occasions (experiences) into the divine life, immortalizing them as they affect Godself (Whitehead, 1978, pp.50, 104-05). In this way, all actual occasions (the world) are in God, but God is more than the sum total of all actual occasions.

Process theologians rearticulate Christian doctrine through Whiteheadian metaphysics, but they are not the only Christian thinkers to combine panentheism with panpsychism. Two further, and notably different, Christian theologians deserve mention; Russian orthodox theologian Sergei Bulgakov and French Jesuit palaeontologist Peirre Teilhard de Chardin. Bulgakov and Teilhard introduce a more eschatological perspective on panentheism – that the panpsychist world *will be* taken up fully into the divine being. We might even call their view pan(en)-*theosis*, rather than just pan(en)theism (Meixner, 2020, p.220).

Bulgakov's panpsychist panentheism is located in his controversial idea of Sophia. Sophia is the *unfolding* Divine *ousia*, which Bulgakov also called the subsistent divine life and divine world. The Divine Sophia is alive and conscious, and contains all the ideas (in the sense of Platonic forms) of creation and is "the divine ground of creaturely existence" that "unites the world with his [God's] divine life." (Meixner, 2020, p.218; Bulgakov, 1993, pp.73-74). Just as the Divine Sophia is alive and conscious so too is the creaturely Sophia, which constitutes all created things, alive and conscious. Therefore, Bulgakov's panentheism entails that consciousness is fundamental and ubiquitous in creation. The divine and creaturely Sophia are identified with the two natures (and minds) of Chalcedonian Christology.<sup>5</sup> In the incarnation, the perfect union of God and the world, of the divine and creaturely Sophia, has been achieved and from this Bulgakov argued we can know that at the end of time, God will be all in all. This is a distinctively Christian panentheism that makes salvation history central to its metaphysical God-world model, and is best described as a pan-theōsis (all things will come to participate in God).

Teilhard de Chardin takes pantheōsis further through his idea of the Christification of the universe; the purpose of creation is to be absorbed into Christ's divine-human body. This Christological vision of a deified creation is combined with Teilhard's enthusiasm for evolutionary theory. Teilhard took the continuity of evolution to mean that "we are logically forced to assume the existence in rudimentary form... of some sort of psyche in every corpuscle, even in those (the mega-molecules and below) whose complexity is of such a low or modest order as to render it (the psyche) imperceptible." (Teilhard, 1955, pp.301-302) He even described the very process of evolution as "the movement of consciousness veiled by morphology" guided by the "great law of complexity and consciousness" (Teilhard, 1955, pp.61, 167). Panpsychism allows Teilhard to interpret evolution as the divine mechanism for the deification of creation.

## 6 | WHEN EVERYTHING IS CREATED BY GOD: TRADITIONAL MONOTHEISM

When panpsychism is combined with pantheism, panentheism, or polytheism it is often because mentality or consciousness is taken to be either identical with, or sufficiently similar to the divine essence. However, for traditional theists, consciousness is a contingent part of creation, just as matter is. As explored in this final section, it is perfectly possible to be a panpsychist and a traditional theist (*contra*, Skrbina, 2009, p.1 and Moreland, 2008, p.118).

My primary historical representative for combining traditional Christian theism with panpsychism is Gottfried Wilhelm von Leibniz. There are others examples I might have chosen to show how panpsychism can be used in support of traditional theism, but Leibniz metaphysics is one of the most explicit panpsychist ontologies in Western history, and he is a staunch and uncompromising proponent of classical theism. Unlike most of the pantheist and panentheist proposals outlined above, Leibniz developed a micropsychist version of panpsychism. (There is no logical reason a classical theist could not adopt cosmopsychism, as long as the cosmic consciousness was also a creature dependent upon God, like the ancient world soul). According to Leibniz, the universe is made up entirely of monads. Monads are simple substances with experiential centres called substantial forms (Leibniz, 1969, pp.530, 643). The substantial form is a soul in humans and animals with memories and an entelechy in smaller animals and plants, which do not have memory. Monads have two properties for Leibniz, appetite and perception. Through perception, each monad is "a mirror of the whole universe from its own special point of view" (Leibniz, 1969, p. 649). For Leibniz, a created thing either is a monad, an aggregate of monads (like a clock), or a community of monads with a shared *telos* (a body). Thus, nowhere is "fallow, sterile, or dead" but all space is filled with monads, each unique and together forming a "plenum" of living creatures (Leibniz, 1989, p. 222).

It is clear that Leibniz is a panpsychist, but how does this relate to his model of God? Leibniz's God is bound up with his commitment to the Principle of Sufficient Reason; "we hold that there can be no fact real or existing, no statement true, unless there be a sufficient reason, why it should be so and not otherwise, although these reasons usually cannot be known by us" (Leibniz, 1899, p. 235). God, for Leibniz, is the "ultimate reason of things" and this for him means that God created the universe *ex nihilo* out of a free, rational, choice. Why did God create this universe of monads, as opposed to another type of universe? Leibniz answers this question by saying that it is "in conformity with the greatest and beauty of the works of God for him to produce as many substance[s] as there can be in this universe... it is a perfection of nature to have many [souls]" (Leibniz, 1899, p. 247). Moreover, through perception, the infinite number of monads produce "greater light, the mirror blending the light not only in the individual eye but also among each other. The gathered splendour produces glory" (Leibniz, 1969, p. 214). Leibniz's motivation for panpsychism is bound up with his theism. A panpsychist universe is, according to Leibniz, the type of universe that gives most glory to its transcendent Creator. Therefore, it is the universe God had sufficient reason to choose to create.

In my own work, I extend Leibniz's argument by incorporating Jewish and Christian biblical and liturgical texts that speak of creation glorifying God (Leidenhag, 2021a, pp.160-170). The prophetic and wisdom literature of the Hebrew Bible, and a few places in the Christian New Testament, depict nature as having a voice. These texts are clearly poetic, but they are not *merely* poetic—that is, they are not without referent in the real world.



Given that mountains, stars, trees and rocks do not have voice boxes, it is unsurprising that some of nature's illocution is also depicted in the Hebrew bible in non-anthropomorphic verbs like "quake" (Ps. 99:1) of the earth, and "roar" of the oceans (Ps. 87:7). In Jeremiah 12:4 the land is said to "mourn", which also connotes a sense of drying up and growing black. These descriptions are in keeping with the responses expected from the natural world, but that is not to suggest they are not speech acts. As Rowan Williams writes, "the bare fact is that the material world *speaks*" (Williams, 2014, p.123). Williams extends the evolutionary grounds of human language deep into our embodied connection to the material world because "material objects and the material world as such are always already 'saturated' with the world of mind." (Williams, 2014, p.101-103) The place of fundamental mentality in such a Christian theology is not as an aspect of the model of God, but as a creaturely community, perhaps even as fellow worshipers in a cosmic church (Leidenhag, 2021, p.164-170).

## 7 | CONCLUSION

Whilst I have not argued for the truth of panpsychism in this paper, it is a view that deserves to be taken seriously. Ancient and contemporary thinkers from a wide variety of traditions around the world have felt the need to explain human consciousness by positing mentality as a fundamental and ubiquitous feature of the universe. Panpsychism is not one view but a family of views and, like all families, there are disagreements and differences. Put most simply, panpsychists agree that everything is or contains psyche, but the definition of 'everything' and 'psyche' as well as the relationship between them can differ significantly.

What this paper sought to do is show how different versions of panpsychism relate to different models of God. There were few entailments here, and any that there were, were conditional on questionable prior assumptions – such as that mentality is, or is continuous with, divinity. When this assumption is made then we can get fine-grained in pairing forms of panpsychism with models of God. Constitutive subject cosmopsychism will likely produce a personal pantheism; a constitutive cosmo-proto-psychism an impersonal pantheism, and a non-constitutive subject cosmopsychism a personal panentheism. Panpsychism is a theologically flexible position. Its role within religious systems depends not only on the form of panpsychism that is adopted, but also on other commitments and assumptions that are made about the relationship between mentality and divinity. We started off by seeing how panpsychism was used to keep theism (of any kind) out of philosophy of mind, or satisfy the atheists religious temperament. We ended by seeing that mentality is created, such that human subjectivity stands in continuity with all creation but God remains radically transcendent. There is no reason that panpsychism cannot be combined with traditional monotheism.

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## CONFLICT OF INTEREST

I confirm that I am the sole author of this manuscript, that there are no known conflicts of interest associated with this publication and there has been no significant financial support for this work that could have influenced its outcome.

## ORCID

Joanna Leidenhag  <https://orcid.org/0000-0002-1164-7032>



## ENDNOTES

- <sup>1</sup> I thank an anonymous reviewer for suggesting this as a clearer way to carve up the terrain.
- <sup>2</sup> As representatives of atheistic uses of panpsychism, Chalmers, Strawson and (this earlier work from) Goff should not be taken as representative for how cosmopsychism might be paired with philosophy of religion more broadly. As explored in later sections of this paper, other philosophers have been far more unapologetic in their pairing of holistic and idealistic version of panpsychism with a particular model of God; see, Mathews (2011), Shani (2015, 2022), Albahari (2019, 2020, 2022); Medhananda (2022); Ganeri (2022).
- <sup>3</sup> Note, not all panentheists believe it is necessary to differentiate their position from pantheism. See, Lancaster, 2014, pp.390-92, and Meixner, 2020, pp.205-07.
- <sup>4</sup> Due to restrictions on space I have omitted discussion of Rāmānuja's Viśiṣṭādvaita Vedānta tradition, which combines cosmopsychism with the panentheistic affirmation of the world as the body of God (Brahman). See Vaidya, 2022, Leidenhag, 2021b, Barua, 2010).
- <sup>5</sup> 'Chalcedonian Christology' refers to Christian teaching about Jesus Christ, which was agreed upon at the Council of Chalcedon in 451 CE. Chalcedon is recognized as the official teaching of Eastern Orthodox and Roman Catholic (and many Protestant) churches. The agreement states that Jesus Christ was one person (*hypostasis*) with two natures (*ousia*), and therefore simultaneously fully divine and fully human. This is emphasised again by saying Jesus is one substance (*homoousios*) with God the Father and that his wholly human mother, the Virgin Mary, is the God-bearer (*theotokos*). What is confusing for many modern readers is that in the ancient world the will and mind went with the natures, not the person, such that Jesus is held to have two minds (one divine and one human) but still be one unified person.

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## AUTHOR BIOGRAPHY

**Dr Joanna Leidenhag** is Lecturer in Theology and Liberal Arts at the University of Leeds. She has published widely on panpsychism and its religious implications. This includes the monograph, *Minding Creation: Theological Panpsychism* (Bloomsbury/T&T Clark, 2021), and articles in leading academic journals such as, *Philosophy, Theology, and the Sciences*, *Scottish Journal of Theology*, *Sophia*, and *Journal of Consciousness Studies*.

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