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ARTICLE

The Values of Intellectual Transparency

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ABSTRACT

In a recent book and journal article, I have developed an account of intellectual transparency as an other-regarding intellectual virtue, and have explored its conceptual relationship to the virtue of honesty. This paper aims to further advance understanding of intellectual transparency by examining some of the ways in which the trait is instrumentally valuable. Specifically, I argue that intellectual transparency tends to enhance its possessor's close personal relationships, work performance, and civic engagement. On account of their intellectual transparency, the intellectually transparent person is likely to enjoy better quality, more satisfied personal relationships such as romantic relationships and friendships. They are likely to contribute to better work outcomes, especially when working in a team context. And, they are likely to be more civically active and to promote epistemic values of democratic deliberation.

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As the field of virtue epistemology has blossomed in recent years, many authors have given attention to developing accounts of specific intellectual virtues (see, e.g. Battaly 2019, Part 2). These efforts have tended to focus on self-regarding intellectual virtues rather than other-regarding intellectual virtues (cf. Kawall 2002). Yet, there are signs that this is beginning to change, with some authors giving attention to virtuous ways of caring for others' acquisition of knowledge and understanding (e.g. King 2021; ch. 7; Wright 2021). Research in the latter area includes some of my own work, where in a recent book (Byerly 2021) and journal article (Byerly forthcoming) I have developed an account of intellectual transparency as an other-regarding intellectual virtue, and have explored its conceptual relationship to the virtue of honesty. This paper aims to further advance understanding of intellectual transparency by examining some of the ways in which the trait is instrumentally valuable – a topic not yet explored in detail in the literature. Specifically, I will argue that intellectual transparency tends to enhance its possessor's close personal relationships, work performance, and civic engagement.

The arguments I will develop to support these conclusions are partly conceptual and partly empirical. The conceptual arguments aim to show that intellectual transparency is conceptually related to known features or antecedents of high-quality personal relationships, work, civic engagement, or democratic deliberation in such a way as to lead us to expect that intellectual transparency promotes better quality outcomes in these areas, other things being equal. The empirical arguments draw upon the joint work that I and Megan Haggard (Byerly and Haggard unpublished manuscript) have undertaken to develop a measure of intellectual transparency and to examine its relationships to other virtues, personality traits, and behaviors. These arguments will show how our findings, together with original secondary analysis of this data (Byerly and Haggard 2022) reported here, lend

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further support to thinking that intellectual transparency has the hypothesized instrumental values in the real world, where other things may not be equal.

1. Intellectual Transparency

I begin with a brief presentation of intellectual transparency as I have defined it. In previous work, I have situated intellectual transparency as one of the virtues of the 'intellectually dependable person' – the sort of person on whom others, including groups of others, can depend in their inquiries. To be this kind of person, I argued, it is not enough to possess true beliefs or knowledge or skills for gaining such – features often associated with expertise (e.g. Goldman 2018). Being intellectually dependable also centrally involves possessing a suite of other-regarding intellectual virtues which are distinct from and needn't require expertise. This suite of virtues includes intellectual benevolence, communicative clarity, audience sensitivity, epistemic guidance, and – our focus here – intellectual transparency.

Intellectual transparency is concerned specifically with the domain of sharing one's perspective with others.[1] As a distinctively other-regarding intellectually virtuous character trait, intellectual transparency is oriented toward and ultimately motivated by promoting others' epistemic goods. Thus, as I've defined it, intellectual transparency is "a tendency to faithfully share one's perspective on topics of others' inquiries with these others out of a motivation to promote their epistemic goods" (2021, 105). The intellectually transparent person values others' attainment of goods such as knowledge, understanding, and true belief, and they understand that sometimes they can promote these goods for others by faithfully sharing their perspective with them. To the extent and in the ways that sharing their perspective can help others attain such goods, they will be *ceteris paribus* inclined to do so. Of course, sharing their perspective will not always be conducive to promoting others' epistemic goods (e.g. where it is clear others already have access to the information contained in one's perspective, or are demonstrably unreceptive to it), and intellectual transparency will not dispose its possessor toward sharing their perspective faithfully in these cases.

The idea of a 'perspective' plays an important role in my thinking about intellectual transparency. Perspectives are richly complex things. They include a person's beliefs, but also their intuitions, experiences, conceptual schemes, arguments, evidential standards, and intellectual tendencies. We might put it this way: when a person shares their perspective with another on the topic of that other's inquiry, what they share is their 'take' on that topic. There's a lot, beyond just beliefs (whether true or false), that might be a part of such a 'take'.

The complexity of perspectives helps to illuminate the role that skill plays in my account of transparency.[2] When I say that the intellectually transparent person tends to 'faithfully' share their perspective, I am alluding to such skill – two kinds of skill, in fact. The first kind of skill pertains to self-knowledge. The intellectually transparent person is good at figuring out what their own perspective in fact is. Having this sort of self-knowledge isn't always easy, and in some cases the intellectually transparent person may get it wrong. But part of their intellectual transparency is that they are at least good at getting it right.

Intellectual transparency also involves skills in communicating one's perspective to others. This requires, for example, a sophisticated vocabulary for distinguishing between such things as when one believes a claim is false and when one does not believe a claim is true, or when one is in possession of an argument for a claim's truth and when one is in possession of a response to an argument for a claim's falsity. It also requires skill in enabling others to enter into and appreciate how things appear from one's perspective. Thus, virtuous intellectual transparency involves skills of self-understanding and skills of self-disclosure to others. As with the skills of self-understanding, the skills of self-disclosure aren't infallible, and whether others capitalize on what is communicated by the intellectually transparent person is in part up to them.

While there is more that could be said about the ins and outs of intellectual transparency, what has been said thus far should suffice for our purposes. Intellectual transparency is a character trait

that involves tending to skilfully attend to one's own perspective and communicate this perspective to others well so as to advance others' epistemic goods. The focus of the present paper is to consider ways in which intellectual transparency might be instrumentally valuable – a topic that is not explored in detail elsewhere. This topic is one that is worthy of consideration in its own right. But it is also one that some virtue theorists may take a particular interest in if they are committed to the thesis that virtues must benefit their possessor.[3] If intellectual transparency has the instrumental values discussed here, this increases the plausibility that it also tends to benefit its possessor by enriching their social, vocational, and civic life.

2. Intellectual Transparency and Close Personal Relationships

This section is concerned with the instrumental value of intellectual transparency for a person's close personal relationships, such as romantic relationships or friendships. The basic argument of the section can be stated fairly straightforwardly as follows. A person is in a better position to have satisfying, lasting personal relationships if they are competent and inclined to disclose themself to their relationship partner. But, being intellectual transparent makes one more competent and inclined toward self-disclosure than does not being intellectually transparent. So, being intellectually transparent puts one in a better position to have satisfying, lasting personal relationships than does not being intellectually transparent. I'll discuss support for each premise in turn.

First, we can observe that both philosophers and social scientists have stressed the value of self-disclosure for lasting, satisfying personal relationships. Laurence Thomas, a philosopher, identifies the 'bond of self-revealing trust' (2012, 31) as the foundation of the best kind of friendship – companion friendship. While he acknowledges that self-disclosure has important roles to play in other kinds of close relationships such as those between parents and children and romantic partners, Thomas wishes to stress the place of self-disclosure and self-disclosing trust in friendships specifically. He notes that, unlike in these other kinds of relationships, friendships tend to be initiated precisely via encounters in which one finds that they can trust the other to understand what they disclose about themselves. When friendships continue and build, they do so through further encounters that likewise involve successful self-disclosure and through which friends discern whether 'they can mightily trust one another to understand what she or he says'. Indeed, Thomas suggests that it is typical for friends that in 'any given routine conversation between them their self-disclosing trust in one another will manifest itself in some way or the other' (33).

The mutual self-disclosure and self-disclosing trust between friends is also central to the value of friendship for Thomas. He writes that 'The very majesty of friendship is due in large part to the fact that each can count on the other to understand what she or he says in just the way that the person meant to say it' (31–2). Companion friendships thus offer a unique opportunity for people to achieve deep understanding of another, and to be deeply understood by another, through mutual self-disclosure. Friendship 'permits extraordinary refinement on the part of each friend with respect to the character, personality, and views of each other' (34).

Eleonore Stump (2006) makes similar remarks in developing an account of love inspired by Thomas Aquinas. On this account, love involves two distinct and interdependent desires. First, the lover desires the well-being of the beloved. Well-being here is evaluated against an objective standard, as the desire for 'those things which in fact contribute to the beloved's flourishing' (28). Secondly, the lover desires a kind of union with the beloved that is appropriate to their relationship. This desire for union involves a desire for 'the sort of sharing and closeness suitable for the persons so related' (31). The nature of the relationship between the persons circumscribes and delimits what sort of sharing and closeness is suitable for them, but in any loving relationship, some sort of sharing and closeness is suitable and must be desired. As Stump puts it, 'Whatever exactly union consists in, it is clear that in order to unite with the beloved, the lover must share something of himself with her' (33).

These philosophical proposals about the importance of sharing or disclosing oneself in close relationships are complemented by social scientific research on close relationships. Sidney Jourard, an early pioneer working on this topic, set the tone for much later research with his book, *The Transparent Self* (1971). The book, based upon Jourard's work in psychotherapy, argued that self-concealment has disastrous consequences for peoples' relationships, and that self-disclosure is needed as an antidote. As Jourard explains, 'If a man is reluctant to make himself known to another person, even to his spouse . . . then it follows that *men will be difficult to love*. That is, it will be difficult for a woman or another man to know the immediate present state of the man's self and his needs will thereby go unmet' (39). Empirical research in several different areas since the time of Jourard's writing has largely confirmed these basic ideas.

First, there is a body of research that indicates that people consider self-disclosure and skills of self-disclosure to be important in personal relationships. For instance, in a study with college students focused on their good friendships (Parks and Floyd 1996), participants were asked open-ended questions about what made these relationships 'close' in their opinion. By far the most frequently cited feature was self-disclosure, with 71% of respondents identifying this feature, while the next most frequently cited feature, support, was only selected 37% of the time. Research also indicates that features of personality or character that have a close conceptual relationship to self-disclosure are considered important for personal relationships. Research with the Values in Action (VIA) classification of character strengths has shown that both adolescents (Weber and Ruch 2012) and adults (Steen 2003) consistently rate honesty as one of the most important qualities for personal relationships. Indeed, cross-culturally, adolescents and adults tend to believe that self-disclosure strengthens relationships and they tend to engage in self-disclosure precisely for this reason (Hunter et al. 2011; Shug, Yuki, and Maddux 2010).

Nor is the importance of self-disclosure merely reflected in peoples' subjective opinions about this importance. Research using more objective measures, or subjective measures of conceptually distinct outcomes, also indicates the value that self-disclosure has for close relationships. One of the most common approaches to studying relationship maintenance focuses on discrete relationship maintenance strategies and their relationships to relationship outcomes. While there are several different measures of relationship maintenance strategies used in this literature, all of the leading measures reflect at least one factor of openness or self-disclosure that involves the partners' sharing their perspectives with one another (see Ogolsky and Monk 2018). This openness factor has been found to have medium to large correlations with relationship satisfaction, commitment, mutuality, liking, and love (Ogolsky and Bowers 2013). Self-disclosing in personal relationships provides partners with a sense of relatedness to the other (Vangelisti and Banski 1993) and contributes to the feeling that they know the other and participate in their life (Rodriguez 2014). Partners who self-disclose more experience greater emotional involvement and positive affect (Prager et al. 2015), and a meta-analysis of findings has revealed that relationships characterised by higher self-disclosure are less likely to end (Le et al. 2010).

Together, these results support the conclusion that a person's ability and inclination toward self-disclosure is highly important for their close personal relationships. Closeness itself may be partly constituted by mutual self-disclosure, and mutual self-disclosure is conducive toward many valuable features of close relationships. Of course, there can be particular circumstances in which self-disclosure is not conducive to relational closeness, and can even lead to the dissolution of a relationship (e.g. where one is disclosing infidelity; Finkenauer, Kerkhof, and Pronk 2018). But the point is that generally speaking a person who is better able to and inclined toward disclosing themselves to relationship partners is more likely to experience better quality personal relationships. As with any other virtue, we might think that the exercise of intellectual transparency in particular circumstances is best guided by practical wisdom.

Turn then to the second premise – that being intellectually transparent will make a person more able and inclined toward self-disclosure than will not being intellectually transparent. The basic idea here is also straightforward. Intellectual transparency is a tendency that involves both skills of self-

disclosure and inclinations toward self-disclosure. Specifically, it involves skills of identifying and communicating the varied aspects of one's perspective, and it involves a tendency to exercise these skills specifically in the service of promoting others' acquisition of epistemic goods such as knowledge or understanding. Possessing the skills that are constitutive of intellectual transparency puts a person in a better position to disclose themselves well to close relationship partners than does not possessing these skills. And, being inclined to exercise these skills in disclosing one's perspective to others out of a motivation to promote their epistemic goods will at least often incline one toward disclosing one's perspective to close relationship partners, whereas the absence of this motivational constituent of intellectual transparency may leave a person uninclined to disclose their perspective to their relationship partner.

This argument still holds if we acknowledge, as I think we should, that (i) there are other goods besides epistemic goods that can motivate disclosing oneself to one's relationship partners, and (ii) disclosing oneself to one's relationship partners may not always advance their epistemic goods very considerably. Regarding (ii), we can acknowledge that sometimes sharing one's perspective with one's relationship partner would do little to improve that person's understanding of the world overall; sharing one's perspective may do little to make any positive difference for how the partner thinks about important matters beyond the relationship. Yet, even in these cases, sharing one's perspective will typically contribute positively to the partner's understanding of oneself, which is an important goal in the relationship. Indeed, self-disclosure is typically valued primarily because of its role in promoting deep understanding between the relationship partners, as we saw above in Thomas's remarks. This epistemic good of deep understanding is particularly valued by the parties of a relationship, even if achieving this good does not advance other epistemic goods independent of the relationship to a significant extent. Moreover, regarding (i), it may be true that caring for other goods besides the partner's epistemic goods can motivate self-disclosure. For instance, self-disclosure in close relationships has health benefits (Uchino 2006). Valuing those health benefits could motivate self-disclosure. But, it remains clear that the person who values the epistemic goods promoted through self-disclosure for their own sake has additional reason to engage in such, beyond whatever further goods may attend to this self-disclosure.

The preceding paragraph focused mainly on the instrumental role of the motivational constituent of intellectual transparency, but the skill constituent is also highly significant. As we saw in Thomas's remarks, part of what the parties in a close relationship seek is to be understood very well by the other person. Yet, a person who has a better grasp of their own perspective and who is skilled in communicating this perspective to others is in a better position to help others understand their perspective very well. Thus, the kinds of skills that are definitional of intellectual transparency have an important role to play in putting a person in the position to achieve the goal of having another person understand them very well. In fact, these skills are relevant for how well they achieve this goal even if their motivation for pursuing it is something other than the motivation distinctive of intellectual transparency. Thus, the skills constituent and the motivational constituent of intellectual transparency are each relevant for achieving the self-disclosure that is valuable as a component of or means to high quality relationships.

The foregoing arguments for the second premise are, admittedly, conceptual in nature. There is certainly room to investigate the extent to which they might also be confirmed by empirical research. Unfortunately, intellectual transparency as an other-regarding intellectual virtue has not been studied in previously published empirical research. But, Megan Haggard and I (Byerly and Haggard unpublished manuscript) have begun to change this by developing a self-report measure of intellectual transparency guided by the conception of intellectual transparency highlighted above and by examining its relationships to other features of personality and behaviors. Our measure was created through the use of standard processes of exploratory and confirmatory factor analysis in which a large original pool of items reflecting the various aspects of intellectual transparency was ultimately reduced to a six-item, two-factor measure which is highly predictive of how individuals tend to respond to the full original item pool.[4] While our research with the measure has not thus far

focused specifically on the values that intellectual transparency might have for close relationships, some of our findings are suggestive of this value, and our data can be interrogated further here with this purpose in mind.

First, our work confirms that there is a robust relationship between intellectual transparency and honesty. We found that our measure of intellectual transparency was strongly correlated with the VIA measure of honesty ($r = .52$, $p < .001$), which, as noted above, is among the traits that people tend to judge is most important for personal relationships. This relationship is to be expected *a priori*, as I have argued (Byerly forthcoming) that intellectual transparency is probably best understood as an exceptional or ideal form of intellectual honesty or as a more cardinal virtue than the latter. As such, we might expect that a person's being intellectually transparent would lead them to be highly honest as well. Insofar as honesty may contribute to a person's self-disclosure in their personal relationships, this observed relationship between intellectual transparency and honesty supports the contention that intellectual transparency is likewise related to self-disclosure in personal relationships.

Second, Haggard and I found that intellectual transparency was moderately related to communicative competence ($r = .39$, $p < .001$). The measure of communicative competence we used aims to capture the extent to which a person feels capable and confident in their communicative abilities across a variety of contexts. Again, we can understand *a priori* why a person who is intellectually transparent would likely be a more competent communicator, as they are better able to grasp and reveal their perspective to others. The fact that intellectual transparency is related to communicative competence suggests that in the context of personal relationships, as in other contexts, people who are more intellectually transparent are better able to self-disclose. In fact, our data (2022) allows us to say more than this, because it allows us to examine the extent to which intellectual transparency uniquely predicts communicative competence beyond other variables. For instance, examination of semipartial correlations (Cohen et al. 2003, 72–3) reveals that in our dataset intellectual transparency remains a significant correlate of communicative competence after controlling for participants' love of learning and honesty ($r = .17$, $p < .001$). This provides further support for thinking that intellectual transparency uniquely contributes to communicative competence, and thereby to self-disclosure in personal relationships.

Finally, to cite a more indirect piece of evidence, Haggard and I also found a significant relationship between intellectual transparency and satisfaction with life ($r = .31$, $p < .001$). In fact, again the semipartial correlation between intellectual transparency and life satisfaction remains significant after controlling for love of learning and honesty ($r = .18$, $p < .001$). One plausible explanation for why intellectual transparency would explain additional variance in satisfaction with life beyond these other variables is that it may specifically promote good relational outcomes. Being focused specifically on promoting goods for others, we might expect that it would contribute uniquely to good quality relationships, which are an important contributor to satisfaction with life. This is only an indirect argument, and the data doesn't allow us to draw this conclusion with much certainty. But it is a live hypothesis that would explain well the relationship between intellectual transparency and satisfaction with life in their data. If it is true that intellectual transparency promotes satisfaction with life via promoting good relational outcomes, this would provide a further source of support for thinking that intellectual transparency promotes better quality close personal relationships for its possessor. Indeed, it would support this conclusion even independently of transparency's relationship to self-disclosure; it would simply provide more direct confirmation of this link.

To sum up this section, what we have seen is that there is good reason to think that the ability and inclination to self-disclose in personal relationships promotes closeness and quality in those relationships, and that intellectual transparency promotes abilities and inclinations toward self-disclosure in personal relationships. Moreover, there is indirect evidence for thinking that intellectual transparency may be related to better quality relationships whether or not this is due to its relationship to self-disclosure. Thus, there is an emerging and plausible picture built of both philosophical and empirical pieces which suggests that intellectual transparency promotes better quality personal relationships.

3. Intellectual Transparency and Work Performance

A second way in which intellectual transparency may be instrumentally valuable is that it may promote better quality work performance. This is particularly true in cases where a person's work includes working as part of a team. There is both theoretical and empirical reason to think that intellectual transparency will contribute to work performance as part of a team, and can even contribute uniquely beyond what is contributed by similar virtues such as honesty.

An important theoretical perspective that is relevant for the value of intellectual transparency in group work contexts is that which appeals to group process losses and gains. One of the main findings of psychological research on group processes is that groups often experience process losses due to motivation (Karau and Williams 1993). Group members, when functioning in the group context, may lose motivation to contribute that they would have if working outside of the group context, thereby exhibiting 'social loafing'. This may be for several reasons, including a concern that their contributions may go unnoticed and be unrewarded. As a result, groups may perform worse on a task than group members would if taking on this task independently. On the other hand, researchers on group processes also hold out the possibility that groups may experience process gains due to ability. This may occur if the group members help one another to perform better in the group context than they would outside of that context (see Watson et al. 1998 for a review). If process gains occur, then a group may perform better at a task than its members would if working on the task independently.

Reflecting on the concept of intellectual transparency can help us see why it might mitigate process losses from motivation and promote process gains from ability in group work contexts. It may mitigate process losses to some extent because intellectual transparency includes within it a motivation to contribute to others' epistemic goods that is highly relevant for group working contexts. Even if the intellectually transparent person experiences some loss in motivation when working in the group context, their motivation to promote others' epistemic goods, including those of their fellow work group members and the group itself, may act as a partial buffer to this loss. Whereas those who are not intellectually transparent may lose motivation to contribute in the group work context to such an extent that they decide against contributing and so lead to group process loss, intellectually transparent group members might continue to contribute, given their motivation to contribute to fellow group members' epistemic goods, thus avoiding such loss.

Likewise, intellectual transparency may contribute to group process gains. This is because intellectual transparency, as one of the virtues of intellectual dependability, aims precisely at improving others' epistemic position and performance. The intellectually transparent person tends to share their perspective faithfully in order to advance others' epistemic goods. By doing so, we may anticipate that they will help their fellow group members to attain epistemic goods, and whatever further non-epistemic goods these may be instrumental to, which these group members would not have attained if working alone. As such, there is theoretical reason to suppose that intellectual transparency can both mitigate process losses and advance process gains in group working contexts.

This theoretical and conceptual argument is complemented by previous empirical research on the role of character traits at work, as well as by the work Megan Haggard and I have done on intellectual transparency. Research on the role of character traits at work is fairly new, but it does provide evidence that certain character traits are especially relevant for work performance, including group work performance. Moreover, some of the character traits that are especially relevant for work performance are ones that are either conceptually or empirically related to intellectual transparency.

Research has repeatedly found that several character strengths are related to work performance. For instance, honesty has been found to be related to individual job performance (Harzer and Rich 2014), and teamwork has been found to be related to team work performance (Harzer, Mubashar, and Dubreuil 2017). An interesting question is to what extent character strengths such as these predict additional variance in work performance beyond other variables. In a recent study, Harzer and colleagues (2021) found that employees' self-ratings on the twenty-four VIA character strengths

did continue to have significant relationships with various dimensions of supervisor-related job performance after controlling for employees' general mental ability and Big Five personality traits. While character strengths explained additional variance in both individual job performance, team-level job performance, organizational-level job performance, and deviant behavior in the workplace, the largest relationships were found for team- and organization-level performance. Among the character strengths that were significant for these dimensions of job performance were both honesty and teamwork.

We have already seen in the previous section that intellectual transparency is both conceptually and empirically related to honesty. This gives us reason to expect empirical confirmation of the relationship between intellectual transparency and job performance, including team-level job performance. Similarly, while the relationship between intellectual transparency and the strength of teamwork has not been investigated empirically as of yet, we might expect to find a significant positive relationship here given the conceptual arguments sketched at the outset of this section regarding the role of intellectual transparency in group process losses and gains. Thus, via this pathway too we might expect empirical confirmation of a positive relationship between intellectual transparency and team-level job performance.

There is a final pathway whereby we might expect to find empirical confirmation of a relationship between intellectual transparency and team-level job performance that will allow us to say something more unique about the contribution of intellectual transparency, beyond its relationship with honesty. This pathway is one that attends to the topic of sharing and withholding knowledge in the workplace. Researchers have noted that with shifts in the economy, the management of information in the workplace has taken on added importance (e.g. Grant 2002). Moreover, it has been documented that employees may behave differently in how they manage information, with some being more inclined to share information freely with colleagues to benefit their organizations, and others being more inclined to withhold information and intellectual effort in group contexts for a variety of reasons. Withholding knowledge in the workplace has been estimated to cost fortune 500 companies over 30 billion dollars per year (Babcock 2004). Here it may seem that intellectual transparency would be especially relevant for group work performance.

Previous research has indicated that antecedents of knowledge sharing in the workplace include a variety of factors. A meta-analysis of forty-six studies (Witherspoon et al. 2013) found that significant predictors of knowledge sharing behaviors included employees' intentions and attitudes, organizations' rewards for knowledge sharing, and organizational culture. I will focus on the attitudes and intentions of employees that significantly predicted knowledge sharing, because these are most relevant to intellectual transparency. These attitudes and intentions included (i) employees' intentions to share knowledge, (ii) employees' beliefs that sharing their knowledge is valuable, (iii) the extent to which employees enjoyed helping others through sharing knowledge, and (iv) employees' beliefs that they or others will benefit from their knowledge sharing. On the basis of the conceptualization of intellectual transparency, we might expect that employees who are high in intellectual transparency will more commonly exhibit at least features (i)-(iii), if not feature (iv). This is because their intellectual transparency inclines them toward sharing their knowledge when doing so would benefit others, they tend to believe that engaging in such activity is valuable, and they enjoy engaging in such activity.

My work with Megan Haggard confirms this hypothesis. We examined the relationship between intellectual transparency and the tendency to withhold knowledge, and found that these were robustly negatively correlated ($r = -.47$, $p < .001$). Secondary analysis of our data also reveals that there is a significant semipartial correlation between intellectual transparency and knowledge withholding after controlling for honesty ($r = -.29$, $p < .001$). Thus, it may be that intellectual transparency will contribute uniquely to work performance – especially team work performance – beyond honesty, via contributing positively to knowledge sharing and negatively to knowledge withholding.

A somewhat different lens through which to consider this topic is that of organizational citizenship behavior. Organizational citizenship behavior refers to work behavior that supports the broader social and psychological environment of an organization (Berry and Sackett 2007; it would include voluntarily helping a colleague with a project, exercising 'voice' to raise challenges or questions in an effort to create change in the workplace, or organizing a social event for employees (Zettler 2022). Given intellectual transparency's relationship with knowledge sharing and knowledge withholding, we might expect intellectually transparent people to be inclined toward exhibiting organizational citizenship behaviors that involve other-regarding intellectual behavior. Haggard and I did find that intellectual transparency was significantly related both to how frequently people are involved in training or teaching others in their paid work ($r = .30$, $p < .001$), and how frequently they are involved in training or teaching others in their volunteer work ($r = .22$, $p < .001$). In fact, here again secondary analysis of our data reveals that there is a significant semipartial correlation between intellectual transparency and these variables when controlling for honesty. If intellectual transparency is related to positive organizational citizenship behaviors such as voluntarily teaching, training, or otherwise intellectually benefitting co-workers, this provides another pathway for arguing that it enhances job performance, because organizational citizenship behavior is known to relate positively to team-level job performance (Podsakoff et al. 2009).

I'll briefly note that these relationships between intellectual transparency and teaching and training others raise interesting questions about whether intellectual transparency might be especially relevant for certain careers that are teaching-heavy (e.g. careers in education) or for certain roles, such as leadership roles or influencer roles (on different work roles, see Ruch et al. 2018). We might also wonder whether intellectual transparency is related to particular styles of leadership, such as servant leadership, which are markedly oriented toward benefiting others (Greenleaf 1977). We may also wonder about the relationship between intellectual transparency and certain working environments – both whether there are environments that encourage or discourage transparency (e.g. Kidd 2021) and whether transparency promotes certain kinds of environments, such as safe spaces (Anderson 2021). I will not investigate these topics here, but identify them as promising avenues for future research.

My main aim in this section has been to argue that intellectual transparency is likely to enhance team-level work performance. I have identified several pathways for defending this conclusion. Theoretically, we may expect that intellectual transparency would minimize process losses and promote process gains in group work contexts. Empirically, we know that intellectual transparency is related to other character strengths such as honesty which are related to team work performance, and we know that it is uniquely related to withholding knowledge even when controlling for honesty. Moreover, intellectually transparent people might be expected to exhibit organizational citizenship behaviors that involve benefitting others intellectually, such as teaching or training others beyond the requirements of their jobs. In all these ways, we may expect intellectual transparency to promote team-level work performance.

4. Intellectual Transparency, Civic Engagement, and Democratic Deliberation

A third way in which intellectual transparency is instrumentally valuable is that it promotes better civic outcomes. Specifically, the intellectually transparent person is more likely to participate in certain forms of civic engagement, and their contribution to democratic deliberation is more likely to enhance the epistemic qualities of that deliberation. I'll discuss each of these features in more detail.

First, as we saw toward the end of the previous section, there is both conceptual and empirical reason to think that intellectually transparent people are more likely to engage in certain kinds of other-regarding intellectual behaviors that support common goods. The behaviors we focused on in the previous section included teaching, training, or otherwise offering intellectual aid to co-workers beyond what is demanded of one's job – behaviors often referred to as organizational citizenship behaviors. Yet, similar kinds of citizenship behaviors occur outside of the workplace, and here too we

may expect intellectually transparent people to be more active. As people who care about others' epistemic goods and are inclined to share their own perspective to promote others' epistemic goods, we might expect intellectually transparent people to be involved in activities such as mentoring, teaching, or coaching others in voluntary settings. My work with Megan Haggard offers empirical confirmation of this hypothesis. Intellectual transparency is positively related to volunteering as a coach, supervisor, or referee of a sports team; as a tutor or teacher; as a mentor; providing office serves such as bookkeeping or copyediting; and providing professional or management assistance such as serving on a board or committee.

The tendency of intellectually transparent people to engage in civically-significant other-regarding behavior extends to more overtly political activity as well. Given the value they place on promoting others' epistemic goods by sharing their perspectives, it is to be expected that they would be more actively involved in sharing their perspectives with receptive others on topics of political significance, attempting to influence democratic processes. Here again, Haggard and I have found empirical confirmation of the hypothesis. Intellectually transparent people were found to be more likely to have contacted or visited a public official; taken part in a protest; signed an internet or written petition; liked, promoted or reposted political material shared by others on social media; followed elected officials on social media; encouraged other people to vote; encouraged others to take political action (other than voting); belonged to a political or social organization; voted in local elections; and attended a public meeting.

These relationships between intellectual transparency and civic engagement remain significant if we control for other variables such as honesty. If we create a composite measure for volunteering which includes all of the activities listed above as non-political forms of civic engagement, intellectual transparency retains a significant semipartial correlation with volunteering when controlling for honesty ($r = .20$, $p < .001$). And, if we create a composite measure for civic engagement that includes all of the activities listed above as political forms of civic engagement, then intellectual transparency retains a significant semipartial correlation with civic engagement when controlling for honesty ($r = .23$, $p < .001$). Thus, intellectual transparency may make a unique contribution to the frequency of these forms of civic engagement.

Of course, engaging civically does not amount to engaging well civically. And, beyond intellectual transparency, we can imagine that there might be various other character traits, including more vicious traits such as social vigilantism (Saucier and Webster 2010), which are predictive of more frequent civic engagement. Thus, it is important to also consider whether intellectual transparency is likely related to engaging well civically – specifically in terms of promoting better civic outcomes for one's group.

As it happens, there is indeed reason to think that intellectual transparency will not just increase the frequency of politically-oriented civic engagement, but it will enhance the epistemic values of democratic deliberation. The forms of politically-oriented civic engagement highlighted above all fall within the domain of contributions to democratic deliberation. The latter is usually conceived of as the public exchange and weighing of arguments and reasons among free and equal individuals about political matters (Cohen 1989), or more broadly the exchange and evaluation of their political perspectives (Hannon 2020, 603). Often, it is claimed that democratic deliberative processes promote epistemic values. What I wish to argue here is that there is a plausible case to be made for thinking that citizens' display of intellectual transparency within democratic deliberative processes would make it more likely that these epistemic values would be promoted.

Theorists differ about which epistemic values they believe are promoted by democratic deliberation. Some claim that, at least under favorable circumstances, democratic deliberation is more likely to lead to more accurate views and in turn better political decisions. Landemore (2013, 2021) offers a particularly strong argument for this conclusion, based on the idea that democratic deliberation is the best way to take advantage of cognitive diversity among citizens. Cognitive diversity is a group property that refers to how much variation there is in the way group members see the world and make predictions about it based on how they think it works. Empirical work has shown that groups'

cognitive diversity is more important for their epistemic performance than average group member intellectual ability (Page 2007, 163). Yet, Landmore contends that democratic deliberation that is maximally inclusive and equal is more likely than any other form of political deliberation to capture available cognitive diversity, thus bringing its potential benefits to bear on group decision-making in the face of uncertainty about which political problems may arise. As she puts it, 'numbers trump ability' because including everyone equally in political deliberation 'is the only way to get all the perspectives, heuristics, interpretations, predictive models, and information that may matter at some point (although you do not know in advance when)' (2014, 188).

Other authors have suggested different epistemic values that may be promoted by democratic deliberation. Hannon (2020) argues that democratic deliberation uniquely promotes mutual empathetic understanding among citizens, even if it doesn't tend to lead to more accurate political views and decisions based on these. The kind of understanding in view here is the sort that can only be had of someone with a perspective; it involves 'seeing the other person's point of view' (598). Hannon contends that this understanding is an epistemic good in its own right, which may also be practically beneficial in leading citizens to work together better. For deliberative democracy to promote such understanding, Hannon suggests on the basis of empirical work on group deliberation (Gronlund, Herne, and Setala 2017) that favorable conditions must be present. Specifically, these will include conditions in which citizens engage with members of their political outgroups, focus on showing respect toward these others' opinions, attempt to justify their own views, and practice being open to different views (601). Hannon accordingly emphasizes the importance of practicing reenactive empathy toward others in order to achieve empathetic understanding via democratic deliberation.

What I wish to argue is that for both of these kinds of arguments for the epistemic value of democratic deliberation, the likelihood that the relevant values will be realized is increased when citizens exhibit intellectual transparency. On Landemore's approach, it is important that citizens present their perspectives in order for their cognitive diversity to enter into the equation. In fact, the better they communicate their perspectives – the more fully and effectively they do so – the more their groups will be able to capitalize on this diversity. Yet, it is precisely the full and effective communication of one's perspective in the service of promoting epistemic goods that intellectual transparency is concerned with. Likewise, on Hannon's approach, the primary aim of democratic deliberation is citizens' mutual understanding of one another's perspectives or points of view. Hannon emphasizes the role of those who wish to understand others and the importance of empathy and perspective taking for their task, but we could equally emphasize the role of those who wish to be understood by others and the importance of intellectual transparency for this task. In sum, citizens who are intellectually transparent are more likely to enable deliberative democracies in which they participate to capitalize on their contributions to cognitive diversity, and they are more likely to facilitate the kind of mutual understanding Hannon proposes as the chief epistemic aim of democracy.

Some empirical evidence can be given to support the conceptual argument of the previous paragraph. First, the evidence cited earlier for thinking that intellectual transparency promotes politically-relevant civic engagement provides some support for thinking that intellectual transparency also promotes capitalizing on cognitive diversity. Intellectually transparent people are more likely in the ways indicated to represent their perspectives publicly, making it possible for them to contribute to cognitive diversity.

Second, as Alessandra Tanessini (2021) has helpfully summarized, empirical evidence on group deliberation (e.g. De Dreu, Nijstad, and van Knipperberg 2008) suggests that the accuracy of group deliberation is enhanced when group members' contributions to that deliberation are guided by particular motives. Specifically, deliberation goes better when group members' contributions are guided by prosocial and truth-aimed motives – when group members aim to cooperate with each other and value getting to the truth. Yet, intellectual transparency is closely related to these motivations, and may even be thought of as combining them together. This is not just a conceptual truth, but an empirical one. In the data that Haggard and I have collected, intellectual

transparency is robustly related to both the love of learning (a motivation for gaining epistemic goods) and prosocial traits like altruism. Indeed, it retains a significant semipartial correlation with each of these when controlling for honesty ($r = .40$, $p < .001$ and $r = .35$, $p < .001$ respectively). Thus, studies on what makes group deliberation more accurate suggest that key features which promote accuracy are closely and uniquely related to intellectual transparency.

Third and finally, the data Haggard and I have collected shows that intellectual transparency is robustly related to perspective taking and open-minded thinking, with semipartial correlations remaining significant when controlling for honesty ($r = .33$, $p < .001$ and $r = .28$, $p < .001$ respectively). Thus, in this way, intellectual transparency is related to additional ingredients highlighted by Hannon for promoting mutual understanding among citizens. These relationships are not surprising, given that part of what makes a person with intellectual transparency good at being intellectually transparent is their ability to appreciate the complexities of a perspective – their own. These abilities are relevant for appreciating and being open to the perspectives of others, too, though they may not always translate into an orientation toward achieving empathetic understanding of others.

In sum, people who are intellectually transparent are more likely to be civically active and to promote epistemic values achieved through democratic deliberation. Their civic engagement encompasses both voluntary other-oriented intellectual behaviors that are not primarily concerned with political action, as well as behaviors that are primarily concerned with political action. They promote more accurate democratic deliberation by contributing to cognitive diversity, and by contributing to deliberation in a way that is guided by prosocial and truth-aimed motivations, and they promote mutual understanding by better revealing their political perspectives to others and by better attending to and being open toward the perspectives of others.

5. Conclusion

Intellectual transparency is a disposition to share one's perspective faithfully with others out of a motivation to promote their epistemic goods. This paper has argued that intellectual transparency is instrumentally valuable in three broad ways. First, intellectual transparency promotes high-quality, close personal relationships such as friendships and romantic relationships, via promoting self-disclosure. Second, intellectual transparency promotes better work performance, particularly in team contexts, via promoting knowledge sharing and organizational citizenship behaviors. And, third, intellectual transparency promotes more active civic engagement and epistemically valuable democratic deliberation by contributing to cognitive diversity and mutual understanding among citizens.[5]

Notes

1. This focus specifically on sharing one's perspective helps to distinguish intellectual transparency from certain other intellectual virtues that overlap with it, such as intellectual generosity (Roberts and Wood 2007). The latter trait is more broadly concerned with giving intellectual benefits to others, while the former is concerned specifically with promoting others' epistemic goods via sharing one's perspective with them. See Byerly 2021, Ch. 4 for further commentary on the way in which intellectual generosity fits into the character of the intellectually dependable person more broadly.
2. I follow others, especially Baehr 2015, in conceptualizing at least some intellectual virtues as including components of skill. On this view, part of what it is to possess a certain intellectual virtue is to possess the skills distinctive of that virtue.
3. For a recent critical discussion of this commitment, see Swanton 2021.
4. The two factors reflect participants' motivations to promote others' epistemic goods via sharing their perspective, and their skills in grasping their own perspectives.
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Data Availability Statement

The dataset referenced in this paper can be found at 10.6084/m9.figshare.21269148.

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