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On the Nature of Faith and its Relation to Trust and Belief

One can have faith in someone, believe in someone and trust someone, and these notions seem closely related. Any account of faith should then address its relation to trust and belief. Like trust, faith can similarly have propositional and relational forms. One can have faith that God is good and faith in God; one can trust that another will do something and trust them to do it. Starting from a comparison between these forms of faith and trust, this paper proposes a philosophical analysis of faith and excavates its relation to trust and belief.

The Nicene Creed, written in 325, formalised Christian religious faith; its affirmation starts, *Credo in unum Deum*, 'I believe in one God', or 'I have faith in one God'. Other religious faiths could also start with this affirmation '*credo in*', and then just complete it differently. Moreover, the attitude of faith expressed in religious affirmations extends beyond them. It's possible to believe in, or have faith in, people. In a situation of adversity, I might have faith in you coming through for me in various ways. Thus, Hobbes (1651, 132) observed that, '[t]o *have faith in*, or *trust to*, or *believe a man*, signifie the same thing". One might put one's faith in God, Allah or Shiva, and one can also put one's faith in one's neighbour.

Given this starting assumption – that religious faith manifests an attitude of faith that can also be manifest towards other people – the question is, how should this attitude of faith be philosophically understood? *Credo in*, which starts the Latin version of the Nicene Creed can be translated as 'faith in' or 'believe in', so any account of the nature of faith must explicate its relation to belief. And insofar as Hobbes is correct to equate 'faith in' and 'trust to', any account of the nature of faith must further explicate the relation of faith and trust. Thus, to address the question of the nature of faith, this paper starts by comparing propositional and relational forms of faith and trust. The connection with belief is discussed throughout.

1. Faith and Trust: Propositional Forms

Both faith and trust have propositional and relational forms. Jack might trust *that* Jill will fetch the pail of water. In this case, trust is a propositional attitude; it is a case of X trusting *that* Y will ϕ. But Jack might also trust *Jill* to fetch the pail of water. In this case, trust is a relational attitude; it is a case of *X trusting Y* to ϕ. Faith likewise has propositional and relational forms. According to the Christian creed, the believer has faith in God, and, the assumption is, this attitude of faith can also take persons as its object. In both cases, the object of faith can then be further specified: it is not simply faith in God, but faith in God's goodness; not simply faith in one's neighbour but faith in one's neighbour's honesty. Schematically, the relational attitude is then X has faith in Y with respect to some domain ϕ, or faith in Y's ϕ-ing. But faith can also be propositional. One can have faith that something is so. Person X might have faith *that* Y will ϕ – faith that God's goodness will manifest on this occasion. It is propositional faith, and its relation to propositional trust that is the focus of this section.

What is it to trust *that* p? To begin it is worth noting that trust normally takes a person or thing as its object rather than a proposition. Trust is an attitude taken towards relying on a person or thing in some way; trust grounds reliance. However, what differentiates propositional trust from relational trust is the nature of the attitude had towards reliance. In its propositional form, trust is no more than a belief about outcome. I rely on the branch holding my weight simply because I believe it will do so; I have no expectation *of* the branch, and nor could I have. I rely on you turning up simply because I believe you will do so; I might equally have no expectation *of* you as you do not know I am waiting for you. My trusting the branch to take my weight is then just a case of trusting *that* the branch will take my weight. Similarly, in having no expectation *of you*, my trusting you to turn up is just a case of trusting *that* you will turn up. Trust is propositional, then, when it is no more than a belief that someone or thing can be successfully relied upon.

This propositional form has been called 'predictive trust' (Hollis 1998, Faulkner 2007), 'strategic trust' (Uslaner 2002), 'epistemic trust', (Fricker 2007) and theories that focus on this form of trust have been called 'risk assessment accounts' (Jones 1999). [1] Given that the constitutive expectation of propositional trust is merely subjective, some philosophers prefer not to call this 'trust' at all (e.g. Hawley 2014). We don't really *trust* the branch, so the thought goes, because we can't expect things *of it*. But the reason to recognize

[1] These accounts ostensibly analyse 'X trusts Y to ϕ', but insofar as the analyses proposed are non-normative, the trust should be properly put in propositional terms as 'X trusts that Y will ϕ'. (Conversely, where the trust proposition is normative, trust really involves an expectation of the trusted, and is best conceived in relational terms. This distinction between propositional and relational trust thereby maps on to my previous distinction between 'predictive' and 'affective' trust, see Faulkner (2011).)

this propositional form of trust is that trust can be fundamentally identified as that attitude which supports relying on someone or something; that attitude that renders reliance willing, (Williams 2002, 88). Thus, pursued by foes I might be forced to rely on the branch to cross a chasm even though I think there is every chance it won't hold my weight. In this case I rely but don't trust. Reliance is trusting when it is willing, and belief can make it so. Grounded on the belief that things will work out, an act of relying is then a trusting act.

This raises the question as to the nature of reliance. We rely on someone or something when the success of our action depends on that person or thing. In stepping out on the branch, I rely on the branch holding my weight because I will succeed in making it to the other side of the chasm only if it does. Smith (2010, 144) formulates this into a 'reliance test': "If the success of A's plan depends upon the occurrence of E, and if A does not intend to bring E about himself, then A relies on E." As he notes, many things can bear on the success of our plans: Mary's plan to fly to New York, in his example, depends on the proper functioning of the stationary valve plate in the plane's hydraulic system (Smith 2010, 144). The comparison between this case and that of my walking out on the branch then illustrates that reliance can refer to both an *act* and a *state*. Mary relies upon the proper functioning of the stationary valve plate because she is in a state of reliance, but the action whose success depends on the valve plate is not one of relying upon it because Mary has no conception of this aeronautical component or its role. By contrast, I do rely upon the branch holding my weight, since I recognise the necessity of this for the success of my attempt to reach the other side of the chasm, and I am in state of reliance as I tentatively walk across the branch. Our interest in reliance, in this investigation of trust and faith, is then an interest in *acts* of relying – 'X relying on Y ϕ-ing'. This is because, as the case of Mary shows, we can be unaware of all the ways in which we are in a state of reliance, or as I shall say using 'depends' and its cognates to refer to the state of reliance, all the ways in which we depend on people and things.[2]

How, then, should we understand 'X relies upon Y ϕ-ing'? On one account, to rely on someone doing something is to act on the assumption that they will do that thing because they are motived to do it (Holton 1994, 66). Hawley (2014) simplifies this: to rely on someone doing something is just to act on the assumption they will do it. On these accounts, Hawley (2014, 4) argues, reliance need not imply "risk or vulnerability". To illustrate this, she imagines a picnic where I bring ample food for us both just because I assume you will do

[2] Moreover, that reliance should properly be thought of as an act is shown by the fact that one can rely for any reason. As hypothesised, I rely on the branch because I am forced to do so to avoid my pursuers, but I might equally step out onto the branch because of a death wish or for the 'fun' of it. Some reasons for reliance might be better than others, at least from another's perspective, but no reason is of the wrong kind. Arguably this is defining feature of actions as opposed to attitudes (see Marušić 2017 and Hieronymi 2011).

the same and don't want to seem ungenerous. In acting on the assumption you will bring lots of food, I rely on your doing so, but I am not vulnerable in any way, since there will be plenty of food whatever you do. Now the cases of risk and vulnerability are different. If one relies on someone who is reliable, there is little risk. However, as per Smith's (2010) 'reliance test', for act to be one of relying there must be the possibility of it being unsuccessful because someone or something proves unreliable; it must put the actor in a state of dependence. So if there really is no vulnerability in the picnic case, it is wrong to say that I rely on you bringing food. Since I act on the assumption that this is what you will do, reliance must be more than this.

Two further conditions then need to be added to acting on an assumption. First, and as argued, there needs to be a requirement that the success of the act is dependent in some way of someone or something. And second, again following Smith's (2010) 'reliance test', there needs to be a requirement that there is no attempt to eliminate this dependence. This second condition can be illustrated by the 'helicopter dad' case from (Howard-Snyder and McKaughan 2020, 7). In this case, the father acts on the assumption that his daughter will do her homework, but he also manipulates the circumstances so that she has little choice but to do so. To the extent that his manipulation then determines that she will do her homework, he does not in fact rely on her to do her homework.[3] Adding these two conditions to the idea that relying involves acting on an assumption gives the following definition of reliance. *X relies on Y ϕ-ing iff (i) X acts on the assumption that Y will ϕ, (ii) the success of X's action requires that Y ϕ, which is to say X depends on Y ϕ-ing, and (iii) X does not try and bring it about that Y ϕs*.[4] To bring this notion of reliance in line with the propositional form of trust and faith being discussed, this definition could then be put in propositional terms thus: *X relies on p's being true iff (i) X acts on the assumption that p is true, (ii) the success of X's action requires that p be true, which is to say X depends on p being true, and (iii) X does not try and bring it about that p is true.*

Trust, I've claimed, is fundamentally an attitude that grounds reliance or makes it willing, that is reasonable. This can now be elaborated with reliance understood as above. When I trust that you are home, my attitude of trust is manifest in my leaving for home without my keys. Because I trust that you are home, I rely on your being home, and I do this because (i) I act on the assumption that you are home in leaving for home, (ii) I depend on your being home, since my act of heading home will fail at its last hurdle if I cannot get into our house, and (iii) I do not try and bring it about that you're home.

[3] Thus reliance comes in degrees. In the terms of Smith's (2010) 'reliance test', A's reliance on E permits some attempt to 'encourage' E to happen but does not permit A intending to bring E about.

[4] Compare Marušić (2017), Smith's (2010) 'external reliance' and Howard-Snyder and McKaughan (2020).

Propositional trust then grounds reliance through being a belief that reliance will be successful. In this homeward bound case, this belief is simply that you are at home.[5] It is this belief that rationalizes my leaving for home, which is to say my reliance.

On the face of it, propositional faith seems to play a similar reliance grounding role. The Christian who has faith that God is good arguably relies on this proposition's being true insofar as they depend on its being true for their sense of well-being and act on the assumption that it is true, when living their Christian faith, without trying to make this proposition true. However, while the acting on an assumption and not bringing it about conditions (i) and (iii) are satisfied in this case, the dependence condition (ii) is not. There is some vulnerability in this context, as described; but there is not that dependence that characterises the state of reliance, which is that the success of the act of relying on requires the truth of the relied-on proposition. For what act is it the success of whose performance requires this truth? So this is not a case of reliance, but it is a paradigm example of propositional faith, so propositional faith need not imply reliance.

Propositional faith, then, unlike propositional trust is not to be understood in terms of its relation to reliance. Moreover, propositional faith, again unlike propositional trust, does not imply belief. This is argued by Howard-Snyder (2013), whose main argument concerns the relationship between belief, faith and doubt. Here Howard-Synder distinguishes *having doubts* about p (which is to have reasons for believing not-p), *being in doubt* about p (which is to consider whether p and neither believe p nor disbelieve p), and *doubting* p (which is to believe not-p). Given these distinctions, being in doubt about p is inconsistent with believing that p, since it is, by definition, a matter of neither believing p nor disbelieving p. But being in doubt about p, Howard-Synder argues, is consistent with having faith that p, and to illustrate this he gives the example of a stockbroker who has faith that the stock market will recover despite having doubts about this and being in doubt about it.

It might be said in response, as Malcolm and Scott (2017) do, that if the stockbroker really had faith that the markets would recover, he would not be in doubt about this. However, what needs appreciation here is that this example illustrates how one can 'have doubts' and yet still have faith, which is to say that faith need not fail in the face of evidence that the faith proposition is false. And this implies that there is a difference in the normativity of faith and normativity of belief as each thereby have different relations to counterevidence. So if the stockbroker's faith implies that he believes the

[5] But note if I were to attempt to reduce my reliance by, say, texting you to tell you of my keyless state, the outcome would likely be either that my trust ceases, if you tell me you're not at home; or that my trust becomes relational, if you respond by taking on the commitment to be home, so that I then come to expect this of you.

markets will recover, then he holds this belief in the face of undefeated reasons to think it false – where Howard-Snyder (2013) calls these reasons 'doubts'. And when it comes to belief such reasons *ought* to generate a state of doubt, or the suspension of belief (*unless* they are outweighed or defeated). Ordinarily, they psychologically do just this.[6] So the response that faith implies belief comes at the cost that the implied belief is not normatively constrained in the way belief ought to be constrained, which is to say that it is irrational. Surely better to see the example as showing that faith does not require belief, merely the absence of disbelief? It can then be acknowledged that doubts might lead those with faith to suspend belief (or put them in a state of doubt) – there can be 'dark nights of the soul' – while holding onto the idea that faith should not lead to disbelief (or doubting).

Moreover, faith seems better *qua* faith to the extent that it is not abandoned in the face of counterevidence – to the extent it is "resilient in the face of challenges" (McKaughan and Howard-Snyder 2020). Consider God telling Abraham that he (at a hundred years) and his wife Sarai (at ninety years) would have a son (Genesis 17, 15-27). Abraham had good empirical evidence that this proposition was false, indeed as good evidence as one can have for any empirical claim. So disbelief would be justified. But despite some initial incredulity, Abraham accepted that this would happen, and in this and other respects, he is marked out as a "knight of faith" (Kierkegaard, Evans, and Walsh (2006).

Faith, then, might be aligned with belief, but it does not require belief. Rather it requires, Howard - Snyder (2019, 361) argues, a "positive cognitive attitude", or an attitude which is like belief in taking its propositional object to be true. Since belief is belief-like, it is a positive cognitive attitude, but another is 'beliefless assuming' (see Howard-Snyder 2013 and McKaughan 2013). Similarly, Alston (1996) argues that *acceptance* can be the attitudinal component of propositional faith, while Schellenberg (2005) takes it to be *assent*, and Swinburne (1984) takes it to be *assumption* (albeit with a particular notion of what this is). Consider Alston's (1996) acceptance account of faith; acceptance differs from belief in its dispositional profile and in that it can be an act; "the act of acceptance is the *adoption*, the *taking on*, of a positive attitude to the proposition." (Alston (1996, 8) and compare Cohen 1989). On this account of acceptance, one cannot accept just any proposition – acceptance is not merely adopting an assumption – one cannot accept a proposition one believes to be false. But acceptance, and thereby faith on Alston's account, can be voluntary in a way that belief is not. It follows that faith can be appraisable

[6] Of course, people can, and often do, irrationally persist in their belief, see, Lord, Ross and Lepper (1979). But in this context, it is OK to assume the norm is the norm. And if it systematically were not, the result would be scepticism.

in a way that belief is not; people can be praised for their faith or judged for their lack of faith.

Faith, however, is different from both acceptance and belief in that, as Alston (1996, 12) observes, it "necessarily involves some pro-attitude towards its object", which is to say, in having faith that p, one looks on the truth of p "with favor" (see also Malcolm and Scott 2021). One can accept or believe that something is true without having any 'pro-attitude' towards its truth, without 'favouring', or desiring the believed or accepted proposition to be true. To borrow an example from Aquinas, devils might believe that God exists and is all powerful but they do not desire this to be true so they lack faith (for Aquinas they lack meritorious faith, see Swinburne (1984, 110)). Similarly, if it is a matter of faith that Marxism correctly diagnoses the fundamental flaws in capitalism, it follows both that one thinks this diagnosis is right and that one welcomes this diagnosis or the outcome that is predicted from those flaws.

These considerations could then be formulated into an analysis of propositional faith. *X has faith that p if and only if (i) X accepts that p; (ii) X's accepting that p is not ordinarily susceptible to being undermined by confrontation with evidence that p is false; and (iii) X's accepting that p manifests X's desire that p is true.* Propositional faith involves accepting what you would like to be true and being insensitive to evidence that it is false. It does not essentially involve either reliance or belief.

2. Faith and Trust: Relational Forms

Alongside their propositional forms, faith and trust both also have a relational form. It might be that Jack does not merely *trust that* Jill will fetch the pail of water, rather he *trusts Jill* to do this. In trusting Jill to do this, Jack has an expectation *of* Jill – where the normativity of this expectation is flagged by the fact that Jack's trust renders him susceptible to various reactive attitudes. Trust can be betrayed. This normative relational form of trust is the form that most philosophers focus on (with some, as noted, reserving the term 'trust' for this form).[7] Its form is 'X trusts Y to ϕ' where instances of this can manifest X's trust in Y expressible as the two-place claim 'X trust Y', see (Domenicucci and Holton 2017 and Faulkner 2015). Faith can similarly be relational. Theistic faith, as expressed by the Nicene Creed, is faith *in* God. And, as noted, we can similarly place our faith *in* people. The relational form of faith is then 'X has faith in Y to ϕ' where this expresses not merely X's faith that Y will ϕ but X's faith *in* Y.

Relational trust and faith, I would now like to claim, are similar to propositional faith in that (i) they are voluntary to some degree, (ii) they

[7] Philosophical discussion of trust is extensive, a good starting point for surveying this is McLeod (2011).

manifest a thinking well of their objects, and (iii) they exhibit a certain insensitivity to counterevidence. Consider these connected properties in turn.

First, up to a point – and what this point is, I will come back to – you can choose to trust someone to do something, and similarly choose to put your faith in them doing that thing. With respect to trust, Holton (1994, 63) gives the example of a drama class where you are spun around until you lose your bearings whereupon you let yourself fall into the arms of your class mates. Letting yourself be spun, and letting yourself fall are both decisions, but so too, it seems, is the attitude one takes in participating in this game. It seems that you can choose to rely reluctantly, resentfully, or with that positive attitude that makes this a case of trusting your classmates to catch you. In doing this, you would be putting your faith in them catching you. Equally, you can rely on someone who has previously let you down, choosing to put reasons for doubt to one side and giving them the benefit of the doubt. In this case, your continued reliance would be a case of you trusting them, or putting you faith in them; it would involve, as Løgstrup (2007, 78) notes, "the renunciation of attitudes or movements of thought and feeling that are incompatible with trust."

Second, you can only choose to trust someone, or put your faith in them, up to a point because doing so involves thinking well of them, and the evidence constrains the extent to which this is possible (again the nature of this constraint is something I'll return to). Relational trust and faith involve a thinking well of their objects because they imply that their objects are worthy of trust or faith. This is show by the fact that we want to be trusted, or at least we want to be trusted provided the trust is well placed or a response to a commitment we recognise we have. To be trusted is to be respected in a certain way, as someone who will honour their commitments. This aspect of trust is then brought out differently by different theories. Maybe it is clearest on doxastic accounts, which hold that trust entails the belief that the trusted is trustworthy (see Hieronymi 2008, McMyler 2011, Keren 2014 and Hawley 2014). To believe the trusted is trustworthy is to think well of them. But it is equally true on non-doxastic accounts, which require some optimistic view of the trusted and their motivations (see Baier 1986, Jones 1996). Thus, I've argued that in trusting someone, your optimism manifests as the presumption that you take them to be trustworthy (see Faulkner 2021). And even in the case of 'therapeutic trust', where you trust in the hope of bringing the trusted to trustworthiness, trust requires at least an optimism that the trusted will respond positively to trust. And this too will be a way of thinking well about the trusted (that they are moral or care for you on Horsburgh's (1960) account, for instance). Having faith in someone then carries a similar presumption that they are deserving of this faith in some way. Like propositional faith, relational faith manifests a desire for its truth. However, the implication here does not parallel that implication supported by trust, namely that the person whom one

has faith in is 'faith-worthy'. Outlining this difference, and what is meant by 'deserving of faith', is something I'll return shortly.

Third, both trust and faith exhibit a certain insensitivity to counterevidence. This is manifest in each being characterized by an absence of doubt. There might be risk involved in trust or faith, but this risk does not tend to be felt. And this is because reasons for doubt – evidence that trust or faith will be exposed – is either not seen, through a form of 'blinkered' vision (Jones 1996, 12), or is seen but is bracketed in thinking well of the person trusted or in whom faith is placed. For instance, suppose that the evidence comes from your trust having been previously let down, if you manage to trust again, in trusting you will successfully continue to think well of the trusted person and put doubt to one side. There can be delicate matters here. Suppose my son has a history of drink driving and asks me to borrow my car for a night out. I might successfully bracket my reasons for doubt in handing over my car keys, but lying in bed waiting for his return I find myself anxious with doubt. In this case, at a certain point my worries are such that it ceases to be true that my attitude is trusting my son to drive safely, now the most that can be said is that I have *entrusted* him with my car (see Hieronymi 2008).[8]

This is to sketch the similarities between relational trust and relational faith, but trusting someone to do something is not the same as having faith in them doing that thing. There are, I think, three key differences.

First, when considering trust in its three-place form, 'X trusts Y to ϕ', what is described is X's attitude towards relying on Y ϕ-ing. To trust someone to do something is to be disposed to rely on them doing that thing. Of course, we can rely on someone without trusting them, and this has led philosophers, following Baier (1986), to ask what makes an act of reliance trusting? (The answer, I would suggest, (following Jones 1996) is that relational trust involves an optimistic expectation *of* the trusted, (see Faulkner 2011).[9] By contrast, relational faith, like propositional faith, is not essentially tied to reliance. This can be illustrated by McKaughan and Howard-Snyders' (2020) example of a 'helicopter dad', which I extend and use here for different ends. This father hounds his irresponsible daughter to study. At some point, the daughter turns over a new leaf and develops good study habits, but the father continues to try and micro-manage her studies, until the fed-up daughter protests, "Dad! Have a little faith in me!" This protest seems rightly made. Now suppose the father hears this protest, recognises his daughter's transformation, and consequently puts his faith in his daughter doing her best. Since faith involves a 'thinking

[8] Thanks to Dan Howard-Synder for this example.

[9] Though I would disagree with Jones about the content of this expectation. It is not the expectation of the trusted that they will do what they are "counted on" to do, though it may imply this, it is rather the expectation of the trusted that they will do what they have committed to do. Compare Hawley (2014).

well' of its object, it will always involve some form of dependence, since there is always the threat that this 'thinking well' will be exposed as false. However, reliance requires a specific mode of dependence; intentional reliance, I have suggested, is a matter of depending on something happening *because* one acts on the assumption that it will happen. While the father acts on the assumption that his daughter will do her best when he ceases to hound her, and depends on her doing her best, as shown by the disappointment he would feel were she not to do so, the dependence illustrated by this disappointment follows from the care the father has for his daughter, rather than attaching to the fact that the father acted on the assumption that she would do her best. Were the father disappointed, he would not be so *because* he acted on the assumption that his daughter would do her best, but because he cares for his daughter. To make this clearer, let us forward many years. The father could still have faith in his daughter doing her best as she pursues whatever career she has chosen, and he would still feel disappointed if she makes bad decisions that cost her, but the father looks on from a distance, he does not act on any assumptions about outcome and so his dependence cannot attach to any such action. It is a dependence that comes from thinking well of his daughter, where this is an expression of his faith in his daughter, it is not a dependence that identifies a way in which he relies on her. And the same is true of the daughter's school years: there is faith, and with it a form of dependence, and there is acting on an assumption, but there is no relying on.

Second, trust and faith differ with respect to the limits up to which it is permissible to adopt them. The difference lies in their normative rather than psychological perimeters. When X trusts Y to ϕ, trust is necessarily misplaced if *either* (1) X believes that Y will not ϕ, *or* (2) the evidence is such that X ought to believe that Y will not ϕ. Disjunct (1) identifies the psychological limits of trust: to the extent that X believes that Y will not ϕ, it ceases to be psychologically possible for X to trust Y to ϕ. There might be some cases which raise a question about this; a mother might continue to trust her son with her purse knowing that his drug addiction has led him to steal many times before and believing that he might steal again. But to the extent that the mother does believe that her son will steal again this case, is better described as one of hope rather than trust, and the mother's action is better characterised as one of entrusting her son with her purse, than trusting him with it (see again Hieronymi 2008, 218). Thus disbelief marks the psychological limits of trust, and it equally marks the psychological limits of faith insofar as faith belongs to the class of what Howard - Snyder (2019) calls 'positive cognitive attitudes'.

Disjunct (2) then identifies the normative limits of trust: if X *ought* to believe that Y will not ϕ, then X ought not to trust Y to ϕ. The 'ought' here is not to be understood as X is in a position to justifiably believe that Y will not ϕ: in trust X can give Y the benefit of the doubt and put to one side evidence that Y will not ϕ. For example, to return to the mother and her son. It seems

that the mother can continue to trust her son with her purse after the first time he stole from it and her. She can put this evidence aside – "He wouldn't do it again" – and give him the benefit of the doubt. However, at a certain point, after a certain number of thefts, the mother's evidence is sufficient for making it such that she ought to believe he will steal. At this point, further trust would be unreasonable, and the normative limits of trust would have been reached.[10] It might be that trust remains a psychological possibility – it might be that the mother still does not believe her son will steal again – but trust is now an attitude she ought not to take. The difference with faith is then that this second normative disjunct does not similarly apply. Faith is not similarly normatively constrained. Thus, and for instance, even if the son's theft continued unabated, so that the mother could no longer reasonably trust her son not to steal, it is possible for her to maintain her faith in him not stealing, and this faith is not wrong *qua* faith. Rather, the mother's faith can be rightly located in her optimism that her son will come good in the end. This might be all that is left for her thinking well of her son, but this allegiance to her son seems admirable rather than criticisable as credulity. Now this example could be developed in a way such that there becomes something abusive in the mother-son relationship, and in this case the mother's faith would be misplaced. But it is misplaced because and insofar as it is *bad for her*, her faith has become a source of pain; however her faith, her continued and now quite ungrounded optimism, is not bad *qua faith*. Or to return to a religious example, Mary and Martha were not wrong to have faith is Jesus raising their brother Lazarus from the dead (John 11, 1-43) even though a man has less chance of returning from the dead than kicking a drug habit. Thus, while there are epistemic limits on relational trust, there seems to be no comparable epistemic limits on relational faith. Rather, the limits on faith seem to be solely psychological; a matter of whether faith is possible for the person.

Third, and related to this, relational faith is not so normatively demanding at the interpersonal level. Relational trust is a normative attitude. Its constitutive expectation is one placed on the trusted. The exact nature of this expectation, as noted, is open to debate. As I conceive it, it is an expectation placed on the trusted that they do what they have committed to doing.[11] For example, if you've agreed to help me move today, I expect you to show up and help me load the van with my boxes and so on, and my expectation here is that you will keep your commitment to helping me in this way. However, putting aside the precise content of trust's constitutive expectation, and thereby putting aside philosophical disagreement as to this content, to the extent that trust is identified by a propensity to varieties of resentment, this constitutive expectation will be normative. The resentment experienced by trust being let

[10] In fact, these normative limits are quite fluid and complex; for a discussion of this see Faulkner (2018).
[11] Compare Hawley (2014) and Marušić (2017). This is a change of view from Faulkner (2011)

down is other directed: the trusted failed to do what they committed to doing. This reactive attitude is then appropriate to the extent that certain obligations fall on the trusted, where these obligations follow from the trusted's commitments. By contrast, if faith is let down, it will provoke feelings of disappointment not resentment. To return to the reformed 'helicopter Dad', if the daughter, after turning a new leaf, falls back into old ways, the father's feeling will be one of disappointment. His faith in his daughter will not support resentment because having faith in his daughter does not imply that she is under any obligation to him.

These differences between relational trust and faith suggest that relational faith has something more in common with friendship or love. It suggests that faith should be regarded as what Darwall (2017, 46) called a "second personal attitude of the heart", where these are to be distinguished from "deontic" second personal attitudes. Resentment is a deontic attitude because its second personal character comes from presupposed authority and accountability relations. In resenting someone, you presuppose the authority to call them to account. By contrast, attitudes of the heart derive their second personal character from being reciprocating, where an attitude is reciprocating when it implicitly asks the person that is its object to recognise it and to respond in kind. Second personal attitudes of the heart are thereby invitations to have a certain kind of relationship.

Love is an example of such an attitude. It is not deontic: it cannot be claimed or demanded. "Love is like God's grace. We can neither earn nor deserve it; it can only be freely given as the gift of an open heart" (Darwall 2017, 47).[12] And it is reciprocating in that in loving someone one hopes to be loved back. Relational faith, I suggest, is equally a second personal attitude of the heart. You can no more demand that someone have faith in you, than you can demand their love. And faith comes with "an implicit RSVP" (Darwall 2017, 38) in that the person with faith wants the object of their faith to have faith in them in return. Faith thus contains an implicit invitation to form the kind of relationship where each person thinks well of the other. If, by a change of heart one then betrays this faith, one denies the good of a relationship that through faith one previously invited. The feeling of betrayal will then be partly self-directed; it will be a feeling of disappointment in oneself.

Conceiving of faith as a second personal attitude of the heart is supported by considering the differences between relational trust and faith, or so I just suggested. However, the reason that Darwall introduced the distinction between deontic second personal attitudes and second personal attitudes of the heart is to argue that trust falls into the latter class. Darwall (2017, 42) argues that it is

[12] Although God does command our love, Matthew 22, 34-40.

> essential to my trusting you that I invite you to accept my trust and, indeed, that I invite you to trust that I am trusting you, to trust in my trust and in me, trusting you. It will turn out that trust is a reciprocating attitude to itself. Trust always necessarily invites trust in return.

In considering relational trust, we have been considering a trust situation where one person trusts another to do something, but this quote shifts to one person simply trusting another. This is a shift from the three-place, 'X trusts Y to ϕ,' to the two-place, 'X trusts Y'. The claim is then that in trusting someone you invite them to see your relationship as trusting, where this is something substantial and ongoing. But this is certainly too strong a claim about three-place trust in general, which need not be premised on a background relationship and need not invite such a relationship. For example, consider telling someone something; you expect them to believe you, or trust you for the truth of what you say, but this expectation need involve no presupposition of, or invitation to, a relationship. However, a more modest interpretation is possible, which is just that in relying on someone to do something out of trust, you invite them to recognize that your reliance is trusting. Trust aims at being recognized by the trusted; and it might be added trust has this aim because it is a reciprocating attitude, or one which calls on its object to respond in kind, which is to say to respond trustworthily. But since this trusting exchange can be minimal allowing that trust can be a second personal attitude of the heart in this way is consistent with the differences described in this section.

Moreover, trust and faith seem further different *as* 'attitudes of the heart'. They are difference in the extent that each can persist unacknowledged by the person that is their object. In the case of trust, if it is known that the trusted does not recognise the attitude of trust, this will be perceived as a reason not to trust, and potentially as a slight. Further, this lack of recognition is evidence that the trusted will not be trustworthy. While this evidence is not conclusive and might be overweighed, nevertheless it pushes the truster in a direction where trust is liable to evaporate and reliance is liable to be risked only if forced. Moreover, if there is no counter-consideration, this is a direction the trusted *ought* to travel; without anything to put in the other scale, the persistence of trust marks the truster out as gullible or naïve. By contrast, faith is much more like love. Its invitation to be recognized does imply the desire for a relationship beyond a particular exchange. One might say that its three-place form 'X having faith in Y ϕ-ing' implies the more general 'X has faith in Y'. And because it supports this implication, faith can persist even if unrecognized. Unrequited love is still love. And one can retain one's faith even if the person one has faith in does not deserve this faith.

These considerations suggest that while relational faith is different to relational trust, it remains essentially similar to propositional faith. The previous analysis given might then be carried over to give, thus: *X has faith in Y ϕ-ing if and only if (i) X accepts that Y will ϕ, (ii) X's accepting this is not*

ordinarily undermined by evidence that X will not ϕ, and (iii) X's accepting this manifests X's desire for Y to ϕ. The essential difference between the relational and propositional forms of faith then lies is in the pro-attitude condition (iii): the desire that Y ϕ, which in the case of propositional faith would be a desire for the truth of the faith proposition, manifests, in the case of relational faith, something like love of the person.

3. Conclusion: The Nature of Faith

Faith, like trust, has propositional and relational forms. These are respectively, 'X has faith that p', and 'X has faith in Y' or 'X has faith in Y ϕ-ing'. Propositional faith, like propositional trust, is similar to belief in that it rationalizes belief and action. It is different to belief in its relation to the evidence and its voluntariness. In these respects, propositional faith might be compared to acceptance, but unlike acceptance it necessarily involves a thinking well of its object.

Relational trust and faith shares key properties with propositional faith. Both are similarly voluntary to a degree, involve a similar detachment from matters of evidence and involve a thinking well of its object. Both differ from propositional faith in that they are relational or take persons as their objects. We can have faith in others, just as we can trust others. Relational faith then differs from relational trust in that it is not so focused on a specific interaction, and, as such, need not involve any dependence. It is also merely psychologically and not normatively constrained. In this respect, I suggested, relational faith is comparable to love and friendship.[13]

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