ON GLOBAL LEARNING

PRAGMATIC CONSTRUCTIVISM, INTERNATIONAL PRACTICE AND THE CHALLENGE OF GLOBAL GOVERNANCE

Jason Ralph

To class 6CM of Calverley Church of England Primary School, and your friends across the world, whose schooling was cut short by the global pandemic; your learning did not stop and make sure it never does, for the world always needs the intelligence and creativity of the next generation.

'A possibility of continuing progress is opened up by the fact that in learning one act, methods are developed good for use in other situations. Still more important is the fact that the human being acquires a habit of learning. [S]he learns to learn.'

John Dewey, *Democracy and Education,* 1916.

'We are told almost daily and from many sources that it is impossible for human beings to direct their common life intelligently. We are told, on the one hand, that the complexity of human relations, domestic and international, and on the other hand, the fact that human beings are so largely creatures of emotion and habit, make impossible large-scale social planning and direction by intelligence. …. There is nothing in the inherent nature of habit that prevents intelligent method from becoming itself habitual; and there is nothing in the nature of emotion to prevent the development of intense emotional allegiance to the method. … The most important attitude that can be formed is that of a desire to go on learning.'

John Dewey, *Experience and Education*, 1938.

'[Intelligence involves c]oncrete suggestions arising from past experiences, developed and matured in the light of needs and deficiencies of the present, employed as aims and methods of specific reconstruction, and tested by success or failure in accomplishing this task of readjustment … Intelligence is not something possessed once and for all. It is in constant process of forming … an open-minded will to learn and courage in readjustment.'

John Dewey *Reconstruction in Philosophy,* 1948.

'Being alive as human beings means that we are constantly engaged in the pursuit of enterprises of all kinds, from ensuring our physical survival to seeking the most lofty pleasure. As we define these enterprises and engage in their pursuit together, we interact with each other and with the world and we tune our relations with each other and the world accordingly. In other words, we learn.'

Etienne Wenger *Communities of Practice. Learning, Meaning and Identity*, 2005.

'Our best practical judgements are won in involvements with uncommon others, meeting the challenges of plurality and experimenting with what works among those affected.'

Molly Cochran, 'The "Newer Ideals" of Jane Addams's Progressivism' 2017.

Contents

Chapter 1 – Introduction
Pragmatism and the 'New Constructivism'
Pragmatism and Global Learning
In From the Margins. Pragmatism and International Relations
    Beyond Paradigms and the Theoretical Impasse
    Extrapolating from History
    Pragmatism as an Analytical and Normative Framework
Pragmatic Constructivism, IR and Global Learning. A Chapter Outline

Part One

Chapter 2 – Norms and Practice
New Constructivism / Pragmatic Constructivism
Finding normativity in and through experimental practice
The inclusive community of deliberative inquiry and society's 'stock of learning'
The logic of arguing and a theory of contestation
Let's argue! But for (or from) what?
Conclusion

Chapter 3 – Habit, Habitus and Conscientious Reflection
IR Practice Theory and Classical Pragmatism
Habit, intuition and conscientious reflection
Ends, means and 'virtuoso' performances
Dewey's 'pedagogic creed' and a theory of learning
Conclusion

Chapter 4 – Learning, Democracy and the Realist critique
Classical Pragmatism, Realism and democratic politics
Material change and the national interest
Reducing our 'vulnerability to tragedy'
Pragmatism, Realism, Prudence and Learning
Conclusion

Chapter 5 – Pragmatic Constructivism and the challenge of Global Governance
International Relations, globalization and the 'eclipse' of the public
Communities of practice and the 'software' of global governance
Publically oriented communities of practice: a Pragmatist 'Vocation'
Inclusionary reflexivity and deliberative practical judgement: two tests for communities of practice

Conclusion

Part Two

Chapter 6 – International practice and global security
Sovereignty, intervention and R2P practices
Assessing the UN Security Council as a community of practice
R2P skepticism and the Pragmatist Vocation
Nuclear atrocity prevention
Conclusion

Chapter 7 – International practice and climate change

Assessing the IPCC as a community of practice
Assessing the COP as a community of practice
Pragmatism in Paris and the view from Glasgow
Nationalism to realize nationally determined targets?
Conclusion

Chapter 8 – International practice and global health

Assessing the WHO as a community of disease control practice
Assessing the PHEIC community of practice. Lessons from the pandemic
Global health publics and intellectual property practices
The practical value of a public health treaty
Conclusion

Chapter 9 – Conclusion. *American* Pragmatism and *Global* IR

American Pragmatism and Pragmatic Constructivism
Pragmatism, Relationalism and Confucianism
Thoughts on future research

Acknowledgments

The research for this book began in 2013 when I read Richard Price's edited volume *Moral Limit and Possibility in World Politics*. I was intrigued by the idea that normative theorizing might be the next stage of the constructivist research agenda. The questions to emerge from that agenda formed the basis of a research grant proposal and I was awarded an EU Marie Curie International Outgoing Fellowship (project number 627740) in 2014. The grant writing task is an arduous process and I received help from the University of Leeds research support team, especially Maggie Credland. The first year of that two year Fellowship was spent at the University of Queensland. I would particularly like to thank Tim Dunne, Christian Reus-Smit, Richard Devetak, Marianne Hanson, Alex Bellamy, Seb Kaempf, Anna Nolan, Matt MacDonald, Andrew Phillips, Richard Shapcott and Martin Weber for their support, advice and friendship during my year at UQ.

It was at UQ that I was introduced to Emanuel Adler, Vincent Pouliot and their groundbreaking work. They were also visiting UQ at that time. The encouragement I received from them at that early stage of my project was extremely valuable. Initial findings from that phase of research were published as articles. I want to thank Jess Gifkins for agreeing to work with me on one of those. Her understanding of UN working practices enabled the application of the emerging pragmatist critique and we published in *European Journal of International Relations*. I want to thank the European International Studies Association for the award of the best 2017 EJIR article. That provided encouragement to take the project further.

Another article from this early stage was published in *International Organization*. The rigorous review process pushed the investigation further and I would like to thank the anonymous reviewers and IO Editor Michael Barnett for the constructive way their challenges were posed. Writing that article involved presentations at ISA 2015 New Orleans, OCIS 2016 UQ Brisbane, ISA 2017 Baltimore. I would like to thank the organizers of these conferences and the other conferences I attended in this period, including EISA and BISA. I also thank Robin Eckersley, Matt Killingsworth and Colin Wight for hosting my presentations in Melbourne, Tasmania and Sydney respectively.

It was at Baltimore ISA that I had important conversations with Richard Price and Kathryn Sikkink. Kathryn encouraged me to expand my conception of Pragmatic Constructivism and apply it to case studies beyond the humanitarian field. Acting on that suggestion probably delayed the book by a few years but I believe it is stronger for it and I am again grateful for the encouragement. If others disagree about the strength of these cases then of course the failing is in my application not in the suggestion. The claim I was making in the IO article had to be tested across a number of issue areas.

As the Marie Curie Fellowship came to an end I was appointed Head of the School of Politics and International Studies at the University of Leeds. I am grateful to colleagues who made it possible for me to continue researching during this period. Caroline Wise and Jenny Love were key to that, helping to protect space in my diary. I was also able to work with Eglantine Staunton during this period. Her knowledge of the R2P norm enabled further application of the Pragmatist critique, in that case to EU practice in relation to the Myanmar genocide. This was also published in the *European Journal of International Relations*. I am also grateful to Research Councils UK and their 'Rights and Ethics in a Security Context' research

Permissions

Chapter One

There is now a recognition that planetary history has entered a new age – the Anthropocene – where human activity is the dominant influence on the environment (Fraundorfer 2022; IPCC 2021, 4). With the articulation of a 'climate emergency', moreover, the failure to prevent a global pandemic, and the renewed threat of nuclear atrocity, there is a strong sense that international society is not coping with this new age. Practices must change therefore. Failing to acknowledge this, and without intelligent change, human beings face what Ken Booth (2007, 2) called 'the Great Reckoning'. On the back of the extreme weather events at the end of 2019, the global lockdown caused by the spread of the Covid-19 virus certainly felt like a Reckoning. The virus itself was not, as far as we know, and despite some claims to the contrary, the outcome of malicious human intent.[1] The pandemic was, however, a reminder that despite human influence nature has the power to overwhelm and change human society (Corry 2019; Davies, Kamradt-Scott, Rushton 2015). The global lockdown felt like the emergency that climate change is and relations between nuclear adversaries can be.

We have been able to pretend otherwise, but the natural world evolves; sometimes because of human practice, but never with regard for human interest and feeling. In response, human interests and feelings must also evolve, and that requires intelligence, creativity, courage and faith. The quite remarkable aspect of the global lockdown was how human practices did change; radically, in a short space of time, and with positive consequences. Without losing sight of the human cost of the pandemic, for instance, the former chair of the UK government's science advisory committee Paul Monks noted that as a consequence of the lockdown air quality had improved. That, he predicted, would have human health benefits. These were not the circumstances we would choose, but we were, he stated in March 2020, 'inadvertently, conducting the largest-scale experiment ever seen' on how lower-carbon societies operate (Watts and Kommenda 2020).[2]

Monks' focus was on air quality. Yet his characterization of the lockdown as an 'experiment' that could lead to intelligent change evokes a Pragmatist 'attitude' (Franke and Weber 2011), 'mood' (Posner 2003, 26), 'temperament' (Nicholson 2013), 'ethos' (Owen 2002, 654) 'frame of mind' (Rorty 1999, 24), 'intellectual stance' (Sil and Katzenstein 2010, 412) or 'disposition' (Dewey quoted in Nicholson 2013, 254) that has wider applicability. This book is about that 'temperament', and how it can help the discipline of International Relations (IR) help global society address its challenges before a Great Reckoning. I use the words 'Pragmatism', 'Pragmatic' and 'Pragmatist' to refer to the 'historically specific philosophical

---

[1] 'To date we have seen no new facts which contradict the conventional wisdom concerning likely origins, but we regret the lack of a transparently-established, global consensus on the origins' (Independent Panel, 2021a); 'SARS-CoV-2 is … a virus of zoonotic origin whose emergence was highly likely. Current evidence suggests that a species of bat is the most likely reservoir host' (Independent Panel 2021b).

[2] Others reported that global CO_2 emissions temporarily fell by 18 per cent, and emissions from aviation fell by a staggering 60 per cent compared with 2019 (Fraundorfer 2022, 295).

movement' (Seigfried 1996, 18) that emerged in the United States at the turn of the 20th Century.[3] The roots of that movement are often traced to the discussions of a group of thinkers called the 'Metaphysical Club', which included the future Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr, the philosopher and psychologist William James, and the mathematician and philosopher Charles Sanders Peirce (Menand 2002). Jane Addams, John Dewey, George Herbert Mead, Alain Locke, W.E.B DuBois, Sidney Hook, and Josiah Royce are often cited as contributors to this 'classical' phase of Pragmatist thinking. As Charlene Haddock Seigfried (1996, 5-6) notes, however, Addams's contribution is often overlooked because of the sexism that influenced the writing of the academic canon. It is worth saying, in that context, that alongside Dewey's 'experimental' approach to knowledge construction, and the way that informed a democratic ethic, Addams's work on activism, and how that constituted a Pragmatist 'vocation' (Abraham and Abramson 2015) has greatly influenced my thinking.

What links these people as philosophical Pragmatists is an understanding that social reality changes – or is in a constant state of becoming - and that the modernist 'quest for certainty' (Dewey 1930) is therefore futile.[4] This acknowledgment does not, however, lead to the paralysis of relativist uncertainty, or to an 'anything goes' nihilism (Friedrichs and Kratochwil 2009, 705). This is because the Pragmatist temperament accepts – pragmatically – that some ideas are better than others. Good ideas are those that resolve doubt because they ameliorate the lived experience by solving practical problems. Pragmatism does not rest there, however. Because the environment around us - its viruses, weapons and climate – is in a constant state of change, we must treat even good ideas with a sense of fallibilism. We should treat ideas as hypotheses, in other words. As hypotheses, ideas about appropriate practice (or norms) need to be empirically tested in context for their problem solving capacity (Hildebrand 2013; Hookway 2013, 21-2). In its American version, which emerged from the Peircean commitment to 'science', this kind of 'experimentalism' is the only effective way of 'fixing' beliefs (or norms) in an ever changing world (Peirce 1877).[5] Believing that knowledge can be founded on uncontested truth claims risks reifying out of date ideas and maintaining unwarranted social hierarchies; hierarchies that impede intelligent inquiry into the kind of practical knowledge that could otherwise sustain and improve the lived experience.

This commitment to 'experimentalism' evolved through the philosophy of Addams, Dewey and others into a humanistic commitment to deliberative democracy as an intelligent method of inquiry and social learning. Where problematic experiences give rise to doubt, and the sense that we collectively no longer know how

[3] I have chosen to follow Cochran (2012, 3) in the use of upper case to separate philosophical Pragmatism from everyday usage of that word. Nicholson (2013, 263-5) notes the 'enormous misunderstandings' that stem from 'confusing pragmatism as a philosophical movement with the variety of different ordinary language uses of the words "pragmatic" and "pragmatism"'. She identifies three such uses: to identify a sense of being practical, opportunistic and not dogmatic or ideological. She cites Bertrand Russell's confusion of philosophical Pragmatism with the opportunism of American commercialism, a view Dewey dismissed. Philosophical pragmatism 'is closest in meaning to the third sense, in which the pragmatist is the antithesis of a dogmatist or an ideologue'. On the European movement of that time see Nicholson 2013, 250-2.,

[4] After the ancient Greeks, Dewey argued, Western philosophies 'had one thing in common: they were used to designate something taken to be fixed, immutable, and therefore out of time; that is, eternal' (Dewey 1948 [1972], xii). For this reason, philosophy needed reconstructing.

[5] This '[e]mpiricism runs from Democritus in antiquity to Dewey in the twentieth century, and…has developed in Western thought [as] a theory of the contribution of experience to problems of knowledge' (Allan 2021, 67).

to ameliorate the lived experience, the task of the philosopher and social scientist is to suggest practices that can restore epistemic authority to, and a sense of faith in, our practices. By epistemic authority I mean the sense that we know what we are doing when enacting a particular practice, and that what we are doing is the best we can in particular circumstances.[6] Philosophical Pragmatism tells us that the way to achieve that authority is through inclusive deliberative inquiry. Cheryl Misak (2004, 15) helpfully captured this when she noted that for the Pragmatist 'deliberative democracy in political philosophy is the right view, because deliberative democracy in epistemology is the right view'. The Pragmatist interest in the norms and practices of deliberative democracy emerged, therefore, not because these were ordained by abstract religious, moral or political theories, but because they were useful for identifying lived social problems and learning how to mitigate them.

This book is not an intellectual history of Pragmatist thought, nor is it an attempt to identify and resolve subtle differences between Pragmatist thinkers. Rather my purpose is to offer a reading of classical Pragmatism to answer questions pertinent to the discipline of International Relations (IR) in its current global context. My sense is that global security, climate and health challenges have created a deep-seated unease about international society's capacity to cope with change; that IR should be able to respond in ways that address that unease; and that IR would be better positioned to do that if it drew more explicitly on the insights of classical Pragmatism. More specifically, then, my purpose is to answer three questions: (1) what can classical Pragmatism bring to debates in IR, including those centered on the perennial question of how norms, practices and interests interact to influence international society and its practitioners? (2) How, if at all, should international practices and practitioners adapt in the face of pressing global security,

---

[6] Zürn (2018, 9) uses the term 'epistemic authority' in global governance to refer to the practices of organizations that assess the quality of different national policies in various fields, for instance the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). On the idea of 'active epistemic authority', which is exercised in ways 'unrelated to any legal instrument, and is exercised directly, unmediated, on the strength of the scientific evidence' see Klabbers 2019, 280. Zürn shows how contestation holds such knowledge to account before it can be considered authoritative. The difference here is that my use of the term epistemic authority problematizes technocratic knowledge and requires an inclusive or democratic form of contestation and deliberation before expert knowledge can claim the label epistemic authority. For discussion that problematizes the sources, mechanisms, and implications of Zürn's argument see Pouliot 2020. Similar to Zürn, Haas (2017, 221) writes that '[s]cientists enjoy epistemic authority for expertise', although he too recognizes that this is contingent on legitimacy, the nature of which is contested. Adler (2008, 203) uses 'cognitive authority', which 'renders competing practices less appealing'; and Adler (2019, 3) uses 'epistemic practical authority' to identify a form of 'deontic power – the structural and agential establishment of status functions, such as rights, obligations, duties … It also involves "performative power" – the capacity "to present a dramatic and credible performance on the world state" (citing Searle 2011, 8), thus bringing epistemic practical recognition to a variety of audiences and stakeholders.' Again, my use of the term is more normative to the extent epistemic authority can be claimed only when it rests on a democratic form of contestation and deliberation among stakeholders, which includes practitioners *and* those affected by practice. For a view that epistemic authority is 'always in flux, more or less embattled, and in need of constant reproduction' see Danielsson's (2020, 117) Bourdeiusian-informed account. This resonates with my Pragmatist interpretation, but again I am interested in establishing why one would accept certain claims as more authoritative and the kind of contestation that facilitates that. Epistemic authority cannot be bestowed if those affected by a practice are excluded from processes that construct background knowledge, and in that sense participation in communities of inquiry is a broader issue than whether agents experience 'an attraction to the object' (Danielsson 2020, 123).

climate and health challenges? (3) Given the Pragmatist answer to these first two questions, what normative conclusions can we come to about actual practice in contemporary international society?

Pragmatism and the 'New Constructivism'

My answer to the first question is that by drawing together IR Norm theory and IR Practice theory, while also addressing the IR Realist interest-based critique, a Pragmatist informed approach fits with what David McCourt (2022) recently called the 'New Constructivism' in IR Theory. The Pragmatist understanding of social reality as 'processural' (Hoffman 2009) fits with the 'anti-essentialism' of New Constructivism for example.[7] More specifically, Pragmatism's 'processural ontology' (Adler 2018) - the sense that the things we study are socially constructed and in a constant state of becoming - adds to the longstanding criticism of those (see for example Wendt 1999; Weiner 2018) who argue that IR norm-, practice- and realist-theory incorrectly take the subjects of their study to be fixed. These concepts, and their meanings, are instead socially constructed and thus contingent on practice. Pragmatism, I suggest, can help New Constructivists understand how norms, practices and interests interact in that process, which is important given the analytical risk of working on these concepts in intellectual silos.

Yet my purpose is to go beyond identifying the parallels between Pragmatist and New Constructivist thought. My purpose is to demonstrate that Pragmatist thought offers the New Constructivist research agenda something else. The Pragmatist understanding of practice as a lived experience offers *normative* reasons why norms (even those that are taken for granted) *should* change. The direction of normative critique, and the impulse for norm change, is in this sense two-directional. Not only can a norm as a standard of appropriate behaviour condemn or justify practice, the experience of a practice can challenge or confirm a norm. That, as Bernstein and Laurence (2022, 79) note, is an empirical matter. The same applies to a consideration of interests. The argument that ideas or norms reconstitute interests is well known to the IR Constructivist research community (Katzenstein 1996; Klotz 1995; Wendt 1999), but what Pragmatism adds is a focus on how practice (and the experience of it) can also do that. For example, we might learn through experience that pursuing a particular practice was never in our interest even if we thought so at the time. Through their interplay, in other words, norms, practices and interests can create *learning experiences,* which opens up the possibility that personal and social realities can change, problems mitigated and lived experiences improved.

The fact that Pragmatism can identify *normative* reasons for change, and reasons why change can be classed as *progress*, suggests Pragmatism also helps to answer my second research question, which asks whether, and if so how, international practices *should* change. This normative approach to assessing change (the need for it and the direction of it) has not been fully addressed by Constructivist IR, which tends to *explain* change rather than normatively *assess* it (Havercroft 2018). The normative approach is, however, implied in the concept of 'learning'. In Pragmatist thought learning describes a process that

---

[7] See also Barkin and Sjoberg (2019) on the many IR constructivisms and their conclusion (2019, 59) that 'the common thread … lies in the use of methodologies to address an ontology of social construction in the context of specific research questions'.

sustains and improves experiences by changing practices so that lived problems are mitigated. When we learn to improve an experience, moreover, Pragmatism identifies that as progress. Progress is found not in the movement toward a fixed end, but in working through a process that ameliorates experiences by mitigating problems as they emerge from practice.[8] In doing that we can move from doubt to knowledge, albeit a knowledge that is contingent and therefore fallible.

Fallibilism is central to Pragmatist philosophy. We can claim progress by mitigating problems in the here and now. Any sense of resolution is contingent however, for even when a new practice manages to improve experiences its normative value depends on circumstances remaining similar to those that made it useful; and because environmental change is constant that cannot be assumed. Pragmatists find normative value at a deeper level therefore. It lies in the practices and *habits of learning*, for these enable two things: they enable us to cope with change when it is forced upon us and to initiate change when it is necessary. The habit of learning, in other words, enables the discovery of the kind of knowledge that mitigates social problems as and when they emerge. Furthermore, to the extent the global environment in its various guises (e.g. the balance of power, the disease ecology and climate) is constantly changing, then learning has to be at the global level too. This is what I mean by 'global learning'. It refers to the learning that takes place within those communities of international practice that have an impact on the global challenges to the lived experience. By sustaining and improving the lived experience, global learning helps to restore a sense of epistemic authority to, and therefore faith in, international practices as we 'go on' living.[9]

The focus on 'mitigating' a problem (as opposed to 'solving' it once and for all) is significant here. It again alludes to the sense that Pragmatism is anchored in an ontology of constant change and an anti-foundationalist epistemology. Ameliorating the lived experience by mitigating the problem that emerges from everyday practice is all we can hope for given that change is constant. That might be less than ideal, but it is the only worthwhile goal given that the search for uncontested, unchanging and absolute knowledge is futile. Pragmatism is less 'academic' in this respect. The problems to be addressed emerge from the processes and practices of societies rather than the inward-looking angst of academic elites concerned with 'disciplinary self-identification' (Barkin and Sjoberg 2019, 9, 11). For that reason Pragmatism is considered a democratic philosophy. Rather than impose knowledge that is formulated by unaccountable elites who think abstractly (or theoretically), it tries to facilitate social learning in order to create practical knowledge that is useful to society.

These points are significant for my book because they allow me to answer my second question: how *should* we act? I suggest, however, that they also have implications for New Constructivism and IR theory more generally. The Pragmatist commitment to learning as a way of mitigating social problems means Pragmatism is a social *and* normative theory. I argue then that Pragmatism can not only complement Constructivist IR, it can extend it. Pragmatism is Constructivism's normative cousin. It identifies when

---

[8] As Snyder (2022, 31) writes, this thinking underpinned the Progressive movement of the late 19th Century: 'Progressives prided themselves on having solutions to problems that would actually work to make people's lives better. The test of Progressive proposals was not just that they conformed to underlying principles but that they were practical and would ban tainted meat, improve education, and pull the economy out of the Depression'.
[9] This term features heavily in Friedrich Kratochwil's work. See Kratochwil 2018; also Hellmann 2022, 79.

norms, and the practices they enable, need to change; and it can pass normative judgement on arguments that deny that. Put together, Pragmatism and Constructivism can identify the learning processes that equip societies to ameliorate the lived experience; and in this way they can pass normative judgement on communities of inquiry and practice. McCourt's summary of the New Constructivism does not do this. On his reading, New Constructivism draws on fresh ideas imported from other disciplines, notably Practice theory, and it links those ideas to the Old Constructivist research agenda on ideas and norms. It recognizes links between Constructivist theory and normative theory, but it does not embrace them.   New Constructivism from McCourt's perspective instead remains focused on explaining social change. It need not get involved in justifying or condemning that change. In this respect, New Constructivism is the same as Old Constructivism: it is normatively and politically 'agnostic' (McCourt 2022). Pragmatic Constructivism is I suggest different. It draws normative conclusions from its analytical findings and is politically engaged.

That the Old Constructivism has been normatively and politically agnostic - despite its focus on norms as standards of *appropriate* behaviour – was pointed out some time ago by Richard Price (2008a, b, c, d, e; see also Price and Reus-Smit 1998; Weber 2014; Havercroft 2017 and 2018). Price distinguished between the rich seam of Constructivist research on the social *influence* of norms and contrasted that with the lack of inquiry into the normative *value* (or normativity) of a norm. Of course, normative implications flowed from the Constructivist finding that norms influenced states. Demonstrating that states are not necessarily power-maximizing, rational, egoists 'may reveal new possibilities for change' (Wendt 1999, 314-5).[10] Without engaging normative theory, however, Constructivism could not assume that influential norms and new identities were indeed appropriate. Nor could it assume that norm change was the same as normative progress (i.e. change for the better). This gap in the Constructivist research agenda was further exposed by research demonstrating the influence of what many assumed to be 'bad' norms (Adler 2005; McKeown 2009; Sikkink 2013; Gadinger 2022). This reinforced the explanatory power of Constructivist-inspired Norm theory but demonstrated that norm change could not necessarily be equated with normative progress. Some Constructivist norm-theorists took on the normative challenge (see the contributors to Price 2008a), but as critics pointed out (Barkin 2010, 63, 97, 139-43; Erskine 2012; Weber 2014; Havercroft 2018; Ralph 2018) they did not necessarily do this in a way that was consistent with the Constructivist's empirical finding that norms are socially constructed and historically contingent. This left unanswered the question of how Norm theory should engage normative theory.

The 'New Constructivist' embrace of Practice theory is not helpful here either, at least not in the way Practice theory was introduced to IR, which essentially bracketed questions of normativity (see Ralph and Gifkins 2017). That may be changing because, as I explain in Chapter 3, IR Practice theory is evolving. The initial wave of IR Practice theory, however, defined practice as the 'competent performance' of 'pattered actions that are embedded in particular organized contexts'. Practical, or 'how to', knowledge is, from this perspective, not only inarticulate and tacit (known only to 'insiders'), it is 'pre-intentional' and 'pre-reflexive' (Adler and Pouliot 2011, 6). Furthermore, IR Practice theory, it was argued, operated on 'a different analytical plane' to norms or normative reflection (Pouliot 2008; Pouliot and Adler Nissen 2014;

---

[10] Wendt (1999, 376) concluded his *Social Theory of International Politics* by noting the importance of dialogue between IR and the fields of Political Theory and Normative IR if we were to realize the 'possibility of collective reflexivity at the international level'.

Neumann and Pouliot 2011, 114). That led critics to question whether Practice theory could explain change (Hopf 2018). More specifically, it led to the criticism that an emphasis on pre-reflexive or tacit knowledge risked the unwarranted attribution of 'competence' (Ralph and Gifkins 2017; Duvall and Chowdhury, 2011). This would not be appropriate in a normative sense if situations demanded critical reflection and creativity on the part of practitioners. Practice might be 'the central' principle of Pragmatist thought' (Putnam 1995, 52; cited in Hellmann 2009) but for Pragmatists practice has a normative connotation that was not evident in IR Practice theory.[11]

On their own then, the Old Constructivist research on norm change, and the New Constructivist research that combines Norm and Practice theory cannot answer my second and third questions: how *should* international practices adapt to global challenges and should we support or oppose existing practices? I suggest Pragmatism can help us answer these questions; and because it can help answer them I also suggest Pragmatism can extend the New Constructivist research agenda beyond what McCourt anticipates. Pragmatism's affinity with Constructivism suggests a form of 'Pragmatic Constructivism', but if New Constructivists disagree then I suggest 'Pragmatist IR' will suffice.[12] Either way, I think classical Pragmatism can bring valuable resources to IR.

Pragmatism and Global Learning

In terms of the three questions I have set in this book, the 'processural ontology' of Pragmatist thought is central to understanding the way norms, practices and interests interact. Pragmatism's theory of learning, or what has been referred to as its 'evolutionary epistemology' (Haas and Haas 1992), is important to answering the normative question 'how should we act'. Past learning experiences give us a starting point for answering that question. They give us, in other words, an idea – or a hypothesis – of what might work to sustain and improve the lived experience as we go forward in time. We then subject that hypothesis to deliberative inquiry, which assesses the consequence of practice in its current and future context and judges its effectiveness against possible alternative practices. I think, however, Pragmatism tells us much more. It tells us how society should organize this kind of inquiry, the purpose of which is to find the ideas and practices that will in*deed* mitigate the problem. It is here that we find a normative and political commitment to democracy as a form of social inquiry and social learning.

As noted, Deweyan Pragmatism is associated with 'experimentalism', or a process that involves testing beliefs and habits for how well they improve the lived experience. Experimentalism is, in this sense,

---

[11] In this respect, and like Grimmel and Hellmann (2019), I see IR's 'practice turn' is a step along the wider arc of a 'Pragmatic turn' (Abraham and Abramson 2015; Adler 2018; Adler and Pouliot 2011; Bauer and Brighi 2009; Friedrichs and Kratochwil 2009; Kratochwil 2009, 2011), which was has been assisted by special issues of *Millennium* (2002), *Journal of International Relations and Development* (2007) *International Studies Review* (2009). See Hofius 2021 for an overview.

[12] The term 'pragmatic constructivism' was used by Haas and Haas (2002). There are obvious overlaps with my invocation of that term but where their focus was on establishing an 'explanatory lens' for IR, I am also interested in the development of a pragmatist informed normative position. See also Ralph 2018. Widmaier (2004) uses the 'pragmatic constructivist' term in his discussion of theorists as public intellectuals.

understood 'quite broadly to mean a self-conscious and purposeful approach to learning, rather than in the more restrictive sense of a randomized controlled experiment' (Ansell 2011, 12). Dewey called what emerged from the process a 'stock of learning' (Dewey 1925a [1998], 8). The normative implication for me is that those norms, practices and interests that are consistent with a stock of learning command a degree of epistemic authority. As such they are worth acting on and defending against contestation, at least until experience suggests otherwise. Like the concept of 'background knowledge' in IR Practice theory (Pouliot 2008; Adler 2008), the stock of learning can inform the starting point for a community's approach to a particular problem.

Yet in contrast to the pre-reflexive character of certain iterations of IR Practice theory, the Pragmatist adopts a more critical approach to the stock of learning; one that demands conscientious reflection (Dewey 1932a [1998], 334-5) on whether the findings of previous experiments are suitable to the specific problem in view. It may be that the stock of learning does inform practice in ways that usefully mitigate a current problem, but - crucially - the Pragmatist knows there is nothing certain about its value in the future; especially when future practices give rise to new experiences and the need to include them in an expanded problem solving community. This commitment to epistemic fallibilism, inclusion, reflection, growth and deliberation is what distinguishes Pragmatism from dogmatism; and in this sense it is what attracts Pragmatism to democracy as a means of never-ending inquiry rather than an ideal endpoint.

If then Pragmatic Constructivism can help answer my first two questions in ways that Old and New Constructivism cannot, how can it answer my third question: what normative conclusions can we come to about actual practice in contemporary international society? My initial attempt at answering this question emphasized the importance of conscientious reflection and practical judgement to a normative assessment of a norm's meaning in use. In that article (Ralph 2018) I applied a Pragmatic Constructivist approach to argue that Constructivist-inspired Norm theory should go beyond tracing the meaning of a norm (like the Responsibility to Protect) that is in discursive use. It should also assess whether those meanings are useful in practically mitigating the problem in view (like the humanitarian crisis in Syria). That article, however, left much unanswered about the Pragmatist contribution to Constructivism and IR more generally. For that reason, the scope of this book is much broader. The focus is on 'communities of practice' in contemporary international society and how well they function as the kind of inclusive, reflexive and deliberative communities of inquiry that Pragmatism values as sites of social learning.[13] My focus in this book, in other

---

[13] Emanuel Adler (2005, 18-9) identifies two meanings of social learning. The first involves social-psychological changes as a result of people's interaction with other people.   The second involves 'the evolution of background knowledge (intersubjective knowledge and discourse that adopt the form of human disposition or practices) or the substitution of one set of conceptual categories that people use to give meaning to reality for another such set'. The emphasis in this book is on the second meaning. It can refer to normative as well as causal knowledge (Sonderjee 2021, 310). Adler (2008, 202) later described this second meaning 'cognitive evolution', which he defines as 'an evolutionary collective-learning process that explains how communities of practice establish themselves, how their background knowledge diffuses and becomes institutionalized, how their members' expectations and dispositions become preferentially selected, and how social structure spreads. ... By stressing the notion that, mediated by practice, the evolution of background knowledge at the macro level constitutes changes in expectations and dispositions at the micro level, this concept differs from those of individual learning, understood simply as changes in the beliefs held by individuals (Levy, 1994)'. Levy does offer a similar definition of learning at the collective level but

words, is on international practice and the related communities of practice, and I pass normative judgement on them by asking whether they are constituted in ways that realize (both as understanding and fulfillment) improvements to lived experiences. My normative focus, in other words, is on how well existing communities of practice enable global learning.

The concept of a 'community of practice' is borrowed from Emanuel Adler (2005, 2008, 2018), who drew on the work of earlier practice theorists like Etienne Wenger (1998). Adler defines communities of practice as 'spatial-organizational platforms where practitioners interact, learn, and end up creating and diffusing practices and promoting their adoption by future practitioners' (Adler 2018, 41). My reading of Pragmatist thought adds a more explicitly normative element to that definition; a normative element that is encapsulated in the concept of learning. Learning from my Pragmatist-informed perspective is not simply the creation and diffusion of practices among practitioners; that I fear has elitist connotations that may not even diagnose the problem with current international practice (especially if practitioners are not shaken from their pre-reflexive mindsets). Rather, learning from my Pragmatist-informed perspective involves a 'sympathetic' (Dewey 1932a, [1998], 333) or inclusionary form of inquiry. This aims to understand the experiences not just of those who implement a practice. It aims to understand the experiences of those who are affected by a practice but are excluded from the community of inquiry that (notionally) establishes epistemic authority. An inclusionary and deliberative method of inquiry and learning is necessary to establish the epistemic authority of the background knowledge that enables practice; and epistemic authority – to repeat my above point – gives a community of practice the sense that it knows what it is doing and what it is doing is the best it can in the circumstances.

Of course, this inclusionary mode of inquiry fits with the classical Pragmatist idea that democratic practice (even democratic habits) are of value because they act as effective forms of social inquiry and problem-solving. There are two important qualifications that help clarify that point when applying it to international communities of practice in the global context. The *first* is that Dewey (1927c) identified those that are affected by practice but excluded from communities of practice as 'publics'. Publics have a particular role to play in the process of social (including global) learning: they alert communities of (international) practice to the existence of the indirect consequences of their practices, especially when those consequences harm the lived experience. This form of inclusivity is necessary if a practice (or more accurately the practitioner) is to claim epistemic authority and command normative support.[14] A practice that has emerged from an exclusionary community cannot claim epistemic authority because the practitioners simply do not know the consequence of that practice, nor can they be sure that what they are doing is the best they can do in the circumstances. By excluding publics, in other words, they do not know *the* public interest, and they cannot authoritatively claim to be pursuing it.

Now, it is at this point that a Realist critique troubles Pragmatist thought, and indeed it is one that Dewey's contemporaries, Reinhold Niebuhr and Hans Morgenthau, leveled at him. The idea that practitioners are

---

adds that '[organizations] learn only through individuals who serve in those organizations, by encoding individually learned inferences from experience into organizational routines' (1994, 287).

[14] 'Praxis does not "speak", only practitioners do' (Hellmann 2022, 75).

16

first able to understand what is in *the* public interest, and then adapt in ways that realize it, betrays the 'prejudices of the middle class educator' (Niebuhr [1932] 2001 xxvi-xxvii). Their criticism, however, misunderstands Dewey's conception of learning, as I demonstrate in Chapters 4 and 5. While Dewey thought that formal education could play a role in nurturing the habits of democracy and inquiry, he saw *social* learning as something else. It is an intensely political enterprise that is not naïve to the role of power. Social learning is instead a political response to a changing material and social environment. It is a response that is necessary because existing practices no longer secure interests. Furthermore, social learning holds open the possibility that, in these new circumstances, the self-interest might be better advanced by practices that realize the public interest. That at least requires recognition that self and other interests may be complementary, but – and this is the point – that disposition is no less political and no more naïve than a view that self-interests are secured through selfish (i.e. other-exploiting) strategies. Self-interest remains at the core of Pragmatism, but Pragmatism realizes that the meaning of 'self-interest' is indeterminate. The self can grow and interests can change so that they are realized through practices that secure the public good.

The Pragmatist idea of social learning (at whatever level) is thus based on an understanding that particular interests (including 'national' interests) can be reconstituted so that the clashes Realists see as inevitable can in practice be ameliorated by the constitution of a public (including global) interest. Dewey found evidence of this in the emergence of the state and the 'growth' – a concept that links his philosophy, pedagogy and politics - of larger communities. As noted, this is explored in detail throughout Part One of the book. The point here, however, is that the reader should not assume (as early Realists tended to) that the Pragmatist emphasis on learning is apolitical. Indeed, a Pragmatist approach to the study of practice involves not just an assessment of how inclusive communities of practices are. It involves a vocational commitment (Abraham and Abramson 2015) to supporting 'publics' so that they can enter processes that deliberate on, and constitute, the public interest. It involves a political commitment, in other words, to democracy as a means of social learning. That has to be nuanced at the international level, but the point remains: the Pragmatist commitment to global learning involves supporting transnational 'publics' so that they are included in the international communities of practice constituting the global public interest.

The *second* qualifying point is that the Pragmatist commitment to democratic inclusion involves a commitment to deliberation as a means of effective problem-solving. As a form of inquiry, democratic inclusion appeals to the Pragmatist as a means of discovering and mitigating social problems as they emerge in practice, but the problem driven focus is important because it too should influence the constitution of a community of inquiry. A community of inquiry should include those that can influence a practice and those that are affected by it, but beyond that the emphasis on inclusion can become unhelpful. Likewise, deliberation does not mean it is necessary to treat all opinions as having equal value. Problem-solving involves making judgements about what will work to sustain and improve the lived experience and that might involve specialized (expert) knowledge. To ignore that because one operates with a definition of inclusion that assumes all opinions have the same epistemic value is also unhelpful.

The recent rise of 'populist' politics reminds us of this. On the one hand, populist politics is consistent with Pragmatist philosophy. As a movement that builds 'popular power to break unjust concentrations of wealth and power … [populism] is a civic learning movement, developing people's civic identities, imaginations and

skills' (Boyte 2007, 4). On the other hand, populist politics can damage the deliberative quality of democracy if its anti-elitism leads to an unwarranted dismissal of expert knowledge.[15] Expert knowledge, in this sense, is that which is derived from scientific methods (in its broadest sense). It can claim epistemic authority in a way that knowledge claims anchored in different methods cannot. To ignore that hierarchy is a pathway to what Adler (2019) calls 'epistemic insecurity' (also Adler and Faubert 2022). Former US President Donald Trump's populist platform, which included climate change denial and what many see as an ineffective assessment of the Covid-19 pandemic, is perhaps the most high-profile example. That does not mean the everyday experiences of 'the people' are irrelevant, it means only that when communities of practice are constituted they find the right balance between different forms of knowledge. As Boyte (2007, 10) concluded, how populism develops 'depends on who organizes its discontents'.

In Pragmatist thought then, the openness of communities of inquiry is crucial to establishing the epistemic authority of a practice, but that does not mean particular forms knowledge – that held by experts for instance - should be dismissed, especially if the problem in view demands specialized knowledge. Hilary Putnam (2004) captures this when recalling Dewey's 'epistemological justification for democracy'. In a deliberative democracy, he argues, 'learning how to think for oneself, to question, to criticize, is fundamental. But thinking for oneself does not exclude – indeed it requires –learning when and where we seek expert knowledge'. In fact, and as is often the way with Deweyan philosophy, democracy as a form of social inquiry persuades us to collapse the expert/everyday distinction in favour of norms that value good judgement in the face of uncertainty. 'Such intelligence', McAfee (2004a, 148) writes, 'is not an attribute of experts nor of individual citizens but something possessed by a community'. The standards by which Pragmatists assess communities of practice therefore - and this is applied in Part Two of the book, which answers my third question - includes an examination of how reflexive and inclusive they are (inclusionary reflexivity). But it also includes an assessment of how deliberative they are when judging the consequences of existing and alternative practices, when that is they are constituting and realizing the public good (deliberative practical judgement).

In From the Margins. Pragmatism and International Relations

It in this way then that I think classical Pragmatism can answer the three questions I ask. In so doing I hope to demonstrate how Pragmatism can extend the New Constructivist research agenda. That may seem ambitious for an approach to IR that has been described as 'a sort of hidden paradigm in IR (Drieschova and Bueger 2022, 10). But that only means we should take a closer look at how the discipline has been influenced by Pragmatism to date. I identify in this section three specific areas. The first area involves work that sees in classical Pragmatism a means of transcending various methodological and theoretical impasses within the discipline. The second body of work extrapolates from what Jane Addams, John Dewey and other Pragmatists said about international issues of their day to help us understand what a more fully developed Pragmatist approach to IR might look like. While these two literatures are important, the third

---

[15] On the evolution of the post-1945 liberal international order and the politicization of global governance along these lines see Zürn 2018. See also Spandler and Fredrik Söderbaum 2021.

body of work, which is perhaps the least developed, is most significant for my purpose. This is because it signposts ways of applying Pragmatism to make normative assessments. This third body of work, in other words, attempts to distill from philosophical Pragmatism and related social theory a normative approach to IR that can be applied to assess the appropriateness of current international practice.

The fact that the literature in this third area is underdeveloped has been noted by others. Frank Gadinger (2016, 188) for example has noted a hesitancy within IR to use Pragmatism for empirical purposes. Where Gadinger aims to address this lacuna by introducing the 'French-styled' (Gadinger 2016, 188) Pragmatist sociology of Luc Boltanski to IR, my purpose in this book is to develop the application of classical 'American' Pragmatism.[16] That being the case, I cannot avoid the charge of western-centrism. My mitigating plea at this stage of the book is that the recent moves toward post-Western and global IR (for example Acharya, 2014, 2016; Acharya and Buzan 2019) will find an ally in my reading of American Pragmatism. Its emphasis on the value of fallibilism, sympathy, pluralism, inclusion, growth and deliberation can be applied to academic disciplinary practice as well as international practice. I elaborate on this point below and more fully in the book's concluding chapter.

Beyond Paradigms and the Theoretical Impasse

Jörg Friedrichs and Friedrich Kratochwil (2009, 701) have drawn on philosophical Pragmatism to argue that IR has long known that 'the traditional epistemological quest for the incontrovertible foundations of scientific knowledge is futile'. An appropriate response they argue is for the discipline to cut the losses sustained during its positivist phase and to look for Pragmatic alternatives that focus on the development of practical problem solving knowledge. Similarly, Jonna Nyman (2016, 821) draws on classical Pragmatism to move beyond disciplinary debates on the value of security. The sub-discipline, she argues, 'should shift from defining what makes security practices positive or negative in the abstract, to studying actual situated security practice in context and using this to make conclusions about the value of security in a particular case'.

These insights usefully identify Pragmatism's value in focusing scholarly attention on solving real problems, i.e. those that emerge from actual social practice and the experiences of everyday (as opposed to 'academic') lives. They also propose a Pragmatist-inspired research method: 'abduction'. Instead of trying 'to impose an abstract theoretical template (deduction) or "simply" inferring propositions from facts (induction)', abduction offers 'a more conscious and systematic version of the way by which humans *have learned to solve problems and generate knowledge in their everyday lives*' (Friedrichs and Kratochwil 2009, 715, 710, emphasis added; see also Kaag and Kreps 2012, 194).

This use of Pragmatism to focus on 'what works' to ameliorate the lived experience, rather than to discover incontrovertible truths, has made an important contribution to the discussion on what (or who) IR is for. There is a risk, however, that the way in which Pragmatism is being interpreted in contemporary IR does not do justice to the normative positions of classical Pragmatist thinkers. This risk is immanent within Sil

---

[16] See also Duncan Bell (2018) on the English-styled, if American influenced, Pragmatism of H. G. Wells.

and Katzenstein's (2010) influential call for 'analytical eclecticism' and the way it invokes Pragmatism (see also Sil 2009; Blanchard 2020; Chernoff 2020; Chernoff, Cornut, and James 2020; Peet 2020). Sil and Katzenstein write, for instance, that analytical eclecticism is consistent with an 'ethos' of Pragmatism. It mirrors Pragmatism

> in seeking engagement with the world of policy and practice, downplaying unresolvable metaphysical divides and presumptions of incommensurability and encouraging a conception of inquiry marked by practical engagement, inclusive dialogue, and a spirit of fallibilism. Second, it formulates problems that are wider in scope than the more narrowly delimited problems posed by adherents of research traditions; as such, eclectic inquiry takes on problems that more closely approximate the messiness and complexity of concrete dilemmas facing "real world" actors. Third, in exploring these problems, eclectic approaches offer complex causal stories that extricate, translate, and selectively recombine analytic components—most notably, causal mechanisms— from explanatory theories, models, and narratives embedded in competing research traditions (Sil and Katzenstein 2010, 411).

These are themes that are consistent with my reading of classical Pragmatism.[17] Yet the emphasis on analytical eclecticism as a means of 'bypassing' inter-paradigm debates and solving research problems through the generation of middle-range explanatory theory (Sil and Katzenstein 2010, 415) should not I suggest hide the equally important normative character of classical Pragmatism (Cochran 2012, 13-15; Cochran 2021), nor the democratic, meliorist and deliberative politics that it inspired (Bohman 1999, 603).[18] Indeed, Fred Chernoff hints at this when he writes that Sil and Katzenstein's criterion for 'successful practice' is undeveloped. 'Any attempt to clarify what 'successful' means in this context and how it is identified in real cases, requires a much more precise and rigorous operationalization of the term – a project that American pragmatism can straightforwardly underpin' (Chernoff 2020, 419). Likewise, Christian Reus-Smit (2013) earlier argued that analytical eclecticism had to be integrated with normative forms of reasoning if it was to deliver on the promise of practical knowledge.[19]

To be sure, Sil and Katzenstein (2010, 418) do take on the normative question of how problems become the focus of inquiry, noting the Pragmatist push to open up academia 'to concrete dilemmas related to

---

[17] See also Franke and Weber (2011, 671) and Lake (2013, 573) who respectively describe theories as 'tools' or 'bets' that help explain and resolve complex practical problems, rather than as abstracts truth statements.

[18] Haas and Haas's (2002) 'pragmatic constructivism' centres on generating 'useful mid-level truths', and like Sil and Katzenstein, their focus was on establishing a new 'explanatory lens' rather than an ethic that could inform political practice. That relatively less attention is paid to the democratic and meliorist ethos is possibly a consequence of excluding Addams from the 'canonical trinity' of John Dewey, Charles Peirce, and William James (Sil and Katzenstein 2010, 417; quoting Festenstein 1997, 2). In this vein, (Cochran 2009, 171) notes how 'Haas and Haas fail to take seriously in a way Deweyan pragmatism does, the notion that facts cannot be examined independently of human desires and purposes'. See also Nyman (2016, 835) who focuses only on the contextualism of Dewey and James, overlooks Addams, and goes outside the tradition for normative direction. On the exclusionary consequences of Sil and Katzenstein's representation of IR paradigms see Blanchard 2020. For an argument that they overlook power dynamics within the discipline, and the need for a critical pragmatism that include Addams see Peet 2020. For a response that welcomes engagement with ethics see Sil 2020.

[19] A more recent *International Studies Review* forum collectively affirms 'the value of pragmatist work beyond metatheory and methodology' (Pratt 2021, 1933).

policy and practice'. They acknowledge the Pragmatist emphasis on the 'process of dialogue and reflection within a more open community in which participation and deliberation are counted upon to legitimize whatever consensus emerges in relation to specific problems' (Sil and Katzenstein 2010, 417). Likewise, the possibilities of including 'the public' in academic debate are referenced. Still, I agree with the criticism that the normative implications of Pragmatism are underexplored in their account, especially in comparison to their focus on causal mechanisms and sequences. Furthermore, the normative and intensely political quality of Dewey's definition of 'publics' (i.e. those indirectly affected by practice but excluded from communities of inquiry) risks being hidden by this approach to Pragmatic IR (Abraham 2017, 8).[20] Pragmatism was dismissed by twentieth-century IR Realists for being too academic and lacking a theory of politics and power (see chapter 4); a charge also levelled by some feminists at Richard Rorty's neo-Pragmatism (Cochran 1999, loc.3093). It would be unfortunate if IR's recent turn to Pragmatism through Sil and Katzenstein was framed in a similar way. It would be unfortunate because Pragmatist IR offers society something more than a useful approach to explanatory research.

Among the IR texts to address disputes in normative IR theory through a 'politically engaged' Pragmatist 'concern for social reconstruction' is Molly Cochran's book *Normative Theory in International Relations: A Pragmatic Approach* (Cochran 1999, loc.2263).[21] Classical American Pragmatism enables Cochran to break the 'impasse' within the cosmopolitan/communitarian debate, as well as the related foundational/antifoundational divide, and move beyond this 'narrow oppositional framing' (Cochran 1999, loc.117; see also Bellamy 2002; Bray 2013; Owen 2002).[22] Crucial to this argument is what Cochran describes as

> a will to universalization that seeks the growth of human capacities and the expansion of
> the 'we' feeling'. These ambitions are facilitated through its notion of 'fallibilism', which
> takes the absolutizing edge off its ethical claims, and through its use of "moral imagination"
> to project alternatives to problematic ethical / political situations (Cochran 1999, loc.150).

This is an important insight for those who are focused on global challenges and who argue that the identification and realization of the global public interest requires high levels of trust and solidarity: the 'we' feeling of a global community. For Cochran, this possibility is latent within a Pragmatist approach to IR, which drops the mainstream view that communities are necessarily separate and occasionally opposed to each other. Instead, communities are recognized as socially constructed entities responding over time to practical challenges. Constructing a wider sense of community is difficult in practice given the habits of

---

[20] Addressing the abductive approach Franke and Weber (2011), following James (1907), draw on Papini's metaphor to distinguish theorists working (ISA-style) in separate hotel rooms, and practitioners (or Pragmatists) roaming corridors prepared draw on separate knowledge sources if they usefully solve a specific problem. For a similar metaphor but using 'separate gardens' instead of rooms, where scholars 'grow what they can best' see Lake 2013, 580. One might extend Papini's metaphor to say Dewey's 'public' includes those who cannot perhaps afford the hotel room, or even access to the corridors (of power), and are therefore dependent on knowledge producers leaving their hotel rooms, while trying to organise ways of making their own knowledge representations for a meeting in the lobby. See Abraham and Abramson 2015 for this reading of the pragmatist 'vocation', and Chapter 4 for further discussion.
[21] Other important classical Pragmatist-inspired contributions to normative IR theory include Hoffmann 2009.
[22] See also Talisse (2004) on the contribution Pragmatism makes to the deliberative turn in political theory, and its attempt to transcend the liberal/communitarian impasse.

localism, nationalism and statism, but it is impossible if our theories fix our ontologies, bind us to foundationalist thinking, and limit our imagination. A Deweyan focus on 'learning' and 'growth' – or an ontology of 'becoming' – frees us from these bonds and gives human communities a chance of meeting new challenges. Solidarity is difficult to achieve if exclusionary practices dominate, and following Addams, Seigfried and others,[23] Cochran (1999, loc.2750) draws on feminist theory to supplement these Pragmatist themes. Her purpose is to make sure Pragmatism is 'sufficiently political, critical and imaginative to provide for moral inclusion and social reconstruction in international practice'. Likewise, Cochran's Pragmatism values a 'bottom-up' (Cochran 2002; 2010, 330) approach of locally situated but globally oriented civil society actors. It is they that affect the lived experience in ways that construct transnational and global solidarity.

More recently, Emanuel Adler's book *World Ordering: A Social Theory of Cognitive Evolution* develops the idea of human 'becoming' by drawing on what he calls the 'processural ontology' and 'evolutionary epistemology' of classical Pragmatism (Adler 2019, 45-108). As noted above, Adler, along with Vincent Pouliot, has been at the forefront of the 'practice turn' in IR (Adler and Pouliot 2011), but in *World Ordering,* Adler departs from the earlier Bourdieusian influence, in favour of a Pragmatist-inspired account of practice (Adler 2019, 109-22). This places new emphasis and value on the latent potential for collective learning and change (or 'cognitive evolution'). This happens as practitioners exercise understanding, interpretation, imagination, experimentation and reflexivity when interacting with their material and social environments (Adler 2019, 19-24; 38).

This move, present also in Adler's earlier work on 'learning' (Adler 2005), has inspired themes that feature strongly in this book. For instance, Adler's emphasis on 'communities of practice' (Wenger 1998) as 'vehicles' (Adler 2019, 3) of learning and progressive change informs the analytical framework that is taken forward into Part Two of the book. There I assess international practice in the fields of global security, climate change and health and how well they facilitate global learning. But by his own admission, Adler's social theory offers only 'a tentative venture into normative theorizing' (Adler 2019, 265), which is addressed in the final chapter of *World Ordering*. While I reach a similar position, my approach is avowedly normative from the beginning, moving relatively quickly through the philosophy of Pragmatism to discuss the approach to IR that it informs and the politics it commits to.[24] This allows more space for an empirical analysis of existing communities of practice, as well as the norms, habits and politics that sustain them.

Extrapolating From History

The second way classical Pragmatism has informed contemporary IR involves extrapolating from what Addams, Dewey and other Pragmatists said about international issues of their day.[25] Of course, much of

---

[23] See Miller 2013 Whipps and Lake 2017 for summaries.

[24] Adler for instance, proposes an approach he calls 'practical democracy' (2019, 290-4), which follows Dewey's radical conception of democracy 'as a way of life', to enable 'better practices and bounded progress [which] are more likely to be associated with horizontal systems of rule, [and] are anchored in interconnectedness' (2019, 40).

[25] For analysis of the work of the Pragmatist Josiah Royce, who developed theories of international cooperation from Peirce's idea of communities of interpretation, see Kaag and Kreps 2012.

this literature is dominated by the question that confronted (and divided) classical Pragmatists, which was whether the US should enter World War I and what kind of foreign policy should follow (see Cochran 2010, 2017; Howlett 2017; Livingston 2003). The fact that Pragmatists had substantive disagreements about this question, central to constitutive debates in Western IR, is significant. Addams, for instance, welcomed Woodrow Wilson's reelection in 1916 believing 'that the United States was committed not only to using its vast neutral power to extend democracy throughout the world, but also to the conviction that democratic ends could not be attained through the technique of war' (Addams 1922). She expressed her disappointment in Pragmatist terms, questioning whether it was ever possible to achieve the level of certainty that was required to sacrifice the lives of thousands.[26] Dewey, on the other hand, supported the decision to enter the War. The crisis was not to be welcomed, but it presented an opportunity to reset the habits of 'old diplomacy' and to learn from the American experience, which he saw as 'a laboratory generating the kind of instrumentalities that might contribute to the democratic management of international relations' (Cochran 2010, 318). It was important that Germany was defeated, and 'in Dewey's mind this could not have been done without US involvement'. Ideals, he concluded, 'sometimes require this kind of coercive power to have effect' (Cochran 2010, 320).

Dewey's disappointment with the Versailles peace – he thought the US had been 'coopted into assisting Europe with its Old World domains' (Cochran 2010; see also Howlett 2017) – inspired his support for the Outlawry of War movement (Cochran 2012, 4). He later reflected on that too, noting that international legal instruments had very little influence if they were not backed up by moral sentiment. Yet Howlett (2017, 30) argues that Dewey's commitment to the Outlawry of War project was not the example of interwar naiveté it is sometimes portrayed to be. Rather, the movement and the treaty represented in Dewey's mind 'an educational instrument designed … to inculcate further the habits of rational, critical, and reflective thinking necessary for change' (Howlett 2017, 130). The emphasis was on the process the treaty could inspire, not on the treaty as an end in itself. As an educational tool the treaty provided a focus 'for the expression of this community of moral thought and desire'. It would produce the 'crystallizing effect for morals with respect to international relations that law has supplied everywhere else in its historic development' (Howlett 2017, 133). The question for Dewey, therefore, was not whether to have faith in law, morality *or* politics, the question was how these practices could work together to facilitate the social learning that bettered international relations and ameliorated the problems that people experienced.

For her part, Addams supported the League of Nations, despite similar reservations about the postwar peace. The work to build moral sentiment would be done by convincing the League to meet the needs of war torn societies, most notably the supply of food. She chose, as Cochran puts it, to steer 'new diplomacy' toward concern for human social relations rather than foreign relations between states. This was 'relational work which focused on sources of motivation – primitive, emotional, sentimental – to inspire compassion for distant others and see them worthy of social justice' (Cochran 2017, 145). Furthermore, for Cochran (2012) the 'idea that welfare provision required global cooperation and that functional

---

[26] See also Cochran, who rejects force in cases of humanitarian intervention on the grounds that any sanction of such acts 'has to have *strong* incontrovertible foundations which … are not available to us' (Cochran 1999, loc.3273).

cooperation would require new socially democratic institutional structures, putting individual human beings at their centre, anticipates the global politics of today'.

These differences of emphasis and position, including the reversals, demonstrate how *the Pragmatist commits to a method of inquiry and a process of learning* rather than pre-cooked substantive policies. Such an approach values the exercise of deliberative judgement *in situ* rather than the absolute commitment to policies that are developed in the abstract and applied without consideration of social and historical context. Disagreements among the classical Pragmatists were 'part and parcel of what Pragmatic method generates…. [Its] epistemic openness is confirmed in the separate judgements each took' (Cochran 2017, 160). What united them was a commitment to the democratization of international practice as a response to the growing interconnectedness of the 20th Century. Internationalism was not an abstract aspiration but a material fact. It was not, as Dewey put it 'a sentimental ideal but a force' (quoted in Cochran 2012, 6). The habits, doctrines and dogmas of exclusionary nationalism 'were the strongest barriers to the effective formation of an international mind'; and that kind of mind was best suited to the times.

To be sure, nationalism was not ignored by classical Pragmatists, either as a social fact or indeed as a value that facilitated growth. William James, who was one-time President of the Anti-Imperial League, opposed the assertive nationalism of Theodore Roosevelt but 'admired his robustness' (Kaag 2013, 70).   The task for James was to 'appropriate and redeploy' (Kaag 2013, 70) nationalism toward civic projects that encouraged public sentiment without, it was supposed, the downside of war (Marchetti 2015, 239-45). These projects could claim to be 'the moral equivalent of war' (James 1908). The value of such a framing can be contested if one thinks of the difficulties that have followed the securitization of public problems for example the 'wars' on terror and drugs. Indeed Dewey, who was suspicious of 'the anti-democratic nature of an educational program that sanctioned the martial spirit' (Hewlett 1976, 49), later 'derided' (Kaag 2013, 78) this kind of approach. Again, the difference illustrates the point: classical Pragmatism commits to a method for social inquiry and a process of learning, not preconceived solutions or fixed substantive positions.

Pragmatism as an Analytical and Normative Framework

Pragmatism has informed IR in a third way: IR researchers have turned to Pragmatism for an analytical and normative framework. Their purpose is similar to mine. It is threefold. The frameworks they craft from Pragmatist thought are used, firstly, to focus on social problems (including in the areas I address in this book). Secondly, they assess the role practices play in the constitution of those problems; and finally they propose ameliorative ways forward. While the literature in this area is relatively sparse (confirming Pragmatism's marginal position in contemporary IR) it does signpost methods and themes that I develop in this book. In the security field for instance, Patricia Shields and Joseph Soeters (2013) develop Kaag's (2013) focus on what Pragmatism says about militarism, especially the way it grounds particular habits in essentialist (and thus unwarranted) views of the friend/enemy distinction. Shields and Soeters then draw on the Pragmatist-inspired work of the military sociologist Morris Janowitz to show how the deconstruction of otherwise fixed binaries has facilitated the development of new security practices such as peacekeeping. More recently Jack Snyder (2022, 30-31) briefly references the classical Pragmatists to support his politics-

based and 'outcome-oriented criteria for judging the appropriateness of tactics for advancing human rights' (Snyder 2022, 3).

Other more recent works drawing on classical Pragmatism to understand security practices include Deborah Avant's (2016) 'relational pragmatist' account of private military governance. Avant focuses on how problems created by the emergence of private military actors were identified and how connections were made among those affected ('stakeholders'). She examines the attention that was given to the consequences or workability of proposed reforms, and the relative openness of practitioners to possible solutions. In this way, Avant (2016, 340) traces how '[o]pen "thinking" among consequential stakeholders can yield creative, workable collective action in pursuit of general concerns, in other words, effective governance.' Similarly, Christian Bueger and Timothy Edmunds' (2021) account of maritime security governance describes processes of 'pragmatic ordering', which includes experimenting with new practices and developing new knowledge; and Pol Bargués (2020, 237) offers a critique of contemporary peacebuilding practices that encourages 'practitioners to experiment' without 'dreams of otherworldliness'.[27] While these works draw on Pragmatist concepts (e.g. experimentalism, inclusive deliberation) to analyze the ways in which practices were understood as being problematic, and the means by which those problems were mitigated, they do not explicitly draw normative conclusions or implications for wider IR theory. Still, when these findings are set in a wider reading of Pragmatist thought they provide further evidence to suggest that this is possible.

With respect to Pragmatist-inspired IR research in the area of climate change there are even fewer examples to cite. Matthew Brown's (2013) contribution to Shane Ralston's edited book *Philosophical Pragmatism and International Relations* stands out in this regard. Brown shows how a Pragmatist conception of democracy as a form of social inquiry directs us to ask who is included, either directly or indirectly, in the 'community of inquiry' that first establishes climate change as a global problem. The epistemic authority of the findings and recommendations - our faith in them - is contingent on the way that the community is constituted. For Brown, Pragmatist IR encourages a more inclusive approach among communities of inquiry, and greater involvement of affected publics as a means of reimagining what he saw as a policy impasse involving strategies of adaptation, mitigation and geoengineering (see also Bray 2013, 465-9). To find further application of Pragmatism to this area of governance, however, we must go beyond IR sources.

The work of the environmental ethicist Ben Minteer (2012) is directly relevant here. He makes the case for a more experimental, interdisciplinary, and democratic approach, one that stands as an alternative to what he saw as the dominant nature-centered outlook.[28] More recently, the philosopher Steven Fesmire draws

---

[27] See also Nance and Cottrell (2014, 278). While they do not relate their work on security governance to Pragmatism, they draw on the 'experimental turn' in EU legal studies, which focuses on 'an iterated standard-setting process, increased participation at multiple societal levels, and experimentation to generate new knowledge about the challenges stakeholders face'.

[28] As explained by Fesmire (2020): 'The most notable feature of environmental pragmatism … is rejection of the mainstream attempt to find a single defensible paradigm with which we must align ourselves. Specifically, whatever their own eco-ontologies, pragmatist environmental ethicists do not respond to anthropogenic climate disruption by prioritizing a revolutionary attempt to convince doubters that natural systems have intrinsic value. Instead, they tend

on Deweyan Pragmatism to argue that we are suffering 'from a sort of "moral jetlag" due in part to "moral fundamentalist" habits'. This jetlag is an obstacle 'to fostering habits of moral and political inquiry better suited to dealing with predicaments rapidly transforming our warming planet'. What he calls Pragmatic pluralism is necessary if we are to 'speak more effectively to "wicked problems" in a way that aids public deliberation and social learning' (Fesmire 2020, online). Again, these works suggest Pragmatism can deliver significant insight into, as well as a normative assessment of, international practices such as those operating under the banner of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change. I speak directly to that in Chapter 7 of this book.

As with the issue of climate change one has to draw on the work of philosophers to find the application of Pragmatist ideas to the study and assessment of international practices in the global health field. James Bohman's (1999) study of the AIDS epidemic is particularly helpful in this respect. For Bohman, that epidemic raised difficult questions of epistemic hierarchy given the large asymmetries of knowledge and 'the ability to assess and employ it'. Those hierarchies might see an improvement in expert effectiveness but it did not necessarily follow that the problems experienced by non-experts were being addressed. For Bohman, the Pragmatist commitment to democracy as a form of social inquiry, and to social inquiry as a democratic practice, could help to transcend this dilemma. This is because knowledge construction for the Pragmatist rests on what Bohman (1999, 592) called an 'epistemic division of labor'. On the one hand the expert brings a technical understanding of the issue - in this case the virus - and on the other hand publics affected by the virus bring an understanding of the problem and how it is experienced. Neither the expert nor the affected can claim epistemic authority without the input of the other.

Thus, Bohman (1999, 600) concludes that '[i]nclusion in the process of decision-making of all those involved in collective enterprises establishes and enhances critical scrutiny and the epistemic authority of the experts'. He demonstrates how the AIDS case confirmed the relevance of a key Pragmatist insight: intelligence is 'a genuinely social property' (Bohman 1999, 594). The normative implication of this argument is that progress toward resolving lived problems requires the establishment of a 'free and open interchange between experts and the lay public' because this helps to 'discover ways of resolving recurrent cooperative conflicts about the nature and distribution of social knowledge' (Bohman 1999, 592). Equally, Bohman's evidence confirms the classical Pragmatist argument that normative progress requires a commitment to *a politics of the public interest*. It was only when those affected by AIDS organized politically that a challenge to how experts defined theirs and the public's interest could be mounted. After this political campaign the supposed public interest in high standards of scientific validity (which was favoured by the technical expert) was rebalanced to one where drugs were more widely and quickly available (Bohman 1999, 600).[29] Again, there is sufficient evidence here to suggest that Pragmatism can deliver significant insight into, as well as a normative assessment of, international practices in the global health

---

to focus more than monists on ameliorative processes for resolving disagreements, on making workable, ecologically-informed decisions'.

[29] See also Garrett Brown's work on international HIV/AIDS norms. While he does not frame his critique in Pragmatist terms, there are parallels to the extent it is based on a deliberative approach that makes 'public policy more efficient, effective and legitimate by including multisectoral input and creating a sense of policy ownership' (Brown 2010, 513).

field. I speak directly to that in Chapter 8 of the book, which examines and assesses the practices of the World Health Organization and how they have been challenged by the Covid-19 pandemic.

Pragmatic Constructivism, IR and Global Learning. A Chapter Outline

I should restate my purpose. I am seeking to answer three questions: (1) what can classical Pragmatism bring to debates in IR, including those centered on the perennial question of how norms, practices and interests interact to influence international society and its practitioners? (2) How should international practices and practitioners adapt in the face of pressing global security, climate and health challenges? (3) Given the Pragmatist answer to these first two questions, what normative conclusion can we come to about actual practice in contemporary international society?

To answer these questions I divide the book into two parts. Part One speaks to my first two questions. While there is overlap, the Chapters are organized to shed light on what classical Pragmatism brings to the Constructivist areas of Norm studies (Chapter 2), Practice theory (Chapter 3) and the interest-based critique of Realist IR theory (Chapter 4). As noted above, the inclusion of Practice theory alongside Norm studies has been described as a New Constructivist research agenda (McCourt 2022).[30] My interest in these chapters is to demonstrate how, by including the insights of classical Pragmatism, the New Constructivist research agenda can be further expanded to also answer my second question: how *should* international practices adapt in the face of global challenges? Answering that question enables IR to not only identify and understand international practices, it demonstrates how IR can normatively assess them. Adopting what I call a Pragmatic Constructivist approach, with its normative commitment to learning can, in other words, complement *and* extend New Constructivist research.

Chapter 5 consolidates the arguments advanced in Part One of the book to create an analytical and normative framework that can first be identified as 'Pragmatic Constructivist IR', and then, second, be applied to assess communities of international practice. The chapter builds on the literature introduced in the previous section to focus on the way in which communities of practice and inquiry identify problems and then try to solve them. In the absence of certainty about immutable truths and ideal end points, a Pragmatic Constructivist approach focuses on the problems that are immanent within, and emerge from, actual international practice. A problem occurs when a practice fails to sustain or improve the lived experience of practitioners (those performing the practice) *and* publics (those affected by the consequence of practice). This of course is an empirical question, which requires a dual focus on the implementation *and* consequences of practice; and, crucially, that is important for interrogating the epistemic authority that practitioners claim. Without a holistic understanding of the consequences of a practice, practitioners cannot know that what they are doing is the most appropriate course of action. *This is the first normative test of a community of practice: how reflexive is it? In other words, how well does the community of practice know the consequence of its practices and how open is it to learning from affected publics.* To the extent international practices have global consequences, global learning requires a political mobilization by, or on

---

[30] Adler (2008, 219) identified this potential: 'Building on premises consistent with social-construction processes, a theory of communities of practice and cognitive evolution broadens constructivist IR theory'.

behalf of, affected publics so that their experiences are included in the deliberations of the relevant community of practice.

The second test follows on from the above point that reflexivity and inclusion are necessary but not sufficient for global learning defined as effective problem-solving. A practice need not be dismissed because it is contested either by practitioners or excluded publics. This is particularly the case if, as noted above, it draws authority from Dewey's 'stock of learning' or the lessons of the past. Moreover, while new information of lived experiences should be a cause for conscientious reflection on the value of an existing practice that again does not mean the practice should necessarily change. Effective problem solving requires both backward looking and forward looking (Hildebrand 2013, 67) or 'counterfactual' (Sikkink 2008) inquiry. The wisdom of the past may not be applicable in the present or the future because things change. As another contemporary Pragmatist put it, effective inquiry requires an 'imaginative rehearsal' (Hoover 2016, 119) of what would follow if those practices were abandoned or changed; and given the basis for action is in part imagination, practice also involves what James (1896 [2005]) called the 'will to believe' (see Bray 2013). *The second normative test of a community of practice, therefore, is how well it exercises deliberative practical judgement, or, in the words of Kathryn Sikkink (2008), how well it 'weighs the consequences' of alternative courses of action.* To the extent international practices have global consequences, global learning not only requires the communities of practice to be inclusionary and reflexive, it requires them to deliberate on how practical problems can be solved and that requires the ability to judge between alternatives pathways.

In Part Two of the book (Chapters 6-8) I apply these two tests – what I call inclusionary reflexivity and deliberative practical judgement – to normatively assess the practices of contemporary international society in the context of global security, climate and health challenges. In this way, I answer my third question and I summarize each chapter's contribution below. It is first necessary by way of introduction, however, to clarify something about the scope of the international practices I am interrogating.

The practices interrogated in Part Two of the book tend toward the 'macro' level of analysis. The macro-micro conceptualization has emerged within IR Practice theory research, and by working at the macro level I follow the approach of Silviya Lechner and Mervyn Frost (2018). In contrast to the wider tendency to go 'micro' (see Soloman and Steele 2017) - that is to focus on practices in bureaucratic settings - Lechner and Frost's Practice theory focuses on international society's 'institutions' (e.g. sovereignty) as sets of meaningful practices.[31] For Nora Stappert (2020b, 188), this move is 'squarely at odds' with an approach to Practice theory that focuses on 'multiplicity' and rejects the idea of an all-encompassing global order. On my reading, however, Lechner and Frost do not reject multiplicity, but argue that it can be brought together

---

[31] Furthermore, by noting that norms make practices meaningful Lechner and Frost (2018) reject Pouliot's claim that the study of norms and practices operate on different analytical planes. The shared analytical plane is evident also in Bull's (1977 69) definition of 'institutions', which recognises that rules (or norms) are 'performed' (as practices). He adds: 'by institution we do not necessarily imply an organisation or administrative machinery, but rather a set of habits and practices shaped towards the realisation of common goals' (Bull 1977, 71). See also Ansell (2011, 15) for a Pragmatist interpretation and assessment of institutions as 'repositories of experience and knowledge as well as tools for collective action and problem solving'.

through the concept of the 'institution', or a 'practice of practices'.[32] International society, in this sense, is a community of practice.[33] The idea of a 'practice of practices' is a helpful one. It offers research versatility. Indeed, while I tend toward the macro level, my analysis in this book switches between the macro and micro levels of analysis.

Chapter 6 begins the application of Pragmatic Constructivism by first interpreting and assessing how, as a community of practice at the macro level, contemporary international society has responded to instances of mass atrocity and the problem that created for the practices of state sovereignty. I demonstrate how political mobilization on behalf of once excluded publics (in this case vulnerable populations) contributed to a reimagining of sovereignty as a responsibility to protect, as well as a normative reassignment of that responsibility to international society when a state 'manifestly fails'. I apply the two tests – inclusionary reflexivity and deliberative practical judgement - to the micro level by assessing the working practices (e.g. penholding, veto reform) of the UN Security Council, which I see as a community of R2P practice. While greater inclusivity signposts ways in which the Council can better respond to the public interest, the impact of micro-adaptation is ultimately contingent on a deeper level of change in the identity of member states. Given the Pragmatist's interest in finding better alternatives I also assess the practical judgement of R2P sceptics, which I conclude is lacking given that their prescription does not address their own criticism of R2P. I conclude that it is only through the kind of long-term political mobilization that reconstitutes state identity and interests that we will see international practice realize the global public interest. In that light, the R2P norm acts as a useful pedagogic tool.

Chapter 6 also considers the particular threat of nuclear atrocity, which would in all likelihood follow the use of nuclear weapons in conflict. My argument here focuses on the lack of faith international society has in deterrence as a means of preventing nuclear atrocity, which manifests itself in non-proliferation practices. These two contradictory practices may be reconciled by the hierarchical argument that only certain states are capable of 'nuclear learning' (Nye 1986) and only these states can be trusted to practice nuclear deterrence. I conclude that this argument also lacks epistemic authority, especially across post-colonial international society. This level of doubt, I further argue, is unsustainable to the extent its practical consequence is continuing proliferation, which increases the risk of nuclear atrocity. As with the R2P section, I criticize the impracticality of alternative proposals (e.g. the world state of the nuclear realists, and the movement for complete nuclear disarmament), but adopt Daniel Deudney's (2007, 2019) proposal for what he calls 'deep arms control'. This I suggest can be a focus for future learning. Based on Cold War

---

[32] Adler's (2019, 127) use of the concept of 'anchoring practices' has a similar implication. These are 'patterns of social activities that constitute social contexts and order by rendering possible and defining the criteria used in more specific practices. … [They] configure, organize, arrange, and stabilize social life around core constitutive rules'. He gives the example of the European order constituted by the free movement of goods and peoples across borders. Cooper and Pouliot (2015, 348) also talk about a multilateral forum, like the G20, as 'a bundle of practices'; Morgan (2011, 150) describes Cold War deterrence as a 'cluster of practices'.

[33] Of course the concept of 'international society' is often associated with English School IR. For a discussion on the place of 'practice' in English School framings see Navari 2011. One does not have to have that association to discuss macro-practices. See Cooper and Pouliot (2015, 337) who discuss deterrence, arms control and diplomacy as practices.

evidence, it can be a focal point for a public that would, by explaining the reasons for deep arms control, constitute the other-regarding and publically oriented states that are necessary to prevent nuclear atrocity.

In Chapters 7 and 8 I apply the two tests of Pragmatic Constructivism to communities of practices in the respective fields of climate change and global health governance. With respect to climate change, I examine two communities of practice, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) which in effect frames the problem of climate change, and the Conference of Parties (COP), which meets annually to discuss international society's response to the problem within the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change. The question here is whether the COP deliberations are properly constituted in order to deliver changes to carbon emitting practices and thus slow down and limit the increase in global temperatures. The analysis operates at a micro-level - for instance, how physical space in the Conference is organized - and the macro-level - for instance, whether it would be better to organize deliberations on a 'minilateral' basis that is less inclusive but more likely to cut carbon emissions. The focus here is driven by the Pragmatic Constructivist interest in constituting the community of inquiry that is most appropriate for solving the problem. I note that for the most part this debate has been by-passed by the decision at the 2015 Paris COP to commit to Nationally Determined Targets (NDCs) for emissions reduction. Here I apply the second Pragmatic Constructivist test. I assess the consequences of that collective judgement in light of progress made at the 2021 Glasgow COP, which was the most recent meeting at the time of writing. From that analysis I conclude that the problem should now be framed in terms of states delivering on the commitments they have made and I consider the usefulness of nationalist dispositions in that process.

Chapter 8 focuses on global health governance and specifically the problem of containing the spread of contagious diseases. This is one of the tasks of the World Health Organization (WHO) and its practice of declaring a Public Health Emergency of International Concern (PHEIC). Given the 'pervasive uncertainty' (Davies et al. 2015 189) that surrounds the outbreak of a contagious disease and the costs of declaring a PHEIC, which includes the possible isolation of the effected state, the decision inevitably involves a judgement call rather than the pre-reflexive implementation of preplanned steps. Applying the first Pragmatic Constructivist test to this practice leads me to ask if the community of practice charged with making that judgement is properly constituted and sufficiently inclusive.   I ask if it fully understands the nature of the problem and is constituted to make the best possible judgement. The evidence suggests that it is not. More specifically, the evidence points to practice that has privileged technical (in this case epidemiological) expertise over social and political advice. This is problematic because of the importance of the latter. As Sara Davies and Clare Wenham put it, 'political solutions will also be required to achieve international cooperation and solidarity' (Davies and Wenham 2020, 1228).

A second application of the Pragmatic Constructivist tests focuses on an inconsistency internal to global health practices as they relate to the worldwide distribution of vaccines. Practices that would arguably achieve this more effectively, such as the local manufacture of vaccines, are prevented by intellectual property practices. Applying a Pragmatic Constructivist approach to this problem would lead one to weigh the experiential consequences of such practices, which leads me to criticize it not simply because it fails to sufficiently protect populations in the developing world, but because the Covid pandemic has again illustrated a global public interest in comprehensive and universal vaccination. This is an intensely political interest, but my conclusion is that a Pragmatic Constructivist can make a normative argument for changes

to intellectual property practices based on its identification of a public interest. Such policy proposals, in this and other chapters, of course requires a deeper consideration of the empirical evidence, and Pragmatists may reach a different judgement on the appropriateness of these 'forward looking' proposals. My more limited purpose here is to illustrate the approach, both academic and political, that is involved in Pragmatic Constructivist social inquiry.

In the concluding chapter I go beyond a summary of my contribution to address the question of how an approach inspired by *American* Pragmatism can inform *Global* International Relations, which I understand to mean the construction of a discipline that is more inclusive of non-Western perspectives. To do this I draw parallels between my reading of Pragmatist thought and non-Western 'cosmologies' like Confucianism.[34] This has been introduced to a contemporary Western IR audience mainly through the works of Yaqing Qin (2016 2018). I am, however, building on what others have identified as 'the many resonances between Deweyan pragmatism and Confucian philosophy' (Ames, Chen and Hershock 2021, 12).

As noted in this Chapter, Pragmatism cannot be considered part of the rationalist IR 'mainstream', and it is not therefore subject to recent non-Western critiques (see for example Qin 2016, 2018) of the discipline. Moreover, if the Pragmatist turn in Western IR continues then it can, I suggest, be more easily harmonised – contrapuntally (Bilgin 2016) - with the non-Western cosmologies I discuss in Chapter 9. This at least signposts a path 'toward' Global IR, even if it does not fix the path's end point. Indeed, I suggest we follow such signs *because* they do not fix the destination. Those end points are for practitioners and global publics to construct as they work collectively through communities of practice that are inclusive, reflexive, creative and deliberative.

---

[34] 'A cosmology seeks to explain the origins of the cosmos in which we find ourselves and our place within it. As such, it shares many similarities with ontology and epistemology but differs from both as it has a sacred dimension that is often, though at times erroneously, translated into the concept of 'religion'. Therefore, it cannot be reduced to 'ontology' or 'epistemology' without violating its sacred core' (Shani and Behera 2021, 2).

Chapter 2

Norms and Practice

My purpose in these opening Chapters is to answer my first question: what can classical Pragmatism bring to debates in IR, including those centered on the perennial question of how norms, practices and interests interact to influence international society and its practitioners? My starting point is Constructivist-inspired Norm theory, which began to impact the IR mainstream in the 1990s. This development was a consequence of research that demonstrated how ideas became accepted as international norms (e.g. Finnemore and Sikkink 1998), and how international norms not only influenced international relations but also contributed to domestic change (e.g. Risse, Ropp and Sikkink 1999). I use the term 'Constructivist-inspired Norm theory' because I see Constructivist IR scholarship addressing a broader sociological agenda than the one focused only on norms.[35] The 1990s Constructivist turn, for instance, focused on the influence that 'ideas', 'beliefs' (Goldstein and Keohane 1993) and 'cultures' (Katzenstein 1996; Wendt 1999) had on decision-making. The implication, however, was the same. IR could no longer have faith in the theoretical claim that states made rational calculations on how to advance their material interests, which were pre-given and (somehow) exogenous to relational or social settings.

I accept therefore that Constructivist IR is not just about norms, but I do focus in this Chapter on norms as 'standards of appropriate behaviour' (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998, 891). Their proximity to my interest in normative theory justifies that, but there is nothing to stop future research applying Pragmatist insights to the normative study of ideas and cultures. We find norms in 'should' or 'ought' statements, as well as in practices that are enacted out of a commitment to do what is considered appropriate. I give a more detailed account of practice in Chapter 3, but for now I refer to practice as material actions (e.g. speaking, writing, negotiating, moving, fighting) that have a relation to norms and interests and produce lived experiences. The commitment in practice to a norm may be in opposition to interests, but that is not necessary to show the impact of a norm. A norm can (re)constitute an interest in ways that mean the social agent has an interest in complying with and enforcing the relevant standard of appropriateness. There is nothing inevitable about that process, and when someone acts to advance interests that are contrary to standards of appropriateness society uses words like 'rogue', 'irresponsible', 'reckless', 'selfish' and so on to condemn them. In this way, norms do not necessarily lose value when practices do not conform. Norms in this instance become the referent point for saying why certain practices are inappropriate.

---

[35] See McCourt (2022, 4-6, 25-38) for a useful 'stock take' of 'old Constructivism'.

In Finnemore and Sikkink's (1998) article 'Norms and International Theory', we learn how an idea becomes accepted as an international norm. Their 'norm life cycle' illustrates this. Principled ideas inform the agency of 'norm entrepreneurs'. As a result of their activism, a principled idea can 'diffuse' and then 'cascade' through international society, leading to a point where it commands sufficient support to be called an international norm. Normative change, Finnemore and Sikkink argued, can be identified at the point states 'internalize' the new standard of appropriateness. From that point on the norm becomes a social fact; a standard of appropriateness that is 'taken for granted'. Alongside this, Risse, Ropp and Sikkink's (1999) 'spiral model' demonstrated how, in a human rights context, transnational activism committed to international norms influenced domestic societies as their governments went through various stages of 'repression', 'denial', 'tactical concession', 'prescription' and 'rule consistent behavior' (see also Keck and Sikkink 1998).

This theory of how normative change happens, and how new norms change practices, inspired a whole new empirical research agenda.[36] But it also inspired a second wave of research that was more critical of the theory's assumptions.[37] Two points gained particular attention: the implication that once adopted the meaning of a norm was fixed; and a sense that the processes of norm adoption and norm influence were too linear. Of particular influence was Antje Wiener's (2004, 200) argument that social meanings of a norm - 'while stable over long periods of time and within particular contexts – are always in principle contested'. For Wiener, discourse analysis was needed to understand the meaning of a norm 'in use'. Similarly, Amitav Acharya (2004; 2013) argued that a norm's meaning was understood differently within global regions and could be 'localized' to fit particular cognitive priors and cultural predispositions.

This second wave of norm-research was characterized by empirical work that demonstrated the perceptiveness of these and other critiques.[38] It also led Wiener and Acharya to develop normative projects: the theory of contestation (Wiener 2014; 2018) and global IR (Acharya, 2011, 2014, 2016). These

---

[36] See, for instance, work on the influence of norms on practices related to nuclear (Tannenwald 1999) and chemical (Price 1997) weapons, landmines (Price 1998), racial equality (Klotz 1995, 1999), and human rights (Risse, Ropp and Sikkink 1999; Sikkink 2011)

[37] The language of 'generations', 'waves' 'turns' 'moves' or 'dimensions' is used to describe the history of the field. The lines separating phases of research are never distinct, so this language can be criticized, but it remains useful. See Lantis and Wunderlich 2018; Pratt 2021; Ralph 2023.

[38] This second wave of norm research was variously described as a 'critical' (Hopf 1998) 'consistent' (Fierke 2013); 'reflexive' (Wiener and Puetter 2009); 'post-positivist' (Welsh 2013). It shifted the focus toward the study of indeterminacy and the role agency has in normative interpretation and contestation. Research shifted to examining norms as 'processes' rather than 'things' (Krook and True 2012) and questioned how discursive practices constituted the meaning of a norm *in use* (Wiener 2009; Wiener and Puetter 2009; Wiener 2018, 13-6; 77-8; Linsenmaier, Schmidt and Spandler 2021). For early links to Pragmatist themes see especially Sebastian Schmidt (2014, 817) who demonstrated how 'concepts derived from pragmatism help explain how the creative recombination of practices by actors in response to changes in material and social context of action can transform largely tacit notions of appropriate behaviour'. This second wave of Norm theory research also challenged the linear view that norm change, highlighting how, in contingent situations distinct norms could clash (Bloomfield 2016) or be reconciled and aligned in 'norm clusters' (Lantis and Wunderlich 2018; Winston 2018; Staunton and Ralph 2019), and how processes of contestation could be characterized (Deitelhoff and Zimmerman 2019). Acharya's (2004) conceptualization of norm localization inspired work on R2P (Prantl and Nakano 2011; Capie 2012; Negrón-Gonzalez and Contarino 2014; Kenkal and De Rosa 2015; Stefan 2017; Doherty, Mathieu and Ralph 2020), indigenous rights (Steinhilper 2015), women's rights (Levitt and Merry 2009), health (Collins 2013), environment (Hesengert 2015).

projects were interested not just in explaining norm change. They were also interested in the normativity (or appropriateness) of new norms. Rather than assume the standards of behaviour that a norm articulated were appropriate, these scholars asked what processes made those norms appropriate.[39] These projects are still in their own ways influencing IR. Nevertheless, research into a more 'holistic' (Reus-Smit 2008, 65) approach to norm studies, one that combines constructivist IR and normative theory remains, I suggest, underdeveloped. If standards of appropriate behaviour are the product of social processes (which Constructivism demonstrates) what is it about those processes that enables one to accept, defend and enforce those standards? What convinces us that a standard of appropriate behaviour is indeed (or in deed) appropriate?

There have been significant efforts to get IR Constructivists to address this question. As I noted in the previous Chapter, the question was raised by those Constructivists, including Finnemore and Sikkink, who contributed to the volume edited by Richard Price (2008) *Moral Progress and Political Limits*. That book reprised the question Price and Christian Reus-Smit (1998) asked about the relationship between norm change and normative progress. If Constructivists were claiming - perhaps implicitly (see McCourt 2022, 9; Havercroft 2018) that norm *change* was evidence of normative *progress* then their theory had to do more work. It had to explain why the processes that established new norms influenced practice *for the better*. As I also noted in the previous Chapter (see also Ralph 2018), the contributors to *Moral Progress and Political Limits* were criticized by Toni Erskine (2012) for adopting what she called a 'division of labour' approach to this question. Constructivists interested in establishing the normativity of the norms they studied could not work with *any* normative theorist. It would be inconsistent, for instance, to argue on the one hand that standards of appropriate behaviour are constructed by social processes but then make normative judgements based on standards derived from abstract philosophies that (somehow) transcended those same processes.

How to resolve this problem is I suggest a question that is still at the edge of contemporary IR norm studies. It is a question that I think, following Price's (2012) lead, Pragmatism can answer.[40] That is because Pragmatism accepts the futility of grounding moral ends in abstract philosophy, brushes to one side the quest for absolute moral certainty, realizes that social processes are constantly constructing norms and their meanings (i.e. a processural ontology) and finds normativity in processes that demonstrate their usefulness for ameliorating the lived experience by mitigating social problems. I develop that claim in this chapter, identifying in particular the normative values that emerge from this focus on problem-solving

---

[39] It is interesting to reflect on conceptions of learning in light of this 1st and 2nd wave research. Checkel (2001, 562 emphasis added) for instance saw learning as 'a process of *convincing* someone through argument and principled debate' to comply with a norm. The risk with Checkel's definition is that it put the norm (and its spokespersons) outside the process of reflection and learning. The learning in that sense was hierarchical and unidirectional. As I argue below, Pragmatism does not dismiss such a conception of learning, but the act of convincing another has to be accompanied by a reflexive process of deliberation if we are to remain confident in the norm's appropriateness. Gadinger (2022, 116) suggests something similar when he notes how Pragmatism locates 'normativity in the process of learning as active participation in communities', which 'implies a completely different research perspective than technical notions of norm implementation and socialization'.

[40] Referring to Molly Cochran's (1999) IR pragmatism for instance, Price wrote: 'there seems to be very much in common in spirit between such an approach and an appreciation of the practical judgements that might flow from understanding how moral norms work'.

practice. The bottom-line is that Pragmatic Constructivism values practices that are open to reflective, inclusive, deliberative and prudential reasoning for it is these that facilitate society's ability to cope with change, mitigate the problems that threaten the lived experience, and formulate creative ways of transcending them. These practices are valued, in other words, because they facilitate social learning.

I develop this argument in the first part of the Chapter. I then distinguish the Pragmatic Constructivist approach from other normative approaches that have emerged from a within norm studies. To do that I focus on Antje Wiener's theory of contestation (I speak to Acharya's 'global IR' project in Chapter 9). By the end of this chapter, therefore, I will have put in place the first building block of a Pragmatist and Constructivist informed normative framework. I will then be one step closer to answering my second question: how *should* international practices adapt in the face of pressing global security, climate and health challenges? Other chapters will add further building blocks to this Pragmatic Constructivist framework, which will be consolidated in Chapter 5 and applied to assess current international practice in Part Two of the book. My first task then is to elaborate on why I think Pragmatism and Constructivism can align, and why I call that approach a Pragmatic Constructivism.

New Constructivism / Pragmatic Constructivism

David McCourt (2022, 3) reflects on the current state of Constructivist IR research and argues for a broader understanding of what it includes. Essentializing Constructivist IR theory leaves scholars 'unable to see the connections between Constructivism and exciting new developments, such as the recent turn to 'practice'. 'New' Constructivism, he argues, studies norms alongside relational practices. That may be new within mainstream IR, but I am tempted to say the study of norms and practice (or more precisely the experience of practice) has *always* at the forefront of the Pragmatist approach.[41] Indeed, it is in the relationship *between* norms and practice (its effects, affects and how they are experienced by the self and other) that we find answers to the questions Constructivists are asking about normativity (i.e. appropriateness). Realizing this is not an argument for replacing Constructivism with Pragmatism. It is an argument for creating a Pragmatic Constructivist approach.

The potential for merging Pragmatism and Constructivism is evident in McCourt's eight point summary of New Constructivism.   Seven of those points I suggest resonate with the social theory of classical Pragmatism, but the seventh – political agnosticism – is problematic. I will explain why it is problematic in this section. I will also explain why I think McCourt is wrong to argue that Constructivism is politically agnostic. In doing so, I remove what I think is the only obstacle to merging Pragmatism and Constructivism into a single approach. But, as I said in the previous Chapter, whether the label 'Pragmatic Constructivism' gains traction is for others to decide. Pragmatism is there if IR Constructivists want it. It is helpful to answer the question of how to identify progressive change while remaining true to the idea that norms are socially constructed. But if the Constructivist IR research community shows no interest answering that question,

---

[41] McCourt (2020, 3) does add that 'early constructivists emphasized the importance of practice and practical knowledge in international affairs. However, such insights were quickly overshadowed by more easily operationalizable concepts, such as norms, identity, and culture'.

and its corollary - how *should* international practices work? – Pragmatism need not retreat to the side-lines. This is because, I would argue, Pragmatism is better placed to answer the most important questions to humanity and its various societies: how should we act in the face of existential global challenges. For that reason, as well as for the way is can talk to non-Western approaches (see Chapter 9), I think Pragmatism – either as Pragmatic Constructivism or as Pragmatist IR – should now inform the 'mainstream'.

For McCourt (2022, 13) the New Constructivist approach to IR is rigorously anti-essentialist; anti-foundationalist; methodologically promiscuous; conceptually pluralist; reflexive; necessarily historical; politically agnostic; and attuned to emotions and affect. My introduction to Pragmatism in the previous Chapter should alert the reader to the parallels. Deweyan naturalism and the influence of evolutionary theory (i.e. environments and agents adapt to each other) underpins the kind of processural ontology that McCourt identifies when he refers to the 'anti-essentialism' of New Constructivism. Because the world is in a constant state of becoming, it leads Pragmatists to drop the quest for epistemic certainty, as well as the search for incontestable ideal templates for society. The Pragmatist focus is instead on the lived (or experienced) problems that are 'in-view' (i.e. actual problems that emerge in constructing realities).

This approach maps on to the 'anti-foundationalism' McCourt associates with new Constructivism, as well as its commitment to study history as a means of understanding how and why problems emerge. Problems may emerge because our practices – as well as the emotions, habits and norms that enable them - become maladapted to the changing external environment. That demands what Dewey called conscientious reflection (see Chapter 3) and that also resonates with McCourt's reference to the 'reflexive' character of New Constructivism. Finally, the Pragmatist commitment to theories as tools (see Chapter One) that can ameliorate social problems (rather than statements that reveal inalienable truths) maps onto the 'methodological promiscuity' and 'conceptual pluralism' of New Constructivism.

All this might lead one to conclude that Pragmatism *is* Constructivism and Constructivism *is* Pragmatism.[42] But what about McCourt's claim that New Constructivism is 'politically agnostic'? This is problematic because, as I noted in Chapter One, Pragmatist thought is committed to a politics of inclusion and deliberation as a means of learning how mitigate social problems. Problem-solving behaviour means finding a practice that can command epistemic authority, or the sense that what we are doing is appropriate in the context of the problems we face. That involves including the knowledge of practitioners, as well as the knowledge of those who experience the consequences of practice, what Dewey called 'publics' (see Chapters 4 and 5). It then involves deliberating to creatively find the best way forward. That way is identified as *the* public interest. The process of first discovering the public interest and then realizing it is a learning process, but the process of establishing an inclusive and deliberative community of inquiry is intensely political. This is significant for my project, because if, as McCourt insists, New Constructivism is politically agnostic then Constructivism is at odds with Pragmatism and the two approaches will influence IR separately. I would argue that is unnecessary because it is my sense that New Constructivism is more political than McCourt thinks.

---

[42] This might be the implication of Andrew Abbott's observation, cited by McCourt's (2022, 38), that the claim 'social reality is given by practice rather than given ex ante has made at least four separate appearances in this century's social science: first in the pragmatism of Dewey and Mead'.

I would argue, for instance, that a political stance of some sort follows from the New Constructivist ontology, which is 'rigorously anti-essentialist' (McCourt 2022), and its argument that reality is socially constructed. Posing the following question illustrates this: how do New Constructivist social theorists relate to political projects that are based on essentialist conceptions of the other? It has been common, for instance, for politicians to hold essentialist views of their enemies. President Reagan's view that the Soviet Union was innately 'evil' is a good example. In this circumstance, the rigorous 'anti-essentialism' of Constructivism would have told President Reagan that he is wrong. 'There is nothing innately evil about the Soviets, Mr. President. Their current combination of identity and interests has been socially constructed over time, and indeed the way in which the US has interacted with the Soviet Union has been part of that process and will continue to be'. If the New Constructivists are still in the Oval Office at this point, they would add: 'You might, Sir, be right to increase defence spending in response to Soviet actions, but that cannot be justified by essentialist assumptions about Soviet interests or identities'.

Of course, President Reagan changed his own mind (or at least his rhetoric) about the Soviets as they changed their interests (and identity), and some might claim that this was part of Reagan's strategy to win the Cold War. In other words, Reagan did *not* hold essentialist views. He knew that the Soviets could change if the US changed the relationship and its interactions. My point does not require resolving that historical question, however. My point is simply that political positions are sometimes based on essentialist reasoning, and to rigorously argue that those positions are wrong *is a political intervention.* Despite McCourt's claim, Constructivists cannot avoid the political fray. Their anti-essentialism opens up epistemic space to justify alternative responses to those based on essentialist reasoning and that has political implications and responsibilities.[43] In the above scenario for example, anti-essentialism opened up political space for challenging the preferred policy of increased defence spending. Whether increased defence spending was appropriate thus became a matter of practical and political judgement.

One could make similar arguments with respect to the New Constructivist's anti-foundationalism but I do not want to belabour the point. When confronted by political positions that rest on foundationalist truths or essentialist views of the other (and, for that matter, the self) the New Constructivist commitment to anti-foundationalism and anti-essentialism is politically consequential. Still, McCourt might respond by arguing that it is still not necessarily the case that political agnosticism is inconsistent with New Constructivism. A New Constructivist might argue that anti-essentialist empirical research reveals different political options, but it does not follow that as social theorists they need team up with a normative theorist or take a normative view on the appropriateness of those options. There is something important in that response. The epistemic authority offered by academic research is not the only factor that should be considered when deciding the appropriateness of practice. Academic research only goes so far in deciding the appropriateness of a particular practice; and of course in democratic societies we tend to invest authority in officials elected by peoples, not academics appointed by other academics. New Constructivists

---

[43] A similar inconsistency is contained in Samuel Barkin's (2010, 79, 90, 104) argument that Constructivism encourages reflexivity among Realists but is not a normative theory. To criticise a Realist practitioner for not being reflexive has normative and political implications.

might insist, therefore, that academics should not involve themselves in normative judgements and political decisions. While that position reveals something important I think there is also something missing.

As noted, those taking political decisions may be uninterested in what is empirically correct because it does not suit their particular interests. Democratically elected politicians are not immune from this impulse, especially when they are elected by a particular constituency. For the New Constructivist to be 'politically agnostic' in this instance carries normative risks. It risks vacating the field to what John Dewey called 'the men of action', i.e. practitioners who may politely listen to philosophers (and social theorists) before ignoring them (Dewey 1908b [1965], 64-5). Again, the New Constructivist may be comfortable with that, but I wager that not many are; and why is that? I think such a scenario would make New Constructivists uncomfortable because underpinning academic research is a view that *verified knowledge should not be ignored* simply because it is inconvenient. I also think that New Constructivists do not settle for such a situation. They hope that if people in power ignore their findings because they are inconvenient, others will use those findings as a means of opposing what is a politics of ignorance. The point is not just that New Constructivists are caught up in politics therefore. It is that the academic impulse to produce work that is *relevant* means New Constructivists do not want to avoid politics.[44] To have scientifically verified knowledge, to want it to be heard and to want to further deliberate, I suggest, *leads to a normative commitment to deliberative social inquiry*; and, as the following Chapters demonstrate, it is not far from that to the Pragmatist's political commitment to *democracy* as a method of solving social problems. That commitment to democracy as a form of social inquiry and a means of making judgements on the value of different hypotheses is not apolitical.[45]

Others New Constructivists like Barkin and Sjoberg accept the view that New Constructivist theorizing has political implication. Like any form of theorizing, Constructivism cannot be value-neutral, but that does not mean, they argue, Constructivism points us in a particular normative direction or commits us to certain political values. Our values and political commitments they insist are independent of our social theory (see also Barkin and Sjoberg 2019, 63-77). I would accept that to an extent. On my reading, New Constructivists would have problems accepting (for example) conservative and liberal values that are based on essentialist reasoning about (for example) human nature, race or gender. That would again be inconsistent with its anti-essentialism. Constructivism that is aware of the socially constructed character of values, however, could accommodate conservative and liberal *hypotheses* about the best way to solve social problems as

---

[44] See Tetlock (1991, 52-3) for a similar argument: 'Who, for instance, would propose that social scientists should act as though they are totally agnostic on whether the monolithic neo-Stalinist image or the pluralistic Gorbachevian image of US foreign policy is more correct? Or on whether the winnability of all-out nuclear war is an open issue? … Aspiring to total value neutrality in an intellectual enterprise of this nature is not only unrealistic, it is also undesirable. In part, this is so because it requires us to understate our substantive knowledge'.

[45] For Dewey, 'agnosticism' is 'a shadow cast by the eclipse of the supernatural'. To reject the possibility of absolute and transcendent truth, in other words, implies that we cannot have faith in anything and should be agnostic toward everything. But, he added, 'generalized agnosticism is only a halfway elimination of the supernatural. Its meaning departs when the intellectual outlook is directed wholly to the natural world. When it is so directed, there are plenty of particular matters which we must say we do not know; we only inquire and form hypotheses which future inquiry will confirm or reject. But such doubts are an incident of *faith in the method of intelligence.'* (Dewey 1934b [1962] 86 emphasis added). This passage is taken from Dewey's faith in, and defence of, democracy as a means of coping with philosophical doubt, agnosticism, relativism and political contestation.

they emerge from practice. Conservative constructivists might emphasize the wisdom of the past, for instance, whereas liberal constructivists might emphasize the wisdom of greater inclusion. The implication of New Constructivism's anti-essentialism and anti-foundationalism, however, is that these positions can only be advanced as *hypotheses* rather than absolute values; hypotheses on how we should act toward each other in a given situation. This, as I shall demonstrate, is what Pragmatism tells us about how we can deal with the anti-essentialism and anti-foundationalism that New Constructivists are signed up to.

Again, the New Constructivist might accept this because it does not necessarily lead in a particular political direction. McCourt writes, for instance, that New Constructivism accommodates a 'plurality of ethical commitments'. Similarly, Barkin and Sjoberg (2019, 73-88) argue that Constructivism accommodates 'political promiscuity'. But the question any society (including academic society) has to face is how does it deal with plurality and with contestation? My answer to that is because New Constructivism's anti-essentialism and anti-foundationalism demands treating values as hypotheses it leans heavily toward the Pragmatist's ethical commitment to deliberation and learning; and it is not far from that toward a political commitment to democracy as a form of social inquiry and a means of coping with (and defending) pluralism. This commitment to democracy seems to be unstated in the argument that New Constructivism accommodates 'a plurality of ethical commitments' (McCourt 2022), and that it helps scholars to effectively promote their ethics and thus accommodates 'political promiscuity' (Barkin and Sjoberg 2019, 73-77). Such arguments are somewhat dependent on power accommodating Constructivism. It is not difficult to imagine a scenario where New Constructivists would indeed find a common political position if those in power were beholden to essentialist and foundationalist beliefs and were not so accommodating.

While I would argue, therefore, that those who insist 'Constructivism does not have a politics' (Barkin and Sjoberg 2021, 63) hold too narrow a view of the political (and possibly take democracy for granted) there is common ground to the extent they do see social theorists working 'in concert' with normative/political theorists (Barkin and Sjoberg 2021, 65). There is nothing in Barkin and Sjoberg's (2021, 77) view that would stop a potential 'pairing' of the New Constructivist research agenda and classical Pragmatist thought. I might argue that the anti-essentialism and anti-foundationalism of the New Constructivist agenda implies a commitment to deliberative democracy without such a pairing, but if that is what is required then I will argue for Pragmatic Constructivism. What that approach can bring to perennial debates about norms, practices and interests in IR is set out in the remainder of this Chapter, and the two that follow. My main claim here is simply that classical Pragmatism helps Constructivism to answer the normative questions posed by Price (2008) and others. On that basis, Pragmatic Constructivism not only explains how norms, practices and interests influence the conduct of international relations, it can also offer a normative assessment of those norms, practices and interests in the context of the problems emerging in the field. The following sections tell us how it does that.

Finding normativity in and through experimental practice

As noted, classical Pragmatism shares with Constructivism an 'anti-essentialist' (McCourt 2022) or 'processural ontology' (Adler 2019, 45-76; see also Jackson and Nexon 1999, 308). The things we study – e.g. the identities and interests of states; the meanings of norms – are always being discursively and socially

constructed. They are in a constant state of becoming. This was what Dewey took from Darwinian thought. What we see in front of us has not always been that way. It has evolved as it, and its environment, adapted to each other.[46] The same evolutionary (or growth) process works for social things. Their essence has not been, nor can it be, fixed.   As Dewey (1925a [1998], 8) put it recalling the work of William James, Pragmatism 'takes us to the conception of a universe whose evolution is not finished, of a universe which is still, in James' terms "in the making", "in the becoming", of a universe up to a certain point still plastic'.

This evolutionary process takes place because human practice is inevitable and constant (Bueger 2014; Bigo 2013, 123). Humans are never called on 'to judge *whether* [they] shall act but simply *how* [they] shall act. A decision not to act is a decision to act in a certain way' (Dewey 1915 [1998], 251). For this reason, practice is '*the* central' principle of Pragmatist thought (Putnam 1995, 52; cited in Hellmann 2009; Adler 2019, 118; Franke and Weber 2011, 675). Pragmatism recognizes, moreover, that practice can happen prior to, and without, normative guidance or reasoning.[47] This is because practice can be a function of corporal need, desire, emotion and habit. It can proceed without reference to the social norms articulated in language (Cochran 1999, loc.2334).[48]   That does not mean this kind of practice is without normative consequence, or that norms as standards of appropriate behaviour are irrelevant. It means only that norms do not necessarily influence practice. As Wenger (2005, 87) usefully put it, practice and normative reasoning are in motion, but they do not necessarily 'move in lockstep' (Wenger 2005, 87).

The inevitability and constancy of practice, therefore, explains how a social environment, and the human experience of it, changes around (and without reference to) the subjective and intersubjective understandings of norms. Because change is constant this can make existing norms problematic. Social norms, and the standards of appropriateness they articulate, may stay the same (and of course foundationalist reasoning suggests they do), but if practitioners are driven by other material energies and are not listening to discourses of appropriateness then those norms become problematic (or simply irrelevant). Individuals experience that problem as 'real and living doubt' (Peirce 1877). Society experiences it through various modes of normative contestation and political conflict. For the Pragmatist, it is this situation that should prompt normative and social inquiry.

The aim of social inquiry is both an epistemic and practical one: to recover a sense in an otherwise uncertain environment that we know what it is we are doing and to recover a sense that what we are doing will sustain and improve the lived experience. If what we are doing does not do that, if our practices do not ameliorate the lived experience, then we have continued reason to doubt and contest the claims that enable that practice. In this context, foundationalist assumptions about right and wrong, and the social hierarchies that are built around them, can limit the effectiveness of problem-solving inquiry (Dewey 1920 [1972]; 1929; 1934b [1962], 76). That does not mean Pragmatists hold no conception of right or wrong, but because

---

[46] The pragmatism of Addams and Dewey was heavily influenced by Darwin's publication of *Origin of the Species* in 1859 but in ways that opposed Social Darwinism. See Ansell 2011, 9-10; Cochran 2017, 151-2; Dewey 1908a [1965].
[47] As Friedrichs (2009, 647) puts it, 'human practice is the ultimate miracle' because it proceeds even when our theories fail.
[48] Jane Addams (1902 loc. 1899) captured this when she wrote that 'general movement is not without its intellectual aspects, but it has to be transferred from the region of perception to that of emotion before it is really apprehended. The mass of men seldom move together without an emotional incentive'.

those conceptions are drawn from anti-foundationalist (i.e. evolved) knowledge Pragmatists commit to them with a sense that they are fallible. The implication of that is important. A conception of what is right can be offered as a starting point for deliberation but it should not stand in the way of the reflective and creative process of mitigating emergent problems. Convictions can inform inquiry but they should not prevent learning.

In a situation of real and living doubt, then, there is a need for inquiry. Inquiry is not necessarily the same as contestation because it is about constructing as well deconstructing definitions of appropriateness. But how should society conduct that inquiry? How do we arrive at a point where we can defend a norm and its assignment of appropriateness to a practice? How, to use Charles Peirce's (1877) famous formulation, do we 'fix' our beliefs? We might, Peirce suggests, consult the findings of philosophers who work with concepts that stand outside history; abstract scenarios untainted by the complexity of practice. Here we might find an ideal that can be used to discipline practice. Think for instance of the 'state of nature' scenario and 'social contract theory' in political philosophy. This pre-social scenario did not exist, and the social contract is merely a metaphor, but it has been used to construct the legitimacy of the sovereign state. For Peirce, this kind of inquiry cannot fix belief because abstract reasoning 'something similar to the development of taste' and taste 'is always more or less a matter of fashion'. Abstract reasoning, in other words, is too close to the philosopher's personal predispositions, which themselves are forged in a particular social setting. Indeed, one can understand that critique if one sets state of nature reasoning in historical context. Hobbes's *Leviathan* was influenced by the English Civil War and the trajectory of political philosophy - and IR Realism – (see Williams 2008) may have been very different had that not happened.

Peirce suggested that another method of fixing a belief was to simply be tenacious in the face of experience. This may work for individuals whose own experience is not damaged, or whose belief in a better life after death changes their definition of lived experience. But Peirce concluded that this kind of reasoning rarely prevails in social settings. Unless 'we make ourselves hermits', Peirce (1877) wrote, 'we shall necessarily influence each other's opinions; so that the problem becomes how to fix belief, not in the individual merely, but in the community'.[49] In this context, Peirce continued, the 'method of authority' (i.e. forcing people to believe) has had 'proportionately greater' success than tenacity, but it too was ineffective in the long run. This is because 'no institution can undertake to regulate opinions upon every subject'. To illustrate this point, Peirce pointed the plurality of international and historical experiences. Those living according to truths established by force he wrote,

> see that [those] in other countries and in other ages have held to very different doctrines from
> those which they themselves have been brought up to believe; and they cannot help seeing that
> it is the mere accident of their having been taught as they have, and of their having been
> surrounded with the manners and associations they have, that has caused them to believe as
> they do and not far differently. Nor can their candor resist the reflection that there is no reason

---

[49] Or as Dewey (1928a [1998], 313) put it 'the actual structure of knowledge viewed in relation to the operations by which it is concretely established to be knowledge in the honorific sense, that is as tested and justified, as grounded, instead of as mere opinion and fantastic belief, can be understood only in social terms'.

to rate their own views at a higher value than those of other nations and other centuries; thus giving rise to doubts in their minds (Peirce 1877).

The point Peirce is making here is that force can achieve some things but it is not good at fixing belief in the long term. Authoritarianism might *silence* doubters but it cannot cultivate the epistemic authority that *convinces* doubters, and it is the latter that is needed to fix belief.

What Peirce is doing by looking at *a priori* reasoning, tenacity and authoritarianism is ruling out methods of inquiry that do not adequately resolve the doubt created by the inevitability of practice and the constancy of change. In that respect, Peirceian Pragmatism maps on to what Constructivist research tells us about the social construction of knowledge, including the kind of normative knowledge that identifies standards of appropriateness. So how *do* Constructivists fix normative conceptions of appropriateness when they acknowledge the social world around them is in a constant state of becoming?

Having ruled out abstract reasoning, tenacity and authoritarianism, Peirce answered this question by drawing on the experimental method of science. Science did not need to avoid doubt because doubt is not fatal to science in the same way it is to those other methods. This is because science is committed *only* to a method (or practice) – experimentalism - rather than to any particular truth claim. Scientists are able to revise their beliefs (or hypotheses) when practical experience reveals unanticipated consequences; and, as long as experimental practice confirms a hypothesis scientists can believe in it.[50] It is only when doubt is 'real and living' i.e. experienced as practical consequences rather than intellectual curiosity, that there is a reason for inquiry. If moreover the practical consequences of acting on a new hypothesis improve the lived experience then we can have faith in it instead of the old thinking. In this way science is the most appropriate method for coping with change. A faith in experimentalism as a suitable method remains intact even when experience forces a change of belief.[51]

Furthermore, if the belief and its related practice is confirmed after the community of inquiry is expanded, which means new evidence is introduced, then we are more prepared to fix a belief and commit to a norm or course of action. Most people know this. They experience that sense of epistemic relief (and subsequent conviction) when they find someone who shares their interpretation of a situation and their belief about what is right. In this instance, a belief or norm, and the practice enabled by it, commands greater epistemic authority. The implication of this is that a norm commands greater authority – we have more faith in it - if the community in which it is tested is inclusive and diverse. Crucially, however, that authority is never absolute and that faith should never be blind. A properly constituted community of inquiry knows that its

---

[50] Peirce (1878) called the idea that meaning was found in practice the 'pragmatic maxim': 'Consider what effects, that might conceivably have practical bearings, we conceive the object of our conception to have. Then our conception of these effects is the whole of our conception of the object'.

[51] Pragmatism, in this sense, takes normative theory to be non-ideal and processural (Hoffmann 2009). It concentrates on 'the relationship between the attained and the attainable' (Owen 2002, 671). It does not begin 'from the identification of an ideally normative justified model of society' (Frega 2014a, 66). It is instead problem-driven, 'motivated by an empirical examination of problematic situations as they emerge and are perceived in the social historical experience, and oriented to the pragmatic identification of working "instrumentalities to be employed and tested in clarifying concrete social difficulties".' (Frega 2014a, 65; quoting Dewey 1920; see also Hoover 2016, 115; Avant 2016, 333).

environments change. What is appropriate in any given moment, therefore, may not be appropriate in the future. *In this instance, it is only a commitment to the experimental method that is ever truly fixed*.

Peirce influenced the philosophical Pragmatism of John Dewey. For Dewey, contestation and doubt was not fatal to the scientific method in the way it was to, for example, other methods of fixing belief (Dewey 1934b [1962], 38-9). This is because a belief that stood up to contestation by improving the lived experience could inspire a greater faith. There is no better way of resolving doubt than by exposing beliefs to practice and our experience of it. For

> if a notion or a theory makes pretense of corresponding to reality or to the facts, this pretense cannot be put to the test and confirmed or refuted except by causing it to pass over into the realm of action and by noting the results which it yields in the form of the concrete observable facts to which this notion leads (Dewey 1925a [1998], 8; see also 1925b [1998], 100).

In this sense, the consequences that flow from belief-based practice - or more precisely our experience of those consequences - is the community of inquiry's evidence for testing appropriateness. That evidence should be used to test the appropriateness of any form of practice, but especially the pre-reflexive kind. Just as the taken-for-granted norm and interest may become redundant or inappropriate in a changed setting, so practices that are driven by emotion or habit can produce unintended and unwanted experiences. The important point for Dewey was that communities of inquiry had to assess practice, and the reasoning (or lack thereof) behind it, according to its experiential consequences.[52]

With this claim, Dewey was extending the Pragmatism of William James (1907 [1995]) who argued that the value of theory could be assessed in terms of its 'cash-value in experiential terms' (see also Franke and Weber 2011). Jane Addams (1920, loc.1902) similarly insisted that action and experience was 'the sole medium of expression for ethics'. The epistemic authority of a normative statement and our willingness to believe it, in other words, stems not from its correspondence to an external or *a priori* fixed authority (e.g. nature or god), but from the practical consequences experienced by those living it, either directly or indirectly. Relating this to contemporary IR Practice theory I suggest is not difficult. It requires an element of what Christian Bueger (2014, 389) called a 'looking down' strategy. There is nothing to stop grand theory claiming epistemic authority, but it should be tested, and held accountable, *at the level of everyday experience*.[53]

This focus on what Dewey (1927c, 213), following Addams (1902 loc. 1899), called the 'vitality' of the everyday experience, humanized Peirce's philosophical commitment to scientific method, but the principle is the same. The appropriateness of norms (as well as emotions, habits, interests and knowledge claims) could not be taken-for-granted in a changing world. We have to assess them in context and against *what they do* for the lived experience. We can have faith in the value of certain norms for as long as they enable

---

[52] Martin Weber (2014) criticised Price's (2008) understanding of a constructivist ethic based on consequentialism. Like Price, Sikkink (2008) identified the ethical requirement to 'weigh the consequences' of practice, but without referencing Pragmatism. My argument is that once this kind of consequentialism is set in broader Pragmatist thought, especially its commitment to experimentalism and learning as means of co-constituting the public good, we can begin to address Weber's concerns.

[53] For a summary of recent IR work on 'the everyday' see Solomon and Steele 2017, 274-5.

practices that sustain and improve the lived experience.[54] Understanding that the world can change around existing norms, however, means accepting their fallibility and contestability. Again, what Pragmatists *do* commit to in this context are the practices that facilitate inquiry and society's ability to improve experience by learning from it.

The inclusive community of deliberative inquiry and society's 'stock of learning'.

The argument that our faith in the appropriateness of a norm increases as it is exposed to different experiential knowledge is an argument for democratizing the community of inquiry. But the democratic leaning of Pragmatism starts before that. As noted, Pragmatist inquiry begins with reference to already existing norms and practices and the emergence of 'real and living doubt' within them. It does not begin 'from the identification of an ideally normative justified model of society' (Frega 2014a, 66). It is instead problem-driven,

> motivated by an empirical examination of problematic situations as they emerge and are perceived in the social historical experience, and oriented to the pragmatic identification of working "instrumentalities to be employed and tested in clarifying concrete social difficulties"'(Frega 2014a, 65; quoting Dewey 1920; see also Hoover 2016, 115; Avant 2016, 333).

Making knowledge accountable to the lived experience in this way is also a democratizing move because it makes epistemic elites, who are prone to claiming a monopoly on truth, accountable for the consequences that follow their pronouncements. In this way, substantive conceptions of 'the good' emerge from the 'office of life itself' (Dewey 1925b [1998], 99). A further implication is that there are no pre-baked conceptions of an ideal end, only an ideal process of inquiry. The 'difference Pragmatism makes', therefore, 'is always the difference people make with it' (West 1989, 181; see also Franke and Weber 2011, 685).

Of more direct relevance to my interest in applying Pragmatism to analyze and assess international practices, however, is what the experimental approach means for the constitution of a community of inquiry. Expanding the community of inquiry is a means of cultivating faith in norms and practices. If they prove valuable to a community of diverse experiences, if they ameliorate the conflicts that emerge within a diverse community, then we can more authoritatively claim their value. They are, so to speak, tried and tested. Expanding the community of inquiry also enables us to answer the pressing question: whose lived experience are we talking about? It is important to note at this stage that I have been careful to use *the* lived experience when referring to the evidence that is used to test the value of a norm and the practice is enables. *The* lived experience has a neutrality attached to it. It refers to inquiry that is interested in finding ways of sustaining and improving the experiences of both the self and the other, which collectively can be referred to as the public interest. Of course, it may not be possible in any given situation to identify or

---

[54] For Dewey 'faith was often mistakenly believed to be a kind of "knowledge" having certain contents guaranteed by an appeal to their alleged "supernatural" author. If one interpreted faith properly, that is in naturalistic terms, it could be seen to express a belief that "some end should be supreme over conduct" and not a conviction that a being or an object "exists as a truth for the intellect"' (Rice 1993, 49, quoting Dewey 1934b).

realize the public interest by improving the lived experience of all, but to assume it is impossible is to needlessly cut short the process of inquiry and that creates (rather than resolves) doubt. How do we know we cannot identify and realize the public interest if we do not test the hypotheses that claim to do that? And if we cut short inquiry then we cannot claim that the norms and practices that emerge from it command epistemic authority. In those circumstances, we do not know that what we are doing is the best we can do in the given circumstance.[55]

Reflecting on this, Dewey argued that effective inquiry demands 'sympathy' for the other.[56] Of course, people experience sympathy (in varying degrees) as an emotional reaction. This does not mean it should play no role in an experimental method that is inspired by science. In fact, 'sympathy' was valuable to Dewey because it expands the self's personality and democratizes the process of inquiry by bringing the affected other into the investigators thoughts. Furthermore, sympathy disturbs habit and challenges intuitive practice. It triggers the kind of deliberation that is necessary to cope with change, identify the public good and then realize it. As Dewey put it: 'to see things from the standpoint of their purposes and values, to humble, contrariwise, our own pretensions and claims till they reach the level they would assume in the eye of an impartial sympathetic observer, is the surest way to attain objectivity of moral knowledge' (Dewey 1932a [1998], 333).[57] In this respect, sympathy is not *just* an emotion, it is an 'efficacious intellectual standpoint' because it assists scientific inquiry and social learning. Sympathy for others is a sentiment to be cultivated and rendered 'more intelligent in practice' (Sorrell 2014).

But the usefulness of sympathy goes beyond even this. Sympathy is a valuable emotion because it 'aids us to count and weigh' (Dewey, cited in Sorrell 2014, 75) the consequences of practice and to mitigate emergent problems. Sympathy

> is the tool par excellence, for resolving complex situations. Then when it passes into active and overt conduct, it does so fused with other impulses and not in isolation and is thus protected from sentimentality. In this fusion there is broad and objective survey of all desires and projects because there is an expanded personality (Dewey 1932a, 333; see also Addams 1902 loc.115).[58]

---

[55] While this resonates with Miranda Fricker's (2007) concept of 'epistemic justice', the emphasis here is the process of constructing epistemic authority. Fricker's idea of 'testimonial injustice', which is when 'prejudice on the hearer's part causes him to give the speaker less credibility than he would otherwise have given' (Fricker 2007, 4), is captured in the Deweyan concept of 'conscientious reflection' and how it guards against maladapted predispositions (see Chapter 3). Both share the sense that this virtue is 'socially inculcated' through 'real-life training' that 'instils in the virtuous learner empirically well-grounded habits of epistemically charged social perception, and thus reliable perceptual judgements of speaker credibility' (Fricker 2007, 5).
[56] On the 'varied and nuanced' uses of the term 'sympathy', which may include 'empathy', see Sorrell 2014, 72-7.
[57] For the way this resonates with the philosophy and pedagogy of Rabindranath Tagore see Nussbaum 2006. See also Dunne and Booth 1999.
[58] The concept of 'sympathy' originates in Dewey's understanding of the child who leaves the nurturing environment of the home to enter the expanded and complex community of (ideally) the school. Schools will only provide a bad experience, which closes the student's mind and willingness to learn, if they do not understand how the student has learned up to that point, which is usually through practical activity like play and problem-solving (Dewey 1916 [2011]; 1938 [2015]). See chapter 3 for elaboration.

It is by nurturing the 'expanded personality', in other words, that inquiry improves and we have a better chance of resolving problems by constructing an effective conception of the public good. Dewey called this nurturing of the expanded personality 'growth', and I return to it in later chapters. At this point, however, it is important to note how Dewey was in fact channeling the thinking *and* practice of Jane Addams. Addams's Pragmatism stressed the importance to inquiry of the knowledge that is often available at the margins of society. Again, I develop the point in later chapters, especially Chapter Four, where I discuss how sympathy as a tool of inquiry translates into a broader political commitment to democracy.[59]

It is also important to clarify that sympathy does not mean that the deliberations of a community of inquiry are *dictated* by the views or interests of the one-time excluded other. Sympathy for Dewey merely saves the 'consideration of consequences from degenerating into mere calculations, by rendering vivid the interests of others and urging us to give them the same weight as those which touch our honor, purse and power'. This was 'another consideration when we deliberate on the consequence of our action' (Dewey 1932a, 333) and search for the public interest. The danger is that without sympathy, inquiry does degenerate into the mere calculations of powerful insiders; and, to go back to Peirce, knowledge that is the product of power can only go so far in establishing the epistemic authority of those who do claim to speak for *the* public. But this still begs the following question: how does a community of inquiry deal with the new evidence that is created when its personality is expanded?

It is here that the Pragmatist emphasis on the *deliberative* aspect of problem-solving is important. A more inclusive community of inquiry may be more fully informed of the consequences of existing practice; it may be more reflexive as a result; and it may be more creative because it is aware of alternative means of constituting the public good. But it is not necessarily the case that all knowledge claims are as valuable as each other. In deciding what should be done, an effective community of inquiry needs to be deliberative. That involves reflecting not just on the consequences of what we are doing. It also involves reflecting on the consequences of what would follow if (hypothetically) we changed our practices.[60] The valuation of a

---

[59] Cochran (2017, 161) identifies what she calls the 'relational epistemology' underpinning Addams's sympathetic approach. Knowledge of, and from, the margins of society 'is good in and of itself, but as knowledge *felt* it triggers a sense of responsibility to engage others in working cooperatively toward not just better coping, but cosmopolitan justice.' Tickner and True (2018, 224) also draw parallels between the use by early feminist Pragmatists of the term 'sympathetic understanding' and contemporary feminism's emphasis on 'empathic cooperation' as a method of inquiry. See Sylvester 1994.

[60] This is necessary because value judgements are relational. As Dewey put it: 'to prefer this is to exclude that' (Dewey 1925b [1998] 98). This may not appear to be the case within a particular predisposition, but the fixed position does 'assume a liability'. This is the case with pre-reflexive or habitual practice. It is not even aware that it is liable for the experiential cost of 'the road not taken'. Like Robert Frost's famous poem (see Shaw 1986) normative theory's purpose is to bring that liability (to the self and the other) to the foreground. This is a means of protecting intelligent reflection from the force of habit, and ultimately freeing ourselves from the unwanted experiences it causes. To do that in ways that speak to everyday experiences, moreover, normative social theory should draw on literary discourse and the arts (Cochran 1999, loc.2299-311). This is because experiences are 'vivified and intensified by the insight of an artist', which can clarify the consequences of a practice and bring to life the paths not taken (Dewey 1925b [1998], 99; see also Dewey 1927c 183-4; Addams 1902 loc.125; Hook 1974, 183-201). This is a theme that is developed in the work of neo-Pragmatists, most prominently Richard Rorty (1989).

practice, in other words, requires an 'imaginative rehearsal' (Hoover 2016, 119) or 'dramatic rehearsal' (Sorrell 2014, 76) of what it would mean to act differently in a particular situation.[61]

Indeed, for Dewey the value of a practice was found not in the practitioner's motivation or intended goal but in its social consequence, which included a judgement of the opportunity cost.[62] But Dewey offers an important and familiar qualification here. In exercising our judgement on which practice is appropriate in any given situation we do not start from scratch; we can be guided by value claims (norms) that have 'already been tried out and verified' (Dewey 1925a [1998], 8). In other words, we can at least start our inquiry with an understanding that a norm has in the past enabled useful practice and helped societies to transcend conflict by identifying a public interest.

Dewey called this tried and verified knowledge a 'stock of learning' (Dewey 1915 [1998], 265). It is the product of past experiments and as long as the present situation reflects past circumstances (and that requires a judgement), the stock of learning and the norm that it draws on should inform ethical reasoning.[63] As a product of past experiments this shared 'knowledge' should carry more authority than 'culture', which may not have been exposed to the kind of test experimentalism demands.[64] Put differently, we can have faith that our commitment to a norm that has been tested is not misplaced because we *know* it has worked in similar past situations. But – and this is crucial - 'even such verifications or truths' can never be absolute. They 'are always subject to being corrected by unforeseen future consequences or by observed facts which had been disregarded' (Dewey 1925a [1998], 8). The norm that gives meaning and authority to a practice will always remain a *hypothetical* claim therefore. The norm is only as strong as the evidence that improved experiences follow once it is acted upon.

This 'stock of learning' is important not just because it is the starting point for ethical reasoning. It also underpins what is progressive about Pragmatism. What we are referring to when citing the stock of learning is not the accumulated knowledge of a social reality that is somehow 'out there', separate from practice,

---

[61] While not explicitly set in the context of Pragmatist thinking, IR Constructivists have reached similar conclusion. See in particular Sikkink 2008 on a constructivist ethic that focuses on an informed capacity to effectively 'weigh the consequences' of norm-inspired action in the counterfactual scenario. On the Pragmatist's approach to 'undecidable questions' and the need to 'weigh the evidence' see Friedrichs and Kratochwil 2009, 705. The parallels with the Realists' emphasis on prudence, which Morgenthau (1948 [1967] 10) defined as 'the weighing of consequences for alternative political actions' is discussed in Chapter 4.

[62] See Dewey 1922a [1998], 33-4 and Dewey 1932b on the separation of motive and act, and Dewey 1922b [1998], 276 on the separation of will and deed. Also Addams 1902, loc. 87, 745. For these Pragmatists, consequences fix the moral quality of an act and 'consequences include effects upon character, upon confirming and weakening habits, as well as tangibly obvious results'. It may mean therefore, 'that the survey of objective consequence is duly extended in time' (Dewey 1922a [1998], 35; also Dewey 1932a, 338). This distinction between act and rule consequentialism distinction is an important aspect of ethical inquiry, which features prominently in ethical judgement related to the torture prohibition (see below).

[63] It finds expression in Emanuel Adler's concept of 'cognitive evolution'. This 'describes a process of collective learning in which innovative ideas preferentially survive processes of political selection and institutionalization and thus become the foundation of new international practices and national interests' (Adler 2005, 63). Likewise, Alexander Wendt's (1999, 59) idea of 'mature' theories, that 'have proven successful in the world', and Christian Reus-Smit's (2008) invocation of E.H. Carr's call for a 'mature science' that 'evolved progressively'.

[64] I thus follow Wendt (1999, 140-1) in separating 'knowledge' from 'ideas', but I also separate 'shared knowledge' (or the stock of learning) from 'culture'.

waiting to be discovered by the application of the scientific method. It is rather the accumulated knowledge of human experience and useful practice (Frega 2019, 285). It is based on prior learning experiences and it represents progress because those experiences have proven valuable in ameliorating lived problems.[65] Furthermore, it is this 'stock of learning' that enables an anti-skeptical defence of a norm against relativism and contestation (Dancy 2016, 516). It provides what Adler (2019 90-4; Adler and Drieschova, 2021) - echoing Peirce (1877) called 'epistemological security'. It is the sense that we in fact *know* that what we are doing *will* improve experiences (at least until our environment changes). On that basis we can defend a norm and its associated practices against contestation.

The logic of arguing and a theory of contestation

The value Pragmatism places on reflexivity, inquiry, inclusivity and deliberation as means of problem-solving and social learning resonates with that branch of Constructivist IR research that focused on the so-called 'logic of arguing' (Risse 2000). This is not surprising given that Thomas Risse introduced this idea to Constructivist IR by drawing on Jurgen Habermas's theory of communicative action, and Habermas himself drew on Peircean and Deweyan Pragmatism when developing that theory.[66] Risse's use of Habermas's theory tended, however to reflect the IR Constructivist's focus on explaining state practice rather than assessing it against normative criteria. He illustrated how states could, by arguing their case, resolve the problems that emerged in indeterminate situations. States could work problems out by arguing in communities of practice like the UN Security Council and eventually settling on a consensus position. Risse thus demonstrated how a 'logic of arguing' – as opposed to an interest-based 'logic of consequences', or a norm-based 'logic of appropriateness' – also influences international relations. The normative implication of such research was, however, left unspecified.

---

[65] This answers Knopf (2012) question of whether learning is normative concept. As Levy (1994) notes, this implies the existence of normative or epistemic criteria that identifies learned practice as more appropriate or more accurate. Levy argues there is no such criteria. This is in contrast to Breslauer and Tetlock (1991, 13) who link learning to 'greater realism of beliefs or goals'. To the extent Pragmatists associate learning (and progress) with solving (or at least mitigating) social problems then it is a normative concept (see Haas 1991). The 'stock of learning' and 'conscientious reflection' is the criteria that Levy is missing. Social learning improves practices by discovering a public interest that solves social problems and ameliorates the lived experience. It makes no sense therefore to say that actors 'who figure out how to carry out a genocide more effectively' (Knopf 2012, 85) have gone through a social learning process. They have not been sympathetic to the lived experience of the affected and they have exacerbated rather than mitigated the problem of associated living. For a Pragmatist response to genocide see Chapter 6.

[66] It was Peirce, Habermas (1996, 14) writes, who established 'not only the ideal moment of concept formation, which establishes generality, but also the idealizing moment of forming true judgements, which triumphs over time'. The theory Habermas developed also took inspiration from classical Pragmatism, not least the importance Dewey placed on inclusion as a means of effective social inquiry. Indeed, Dewey's argument on everyday democracy (see Chapter 4), where majorities are formed antecedent to the deliberative processes of Parliaments and other formal chambers, was important to Habermas's own thoughts on reviving the public sphere. 'No one', wrote Habermas, 'has worked out this view more energetically than John Dewey' (Habermas 1996, 304). For further discussion see Weber 2014, 532-7.

Reflecting on the research that was inspired by the 'logic of arguing' concept nearly two decades later Risse (2018) still seemed hesitant to say what the logic of argument meant for normative IR. He concentrated instead on how IR 'turned empirical to not only demonstrate that arguing actually matters in global affairs, but also to discern the conditions under which deliberation effects negotiation outcomes and international institution-building' (Risse 2018, 527).[67] Anyone interested in the ethical implications of Constructivist research were, however, given a tantalizing glimpse of the themes that resonate with the Pragmatic Constructivist approach I am developing here. Constructivist IR, Risse wrote, should see global governance arrangements

> not just as institutions to solve collective action problems and to lower transaction costs, but as discursive arenas to deliberate about appropriate standards of behavior and about improving the human condition. From a normative point of view, the task would then be to design international institutions in such a way as to enable communicative rationality to prevail … . This concerns access to the discourse for the underprivileged and those representing them, … transparency and publicity, as well as mechanisms allowing for honest brokerage (Risse 2018, 527; see also Risse 2004).

That stress on inclusivity as a condition of effective deliberation points in a Pragmatist direction but unfortunately neither Risse, nor those using the 'logic of arguing' framework have elaborated on that point.

It is important to note, at this point, that theorists informed by the work of Addams and Dewey draw an important distinction between classical Pragmatism and Habermas's critical theory. It is said that Habermas's thought 'exalts' (Linklater 1998, 120) features of communication. He argued, for instance, that in the operation of language there is evidence of the collective acceptance of rules around shared meanings and problem-solving practices. Socialization creates particular meanings, but in the context of the rules and practices of communicative action, these can be rationally reconstructed and partiality transcended. Speech acts thus already anticipate the creation of a universal 'communication community' (Linklater 1998, 120). These communication communities moreover '"already carry within them the germ of morality"' (Bookman 2002, 69 quoting Habermas 1993, 132). Just as the operation of unrestricted experimentalism for Peirce meant scientists could eventually settle on the universal truth that was immanent in inquiry, so for Habermas, dialogue operating under ideal circumstances could transcend existing (partial) knowledge claims to discover the universal moral truths immanent in discourse ethics.

The emphasis placed on communicative action is by no means a contradiction of classical Pragmatism. Indeed, Dewey wrote, in a much cited passage, that '[o]f all affairs, communication is the most wonderful' (Dewey 1925c [1998], 50; Biesta 2006). Yet theorists argue that in the exaltation of language and reasoned argument Habermasian Pragmatics departs from Deweyan Pragmatics. This is because the latter placed relatively greater emphasis on lived (or embodied) experience and thus emotional intelligence (Adler 2019, 115-6; Crossley 2013, 142-53; Hoover 2016, 115; Pappas 2012, 60-61; Shalin 1992; Ray 2004; Wyn Jones 2005, 224-7). Dmitri Shalin, for instance, argued that Habermas's emphasis on 'disembodied reason'

---

[67] A lot of this work concentrated on 'rhetorical entrapment'. See Risse 2000; Schimmelfennig 2001; Petrova 2016; Bower 2020.

should be contrasted with Dewey's 'embodied reasonableness'. Reason in the theory of communicative action 'is primarily taken to be consciousness, understanding, cognition with no obvious relation to the human body and noncognitive processes (emotions, feelings, sentiments). What Pragmatists call "experience" had, in Habermasian theory, 'shriveled into verbal intellect' (Shalin 1992 254; see also Ray 2004; Benhabib 1986, 327-343; Fierke and Jabri 2019, 516-7; Hoover 2016, 125-6; McAfee 2004a 150-2).

For Pragmatists, the Habermasian preference for reason over experience limited the purchase that it had on practice (see Abraham and Abramson 2015, 40). This is because it potentially set itself against individuals and societies when it dismissed their norms and practices as 'irrational' simply because they were 'sentimental'. What Shalin describes as the 'embodied reasonableness' is better placed to discuss social problems. This is because it does not scoff at the ways sentiments are articulated in the background knowledge of norms or in articulations of common sense.   'Human intelligence is emotional just as emotions are intelligent, and this is so because we live in the world of indeterminacy that no rational faculty and theoretical rigor can expunge' (Shalin 1992, 256; see also Cochran 1999, loc.2340; Avant 2021).[68] This matters, I suggest, for assessing the appropriateness of practice. If the consequence of telling someone that their emotional reaction is irrational is to exacerbate rather than ameliorate the problem then it is from the Pragmatist perspective neither necessary, intelligent nor appropriate.

The value Pragmatism places on reflexivity, inquiry, inclusivity and deliberation as means to problem-solving and social learning also resonates with Antje Wiener's (2014, 2018) more recent theory of contestation, which has been described as 'agonistic constructivism' (Havecroft 2017; see also Wiener 2022) . This emerged from Wiener's influential work (Wiener 2004; 2007; 2009; Wiener and Puetter 2009) critiquing the first wave of Constructivist-inspired norm studies. Contrary to the claim that a norm's meaning could be 'taken-for-granted', Wiener argued that we had to understand the meaning of a norm that was in discursive use. Yet with the theory of contestation, Wiener also spoke to a need to question the normativity of a norm and its various meanings in use. Central to her 'normativity premise' is the *quod omnes tangit* principle: what touches all must be approved by all, and for some (Zimmerman 2017; Wolff and Zimmerman 2016), this evoked a Habermasian ethic. Yet Wiener rejects that comparison in terms that echo the Pragmatist approach. By identifying the 'germ' of universal truth in communicative action, Habermasian discourse ethics too easily dismisses as irrational the embodied character and the diversity of everyday practice (Wiener 2018, 12). Diversity is normatively important to Wiener, and the practice of normative contestation is valuable as a means of recognizing diverse cultures in a global 'multilogue'. Indeed, Wiener (2014, 40) is 'interested in respect for diversity as a condition for legitimate and fair governance in the global realm. ... By addressing diversity upfront, contestation can be conceptualized in a focused way to enhance rather than undermine fair and legitimate governance'.

Like Risse's focus on arguing, then, Wiener's focus on contestation resonates with what I am calling Pragmatic Constructivism. I think, however, Wiener's theory of contestation attributes more weight to

[68] Richard Rorty (1993) defends human rights norms, while critiquing foundationalist arguments that ground them, by citing the 'progress of sentiments', which he takes from Annette Baier's (1991) reflection on the moral philosophy of Hume, whom she described as 'the woman's moral philosopher'. For the influence of Hume on current Pragmatism in IR see Kratochwil 2018; Fierke 2020. On 'key pragmatic arguments that highlight human elements seen as more associated with femininities' see Avant 2021.

diversity than classical Pragmatism. For Wiener (2018, 38-9), access to the process of contestation is important as a means of *recognizing difference*. But for Deweyan-inspired Pragmatism, exposure to diversity is valuable as a means of testing knowledge claims and *learning* from different experiences. The latter's emphasis is on resolving the doubt created by pluralism and contestation. Contestation is not an end in itself and in fact the emphasis is on deliberation as a means of resolving the problems that create doubt and on re-establishing epistemic authority to a particular norm / practice. This distinction is significant, I suggest, because from the Pragmatist perspective it is important to recognize different knowledge claims and to include them in a properly constituted community of inquiry, but that process does not necessarily involve agreeing with such claims.

For the Pragmatist then, the epistemic authority of diverse knowledge claims should be set in the context of the specific problem in view. Diversity can be a value but like other values it has to be assessed according to the practical consequences that follow practices that act in accordance with it. Recognizing different sources of knowledge is only part of the deliberative process that constructs and realizes the public good. That may mean amending the existing stock of learning that underpins the background knowledge of a particular international practice, and it may mean amending the practice itself. But from the Pragmatist perspective it may also mean defending a norm and practice *against* the contestation that emerges in the context of epistemic pluralism.[69] I illustrate this difference in the following section with reference to the contestation of the anti-torture norm following the terrorist attacks of 9-11.

Let's argue! But for (or from) what?

By accepting the norm-generative function of multilogue, and by advocating 'regular' (Wiener 2014) rather than constant critique, Weiner seemingly acknowledges the importance of resolving the indeterminacy created by contestation, albeit as part of an ongoing process. The 'contestedness of norms', she writes, 'does not imply that norms are never stable' (Wiener, 2018, 14). There is, however, little normative guidance in the theory of contestation about *what to argue for* when a norm and the practice it enables is contested (Wolff and Zimmermann 2016, 532). The theory of contestation says it 'becomes possible to evaluate norm change', in terms of how it 'takes diverse affected stakeholders into account' (Wiener 2018, 31, also 36, 78). But does that always mean contested meanings necessarily have to change to meet the objections of its critics? Is there no reason for defending a norm against contestation? Wiener's focus (2018, 42-7) is on the formal, social and cultural sites of normative validation but that does not guide us on how to resolve indeterminacy (i.e. doubt) at those sites. Indeed, because her emphasis is on proving the value of access to contestation, rather than deliberative practical judgement within inclusive modes of contestation, it leads to difficulties when the substantive norm being contested is one Wiener wants to

---

[69] There is an interesting Pragmatist angle to Wiener's 'agonistic constructivism' (Havercroft 2017), which can be found in Robert Talisse's (2007) 'Peirceian' conception of 'epistemic agonism'. Relative to Dewey, Wiener and Talisse place greater value on contestation as a guard against substantive conceptions of the good oppressing pluralism. In contrast, a Deweyan-inspired Pragmatism emphasizes and values the solidarity that emerge out of pluralism, based that is on the stock of shared learning experiences. See Ralph 2023 for further discussion.

defend. This is evident, for instance, in her (2018, 127-75) account of the Bush Jnr. administration's contestation of the prohibition on torture.

In Wiener's typology, the normative prohibition against torture, as set out in the UN Convention against Torture, is a 'Type 1' norm. This is because it has wide moral reach. It thus generates a low degree of 'reactive contestation' or objection, but a high degree of 'proactive' contestation or critical engagement regarding implementation (Wiener 2018, 129). In Wiener's case study, however, the Bush administration's actions and arguments - that 'enhanced interrogation techniques' (EITs) like waterboarding did not constitute torture - are described as both a 'breach' (Wiener 2018, 127, 165-6) and a 'proactive contestation' (Wiener 2018, 143, 149, 169). Presumably there is something substantively wrong with the Bush administration's contestation for it to be classified as a 'breach', as that implies sympathy with those who argued that EITs are normatively objectionable. Yet the theory of contestation cannot answer why that is the case because it is interested in empirically mapping the points of access to contestation more than it is defining what constitutes a reasonable contestation.

Likewise, Wiener's claim that the process of contestation uncovered a 'hidden' practice (i.e. universal jurisdiction through national courts) is a significant empirical finding. But that only goes part of the way to making a normative argument. That the Bush administration's contestation of the anti-torture norm inspired opposition is normatively significant because it shows that the 'breach' argument in fact received support at the 'glocal' level. But again that finding by itself does not address the normative question of why we *ought* to support strategic litigation networks and the practice of universal jurisdiction. In this instance, the theory of contestation cannot tell us *why* enhanced interrogation or torture is objectionable, only that it was part of a process of normative contestation. I think Pragmatic Constructivism takes us beyond that problem. It accepts that the meaning of a norm is not fixed, and it embraces contestation as part of its commitment to an experimental method of inquiry into the appropriateness of a norms and their various meanings in use. But it can also defend certain norms by 'anchoring' substantive arguments in relevant stocks of learning.[70]

I offer two Pragmatist inspired argument that defend human rights norms against contestation in order to illustrate this point. The first recalls Richard Rorty's (1993) anti-foundationalist defence of human rights.[71] Rorty emphasizes the value of sympathy in expanding the conception of the self and constructing a 'human rights culture' that can be used as the basis for condemning EITs. Through the 'sentimental education' of the arts and humanities we have learned, Rorty argues, what it means to experience torture. We are able to put ourselves in the shoes of the person being tortured, or those of their loved ones. It is possible to condemn EITs, and defend the Convention against Torture, not because they violate a reasoned consensus, but because such techniques are cruel. Indeed, such an argument would be reason to argue for the Convention against Torture if it did not exist. The fact that a consensus of sorts does exist, reinforces the

---

[70] On the concept of 'philosophical anchorage' see Booth 1999a, 43; and 2007, 234-6.

[71] Rorty is often referred to as a 'neo-Pragmatist'. He was critical of what he saw as the 'methodolatry' of classical Pragmatism (1999, 36). Where classical pragmatism favoured a kind of radical 'empiricism', which holds that actual lived experience is the primary material for philosophical theorizing, Rorty rejected the idea that experience is primary. He described himself as having taken the 'linguistic turn,' the 'turn philosophers took when, dropping the topic of experience and picking up that of language' (Rorty 1999, 24-5, quoted in Talisse 2007, 3).

authority of the knowledge claim that violent forms of interrogation are cruel and should be condemned. Illustrating a remarkable commitment to the fallibilist quality of epistemic truth claims, moreover, Rorty suggests understanding and engaging the 'heartfelt' sentiments of torturer, and the justificatory arguments they make. There is little value in dismissing them as irrational or evil because this closes the door on their capacity for reflection, deliberation and sentimental learning. To be clear, Rorty dismisses as improbable the likelihood of changing the torturer's beliefs and practices. The task instead is to stop the practice through the sentimental education of the next generation, and this can be done using 'vocabularies' that do not dehumanize either the victims or perpetrators (Rorty 1989, 1993).

Of course, the litigation practices that Wiener observed in the response to the Bush administration can be an important part of that vocabulary. This is especially the case if the legal process includes statements capturing the lived experience of the victims. This is one reason I suggest Pragmatists would support litigation in this instance. Wiener also seems to acknowledge this when she writes human rights practices such as litigation can have important secondary effects. Even if, as in the *Rumsfeld* case, legal action failed to prosecute the alleged torturers, 'justice does not depend on victory in court' (Wiener 2018, 167). Yet there is a second aspect to the Pragmatist argument that would lead one to support the opposition to the US attempt to revise the anti-torture norm and this is more Deweyan. It draws less on the importance of sympathy and sentimental education, and more on the argument that past experiments with torture have created a stock of learning that condemns such practices.

In this instance, a strong argument against the use of EITs could be made based on the evidence that torture provides intelligence that is at best useless and at worst counterproductive. In fact if we recall Peirce's arguments, we are more inclined to believe coercive methods create doubt. Why would one have faith in intelligence if it is possible that the torture victim would say anything to stop the pain? Additional evidence from past experiments with torture demonstrates how inhumane treatment radicalizes opponents and acts as a recruiting tool for enemies. More than that it creates grievances that make the reconstitution of opposing interests more difficult. Again, this evidence suggests torture is not only ineffective it is counterproductive. Indeed, these were arguments that informed the Barack Obama opposition to the Bush administration's contestation of the anti-torture norm and the rejection of so-called 'enhanced interrogation' (Ralph 2013). This was done without dismissing the impact of the emotions (e.g. fear, anger, revenge) of 9-11. The priority for Obama – who, it has been suggested, often displayed a Pragmatist temperament (Cormier 2012) - was instead to render those emotions intelligent.[72]

Such arguments help illustrate Geoff Dancy's (2016, 518-9) point that there is nothing fatal about anti-foundationalist critiques of human rights advocacy. After all, human rights practitioners 'rarely presume or articulate a single source of validity'. Neither do they 'toil mentally' over such questions. Rather they 'think about the [practical] possibilities created and foreclosed by that usage'. Indeed, Joe Hoover argues that because appeals to human rights have been powerful tools for destabilizing reified beliefs they

---

[72] Friedrichs and Kratochwil (2009, 706) make a similar Pragmatist argument against the use of force to promote democracy: 'If it turns out, over and over again, that democratic freedoms cannot be imposed from the barrel of a gun and that bombing civilian targets does not lead to military victory, one should be skeptical about these instruments. The reason is not so much a lack of correspondence with the facts in the "real world", but rather the need to agree on the harmful consequences of sticking to schemes that have misfired so many times'.

complement the Pragmatist's faith in the experimental method. Appeals to human rights have, Hoover (2016 134) writes, 'enabled claims that could not have been justified within the existing order of things. It made possible an ethical appeal beyond established principles'. These appeals empowered publics to contest what otherwise may have been unjustifiably accepted as common sense.[73] They facilitated inclusion in an otherwise closed community of inquiry. Human rights struggles in this respect have been important in encouraging the conscientious reflection that drives the growth of sympathetic personality and the social learning that is at the center of the Deweyan-inspired Pragmatism. It is important to the Pragmatist, however, that those invoking human rights do so with the fallibilist's appreciation of their contingency. The *idea* of 'human rights' is powerful as a tool of democratic discourse, not as a transcendent moral absolute that trumps politics; and Pragmatists discourage the latter because it tends to push politics toward the dogmatism of entrenched and extreme positions (Hoover 2016, 134-6).

Conclusion

The contribution of this Chapter to the central purpose of the book is twofold: first, it makes the case for Pragmatic Constructivism by demonstrating the synergies across Pragmatist and Constructivist social theory and by demonstrating how Pragmatism can inform the search for an ethically minded Constructivism if not necessarily a Constructivist ethic. By drawing on McCourt's description of 'New Constructivism' I noted how there remains a hesitancy among Constructivists to adopt a normative position and to engage in a political defence of that position. I think that hesitancy can be overcome by interrogating the unstated normative assumptions of Constructivist research which I think are aligned to a Pragmatist commitment to inclusive and deliberative methods of social inquiry. For that reason, I stand by my argument that Pragmatic Constructivism is a useful label.

The second contribution is to set in place the first building block of my Pragmatic Constructivist normative approach. What emerges from the analysis is a commitment to an experimental method that tests the knowledge claims of norms against the lived experiences of practitioners, as well as those affected by norm-enable practice (what Dewey called 'publics – see Chapter Four). Where these experiences create doubt in the epistemic authority of a norm problem emerges that requires social inquiry. The Pragmatist's normative lens then focuses on the ability of a community of inquiry to learn new practices. That focus reveals the value of communities that are reflexive, inclusive and deliberative.

This last point, I suggest, is what separates Pragmatic Constructivism from other normative positions to emerge from recent developments in Constructivist-inspired norm studies. To illustrate that, I focused on

---

[73] See also Adler (2019, 268), who defends his 'humanist realist' position, based on 'the propensity, even if unapparent now, that a few humanist practices, which develop in communities of practice, may become universally socially constructed'. This is how practices like those associated with anti-slavery could be defended against the common sense of the moment. Ultimately, 'practitioners in communities of practice that *politically* sustained slavery learned in and through practice and political processes to endow all individuals with a common humanity status' (Adler 2019, 270). Likewise, Brown (1999, 118) writes that for Pragmatists it becomes possible to assert 'both that the Athenians were not necessarily wrong in condoning slavery, and that our ways in this matter are better than theirs – history has moved on and moral development has taken place'.

Antje Wiener's theory of contestation where the emphasis is more on an agonistic approach that helps recognize and reconstitute diversity. The Pragmatic Constructivist approach I offer is more focused on discovering a public good that not only recognizes diversity but also addresses the problems that emerge within it. Here the emphasis is on deliberative and creative problem-solving, which leads Pragmatic Constructivists to not only engage in the processes of normative contestation but to make judgements about which arguments best serve the public good.

The next Chapter turns our attention to the so-called 'Practice Turn' in IR theory. My contention is the same as this Chapter: that classical Pragmatism can speak to unresolved questions in a significant area of IR research. The focus there is on the question of how practices as patterns of pre-reflexive behaviour change, and we can reflect on the normative value of those practices. For McCourt, these questions fall under the remit of 'New Constructivism'. In that case, if I can demonstrate how classical Pragmatism contributes to IR Practice theory I can also claim to have put in place another plank of the Pragmatic Constructivist platform and to further extend New Constructivism in a normative direction.

Chapter 3

Habit, Habitus and Conscientious Reflection.

My purpose in this Chapter is to develop my answer to the book's first question: what can classical Pragmatism bring to debates in IR, including those centered on the perennial question of how norms, practices and interests interact to influence international society and its practitioners? Whereas the previous Chapter approached these questions from within Norm studies, this Chapter is situated more closely to debates within IR Practice theory. This is an organizational move and does not mean I see norms and practices (or indeed interests) operating on different 'analytical planes' (Adler-Nissen and Pouliot 2014, 891). Indeed, I see norms - and the learning that should inform the social processes that construct them - as part of what Practice theory calls 'background knowledge'. This is the tacit knowledge that is held by competent practitioners. Yet my focus in this Chapter is on the value – both descriptive and normative - of defining practice as pre-reflexive or habitual, which is how Practice theory was recently introduced to IR (e.g Adler and Pouliot 2011). John Dewey was clear: habits can be useful, but only if those subject to their hold can improvise when practice produces unwanted consequences. This again points to the centrality of reflection and learning to the Pragmatist temperament; and this Chapter explores that in-depth by examining how Dewey's 'pedagogic creed' aims to put individuals and societies in control of their habits. Only then can they adapt practices when the lived experience demands it. This theory of learning is significant for the argument that answers the book's other questions. This is because Dewey not only developed a critique of the unhelpful hierarchies in formal education, he extrapolated from that a theory of social learning, which included an emphasis on the role democracy plays in facilitating the reflexivity and deliberation that social learning requires.

To apply these insights to IR Practice theory, I divide this Chapter into four sections. The first two illustrate the normative dangers of pre-reflexive practice by exposing it to the Pragmatist critique. In the third section I apply that critique to offer a normative assessment of foreign policy. More specifically, I show how a failure to adequately reflect on the situational value of an ideological commitment to 'democracy promotion' - what Bourdieusian-informed Practice theory might call a Western *habitus* - contributed to the maladapted response to the humanitarian crises in Syria and Myanmar. The argument that emerges from these empirical cases is a Pragmatist one that stresses the value of the 'virtuoso performance' (Cornut 2018; Pouliot 2016b, 14): a mastered art that enables the reflexive practitioner to adapt otherwise ingrained practices to the contingencies of the situation and to exercise prudential judgement for the purpose of improving the lived experience. In the final section, I expand on Dewey's theory of learning, or 'pedagogic creed', because it gives insight into how the habits of reflection and deliberation – in other words, how virtuosity – can be nurtured. That prepares the ground for a theory of social learning, which is developed in subsequent chapters.

IR Practice Theory and Classical Pragmatism

In 2008, Vincent Pouliot introduced what he called the 'logic of practicality' to IR theory. His aim was to correct what he called the 'representation bias' (Pouliot 2008, 260; 2010, loc.165-283) in the three logics (consequences, appropriateness and arguing) that had previously informed Constructivist IR theory. In contrast to these approaches, which all focus on 'what agents think about', the 'logic of practicality' reveals 'what they think from'. In fact, the logic of practicality, Pouliot argued, is ontologically prior to interest-, norm-, and truth-based reasoning because it is the agent's 'practical sense' that enables them to 'feel whether a given social context calls for instrumental rationality, norm compliance, or communicative action' (Pouliot 2008, 276). This practical sense emerges from the 'inarticulate know-how' of practitioners, which 'makes what is to be done self-evident or commonsensical'. Like the chefs who do not consult the recipe each time they cook, practitioners operate according to 'tacit' or intuitive knowledge (Pouliot 2008, 267; 2010, loc.297, citing Ryle 1984; 2016a, loc.252 Bueger 2014, 386). Agents become 'competent' in a practice – they become practitioners – through a learning process that is experiential and therefore exclusive to those inside the practice (Adler-Nissen and Pouliot 2014; Pouliot 2016a and b). IR research can only understand practical knowledge therefore through the application of interpretivist and ethnographic research methods (Pouliot 2013, 2015; Bueger 2014). For Pouliot, such knowledge is too often in the background of IR, and the task of Practice theorists is to bring it to the analytical foreground (Pouliot 2008, 259).

To articulate the inarticulate - a problematic proposition, as we shall see - Pouliot draws on Pierre Bourdieu's concept of 'habitus'. This is the term used to describe a 'system of durable, transposable dispositions, which integrates past experiences and functions at every moment as a matrix of perception, appreciation, and action, making possible the accomplishment of infinitely differentiated tasks" (Pouliot 2008 quoting Bourdieu 2001, 261). Pouliot illustrates this with reference to a 'diplomatic habitus'. This is described as 'a set of regular traits which dispose its bearers to act in a certain way, which makes international diplomatic interaction possible' (Pouliot 2018 quoting Neumann 2002b). These dispositions are acquired through socialization, exposure, imitation, and symbolic power relationships, and while they do not necessarily create repetition of practice (which is Pouliot's interpretation of Hopf's 'logic of habit') 'habitus instils path dependency in social action'. This is because 'revisions take place on the basis of prior dispositions'.[74] Several questions have been levelled at this Bourdieusian-inspired approach, including where new thinking, creativity and learning comes from. For the Pragmatist, I suggest, it is the failure of existing practice to resolve the epistemic doubt that emerges from problematic experiences that necessitates inquiry, reflection, imagination, deliberation and learning. As such, these are normative standards that can be used to critique practices and their habitus.

---

[74] IR research informed by this and other aspects of Bourdieusian sociology includes work on security (Bigo 2002, 2016; Berling 2012, 2015; Pouliot 2010; Williams 2007), defence (Mérand 2010) diplomacy (Adler-Nissen 2008, 2010; Pouliot and Cornut 2015, Neumann 2002a; Pouliot 2016a), and international law (Stappert 2020a). Others have drawn on different kinds of Practice theory to make contributions in this area. For instance Bueger (2015) draws on Knorr Cetina's (2008) concept of 'epistemic infrastructure' to analyze the UN Security Council's response to piracy.

In their recent book *Practice Theory and International Relations* Lechner and Frost (2018) criticize the Bourdieusian-inspired practice turn in a number of ways. Firstly, as I noted in previous chapters, Lechner and Frost insist that we cannot properly understand practice, as distinct from action, without incorporating rules and norms into our definition. Criticizing Adler and Pouliot's original definition of practices as 'patterned actions that are embedded in particular organized contexts' (Adler and Pouliot 2011, 6), they offer a more expansive definition of practices as 'distinctive domains of intelligent action and interaction structured by common rules' (Lechner and Frost 2018, 41, see also 45, 115; also Gadinger 2016, 195-7).[75] Drawing on Michael Oakeshott's philosophy, they see practice as 'meaningful action'. What makes action constitutive of practice is not its mechanical or patterned character, but the intersubjective rules that socially recognize it as a practice. A practice, in this sense, is action in the context of a 'framework' or 'system' of constitutive rules or norms. These rules, to use their example, enable us to distinguish the simple *act* of walking from the *practice* of marching. 'Once we enter the world of social practices', they write,

> it is no longer the case that we perform a given action, for example marching, simply by virtue of the physical capacities at our disposal. Rather we have been *taught* that doing this – in this particular way – counts as 'marching'. We know how to march because we have learned to distinguish the description 'marching' from 'walking' … . As Oakeshott pointed out, a practice is a social engagement of teaching and learning: it is a human accomplishment, not a natural or physical process. As such it can only be mastered through effort and it can be mastered well or ill (Lechner and Frost 2018, 50).

Norms, in this sense, do not operate on a different analytical plane to practice but neither are they 'subsumed' (Bernstein and Laurence 2022, 78) by practice. Norms can give meaning to practice, and that can include making a normative judgement on the appropriateness of practice.

Lechner and Frost's second comment on Bourdieusian-inspired Practice theory is less a criticism than an elaboration of the 'novel theme' of macro-practices. This is a response to the Practice turn's tendency to theorize at the micro level (Lechner and Frost 2018, 182; see also Qin 2018, 40).[76] Framing practice as a system of constitutive rules enables Lechner of Frost to talk alongside English School theorists (Navari 2011) about the practices of international society and global civil society. Macro-practices are 'practices of practices' or institutions (Lechner and Frost 2018, 191). They bring together the micro-practices to create institutions such as diplomacy, the balance of power, and international law.[77] A macro-practice is also

---

[75] Adler accepts (2019, 129) that 'norms … also constitute practices, intersubjective understandings of competence, and "better" practices' conceptions. … From a practice perspective, therefore, the efficacy of rules and norms and their constitutive roles come to play a part of the background knowledge that sustains practices'. On norms as *nomos* in Bourdieu's thought see Epstein 2013.

[76] Stappert (2020b, 188) argues that this is at odds with Bueger and Gadinger's argument that Practice theory focuses on multiplicity and rejects the idea of one global all-encompassing social order. As noted in Chapter 1, I do not think Lechner and Frost reject multiplicity but instead argue it can be brought together in the 'practice of practices'. On a wider tendency to go micro see Solomon and Steele 2017.

[77] As Navari (2011, 620) notes, what Bull called 'institutions' of international society is identical to Practice theory definitions (e.g. Schatski) or practice. Further parallels are clear reading Lechner and Frost's Oakeshottian account of practice next to Navari's description of Robert Jackson's (2000) Oakeshottian- and English School-inspired account of

'comprehensive' in its inclusion of all participants of a given domain, and 'fundamental' in the sense these participants view inclusion as key to their ethical standing. The question of a state exiting the macro practices of international society, for example, does not arise in Lechner and Frost's view 'since this society has become globalized – its normative blanket covers all parts of the world. If a state were to persist in breaching the common rules in the practice of states, it would not be expelled from the practice … but punished or ostracized *within* the practice' (Lechner and Frost 2018, 194). As noted in Chapter 1, this conceptualization of the macro practice, and its articulation through the concept of international society, is useful for thinking about the obstacles to meeting global challenges; and with that in mind I return to it in the second part of this book.

Lechner and Frost's third criticism is the most significant for my present purpose, and it centers on the Bourdieusian claim to identify knowledge that is external and unknown to practitioners. This is important because it reflects on the Bourdieusian account of learning and the potential for change. Lechner and Frost's criticism is that in Bourdieusian Practice theory, reflexivity is limited to the social scientist situated outside the practice. Practitioners inside the practice exist in a state of 'learned ignorance' (Pouliot 2008, 273 quoting Bourdieu). Lechner and Frost (2018, 72-73) equate this to a 'false consciousness' argument, which for them is 'untenable'. It imposes meaning from an objectivist standpoint that simply does not exist, or exists only by asserting an epistemic hierarchy or 'asymmetry' between observer and practitioner (Schindler and Will 2019; see also Gadinger 2016 190-1).[78] The Bourdieusian critique must itself be inside a practice, and if *it* is able to learn reflexivity then there is no reason why practitioners inside other practices should be considered incapable of self-knowledge and critique. The implication for my analysis is that practitioner learning is not limited to mimicking existing practice, practitioners are capable of more complex learning. Practitioners are able to understand when their practices are no longer fit for purpose, and even reflect on the appropriateness of that purpose. They can moreover think imaginatively how to change.[79]

This is how Sebastian Schindler and Tobias Wille (2019) distinguish the 'Social critique' of Bourdieusian-inspired Practice theory from what they call a 'Pragmatic critique'. Where the former is interested in unmasking how power operates on unwitting practitioners, the latter rejects this view of practitioners as normative or judgemental 'dopes' and sees them as capable of identifying and resolving problems (Kratochwil 2011, 50; Franke and Weber 2011, 676-8; Gadinger 2016, 190; Frega 2014a; Pratt 2020). Indeed, the 'epistemic symmetry' of Lechner and Frost's internalist view (i.e. the observer *and* the observed

---

contemporary international society's practice. However, Navari (2011, 624-5) criticizes Jackson's 'static' account of practice for ignoring 'slippage and experimentation'. On the English School's – or at least Hedley Bull's – 'longstanding habit of moral skepticism', and how it lacked 'a method of reasoning about value conflicts', a gap that Pragmatism can fill, see Cochran 2013, 160.

[78] Navari (2011, 627) also separates an English School definition of practice from Bourdieu on this point: 'In the English School conception, there is nothing 'behind' the balance of power or 'behind' the practice of recognition and the methodological approach is a direct encounter with self-understanding'.

[79] A Bourdeusian response, as Deer (2008, 201-2) explains would be to argue that 'a genuine reflexive approach is … hardly within reach of lay people because the scientific conditions of practice as well as the mobilization of knowledge it requires fall necessarily beyond the scope of the day-to-day experience and pre-reflexive knowledge of non-specialists'.

are both capable of reflexivity) is key to an argument of how international practices change, an argument that Ted Hopf (2018; see also King 2000, 427-9) claimed was missing from the Bourdieusian approach (see below). In Lechner and Frost's Practice theory, reflexivity on the part of practitioners and observers contributes to the 'ethical erosion' of maladapted practices, and that in turn drives creativity. In the Peirceian terms set out in the previous Chapter, an internal inconsistency in a practice creates 'real and living doubt', which then gives rise to new hypotheses (or 'integrative practices') that are to be tested through further application.[80] In Lechner and Frost's Hegelian terms, doubt can be overcome or 'sublated' (*aufgehoben*) through learning processes that create better adapted practices (Lechner and Frost 2018, 158).[81]

The argument that practice 'is not inherently unreflective … [but] must be understood as a learning process' (Wenger 2005, 48-9) can be found elsewhere in recent IR scholarship. As noted, Ted Hopf (2018, 687), criticized Pouliot for not having 'a creditable account for change in world politics' (see also Bueger and Gadinger 2015; Schindler and Wille 2015; Hopf 2022). The primary reason for this, Hopf argues, is the abandonment of reflection *within* everyday practice. He accepts Pouliot's conception of practice as action based on inarticulate know-how, but Hopf insists that within that definition there is room for agents to improvise and to therefore change practice and its effects.[82] Practitioners, he notes, are 'irreducibly unique' (Hopf 2018, 693). Life experiences make it impossible for them to be identical in understanding and responding to the social world even when they are performing the same practice (Hopf 2018, 693). This gives rise to what Hopf calls 'microdisruptions' (Hopf 2018, 706 citing Scott 2012), and these can gradually change practice. More conscious forms of reflection, he notes, are contingent on 'the presence of meaningful and effective difference, the degree of socialization and institutionalization, the availability of liminars [outsiders inside the habitus] and margins, exogenous shocks and productive crises, and problems that matter to going on in the world' (Hopf 2018, 696).[83]

To make this criticism of the Bourdieusian-inspired practice turn, Hopf draws on what Pragmatists like James and Dewey say about habit and reflection. Based on Dewey's discussion in *Human Nature and*

---

[80] On integrative practice, which reconciles values that have come into conflict by discovering additional values through activity see Alexander 1993, 388-9.

[81] See also Cochran (1999 loc.2613) citing Hegel, adding: 'I believe this describes well what Rorty understands to be the stimulus behind the search for new vocabularies, why persons are ultimately moved to stray from the comfort of unthinking acceptance of social custom.' In Hegelian thinking, she adds, 'the thought troubles its thoughtlessness, and its own unrest disturbs its inertia'. See also Alexander (1993) on the role imagination plays in disturbing existing states, highlighting what is immanent within them, and therefore understanding the actual in light of the possible.

[82] See also Adler 2019, 20-1, and 36 where he writes: '[a]lthough I place more emphasis on reflective and evolutionary change [than Hopf], and highlight different change mechanisms, than he does, our conceptions of change in practices are to an extent compatible'. Christian Bueger (2015) draws on Knorr Cetina's Practice theory to note that in their production of epistemic objects (e.g. 'piracy') epistemic practice is never complete and constantly changing. These objects 'continuously raise new questions, have to be re-evaluated and dealt with differently. … Epistemic practices likewise continuously unfold, the construction of objects is never complete, but requires ongoing maintenance work by which the elements required to construct the object are held together and temporarily stable representations of the object are produced' (Bueger 2015, 6-7). On the value of what they call 'processual relationalism' as way of explaining change that is not dependent on exogenous shock see Jackson and Nexon 1999.

[83] See also Adler (2019, 225) who stresses the creative potential of practitioner imagination, as well as the role 'boundary encounters' between different communities of practice can 'become a source of creative variation'.

Conduct, Hopf (2018, 695) writes that Dewey 'introduces a common claim in practice theory: habits prevail until they do not work; we reflect upon why not; we decide to change our practices, or not'. But by limiting himself to understanding *when* reflection happens (i.e. in moments when habits do not 'work'), and not exploring *why it should* happen (i.e. to improve the lived experience), and by not exploring the more normative aspect of Dewey's philosophy, especially in the later work *Ethics* (Dewey 1932a and b), Hopf takes Practice theory only so far down the Pragmatist path. Indeed, even in *Human Nature and Conduct* Dewey (1922a [1998], 24) notes that the purpose of studying habit is not simply to understand change but 'to get a rational basis for moral discussion'; adding: 'only deliberate action, conduct into which reflective choice enters, is distinctively moral, for only then does there enter the question of better and worse' (Dewey, 1922c [1998], 321). Other Practice theorists acknowledge the influence of Dewey's thinking in this respect. Gadinger, for instance, references Dewey's influence on Luc Boltanski's 'Pragmatist sociology' where 'reflexivity is not separated from action; it is enmeshed within it' (Gadinger 2016, 191).[84]

These arguments have seemingly impacted on those who introduced Practice theory to IR. In his more recent work for instance, Emanuel Adler appears to turn away from the earlier Bourdieusian influence. There is now 'a greater emphasis on the reflexive rather than on the tacit quality of background knowledge' (Adler 2019, 110-11, also Adler and Faubert 2022, 52). In this vein, Adler (2019, 121-2) distinguishes the Bourdieusian concept of habitus from Deweyan thinking on habits, arguing that 'pragmatists have much more to say about creativity than Bourdieu does'. Adler also builds on the normative implications of this, more so than Hopf for instance. Yet despite that, Adler still acknowledges that his normative turn is 'a tentative venture' (Adler 2019, 265). Likewise, Pouliot's thinking also suggests a Pragmatist turn. In his critique of Michael Zürn's (2018) *Theory of Global Governance*, for instance, Pouliot clarifies the role that reflexivity plays in his Practice theory:

> [t]he point of practice theory is emphatically not that global actors go about their trade blindsided, unable to reflect and aimlessly. On the contrary, the argument is that, when they strategize, talk and act, practitioners start from established practices, which form the infrastructure of social and political interaction. Contingent as practices may be, their patterned nature also makes them relatively stable and even predictable within a defined context. Of course, in making rules global actors argue reflexively; but they do so in reference to existing practices – including when they seek to innovate. Indeed, from time to time global governors do experiment with untrodden ways of doing things, and as a result new practices emerge, such as multi-stakeholder partnerships for example. But, these transformations are heavily path-dependent and they continue to rest on, and coexist with, more traditional modes of action (Pouliot 2021, 153; also Pouliot 2022).

The point here is that the practices constituting global governance are neither reflexive nor axiomatic. 'Ways of doing things are always, and inevitably, both at the same time' (Pouliot 2021, 153). In this clarification, I suggest, Pouliot is moving closer to the Deweyan position (e.g. 'experiment'), which includes an understanding of change as 'growth'.[85] Change is less likely to be a radical rupture from existing practice,

---

[84] According to Gadinger (2016, 192) Dewey's influence on Boltanski 'is obvious, despite being rarely referenced'.
[85] Pouliot's (2020) reference to 'coping with the social world' also resonates with Pragmatist theme.

which for some is how Bourdieu saw it.[86] It evolves from what is immanent in existing practice and realized through the imagination and reflection of practitioners. But like my critique of Wiener's theory of contestation (see Chapter Two), which argued that a recognition of and commitment to contestation could not tell us *what to argue for*, Pouliot's argument that reflexivity intertwines with 'a stock of unspoken assumptions' (Pouliot 2021, 153) does not necessarily help us answer the normative question of why those assumptions should stand or fall when faced with critique.

On this, Pouliot's language again echoes Deweyan ideas. For the Pragmatist, Pouliot's 'stock of unspoken assumptions' evokes Dewey's 'stock learning' or 'a store of achieved truth' (Dewey 1915 [1998], 266), which I discussed in Chapter Two. But here Dewey is more explicit in explaining the normative value of this 'stock', which for him is the product of prior reflective and deliberative experiments. As long as the present situation reflects past circumstances (and that requires a judgement), the stock of learning - and the practice it enables - has a claim to epistemic authority. It is something to believe in. Furthermore, that practice is worth performing and defending against contestation (a 'stock of learning' cannot therefore be 'unspoken'). Behavioural 'adaptations' that are not informed by this stock of learning cannot necessarily claim the epistemic authority that leads us to commit to a practice. As adaptations they may be more than mimicry but if they are not drawing on the store of achieved truth then they do not constitute 'learning' and do not command the epistemic authority that bestows.[87]

Of course, there are limitations to the authority of an existing stock of learning. As the last Chapter showed, a fallibilist predisposition means the Pragmatist recognizes how even these 'verifications or truths' can never be absolute. They 'are always subject to being corrected by unforeseen future consequences or by observed facts which had been disregarded' (Dewey 1925a [1998], 8). Just as a norm's claim to appropriateness is contingent (see previous Chapter), so too is the practitioner's claim to competence. It is only as strong as the evidence that improved lived experiences (direct and indirect) follow from the practice being performed. Put differently, we might say we can have faith in the competence of practitioners and their habitus when it is the product of deliberative processes that reflects on the experiences of both the practitioners themselves and those they affect. This begs the next question: how is the community of practice constituted to nurture this kind of reflexivity and deliberation? How, in other words is the community of practice constituted so that it keeps its stock of learning current and useful? I address that question in the chapters that follow.

Before moving on to that issue I want to finish this review of IR's recent Practice turn and what Pragmatism can bring to it. I want specifically to address Lechner and Frost's internalist approach to Practice theory. As noted, it more explicitly addresses the place of norms in practice, which might suggest it is well placed to address normative questions as well. That is not necessarily the case, however, because while Lechner

---

[86] Nick Crossley's (2013, 151) reading of Bourdieu and Dewey is helpful here. He notes how Bourdieu (1977) 'too recognizes what he calls "crises", where habitus cease to suffice as a basis of action. Such moments are relatively rare and involve major social and political upheaval for Bourdieu, however. They are both mundane and more common for Dewey, stemming from the fundamental contingency of our everyday worlds.' The difference in Bourdieusian and Deweyan approaches should not therefore be interpreted in an either (pre-reflexive practice) / or (reflexive practice) light. The difference is rather a matter of emphasis.

[87] For further discussion on the distinction see Breslauer and Tetlock 1991, Tetlock 1991 and Chapter 4.

and Frost see norms as constituting 'meaningful' practice, they seemingly limit Practice theory to 'normative description'. This, as Nora Stappert (2020, 196-7) notes, 'does not allow us to use language (or apply criticism) not used by practitioners themselves, and [it] rejects the study of any practice that we [outsiders] do not participate in'. The risk here then is that IR Practice theory becomes 'a rather inward looking and uncritical exercise'. This is an important point, but Lechner and Frost's argument is not that we are dependent on practitioners to be self-aware and self-critical, but that criticism (of, for example, the international practice of states) comes from within another practice (for example global civil society). Critique is simultaneously external and internal. The question then is not whether we can criticize a practice we do not participate in; we can, especially if that practice affects us and excluded others. The question rather is *how* to criticize, given our own practices and predispositions, and how to best establish epistemic authority so that we can have faith in what emerges from critique and reflection.

Classical Pragmatism I suggest directs us to a particular practice (even habit) and to a particular politics. It forces us in moments of real and living doubt (i.e. when lived experiences are being harmed) to reflect on what we assume about current practice and how background knowledge enables it. In the context of that problem, the Pragmatist commitment to social inquiry does not necessarily dismiss existing practice, but encourages us to make judgements and choices about whether the existing practice is best placed - relative to other practical alternatives - to solve that problem. We cannot necessarily criticize existing practice without making this relative judgement and we cannot make this judgement without deliberating with those who are performing and those who are affected by the practice in question. This is necessary for an understanding of what the best possible practice might look like. All that, I suggest requires Practice theory to go beyond 'normative description'.

Making a judgement on the value of an existing practice need not mean we are limited to assessing it alongside from within the confines of another existing practice, which seems to be the inclination of Lechner and Frost's internalist position. It can mean *imagining* and *prescribing* practices that are not yet available, including practices that might reconcile otherwise competing alternatives. That kind of assessment is a necessary part of any normative judgement because the value of existing practice is always relative to practical (but as yet untried) alternatives. But does this commitment to normative prescription beyond that which is currently problematic mean Pragmatism is a form of externalist critique dependent on some form of abstract normative theory? I do not think so. It means only that Pragmatism is committed to a practice of social inquiry and problem solving (which includes a disposition toward sympathy, reflexivity, inclusion and deliberation) that is immanent (e.g. not yet realized) in existing practices. That practice of social inquiry and learning too also be embedded in the habits of a community; and in that way communities can be better placed to ameliorate lived experiences when circumstances demand.

This leads to a final comment on the relationship between Pragmatism and IR Practice theory in its various forms, one that is important for understanding the approach that is developed in subsequent chapters. It relates to Schindler and Wille's (2019, 13) argument that the 'Social critique' of Bourdieusian-inspired Practice theory, which is interested in unmasking how power operates on unwitting practitioners, and the Pragmatist critique found in Deweyan-thought are 'systematically opposed'. This makes sense in the context of the 'internalist' and 'externalist' perspectives described above, but it underplays the Deweyan argument that social learning requires critiques of power and the way practitioners wield it. As the previous

Chapter argued, the classical Pragmatist commitment to social inquiry as a form of social learning demands sympathy on the part of practitioners, but – and this is the link to the following Chapter – classical Pragmatists were not sufficiently naïve to expect that. Like the Bourdieusian approach, a Deweyan critique also involves 'unmasking power'. More than that, Deweyan-inspired Pragmatism involves empowering those that are excluded from relevant communities of practice so that they can bring knowledge of their experiences to the epistemic search for best practice. In this respect, my reading of Deweyan Pragmatism echoes Gadinger's reading of Boltanski's Pragmatism, with its 'strong emphasis on the interpretive work of observing actors *en situation* [which] renews the possibility of critical sociology by taking seriously the critical capacities of ordinary actors'. Gadinger adds that while Boltanski's 'perspective aims to become an active "sociology of emancipation," it still addresses core concerns in the tradition of Bourdieu such as complex domination, the ambivalent role of institutions, and resource inequality' (Gadinger 2016, 188; see also Frega 2014a and b; Frega 2019, 228-38).

Habit, Intuition and Conscientious Reflection

Deweyan-inspired Pragmatism may see a capacity for, and value in, practitioner reflection, but this does not mean it is dismissive of an analytical focus on habits or indeed their normative worth. Dewey recognized the efficiencies contained within actions that were habitualized, a point echoed by Pouliot (2008, 267-8), Friedrichs and Kratochwil (2009, 702-3) and Hopf (2010, 550). In this respect habits were like tools in a box. The habits children pick up from their parents and teachers, for instance, enable them to 'traverse in a short lifetime what the [human] race has needed a slow, tortured age to attain' (Dewey 1916 [2011], 24; also 28-9). Furthermore, as Frega (2019, 135) puts it, the 'grammar of habits' transcends the problems of moral values and social action because 'habits establish a more direct causal connection with social reality'.[88]

Having said that, Pragmatist theory is acutely aware that a habit's 'ability' (Dewey 1922a [1998], 41) can be misused. Unwanted consequences can flow from habits that do not adapt to the environment that is changing around them. When this happens internal inconsistencies between the means (practice) and ends (ameliorating the lived experience) emerge, and this should – if the social agent is in control of their habits (rather than vice versa) – prompt what Dewey called 'conscientious reflection'. This is a necessary part of experimental social inquiry, and it has to be nurtured. Reflection is not only possible therefore, from this perspective it offers a standard against which a habit can be normatively assessed. A bad habit is something which has a hold on the agent, 'something not easily thrown off even though judgement condemns it' (Dewey 1916 [2011], 30). A good habit is one confirmed after conscientious reflection; or it is the habit of conscientious reflection itself.

This normative position is developed more fully in the 1932 book *Ethics*, in which Dewey explains that our moral responses are often intuitive. 'They are not based upon any thought-out reason or ground. We just

---

[88] Frega (2019, 272) adds that institutions, which he sees as an amalgam of norms and practices, 'function as habits at the individual level, that is, they are organized patterns of response that leverage past experience for the sake of future action. Therefore they reduce the uncertainty of action, while increasing its efficiency'.

admire and resent, are attracted and repelled' (Dewey 1932a [1998], 330). Here Deweyan Pragmatism overlaps with the Bourdieusian concept of *habitus* and the 'hunch' (Pouliot 2008, 261) that persists in acquired dispositions. Intuition is the result of prior experience which 'get taken up into habits, and express themselves in direct appraisals of value' (Dewey 1932a [1998], 330); and for Dewey, intuitive responses were not always inappropriate.[89] This is echoed by contemporary IR Pragmatists like Sil and Katzenstein's (2010 413-4). Their defence of methodological eclecticism (see Chapter 1), for instance, refers to Albert Hirschman's observation about the failure of paradigm-driven social science relative to intuition born of experience. The commitment to paradigmatic explanation meant that its 'guesses are often farther off the mark than those of the experienced politician whose intuition is more likely to take a variety of forces into account'. Sil and Katzenstein also cite Tetlock's (2005) account of political judgement to make the same point. But for Dewey (1932a [1998], 331), there is 'a permanent limit to the value of even the best of the intuitive appraisals'. There is always a danger that the psychological value of the habitual response can create an unwarranted sense of epistemic authority. Intuitive responses are dependable in this latter sense only 'in the degree to which conditions and objects of esteem are fairly uniform and recurrent. They do not work with equal sureness in the cases in which the new and unfamiliar enters in' (Dewey 1932a [1998], 331; also 1915 [1998], 252).

Of course, it is likely that the 'new and familiar' *will* enter into the experiences and considerations of practitioners if one accepts, like Pragmatists do, that the world is in a constant state of becoming. Dewey's Darwinian (Dewey 1908a [1965]) and Hegelian (Bernstein 2013; Garrison 2008) influences meant he saw evolutionary and dialectical change as a constant feature of social environments. Practices evolve as they adapt to microdisruptions, including the criticisms that emerge from experiential affects. In this sense, the acuity and appropriateness of intuition cannot be guaranteed. Every intuition, Dewey wrote, 'even the best, is likely to become perfunctory and second-hand unless revitalized by consideration of its meaning - that is, of the consequences which will accrue from acting upon it' (Dewey 1932a [1998], 331). The value of intuition then is

> subject to correction, to confirmation and revision, by personal observation of consequences and cross-questioning of their quality and scope. The usual name for this process is deliberation; the name given moral deliberateness when it is habitual is conscientiousness. This quality is constituted by scrupulous attentiveness to the potentialities of any act or proposed aim. Its possession is a characteristic of those who do not allow themselves to be unduly swayed by immediate appetite and passion, nor to fall into ruts of routine behavior. ... Genuine conscientiousness has an objective outlook; it is intelligent attention and care to the quality of an act in view of its consequences for general happiness; it is not anxious solicitude for one's own virtuous state (Dewey 1932a [1998], 334).

---

[89] Nick Crossley (2013, 145) explains that the term 'habitus' emerged 'to capture the habitual basis of human perception, thought and motor activity in a discourse which explicitly disavows the empiricism and naturalism with which concept of "habit" is tinged'. In other words, habitus is different to habit when the latter is used to mean a bodily / mechanical (i.e. unthinking) response to stimulus. However, Crossley further notes that Dewey's critique of habits is also applicable to habitus.

Dewey then does not reject the possibility that habitual practice can be a force for good. Echoing Peirce's words on belief, Dewey writes that we are 'at home and feel comfortable in lines of action that run in the tracks of habits already established and mastered' (Dewey 1932b [1998], 353). In fact, Dewey looks to redistribute a habit's 'energies' (Dewey 1932c, 323). It 'tracks' should be directed toward deliberation. This is because deliberation facilitates 'control' (Dewey 1916 [2011], 17, 25) over our impulses and habits. Deliberation are like the 'points' (or the junction) – to continue Dewey's metaphor – that enable us to switch tracks when the consequence of not doing so produce harmful experiences. The social agent in this sense can 'intend consequences instead of just letting them happen' (Dewey 1916 [2011], 45).

The question that follows, of course, is this: how can individuals, and society in general, nurture the habits of reflection and deliberation that enables them to better ameliorate the lived experience? Interestingly, and perhaps counter-intuitively, Dewey found answers to that question in the growth processes of children. He celebrated their learning capacities, or what he called the 'plasticity' (Dewey 1916 [2011], 27-28, 32; 1922a [1998], 42) of the child who adapts to new experiences on a daily basis. Jane Addams similarly embraced 'the will to helpfulness, to act, especially among the youth' (as quoted in Cochran 2017, 153). Indeed, Dewey regretted the apathy of socialized adults who become fixed in their ways and prejudices. Still, he remained hopeful. '[U]nless and until we get completely fossilized, we can break old habits and form new ones' (Dewey 1932b, [1998], 352).

As the final section of the Chapter demonstrates, Dewey's critique of formal education was driven by his sense that society would better adapt to the challenges thrown up by its environment if its members were not educated to repeat – habitually – established knowledge. The primary task of education was to cultivate the habits of conscientious reflection; to help the student learn how to learn.[90] That would enable social progress, but progress was defined not as the attainment of indisputable knowledge or any other absolute ideal. It was defined instead as the movement from a problematic practice to a better one (while recognizing that the better practice might one day become problematic). The better practice would be authenticated not by comparison with a foreign or abstract ideal (nor by knowledge handed down by unsympathetic practitioners or teachers stuck in the past). Rather better practice emerged from an 'indigenous' (Dewey 1932c, 322; see also Neubert 2008) sense of resolution that came from a community of practice that owned its problems and solutions because it was inclusive and deliberative. Before elaborating on that theory of learning, however, I want to illustrate the normative risks of unreflexive and imprudent international practice among states.

Ends, Means and 'Virtuoso' performances

As the previous Chapter noted, Dewey criticized the ideals conceived by the detached theorist who expected the burden of their realization to be met by the humble practitioner. The articulation of moral ends was not a pointless exercise, but they had to be formulated with due regard for those wielding and

---

[90] In this respect, a Pragmatist theory of learning distinguishes 'learning that' (i.e. becoming aware of the knowledge held in the stock of learning) and 'learning how' (i.e. becoming aware of the processes by which that stock is created and maintained). For a non-Pragmatist use of these terms in IR see Breslauer and Tetlock 1991.

experiencing the means of realization. Good theoretical practice in this sense is 'consummatory': 'problematic situations are overcome and a unity is established between reflective thought and empirical experience through practical activity' (Hoover 2016, 116; see also Alexander 1993, 393; Hook 1959-60, 12). To achieve this unity the formulation of ends has to be inclusive of the means, including the practitioners that wield them and the 'publics' that experience them. Indeed, Dewey argued that because ends were experienced through their implementation the means-end binary was unhelpful. In practice, the worthwhile goal was one that was an experience that was rewarding because it was realizable. Anything else was tokenistic and possibly irresponsible if its pursuit needlessly harmed experiences. Furthermore, the failure to match ends and means could not be disguised behind the veil of good intentions (Addams 1902, loc. 87, 745; Dewey 1932b [1998], 341-3). Conscientious reflection in the face of uncertainty thus involves practical judgement. It involves formulating a 'positive interest or line of action', an end-in-view that improved on business-as-usual but was neither abstract nor unattainable (Dewey 1922a [1998], 30-1).

The practice of conscientious reflection and practical judgement can apply in any indeterminate situation. It does not necessarily require a sense of crisis. But of course IR is often concerned with the indeterminacy of the crisis situation, and this section focuses on two such instances – the 2017 atrocities in Myanmar and the Syrian atrocities from 2011 onwards - to illustrate how this aspect of the Pragmatic temperament prompts a normative judgement of international practice. In this respect, I am beginning to address the book's second and third questions: how should international practices and practitioners adapt in the face of social problems, and what normative conclusions can we come to about actual practice in contemporary international society? More specifically, I am offering a Pragmatist-informed normative assessment of a Western habitus or predisposition to 'promote democracy'. I argue this predisposition clouded the judgement of practitioners when they were confronted by crimes against humanity and genocide. Drawing first on the work of Staunton and Ralph (2020) and then on Ralph, Doherty and Mathieu (2020) I show how Western faith in 'democratic transitions' as means of protecting vulnerable populations led to policies that were maladapted to these specific circumstances.

The argument that democratic states better protect their populations from atrocity crimes stands on solid ground. The evidence – or 'stock of learning' – is overwhelming in this respect (see for example Rummel 2017). There is nothing intrinsically wrong, therefore, with Western states assuming that by siding with democrats and promoting democracy they are also properly discharging a responsibility to protect populations from atrocity crimes. In this sense, a Pragmatist analysis would not necessarily find reason to criticize government policies that 'grafted' (Acharya 2004) the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) norm (see Chapter 6) and its associated practices on to a Western habitus that valued democratic governance.[91] This is because the background knowledge that underpinned such practices would seem to command epistemic authority. Yet the Pragmatist sensitivity to the ethical demands of a particular situation would qualify support for such a practice and be wary of the habitus that cultivated it. To repeat Dewey, the 'verifications or truths' contained in the stock of learning can never be absolute. They 'are always subject to being

---

[91] Amitav Acharya describes this as a process of 'norm localization', where the meanings of global norms are in practice reconstructed by local agents to ensure they 'fit with agents' cognitive priors and identities' (Acharya 2004, 239). Acharya does not draw on Bourdieusian-inspired Practice theory to make this point, but I assume the reference to 'cognitive priors' mirrors what that theory refers to as 'habitus'.

corrected by unforeseen future consequences or by observed facts which had been disregarded' (Dewey 1925a [1998], 8). In this way, the Pragmatist is sensitive to the possibility that the norms and practices that are aligned in theory (e.g. democracy promotion and atrocity prevention) may work against each other in practice. That would reveal an internal inconsistency in the 'norm cluster' (Lantis and Wunderlich 2018; Winston 2018), which would demand further reflection and deliberation to resolve.

While they do not frame their analysis in the language of Bourdieusian-influenced Practice Theory, Staunton and Ralph (2020) in effect demonstrate how the R2P norm and its associated practices of atrocity prevention were 'grafted' on to a Western habitus that was committed to other distinct norms including conflict prevention, human rights, democracy and good governance. They make the above point, that there is nothing inherently problematic with this in the abstract. However, they go on to demonstrate how EU practices that *should* have been regarded as problematic in the context of Rohingya vulnerability were not because they were deemed to be consistent with a policy that supported Myanmar's democratic transition. So, for instance, EU aid was increased to Myanmar following the 2015 elections despite the fact that human rights and human protection NGOs were warning of potential atrocities against the Rohingya population. Indeed, the EU continued to praise Myanmar's democratic transition even after the 2016 atrocities, which some saw as a rehearsal for the much larger 'clearance operations' of 2017. It was only after the 2017 atrocities, which the International Court of Justice has ruled is a *prima facie* case of genocide, that the EU changed course and began to sanction members of the government.

Staunton and Ralph's argument is not that the EU could have prevented genocide. Its political leverage relative to other supporters of the Myanmar regime was weak. Rather their argument is that EU policy did not reach this point of reflection and adaptation sooner because it was predisposed to believe that a process of democratic transition would work to prevent atrocity and by supporting the democratic transition it was also properly discharging its responsibility to protect. Again, that is understandable given what we know about democratic states but in practice establishing that kind of democracy in Myanmar, one where the Rohingya population was not vulnerable, was an end far from view. Framing Staunton and Ralph's analysis in Pragmatist terms, one might claim that more conscientious reflection on the suitability of the Western predisposition or habitus could have opened epistemic space for policies that were better adapted to the circumstances and the immediate goal of preventing atrocity. That space was closed, however, by a predisposition (codified by the norm cluster) that took for granted the argument that democracy promotion and atrocity prevention were aligned and complementary.

Like Staunton and Ralph (2020), Ralph, Docherty and Mathieu (2020) demonstrate how the goal of humanitarian protection was grafted on to the goal of democracy promotion in the US response to the Syria crisis, which began in 2011. Again, their analysis is framed in the language of 'norm localization'. Their argument that a discourse of American exceptionalism predisposed foreign policy practitioners to view the 'Arab Spring' through the lens of a 'democracy promotion', and to shape humanitarian protection practices so they were aligned to that goal. Again, this illustrates what Bourdeusian-inspired Practice theory might refer to as an American habitus. Applying the Pragmatist critique would again find no problem with this kind of alignment in the abstract. As with the EU commitment to democratic transition it makes sense to claim that such a goal is consistent with humanitarian protection; but as in the Myanmar situation, the concrete situation in Syria meant a democratic Syria was an end far from view. That kind of idealism is not

68

necessarily problematic, but in practice the US commitment to democratic transition (expressed in the phrase 'Assad must go') proved to be an obstacle to an alternative practice of humanitarian protection, for instance the 2012 UN sponsored peace process (see also Ralph 2018). In this way, the Syria crisis revealed an internal inconsistency in the habitus, one that demanded creative thinking to address. Ultimately, however, the hold that the American habitus had over practitioners in this early period of the crisis contributed to a maladapted response. Assad remained in power and conflict extended beyond 2012, providing the context for further atrocities.

Two points might be directed at this Pragmatist argument on the normative risk contained in an uncritical approaches to habitus and the way it influences, in these cases, foreign policy. Firstly, the claim that there were alternative, indeed better, responses to these crises involves counterfactual reasoning, and one might argue that such reasoning cannot provide the kind of compelling evidence that is necessary to prove the point. That is indeed the case. We can only imagine how things would have been different if Western states had acted differently. But as I noted above, and as Sikkink (2008) explains, counterfactual reasoning is necessary for a normative assessment of practices in indeterminate situations because the value of the practice that was performed is always relative to the alternative practice that was not. There is nothing unusual or 'academic' about this. Indeed, practitioners reason this way when deciding how to act. Theirs is a forward-looking exercise but it still involves imagining the consequences of alternative practices.

Secondly, it might be argued that in both these cases democracy was the end not atrocity prevention or human protection. If the consequence of practices committed to that democracy promotion increased the risk of atrocities then, one might argue, so be it. In other words, in the normative hierarchy contained within the Western habitus, democracy takes priority and that end justifies the costs imposed by the means. I think the Pragmatist would counter this argument in two ways: first, that argument was not used to make the case for supporting democratic transition in these cases. Its absence from the discourse suggests practitioners knew it was normatively and politically untenable. Western discourse was thus forced into defending the norm cluster that aligned democracy promotion and human protection but rather than accept that difficult situations might expose the tensions a Western habitus glossed over the need for conscientious reflection and practical judgement. Second, from the Pragmatist's perspective an absolutist commitment to democracy promotion such as this, one that restores a hierarchy between ends and means, has the potential to be in fact undemocratic. That is because it imposes costs on 'publics' i.e. those who experience the effects of democracy promotion (including increased human vulnerability) without having been considered or consulted in the processes that constitute such a practice.

There is one final point to this analysis that should be made before returning to Dewey's theory of learning: the two cases studies discussed in this section – Myanmar and Syria - illustrate Hopf's point that foreign policy bureaucracies 'are likely sites for the operation of the logic of habit because of their associated routines, standard operating procedures and relative isolation from competing ideological structures' (Hopf 2010, 547).[92] If this is the case, then one might ask whether we should resign ourselves to foreign policy

---

[92] To make this point, Hopf (2018, 702) cites Séverine Auteserre's (2014) analysis of 'the collection of habits of the international community of interveners that prevents them from reflecting upon the many pernicious consequences of their practices. Such shared habits included: not prioritizing understanding local histories, cultures, or languages;

failure. Or more specifically we might ask: what is Practice theory's response? I suggested earlier that Bourdeusian-inspired Practice theory has moved in a Pragmatist direction and Jérémie Cornut's recent work illustrates that in a way I think addresses this question. Building on what he sees as the neglected aspects of Bourdieu's work, for example, Cornut identifies 'a logic of improvisation and virtuosity'.[93] This resonates with Dewey's separation of the conscientious from the intuitive (or pre-reflexive) response and Cornut celebrates the 'virtuoso' performance by contrasting it with that of the 'amateur'. Virtuoso practitioners, he writes, 'have an ability to anticipate and improvise with success new ways of doing things in changing circumstances. On the contrary, strict imitation or the unimaginative application of previously established codes of conduct are characteristics of the amateurs' (Cornut 2018, 720).[94]

Pragmatism, in this respect, may be to IR Practice theory, what that other great American export, jazz, was to music; and indeed it would not be the first time that jazz was used as a metaphor for Pragmatism and its influence on social practice (Kratochwil 2018 424-5; Muyumba 2009). It challenges the practitioner to be so skilled that they can improvise. They can adapt their performance to the situation and pursue ends that may be outside daily routines and common sense expectations. Cornut's point that practical mastery can be learned 'by doing' also resonates with Dewey's pedagogy, which is discussed below. Yet despite this reference to improvisation and learning there is a familiar tone to Cornut's Bourdieusian-inspired Practice theory, one that hints at the complacency of the practitioner who listens only to insiders; a complacency that Kratochwil (2009, 714) warned against when he observed the tendency to become 'enmeshed in interpretive or ethnographic research to such an extent as to surrender all critical judgement to the practitioners in the "field".' Cornut's social agents are said to 'progressively acquire an unarticulated ability and relational familiarity with their field of practice'. This learning process stems from the practice of the game and is 'practically never set out or imposed in an explicit way', takes place 'insensibly, gradually, progressively and imperceptibly', and 'passes for the most part unnoticed' (Cornut 2018, Bourdieu, 2000: 11). The problem here is the vagueness with which the 'field of practice' is defined and a lack of Deweyan 'sympathy' to those who may be excluded from the field but experience its consequences. Does the diplomatic field, for instance, include relations with non-diplomats who are impacted by the consequences

---

not basing recruitment or promotion, even partially, on knowledge of local contexts; and not developing personal or social relationships with the host populations'. He also cites Jérémie Cornut's (2015) analysis of the micro-practices during the Arab Spring, and how they were taken by surprise because diplomats 'preferred to talk to other officials, not "real" people; they preferred those in suits who spoke English, so even those locals with whom they spoke were already far removed from the street that mattered. Moreover, the common practice of a new diplomat arriving in country is to meet with other diplomats, hence reproducing the same circulating narrative among the isolated embassies' (Hopf 2018, 702).   For a similar application, one that reveals different modes of knowledge production – a rule-following mode and a more reflexive mode – in communities of practice see Maren Hofius forthcoming.

[93] This neglect is possibly a consequence of what some see as the incompatibility of Bourdieu's 'practical theory' which emphasizes 'virtuosic interactions between individuals' and the concept of the 'habitus' according to which 'society consists of objective structures and determined—and isolated—individuals' (King 2000, 417).

[94] Different conceptions of Practice theory also emphasize creativity as an endogenous quality. See for instance Bueger (2015), who uses Knorr Cetina conception of practice, which conceives of 'the backbone of practice' as 'the relational dynamics that extends itself into the future in creative and also disruptive ways' (Bueger 2015, 5 quoting Knorr Cetina 2001, 196). Indeed, Pouliot (2010, loc.274-5) distinguished his 'logic of practice' from Hopf's 'logic of habit' in this way: 'While habit is fundamentally repetitive, *practicality is partly improvisatory* because it results from the intersection of a particular set of dispositions and a social configurations' (emphasis added).

of diplomatic practice? Cornut's interpretation of diplomacy during the Arab Spring (cited above) suggests it does, but to leave that unspecified detracts from an otherwise helpful description of 'virtuous' practice.

From a Deweyan perspective, we cannot attribute competence or virtuosity to practitioners who may be ignorant of the consequences their actions have on those outside the community of practice. The implication for the diplomatic habitus is that learning processes have to be democratized to include non-diplomats, and certainly those impacted by diplomatic practice. Again, Cornut hints at the possibility of a more conscientious learning process within the Bourdieusian approach. '[A]gents can also learn', he writes, 'through institutional inculcation, training, teaching, and pedagogic actions' (Cornut 2018 citing Bourdieu, 1984).[95] 'This mode of acquisition is explicit and gives a central place to the formulation and repetition of social rules. It "is one of the major occasions for formulating and converting practical schemes into explicit norms" (Cornut 2018 quoting Bourdieu, 1990: 102–103). But again, without elaborating on the character of the training, teaching and pedagogy, Cornut's attribution of virtuosity (a normatively loaded term after all) risks unwarranted legitimization of problematic practices. That said, the chapter now returns to a Deweyan theory of learning to explain why inclusion, sympathy, deliberation (and ultimately democracy) are practices that improve the process of social learning.

Dewey's 'pedagogic creed' and a theory of learning

Dewey was widely recognized as the pre-eminent educational theorist of the twentieth century. This reputation was built primarily on his argument that formal techniques of traditional education were not fit for the demands of a rapidly changing society. Traditional methods of education were based on practices that saw children routinely repeating what the teacher understood to be knowledge. This turned children, with their innate sense of creativity and adaptability, into creatures of habit and did not therefore prepare them for the ever changing world outside the school. This might be considered irrelevant to an IR audience, but I think that in Dewey's appraisal of traditional pedagogy we find a critique of mimicry as a method of learning, which is arguably how Bourdieusian-inspired Practice theory has defined learning. It is also clear that Dewey's pedagogy informed his theory of social learning and his political commitment to democracy. This was because a commitment to democracy was a commitment to sympathy, inclusion, reflexivity and deliberation, all of which are necessary for society to function as an effective community of inquiry and to adapt appropriately to its changing environment. In this way, therefore, I think an understanding of Dewey's critique of traditional education, and his 'pedagogic creed' (1897 [1998]) helps an IR audience understand where the Pragmatist's commitment to these values comes from.

Dewey argued that '[c]onspicuous dangers' (Dewey 1916 [2011], 9) attended the traditional approach to education, which focused on the ability of the child to absorb and recite subject matter. 'Perhaps the greatest of all pedagogical fallacies', he wrote, 'is the notion that a person learns only the particular thing

---

[95] One way Adler (2019, 2) distances his later Practice theory from his earlier Bourdieusian-inspired approach is by drawing on Joas (1996) and his argument that 'because creativity is a socially emergent collective process –self-organizing collectivities, such as communities, creatively learn'. For similar critiques of Bourdieusian-inspired Practice theory see Knafo 2016.

he is studying at the time'. What he called 'collateral learning', or the formation of enduring attitudes [predispositions], of likes and dislikes, 'may be and often is much more important than [for example] the spelling lesson. … For these attitudes are fundamentally what count in the future' (Dewey 1938 [2015], 48; see also Wenger 2005, 6). The problem with the traditional classroom, was not simply that the subject matter was unsympathetic, conservative and possibly anachronistic (Addams 1902 loc.1275; 1909 [2002], loc.3120). The problem was that its collateral effects encouraged 'docility' rather than conscientious reflection.[96] Docility grew because of 'subjection to those instructions of others [i.e. the teacher], which reflect *their* current habits' (Dewey, 1922a [1998], 40). The pupil learns only how to 'satisfy the teacher in recitation and examination and outward deportment', (Dewey, 1916 [2011], 87), but the more useful habits of setting and accomplishing purposes in the wider social context is left undeveloped. 'The vaunted "skill"' thus 'turns out gross ineptitude' (Dewey, 1916 [2011], 45). The parallel with the above critique offered of diplomatic competence and virtuosity should be clear. A competence that is defined by the ability to mimic the teacher or practitioner is of limited value when the environment is changing.

For Dewey then, the aim of the school should be to nurture 'growth' (intellectual and social, not just physical). This is done by providing good experiences of a society beyond the immediate family, and in this respect the school was above all a social institution where children developed through experience the habits that would stand them in good stead as they entered into even wider society. The role of the teacher was to draw on their experiences to appropriately structure the school environment. Subject matter was of course part of that process, but the primary goal was to provide a good experience of learning because that nurtured an appetite for learning and an ability to adapt to increasingly complex environments. Key to this new pedagogy was a sympathetic approach to the child's situation. Prior to entering school, Dewey argued, a child's learning habits are created through interactive experiences (e.g. crawling, walking, talking), and Dewey's concern was that formal education overlooked and in effect educated children out of what was innately good practice. Formal education was unsympathetic because it was 'foreign to the existing capacities of the young'. It was 'beyond the reach of the experience the young learners already possess' (Dewey 1938 [2015], 19). As a result children experienced education as something to be avoided. Those that did well academically in this system, moreover, were taught to conform rather than inquire, which did not serve either the individual or society in an ever changing world.[97]

Sympathy was therefore important to Dewey's theory of learning. Related to this was the democratization of the epistemic hierarchy between teacher and student. Formal education, Dewey noticed, introduced the child to subject-matter that consisted of bodies of information gathered in the past by teachers. This subject-matter was 'thought of as essentially static' rather than contingent and evolving (Dewey 1938

---

[96] A theme reprised in Wenger 2005, 3.

[97] Addams (1902 loc.319) offers a similar criticism of the charity worker who 'finds herself still more perplexed' when the predispositions about the poor are formed without sensitivity or sympathy for their experience; as well as the philanthropic industrialist who is no longer able to recognize needs because he is 'too absorbed in carrying out a personal plan of improvement' that is good "to" people rather than "with" them (1902, loc.1044, 1102; also 1255). See also Seigfried (1999, 216-7) on the influence Addams had on Dewey's thinking, as well as the women of the Gilded Age and Progressive era who 'used the model of child rearing as one affected by the environment and advocated engaging the child's own interests and feelings rather than unilaterally imposing authority'. Addams's work is discussed in chapter 4.

[2015], 19). Furthermore, the teacher was considered authoritative. The child was expected to absorb that information in an unquestioning way through the repetition of textbooks – 'the chief representative of the lore and wisdom of the past' - rather than through experiment and experience (Dewey 1938 [2015], 17-9). For Dewey, this meant that the methods of learning (reflection, experimental inquiry, deliberation, practice) were subjugated to the knowledge of the teacher. This not only risked the dissemination of anachronism and the alienation of the student it did little to encourage an understanding of how knowledge was created.

To mitigate these risks teachers had to relinquish the sense of authority that command of the subject matter gave them. They had to understand how their students learn through experience and create activities that reinforced those positive experiences. This approach appreciated and valued the learning opportunities that existed outside the classroom, but that did not mean it dismissed subject-matter as unimportant. In broadening the pupil's horizons, subject matters (e.g. history, geography, science) could nurture growth, but only if it was experienced in a way that the child could relate to, which meant using the material to formulate and achieve a purpose.[98] Learning through this kind of purposeful doing, as opposed to learning by mechanical routine, was truly educative for Dewey because it encouraged the conscientious practice of matching ends to means. The sense of fulfilment that this nurtured in the child created an aptitude for learning which could evolve into a habit that equipped them for a constantly changing world. They could sustain and improve the lived experience because with a love of learning they (like the environment around them) were in a constant state of becoming. Subject matter was valuable, but the 'most important attitude that can be formed', Dewey wrote 'is that of a desire to go on learning' (Dewey, 1938 [2015], 48).

Schooling thus offers a significant intervention point in cultivation of good habits and societies need teachers to cultivate the habits that facilitate ongoing inquiry and learning if it is to intelligently adapt to its changing environments. Indeed, the good learning experience stems not necessarily from the hierarchical dissemination of knowledge by the teacher to the pupil, but from a cooperative enterprise whereby students educate teachers of their experience so that the teacher can organize the environment in a way that creates virtuous learning experiences and nurtures the child's growth. Dewey transposed this insight to other parts of society. As a community of practice that enabled individuals to cope with the increasing complexity of societies the school was in effect a model for society. And if society habitually practiced those virtues that facilitated learning - sympathy, inclusivity, reflexivity and practical judgement - then it too could better adapt to the challenges, contestations and doubts created by a changing environment. As we shall see, from these insights Dewey made a normative and political commitment to deliberative democracy because of its association with these practices. Democracy, in other words, was a means by which society can learn how to ameliorate the problems that emerge from the new practices of an expanding society and changing environment.

---

[98] For the way this resonates with the philosophy and pedagogy of Rabindranath Tagore see Nussbaum 2006. For a defence of Dewey's point against its critics, including the charge that it had ill-prepared the US for the technological challenge of the Soviet Union, see Hook 1974, 33-87.

Conclusion

The purpose of this Chapter was to develop my answer to the book's first question: what can classical Pragmatism bring to debates in IR, including those centered on the perennial question of how norms, practices and interests interact to influence international society and its practitioners?   I focused on debates prompted by the introduction of Bourdieusian-inspired Practice theory to IR. Drawing on Dewey's evaluation of habits, I developed the analysis of those who have criticized Practice theory for lacking a theory of change and underestimating the creativity that is immanent in practice. Going beyond that, however, I demonstrated how Deweyan Pragmatism distinguishes between good and bad habits. The former involves recourse to practices that facilitate effective social inquiry as means of resolving contestation and mitigating conflict. As in Chapter Two therefore I began in this Chapter to address the book's normative questions: how *should* international practices adapt and what normative conclusions can we come to about actual practice in contemporary international society.   In that respect I have taken a further step toward defining a Pragmatic Constructivist approach and empirically applying, which I do in Part Two.

The Chapter has also hinted at a unity across Deweyan thought, which I suggest also helps Constructivists to answer these challenging questions. Dewey's social theory and its processural ontology, his humanist based critique of habits and practice, his theory of learning and how it informs a definition of progress, and (as we shall see) his normative and political commitment to deliberative democracy as a form of social learning, can all combine to help IR Constructivists engage in normative argument without contradicting what their empirical research tells them about the social and historical contingency of ideas, norms and knowledge. Constructivists need not retreat from normative theory. They need not be agnostic when it comes to supporting or condemning a practice. They need not, in other words, be spectators of history. A commitment to democracy as a form of social inquiry and social learning is consistent with the empirical findings of their previous research agendas, and from that ground they can make normative judgements about international practices. In so doing, they will no doubt be confronted, as Dewey was, by the classical Realist who sees in the Pragmatist's commitment to learning and progress as part of the naïve 'prejudices of the middle-class educator' (Niebuhr [1932] 2001 xxvi-xxvii; see also Morgenthau 1948 [1967], 3-4; 250-60). It is to that critique, and the Pragmatist's response, that I now turn.

Chapter 4

Learning, Democracy and the Realist Critique

My purpose in this Chapter is to further develop my answer to the book's first question: what can classical Pragmatism bring to debates in IR, including those centered on the perennial question of how norms, practices and interests interact to influence international practitioners? Whereas the previous Chapters approached this question from the perspective of Norm studies and Practice theory, this Chapter addresses the Realist critique of classical Pragmatism. This insists that political interests inevitably corrupt processes of social learning and argues that power, rather than inclusive deliberation, ultimately determines how best practice or the public good is defined. This criticism was levelled directly at Dewey by his contemporaries, most notably Reinhold Niebuhr and Hans Morgenthau, and it has continued to inform 'neorealist' takes on theories of learning. From the latter perspective, states that do not conform to the self-help logic of anarchy are driven from the international system (Waltz 1979). Neorealism only countenances behavioural adaptation or 'simple learning' therefore.[99] States learn how to survive within anarchy, but they cannot improve lived experiences by changing its self-help logic. The 'complex learning' (Wendt 1992, 392; 1999, 326-36) that involves the construction of publicly oriented (or other regarding) identities is considered impossible. In reviving Dewey's response to Niebuhr and Morgenthau, therefore, my purpose is not simply to defend Pragmatism against the classical Realist's charge that Dewey was naïve to the social role played by power, it is to also demonstrate how Pragmatism can defend the idea of 'complex learning' against the contemporary neorealist critique. Ultimately, my argument is that in the face of contemporary global challenges the Pragmatist case for complex learning remains compelling both analytically and normatively.

More specifically, I argue that a Pragmatism inspired by Dewey's response to his Realist critics is not blind to the power of self-interest (nor to the self's interest in power). It simply argues, like contemporary IR constructivists (e.g. Wendt 1999, 92-138), that understandings of the self - its identity and its interests - are not fixed; they are instead contingent on the self's experience of interacting with its material and social environment. The task of theory is to render that process intelligent by subjecting it to the practices discussed in the previous chapters: conscientious (and inclusive) reflection and deliberative practical judgement. The normative questions that apply to norms and practices also apply to interests therefore. How can 'I' or 'we' (the collective self) have faith that 'my' or 'our' interests will sustain and improve 'my' or 'our' lived experience(s)? What lends epistemic authority to the claims of practitioners when they

---

[99] On the rationalist conception of learning Wendt (1992) cites Tetlock 1991, and Nye 1987. See also Checkel 2001, 560-1.

defend or contest a practice in these terms? Without prejudging the substantive character of any particular claim, the Pragmatist would expect to see a learning process that reflects on prior experiences, including recourse to a 'stock' of learning, as a means of weighing the consequences of future practice. Without that backward looking reflection, and forward looking deliberation, individuals and societies may be condemned to disappointment. They may never realize their interests in other words; or, tragically, they may realize their interests but fail to improve their lived experience. Of course, Realist's expect this kind of tragic outcome; the experience of international relations for them is a constant struggle for power between the self and the other and the better life is beyond reach. For the Pragmatist, however, that predisposition (like a more idealistic one) has to be tested *in situ* rather than assumed in abstract.

It is possible to argue that in certain situations Realism is needlessly pessimistic because there is plenty of evidence to demonstrate how the self asserts better control over its environment, and improves its lived experience, once it realizes that its interests can be advanced by being a member of a collective self (or public). This kind of learning (or what Dewey termed 'growth') is not utopian, it has in fact occurred throughout history. Indeed, Deweyan Pragmatism describes the processes that constitute and reconstitute the state - the entity at the very centre of Realist IR theory – in these terms. The state for Dewey is not the manifestation of abstract theory, nor a historical inevitability. It exists because it has mitigated the problems of associated living. How (and whether) it continues to do that is (and should always be) the subject of inquiry, especially in moments when the material and social environment around it changes. That the state itself has 'interests' is obvious; so too is the argument that it inspires loyalty among those who see it as a way to perform national identity. However, in the context of environmental change, the meaning of those interests and identities is far from obvious. That indeterminacy gives rise to 'real and living doubt' – to use the Peirce's phrase - and that can only be authoritatively re-solved (interests can only be fixed) through inclusive and deliberative inquiry.

The crucial difference between Pragmatism and Realism at this point is the emphasis they place on nationalism. Pragmatism does not deny the power, nor the value, of nationalism, but its value is contingent on it being able to improve the lived experience; and if it fails to do that then (like any other norm or practice) it should be subject to critical inquiry. The normative risk with Realist thought (and I am aware there are many variations) is that because it takes nationalism as 'an enormously powerful political ideology' (Mearsheimer 2018, 3; see also Morgenthau 1948 [1967], 255-60) it sees little point in questioning its normative value; and because nationalism tends to define the self against the other it means the possibility of constructing a global public interest through a learning process is nil. That argument carries a normative risk because the material world *has* evolved in a way that challenges the ability of nationalism to sustain and improve the lived experience, which I suggest creates a need to rediscover and realize a new public interest. Again, the Realist would likely respond by pointing to the naivete of such an argument, as well as the tragic element of the current and other historical moments. The Pragmatist would not deny that tragic outcomes are a possibility. Before accepting the Realist analysis, however, I think the

Pragmatist would want to know if such a response is based on a realistic assessment of problem in view, and is not simply the product of the Realist's predisposition, intuition, habit and self-identity.[100]

To make these points, the chapter is divided into four sections. The first, discusses how Dewey defended Pragmatism, including its commitment to democracy as a method of social inquiry, against the Realist critique of Niebuhr and Morgenthau. The issue here is with the Realist argument that the promise of social learning is not strong enough to restrain powerful interests and that something else (religion or the balance of power) is necessary to create order. My argument in this first section is that Dewey was not far enough removed from the Realists' position to justify their criticism. Indeed, through his conceptualization of 'publics' Dewey demonstrated a keen appreciation of political power and its role in making democracy work as a form of social learning. The second section, develops the argument that new 'publics' (and thus new identities and interests) are created by material changes that give rise to new interdependencies and new 'associations'. I draw a parallel here with what contemporary Pragmatists call 'communities of practice' (see Chapter 5). The question for Dewey was whether such communities would be able to authoritatively claim to know, and implement, best practice (or *the* public interest) if these new political interests were excluded. I note here how classical Realism does not necessarily rule out the growth of new political communities (and thus presumably accepts the broadening of self-interest to include the interests of the other). Indeed, so-called 'nuclear realists' have argued for a world state in ways that mirror Pragmatist thought (see Chapter 6). I note in the third section, however, how this kind of creative thinking needs a Pragmatist temperament to shake some Realists from their predisposition toward pessimism and tragedy. The final section reflects on what this analysis means for two concepts that are prevalent in both Realist and Pragmatist thought: practical judgement (or prudence) and learning.

Classical Pragmatism, Realism and Democratic Politics

Dewey's fiercest contemporary critic was Reinhold Niebuhr, who is commonly identified in IR as a classical Realist. Niebuhr saw in the Pragmatist commitment to experimentalism or 'scientism' (Rice 1993, 106) a naïveté and a threat. The Pragmatist view that individuals and their societies were able to deliberate like scientists, and in that way discover a public interest and best practice, was fanciful. Reason, Niebuhr famously wrote was the servant of interests. Interests do not simply give way to the better argument. Evidence is interpreted to suit a particular interest and power is the ultimate arbiter of conflict.[101] To believe otherwise, Niebuhr wrote, 'betrayed the prejudices of the middle-class educator' (Niebuhr [1932] 2001 xxvi-xxvii; see also Morgenthau 1946 [1974]; 1948 [1967], 3-4, 250-60). The implication was that those in a less comfortable position had little faith in reason and were more likely to resort to power to

---

[100] Samuel Barkin (2010, 90-4) makes a similar point. Without referencing Pragmatism he argues that IR Constructivism should encourage a sense of fallibilism and reflexivity in Realist theory and practice.

[101] '[S]ince reason is always, to some degree, the servant of interest in a social situation, social injustice cannot be resolved by moral and rational persuasion alone, as the educator and social scientist usually believes. Conflict is inevitable and in this conflict power must be challenged by power' Niebuhr 1932, xiv-xv.

change their circumstances.[102] Niebuhr was of course a leading theologian, and for him Dewey's appeal to naturalistic ethics would 'be overcome by a sense of frustration'. A society based on Dewey's arguments would not progress, it would 'sink into despair'. This is because Dewey's vision did nothing to address humanity's fundamental flaw: it 'lacked the force to restrain the self-will and self-interest of men and nations'. Life, Niebuhr concluded, had to be 'centered in something beyond nature'. Otherwise 'it will not be possible to lift men above the brute struggle for survival' (Niebuhr 1927, 238, quoted in Rice 1993, 5). Niebuhr's implication was that societies needed religion to restrain politics. Only then could societies survive (Schou Tjalve 2013, 792).[103]

The concern that 'scientism' could not sufficiently check self-interest, and therefore failed to restrain 'the political', as defined for example by Carl Schmitt, also informed the classical Realism of Hans Morgenthau (Schou Tjalve 2013, 792; Williams 2005, 84-127). For Morgenthau, the scientific commitment to improving the human experience had 'an impoverished and inadequate understanding of the nature of politics' and the specific requirements for the construction of stable political order (Williams 2005, 95). The assumption that arguments backed by power would give way because experimental deliberation had authoritatively discovered the public interest was naïve. That is not to say a public interest did not exist, just that it was not discovered by scientific method. Morgenthau's Realist project was to first disabuse society (especially international society) of such naïveté, and then to create political order in the concrete social foundations of competing, but balanced, interests. Only then would the political be restrained and order constituted (Williams 2005, 104). This is 'a *principled strategy*, not a mechanistic process' (Williams 2005, 123); and it is necessary if politics is to be directed to more constructive ends. Indeed, as Williams (2005, 126) concludes, Morgenthau had an 'unalloyed admiration for the founders of the American republic'. This was for two reasons. They had a 'clear-eyed view of the ubiquity of power in politics and the unreliability of human virtue as a basis for political order'. They recognized the value of checks and balances as practices that facilitated the productive possibility of politics.

Dewey defended his Pragmatist philosophy against this kind of Realist critique in his 1939 essay *Creative Democracy – The Task Before Us.* He noted that he had been accused of holding 'an undue, a utopian, faith

---

[102] These positions echoed those of Lewis Mumford (1926), who famously accused Pragmatism of 'acquiescing' in the power structures underpinning social consensus (MacGilvray 2000). Dewey's (1927a [1998], 34) response noted that Pragmatism engagement of the actual is not acquiescent: 'actuality supplies contact and solidity while possibility furnishes the ideal upon which criticism rests and from which creative effort springs'. Similarly, Max Horkheimer of the Frankfurt School of Critical Theory argued that Pragmatism 'was part of the self-destruction of reason in which instrumental means–ends calculation ('subjective reason', *Verstand*) subverts objective, critical reason (*Vernunft*)'. It thus 'represented a positivistic apologia for capitalism and 'belief in the existence and advantages of free competition' (Horkheimer quoted by Ray 2004, 310). As R.W. Hildreth (2009, 781) more recently put it, these arguments accused Pragmatism of lacking the 'independent ends to judge action or inquiry'. In that sense, all Pragmatism could do was affirm the political consensus that was shaped by the particular interests of the powerful. For Hans Joas (1992, 264), Horkheimer's misreading of Pragmatism as subjectivism disguised by a positivist veil continued the 'decades of traditional German arrogant and superficial snub of the most ingenious strand of American thought'.

[103] Interestingly, Niebuhr's argument was not a critique of Dewey's epistemic skepticism. As Schou Tjalve (2013, 787) notes, Niebuhr had been very much influenced by 'the Pragmatist understanding of all human reflection as contextual practice – as a culturally, historically and politically situated activity'. On the 'affinity Niebuhr had with both Dewey and the pragmatic movement in American intellectual history' see Rice (1993, 19; also 39, 56, 90) who describes passages from *Moral Man and Immoral Society* as Jamesian Pragmatism.

in the possibilities of intelligence and education'. He responded by noting that he did not invent this faith. He acquired it from surroundings that 'were animated by the democratic spirit' (Dewey 1939 [1998], 342). Indeed, for Dewey the 'method of democracy' was the best way of instantiating experimentalism at the social level. This is because democracy brings 'conflicts out into the open where their special claims can be seen and appraised'. It is there that knowledge claims 'can be discussed and judged in light of more inclusive interests'. The more these views are 'publicly and scientifically weighed, the more likely it is that the public interest will be disclosed and be made effective' through better practice. In this respect, democracy is 'organized intelligence'. It was the failure to bring conflict 'into the light of intelligence where the conflicting interests can be adjudicated' that generated violence and disorder (Dewey 1935 [1998], 331).[104] What, he challenged his critics, were they saying when they argued against the self-corrective power of consultation, discussion and persuasion. Were his critics arguing against democracy? He was willing, he concluded, 'to leave it to the upholders of totalitarian states of the right and the left the view that faith in the capacities of intelligence is utopian. For the faith is so deeply embedded in the methods which are intrinsic to democracy that when a professed democrat denies the faith he convicts himself of treachery to his profession' (Dewey 1939 [1998], 342).

I think there is a 'strawman' element to Dewey's counter-argument. Niebuhr and Morgenthau were not against democracy. Their concern was that without religion (for Niebuhr) or a balance of power (for Morgenthau) the (liberal) faith in deliberative democracy was misplaced. Indeed, Dewey had seemingly acknowledged the need to nurture a faith of some sort in his 1934 essay *A Common Faith* (Dewey 1934b). He was of course suspicious of Niebuhr's theological approach. It was, for Dewey, merely 'an expression of wholesale intellectual panic' and was itself a threat to democracy and social inquiry (Rice 1993, 74). Traditional religion was, by its own admission, trans-rational. Therefore, 'any appeals it might make on behalf of its "authoritativeness" were, ipso facto, "authoritarian" in Dewey's judgement' (Rice 1993, 69). Echoing Peirce (see Chapter 2), Dewey argued that this method of fixing belief and standards of behaviour would not inspire faith and would not mitigate conflict given the absolutist yet pluralistic character of religion. Yet in *A Common Faith*, Dewey (1934b [1967], 1-29) distinguished religious *experience* from organized religion. A religious experience involved 'more inclusive and deep-seated changes of our being in its entirety toward the world' (Rice 1993, 47). What he called 'natural piety' (Dewey 1934b 25) could, moreover, be cultivated by the arts and humanities, as well as a commitment to learning. In essence, Dewey held on to a civic faith in democracy as a form learning and argued that social and political orders based on that were more secure that those based on the fixed, and hierarchically enforced, norms of traditional religion.[105] As Dewey put it: '[e]ducation cannot do everything. But what is accomplished without education, again in its broadest sense, will be badly done and much of it will have to be done over' (Dewey 1934a).

---

[104] In a similar vein Sidney Hook (1974, 43) responded by noting that '[o]ur whole American experience is testimony to the fact that cooperation and progress on the plan of democratic action is possible without a common belief in first or last things'.

[105] As Schou Tjalve (2013, 786) noted, where Pragmatism espoused 'democracy as a pedagogy, seeking to bolster the democratic "mind"', Realism 'hoped to ground the democratic practice in a deeper theology seeking to re-enchant the democratic "soul".'

Dewey might be forgiven for his depiction of the Realist's argument, not least because their 'caricature' of Pragmatism portrayed him as 'a superficial optimist who was naïve about the harsh realities of life and believed that somehow everything would work out for the best' (Bernstein 2021, 36). Indeed, in his most political work, *The Public and its Problems*, Dewey had in fact pre-empted Niebuhr's Realist critique. He recognized in that work that the 'accidents of education, temperament, class interest and dominant circumstances of the age' often decide which opinion informs practice. He accepted, moreover, that reason can come 'into play only to find justification for the opinion which has been adopted [by power], instead of to analyze human behavior with respect to its consequences and to frame polities accordingly' (Dewey 1927b [1998], 287). Niebuhr was not telling Dewey anything he did not know therefore. Dewey accepted, moreover, that the correction that was needed was a political one. Those who were affected by practice but not part of the community that had enabled that practice (Dewey called them 'publics') had to be supported so that their experiences were not overlooked. There had to be a balance of power for the public interest to emerge through deliberation, but this did not mean accepting power as it was presented. It meant increasing the power of publics (the affected but otherwise excluded) in order to improve the community of inquiry and its ability to construct *the* public interest and implement better practice with a degree of epistemic authority.[106]

Dewey, in this sense, was acutely aware of how every effort is made by the privileged class 'to identify the established order with the public good' (Dewey 1935 [1998], 326). On this he also pre-empted mainstream IR Realist's like E.H. Carr (1939). Indeed, Dewey was far from naïve in his description of those unreconstructed interests that stood in the way of better practice and new public good.[107] New publics, he wrote, are 'inchoate' and state agencies were often in hock to particular interests or anachronistic publics who tended to obstruct new organization. 'To form itself', therefore, the new public had

> to break existing political forms. This is hard to do because these forms are themselves the regular means of instituting change. The public which generated political forms is passing away, but the power and lust of possession remains in the hands of the officers and agencies which the dying public instituted. This is why the change of form of states is so often only effected by revolution. … An epoch in which the needs of a newly forming public are counteracted by established forms of the state is one in which there is increasing disparagement and disregard of the state. General apathy, neglect and contempt find expression in resort to various short-cuts of direct action (Dewey 1927b [1998] 290).

This reference to revolution and direct action is hardly the language of a political naïf or a 'middle class educator' who seeks refuge in the classroom. In fact, it begs the question of whether Dewey's Pragmatism could countenance the use of force to 'break existing political forms'.[108] After all Dewey had supported the US entry into World War I arguing that it was necessary 'to abate an international nuisance' and create new

---

[106] For a similar argument from a contemporary Pragmatist, one that stresses to liberals the need to concentrate on 'power first' because 'rights follow', see Snyder 2022.

[107] Abraham and Abramson (2015, 35) describe this as 'a pointedly "partisan" and "political" text'.

[108] Of course, force is not the only means of direct action. See Frega (2019, 386) on how private certification agencies directly empower the citizen-consumer to bypass the state and take publicly oriented direct action through the market.

forms of international organization (quoted in Cochran 2010, 319). By the 1930s, however, and in the context of US domestic strife, Dewey drew different conclusions on the use of force. The material interactions of modern society were now on a different scale. 'The gulf that once separated the civilian population from the military', he wrote, 'has virtually gone'. In that instance, violence

> involves paralysis of all normal social activities, and not merely the meeting of armed forces in the field. … Today, the civil war that would be adequate to effect transfer of power and reconstitution of society at large, as understood by official communists, would seem to present but one possible consequence: the ruin of all parties and the destruction of civilized life. This fact alone is enough to lead us to consider the potentialities of the method of intelligence (Dewey 1935 [1998], 333).

Social learning was thus a political as much as a pedagogical project, but it had to be an evolutionary, not a revolutionary process; and for Dewey, democratic political institutions were capable of constructively delivering evolutionary change. 'Even as they now exist', he wrote, 'the forms of representative government are potentially capable of expressing the public will when that assumes anything like unification' (Dewey 1935 [1998], 333).[109] But like Niebuhr and Morgenthau, Dewey saw that there was nothing inevitable about this. Social learning required a balance of political power and interests, and that demanded the formation of 'publics' whose views were otherwise 'eclipsed' by the prevailing power structures.[110]

If this equation of 'learning' (a Pragmatist concept) with the 'balance of power' (a Realist concept) is a stretch for those keen on the Realist portrayal of Pragmatism as hopelessly naive, consider Dewey's (1928b) essay *A critique of American Civilization*. In this he asked 'which forces are to win'. Those 'that are [politically] organized, that know what they are after and that take systematic means to accomplish their end, or those that are spontaneous, private and scattered' (Dewey 1928b [1998], 321). He contrasted the 'tightening up and solidifying of the forces of reaction', with the rise of new voluntary associations, which he characterized as a 'working force of liberated individualities, experimenting in their own ways to find and realize their own ends' (Dewey 1928b [1998] 322). Again, this is hardly the language of a utopian dreamer. Indeed, we should not separate Dewey's words from the social context in which they were written and the actions that accompanied them (Livingston 2017, see also Abraham and Abramson 2017, 27). Evoking Dewey to support theoretical arguments in support of deliberative democracy for instance, should not hide the fact that Dewey saw deliberation as a necessary but

---

[109] Jane Addams (1895 [2002], loc.1552) also put her faith in democratic practice. She was all too aware of 'a temperamental bitterness among workingmen which is both inherited and fostered by the conditions of their life and trade', but it was mutual compromise, which was implicit in her progressive approach to social learning and which Addams embodied through her activities at Hull House (see Chapter 5), that prevented contestation 'becoming in any sense a class warfare'.

[110] Frega (2019, 198-9) makes a distinction that is relevant here. He separates groups that are merely seeking their self-interest from political publics organizing to solve a social problem. A public 'denotes any collective of individuals which mobilizes to solve a public problem, hence satisfying interest which also affect those who reside beyond its boundaries'. I think this distinction is significant but the group that mobilizes for self-interest can become publically minded if after deliberation they compromise and accept, or tolerate, practices when they would have preferred not to. At that point self-interest has changed to be consistent with a wider (other-regarding) public interest.

insufficient value. It was, he said, a 'weak reed to depend upon' (quoted by Livingston 2017, 522). Political organization and activism was also necessary, and Dewey was engaged at that level too. Forming a public in Dewey's time meant organizing the labouring class into a movement that could ameliorate the undemocratic consequences of American capitalism, a task Dewey pursued in his position as president of the League for Industrial Democracy (Livingston 2017, 523). Pragmatism was, as I discuss in the next Chapter with reference to Jane Addams's work, a vocation as much as a philosophy.

Material change and the national interest

I have noted in passing that Dewey used the term 'publics' to describe those who were affected by a practice but excluded from the community of inquiry that enabled it. More precisely, Dewey wrote in *The Public and Its Problems* that a public 'consists of all those who are affected by indirect consequences to such an extent that it is deemed necessary to have those consequences systematically cared for.' New publics he explained were often created when material change runs ahead of social and political change, and when the latter fails to adapt. Technological change, for instance, can create a new 'association', which has consequences for the lived experience of those affected by its practices. In these circumstances, we could not be sure that the practices of the new associations reflect *best* practice, or *the* public good, because the experiences of the excluded were not being 'cared for'. As Dewey put it, referring to the material context of his times: '[R]ailways, travel and transportation, commerce, the mails, telegraph and telephone, newspapers' had created 'interaction and interdependence' on a continental scale. This 'elimination of distance', had called into being a new form of political association. However, political practices had 'only piecemeal and haltingly, with great lag, accommodated themselves to the industrial transformation' (Dewey 1927c, 114-5).

If this was the material context, the intellectual context for Dewey's political theory was Walter Lippmann's argument that the complexity of modern associations demanded a form of technocratic government (Lippmann 1925 [2021]). It was impossible in this new environment, Lippmann argued, for citizens to engage in politics from an informed position. This did not mean the dissolution of democracy, but it did limit its meaning to an electoral system where the citizen was occasionally consulted on the general direction of government. Dewey shared Lippmann's diagnosis but not his prescription. For Dewey, Lippmann's view of democracy fell short of what was needed for effective inquiry, social learning and the constitution of a public interest that good authoritatively identify best practice. For Dewey, Lippmann ignored the forces 'which have to be composed and resolved before technical and specialized action can come into play (Dewey 1927c, 125).[111] Lippmann's elitist view of democracy risked presenting the electorate with an unsatisfactory choice if publics were not engaged in the political processes that

[111] See Abraham and Abramson (2015, 35) for a reading of this debate in an IR context. As they put, Dewey's project was opposed to Lippmann's elitist views of democracy. The quality of political democracy for Dewey was 'dependent on the quality of knowledge production: if the latter is oligarchic, held by a few, then the former tends to follow suit'. Without an inclusive, democratic mode of knowledge production 'political democracy becomes merely and empty shell'.

constructed that choice. To make democracy work as an effective community of inquiry the otherwise 'inchoate' public had to find ways of articulating a political interest.

That was not an argument against the democratic election of political representatives, it was instead an insistence that this practice was 'not the whole of the democratic idea' (Dewey 1927c, 146; see also Ansell 2011, 18). In fact, democracy for Dewey had a deeper meaning. Inspired by Addams, he saw democracy as 'social' or 'relational' (Cochran 2017, 152-3) in the sense that it included the other in the formulation of a more expansive self (or public) interest. A technocratic government may be based on expertise but it could not assume to speak for the public interest, nor could publics rely on elections providing them with the choice they wanted. Technocratic associations forged by material change could not claim epistemic authority, until they had at least addressed ('cared for') the experiences of those indirectly affected by those practices; and that meant the political mobilization of such 'publics' as a means of holding associations to account both between and through elections. A further implication of this was, as noted, was that Pragmatists saw engagement in the processes of political mobilization as part of their vocation.

I return to these themes in the next Chapter because there is an obvious concern that contemporary global governance is technocratic and that global publics have been, to use Dewey's phrase, 'eclipsed' by the material changes associated with 'globalization'. I want in the remainder of this section, however, to continue relating this discussion to IR Realism, and in particular the centrality of the state, nationalism and the national-interest, to its philosophy. The manner in which Realism has been 'scripted' (Williams 2005) by IR means we often fail to interrogate the oft-cited 'Hobbesian' claim that human nature means states pursue a national-interest defined in terms of material power. It is, however, important that we do that because, as I have noted, this Realist script has been used to dismiss the Deweyan claim that social learning and the reconstruction of the state is possible.

For Michael Williams (2005, 19-51) the mainstream IR Realist script misinterprets Hobbes. The emphasis on material self-interests in Hobbesian thought is not a statement fact or an explanation of conflict. Like the classical Pragmatists, Hobbes in fact argued that conflict was more likely when politics was guided by assertions of epistemic (including moral) certainty, the absence of reflexivity and the marginalization of the deliberation. In this context, the Hobbesian Realist's emphasis on material interests, was instead a normative or 'prescriptive' (Barkin 2010, 53) position, which tried to limit the destructive capacity of a politics based on competing certainties. A focus on material interests (or what Pragmatists would perhaps call experience) would be more likely to encourage toleration, a sense of fallibility and compromise. That was necessary if social order was to be created out of associated living and if more constructive forms of politics were to be cultivated.

Williams (2005, 82-127) finds the same argument in Morgenthau's Realism. The emphasis on 'the objective national interest' was again a *normative* move. It was less a statement of fact than an attempt to encourage liberal democracies in particular to reflect on the effects of pursuing a values-based foreign policy in the concrete circumstances of the moment. In this sense, the Realist's *pragmatically used* the concept of 'interests' – whether they be material or national – to *construct* rational actors. Rationality was not assumed; it was preferred. Political actors, including states, had *to learn* rationality. Only then could the dangers of normative certainty and pre-reflexivity be avoided. Only after states had *become* rational could

they 'to have succeeded in mastering that blind and potent monster which in the name of God or history is poised for universal destruction' (Morgenthau quoted in Williams 2005, 185).[112]

The distance between classical Realism and classical Pragmatism is less than first appears therefore. Both value the concept of 'interests' to the extent it encourages reflection and political responsibility.[113] Classical Realism moreover can, at least on Williams's reading, be critical of the intuitive commitment to nationalism and the national interest. The invocation of these concepts is not 'morally self-sufficient'. It can in practice be an obstacle to a responsible assessment of experiential consequences, especially when the material context of a judgement or decision changes. As Williams (2005, 209) puts it: the nation-state, for classical Realists 'remains *a* limit – not *the* limit of political community'. The goal of what Williams calls 'willful Realism' is to restrain politics so that order is constructed out of contingent social realities, which in the current context surely includes the material practices of globalization. In this sense 'the continuing centrality of the state in no way precludes the development – and the analytic recognition – of other forms of order, institutions, transversal solidarities and transformations beyond borders' (Williams 2005, 209).[114]

Like classical Pragmatism then, classical Realism can accept the possibility that new identities and new forms of order (or governance) can evolve from, (or 'grow' out of) international practices that reflexively adapt to the challenges posed by material change.[115] Indeed, Morgenthau famously argued that the development of nuclear weapons challenged 'the political at its most fundamental level because the classic Schmittian vision of the political as residing ultimately in life and death struggle no longer makes any sense in an age of mutual annihilation' (Williams 2005, 117 citing Morgenthau); and from such a critique emerged the 'nuclear realist' argument for a world state (see Chapter 6). Where I think Deweyan Pragmatism is more helpful than classical Realism, however, is the way in which it tells us *how* to expand political community (and not necessarily rely on world statism). Its critique of habits and predispositions is much more suited to breaking down practices that are no longer working to ameliorate the lived experience. It is noticeable in this respect that Morgenthau thought international society *was* actually fixed in a state of insecurity because states could not free themselves from nationalism or its conception of the national interest. That, tragically, led them to a misplaced faith in nuclear weapons as an instrument of security. In contrast, and I develop this more in Chapter 6, the Deweyan idea that 'publics' (e.g. vulnerable populations)

---

[112] There is in this sense a profound difference between 'the responsible *practice of objectivity'* and a *'theory of objectivism'* where socially and historically contingent structures become reified in the name of positivist social science (Williams 2005, 195). See also Dewey's recourse to objectivity when he writes: 'Genuine conscientiousness has an objective outlook; it is intelligent attention and care to the quality of an act in view of its consequences for general happiness; it is not anxious solicitude for one's own virtuous state' (Dewey 1932a [1998], 334). On the affinities between James's 'pragmatic method', which interpreted each notion by tracing its respective practical consequences', and E.H. Carr's pragmatic realism, see Molloy 2014, 463.

[113] This is less of a surprise when one considers that 'Realism and Pragmatism developed around some of the very same academic environments', including 'the same groups of liberal thought at New York venues such as Columbia University and The New School'; and that 'Morgenthau and Dewey both built their careers at the University of Chicago; and almost all of the pragmatists and realists of the era contributed to such liberal outlets as the New Republic' (Schou Tjalve 2013, 785).

[114] See also Molloy (2014, 476) on EH Carr's pragmatist attempts to theorize beyond the Westphalian order, which was seen as 'being in a process of evolution'.

[115] On EH Carr's 'ethics of growth', see Molloy 2014, 468-72.

can politically organize to be included in communities of security practice, and can then redefine national identities and interests, is it seems to me a more helpful response to the problems of the nuclear age.

Reducing our 'vulnerability to tragedy'

To be clear, Dewey's view of nationalism was, as one would expect, pragmatic. As an idea that enabled a democratic response to the growing interconnectedness of an industrializing United States it was to be valued. He also argued in support of nationalizing education to help prevent a situation where 'the operation of those forces which are always making for a division of interests, class and sectional ideas and feelings will become dominant, and our democracy will fall to pieces' (Dewey 1916 [1998], 266). In making that argument, however, Dewey also warned that nationalism could create problems, because 'politicians and other self-seekers have always known how to play cleverly upon patriotism, and upon ignorance of other peoples, to identify nationalism with latent hatred of other nations' (Dewey 1916 [1998], 265). In a world where conflict had manifestly proven its potential to be global, cultivating other-regarding (i.e. internationalist/cosmopolitan) habits through education programmes was a matter of national self-interest. The possibility of this had been demonstrated by the Settlement projects of inner city Chicago, which had inspired so much of Dewey's approach to social learning. They pointed to the inter-nationalist resources that were to be found in the diverse or 'hyphenated' nature of an American character (see Chapter 5).[116] If these experiments could be repeated beyond American shores then the problems of globalization could likewise be mitigated.

The problem for this aspect of the Pragmatist argument (at least for its place in IR) is that it became associated with inter-war liberal internationalism, which was easily dismissed by classical Realists as 'utopian' (Carr 1939). That charge continues to have influence, especially among 'offensive' Realists who argue that the anarchic international system triggers nation-states to engage in power-maximizing strategies, which inevitably treats other nation-states as competitors (Mearsheimer 2003). The identities that states act on, in other words, are not constituted by a bottom-up process of social learning. They are constructed by the top-down pressures of surviving in an anarchic system, which states cannot escape. Only the creation of a Hobbesian Leviathan on a global scale would enable them to do this, but because that is impossible 'the world is condemned to perpetual great-power competition…. This situation, which no one consciously designed or intended, is genuinely tragic.' (Mearsheimer 2003, 19-20).[117] The implication, of course, is a normative one. State leaders should not think they can take the practices that have worked to resolve conflict inside the state and apply them to relations between states (Mearsheimer 2018, 11). The situations are different so that particular stock of learning is irrelevant. Even if an international problem is framed by moral discourse, as liberal societies tend to do, the system demands

---

[116] As Hull House resident, Alice Hamilton put it: 'Hull-House was American because it was international, and because it perceived that the nationalism of each immigrant was a treasure, a talent, which gave him special value for the United States'. Quoted in Seigfried 1996, 76.

[117] Mearsheimer's (2018) book *Grand Delusion* does pay more attention to the 'enormously powerful political ideology' of nationalism as a source of state practice. The implication, however, is the same. Nationalism makes a global Leviathan impossible and reinforces the tendency of states to see each other as security competitors.

that state leaders must be prepared to authorize practices that maximize state security. Because that is the case there is a need for heroic leaders who can compromise on national and personal values.[118]

While this respect for situational and consequentialist ethics resonates with Pragmatism, Realism I suggests runs a normative risk that Pragmatism does not. That risk is contained in the Realist's tendency to reify tragedy and the related ethic of responsibility. Although he does not cite Pragmatism as his inspiration, Michael Williams's reading of the Realist tradition is again instructive. Williams accepts that there are often difficult (and therefore heroic) choices to make. But, he adds,

> claims of heroic responsibility can too easily be used to insulate these choices from criticism on the ground that they are irrefutably necessary. Justifying themselves by positing a potentially chaotic world held together only by acts of will, heroic Realist's risk falling prey to their own rhetoric, and losing sight of their responsibility which is the purported foundation of their acts. The heroism of limits is used to justify acts in the name of responsibility, and to limit criticism of those acts through the invocation of heroic responsibility and tragedy (Williams 2005, 196-7).

Indeed, Realists sometime protect themselves against this risk by accepting that reality (and presumably therefore opportunity) is more contingent than their theories suggests. Mearsheimer, for example, accepts that because offensive Realism omits factors that sometime dominate a state's decision-making process it simplifies reality. '[U]nder these circumstances', he adds, 'offensive realism is not going to perform well' (Mearsheimer 2003, 26). That would I suggest lead to the responsible decision-maker to doubt Realist counsel. It might be that the situations they confront are not 'tragic' and that problem-solving practice is available. To miss that opportunity because of a Realist predisposition would be unfortunate and irresponsible.

As noted, Williams did not draw on Pragmatist thought to make this critique of Realism, but a similar point was made by the Pragmatist Sidney Hook (1959-60, 7). While philosophers accept that their task is 'a *quest* for wisdom', he wrote, 'many of those who cite this phrase … speak and act as if they already had it'. From the Pragmatist perspective, in other words, the Realist tendency to see tragedy in concrete, and therefore unchanging circumstances, risks relegating the practitioner to the role of a disenchanted 'spectator'; or, put another way, it risks missing opportunities to at least explore the immanent possibility of mitigating a social problem and ameliorating the lived experience. Conscientious reflection and practical judgement from the Pragmatist perspective may require stoicism (Lachs 2005) in the face of a difficult choice, but to rest there simply demonstrates a lack of 'creative intelligence' (Hook 1959-60, 18-20).

How this might inform the 'Pragmatic Constructivist' approach is illustrated in my earlier analysis of the international response to the humanitarian crisis in Syria (Ralph 2018). Where both the Realist and Pragmatist might agree that military intervention would have been irresponsible, and where both might condemn western democracies for their misplaced faith in the inevitable fall of Assad, the Pragmatist

---

[118] This aspect of the Realist critique of the liberal habitus obviously resonates with the analysis I offered in Chapter 3, which noted how the commitment to 'democracy promotion' led to maladapted foreign policies. Mearsheimer expands on it in 2003 (36-40), and 2018. See also Porter 2020.

would not allow the Realist to rest there by invoking tragedy. By including vulnerable publics in the community of inquiry, if not directly then through the operation of 'sympathy', a Pragmatic Constructivist approach creates a public interest that demands more of the responsible practitioner. There was in this instance a responsibility to 'reimagine' the problem, which meant discharging a responsibility to protect vulnerable publics through a more generous asylum policy (Ralph 2018). The Pragmatist approach, in this respect, takes a more critical and demanding looking at difficult situations, and demands efforts 'to reduce our vulnerability to tragedy' (Lebow 2012, 65; see also Erskine and Lebow 2012, 11; Cochran 2013, 160-1; Hook 1959-60, 22-23). In this respect Pragmatism can be, as Sidney Hook (1959-60, 20-1) put it, 'more serious, even more heroic, than any other approach because it doesn't resign itself to the bare fact of tragedy or takes easy ways out at the price of truth… . It does not conceive of tragedy as a pre-ordained doom, but as one in which the plot to some extent depends upon us, so that we become creators of our own tragic history. We cannot then palm off altogether the tragic outcome upon the universe in the same way as we can with a natural disaster.'

Pragmatism, Realism, Prudence and Learning

Pragmatism thus operates with different 'ethical vistas' to those of the 'tragic Realists'. The latter 'enables *reflection* on the nature of relationships whereas the pragmatic vision is based on the *transformation* of relationships' (Molloy 2014, 483). In this final section I want to consider how this difference impacts on two concepts at the centre of Realist and Pragmatist thought: prudence and learning. It will I hope further clarify the distinct contribution Pragmatism can make to IR. Chris Brown alluded to a shared interest in prudence when drawing parallels across classical Pragmatist and classical Realist thought. Both traditions value practical judgement, but Brown associates Pragmatism with the Aristotelian conception of *phronēsis*.[119] *Phronēsis* roughly translates as practical wisdom or prudence, but where prudence implies reasons for not acting, the practical reasoning valued by *phronēsis* 'is better understood as the ability to weigh the consequences of one's actions' (Brown 2012, 453; see also Brown 2022a; Schou Tjalve 2013, 785; Adler 2019, 131).

Similarly, David McCourt relates *phronēsis* to Pragmatist themes. It is 'a type of knowledge oriented towards acting in a just, wise and appropriate manner in specific historical contexts, unlike the generalizable and context-free knowledge directed to instrumental action that is the domain of neo-positivism' (McCourt 2012, 25-6). *Phronēsis*, in this respect, seem to describe what the Pragmatist values, which is that ability to recognize when situations demand, and when opportunity allows, the kind of creative practice that can transform relationships and constitute a new public interest that better resolves a social problem. Prudence, on the other hand, is a more a Realist virtue to the extent it stops practitioners believing that they can transform relationships when they cannot because interests and identities are fixed.

Another distinction points in a similar direction. It too has its origins in Aristotelian thought (Coll 1991), although it has found expression in contemporary IR scholarship through the distinction of rhetorical and technical prudence (Booth 1994) or instrumental and normative prudence (Jackson 2000). This generally

---

[119] On Pragmatism's Aristotelian influences see Dewey 1915 [1998], 248; Dewey 1932a [1998], 333; Garrison 1999.

points to the tendency of practitioners to invoke prudence as a reason for not doing something but distinguishes rhetorical/instrumental prudence from normative/technical prudence based on the centrality of the other to moral reasoning. Where the former is motivated only by selfish concerns, the latter is self- and other-regarding. Booth (1994) illustrated the power of this heuristic device in his analysis of international decision-making during the Bosnia crisis of the early 1990s. Even though prudence was being used by politicians who did not want to intervene because they did not recognize an international responsibility to protect strangers and were selfishly prioritizing the national interest (rhetorical prudence), a responsible assessment of the situation also demanded military restraint because in those circumstances military intervention would exacerbate the vulnerability of Bosnian populations (technical prudence). To the extent Pragmatism is interested in first discovering the public interest in a given situation by being self- and other-regarding and then responding to that by formulating better practice through the exercise of practical judgement, then I suggest Booth's distinction helps us to further distinguish Realism and Pragmatism.

The second concept I want to focus on is learning. Of course, learning is at the center of Pragmatist thought for all the reasons I have discussed in Part One of this book. But that does not mean Realism lacks a concept of learning. Realists do urge practitioners to learn from experience. John Mearsheimer, for example, cites the experience of liberal hegemony under the Presidencies of Clinton, Bush Jnr and Obama as an experience that has taught (or should teach) the US foreign policy elite the value of restraint. He writes that this

> task should be feasible because most people do learn, and it should be manifestly clear by now that doing social engineering on a global scale does not work. We have run the experiment and it failed. People with the capacity to learn should be open to at least considering an alternative foreign policy (Mearsheimer 2018 231).[120]

Does this commitment to experimentalism, learning and political engagement mean Mearsheimer and his fellow travelers are better described as Pragmatist rather than a Realist? Possibly. They are certainly engaged in a political project that tries to reconstruct liberal conceptions of the national interest.[121] Yet the answer to that question depends on whether they are also willing to subject Realist preconceptions to the same kind of inquiry that they apply when criticizing liberalism. I doubt that is the case given the centrality of nationalism and security competition to their theory. There would be no disagreement from Pragmatists concerning the Realist conclusion that nationalism 'is an enormously *powerful* political ideology' (Mearsheimer 2018, 3 emphasis added), but a failure to reflect on what role nationalism plays in the current context of global challenges would be unsatisfactory from the Pragmatist's perspective. The question the Pragmatist would ask is whether, in this historical moment, nationalism is a *useful* idea. That does not mean Pragmatists are utopian idealists that ignore the power of nationalism. It means simply that Pragmatism is trying to do for nationalism what Realism has done for Liberalism: it is trying to render it intelligent in the context of the global environment and humanity's lived experience of security competition. As subsequent

---

[120] See also Tetlock (1991, 24-7) for what he calls a 'neorealist conception of learning'.
[121] On political engagement, see Mearsheimer's commitment to a project designed to build a 'counter-elite that can make the case for a realist-based foreign policy' (Measheimer 2018, 235). Those efforts have been centered on the work of the Quincy Institute, where Mearsheimer has been listed as an expert.

chapters demonstrate, competitive security practices can exacerbate rather than mitigate these problems, which means the underlying nationalism - and any other ontological security seeking practice (Mitzen 2006) - should be subject to conscientious reflection. Because Mearsheimer's Realism (unlike Carr's and Morgenthau's) is seemingly less questioning of nationalism, it suggests his embrace of inquiry, experimentalism and learning does not go as far as the Pragmatist's.[122]

Alexander Wendt (1992, 392; 1999, 326-36; see also Adler 2005, 18) recognized these varying depths of learning when he distinguished between 'simple learning', which involved behavioural adaptation, and 'complex learning', which involved redefinitions of identity and interest. Wendt cites Joseph Nye's article on 'nuclear learning' as the source of this distinction. Nye wrote that

> [s]imple learning uses new information merely to adapt the means, without altering any deeper goals in the ends-means chain. The actor simply uses a different instrument to attain the same goal. Complex learning, by contrast, involves recognition of conflicts among means and goals in causally complicated situations, and leads to new priorities and trade-offs (Nye 1987, 380).[123]

Offensive Realist conceptions of learning cannot go further than behavioural adaptation, or 'simple' learning. This is because it takes nationalism and the national interest (in maximizing relative power to compete against other states) as a given. Pragmatists, on the other hand, are open to the possibility of a 'complex' form of learning, one that challenges the value of nationalism and national security relative to internationalism and security communities.[124] That is not the same as saying Pragmatists are necessarily against nationalist competition and necessarily support internationalist cooperation. The normative value Pragmatist's place on these -isms is contingent on the specific challenge confronting a society at a particular moment in time.[125] I would suggest, however, that by being open to more 'complex' learning, and by

---

[122] E.H. Carr's (1939, 151-2) Realism included the possibility that power could make a self-sacrifice in order to construct and commit to a wider international public interest. He also argued that education was 'one of the strongest instruments' because it tended to 'promote a spirit of inquiry', which was essential to holding power to account (Carr 1939, 129). On Morgenthau and the usefulness of security competition between nations in the nuclear age, see Chapter 6.

[123] See also Stein (1994, 171-2). Haas (1991, 73) preferred 'adaptation' to 'simple learning'. Nye's definition recognizes that 'individual learning is a necessary, but insufficient, basis for organizational learning. Societies and governments are complex entities'. Furthermore, like Dewey, but without referencing Pragmatist thought, Nye recognizes that social learning is a political not simply a cognitive or organization concept. 'Not everyone learns the same lessons or at the same rate. Shifts in social structure and political power determine whose learning matters' (Nye 1987, 381). By referring to the 'glimpses of more sophisticated thought which go deeper into the chain of ends-means relationships' in Soviet thought Nye anticipated the complex learning processes taking place under Gorbachev (see Chapter 6 for further discussion).

[124] Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett's discussion of learning in the context of the research on 'security communities' is relevant here. In a security community the relations between state 'generate stable expectations of peaceful change' (Adler and Barnett 1998, 6) because they are characterized by social learning. Social learning is 'an active process of redefinition or reinterpretation of reality on the basis of new causal and normative knowledge'. Their notion of learning 'means that the very act of learning can have not only a technical but also a social dimension to it because it can promote mutual trust and shape the identities of actors' (Barnett and Adler 1998, 422).

[125] It is possible therefore that Pragmatists could accept competitive security practices (even war) once it becomes clear that cooperative security practices are being exploited by a rival. As Mor and Moaz (1999) note 'learning' can

offering a method through which that can be achieved (i.e. inclusionary and deliberative social inquiry) Pragmatism is more suited to meeting the challenges of the current historical moment. Indeed, if we accept the premise that climate change and health pandemics (as well as the military capabilities of foreign states) are threats that people experience then it is clear that offensive Realism is of limited value. It says very little about these challenges. 'Under these circumstances', to repeat Mearsheimer's (2003, 26) own words, 'offensive realism is not going to perform well'.

Offensive Realists would no doubt respond that the logic of anarchy prevents an effective international response to climate change and health pandemics. Like the threat of nuclear atrocity, then, the system dictates the tragic character of the human condition. In these circumstances, however, I think the Pragmatist, and those living through climate change, health pandemics and nuclear vulnerability, would lack faith in such a response. Moreover, the Pragmatist emphasis on the lived experience, as opposed to the more abstract Realist concept of state power, challenges the very idea of anarchy and the role it plays in IR theory. Of course, Pragmatism tends to talk about how the self, and self-interests, are constituted through interaction with the 'environment' as opposed to 'anarchy'. Where the latter is state-centric, the former is more relational in the sense that social interactions are between different kinds of selves (not just nation-states), as well as between social entities (e.g. states) and various material entities (e.g. the climate). In this sense, offensive Realism may shed light on current international relations, including the end of the unipolar moment and the 'liberal order' formed under US hegemony. Yet one can reasonably ask how wise Realist counsel is if offensive practices designed to make states secure from each other prevent them from deliberating on shared problems such as climate change and health pandemics.[126]

Conclusion

The purpose of this Chapter was to develop my answer to the book's first question: what can classical Pragmatism bring to debates in IR, including those centered on the perennial question of how norms, practices and interests interact to influence international society and its practitioners? I focused on the Realist criticism of Pragmatism and the claim that political self-interest limits the impact of social learning and renders naïve the idea of normative progress. I drew on Dewey's response to his contemporary critics to demonstrate how Pragmatists are far from naïve about the role of interests and power. I argued that in

---

lead to conflict. Such a scenario remains problematic for the Pragmatist, however, especially given the risks associated with security competition in the nuclear age. See Chapter 6, which discusses the Pragmatist commitment to 'complex learning' in that context.

[126] Offensive Realist thought such as Mearsheimer's (2018) would not deny the existence of an 'international public interest' but would associate it with moments of unipolarity. It would, in other words, reflect the ideology of the hegemon, which in the US unipolar moment has been liberalism. Moreover, because 'the public interest' from this perspective is based on the power of a particular community, rather than any concept of complex learning or expanded sense of community, it is unlikely to endure. Other nation-states will feel threatened by the hegemon – especially if it is not ideologically restrained - and they will seek to overturn international order and its definition of 'the public interest'. In this sense there is an overlap between Mearsheimer's Realism and Peircean Pragmatism, which argued that beliefs imposed by power could not inspire faith (see Chapter 2). For the former that simply means endless power competition, whereas for the latter the experience of competition can lead to complex learning processes and the growth of shared interests.

fact the short distance between classical Pragmatism and classical Realism barely justified the criticism. Both were concerned about the destructive capacity of ideological certainty and both thought that a form of political restraint was essential to the process of constructing a public order that sustained and improved the lived experience. Dewey's Pragmatism did not believe social learning would happen without politics, therefore, it was instead committed to a political project that enabled individuals and societies to learn when the self would be better served by practices that were publically oriented and other-regarding. I further argued that what actually separates Pragmatism from Realism is the latter's predisposition toward nationalism, tragedy and a particular view of heroic leadership. The concern of the former is that these predispositions, like any other predisposition, do not lead to practices that are unsuited to their environment. That the material environment in which nation-states are operating has changed and thus demands adaptation is the subject of the next Chapter. It focuses on how new communities of practice have emerged through the process of globalization and how Pragmatic Constructivism can be mobilized to assess them.

Chapter 5

Pragmatic Constructivism and the challenge of Global Governance

The purpose of this Chapter is to act as a bridge between Part One and Part Two of the book. In the previous Chapters I have reflected on the first question: what can classical Pragmatism bring to debates in IR, including those centered on the perennial question of how norms, practices and interests interact to influence international practitioners? By demonstrating how Pragmatism can extend the research agendas of Norm and Practice theory (which collectively has been called 'New Constructivism'), while also answering the Realist critique, I argued that Pragmatism can make a normative contribution to the study of international relations. The normative contribution of what I call 'Pragmatic Constructivism' centers on the question of how we resolve epistemic doubt by learning how to ameliorate the lived experience and mitigate practical problems. Because knowledge is situated in (and a product of) a changing environment, we must be skeptical of transcendent claims to epistemic authority. We can, however, have faith in such claims to the extent they have practical value in sustaining and improving the lived experience. To know that is the case involves social inquiry into the material (or experiential) consequences of acting on a knowledge claim. It involves, in other words, a process of learning from experience. That requires an ability to reflect on, and if need be challenge, norms that are taken-for-granted, habits and habitus, identities and interests. It does not necessarily mean that critique is constant and deconstruction inevitable. The practitioner's interest in defending norms and practices from criticism is warranted when a society's stock of learning confirms their value; and indeed, because democracy has proven itself as a useful form of social inquiry, Pragmatic Constructivism values its habits. In that sense, I have also begun to answer the book's second question: how *should* practitioners act in the face of problems that are global in scope?

There are two parts to my second question. I may have suggested a normative theory that centers on learning and values practices that facilitate that, but I have not yet elaborated on how that theory can be applied to assess practices in the face of pressing global challenges. I have not, in other words, fully articulated a theory of global learning. That is the purpose of this Chapter. It starts by situating Pragmatist thought in 'pre-IR' developments in order to relate it to the cognate discipline of 'global governance'. In this sense, it speaks to those who are challenging the '1919 founding myth', or the narrative that IR was created after World War I to address the problem of interstate war in an anarchic international system (Buzan and Lawson 2015, 326). This is important because an implication of this revised disciplinary history is the argument that interstate war is just one of the global challenges IR should address (and that public governance of interstate war itself did not start in 1919, see also Mitzen 2013). Indeed, when we broaden

our focus we find that many of the responses to these additional challenges were forged prior to World War I. That is not to say those responses are necessarily the solutions to contemporary global challenges. It is simply to point out that the solutions we seek are 'downstream' (Buzan and Lawson 2015, 5) from the pre-1919 historical moment. It was then that the practice of 'global governance', as well as the intellectual means to assess its value (like the Pragmatist concept of learning), emerged.

The second section of the Chapter follows that 'stream' toward the contemporary practice of global governance and its sites of global learning. In doing that it makes a link to the prior discussion on Practice theory (see especially Chapter 3). The main point here is that the Practice theory-inspired work on assemblages, networks, and especially communities of practice usefully identifies an empirical focus for my study; however, its normative implication is too implicit (which reinforces my earlier critique). It needs, in that respect, to be supplemented by a Pragmatist approach if it is to help me answer my second and third questions: how *should* practitioners act, and what does that tell us about *the value* of actual practice in contemporary international society.

The third section reminds us of the essence of the Deweyan commitment to democracy as a form of social inquiry and a means to progressive learning, and how this provides the framework to normatively assess international communities of practice. The section does this, however, through the work of Jane Addams. That allows me to elaborate on a concept I have only really alluded to so far: the Pragmatist vocation. The final section draws Part One to a close by identifying two concepts that can be applied to normatively assess the international communities of practice discussed in Part Two. I call these two tests 'inclusionary reflexivity' and 'deliberative practical judgement'. They are the constituent parts of the Pragmatist commitment to effective social inquiry, which when they are realized within international communities of practice facilitate global learning. These two normative tests, I submit, offer New Constructivists a way of assessing what they may otherwise be limited to observing.

International Relations, globalization and the 'eclipse' of the public

I started the book by recalling Ken Booth's warning of a 'Great Reckoning'. It was the price to be paid for 'business-as-usual' (Booth 2007, 3, 281-336). Unreconstructed IR is business-as-usual. 'While always recognizing the importance of "the international" (relations between states) the challenge we face in world politics … – whether as citizens or students – must be thought of more holistically', Booth added. In this sense, 'international politics is one (though certainly one of the most significant) of the worlds in world politics' (Booth 2007, 4).[127] International Relations and its sub-discipline Security Studies, were of their historical moment. The 'discipline of international politics, state centric, had been born of the crisis of 1914-1918', while 'the sub-discipline of security studies, realist dominated, was born of the crisis of the Cold War'. Neither discipline, Booth argued, were 'fit for purpose as the coming crisis of the Great Reckoning speeds toward us' (Booth 2007, 27). There was, at the beginning of the 21st century, a desperate

---

[127] As Booth (2007, 5) also notes, the 'English School' approach to IR recognizes this through its 'international' and 'world' society distinction, see for example Buzan 2004; Ralph 2007.

need for critical thinking and a theory of 'world security'. For Booth, IR needed to identify 'the structures and processes within human society, locally and globally, that work toward the reduction of threats that determine individual and group lives. The greater the level of security enjoyed, the more individual and groups (including human society as a whole) can have an existence beyond the instinctual animal struggle merely to survive' (Booth 2007, 4).

This focus emerged from the Critical Security Studies (CSS) movement, which Booth did so much to inspire (Booth 2005; 1997; see also Krause and Williams 1997; People and Williams 2010). Gaining momentum following the end of the Cold War, this movement involved deepening and broadening the subject matter of security, and directing inquiry to the failure of states to provide human security. At the same time, CSS attacked traditional approaches for their fixation on state-centric ontologies, for making unwarranted assumptions about the power-maximizing, rational, and egoistic identity of states, and for giving-in to 'Realist' notions of timeless truths and unending tragedy. On reflection, and in light of the analysis offered in the previous Chapters, it is surprising that critical IR did not provide more signposts suggesting an earlier turn to Pragmatism.[128] The importance of reflexivity and critique as a means of emancipating thought from unnecessary commitments to positivist notions of external truth, and the reconstruction of theory as a practice to improve experience, resonates strongly with Pragmatist meliorism and its articulation of social learning as a means of realizing the public interest.[129]

That Pragmatist resources have been underutilized by IR perhaps illustrates a Pragmatist argument about the power of disciplinary predisposition and habit. Classical Pragmatist works did not stop after World War I, but its pre-disciplinary associations may have put it at a disadvantage. This is unfortunate, for as Barry Buzan and George Lawson (2015, 5; also Acharya and Buzan 2019, 8-66) convincingly argue, the marginalization of the 19th Century's 'great transformation', as well as the thinking – like Pragmatism - that emerged from its challenges, sets the IR discipline on 'tenuous foundations'. Buzan and Lawson further argue that '[w]e are living now, and are likely to be living for some time yet, in a world defined predominantly by the downstream consequences of the nineteenth-century global transformation. If IR is

---

[128] Indeed, had those signposts been set and followed, critical IR may well have escaped the later criticism made by the likes of Abraham and Abramson (2015, 31), who have turned to Pragmatism because critical IR theory 'under-specifies the political content of its emancipatory vocation, leaving its politics ambiguously framed in terms of anti-domination'.

[129] Some have recently made a tentative connection, see Walters and D'Aoust 2015. Schindler and Wille (2019, 6) reject Bueger and Gadinger's (2015) situating critical theory's focus on domination and pragmatist theory's focus on creative problem solving in opposition to one another. They note IR scholars 'have tried to find a middle way between critical sociology and pragmatism, either by emphasizing the more dynamic elements within Bourdieu's own theory of practice (Cornut 2018; Leander 2011), or by complementing Bourdieu's theory with ideas from pragmatist authors like Goffman (Adler-Nissen 2014; Nair 2019)'. See also Frega (2019, 321) who notes 'a wide consensus in seeing Dewey as a precursor to critical theorists'. On 'emancipation' as 'a philosophical anchorage' working with a concept of 'pragmatic truth' see Booth 1999, 43. One possible reason why Critical Security Studies did not turn to Pragmatism was the Frankfurt School's 'arrogant and superficial' misreading of Dewey and others, see Joas 1992, 264. See also Widmeier (2004, 427) who rejects the critical / problem-solving IR theory distinction in favour 'critical approach to the analysis of not only long-term policy possibilities but also to ongoing policy matters'.

to gain a better grasp of its core areas of enquiry, this global transformation needs to become central to its field of vision' (Buzan and Lawson 2015, 5).[130]

Similarly, Craig Murphy dates the emergence of what we call 'global governance' to before the Great War. At that point, the globe was already 'held together by the strong but thin threads of international institutions: the score or so of international unions and the hundreds of international nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) created in the last third of the 19th Century' (Murphy 2018, 26). As a response to material change, new 'associations' – in Deweyan terms (see Chapter 4) – were created to manage emergent practices. Organizations like the International Telegraph Union, the International Railway Congress Association, International Bureau of Weights and Measures and the International Bureau for the Protection of Intellectual Property, linked together the communication, transportation and inter-imperial economies of the separate empires (Murphy 2018, 27).[131] In addition, what were later called civil society organizations such as the International Association of Labor Legislation and the International Institute of Agriculture 'supported large groups within the industrial core of the inter-imperial world that were likely to be harmed by the growing trade in industrial products fostered by the other public international unions' (Murphy 2018, 27). The parallel here to the Deweyan concept of 'publics' (see Chapter 4 and below) should not go unnoticed. Likewise, the Red Cross Movement, the International Labor Movement, and the Peace Movement, were all established in the later 19th Century and 'worked for progressive social measures that directly helped secure the newly internationalized economic order' (Murphy 2018, 27).

It was in the context of this global transformation that Pragmatism's scope extended from philosophical considerations about epistemic authority (or the nature of truth) to a social and political theory that could inform intelligent responses to the rapid pace of material change. Authors like Jane Addams took a Pragmatist temperament into the communities thrust together by immigration to nurture a democratic ethos. That was necessary to help those communities rediscover and realize a public identity and interest that was shared across both practitioners and those affected by new practices. Similarly, W.E.B Du Bois, a student of William James, focused on the racial aspect of the exclusionary hierarchies that were unchallenged by the end of slavery and exacerbated by industrialization (Menand 2002, 294-6). Indeed, Richard Cullen Rath (1997, 463) sees in Du Bois's (1903) most popular book *The Souls of Black Folk* a Jamesian-inspired articulation of 'the hard-won skill of constantly negotiating meanings, [which] was a distinctive, historically forged asset of African American consciousness that the rest of the world would do well to acquire'. While this 'double consciousness' was constantly negotiated, it did not for Du Bois need to be negotiated away. The construction of a resistance / accommodation binary was replaced in Du Bois's thinking by a both / and aspiration. Black consciousness was African *and* American (Rath 1997, 483). The

---

[130] It is still the case, however, that Pragmatism does not feature in Buzan and Acharya's (2019, 33-67) account of international thought prior to 'the founding' of IR in 1919. Du Bois is mentioned but not his links to Jamesian Pragmatism.

[131] In this sense I understand 'global governance' to mean purposive practice that seeks 'to overcome the problems and costs created by interdependence and globalization. In this perspective, the focus is on specific global governance arrangements and their contribution to solve particular problems' (Zürn 2018, 23). I also follow Zürn in seeing norms and institutions as central to the study of global governance, which moves the agenda beyond international regime analysis.

Pragmatism of Du Bois's 'double consciousness' thus 'provided a way of negotiating the stress, flux, and uncertainty of the postmodern world, if only the world would have it' (Rath 1997, 484).

In the thoughts and actions of Addams and Du Bois, therefore, we see a Pragmatist temperament committed to learning in the context of material and social change. This learning was part of a process of adaptation that Dewey encapsulated in the ideas of 'growth' and 'expanded personality' in a changing context.[132] Indeed, how society adapts, and should adapt, to the challenges of this constantly changing world is, as noted in the previous Chapter, the subject of Dewey's (1927c) book *The Public and its Problems.* That book was focused mainly on the US experience. It has, however, been read more recently through a global lens (Bray 2009, 2011; Deudney 2007, 208-14; Narayan 2016; Ames 2021). This is a reasonable extrapolation given the book's comments on the experience of World War I. That war was referenced not as an example of the anarchy problem (which created IR); it was referenced to show how the changing materiality of industrialization, and the challenges created by the scope and intensity of modern interactions, extended beyond the American experience. The war had shown that existing political and legal forms and arrangements were not able to deal with new international practices and associations. The need existed therefore for 'non-political forces to organize themselves to transform existing political structures'. Divided and 'troubled publics' had to integrate (Dewey 1927c, 128-129; see also Cochran 2010, 309, 325-6) to assess the value of international practices and hold the epistemic communities that enabled them to account.

That response was drawn from Dewey's appreciation of the American experience, which had shown how the certainties and habits that had situated individuals in the localized communities at the beginning of the 19th century had been torn apart by the processes of industrialization and war. For Dewey, there was little point resisting the process of material change. New associations would evolve out of the interactions that embodied the possibilities created by this process. That could provide new opportunities, but it could also create 'real and living doubt' (to use Peirce's phrase), especially when social and political practices failed to respond. That was the situation in the early 20th Century. Social and political practices had 'only piecemeal and haltingly, with great lag, accommodated themselves to the industrial transformation' (Dewey 1927c, 114). Of course, new claims to epistemic authority had emerged to enable the practices of these new associations, but if they were to command the faith of those they affected then, for Dewey, they had to be subjected to democratic social inquiry. That required, in the circumstances Dewey observed, the formation of new 'publics'. These were needed to represent the affected and to challenge the assumptions and habits of the new associations. Daniel Bray summarizes the point well: 'given the scale and complexity of modern social life, representation is cognitively required to make sense of the distant and multifarious human interactions that affect our daily lives, and to convert this organic complex of associated behaviour into "communities of action saturated and regulated by mutual interest in shared meanings"' (Bray 2009, 693 quoting Dewey 1927c; see also Frega 2019, 104-7).

---

[132] Or, as Schmidt (2014, 817) helpfully puts it, 'concepts derived from pragmatism help explain how the creative recombination of practices by actors in response to changes in material and social context of action can transform largely tacit notions of appropriate behaviour'.

A 'public', to repeat the quote from the previous Chapter, 'consists of all those who are affected by indirect consequences to such an extent that it is deemed necessary to have those consequences systematically cared for' (Dewey 1927b [1998] 285). Without the political organization of publics, and without their input into the community of learning that reflects on and deliberates *the* public interest, practitioners will not be able to defend the claim that what they are doing is best practice; they will not be able to claim that because, by excluding affected experiences from the processes of deliberation, they would not know with authority what it is they are doing, or indeed what they are capable of doing. This need to see knowledge (epistemic authority) as a social attribute, or the product of a shared division of epistemic labour, is captured in a much cited passage from Dewey's *The Public and its Problems*. Democracy is 'educative', he wrote, because it

> forces a recognition that there are common interests [in associated living], even though the recognition of *what* they are is confused; and the need it enforces of discussion and publicity brings about some clarification of what they are. The [wo]man who wears the shoe knows best that it pinches and where it pinches, even if the expert shoemaker is best judge of how the trouble is to be remedied (Dewey 1927c, 207).[133]

The problem Dewey identified in early 20th century America, especially in his response to Walter Lippmann (see Chapter 4) was that publics had been 'eclipsed' by the new associations and practices of industrialization (Dewey 1927c, 110-42). As such, any idea of *the* public interest, around which society could coalesce, was 'inchoate' (Dewey 1927c, 131). As Dewey put it: 'the Public seems to be lost; it is certainly bewildered' (Dewey 1927c, 116). There was (and is) no substitute in these circumstances for the political organization of those experiences that were being excluded from the new associations of modern society.[134] Only then would *the* public interest be rediscovered and realized, and only then would an authoritative normative assessment of the actual practices of the new associations be available.[135]

---

[133] For later expressions of this epistemic conception of democracy see also Bohman 1999b; Honneth 1998. For a discussion on how Dewey's understanding of 'publics' informs a 'bottom-up' approach to cosmopolitan democracy see Cochran 2002. On a similar theme see Brunkhorst 2002. See also Steffek (2022, 260) on the emphasis 'on experience as a world-disclosing activity' and how 'pragmatism erodes the distinction between scientific and non-scientific approaches to knowledge creation and, along the way, also the schism between the vita activa and the vita contemplativa'.

[134] Indeed, (as the previous Chapter noted) Dewey and Addams were themselves leaders of the kind of progressive social movements that responded to the industrialization and globalization of US society; and of course Du Bois played a leading role in the work of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), which he helped to found in 1909 giving it an internationalist focus. Pragmatists did not only theorize governance in these circumstances, they worked 'amidst conversations about new forms of global governance' (Kaag and Kreps 2012, 191).

[135] As noted in the previous Chapter, Frega (2019, 198-9) makes an interesting distinction between groups merely seeking their self-interest and political publics organizing to solve a social problem. A public 'denotes any collective of individuals which mobilizes to solve a public problem, hence satisfying interest which also affect those who reside beyond its boundaries'. I think this distinction is significant but the group that mobilizes for self-interest can become publically minded if, after deliberation, they compromise and accept (or at least tolerate) practices when they would have preferred not to. At that point self-interest has changed and become consistent with a wider (other-regarding) public interest.

Here we see the Pragmatist normative commitment first to a method of discovering the public interest and then second to a substantive definition of best practice. Any normative assessment of a substantive practice is in this sense a secondary step. It is the product of a first step of prior normative significance. The criticism and formulation of substantive practices has to be preceded by a process that 'sympathizes' (see Chapter 2 and 3) with the experiences of others and includes them in the deliberative processes constituting the public good. In this way we cannot fix the substantive character of norms, practices or interests until know the public good, and our commitment to them is contingent on them serving the public good. We can, however commit more firmly to a process – to deliberative democracy – because we know that is the best way to organize social inquiry.

Before bringing this assessment of early 20th century American governance forward and applying it to 21st century global governance, I want to elaborate on this Deweyan commitment to democracy because I think it runs deeper than the political organization of a society to facilitate inquiry and learning. Indeed, Dewey saw democracy as 'a way of life' (Dewey 1939 [1998], 341). I interpret this as meaning a social life that involves both purpose and compromise; one that sustains and improves experience by appropriately controlling and adapting to a changing environment. This involves democratizing 'the self' by including 'the other' in the learning processes that constitute and reconstitute identity; a process that leads to an expanded or 'integrated' (Dewey 1927c, 148) personality. This can, if it ameliorates the lived experience, be called 'growth' or 'progress'. In terms that speak more directly to this book, it means communities of practitioners including the experiences of the affected in the learning processes that constitute and reconstitute their interests and identities.

Democracy as 'a way of life' is, I suggest, significant because it further decenters or widens (Frega 2019) the Pragmatist conception of democracy. The Pragmatist meaning of democracy aligns with those that involve political organization on behalf of the excluded, but it goes beyond even that. It locates the normative commitment to democracy at the level of everyday practice, and in the reasoning of individuals performing those practices. It is relational, other-regarding and publicly oriented. This decentering of normative practices is important when considering global governance because conceptions of democracy that are fixed on the state are not easily transposed to that level. That requires – as the following section discusses - identifying the communities of international practices that impact on the lived experience, or are well-placed to address the problems emerging from a changing global environment. It then means zooming in on those communities as sites of possible global learning. More than that, however, the decentering process that personalizes democracy adds, as Dewey noted (1927c, 213) following Addams (see below), a 'vitality' to democratic practice. It enables individuals to experience *being democratic*, an experience that is not otherwise available when the concept is thought of abstractly.

Communities of practice and the 'software' of global governance

Two points can be taken from the above discussion. Firstly, Pragmatism is well-placed to speak to an IR discipline that is now more conscious of its provincial beginnings. It can help the discipline to focus on material and social processes other than those centered on the relations between nation-states situated in

anarchy.[136] It focuses on the transnational and global, as well as the international. Or, more specifically, it focuses on the consequences of international practices as lived experiences in transnational and global contexts. Secondly, the social and political practices that are needed to cope with that material change are also decentered.   As a method of social inquiry and learning, democracy is not situated only at the level of the nation-state, it is located in all those communities of inquiry (and even within the deliberative self) that enable practices with social and relational consequence.

In this respect, the Pragmatist conception of democracy can be applied to normatively assess the 'communities of practice' that contemporary IR Practice theorists like Emanuel Adler identify as the 'software' of global governance (Adler 2019, 10). In this metaphor, international organizations like the United Nations represent the computer 'hardware', which helps to structure global governance, but to understand what an organization does, and the consequence it has for the lived experience, we have to study (and normatively assess) the norms and practices (or the 'software') of practitioners.[137] The concept of 'communities of practices', which cuts across state boundaries (Adler 2005, 14) and reflects what Dewey called 'associations', is a useful focal point for my analysis into governance and learning in the context of global challenges. I take that concept forward into Part Two of the book therefore. Before elaborating on that, however, I briefly want to acknowledge two similar concepts, and to say why they are not used.

Drawing on the work of the anthropologist Aihwa Ong, Christian Bueger recently introduced 'assemblage theory' to IR Practice theory and global governance studies. An assemblage is defined as a 'contingent ensemble of diverse practices and things' that is a distinct spatial configuration. It 'implies that a space or territory is made and governed' (Bueger 2018, 618). Assemblages are said to 'establish relations of expertise and authority, technology and politics', relations that are influenced by 'a form of experimental governance in which actors are more concerned about devising problem solutions than ensuring compliance with formalized rules' (Bueger 2018 623). Together with Tim Edmunds, Bueger uses assemblage theory to analyze anti-piracy governance. They reference Dewey's *Public and its Problems* to illustrate the role 'problematisation', 'experimentalism' and 'productive power' plays in processes of 'pragmatic ordering' (Bueger and Edmunds 2021). This might make the approach ideal for my purpose; and yet the normative character of Deweyan Pragmatism and his commitment to 'publics' as agents of democratic and effective social inquiry is not mentioned in this account.[138]

Similarly, Deborah Avant (2016) uses the term 'pragmatic networks' as a heuristic device to understand the development of transnational governance, specifically in relation to private military and security companies. She argues that when such networks '(i) gather around a problem; (ii) make connections among those relevant to it; (iii) interact with relative openness to solve the problem; and (iv) attend to the consequences (or the workability) of their action, they are more likely to generate creative processes' (Avant 2016 340). In this way, the concept of 'pragmatic networks' could inform analysis of practical

---

[136] On the Pragmatist critique of 'methodological nationalism' see Frega 2017.

[137] Many others make a similar distinction. See Cochran 2002 citing Dryzek 1999; Bueger 2015; Sending and Neumann 2011; Srivastava 2013; Snyder and Wenger 2004, 41; Wiener 2014, 3-4; Pouliot and Thérien 2018; Zürn 2018, 3).

[138] Likewise Peer Schouten's (2013) application of Dewey to the study of 'security assemblages' focuses on the overlapping 'ontological indeterminism' and 'relational processes of stabilization' rather than the normative commitment to democracy.

responses to global security, climate and health challenges. But again, the way Deweyan Pragmatism informs political positions is, as Abraham (2017, 7) notes, reduced, or even excised, from this account. Avant (2017, 14) responded to this by noting that problem-solving *is* a form of politics, as well as recalling that the implied preference for gradualism is evident in the Pragmatist sense of normativity and its conception of progress. 'While Abraham is correct to note that Dewey (and others) hoped for great transformations, when true to their ideas they did not expect these to emerge all at once in an internally consistent way.' This is again useful, but I think the normative implications of Pragmatists thought, at least that informed by Dewey and Addams go beyond this commitment to gradualism.

Drawing on the work of Etienne Wenger and others, Adler (2005, 14) defines communities of practice as domains of knowledge constituted by like-minded practitioners. The type of knowledge (scientific, moral, national, transnational etc.) is irrelevant and it may be contested among members. It is their shared undertaking that links them (Adler 2005, 21). As Wenger (2005, 45) himself wrote, communities of practice are 'a kind of community created over time by the sustained pursuit of a shared enterprise'. Such communities might be 'tightly-coupled' in the sense that members know each other (Adler 2005, 24), but this is not always the case, especially with respect to 'communities of communities' (Snyder and Wenger 2004, 53) where the character of the interaction is institutional rather than personal.[139] Like assemblages and networks, therefore, Adler's conceptualization of 'communities of practice' serves to identify 'the spatial field where practitioners' transactions take place'. More specifically, communities of practice are 'spatial-organizational platforms where practitioners interact, learn, and end up creating and diffusing practices and promoting their adoption by future practitioners' (Adler 2019, 41). The interactions of practitioners 'give rise to emergent properties, which means that we cannot reduce communities of practice's properties to those of their individual and corporate practitioners' (Adler 2019, 112). Communities of practice are instead:

> intersubjective social structures that constitute the normative and epistemic ground for action, but they are also agents, made up of real people who make things happen in the world … . On the one hand, they are material insofar as they are doings enacted in and on the world and thus exist embodied in materials. At the same time, practices are also shot through with meaning. Language, communication, and discourse make relationships in communities of practice possible. … [C]ommunities of practice are the site where social order change first takes place, and where metastability is also maintained … but only communities of practice (their practitioners and materials) have agency – they act (Adler 2019, 112, 124; see also 2005, 15; 2008, 198-202).

The emphasis on 'learning' and the 'normative and epistemic ground for action' in this concept nicely links the communities of practice concept to my reading of Pragmatist thought, which originates with Peirce's search for epistemic authority and charts how that informed, through the work Dewey and others, a

---

[139] Of course, there is always a local element to the experiences of practitioners, even when acting on behalf of an institution in a 'macro-practice'. As Wenger (2005, 131) noted we never truly engage the global. The 'cosmopolitan character of a practice, for instance, does not free it from the locality of engagement. Day-to-day work in an office at UN headquarters is still local in its own way, even though it deals with international affairs that have broad ramifications'.

democratic critique of social and political practice. Indeed, Adler's (2019, 109) discussion of communities of practice is informed by 'both Bourdieu's practice theory and American pragmatism's theory of action … with an emphasis on pragmatism'.

It is for this reason that I have chosen this concept to help organize my empirical analysis in Part Two of the book. Yet even these accounts of what communities of practice do lack the kind of critical edge that enables normative assessment.[140] While recognising that we 'partly owe to pragmatism the notion that social learning is a communal and practical endeavour' (Adler 2019, 120; also Adler and Faubert 2022), Adler (2019, 120) does not reference Dewey's 'pedagogical creed' (see Chapter 3) and its criticism of hierarchy and exclusion contained within it; nor does he elaborate on the way that informs a normative and political commitment to democracy. In the current literature, learning is said to take place between and within communities of practice, and while 'practitioners learn competent skills, acquire new meanings, and adopt new identities' (Adler 2019, 120) there is no reference in Adler's Pragmatist account to the role of Deweyan 'publics' in this learning process.[141] Likewise, 'deliberation, judgment and interpretation' are said to take place within communities of practice (Adler 2019, 119), but there is no reference to the Deweyan idea of sympathy as a tool of inquiry. The need to reflect on the consequences of practice beyond the immediate community if its claim to epistemic authority is to stick is at best implicit in Adler's definition.[142]

Earlier Practice theory informed accounts do engage with the concept of the 'public', but without the normative implication of Deweyan Pragmatism. Snyder and Wenger's (2004, 52) account of learning within community of practice, for instance, portrays it as a 'peer-to-peer' process, rather a division of labour between practitioners and publics. Indeed, the idea of 'the public' is sometimes portrayed as something to be managed by elites, rather than a common interest that elites should be pursuing as part of a wider community. In a separate work, for instance, Wenger (2005, 117) notes how 'professional communities of practice … often organize themselves to let outsiders in to some extent, usually in the course of providing or receiving a service, but also in efforts of public relations or under requirements of public scrutiny'. Of course, the idea of 'public scrutiny' hints at the possibility that communities of practice should be other-regarding when formulating practices, and inclusive of publics (not just peers). Pragmatic Constructivism can, I suggest, hold them to that standard.   It can identify practices that are worth supporting because,

---

[140] The separation of analytical from normative communitarianism is explicitly referenced in Adler 2005, 3-27.

[141] Parts of the communities of practice literature explains learning in terms of 'boundary encounters' where 'at least two communities negotiate meaning and knowledge. … Boundary encounters promote learning because participants on both sides have to understand, contest and translate one another's background knowledge. Practitioners are thus confronted with other ways of doing and understanding, which can subsequently influence their own practice and understanding' (Sonderjee 2021, 311-2). On my reading, Deweyan Pragmatism suggests a need to 'encounter' publics i.e. those affected by practice if the community is to claim epistemic authority.

[142] Adler's discussion on communities of practice comes close to recognizing this when he writes 'social order can be associated not only with one community of practice but also with what communities of practice do to nonmembers, and vice versa' (Adler 2019, 115). That there is the potential for a Pragmatist informed normative critique of is acknowledged by Adler (2019, 293), who develops a conception of 'practical democracy' toward the end of his book. It is inspired by Dewey's view of democracy 'as a creative activity' and 'a way of life, which is inculcated through education'. See also Haas's (1991, 67) definition of epistemic communities, which involved 'extracommunity reality tests'. Such communities are 'in principle, open to the constant reexamination of prevailing beliefs about cause and effect, ends and means'.

having realized that standard, they command epistemic authority. Furthermore it can identify the democratic processes that enable communities of practice to sustain epistemic authority and pursue best practice when circumstances change.

Vincent Pouliot and Jean Philippe Thérien's (2018) assessment of global governance practice is particularly helpful in this regard. They identify informal practices that are 'pivotal' to the conduct of global governance, for example the hosting of a global conference, the accreditation of NGOs, the mandating of experts, and the formation of multi-stakeholder partnerships. These may appear to open up 'the political stage to new voices' but in fact 'things are overall not so clear cut' (Pouliot and Thérien 2018, 164; see also Pouliot 2016a and b; Cooper and Pouliot 2015). Such micro-practices, Pouliot and Thérien observe, can still generate unequal access and involvement because they often work 'to the advantage of professionalized, resource-endowed and moderate NGO's of the North' (Pouliot and Thérien 2018, 168).

Similarly, the practice of mandating a group of experts at the UN may have the 'stated objective of inclusion', but most commission members 'come from governments and few have come from civil society' (Pouliot and Thérien 2018, 169). Quoting Cooper and English (2005, 11) they further note how international commissions have been described as 'exercises driven by a global managerial class'. There may be an intention that debate is 'depoliticized … by entrusting their resolution to eminent specialists'. But 'in reality international commissions politicize public deliberation by their authority to impose certain political priorities and opinions over others' (Pouliot and Thérien 2018, 169).[143] There is here, I suggest, an implicit criticism of practices that maintain exclusionary hierarchies while claiming to be more inclusionary and democratic. Still, this Practice theory inspired account does not necessarily establish why inclusionary and democratic practices are better.[144]

It is not the case then that these Practice theory-inspired literatures ignore normativity. My point, however, is that the normative implications could be made explicit; and that certainly needs to be the case if Practice theory is to help me answer all the questions set by this book. Applying Dewey's conception of democracy as a form of social inquiry to an analysis of communities of practice does that. Democratic inquiry structures the learning process in ways that establish and sustain epistemic authority; and because of that democratic inquiry identifies when the 'ground for action' is worth defending or abandoning. The risk is that without this normative tool governance becomes technocratic and thus unfit for purpose because it fails on two counts: it is not aware of the problems it has to solve; nor is it aware of the possibilities that may be available for solving the problems it is aware of.[145]

---

[143] Although it is not inconsistent, this argument is relatively more cautious than Pouliot and Thérien's (2014) earlier claim that identified a historical trend in international governance toward greater inclusiveness, which they explained in terms of the 'ratchet effect' contained within the logic of practice and 'the global rise of democracy' as a powerful social movement.

[144] Although, see Maïka Sondarjee's (2021, 307) article on communities of practice at the World Bank, which shows how 'inclusive practices increased their effectiveness, that is, it improved the acceptability, quality, and sustainability of projects and policies, according to their own standards'.

[145] This concern is also expressed in Bourdieusian-inspired work on security, which focuses on the work of a transnational field of security experts and the removal of political control over what security means, installing in its place a security logic over a "continuum of threats". See for instance Bigo 2002 as cited in Berling 2012.

The epistemic division of labour that Dewey demands (recall his shoe wearer / shoe maker metaphor) thus tells us when certain communities of practice are properly constituted because they facilitate *social* learning. Moreover, when the empirical focus is on communities of international practice that aim to ameliorate the lived experience by addressing global challenges then we can judge them on how well they facilitate *global* learning. Adler's communities of practice concept is a useful analytical tool for my purpose, therefore, and I do use it to focus my analysis of global security, climate and health practices in Part Two of the book. Consistent with my claim to extend the New Constructivist research agenda, however, I subject those the relevant communities of practice to the Pragmatist normative critique discussed here. Exactly how I do that is clarified in the final section of this Chapter. Before that, however, I want to elaborate on an additional aspect of the normative framework: 'the Pragmatist vocation'.

Publically oriented communities of practice: a Pragmatist 'Vocation'

For Charlene Haddock Seigfried (1999), the Deweyan conception of democracy as a form of social inquiry has its roots in the feminist Pragmatism of Jane Addams, and her work in creating the Hull House Settlement, where Dewey was both an associate and sometime resident. Seigfried writes that Dewey's 1916 book *Democracy and Education* (discussed Chapter 3) seemingly draws on his experiences at Hull House, the story of which was published in 1910 by Addams in *Twenty Years at Hull-House*. 'The traits of Dewey's ideal democratic community—namely, that it is "a mode of associated living, of conjoint communicated experience"—were actually instantiated at Hull House' (Seigfried 1999, 213; see also Seigfried 1996, 58-9; Miller 2013, 240-3). Itself inspired by Addams' visits to Toynbee Hall in the East End of London (Cochran 2017, 147), Hull House grew into a 13 building complex that provided social, educational, and artistic programmes for mainly working class, African-American, immigrant families enduring the harsh living conditions in Chicago at the turn of the century. It was, as Jean Bethke Elshtain (2002, loc.212) notes, an attempt by a group of women, led by Addams, to forge a link between abstract ideals and concrete actions in the ways Pragmatist philosophy directed.[146] It was more than an exercise of philanthropy, and indeed Addams (1902) reflected in a critical way about how charity often failed because of its misplaced assumptions about the working poor and their problems.[147] The Settlement in fact was an exercise in mutual learning that broke down social and epistemic hierarchies to create a public interest and sense of community out of diversity.

---

[146] See also Seigfried (1996, 52) on the influence of Elsie Ripley Clapp, including her work in rural schools where 'she saw a chance to turn an abstract idea into reality'. Cochran (2017, 114) writes of the overlap between Addams's Christian humanism, with its emphasis on understanding the doctrine through the deed, and philosophical Pragmatism, which sustained her 'sense of calling to a social morality' after the loss of her religious faith. Relatedly, see Frega (2019, 166) on the contribution of Mary Parker Follett, whose Pragmatist theory of democracy 'anticipates by nearly a decade some of the central themes Dewey will expose in his political masterwork'.

[147] Addams (1902 loc.319) offers a similar criticism of charity worker who 'finds herself still more perplexed' when the predispositions about the poor are formed without sensitivity or sympathy for their experience; as well as the philanthropic industrialist who is no longer able to recognize needs because he is 'too absorbed in carrying out a personal plan of improvement' that is good "to" people rather than "with" them (1902, loc.1044, 1102; also 1255).

Addams' contribution is especially important to acknowledge, not least because her actions and her voice, like those of other women, has been hidden from the Pragmatist cannon (Seigfried 1996). More than that, she offered a lived experience, 'as a woman, activist, social worker, sociologist and philosopher' (Cochran 2017, 145-6) and this influenced a particularly demanding aspect of the Pragmatist temperament. This is the sense that Pragmatism is a 'vocation' that complements, but also challenges, the academic focus on ontology, epistemology and method. As the previous chapter noted, Dewey's educational theory saw schools as communities within communities, but it was the women Pragmatists of his generation who took that argument a step further. They did this

> by adopting the radical position that scholars ought to be or become members of communities plagued by the problems their theories are supposed to solve. They uniquely integrated their professional and personal lives, deliberately putting themselves in experimental situations for the purpose of answering their own needs along with those of others. Their experiments were experiments in community living as well as in community problem solving (Seigfried 1996, 58).

Dewey did credit Jane Addams and Hull House with 'sharpening and deepening his "faith in democracy as a way of life, the truly moral and human way of life, not a political institutional device"' (Seigfried 1996, 58; see also Miller 2013, 233; Cochran 2017, 148, 161).[148] In the preface to *How We Think*, moreover, he credited his wife, Alice Chipman, 'not only with inspiring the ideas in the book but with working them through concretely by embodying and testing them in practice through her work in the Laboratory School' (Seigfried 1996, 59).

The impact of these methodologies on the women's career was double-edge however. While community engagement helped to breakdown the theory-practice hierarchy, it tended to reinforce those hierarchies that excluded women from academia and other areas of society (Seigfried 1996, 62-3). As Cochran (2021, 11) put it: what made Addams an exemplar – her activism - 'detracted from her reputation as a philosopher and contributor to international thought' (see also Seigfried 1996, 28). As a consequence, the contribution women made remained on the margins of Pragmatism. This was unfortunate because (as discussed in Chapter 2) the Pragmatist commitment to sympathy and inclusive reasoning because those practices nurtured learning and growth captured a 'feminine style', if not the feminist voice (Seigfried 1996, 31-7). Nevertheless, the research practice that Addams pioneered continues to inspire feminist Pragmatism, which 'asks researchers to situate themselves within the power dynamics of epistemology, boundaries, and human relations "and to attend to these as a matter of methodology"' (Tickner and True 2018, 229 quoting Ackerly and True 2008).

Indeed, the work of the 'Women, Peace and Security' movement is a good contemporary example of such research. It builds on Addams's distinctive contribution to Pragmatism and the progressive politics it informed (Cochran 2017, 145; Tickner and True 2018). This kind of engagement or activism is considered central to the Pragmatist temperament. Dmitri Shalin, for example, puts it '[a]bove all' else when identifying a Pragmatist essence. Pragmatists 'call for personal efforts in one's immediate community'.

---

[148] For a contemporary elaboration on a Pragmatist conception of democracy as a distinctly social conception see Frega 2019.

They 'follow Chekhov's counsel to avoid grandstanding and take up small deeds' (Shalin 1992, 271). Certainly, these efforts are consistent with the evolutionary ontologies and epistemologies of Pragmatist philosophy, its practice-oriented experimental method, and the ameliorative and inclusionary ethic that follows. Yet it may overstate the case to put this above all else.

Dewey, for instance, reminded us that academic detachment still has value. Echoing the practitioner interviewees who (in my experience) express the value of detached academic analysis, Dewey wrote that 'actual experience is such a jumble that a degree of distance and detachment are a prerequisite of vision in perspective. Thinkers often withdraw too far' he added. 'But a withdrawal is necessary, unless they are deafened by the immediate clamor and blinded by the immediate glare of the scene (Dewey 1925b [1998], 90).'[149] The aim, as always, is to find the middle way. For those 'to whom exact scholarship is an absorbing pursuit', there is a risk that they 'may be more than ordinarily vague in ordinary matters.' Reasoned judgement had to remain grounded therefore. It had to remain in the 'happy cooperation of a multitude of dispositions, such as sympathy, curiosity, cooperation, exploration, experimentation, frankness, pursuit-to follow things through, circumspection, to look about at the context' (Quoted in Shalin 1992, 271).[150]

In contemporary IR's turn to Practice and Pragmatism, Abraham and Abramson (2015) stress this vocational element while citing Addams's influence. They too criticize what they call 'inward looking' approaches that see 'theory, itself, as a practice'. This approach is valuable to the extent it analyzes practices of knowledge production and can expose 'the knowledge–power nexus, unpack social hierarchies, and reveal modes of domination' (Abraham and Abramson 2015, 31). For Abraham and Abramson, however, the 'theory as practice' approach 'under-specifies the political content of its emancipatory vocation, leaving its politics ambiguously framed in terms of anti-domination' (Abraham and Abramson 2015, 31). As a result, Bourdieusian Practice theory carries only 'a thin conception of background political values (ostensibly, anti-domination)' and 'it employs a strategy of fighting expertise with expertise'. In short, 'the public (the dominated) remains non-theorized' in Bourdieusian Practice theory. The public in Practice theory is 'the object of emancipatory efforts but not conceptualized as an agent of these efforts themselves' (Abraham and Abramson 2015, 38).

In response, Abraham and Abramson offer a Pragmatist vocation that is 'indebted' to Dewey, but draws heavily on Jane Addams 'for thinking more concretely and deeply about the promise of a pragmatic attitude for IR' (Abraham and Abramson 2015, 34, also 41). The central problem for contemporary IR is, in their view, markedly similar to that identified by Dewey in *The Public and its Problems*. The consequences of interconnectedness are now, as Dewey anticipated, 'planetary' (Abraham and Abramson 2015, 39-40) in scope and the processes of governance are potentially dominated by a class of experts. A Pragmatist vocation aims to address this. It does that by politically engaging with those reconstituting communities of international practices and indeed reconstituting the practices of the IR community itself. The aim is to enable these communities to better contribute to effective processes of deliberation, problem-solving and learning. Pragmatic IR, in this respect, means working to

---

[149] 'As intellectuals, we will stick to our conviction that warranted knowledge presupposes a degree of reflexive elaboration that is largely absent from everyday life' (Friedrichs and Kratochwil 2009, 703).
[150] See also Kratochwil's (2018, 474-6) use of Hume to make a similar point.

dismantle the academic "field" in order to make the process of social inquiry publicly inclusive. Rather than working to secure academia as a privileged site of knowledge production, the ends-in-view of pragmatic theoretical practice must be to undermine the boundaries of this field by democratizing knowledge production, by actively undermining the inequality of experts and the public. Therefore, in many ways, Pragmatism has a more robust "activist ethos" that derives from an explicit conceptualization of the public and a more radical solution to the problem of expertise (Abraham and Abramson 2015, 38).[151]

Specific changes to the way we do IR are suggested. For example, International Studies Association (ISA) meetings should be broadened to include publics 'in a deliberative space that actively dismantles distinctions between knowledge producer and knowledge consumer' (Abraham and Abramson 2015, 42). The kinds of engagements 'would be the wellspring of deeper collaborative projects and professional incentives for public engagement, the latter of which would have to include a re-evaluation of what counts as success in the academy'.[152] Indeed, the so-called 'impact agenda' in UK academia has encouraged this practice by making it part of the research funding environment.[153] Of course IR scholarship is broader than the ISA, and some who identify as IR scholars do not attend ISA annual meetings because of what they see as the esoteric character of the work presented there. Yet many IR scholars, including those who do attend ISA, *are* part of practitioner communities that include non-academic stakeholders, and the organization has offered webinars on the challenges of balancing policy, advocacy, and research.[154] IR researchers

---

[151] Abraham and Abramson's Pragmatic vocation echoes Richard Wynn Jones's earlier critique of the emancipatory theory that informed the 'critical turn' in International Relations. Specifically on Critical Security Studies, Wyn Jones wrote of the 'need to take emancipation more seriously' by 'thinking through in far greater depth what emancipation might mean in terms of social practices and institutions, as well as how it might be brought about' (Wyn Jones 2005, 216). Otherwise, the meaning of emancipation 'at either the abstract or concrete level – is left either implicit or always deferred' (Wyn Jones 2005, 2018). The importance of '*realizable* utopias', and 'emancipation as a "process" rather than an "endpoint", a direction rather than a destination' (Wyn Jones 2005, 230), resonates with Dewey's articulation of 'growth' and the role of democratic engagement as a form of social learning.

[152] For a response that defends the boundary between expert and everyday knowledge, while accepting that some kind of bridging activity (e.g. teaching) is necessary see Jackson 2021. In another contribution, Jackson (2022, 246) argues for a vocational approach where 'the scholar's influence on the politician is indirect rather than direct; the point is not to urge the politician to see the gap between value commitments and coercive means, but rather to urge other people to recognize themselves as sharing an interest, so that they can urge the politician to enact appropriate policies'.

[153] For instance, funding proposals to the Economic and Social Research Council must include a document on 'pathways to impact', where 'impact' is understood as 'the demonstrable contribution that excellent social and economic research makes to society and the economy, and its benefits to individuals, organisations and/or nations'. Statements usually involve commitments to 'impact partnerships' with practitioners outside of academia and publications on popular or less esoteric platforms. The Research Excellence Framework (REF), a system for assessing the quality of research in UK higher education institutions, also requires the submission of 'impact case studies'. While the REF has been associated with neoliberal practices where everything must be measured (Wolff 2017), and sometimes dismissed by some because of that, I can say from experience that the 'impact agenda' in particular has encouraged sustained efforts to make academic research useful to practitioners and therefore consequential. As Abraham and Abramson (2015, 42) put it: '[t]hese kinds of vocational reorientations configure a mode of producing scholarship not just *about* people and their politics, but *with* them'. This is very much in line with a pedagogy of mutual learning as practiced by Addams and celebrated by Dewey.

[154] ISA Webinar: "Balancing Policy, Advocacy, and Research"

responding to Sil and Katzenstein's (2010) call for a more engaged, practice-oriented and analytically eclectic approach (see Chapter 1) will also have closed this gap. The question the classical Pragmatist would ask of these is how inclusive are the policy communities being engaged. In other words, how aware are they of the consequences their practices have on those outside the community of practice and how are those consequences addressed? In other words, how inclusive and reflexive are the processes that create the background knowledge that a community of practice draws on? How publicly oriented is the community of practice?

Inclusionary reflexivity and deliberative practical judgement: two tests for communities of practice

Through the previous Chapters I have tried to explain why the Pragmatist focus on democracy as a form of social inquiry and social learning extends the New Constructivist research agenda to answer normative as well as analytical questions. For the Pragmatist, like the Constructivist, the search for normativity must start with an acknowledgement that norms are historically and socially contingent. They are constructed by practices, which are given meaning by social processes, including political contestation. Given the ongoing character of that process, abstract normative reasoning, including that which appeals to metaphysical certainties, is unlikely to settle contestation. It will not, in Peircean language, resolve doubt and fix beliefs. Faith in a claim to epistemic authority is more likely to be established and maintained if it also enables practices that sustain and improve the lived experience. When it does not, new practices will be created, epistemic authority will be contested, doubt will pervade society and social problems will emerge with the potential for conflict. As contemporary authors note, a failure to adapt in these circumstance can lead to 'self-undermining processes' (Zürn 2018, 94) or a process of 'ethical erosion' (Lechner and Frost 2018, 169).

In this moment normative conviction is not necessarily helpful because what is needed is a learning process that discovers, through humility, reflection and deliberation, a public interest that resolves fresh doubt by mitigating the emergent problem and ameliorating a shared experience. Only through that kind of learning process can the epistemic authority of (and faith in) a practice be restored. This line of thinking was inspired by Peirce's discussion on how to fix beliefs (see Chapter 2) but finds expression among contemporary Pragmatists. Learning can, as Lechner and Frost (2018, 156) put it, lead to 'higher order constitutive practices which remedy the subversion'. Alongside humility and reflexivity, Pragmatists consider sympathy and inclusivity (other-regarding behaviour) as useful intellectual tools in this moment because they further facilitate the learning process. Without those tools practitioners simply cannot know that what they are doing is unproblematic, and with them they can reflect on that question and they can learn new ways of ameliorating a problem if one emerges. That is not to say other-regarding behaviour necessarily demands compromise. Existing practices may well prove to be the best way of realizing the public interest and in that respect the learning process is more keenly experienced by those arguing for revision. Democracy as a form of social inquiry in this sense is deliberative, but the point is this: democratic practice enables society, as a collective to learn and, if need be, grow.

To make this Pragmatic Constructivist ethic applicable to empirically complex areas of international practice, and to operationalize the concept of global learning, I have reduced it to two tests. The first normative test of a practice - and the community of international practice that performs it - I call *inclusionary reflexivity*. This draws especially on Dewey's critique of habit and the need for what he called conscientious reflection in order to cope with change. I have combined that with the importance of other-regarding behaviour through sympathy and inclusivity because they encourage the practitioner to reflect on the otherwise unseen or unappreciated consequences of practice. I call the second normative test *deliberative practical judgement*. This draws especially on the Pragmatist idea that the value of a practice, and the norms that enable it, lies in how well it sustains and improves the lived experience. That of course is a relative assessment because it requires the ability to 'weigh the consequences' (Sikkink 2008) of acting in one way rather than another; inaction cannot escape this need for judgement, and the responsibility it carries, because inaction can still have consequences for the lived experience. While existing norms and practices may command authority by drawing on a backward looking stock of learning effective problem solving also requires 'forward looking' (Hildebrand 2013,67) or 'counterfactual' (Sikkink 2008) inquiry. As I noted in previous Chapters, moreover, this qualifies the criteria in the first test. Inclusivity is a value but not when it needlessly harms deliberation by, for example, elevating unqualified opinions above the scientific judgement of experts.

I have then answered my first two questions and distilled that answer down to these two normative tests, which can be applied to the empirical study of the communities of international practice that purport to address global challenges. I am now in a position therefore to answer my third question: what normative conclusions can we come to about actual practices in contemporary international society? Before I answer that question in Part Two of the book, I want to remind the reader of the two levels – macro and micro – of international practice, as discussed in Chapter 1. This conceptualization has emerged within IR Practice theory research, and by working in Part Two at the macro level I follow the approach of Silviya Lechner and Mervyn Frost (2018). They do not reject the value of the micro-practice conceptualization but argue such practices can be brought together through the concept of the 'institution', or a 'practice of practices'. International society, in this sense, is a community of practice.[155] It may be more amorphous and unwieldy than other communities of practice, and it is certainly open to the charge that it is dysfunctional. But that latter point is a normative judgement, and the grounds for that have to be established. The idea of a 'practice of practices', and the implication that there are overlapping communities of practice, is thus a helpful one. It offers, I suggest, research versatility, and indeed the following Chapters switch between the macro and micro levels of analysis.

Conclusion

---

[155] Of course the concept of 'international society' and 'institutions' (Bull 1977) is often associated with the English School to study of IR. For a discussion on the place of 'practice' in English School framings see Navari 2011 and Chapter 3 of this book. See also Robert Jackson (2000, 120) who draws on Terry Nardin's concept of 'practical association' to define international as a set of 'authoritative, non-instrumental practices (customs, usages, conventions and so forth) based on the juridical equality of states'.

The purpose of this Chapter is to act as a bridge between Part One and Part Two of the book. It is important in translating the normative contribution of Pragmatist philosophy and its critique of norms, practices and interests into a method that can be used to address my third question and normatively assess actual practice in contemporary international society. In that respect the final section of the Chapter is the most important. It is there that I distill from Part One of the book two normative tests, inclusive reflexivity and deliberative practical judgement. A community of international practice that meets these two tests will facilitate the kind of global learning that is necessary to sustain and improve lived experiences as they cope with global challenges. Applying these tests to actual practice, and actual communities of international practice, operationalizes what I call a Pragmatic Constructivist analysis. That extends the New Constructivist research agenda in a normative direction, but more importantly, it enables Constructivist IR to purposefully contribute to processes of social learning in the face of pressing global challenges.

To be clear, Pragmatic Constructivist IR does not identify the substantive solutions to those problems. The challenges discussed in Part Two of the book will be met by a combination of technological innovation (new vaccines, electric vehicles, carbon storage etc.) and behavioural change. Global learning is in that respect an interdisciplinary exercise. From within the IR discipline, however, Pragmatic Constructivism can inform the politics of adaptation so that societies get the best out of these material changes and direct them so they work to ameliorate the lived experience. Pragmatic Constructivism can, as Dewey would put it, render change intelligent by making it work for those affected by it. In IR, that means empirically analyzing and normatively assessing the communities of international practice that purport to address global challenges and to examine whether they facilitate global learning. It is to those communities of practice that I now turn.

Chapter 6

International Practice and Global Security

My purpose in this Chapter, and the two that follow, is to answer the book's third question: what does Pragmatic Constructivism (as developed in Part One of the book) tell us about the value of actual practices in contemporary international society. In this specific Chapter I focus on global security challenges. There is an argument to say that the following Chapters on climate change and global health are also security challenges, and of course there is a literature on the securitization of these problems (Hanrieder and Kreuder-Sonnen 2014; Larsson 2022; McDonald 2021). My decision not to frame those Chapters in these terms is not a comment on that literature, or the value of that process. It is more mundane than that. I use the term 'security' simply to refer to the problems created by the threat human beings pose to each other through direct lethal action. Given the breadth of problems that are studied under this banner I have chosen to focus on the most extreme examples of violent action, acts that in contemporary international society are referred to as 'atrocities'.

This is relevant because atrocities – genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, ethnic cleansing - pose a particular challenge to international practices, especially those of the society of sovereign states (or international society). Atrocities do this because they evoke a 'visceral impulse to help suffering strangers' (Barnett and Weiss 2011, 112) and that impulse transcends sovereign boundaries. In this way they evoke emotions that drive those practices – for example humanitarian intervention and international criminal justice – that clash with the practices helping to constitute sovereign statehood – for example non-intervention and sovereign immunity from international prosecution.[156] My specific purpose here then is to use the Pragmatic Constructivist framework developed in Part One of the book to assess the value of practices that purport to address this particular challenge. I will call these 'R2P practices'. By that I mean the practices enabled by the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) norm and an associated community of practice, the United Nations Security Council.

To do this I have divided the Chapter into four sections. The first explains, and normatively supports in Pragmatist terms, the emergence of the R2P norm, which was formerly adopted by the United Nations at the 2005 World Summit. I argue that by reflecting on the experiences of the 1990s, and expressing sympathy for vulnerable populations, the R2P norm is including in the constitution of the international public good those lived experiences that have been, and are being, otherwise overlooked by the practices of international society. Moreover, by maintaining that the members of the UN Security Council are best placed to legally authorize humanitarian intervention, the R2P norm recognizes that this kind of sympathy may lead to actions that are not in the wider public interest, especially if the practical consequences of

---

[156] See Lechner and Frost's (2018) description of the practices of sovereign states and the practices of global society.

those actions lead to great power war. In the abstract, therefore, the R2P norm passes the two tests set out at the end of the last Chapter: reflexive inclusivity and deliberative practical judgement.

I extend that assessment in the second section by zooming in on the UN Security Council as *a* community (but not *the only* community) of R2P practice. The finding here is that the informal exclusionary hierarchies in the working practices of the Council contributed to a misjudged humanitarian intervention (the 2011 operation in Libya), which harmed the deliberative quality of the Council in this area. In this respect the Security Council has been working as a community of practice but not one that effectively realizes the public good or best practice. I do not claim that the misjudgements over the Libya intervention explains all divisions in the Council; nor do I claim that changes to the Council's working practices will solve a set of deeper problems in great power relations. There is, however, evidence that creative diplomacy at that level can resolve what might first appear to be insurmountable problems, and that can lead to international public action that is more inclusive and responsive to humanitarian concerns. I profile some of that diplomacy in this section. I also take the opportunity to separate this Pragmatist conception of international diplomacy from some definitions of Liberal internationalism.

In the third section I reflect on what Pragmatic Constructivism tells us about the skeptic's argument that R2P is a 'hollow norm' (Hehir 2019). This is a compelling argument given the continuing occurrence of atrocities, and the failure of international society to realize the public interest in preventing them. It is not necessarily a *useful* argument, however. This is for two reasons: firstly it overstates the agency of a norm, which is (somehow) meant to influence states. It also understates the agency of the norm theorist (and civil society actors), who should *use* the norm to hold responsible agents (states) to account and find alternative ways of realizing the public interest. Secondly, the alternatives offered by R2P sceptics are less compelling than their critique. The idea of creating a new regulatory authority that transcends the UN Security Council, and has the authority to act on the public interest in humanitarian intervention, puts the cart before the horse: it argues that state interests will change in ways that realize the public interest in humanitarian intervention if they are compelled to do so by such an authority, but states will only create such an authority if their national interests change in ways that do not clash with the public interest.

Changing interests and identities, in other words, requires a bottom-up process of humanitarian activism.[157] That has to be politically significant if the skeptic's alternative to R2P is to be realized. But there is a paradox. If humanitarianism is significant enough to change state interests and identities then it is likely that the UN would work as R2P intends and that would negate the skeptic's argument. I focus on the importance of bottom-up processes in the final section, which expands the inquiry on atrocity prevention to include the threat posed by nuclear weapons and 'the genocidal mentality necessary to make deterrence work' (Booth 2007, 267). This section exposes a tension in the concurrent practice of nuclear deterrence and non-proliferation; the former can encourage other states to acquire nuclear weapons which, according to the background knowledge underpinning of the latter, increases the risk of nuclear atrocity. This internal inconsistency creates real and living doubt in the epistemic authority of the current nuclear order. The Pragmatist response, I suggest, is to mobilize vulnerable publics (and there are many) behind creative arms

---

[157] On the importance of bottom-up activism in Pragmatist thought see Chapter 4. See also Cochran 2002.

control strategies; a process that can, I further suggest, become the focus for complex learning and the growth of security communities.

Sovereignty, intervention and R2P practices

The idea that the state is - and should be - sovereign in a territorially demarcated area, and that this is mutually recognized by other states, is often described as 'the basic constitutive norm of international society' (Lechner and Frost 2018, 134; also Bull 1977 35). As a standard of appropriate behaviour, this norm legitimizes and enables a bundle of international practices. When these practices are performed without contestation it strengthens the idea that sovereignty is the way social relations are - and should be - organized on a global scale. Sovereignty is not just a norm in this respect, it is also an institution or macro-practice: a 'practice of practices'. It includes, for instance, respecting the territorial and political integrity of a state by not intervening in its internal affairs (non-intervention), and not prosecuting the head or diplomatic representatives of another state in national courts (sovereign and diplomatic immunity). Of course, there is nothing inevitable about these practices. If state representatives stopped performing them international society would be reconstituted along different lines, or at least the meaning of sovereignty would be altered. Indeed, that is what advocates of the R2P norm argue should happen.

At its most basic, the R2P norm, which was adopted by states at the 2005 World Summit, insists that the privileges of sovereignty are contingent on states meeting a responsibility to protect populations from atrocity crimes.[158] When the state 'manifestly fails' to protect its populations, that responsibility transfers to the international community (Gallagher 2014). Who exactly is expected to discharge the responsibility to protect on behalf of international society was left unstated by the World Summit Outcome Document, and it has not been clarified in subsequent reports. That is a problem (Miller 2001; Ralph and Souter 2015; Erskine 2016). The point here, however, is that R2P, together with the earlier creation of the International Criminal Court, challenges the meaning of sovereignty, makes it contingent on the protection of populations, and gives normative authority to a set of practices (for example humanitarian intervention and international criminal justice) that clash with the practices of the society of sovereign states.[159] I suggest that Pragmatic Constructivism can not only explain these developments, it can normatively support them. To understand why this is the case, we need to go back to the 1990s and appreciate why R2P was first articulated.

The learning experiences from two 'disjunctures' (Bernstein and Laurence 2022, 88) are crucial to understanding the emergence of the R2P norm. The first was the failure of international society to prevent the genocides in Rwanda (1994) and in Bosnia (1995), and the second was the NATO 'humanitarian intervention' to prevent ethnic cleansing in Kosovo (1999). The practices of sovereignty were implicated

---

[158] As Luke Glanville (2014) notes, the idea that sovereignty includes the responsibility to protect is not a departure from the classic definition. It in fact has 'deep historical roots' that extend back to the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Glanville demonstrates how 'the right to national self-governance came to take priority over the protection of individual liberties, but the noninterventionist understanding of sovereignty was only firmly established in the twentieth century'.

[159] On the relationship of R2P to the ICC see Ralph 2015a.

in the former in a very specific way. On reflection, the neutrality of the UN peacekeeping operations in Rwanda and Bosnia was inappropriate given the inhumane consequences, but that practice was then consistent with the view that peacekeepers should respect the sovereignty of a state by not politically or militarily intervening in an internal conflict. Peacekeeping norms also meant leaving the country when either of the warring parties withdrew their consent. A lesson from this experience was that practitioners could not be neutral in a conflict when the practical consequence of that practice was genocide (United Nations 1999a and b; United Nations 2000).

That particular lesson was acted on later in the decade when NATO states refused to perform the practices of sovereignty if it meant being bystanders to ethnic cleansing in Kosovo. Their decision to use of force was not authorized by the UN Security Council, however. It was in that respect a violation of the principle of non-intervention which, as noted, helps constitute the international society of sovereign states. To the extent the Kosovo intervention also increased great power tensions, including a Russian-NATO military stand-off, it also pointed to the dangers of unrestrained humanitarianism. While some lawyers, including those from the UK Foreign Office, argued that the intervention was consistent with the practices of states, which for them underpinned a customary law authorizing humanitarian intervention, others accepted that the intervention was illegal while claiming it was legitimate.[160]

How can we understand this in Pragmatist terms? Out of the failing practices of sovereign states (i.e. non-intervention) a new set of practices had emerged (i.e. humanitarian intervention) but those new practices had only gave rise to new dilemmas and doubt (Bellamy 2002). There existed in the late 1990s, in other words, a social problem that required creative thinking. That problem was captured well by the then UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan. He described this inability to reconcile humanitarianism and the practices of sovereignty as a 'tragedy'. International society, he argued, was caught between 'two equally compelling interests':

> on one side, the question of the legitimacy of an action taken by a regional organization without a United Nations mandate; on the other, the universally recognized imperative of effectively halting gross and systematic violations of human rights with grave humanitarian consequences (Annan 1999).

It is testament to the Pragmatic temperament of Annan, and the UN as a community of inquiry, that they set out to creatively square this circle.[161] Initial work centered on the deliberations of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS 2001). Its report articulated the R2P norm, as described above. On the question of military intervention, the ICISS clearly preferred Security Council authorization but it did not exclude a Kosovo-like operation. The World Summit, however, made Security Council authorization a precondition. This was hardly surprising given concerns raised by the US-led invasion of Iraq in the period between the ICISS report and the World Summit, and it led some

---

[160] For example, the Independent International Commission on Kosovo (IICK) was established by the government of Sweden and found that the intervention was illegal but legitimate. The UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office, however, argued that the intervention was legal on the basis that the Security Council had 'implicitly authorized' the use of force in the resolutions leading up to the crisis, see Wheeler 2000, 258-72.

[161] On the relationship of Pragmatism and tragedy see Ralph 2018, 188-90, see also Chapter 4 of this book.

commentators to lament what they called 'R2P-lite' (Weiss 2016). While that is a good description of how the ICISS report's recommendations were watered down by the two paragraph statement at the World Summit, it is not, I would argue, reason to dismiss the normative value of the R2P norm. That can be established in Pragmatist terms.

The emergence of the R2P norm represents normative progress because it includes the lived experiences of the most vulnerable populations in the deliberative processes that construct the global public good. It demands reflection on existing international practices in terms of the consequences they have for these populations. These populations, who have no other recourse to protection because they happen to live in a state that claims a sovereign right to act with impunity, or because the state is simply powerless against genocidal non-state actors, clearly fits the Deweyan definition of 'publics'. They are affected by the international practices of sovereign states but have no voice to contest the norms that enable those practices so long as states listen only to each other when they deliberate on the public good. By being unaware of the consequences of their practices, these states *cannot authoritatively claim to know the public interest*. By expanding international society's 'circle of empathy' (Marlier and Crawford 2013, 398) to include and care for vulnerable publics practitioners of R2P *can* claim such authority. Of course, the vulnerable are given a voice by R2P in a very indirect way (which has its own problems). It mobilizes the sympathy that is felt by populations when they see the suffering of others and it translates that (albeit in an indeterminate way) into a responsibility to reflect on what could be done differently. In this sense, I would argue that the R2P norm passes the Pragmatic Constructivist's first normative test: inclusive reflexivity.

More than that, by insisting international society acts 'through the Security Council, in accordance with the Charter, including Chapter VII, on a case-by-case basis and in cooperation with relevant regional organizations as appropriate, should peaceful means be inadequate' (UN 2005, para. 139) the R2P norm passes the second normative test: deliberative practical judgement. States willing to act out of sympathy for vulnerable populations may be well-motivated, but the consequences of acting unilaterally (or at least outside the processes set by the UN Charter) can be harmful. That was the lesson of Kosovo. There is a risk that such practices constitute what Christian Reus-Smit (2005) calls 'liberal hierarchy'. This is based on an argument that liberal states need not seek the authority of wider international society before using force. For Reus-Smit (2005, 72), such a hierarchy is unhelpful. It 'can only exacerbate already widespread feelings about the inequities of the present international order, reduce the sense of investment of many states in the institutional architecture and rules of international society, and, as a consequence, heighten rather than diminish conflict and discord'.

At the extreme end of such a scenario, of course, is great power war and the perverse scenario of liberal states risking nuclear war – with all the atrocities that entails – in the name of humanitarian intervention. In this respect, deliberation among the nuclear powers is important; and the R2P norm is to be valued because it encourages that. But we do not have to entertain that extreme scenario for the costs of exclusionary and hierarchical decision-making to be apparent. Power is relative to the problem in view, and the ability to mitigate vulnerability is often beyond those states who make decisions at the UN Security Council, let alone the liberal states on the Council. I demonstrate this with empirical examples in the following section, but the implication should already be apparent: why, given the limited power of liberal

states, and given the public interest in mobilizing international support for vulnerable populations, would it be appropriate to exclude from deliberative processes the states do have problem-solving resources? In this sense, the commitment to UN multilateralism found in the 2005 articulation of the R2P is to be valued. It is sensitive to the Pragmatist argument that solving practical problems in the public interest has to work with, rather than against, power. Communities of inquiry have to be constructed with that in mind. The difficulty, of course, is that since the articulation of the R2P norm in 2005, the UN Security Council has not been responsive to the public interest articulated in the World Summit statement, and that has created doubt in the value of the R2P norm. I address that in the following two sections.

Assessing the UN Security Council as a community of practice

At least in theory, then, the R2P norm is worth supporting. But how has it worked in practice? If we focus, at least for the moment, on the UN Security Council as a community of R2P practice, the answer is not encouraging. At the time of writing, the permanent members of the Council were divided and two of those great powers – Russia and China – were accused of atrocity crimes in Ukraine and Xinjiang respectively. The Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, moreover, listed 31 other situations of concern. Prior to that, the Council had failed to act in 'a timely and decisive manner' to protect vulnerable populations in Syria, in part because Russia and China had vetoed resolutions addressing the situation. For some, the lesson of that particular experience was the need to reform Security Council procedures. An initiative from the Small Five Group of states, for instance, proposed that the negative vote of a permanent member be counted in the same way as that of an elected member rather than a veto. The Accountability, Coherence, and Transparency Group of 20 states also proposed that the P5 voluntarily suspend the use of their veto when faced with a 'credible' draft resolution to end atrocity. France and Mexico proposed adding a procedural trigger to this whereby veto restraint would only apply when at least 50 member states request the Secretary-General to confirm that the situation necessitates veto restraint. The P5 would not be expected to forego the veto in situations that involved the 'national interest' (Adediran 2018; Luck 2019; Hehir 2019, 138-42; Morris 2015; Morris and Wheeler 2016; Vilmer 2018).

Such proposals are consistent with Pragmatic Constructivism's first test: reflexive inclusivity. By including the General Assembly in the process that determines a situation involves atrocities – and therefore triggers the international responsibility to protect – these proposals encourage conscientious reflection on the part of the Council's veto powers. The situation with the second normative test – deliberative practical judgement – is, however, less clear cut. If the expectation is that the great powers should not veto a resolution addressing an atrocity situation, what is the implication when they fail to meet that expectation? Is the implication that it is in the public interest to ignore the veto and act on the resolution? What if ignoring the veto means using force in a way that threatens the great power's interest? Might international society be on the slippery slope toward the extreme scenario of great power war cited above? Such a scenario is a reminder of Inis Claude's (1971, 156) justification of the Security Council veto: it is a fuse 'designed to break the flow of electricity whenever circumstances are such that continued operation of the circuit would be dangerous'. The UN Charter 'registered power; it did not confer it' (Claude 1971, 72) and in that respect it is potentially dangerous for states to ignore it. By ignoring the veto the Council would no

longer act as a 'fuse' and international society would risk experiencing the surge of great power conflict.[162] A stalemate at the Council 'is an inconvenience', Claude (1971, 157) added, 'a showdown would be a disaster'. For this reason, and following the Pragmatic Constructivist second normative test, there are good reasons for not supporting these reform proposals and working within the existing meanings of R2P.

Of course, it is not necessarily the case that action without the consent of the great powers would lead to Claude's 'disaster'; and it could be that a stalemate at the Council in the face of genocide is more than an 'inconvenience'. A judgement has to be made on a case-by-case basis. Diplomacy can, moreover, change the parameters of the dilemma facing practitioners, making it easier or more difficult for states on the Security Council to respond to atrocity situations. This is a lesson of the Council's response to the 2011 situation in Libya, when Muammar Gaddafi's regime threatened the population that was rebelling against its rule. On that occasion the Security Council did pass a resolution authorizing the use of force to protect vulnerable populations. This in fact was regarded by the then UN Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon as the moment R2P 'came of age' (cited in Ralph and Gallagher 2015, 566). Yet there is evidence that the diplomacy at the Council was not as 'competent' – to use a term from diplomatic practice theory (Adler-Nissen and Pouliot 2014) – as might first have appeared. Ralph and Gifkins (2018) argue, for instance, that the collapse of the diplomatic consensus at the Security Council was in part a consequence of the way in which the resolution in question was negotiated. More specifically, the domination of the process by France, the UK and the US (the permanent 3 or P3) contributed to a level of mistrust that was later exposed by the military operation, which helped the political opposition to overthrow the Gaddafi regime. This is relevant here because it casts doubt on Security Council as a community of practice that is sufficiently inclusive and reflexive to be able to realize the public interest in protecting vulnerable populations.

At issue here is the micro-practice of 'penholding' and the performance of the P3 as penholders. Penholding refers to the physical and diplomatic process of drafting a Security Council resolution. It is an informal practice that emerged as a response to the increase in Council business, and it is a sign of diplomatic competence to be a 'penholder'. It is also a form of diplomatic power (and hierarchy) because the penholder is in a position to lead the process and influence - if not dictate - the substance of a resolution. This is potentially problematic in terms of Pragmatic Constructivism's two normative tests, and this is what Ralph and Gifkins (2018) exposed. They found that states who were central to preserving the support for R2P felt sidelined by the P3 process of drafting the key resolution on Libya, Resolution 1973. That form of exclusion contributed to a relative lack of reflection on the part of the P3, which assumed that the R2P coalition would hold once Resolution 1973 was passed. That was not the case. In fact, the emerging powers – states that a Pragmatist would consider important for the future practice of R2P – spoke out against regime change in Libya, arguing that they had been misled by the P3 at the Council. That made the difficult task of finding consensus on the contemporaneous situation in Syria even more difficult, and for that reason Ralph and Gifkins conclude that P3 diplomacy over Libya was not as competent as Practice theory accounts might suggest.[163] The point here, is that when penholding is practiced in a hierarchical and

---

[162] On the Council as a 'concert' of power, as well as a council of 'global governance' see Bosco 2014.
[163] See also Snyder (2022, 45) whose Pragmatist informed approach views these events in terms of liberal internationalists overreaching politically and making it harder to protect human rights.

exclusionary way it can contribute, as Pragmatism would suggest, to misjudgements and policies that are maladapted to the situation.

Two counter-arguments challenge this analysis. The first is that penholding is a practical necessity. Someone has to take the lead in writing a resolution and that requires the kind of skill that permanent membership of the Council nurtures. The hierarchies that attend penholding, therefore, may be exclusionary, but there is no guarantee that putting the pen in the hands of less qualified diplomats will lead to better outcomes. The second point stresses the limitations of concentrating the analysis on micro-practices like penholding. The collapse of the coalition authorizing the Libya intervention was a consequence of the way the military operation was conducted. That would have happened no matter how well diplomats at the Security Council had negotiated Resolution 1973.[164] Likewise, the Council's paralysis on Syria may have followed regardless of the events in Libya. From this perspective, Russia's interest in keeping Assad in power had more to do with its regional security interests than a normative contestation over the use of R2P post-Libya. On both these points, however, there is evidence to argue that Pragmatism still delivers a compelling normative critique of the Security Council, as well as guidance on alternative practices.

On the first point, that penholding requires the competence that only diplomats from permanent members have, there is evidence to show why this is not necessarily the case. Again, this stems from an appreciation of the situational character of problem-solving. Ralph and Gifkins (2018) note, for instance, how the Council was able to agree - even in context of continuing great power mistrust - a resolution that guaranteed humanitarian access without the consent of the Syrian government. It did this by changing the penholder on the situation in Syria. In that instance, leadership by the elected members Australia, Lebanon and Luxembourg helped to transcend the political obstacles that stood in the way of diplomats from the P3. This creative approach found a way to mitigate vulnerability by challenging existing practice.

The second point – that adjustments to the micro-practice of penholding will have limited impact - is more difficult to deal with. If the political divide between states is so wide then adjustments to the Council's working practices will not have an ameliorative effect. That does not mean Pragmatist insight is redundant, however. Pragmatists must adjust their analytical focus and zoom-out to view the great power habitus that stymies cooperation. In this context, it is worth recalling the point I made in Chapter 3 about the impact of the liberal habitus on R2P practice. The assumption that democracy promotion – or in the Syria case political and criminal accountability – is consistent with atrocity prevention should not have been taken for granted in the way it was by Western practitioners during this period (Ralph, Holland and Zhekova 2017; Docherty, Mathieu and Ralph 2020). Reflecting on that relationship in the specific context of the moment, I suggest, could have prompted better judgement of the costs of calling for Assad to go (even if it was right

---

[164] There is an argument that justifies the NATO military operation, which led to regime change, as the only way of protecting the Libyan population. This was made, for instance, by the UK Foreign Office, which argued the regime was a threat to the population, so targeting the regime was reasonable and that regime change was a consequence of that rather than an aim of the mission (see Ralph and Gallagher 2015). The corollary of this is that responsibility for the collapsed coalition on R2P lies not with NATO or P3 diplomats, who did what was necessary to protect the Libyan population, but with BRICS states who were either mistaken in their judgement on Libya or used NATO actions as an excuse for an unreasonable position on R2P.

as a matter of principle), and that would – as others have argued – led Western powers to be more supportive of UN diplomacy at the beginning of the conflict.[165] In light of what followed – a failure to dislodge Assad and prevent mass atrocities – the path not taken in 2012 may have been the better option.

It is at this point that I can make explicit a difference between Pragmatic Constructivism and Liberal Internationalism. It is difficult to pin the latter down given that there are different versions, but it is fair to say that these versions place greater and lesser emphasis on multilateralism and democracy promotion. For example a 'hard Wilsonian' (Boot 2004) version tends to share with Neoconservatives an emphasis on the material power of liberal states. It is suspicious of multilateralism, which it sees as a harmful restraint on liberal power.[166] From this perspective, liberal values are best secured by liberal hegemony. A 'soft Wilsonian' version, on the other hand, shares a Republican suspicion of concentrated power (Deudney 2007). In this respect, the multilateral processes of international organizations mitigate the power politics that Realists like Mearsheimer regard as an inevitable and tragic feature of international relations (see Chapter 4). Because they ameliorate the demands of power politics, international organizations help promote liberal democracy by, for example, removing the national security imperative to centralize power. In this way, international organizations make the world safe for democracy.

Pragmatic Constructivism, I suggest, has more in common with the latter version of liberal internationalism, especially because the former is prone to the misjudgements that stem from misplaced moral certainty (for example the US-led invasion of Iraq). Pragmatic Constructivism is committed to deliberative democracy as a form of social inquiry that reveals and realizes the public interest in the face of a given problem. I would argue, however, that it shares with Realism an ethic of responsibility (see Chapter 4) that is sensitive to the sometimes harmful material (or experiential) consequences of foreign policies that try to promote democracy, and this is illustrated by the R2P case. R2P practices should protect populations from atrocity crimes, not make them vulnerable to such crimes in the name of democracy. Moreover, as the following Chapters demonstrate, the global challenges that impact on the lived experience need to be addressed by decision-making at a global level and the state-centric approach of liberal internationalism does not necessarily address that. At the level of global governance, the Pragmatic Constructivist emphasis on reflexive inclusivity and deliberative practical judgement translates into a primary focus on the qualities of communities of practice. Attention to the democratic credentials of nation-states is a secondary, but not irrelevant, focus.

R2P skepticism and the Pragmatist Vocation

The record of the Security Council as a community of R2P practice is such that skeptical commentators are prepared to dismiss R2P as a 'hollow norm' (Hehir 2019). Aidan Hehir (2019, 3) finds, for instance, a 'jarring' disparity between the exhortation of the norm's influence and ongoing atrocities. This is because, in Hehir's

---

[165] It is worth noting here that Realists (e.g. Walt 2016) and UN diplomats (e.g. Guéhenno 2015) were aligned (Ralph 2018).

[166] On Neoconservative thought, which uses democracy promotion as a nationalist rallying call, and is a reaction against domestic liberalism, see Williams 2005 and Drolet 2011.

eyes, the World Summit changed nothing about the way international society views humanitarian protection. It failed to challenge the primacy of the Security Council as the institution that legally authorizes humanitarian intervention and, as a consequence, international society's response to atrocity crimes is characterized by ongoing inconsistency. When great power interests coincide with the demands of the R2P norm the Security Council responds appropriately. On any other occasion, the Council is either unresponsive or deadlocked (Hehir 2013). This means R2P is a 'hollow norm' because 'its implementation is regulated by those it seeks to constrain rather than either an impartial body or those it seeks to protect' (Hehir 2019, 9). The reference to an 'impartial body' points to Hehir's proposal for much more radical legal reform, which he set out in an earlier work (Hehir 2012). There he called for a new judicial body that would 'operate as an alternative when the P5 are paralyzed' (Hehir 2012, 233). It would determine the existence of atrocities and the appropriate response. A finding of atrocities by such a body could justify unilateral humanitarian intervention by a willing state or a United Nations standing army (Hehir 2012, 233-6). Its 'freedom from any particular national bias would give it credibility and legitimacy that the Security Council lacks' (Hehir 2012, 240). [167]

Pragmatic Constructivism, I suggest, offers three responses to Hehir's skepticism and his idealism. Firstly, Hehir's skepticism is based on a rationalist assumption that state interests and identities are fixed (Hehir 2018; also Murray 2013). From the Pragmatic Constructivist perspective, this is an unwarranted assumption. That states act on their interests is obvious, but what those interests are is influenced by conceptions of the national identity, and those conceptions are themselves influenced by international norms like R2P. Luke Glanville (2016) captures this when he describes R2P as a 'constitutive norm'. He illustrates this by pointing to evidence that shows how 'the Obama administration was moved by a felt imperative to act to protect Libyan civilians in 2011' (Glanville 2016, 193). Intervention happened 'despite the expressed concerns of leading officials within the administration that the United States had no strategic interest' in such an action. The US identity as a responsible great power was influenced on that occasion by a norm that determined what the global public interest was and what, in that context, international responsibility meant. It meant acting through the Security Council in a timely and decisive manner to protect the Libyan population from atrocity crimes. The US could not act in any other way because, in the words of President Obama, 'that's not who we are' (cited by Glanville 2016, 192).

Secondly, Hehir's skepticism is directed at R2P as if it – as a set of words – has agency. With respect to the Syria situation, for instance, we are told that 'R2P has tragically fallen short' (Hehir 2019, 29). This formulation is misleading and unhelpful. Norms – as a sets of words – do not have agency. They 'don't have arms, legs, brains or iPhones. They can't do anything' (Jetschke and Liese 2013, 54). When action that could protect vulnerable populations is not taken it is not *the norm* that fails. The failure rests with those with agency (e.g. practitioners) and the R2P norm – as a set of words – helps to articulate that. But even here, the argument of those, like Glanville (2016, 189-90) and Jarvis (2022, 147-52), who argue that the R2P norm works 'in the breach' is also misleading and unhelpful. The norm can help articulate why some (non-) actions are irresponsible but the norm itself does not *do* this is. Exposing the breach requires action, a performance, a practice. It requires, in other words, political agents; and from the Pragmatic

---

[167] For similar proposals see Tesón 2006; Roff 2013; Ercan 2016.

Constructivist perspective the norm theorist is not without agency: they can either *use* the norm to hold states to account or they can let states off the hook by dismissing the norm as hollow. Indeed, one interpretation of the sceptic's argument that states invoke 'R2P' without changing their practices (Hehir 2019, 9) is that those states are being irresponsible, but the sceptic cannot say that explicitly because to do so would demonstrate the usefulness of the norm. Pragmatic Constructivism, I suggest, has less doubts. Because it is committed, for reasons given above, to R2P as a good norm it has no hesitation about using it to criticize agents when they fail to act in accordance with the global public interest.

Thirdly, Hehir's proposal for an impartial body to second guess the Security Council misses the point that the constitutive work to change the state's identity and interests must come first if states, and especially the P5, are to consent to the creation of a new judicial body. This is the lesson of the progressive move to create the International Criminal Court. That was offered as a solution to the problems created by the selective practice of international criminal justice, which centered on the authority of the UN Security Council to establish *ad hoc* courts. The movement to create a permanent court that was independent of the Council was successful but it had to make political compromises. To get the consent of states it had to tailor the founding treaty and limit the Court so that it would not exercise its jurisdiction over the citizens of states that withheld their consent (except when a situation was referred by the Security Council). Some unreconstructed sovereign states (including the US, Russia and China) withheld their consent; and because some of these states can veto Security Council resolutions referring situations involving their citizens (or other interests) there are gaps in the Court's jurisdiction (Ralph 2016; see also Royer 2019; Jarvis 2022, 156-7).[168]

The point that this specific lesson, and Pragmatic Constructivism more generally, alerts us to is this: without a bottom-up process that reconstructs the identity and interests of states (especially the three mentioned above) Hehir's proposal is unlikely to work in the way he thinks it will. Why, one might ask, would unreconstructed great powers be shamed by a new independent judicial body when they are not moved either by the ICC, the UN General Assembly or global civil society more generally? More than that, the second Pragmatic Constructivist test – deliberative practical judgement – suggests Hehir's proposal is potentially dangerous in the same way as the move to ignore the veto is, a move he in fact criticizes (Hehir 2018). The dangerous consequences that follow from an action that challenges the interests of a great power do not change simply because a military intervention has the authority of an independent judicial body behind it.

So what then is the alternative to the Security Council as a failing community of R2P practice? The temptation is to retreat into a Realist counsel of despair and point again to the tragic character of international relations. From the Pragmatic Constructivist perspective that is, as I noted in Chapter 4, unnecessary and unhelpful. A more constructive approach is to recognize that the Security Council is not the only community of R2P practice and that military intervention is not the only means of properly discharging the responsibility to protect. As less skeptical commentators have noted, for instance, the

---

[168] To be sure, the ICC Independent Prosecutor has jurisdiction over situations occurring on the territory of state party, which might mean citizens of states not party to the ICC's founding document, the Rome Treaty, could be prosecuted. On the 'exceptionalist' roots underpinning the US reaction to this see Ralph 2007.

norm entrepreneurs of the 1990s never conceived R2P in these narrow terms. International society has a broader *responsibility to prevent* situations from descending to a point where military intervention is the only way to protect populations (Bellamy and Luck 2018; Bellamy and Šimonović, 2021; Jacob and Mennecke 2019; Sharma and Welsh 2016; United Nations 2013, 2014). This could include diplomatic initiatives by regional organizations that do not implicate Security Council practices (Kikolar 2016, Sharma 2016). It could include longer term initiatives that focus on the root causes of extreme violence through a focus on education (Rubaii, Wright and Prentice 2021) and poverty (Bohm and Brown 2021). Others have argued for a broader understanding of R2P in those situations where prevention has failed and states are forced to react to ongoing atrocities. An international responsibility does not end simply because military intervention is unable to protect populations *in situ*. It demands states offer asylum to those who are able to protect themselves by fleeing violence (Ralph and Souter 2015.)[169]

For the skeptic, these proposals are both ineffective and insufficient. Hehir, for instance, describes the emphasis on prevention as 'the last refuge of the unimaginative' (2012). The idea that R2P has various meanings is, from this perspective, evidence of its malleability. This only facilitates instrumentalism as states seek 'to support pre-existing dispositions and interests'. R2P remains hollow because it 'can be affirmed without cost' (Hehir 2018, 8). This last point is important, but again it is one that the Pragmatic Constructivist is sensitive to and committed to normatively addressing. Malleability of meaning only works to the extent it helps to improve the lived experience by protecting vulnerable publics. Existing dispositions and R2P practices have to be assessed in that light. Pragmatic Constructivism, as I argued previously (Ralph 2018), shifts the research agenda from tracing the meanings of a norm in discursive use toward assessing the usefulness of those and other meanings; and again that reminds us of the agency (and vocation) of Pragmatist theorists and their partnerships across civil society.

On this last point, the skeptic's description of R2P advocacy groups as 'courtiers' rather than 'critics', and the dismissal of their work because of their ongoing dialogue with states is also unhelpful (Hehir 2018, 105-121). States should be held to account in the normative context created by R2P but there are multiple ways of doing that and they differ according to particular circumstances. As Jack Snyder (2020; 2022, 12-7, 189-211) notes with respect to human rights diplomacy, naming and shaming can have unintended and perverse consequences, and in those situations respectful dialogue can produce better results. Snyder's pragmatism draws only briefly on the philosophical Pragmatism of Dewey (Snyder 2022, 30-31) but it nevertheless maps on to the Pragmatic Constructivist temperament I set out here.

Nuclear atrocity prevention

The Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, and the calls for a NATO intervention to protect vulnerable populations (Lambert 2022), raised the prospect of great power conflict. A reason why that did

---

[169] Welsh (2019, 64) has argued that broadening the meaning of R2P to include a responsibility to provide humanitarian assistance and asylum risks substantially diluting what is meant by 'protection'. This is true, but at the same time, limiting the meaning of R2P to military intervention risks substantially diluting the meaning of 'responsibility'. It could, as a result, mean those states that can take action to ease suffering do not because they can claim the situation is a tragic one where R2P (i.e. military intervention) would only make things worse.

not happen was the existence of nuclear weapons and the practice of deterrence (Morgan 2011). Arguably, the *practice* of deterrence was not necessary to deter a NATO intervention. As Lawrence Freedman (1988) argued in a different context, the mere *existence* of nuclear weapons can be enough to deter military action against the state that possesses them. Yet when President Putin threatened to use nuclear weapons against any state militarily intervening in the Ukraine conflict (Brown 2022b) he was performing the practice of nuclear deterrence. Pragmatic Constructivism is not only able to identify this as an international practice, it is I suggest, able to normatively condemn it in these circumstances.

Putin's threats were part of an aggressive campaign that harmed the lived experience of Ukraine's population and, arguably, the Russian population. It made many others feel insecure. But the extent nuclear deterrence did work to limit the war – at the time of writing Russia had not attacked a NATO state and NATO had not attacked Russian forces – one might argue nuclear deterrence is a useful practice. One might also draw the lesson that Ukraine should not have given up the nuclear weapons it had as part of the Soviet Union. A similar point was made with respect to the US-led invasion of Iraq and NATO-led intervention against Libya (see Wheeler 2018 90-1). This evidence suggests that nuclear weapons states do not attack each other, so the lesson may be that we can (as neorealist theory has told us) stabilize international relations, and prevent the harms of war, through the proliferation of nuclear weapons (Waltz 1981, 1990, 2012; Sagan and Waltz 2010).

Such proposals do not command epistemic authority across international society, however. International society's doubt is evidenced by a strong commitment to *non*-proliferation practices. Despite the 'nuclear learning' (Nye 1987; Knopf 2012) that has enabled nuclear weapon states to avoid war, and despite the emergence of a 'nuclear taboo' (Tannenwald 1999, 2005, 2009), which can explain why nuclear weapons are not used against non-nuclear weapon states, international society does not have faith in the argument the proliferation of nuclear weapons is in the global public interest. This is captured in the 1968 Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which begins by noting 'that the proliferation of nuclear weapons would seriously enhance the danger of nuclear war', adding that 'the devastation that would be visited upon all mankind by a nuclear war' means there is a 'consequent need to make every effort to avert the danger of such a war and to take measures to safeguard the security of peoples'.

Such language suggests R2P and non-proliferation practices share the same objective. Underpinning the NPT, and the practices it inspires (Sidhu 2016), is a humanitarian concern to prevent atrocity, which is what the use of nuclear weapons in conflict would constitute. This was the understanding of the International Court of Justice, which ruled in 1996 that the destructive capacity of nuclear weapons meant their use in conflict could not be reconciled with international humanitarian law (Farrell and Lambert 2001). Preventing nuclear use is, in this sense, aligned with 'atrocity prevention'. I made this point in the context of the Ukraine conflict when arguing against those who were willing to risk a war between nuclear powers in the name of humanitarian intervention (Ralph 2022).

Over 75 years since the use of nuclear weapons in conflict then, there remains epistemic doubt about how to cope with this material change and what constitutes the global public interest. If nuclear deterrence prevents war why not expand nuclear ownership? If nuclear weapons increase the risk of atrocity why not disarm? This doubt is exacerbated by the internally inconsistent reasoning of the great powers. On the

one hand, they justify their continuing possession (and indeed modernization) of nuclear weapons, as well as their deterrence practices, as a hedge against an uncertain future (US DoD 2018, 37; Plant and Harries 2021).[170] On the other hand, they deny those reasons are relevant to other states, who may be in even more vulnerable positions. This inconsistency may not be entirely unreasonable. It may be justified if the hierarchy of nuclear responsibility, on which it is based, has positive consequences. The hierarchy assumes that while some competent states (to again use Practice theory language) might be well-versed in deterrence theory and to be trusted with nuclear weapons, others should be denied that capability because they are less competent and cannot be trusted.

This kind of discriminatory practice is not uncommon. It is used perfectly well to realize the public interest in other walks of life, for instance the right to drive a car.   Indeed, a form of discrimination is at the center of the NPT, which distinguishes between nuclear and non-nuclear states. The issue is not one of hierarchy and inconsistency *per se* therefore. Rather the issue is whether the consequences that follow from the associated practices improve or threaten public security.   The question then is whether the existing relationship between deterrence and non-proliferation practices, which can work in theory, is working in in actual practice? Can existing practices be defended?

From a Pragmatic Constructivist perspective I think the answer to the last question is no.   In practice the hierarchical norms that try to justify what Shampa Biswas (2001) called 'nuclear apartheid' do not command epistemic authority.   They have not reduced the risk of nuclear use by preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons. The inconsistency – some might say hypocrisy – of nuclear weapon states, for instance, simplified the Indian decision to acquire a nuclear weapon capability. Explaining that decision, Prime Minister Jaswant Singh (1998, 43) posed the following rhetorical questions as a means of illustrating the doubts underpinning global nuclear practice: 'If the permanent five's possession of nuclear weapons increases security, why would India's possession of nuclear weapons be dangerous? … If deterrence works in the West – as it so obviously appears to, since Western nations insist on continuing to possess nuclear weapons – by what reasoning will it not work in India?' In that context, and faced with the argument that it was lingering racism and colonialism that underpinned the nuclear hierarchy (Biswas 2001), certain states consider it appropriate to challenge the non-proliferation norm and acquire nuclear weapons.[171]

That still does not mean the inconsistent nuclear practice across international society is a problem that needs addressing. The possibility remains that new nuclear states can learn from the experiences, doctrines and force postures of those that have (so far) avoided nuclear atrocity. Indeed, evidence that this is possible exists in the fact that relatively new nuclear relationships, like India and Pakistan, have (so far) avoided nuclear atrocity (Knopf 2012). In this sense, a gradual process of nuclear proliferation might be in the global public interest. That hypothesis does not inspire confidence, however, especially among those who have analyzed the experiences of existing nuclear relationships and found them to be less stable than

---

[170] See Ruzicka (2019, 391-3) for other 'paradigmatic' examples. Indeed, the P5 have been disengaging from nuclear disarmament negotiations to engage in the modernization of their nuclear forces, see Thakur 2018.

[171] As well as the hypocrisy, nuclear weapon states can be accused of nuclear irresponsibility to the extent they have, as noted, used their nuclear status to attack non-nuclear states.

supporters of deterrence practices maintain. Based on these experiences, they argue that the risk of an inadvertent or accidental nuclear atrocity is unsettlingly high (Craig 2003, 2018; Thakur 2017, 110-11; Wheeler 2009, 433). In that light, the path of gradual nuclear proliferation is not a sensible one to take. More nuclear weapon states only increases the risk of nuclear atrocity and cannot therefore be in the global public interest.

The situation does therefore demand creative thinking to change current nuclear practices. Indeed, this was recognized some time ago by Realist thinkers like Hans Morgenthau. He thought there was 'a gap between what we think about our social, political and philosophical problems and the objective conditions which the nuclear age as created' (Morgenthau 1964, 23). This Deweyan sentiment was matched, moreover, by his criticism of those who attempted to 'normalize, conventionalize and "nationalize" nuclear power' (Morgenthau 1964, 35).[172] Here we see what Campbell Craig (2003; see also 2019, 355-8) called the Realist's 'glimpse' of a new 'political process whereby a condition of anarchy evolves into a new Leviathan: a world state that comes into being merely because of the *prospect* of a nuclear war of all against all'. As Craig (2003) demonstrates, this glimmer of global governance was also evident in Niebuhr's and Waltz's work.[173] It has found more recent, and more substantive, expression in Craig's 'Weberian realist' proposal for centralizing the nuclear weapon capability in a world state, which, in his view, would be able to claim legitimacy because it advanced the public interest in preventing nuclear war (Craig 2019, 352). Similarly, Daniel Deudney argues for the centralization of a nuclear weapon capability, but his conception of a 'republican union' would not look like a state. It would instead be composed of specialized agencies that separated the power to weaponize nuclear technology, a practice that Deudney (2019) calls 'deep arms control'. Rather than practices that 'mobilize, concentrate and accelerate' nuclear technology for the purpose of nuclear use, the practice of deep arms control would 'de-mobilize, separate and divide, and decelerate in order to prevent employment' (Deudney 2019, 380).

These macro-level proposals mirror Aidan Hehir's solution to the problems with R2P practice. They both aim at transcending the anarchic state system by creating new forms of global governance. Like Hehir, moreover, the nuclear Realists also risk putting the cart before the horse. States will not delegate authority over nuclear weapon capabilities to a supranational organization unless their security policies are sufficiently other-regarding (i.e. not focused solely on national security); and if they are other-regarding in this way then it is possible that their nuclear weapons will not be a problem. In this scenario, 'complex-learning' (Nye 1987) alters the identity of the state so that 'national' security is achieved only through 'common security' practices. 'National' communities competing for power are part of more inclusive and deliberative 'security communities' where war becomes unimaginable (Adler and Barnett 1998; Booth 1999c). The wider point is this: the complex learning that constructs a security community is needed *before* states will delegate control over nuclear weapons capabilities to a supranational organization, and in such

---

[172] Deudney (2019, 381) also articulates this in Deweyan terms, when he writes: '[w]hile the forces of destruction have been "revolutionized" by the development of nuclear weapons, the superstructure of statist security practices and political structures lags in its adjustment to the new material realities'.

[173] See also Herz 1960. Mearsheimer (2003, 12-3) also notes that there is no escaping the tragedy of great power politics 'unless the states that make up the system agree to form a world government. Such a vast transformation is hardly a realistic prospect'.

a scenario this kind of organization would not be needed because another state's nuclear weapons would not be a threat.

I do not think the role these creative proposals can play ends there, however. I return to this - especially Deudney's idea of 'deep arms control' – below. But first it is necessary to cite the evidence that shows how identities, interests and relations can evolve, even under the shadow of nuclear capabilities, to constitute an inclusive and deliberative security community. The most obvious example to cite in this regards, is the relationship between France, the US and the UK, where nuclear war is unthinkable. Similarly, it is claimed that Brazil and Argentina's nuclear relationship, which is not weaponized despite the capability, benefitted from this kind of complex or 'substantial learning' (Knopf 2012, 88-9). This was helped, as Andrew Hurrell notes (1998, 244) by processes of democratization, which increased the transparency of nuclear decision making and facilitated transnational confidence building measures. Such evidence should contribute to the 'stock of learning' that Pragmatist Constructivism turns to (see Chapter 2) when forming an initial assessment of the problem in view. Pragmatic Constructivism would in this sense, invest epistemic faith and political energy in the kind of social activism that challenges nationalist predispositions underpinning exclusionary conceptions of security; predispositions that even Realists like Morgenthau acknowledged were maladapted to the nuclear environment.

As further evidence that this analysis and normative position is not misplaced, Pragmatic Constructivists would point to the experiences of those who recall the end of the Cold War. Matthew Evangelista (1999), for instance, demonstrates how arms control and disarmament activists, among them prominent scientists and physicians, informed the constitutive processes that changed the interests and identities of the Cold War superpowers. The material conditions of Soviet decline, Evangelista concludes, did not determine *how* the Cold War ended.[174] The challenge to the Cold War order that accompanied the practices of 'common security' and 'defensive defence' instead originated in the transnational community of publically oriented arms control and disarmament activists (Evangelista 1999; see also Adler 1992; Adler and Faubert 2022; Evangelista 1995; Risse-Kappen 1994; Herman 1996; Booth 1999b). These experiences are both a motivation and a warning. As Deudney notes (2019, 381) '[a]bsent public pressure or acute nuclear learning episodes', the long-established practices of the nation- (or real-) state will likely to prevail.[175] That reminder of the need for political agency is important. But these experiences do I suggest offer evidence that Deweyan publics can change failing national security practices. They show how 'mutual trust was generated in and by practice' (Adler and Faubert 2022, 68). In that way they can inspire future activists.

---

[174] See also Wendt 1999, 129, 375 and Stein 1994, 173. Stein argues that Gorbachev's cognitive make-up as a motivated but 'relatively uncommitted thinker' meant he was able to engage in 'trial-and-error learning from failure', which helps explain the shift in Soviet interests and identity, even if that change also involved a wider political process. 'Gorbachev', she adds (1994, 178) 'learned through experimentation' and this is just a starting point for understanding wider social learning, which is created by individuals but involves the institutionalization of individual learning (1994, 182).

[175] Deudney (2019, 379) uses the term 'real-state' to describe the state that may not be based on a sense of nationhood but persists with practices that 'mobilize, concentrate, and accelerate violence capability in the hands of a centralized unitary actor for employment against adversaries'.

The Realist would, of course, stress that new Soviet thinking was made possible by declining material power. To reinforce that point they would explain Russia's recent offensive posture in terms of its material recovery. But from the Pragmatic Constructivist perspective there is nothing inevitable about the practices that follow shifts in material power. Indeed, Practice theory inspired accounts of the post-Cold War period point to the *social* process that reconstructed Russia's 'great power habitus'. This included a pushback against the 'superiority complex' among NATO practitioners who saw themselves as the 'teachers' of Russian diplomats (Pouliot 2010 loc.1704). This may itself have been a consequence of a Cold War habitus among Western diplomats, but Dewey's theory of social learning, which informs the two normative tests at the centre of the Pragmatic Constructivist approach, would have normatively criticized such a predisposition.[176] As Chapter 3 noted, for instance, social hierarchies (especially if they are unsympathetic) can be obstacles to social learning.

The task now is to follow these normative signposts by mobilizing the publics made vulnerable by the renewed threat of nuclear atrocity so that the representations they make in established communities of practice, such as the Non-Proliferation Review Conference and national security reviews, have wider significance and influence.[177] In this respect, the proposals for 'deep arms control' discussed above are useful after all. This is because they can act as a focal point for such a movement and a pedagogic tool for the kind of complex learning that is in the public interest (Deudney 2007, 254). Explaining the reason for deep arms control would, I hypothesize, address the 'challenge of mobilization' (Jarvis 2022, 140). It would educate national sentiments (Rorty 1993; Booth and Dunne 1999) so that they become other-regarding and publically oriented. It would help cultivate the kind of 'planetary mind' (Herz 1960, 230 quoted by Deudney 2019, 377) that is necessary to reduce the risk of nuclear atrocity.

Conclusion

Molly Cochran's Deweyan-inspired analysis of the current nuclear order notes that there are 'no solutions within the corpus of knowledge learned through tradition' (Cochran 2013, 173). This is what makes it a wicked rather than benign problem. The argument I advance here challenges that, but also builds on Cochran's view that when solutions are not currently available they 'must be imaginatively woven or constructed in the process of problem solving' (Cochran 2013, 177). Without underestimating the difficulty of the task, I suggest we can draw on the resources of past nuclear learning to guide vulnerable publics as they cope with the threat of nuclear atrocity. Like the transnational movement that ended the Cold War, and for a brief moment mitigated the trans-Atlantic security dilemma, a focus on deep arms control can act

---

[176] This suggests NATO expansion was not, as some have argued (Mearsheimer 2014), the reason for Russian aggression towards its neighbours. It was instead, in part, a consequence of the diplomatic practices accompanying that policy. To argue this, does not release Russian practitioners from responsibility for their aggressive actions. For an argument with a different implication - that NATO post-Cold War transformed from an alliance into a community based not only on democratic values, but on learned self-restraint subjectivities and cooperative security practices - see Adler 2008.

[177] That these conferences are heavily influenced by wider political environment was demonstrated in August 2022 when Russia's continuing occupation of Ukraine prevented consensus on any final document (Spilman and Claeys 2022).

as a pedagogic tool to rebuild the kind of public sentiment that underpins common security practices. I think deep arms control, rather than disarmament, is best placed to do this because it is not vulnerable to the counter-argument that nuclear weapons technology cannot be forgotten.

This is potentially at odds with the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN), which has successfully coalesced an otherwise inchoate public of vulnerable populations. On the one hand, my advocacy of deep arms control shares ICAN's view that raising awareness of the inhumane consequences of nuclear use is important, but on the other hand, my hypothesis rejects ICAN's view that nuclear weapons can be treated (and banned) like landmines. Nuclear weapons *are* exceptional. After all, great powers do not base their defence strategies on landmines (Ruzicka 2019, 390). For this reason abolition will not appeal to a community of inquiry that is inclusive of all stakeholders.   Deep arms control has a better track record in that regard and for that reason it is more likely to be the focus of an effective transnational movement whose value will ultimately be in changing the interests and identities of the great powers.

By framing the nuclear problem as an issue of atrocity prevention this chapter is politically aligned to that process. That language is commonly associated with the discourse on R2P, which I concentrated on as an example of progressive change in international society. Applying the two tests of Pragmatic Constructivism I explained and defended the R2P norm because it, at least in the abstract, includes vulnerable populations in the otherwise exclusionary practices of the community of sovereign states. I also defended the UN Security Council as a micro-community of practice that plays a particular role in the authorization of the use of force for humanitarian purposes. Excluding the great powers from that practice would, I argued, fail the deliberative practical judgement test to the extent it could – in the extreme scenario - risk nuclear atrocity in the name of humanitarian intervention. On that basis, I also argued against the implication that atrocity situations enables state to ignore the great power veto. Other proposals to reform the working practices of the Council, such as a more inclusive approach to penholding, are more compelling, especially because there is evidence that they can help to break great power deadlock. They also offer an opportunity to better bind emerging powers to the Council and thus make the Council a more effective community of R2P practice.

Chapter 7

International Practice and Climate Change

My purpose in this Chapter is to develop the answer to my third question: what does Pragmatic Constructivism (as set out in Part One of the book) tell us about the value of actual practices in contemporary international society. I focus on the challenge posed by climate change, and whether the communities of international practice that purportedly address that challenge authoritatively define the public interest in ways that should command normative and political support. The challenge of climate change is similar to the security challenge discussed in the previous chapter. The security challenge is a consequence of material change to the extent nuclear weapons, and modern delivery systems, have increased the risk of atrocities. Similarly, the increasing global temperature is a material change that also makes populations vulnerable, in this case to extreme weather events. How people will or should react to these changes is indeterminate and uncertain, which triggers the need for inquiry.

While uncertainty exists, there is a sense that existing practices across both the security and climate fields are unsustainable. If we continue business as usual, the lived experience will worsen. That should lead us to reflect on the authority of the background knowledge underpinning existing practice. The previous chapter demonstrated for instance how, if nationalist predispositions continue to inform the security practices of sovereign states, international society will not be able to realize the public interest in protecting vulnerable populations. To the extent existing security practices lead to the proliferation of nuclear weapons, moreover, international society is actually increasing the risk of atrocities. Likewise, if human practices continue to emit greenhouse gases at their current levels then, we are told, global temperatures will increase in ways that cause irreparable damage to the lived experience. There are sufficient parallels, and sufficient concerns, in other words, to justify my focus.

In this context, this Chapter asks whether we can have faith in the current practices of global climate change governance. It uses the Pragmatic Constructivist tests developed in previous chapters – inclusive reflexivity and deliberative practical judgement – to normatively assess two relevant communities of practice: the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) and the Conference of Parties (COP) to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). The Chapter is structured by four sections. In the first section I focus on the IPCC. The IPCC in effect frames the problem of climate change and it is an interesting case study for Pragmatic Constructivists because it reveals the complexities involved in asserting epistemic authority. As a panel of expert climate scientists one might expect inclusive reflexivity to be somewhat narrowly construed by this community of practice. Indeed, there are good reasons why the community needs to establish exclusionary boundaries as a means of protecting its expert status: we would have little faith in its judgement if anyone and everyone with opinions about the weather were invited to contribute. Yet Pragmatism alerts us to the social context of knowledge construction, and this remains important in this area. Even *bona fide* experts should not, if they are motivated to solve the problem, be

blind to how their knowledge is received. I illustrate this in the first section by showing how the Pragmatic Constructivist analytical and normative framework influences an assessment of the IPCC.

The second section focuses on COP as another community of practice. Where the IPCC defines the parameters of the problem, COP meets annually to discuss international society's response. I assess the extent to which COP is appropriately constituted at the micro- and macro-level. The former reveals concerns about the way the conference is organized and how it has, in effect, excluded global publics (i.e. those populations most affected by climate change). This in turn has impacted on the faith international and civil society has in COP. Some doubt whether the practice can construct and realize the global public interest. Analysis at the macro-level reveals concerns that in fact COP has instead been *too inclusive* to secure an agreement that has practical effect. In this context, I examine the normative value of so-called 'minilateralism', a diplomatic practice that brings to the table 'the smallest possible number of countries needed to have the largest possible impact on solving a particular problem' (Naim 2009). The risk with this practice, I argue, is that it discourages reflexivity. States involved in minilateral diplomacy may indeed have the largest *potential* impact, but without the inclusion of international and global publics it is possible that those states will not even recognize the problem. The task then is (again) to find the right balance between inclusion and exclusion, and in this section I draw on Robyn Eckersley's (2012) idea of 'inclusive minilateralism' as a way of approaching that task.

International society has not taken the path of formal minilateralism. In the third and fourth sections I analyze and assess the direction it did take at the 2015 Paris COP. This was a turning point in global climate governance because it was then and there that the objective of writing a treaty to set top-down targets for reducing carbon emissions was dropped. The Paris Agreement instead created a new bottom-up practice, the formulation of 'nationally determined contributions' (NDCs). After Paris, states would decide how much they would be able and willing to contribute to the collective effort of slowing down temperature increases by reducing their carbon emissions. The background assumption was not only that this would save global climate governance from possible collapse, it would actually work to reduce carbon emissions by shaming states into action. This assumption is assessed in the third section. To do this I draw on the IPCC reports issued prior to the 2021 Glasgow COP and I find evidence to doubt that NDC practices are working, as well as reason to question the background knowledge on which they rest. To help explain why a practice that assumes shaming states into action has not worked, and might not work in the future, I draw in the fourth section on Jack Snyder's (2020) recent analysis of shaming practices in the human rights field.

Snyder's argument offers important insight, especially on the role that nationalism plays in mediating international shaming practices. It is important because it demonstrates how Pragmatic Constructivists can hold states to their pledges (or to more demanding standards) in a culturally sensitive and therefore constructive way. Snyder's account, I suggest, presents evidence that anyone in search of practices that actually ameliorate the problem will find helpful. It challenges those who use shaming practices simply as a means of signaling virtue. I further examine the role that nationalism plays in global climate governance in this final section. Here the assessment is of 'Realist' arguments (Lieven 2020) that nationalism can be useful in mobilizing support for practices that reduce emissions. My concern from a Pragmatic Constructivist perspective is that 'nationalism' is insufficiently reflexive to address the problem. Without an *inter*nationalist sense of the global public interest, which requires a self- and other-regarding sensibility,

nationalism can quickly become part of the problem. Again, the way in which the internationalist argument is made is important. Nationalism is, to repeat Mearsheimer, 'an enormously powerful political ideology' (Mearsheimer 2018, 3). The possibility exists therefore that an insensitive and unsympathetic critique of a nation-state will only entrench practices that are unhelpful in constructing and realizing the global public interest.

Assessing the IPCC as a community of practice

Climate change threatens the lived experience on a global scale. According to the 2014 IPCC impact report, '[e]ach of the last three decades has been successively warmer at the Earth's surface than any preceding decade since 1850'. (IPCC 2014, 2).[178] As a consequence, the reduction in glacial and ice sheet mass has contributed since the mid-19th century to sea level increases 'larger than the mean rate during the previous two millennia' (IPCC 2014, 4). Dryzek and Pickering (2019) call this 'the great acceleration', and they share the view that it ushers in a new epoch - the Anthropocene - where the Earth system is human-influenced. According to the IPCC (2014, 4), it is 'extremely likely' that climate change has been caused by anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions, 'which have increased since the pre-industrial era, driven largely by economic and population growth, and are now higher than ever'. Without change to human practices, the IPCC concluded, it was more than likely that the global temperature would exceed a 4 degree increase on pre-industrial levels. Indeed surface and ocean temperatures were projected to rise 'under all assessed emission scenarios' and it was 'virtually certain that global mean sea level rise will continue for many centuries beyond 2100' (IPCC 2014, 10, 16). In other words, the question confronting international society was not *whether* the temperatures would continue to increase, the question was *by how much*; and that was contingent on human practice.

These material changes impact on the lived experience across all continents because they lead to extreme weather patterns and new threats to biodiversity, water resources, crop yields, food security and human health. Action taken in the short term to mitigate temperature increases, such as substantial emissions reductions, could increase the prospects 'for effective adaptation'. It could also 'reduce the costs and challenges of mitigation in the longer term and contribute to climate-resilient pathways for sustainable development' (IPCC 2014, 17). However, if practices did not change and the global temperatures increased by 4°C, human communities would experience severe consequences. 'The risks associated with temperatures at or above 4°C include substantial species extinction, global and regional food insecurity, consequential constraints on common human activities and limited potential for adaptation in some cases (high confidence).' These risks, the IPCC (2014, 13) added, were 'unevenly distributed and are generally greater for disadvantaged people and communities in countries at all levels of development'; and indeed the World Bank has estimate that climate change will generate 143 million more migrants in three regions: Latin America, sub-Saharan Africa, and Southeast Asia (Podesta 2019). Unsurprisingly, the IPCC concluded,

---

[178] I start with the 2014 report as it preceded the 2015 Paris COP. I discuss the latest report (at the time of writing) later in the chapter. That enables a normative assessment of COP practices after the Paris meeting.

these changes 'can directly increase the risks of violent conflict by amplifying well documented drivers of these conflicts such as poverty and economic shock' (IPCC 2014, 16).

But why should we believe the IPCC? On what basis does it claim epistemic authority? The IPCC is a panel of scientific experts. It does not conduct its own research. It instead assesses the strength of scientific agreement in different areas (note for instance the parentheses in the above quotations indicating the level of confidence). As well as presenting current understandings of the problem, it recommends where the scientific community needs to conduct further research. It is described as 'the best known epistemic community in global environmental policy' (Beck and Forsyth 2017, 89), and its reports 'have served as benchmarks for consensus on climate change' (Hoffmann 2018, 658; see also Beck and Mahony 2018, 1; Hughes 2015, 85; Hughes and Paterson 2017, 747). Given this, it would seem that the Pragmatic Constructivist emphasis on inclusive reflexivity (and indeed democracy) as form of social inquiry is irrelevant to assessing the IPCC as a community of practice. The issue is more nuanced than that however.

It is the case that the IPCC must manage the boundary between expert and non-expert opinion if it is to serve the public interest in defining the scope of the problem and judging the practical effectiveness of ameliorative action. I discuss how that is done below, but it is not the case that inclusive reflexivity is irrelevant to judging the IPCC.   As Peirceian Pragmatism tells us, the scientific method requires proving truth claims within a community setting. If that were not the case, international society might appoint an individual expert researcher, rather than a panel that synthesizes multiple findings, to do the IPCC's task. More significantly, the IPCC is not the kind of epistemic community that is interested in knowledge for knowledge sake. Its task is to produce knowledge that is useful for changing human practice. In that sense, it must be politically sensitive and reflect on how its findings are received. How inclusionary the IPPCC is can impact that reception. Inclusive reflexivity is, therefore, a consideration when assessing the IPCC as a community of problem-solving practice, and the focus naturally moves to how the boundaries demarcating the IPCC from other communities are managed.

IR Practice theory sees 'boundary encounters' (Wenger 1998, 112-3), where distinct communities of practice come into contact, as a source of learning or 'creative variation' (2019 224-226). For example, Emanuel Adler (2019 225-6) writes:

> Boundaries mediate between different organizations, and as meanings spread and are translated across communities' boundaries and organizational boundaries, they become the source of creative variation. The positioning of individual practitioners within and between several communities of practice and organization is also an important source of creative variation. … When practices overlap, the common space they share enable and promotes changes in the performativity of practices and definitions of competence.

This implies boundary encounters and inclusivity promotes learning; and the Pragmatist would agree. However, the risk in this particular formulation is that there is no normative component to it. We do not know if the 'creative variation' is for the better (and therefore qualifies as learning rather than adaptation). This is important when faced with a challenge to the lived experience like climate change. We want to know if the boundary encounters are producing useful knowledge. The IPCC serves the public interest by informing international society of the material changes taking place in the climate, and by extrapolating

from that future trajectories so that states can take ameliorative and adaptive action. That task requires resources, skills and methods that only certain scientific experts have. For states and other publics to have confidence in the IPCC therefore it has to manage and protect the boundary that separates expert knowledge from non-expert opinion.

In this respect, including practitioners from several different communities of practice may not be good knowledge 'brokers' (Wenger 1998 105). They may in fact harm the reputation of a particular community of practice and create doubt in its findings. Not all boundary encounters, therefore, lead to learning. Silke Beck and Martin Mahony (2018) draw our attention to this with respect to the IPCC. Its scientists often engage in 'boundary work' as a means of establishing and protecting the autonomy of their methods from political interference. 'Boundary work' in this area is defined as the 'ideological efforts by scientists to distinguish their work and its products from nonscientific intellectual activities' (Gieryn 1983, 782, quoted by Beck and Mahony 2018, 2). It involves considerations at various levels. At the cognitive level it involves a sensitivity to the demarcation of facts from values and description from prescription. At the sociopolitical level it includes the establishment of appropriate lines of accountability. A scientific opinion for the IPCC may be compromised, for instance, if the scientist is not fully independent of a national government or other particular interest. Boundary practices have to be carefully managed therefore if an expert community is to command epistemic authority and maintain the confidence of international and global society.

If boundary work is about excluding non-expert opinion how then does that relate to the Pragmatic Constructivist view that inclusive reflexivity is valuable? I maintained in Part One of the book that the Pragmatist commitment to this norm is relative to the problem in view. Dewey's 'epistemological justification for democracy', to repeat Putnam's (2004) useful formulation, meant 'learning when and where to seek expert knowledge (quoted in Hilde 2012, 94). Climate change is, I suggest, an instance where we need to learn to trust climate science and support the boundary practices that protect its methods. But, and this is crucial, that does not mean scientists can be blind to how publics receive expert knowledge. Hughes and Paterson (2017, 749-50) have noted, for instance, how the IPCC's constitution has negatively impacted on its epistemic authority. They point, for instance, to the fact that panels have been predominately male and European, and that Economics has been the most prominent discipline. Doubt is introduced if the imbalance is not addressed or justified.

Hughes and Paterson's Bourdeusian account of the IPCC habitus, for instance, identifies how everyday practices have sidelined scientists from the global South. Expertise has been concentrated around certain research institutes in the developed world, as well as publication practices that create the potential for certain individual researchers to dominate IPCC reports (Hughes and Paterson 2017; see also Hughes 2015). This is significant because these practices can undermine faith in the IPCC and weaken its claim to epistemic authority especially in the areas that sense the exclusion. That, in turn, impedes effective global climate governance (see also Beck and Mahony 2018, 5; see also Beck and Forsyth 2017). There is, however, evidence that the IPCC has been able to learn from these reflections. It has in the past taken steps to address such concerns. It has funded participants from developing countries and increased representation within its bureau. This, Hughes concludes, has helped it to secure its central position within the climate change field (Hughes 2015, 95).

This ability to reflect on the constitution and practices of the IPCC as a community climate change governance is especially important given the proposals to geo-engineer solutions to the problem of climate change. A concern here is that science is offering ameliorative ideas and factoring those in to its projections of temperature increases. This is a problem if the 'science' in this formulation does not include the social and political analysis on the likelihood that these solutions will be implemented. For example, technology like Bioenergy with Carbon Capture and Storage (BECCS) may help states realize their pledges to reduce net carbon emissions, and the IPCC may therefore factor them into their projections.[179] As Beck and Mahony (2018, 7) point out, however, the implementation of such technologies has immense social impact, which must be factored into the feasibility of technologies, and – by extension – the scientific projection of temperature increases.[180] Their concern with IPCC practice is that the social aspect and political feasibility of geoengineering projects such as this are not being fully discussed. This is a problem because BECCS technology 'would involve massive displacements of land and people, with global implications for food supply, land rights and environmental justice'. Moreover, it is a problem that can only be addressed by the IPCC including social and political science in their deliberations. The Pragmatic Constructivist commitment to inclusive reflexivity is thus valuable, both analytically and normatively, when viewing such a problem.

Appropriate boundary practices, therefore, try to find a balance between the inclusions and exclusions that are necessary to nurture epistemic authority and maintain the confidence of international and global publics. This balancing act starts from a different point when the IPCC's remit shifts from identifying material problems to proposing solutions that have social impacts and political parameters (Beck and Mahony 2018). Some call this process the 'the scientization of politics and the politicization of science' (Hughes and Paterson 2017, 745). Beck and Mahony (2018, 11) prefer to talk about 'the co-constitution of epistemic and political authority'. Policy relevant knowledge, in this respect, is 'a hybrid rather than neutral activity', and 'experts must think of ways to combine scientific reasoning with social and political judgements – even when their formal role is to assess science'. For the Pragmatic Constructivist this demands a focus on boundary practices and whether they are fit for the purpose of mitigating the problem in view. This means the IPCC reflecting on how, in a changing environment, it 'seeks to rebalance scientific integrity and neutrality with political relevance and oversight' (Beck and Mahony 2018, 8).

Assessing the COP as a community of practice

If the IPCC is a community of practice focused on framing the problem, the Conference of Parties (COP) to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) is a community of practice that focuses on formulating international society's response. The UNFCCC was created shortly after the 2001 US withdrawal from the Kyoto Protocol. This set global climate governance back to square one. Still, given the relative success of the 1987 Montreal Protocol, an international agreement to stop chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) destroying the ozone layer, the UNFCCC persisted with the Kyoto approach. That approach was to

---

[179] See for example the US climate envoy's suggestion that carbon reduction targets would be met by technology not yet invented (Harrabin 2021).

[180] See also McLaren and Corry (2021, 21-2) who argue that an 'assessment of future geoengineering technologies…should factor not just climate risks but also those by probable imposition via global power relations'.

negotiate a comprehensive treaty that would legally bind states to collectively agreed greenhouse gas emission reductions. To that end, state parties to the UNFCCC, as well as global civil society activists and other lobbyists, started in 2005 to meet annually in a specified city.

The 2015 Paris COP represents a turning point in global climate governance. What was apparent before then was formally acknowledge: that the 'top-down' approach to reducing carbon emissions by collectively agreeing targets for particular states was beyond international society. It was decided at the 2015 Paris COP therefore to shift to a 'bottom-up' approach. Instead of setting legally binding targets in the form of a treaty, in other words, climate governance would be based on a system of voluntary state pledges (Falkner 2016a, 1111; Stevenson and Dryzek 2014, loc.1764). I make an assessment of that shift in the following section, focusing on its practical consequences for the public interest in cutting carbon emissions. Before that, however, I ask in this section whether COP as a community of practice meets the two normative tests set by Pragmatic Constructivism, These are necessary if international and global society is to have faith in COP as a practice that delivers the public interest.

The two tests - how open is it to learning from affected publics and how well does it exercise deliberative practical judgement – can be applied at a micro and macro level of analysis. Assessment at the micro level involves, for instance, analyzing how the annual conference is organized and whether affected publics (both international and global) feel included in a way that creates faith in the outcome. The micro-practices of COP15 in Copenhagen offer a useful example here. Its organization came under intense scrutiny and was criticized. At that conference, which took place in December 2009, NGO spaces were segregated from government booths and formal meeting rooms, which created a sense of exclusion among civil society actors (Paterson 2014, 164). While this was a consequence of the venue's architecture, which could not accommodate NGO demand, the political consequence was to compound a lack of faith in global climate governance. The everyday practice of event management impacted negatively on the process of constructing a shared public interest that could mobilize appropriate action (Christoff 2010; Stevenson and Dryzek 2014).[181]

To draw attention to the architecture of a conference may seem a banal point, but as Practice theory reminds us, everyday practices are consequential. It is, therefore, important not to neglect that level of analysis. Indeed Paterson's analysis of the Copenhagen COP led him to conclude that public spaces are crucial to the construction of the public interest. If the emerging 'global public domain' entails that the

---

[181] COP15 Copenhagen involved nearly 27,000 people, including 10,500 delegates representing 190 states, and over 120 heads of state and government (Christoff 2010, 637). 'The setting in which the Copenhagen Accord was drafted reflected an even lower degree of discursive inclusivity' (Stevenson and Dryzek 2014, loc.1756). 'The level of civil society interest overwhelmed the Danish hosts, who despite several months' notice only established one registration venue. As a result, members of civil society queued for up to eight hours in freezing temperatures only to be told in some cases to return to their hotels without gaining access' (Stevenson and Dryzek 2014, loc.2683). This is not just a consequence of size. Stevenson and Dryzek (2014, loc.1735) also noticed similar dynamics in smaller Working Group settings that better accommodate civil society. 'Whereas [state] Parties need to engage with one another's positions to facilitate the negotiating process, there is no such imperative to engage civil society positions. Generally speaking from the back of the room while facing the backs of most (remaining) Party delegates, it is easy for civil society observers to be ignored by those with negotiating power. There is no face-to-face contact during such interventions and no response from Parties. This clearly weakens the likelihood of outsider discourses attracting genuine reflection'.

"system of states is becoming embedded in a broader, albeit still thin and partial, institutionalized arena concerned with the production of global public goods", then these spaces are the physical organization of how this embedding is organized'. That, he concluded 'needs to be constantly reflected upon' (Paterson 2014, 167, quoting Ruggie). In this sense, Pragmatic Constructivism goes one step further than Practice theory. It is able to distinguish good conference practice from bad conference practice. Paterson (2014, 167) holds, for example, that the 2008 COP in Poznan offered an example of good practice. Its space was well-organized because it rendered 'the boundaries between formal negotiating spaces for conversations between a huge range of actors highly fluid'. The ability to organize workshop discussions on the specific problem being negotiated encouraged a focus on 'collective learning … rather than the more traditional line-by-line intervention around a specific negotiating text designed to set the scene for backroom bargaining' (Paterson 2014, 167).

At the macro-level, the analysis of COP differs slightly. The criticism is not that the inclusion of all states and the many affected publics (as represented by NGOs and issue-based groups) fails the inclusive reflexivity test. It is the opposite. COP is criticized for being too inclusive. Its inclusivity is considered a hindrance to international society's ability to reach agreements that can have a positive practical consequence. Indeed, one can understand the shift away from a top-down comprehensive treaty based approach as a consequence of what in effect was an exclusionary move to break the political deadlock of the 2009 Copenhagen COP. Late-on in that Conference, the US, China and India decided to sidestep the issue of universally agreed and legally binding emissions targets and reimagine the system of climate governance based on a system of voluntary pledges (Falkner 2016a, 1111; Stevenson and Dryzek 2014, loc.1764). As one would expect this move, and the way in which it was done, was denounced by the developing world. It was described as 'a sham process fashioned behind closed doors by a club of rich countries and large emerging powers' (Christoff 2010, 640, quoting Revkin and Broder 2009). But how should we assess this move and its critics? As noted in the previous section's discussion on expert knowledge, from the Pragmatic Constructivist perspective exclusionary practices are not necessarily contrary to the public interest. If, in this instance, the bottom-up process of voluntary pledges achieves what the top-down process could not (i.e. a reduced level of carbon emissions) then it might be that the better path was taken at Copenhagen.

From one perspective, what happened at Copenhagen demonstrated that the only way to cut through the deadlock created by an overly inclusive community of practice is to reconstitute that community. In the absence of consensus across all states, the argument went, it was important to formulate an agreement among those states whose practices (in this instance carbon emissions) had most impact on the problem (in this case climate change). From this perspective, the outcome of the Copenhagen COP was great power 'minilateralism' (Eckersley 2012, 31; Falkner 2016b, 90). This is a form of deliberation that is said to be more suited to practical problem solving because it is not hostage to an insistence on universal inclusion and consensus.[182] The term 'minilateralism' was coined by Moisés Naim (2009), who argued that the way to solve the practical problems created by inclusive multilateralism was 'to bring to the table the smallest possible number of countries needed to have the largest possible impact on solving a particular problem'.

---

[182] See Falkner 2016b for a useful summary and review of various such proposals.

This, he argued, was 'minilateralism's magic number'. In the case of climate change governance, he concluded, the magic number is 20 because the world's top 20 carbon polluters account for around 75 per cent of global emissions.

With its emphasis on reconstituting communities of practice as a means of solving otherwise intractable problems, 'minilateralism' would seem to be a practice that Pragmatic Constructivism would endorse. But that depends on whether its exclusions can be reconciled with its commitment to constructing and realizing the global public interest. Robin Eckersley's (2012) critique of what she calls 'exclusionary minilateralism' is helpful in this regard. It recognizes the need for 'non-ideal theory' that 'grapples with, rather than brackets, real world tensions and constraints' (Eckersley 2012, 25). It accepts that minilateral practices may be appropriate. It finds, however, three problems with its application to global climate governance. Firstly, the obstacles to a comprehensive climate agreement lay within the group of major emitters. In this sense, excluding the lower emitting states would do little to address the problem. Minilateral practices might enable a limited consensus but it would be useless when set alongside what the scientific advice tells us is needed. Indeed, those excluded from the minilateral practice at Copenhagen dismissed it as 'a sham process' for that very reason (Christoff 2010, 640, quoting Revkin and Broder 2009).[183] In this sense, the exclusionary practices of minilateralism are unlikely to deliver ameliorative changes that address the problem. They would seem therefore to fail both of the Pragmatic Constructivist tests.

Secondly, Eckersley argued that 'minilateralism among the major emitters is likely to produce a self-serving agreement', which could not authoritatively claim to be in the public interest. Excluding those most vulnerable to climate change, what Dewey would call 'publics', weakens any such claim. While agreement between the great emitters is a necessary part of an effective response to the challenge, it is not sufficient. To ignore these publics would 'remove an important source of information and advocacy for strong action on mitigation, and therefore reduce the quality of the dialogue and eliminate the answerability of the major emitters' (Eckersley 2012, 33). So again, it is unlikely that minilateralism would produce the kind of action that is necessary to limit global temperature increases. The opposite is also true. The inclusion of vulnerable publics is more likely to encourage the necessary level of reflection among the major emitters. Finally, Eckersley argued that because minilateralism lacks legitimacy in the eyes of the excluded, it could not serve as a stepping-stone to more effective action (Eckersley 2012, 33-34; see also Bäckstrand and Kuyper 2017, 768; Kuyper, 2015).

Eckersley's critique is compelling from a Pragmatic Constructivist perspective that is focused on the importance of inclusive reflexivity and deliberative practical judgement. Equally compelling, I suggest, is Eckersley's alternative suggestion: 'inclusive minilateralism' (see also Bray 2013 465-6). That is because it restores some of the authority that exclusionary minilateralism loses by failing the normative tests of Pragmatic Constructivism. Eckersley proposes the creation of a 'Climate Council' made up of states representing the most capable, most responsible *and* the most vulnerable. By including international

---

[183] Or as Falkner (2016b, 90-1) put it: '[w]here the interests of the great powers are too diverse and domestic support for strong international action too weak, changes to the bargaining process alone cannot hope to overcome those barriers, especially when it comes to distributional conflicts…. . In a situation where the main interest of a significant number of great powers lies in resisting costly policy measures to reduce emissions, shifting the negotiations to a minilateral forum will do little to induce a change in the interest calculus of major emitters'.

publics like the Association of Small Island States as one of 12 Council members, therefore, Eckersley's proposal meets both tests in a way that the unwieldy nature of COP and the exclusionary nature of minilateralism do not. The chances of a practical outcome from the discussion could improve by being limited to a lower number of stakeholders, but the inclusion of vulnerable publics would mean those deliberations could more authoritatively claim to constitute *the* public interest.[184]

The quality of international society's reasoning did not, however, match that of Eckersley's. Following the failure of the 2009 Copenhagen COP to agree a comprehensive treaty, there was instead a reassessment of the necessity of a 'top-down' approach. In amongst the doubt there was an acknowledgement that 'a "one size fits all" solution' (Hilde 2012, 897) was impossible. There was also a sense that it might not be necessary. International society might still be able to take action that had an ameliorative effect if it could work with (rather than against) 'the needs, best practices, values … and socio-cultural nuances of particular local contexts' (Hilde 2012, 897). Indeed, by setting out a framework for states to register national mitigation targets and actions, the 2009 Copenhagen Accord nudged international society to adopt a different set of global climate practices. As noted, however, it was not until the 2015 Paris COP that this new bottom-up approach was more fully and formerly adopted.

Pragmatism in Paris and the view from Glasgow

The Copenhagen Accord signposted a new pathway for global climate governance. There was at that stage, however, a hesitancy about formally adopting a new bottom-up approach. Objections of a small group of states (led by Sudan, Venezuela and Bolivia) meant the 2009 Accord could only note, rather than endorse, the new direction. In the view of the objectors the usual procedures for consultation, plenary debate and discussion had not been followed (Eckersley 2012, 31). The idea did not disappear, however. It was subsequently acknowledged at the 2010 Cancún COP where a formal decision was taken to recognize national mitigation and financial pledges. It was there that 'a new mood of pragmatic accommodation of geo political realities' took hold (Eckersley 2012, 31-2). By the 2015 Paris COP the society of states had embraced the process of 'localizing' global climate governance. Rather than negotiate a set of internationally agreed emission reduction targets, international society would 'sidestep' the distributional conflict inherent in those negotiations. It would do this 'by leaving it to individual countries to determine how much they wish to contribute to the collective mitigation effort' (Falkner 2016a, 1115). Pragmatic Constructivists might at first sight endorse this move to reimagine global climate governance. It can be interpreted as a creative way of ameliorating a problem worsened by political deadlock. But there is a qualification. Pragmatic Constructivists would only be committed to the new practice to the extent it delivers the cuts in carbon emissions that the IPCC, COP and other communities see as being in the global public interest.

---

[184] Despite a strong critique of minilateralism, Falkner (2016b, 88) also concludes 'climate clubs can enhance political dialogue in the context of multilateral negotiations and provide a more conducive environment for great power bargaining; they can create club benefits that strengthen mitigation strategies and reduce free-riding, but only for so-called coalitions of the willing; and they can help re-legitimate the global climate regime against the background of profound power shifts that have slowed down progress in the multilateral negotiations'.

In order to achieve long-term emissions reductions and keep global temperature increases to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels, the Paris Agreement obliges parties to submit pledges—so-called 'nationally determined contributions' (NDCs)—on a regular basis. It was argued by some that this will lead to more ambitious carbon reducing practices. The top-down approach had merely 'precipitated a race to the bottom when it came to agreeing on binding targets' (Fesmire 2020, 19). The hypothesis in the background of the Paris approach is that the 'pledge and review' practice will better deliver the necessary emissions cuts. This is because the Paris approach is 'pluralistic and culturally contextual', which means that a country's pledge has a greater chance of being delivered because it will 'make sense domestically' (Fesmire 2020, 19 citing Light 2017).[185] There is a further assumption, however. The hypothesis underpinning NDC practices is that they improve the public competence of states by getting them to gradually increase their commitments and ultimately achieve net-zero carbon emissions status. Setting and achieving realistic targets, it is hoped, will have a ratchet effect whereby states set new targets that 'exceed the ambition of existing ones' (Falkner 2016a, 1114; see also Falkner 2017). For that reason, the Paris Agreement suggested states should aim at keeping temperature increases 'well below' 2°C above pre-industrial levels, and countries should 'pursue efforts' to limit warming to the 1.5°C.

In this context, COP is an important community of inquiry because it is the means by which international society reflects on the public performance of the NDC practice. As noted, COP meets annually, but it also has instituted a 5 year review process. The assumption here is that such a process will 'shame and blame' states, and presumably the cultural contexts in which state practice is embedded, if carbon reducing pledges and actions do not progressively increase in good time (Light 2017, 494).[186] The 2020 Glasgow COP took on an additional significance in this respect. Five years on from the Paris Agreement it marked the moment when international society could reflect on the performance of the NDC practice. The Covid pandemic delayed the COP by one year, but it did eventually meet for two weeks from 31 October.

In the lead up to that conference, the IPCC (2021) published its Sixth Assessment Report. That report strengthened the 2014 claim (see above) that it was 'extremely likely' that climate change has been caused by anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions, stating that it was now 'unequivocal that human influences have warmed the atmosphere, ocean and land' (IPCC 2021, 4). It confirmed that 'the scale of recent changes across the climate system as a whole – and the present state of many aspects of the climate system – are unprecedented over many centuries to many thousands of years' (IPCC 2021, 8), and concluded that 'Human-induced climate change is already affecting many weather and climate extremes in every region across the globe'. Evidence that extreme weather events such as heatwaves, heavy precipitation, droughts, and tropical cyclones could be attributed to human influence had, the IPCC stated, strengthened since its previous report (IPCC 2021, 8).

---

[185] Light's analysis is informed by his experience as a practitioner. From 2013-16 he served as Senior Adviser and India Counselor to the U.S. Special Envoy on Climate Change. He also served as a staff member in the Secretary of State's Office of Policy Planning, in the U.S. Department of State. The analysis is also informed by his academic work on Pragmatism, see Light and Katz 1996.

[186] The Paris Agreement formalized this pledge-and-review system of voluntary commitments by establishing 5-year 'global stocktakes' of NDCs coupled with a transparency framework – which engages non-state actors – for assessing the comparability of these pledges in an effort to ratchet up ambitions (UNFCCC 2015b).

Projecting forward to the end of this century, the report set out five 'climate futures'. The best case scenario suggested that the average global temperature could rise by 1.5 degrees Celsius. This was due to the irreversible effect of prior emissions and it was contingent on a reduced level of future emissions. The other scenarios suggested global warming of 1.5°C and 2°C will be exceeded 'unless deep reductions in CO2 and other greenhouse gas emissions occur in the coming decades'. The fifth and most extreme scenario sees temperature increase as high as 4.5°C. This of course was alarming because 'every additional 0.5°C of global warming causes clearly discernible increases in the intensity and frequency of hot extremes, including heatwaves (very likely), and heavy precipitation (high confidence), as well as agricultural and ecological droughts in some regions (high confidence)' (IPCC 2021 15). At that level, the IPCC reported, there was a risk that anthropogenic emissions could overwhelm Earth's capability to absorb carbon. 'Under scenarios with increasing CO2 emissions the ocean and land carbon sinks are projected to be less effective at slowing the accumulation of CO2 in the atmosphere' (IPCC 2021, 19).

Clearly, then, the IPCC projections since the Paris COP had not improved. The new practices had not delivered the kind of action (nor the pledges) that would give the IPCC the confidence needed to rule out the worse-case scenarios. Such an expectation was perhaps unrealistic given the report was only 6 years on from the Paris Agreement. Nevertheless, practitioners gathered at the Glasgow review conference against the backdrop of a public discourse that framed it as the "the last best chance" to avert climate catastrophe by keeping temperature increases to 1.5°C (Propp 2021). The outcome of that COP has been described as a 'mixed bag'. On the one hand, states pledged to cut methane emissions by 30 percent and to "halt and reverse forest loss". Large states like India and Nigeria committed to reach net zero emissions by 2070 and 2060 respectively (Lewis and Maslin 2021). Furthermore, private manufacturers pledged to make all new car sales zero emission vehicles by 2040 and financial institutions created the Glasgow Financial Alliance for Net Zero, which would manage a total of $130 trillion in ways that were consistent with the net zero pledge by 2050 (Propp 2021; Staunton 2021; Tooze 2021; Obergassel et al. 2021, 274).

Despite these achievements, however, there remained a gap between the net-zero emissions targets, which was deemed necessary to keep temperature increases at 1.5°C, and the collective effect of state NDCs. Modeling based on the NDCs submitted prior to the Glasgow COP estimated a temperature rise of 2.7°C by 2030 (UNEP 2021). The announcements at COP26 only reduced this to a best estimate of 2.4°C (Lewis and Maslin 2021, citing Climate Action Tracker). While some see this as evidence that the Paris Agreement is having an impact and that progress is being made (Obergassel et al. 2021, 280), they accept that it 'falls short of meeting overall objectives'. Indeed the 2.4°C figure was disappointing given the pre-conference slogan 'keep 1.5 alive' and the best that commentators could conclude was that the COP target was now 'on life support – it has a pulse but it's nearly dead' (Lewis and Maslin 2021; see also Obergassel et al. 2021, 273). Some connected this disappointing outcome to the constitution of COP as a community of practice, which is important when thinking in terms of the Pragmatic Constructivist tests and how to assess the situation.

The COP refusal to eliminate fossil fuel subsidies, which amounted to $5.9 trillion in 2020, was for example linked to the presence of the fossil fuel industry at the conference (Hughes and Morgan 2021). Indeed, it was reported that this industry not only had the largest delegation at the summit it was 'larger than the combined total of the eight delegations from the countries worst affected by climate change in the past 20

years' (McGrath 2021). The contrast to the under-representation of, for example, indigenous groups was stark. Global South delegates also reported Covid-related difficulties attending the conference (Obergassel et al. 2021, 271). The accusation levelled at previous COP's thus remained. A lack of openness undermined its authority (Lakhani 2021), although this was mitigated by the claim that Glasgow 'brought to a whole new level the public livestreaming of climate conferences and resulting transparency' (Depledge, Saldivia and Peñasco 2022, 148).

What then might be a Pragmatic Constructivist take on COP at this moment? How might its two normative tests work in this case? There is clearly doubt in the value of COP's deliberations when they fail to deliver the practical outcomes that wider international and global society can have confidence in. The question that follows, however, is this: what alternative practices are there that can better address the problem? Given the experience of the COP pre-2015, and the failure of top-down global climate governance, there is an argument for persisting with this bottom up approach. Two lessons do seem to follow from the Glasgow COP, however.

Firstly, it might be that its constitution is rethought to achieve a more publicly oriented agreement. Rather than thinking in the state-centric terms of 'minilateralism', COP might think about how power across civil society can be rebalanced in ways that better serve the public interest. This would shine a normative spotlight on the practice of conference accreditation (Pouliot and Thérien 2018), which might exclude from its deliberations (or at least reduce the presence of) those private interests (like the fossil fuel industry) that so obviously clash with the aim of reducing carbon emissions. Even then, however, there is no guarantee that a more ambitious approach to weaning the world off its fossil fuel habit will emerge. After all, the Glasgow commitment to 'phase down' and not 'phase out' coal use was due to a last minute intervention by India, which politically linked it to the question of support for the developing world and what it called 'a just transition'.[187]

Secondly, one has to question why the COP process does not necessarily work as it was expected when it comes to shaming states into taking action that is in the global public interest. My answer to that, which is explored in the following section, focuses on the mediating role of nationalism and what is needed to address that. This I suggest is a necessary focus for inquiry because it is nationalism that enables state representatives at COP to put the particular (i.e. the national interest) ahead of the global interest. Once one recognizes that, one realizes that change at a much deeper level is required. A truly bottom-up process to global governance involves the reconstruction of the meaning of nationalism in the context of this and other global challenges. I consider that point in more detail in the following section.

Nationalism to realize nationally determined targets?

---

[187] India is part of the G77 and China negotiating bloc at COP, as well as the Like Minded Developing Countries (LMDC), a group of 24 countries from the global south. These groups did not support its stance on coal (Sirur 2021). Despite India's position, and 'after resistance from the US, the EU and some other rich nations', COP26 'failed to secure the establishment of a dedicated new damages fund, [which] vulnerable nations had pushed for earlier in the summit' (Rowling 2021; see also Tooze 2021).

The problem with relying on naming and shaming to encourage climate responsibility, as more recent Constructivist IR scholarship demonstrates, is that the practice can have unintended consequences. For instance, Jack Snyder (2020) has argued with reference to human rights practice, that 'activists nor the scholars who study them have paid much attention to the emotional dynamics of the targeted group, and in particular to the emotions of shame and shaming, nor to the sociological mechanisms that underpin the politics of status and status competition'. Snyder adds that

> external outrage plays into the hands of elites in a traditional power structure, drawing energy from outrage at loss of status in a way that motivates widespread popular backlash. The backlash narrative alters public discourse, reinvigorates and reshapes traditional institutions, and in these ways locks in and perpetuates patterns that leave the progressive namers and shamers farther from their goals (Snyder 2020, 1).

Such evidence would affirm the importance of the Pragmatic Constructivist respect for the power of emotions and the commitment to a method of practical judgement that weighs the consequences of a practice. Conscientious reflection (see Chapter 3) prevents what might in one circumstance be a helpful shaming practice turning into unhelpful 'outrage'.[188] Furthermore, the possibility that one may be wrong (fallibilism), or that one can be more effective by tailoring the message (practical judgement), qualifies the commitment to shaming practices and demands a degree of adaptability and creativeness rather than knee-jerk moralism. Shaming strategies that are interpreted by the target society as an attempt to assert a moral, social and political hierarchy can provoke a backlash and a doubling down on the original behaviour. This resonates with Deweyan pedagogy, which notes how hierarchies (even in the classroom) are not conducive to learning. Snyder's pragmatism does not cite Dewey but the parallels are clear when he writes:

> Don't lecture, have a two-way conversation about normative standards. Don't insist on using the language of legalism and universalism, acknowledge the validity of local normative systems, and use generic language of respect and fairness that travels across normative systems (Snyder 2020, 9).[189]

This is especially important advice when targeting the climate practices of a state with a strong sense of national identity. After all nationalism is about distinguishing one community's identity from another and

---

[188] Snyder (2020, 5) accepts that the impact of shaming is dependent on the circumstances, the target, and the technique of shaming but his emphasis is on the risk that it will 'lead to a self-reinforcing cycle of humiliation, anger, hatred, social withdrawal, and attachment to a counterculture of proud deviance'.

[189] This approach also resonates with Dryzek and Stevenson's emphasis on the deliberative importance of 'bridging rhetoric', which they argue can make an important contribution to the COP processes aimed at constructing a public interest. Stevenson adds that naming and shaming strategies, even those sensitive to the possibility of provoking unintended consequences, can still be ineffective when political leaders are happy to 'bullshit', and do not fear the charge of 'hypocrisy'. This is a particular concern in the field of climate change for 'the complexity of climate change science and policy makes this domain particularly vulnerable to insincerity and hypocrisy. Few citizens have the capacity to readily distinguish truth from bullshit in the pronouncements of political leaders and policy actors' (Stevenson 2020, 2).

it underpins the sovereign sense that a community should be free of outside interference. A nationalistic society would not respond well to shaming tactics that challenges this sensibility, especially if they are seen as attempts to assert, or in the case of post-colonial societies, reassert a form of hierarchy. Nationalism would thus seem to be at odds with the background assumptions underpinning COP practice, which is that international society can shame nation-states into practices that are other-regarding and publicly oriented. India's position against the Glasgow COP 'phase-out' of coal (see above) is an illustration of the limits of international peer pressure.

Anatol Lieven offers a different reading of the value of the nationalist predisposition. His 'realist' approach is like Mearsheimer's to the extent it recognizes the political power of nationalism. But Lieven offers something else. He tries to make nationalism part of the solution to climate change. It is, he suggests, 'the only force (other than direct personal concern for children and grandchildren) that can overcome one of the greatest obstacles to serious action; namely, that it requires sacrifices by present generations on behalf of future generations' (Lieven 2020, 17). This is, potentially, a useful way to reimagine nationalism and realism in ways that help to meet the challenge of climate change. It is certainly a better response than assuming that international relations has tragically sealed the fate of humanity. Lieven's idea in fact echoes the classical Pragmatism of William James, who also sought to use nationalist themes to realize the public interest. It was possible, he argued, to 'appropriate' (Kaag 2013, 70) the nationalist sentiment that was generated by 'war' and 'redeploy' it. Such practices could claim to be 'the moral equivalent of war' (James 1908).

In his efforts to convince us of the nationalist case, however, I fear Lieven downplays the risk of using such narratives. To be sure, Lieven's positive view of nationalism is not blind to the harmful consequences of its extremes, but in the same way Dewey is said to have held reservations about James's moral equivalence argument, I think it is necessary to qualify the usefulness of Lieven's argument. Lieven does not recognize, for instance, how much more difficult it would be for governments to convince even the most patriotic of citizens to make the sacrifices required to reduce carbon emissions, if the citizens of another nation-state were not making similar sacrifices. In this case, the motivating power of nationalism is weakened by a sense of international injustice. The free-rider problem may no longer complicate efforts to agree a legally binding comprehensive agreement, but that does not mean it disappears from climate governance. It is merely being transposed to a different (national) setting. Without an internationalist sense of the global public interest in other words nationalism can quickly become a part of the problem because it is more willing and able to pass responsibility (and its burdens) on to others. Richard Beardsworth's (2020, 381) recent argument on the role and identity of the state is in this respect more helpful. In the post-Paris international environment, he writes, 'political action redounds above all to the agency and responsibility of the state both in relation to its own citizenry *and* in relation to other states and their citizenry'. The Pragmatic Constructivism would, I suggest, find this kind of other-regarding *inter*nationalism to be more suited to addressing the global challenge of climate change.

The question that remains is one that is again familiar to constructivist-inspired human rights scholarship. That scholarship demonstrated how progressive change involved a combination of 'bottom-up' and 'top-down' pressure (Risse, Ropp and Sikkink 1999; 2013). Global climate governance has given up on the 'top-down' pressure of treaty law but through the practices of the IPCC and the COP it invests faith in the idea

that these will be able to shame states into reducing their carbon emissions. These communities of international practice are in place, but can we be sure that there is a deeper 'bottom-up' process constructing the kind of internationalist identities that experience shame when governments act against the global public interest? If those identities do not exist below the level of the state then governments will be able to resist the pressures of COP, which will itself fail to meet its purpose of reducing carbon emissions. That then leads to the Deweyan-inspired question, which is how can we nurture the growth of internationalist sentiments that do make states vulnerable to pressure of the IPCC and COP?

There is evidence contained within the deliberative democracy literature that I suggest is helpful. That literature values, for instance, the practices of citizen's assemblies because they help construct publicly oriented identities. The work of Dryzek, Bächtiger, and Milewicz illustrate this. Participation in citizen's assemblies, they note, normally increases trust, confidence and interest in publicly oriented practices as well as a sense of civic commitment. Indeed, 'for some participants it proves to be a life-changing experience'.[190] More specifically, '[a]nalysis of the dynamics of deliberative citizen forums shows that there is often a shift in the direction of public goods and regard for the interests of others, as well as those of society as a whole' (Dryzek, Bächtiger, and Milewicz 2011, 37). Citizen's assemblies in this respect act as a pedagogic tool. They help nurture the kind of social learning that usefully directs nationalist and internationalist predispositions toward problem-solving outcomes.[191]

Conclusion

What then does Pragmatic Constructivism, with its two normative tests – inclusive reflexivity and deliberative practical judgement – tell us about actual practices and communities of practice in the field of global climate governance? To answer that question I focused on two communities of practice, the IPCC and COP. The IPCC is an interesting case study to the extent it poses difficult questions about the way the

---

[190] See also Bellamy, Chilvers and Vaughan (2016, 283), who cite how deliberative mapping processes, which in some ways replicate citizen assemblies encouraged reflexivity in framing issues and facilitated citizen–specialist interaction through the joint workshops. 'Overall, the citizens engaged in a recognizably intensive learning process, but expressed regret at not having more time or information to complete the appraisal. This research has thus shown that citizens can effectively engage in complex issues such as geoengineering in the context of tackling climate change and develop informed and considered judgements that are fully comparable with those of specialists'.

[191] A proposal for a climate assembly is contained within the Climate and Ecological Emergency Bill, which in August 2020 was presented in the UK Parliament as 'a private members bill' (i.e. it was proposed by a member of parliament not the government). According to John Harris (2020), the bill did two things: it highlighted 'how much our politicians are defying the urgency of the moment. And, by presenting clear and precise proposals to drastically reduce carbon emissions and restore biodiversity in the same typefaces and official vocabulary as the laws that define whole swathes of our lives, it makes the prospect of radical action eminently imaginable'. Its proposal to set up a citizens assembly, Harris added, would 'mark the entry into the legislative process of a new, disruptive element, which might pull things away from charmed circles, lobbyists and Westminster's eternal tendency to conservative groupthink' (Harris 2020). In support of such a proposal, he cited evidence that such assemblies work 'to reduce our susceptibility to division and rancour' as we seek to adapt to changed circumstances. Indeed, what Harris (2020) sees in citizens assemblies, I contend, fits with the normative thrust of Pragmatism: 'crowds of strangers calmly gathering in hotel meeting rooms and plotting the future on the basis of things we are in danger of forgetting – empathy, openness and the basic human ability to not just think about complex problems, but to actually solve them'.

two tests interact in light of the particular problem in view. The task of the IPCC is to tell states how the Earth's climate is reacting to human practice, which requires expert practical judgement. The second test therefore demands that exclusionary boundaries are placed around this particular community of practice. Yet I have argued that even the IPCC, because it is ultimately a problem-solving and not a purely scientific agency, has to be conscious of how its knowledge is received. It may offer the best technical analysis but that analysis is pointless if it is not acted on. Realizing this, the IPCC has demonstrated sensitivity to the inclusive reflexivity criteria, and for that reason I conclude it passes the two tests.

The normative verdict on the COP is more complex. Based on state practice between the 2015 Paris Agreement and the 2021 Glasgow meeting it is evident that COP is not delivering sufficient progress to keep temperature increases at 1.5°C. The Chapter examined reasons that contribute to this record, including how the COP is constituted at a micro- and macro-level. As in the previous Chapter's discussion of the UN Security Council, adjustments to COP's micro-practices should be considered to rebalance the inclusionary and exclusionary imperatives. Some have argued for instance that the fossil fuel industry should not have the level of accreditation it had at the Glasgow Summit. There is a sense, however, that while they are part of the solution, micro-adjustments to the running of the conference will be of marginal impact.

Given the pre-Paris failure to negotiate a top-down comprehensive treaty that would legally bind states to emissions targets, the bottom-up practice of pledging and delivering NDCs was and is the best possible path for international society to take. However, to make that work I suggest the bottom-up process has to go much deeper. It has to focus on the communities of practice that are now ultimately responsible for setting and delivering NDCs i.e. nations. Pragmatic Constructivism, I suggest, tells us that states are not, at this moment in time, ambitious enough in their pledges. They are exercising poor practical judgement in the context of what is required because the national populations they represent have not sufficiently reflected on the problem and understood what is required. Ways of addressing that, I suggested, include creative methods of democratic inquiry such as citizen's assemblies. Some of these themes are relevant to the global health challenges also, and it is to that issue that I now turn.

Chapter 8

International Practice and Global Health

My purpose in this Chapter is to complete the set of studies that answer my third question: what does Pragmatic Constructivism (as set out in Part One of the book) tell us about the value of actual practices in contemporary international society. I focus on the global challenges to human health, and whether the communities of international practice that purportedly address those challenges authoritatively define the public interest in ways that should command normative and political support. I concentrate on the ability of these communities to learn from the outbreak of SARS-COV-2, or what the World Health Organization (WHO) officially named COVID-19 on 11 February 2020. The outbreak was first discovered in Wuhan in 2019, and its spread was declared a pandemic by the WHO in March 2020.[192] At the beginning of July 2021, the WHO reported that 3,981,756 people had died as a result of infection and there were 183,700,343 confirmed cases.[193]

Despite its Asian origins, the vast majority of these deaths were, at that moment, among populations in the Americas and Europe; and while the discovery of a vaccine gave societies hope that the virus could be controlled, that was tempered by the emergence of variant strains, especially among unvaccinated populations. The pandemic marks a failure of global health governance, especially in the context of prior experiences. In 2015 the G7 described the Ebola outbreak as a 'wake up call' (Paul, Brown, Ridde 2020). Moreover, international society knew of the coronavirus risk having relatively recently experienced two outbreaks (SARS-COV-1 and MERS-COV),[194] as well as the H5N1 avian flu and the H1N1 swine flu virus.[195]

---

[192] For a detailed chronology of events see Independent Panel 2021b, 22-9.

[193] For a fuller list of impacts, including details of 'the deepest shock to the global economy since the Second World War and the largest simultaneous contraction of national economies since the Great Depression of 1930–32', see the Independent Report (2021b, 10).

[194] The 2003 SARS-COV-1 coronavirus outbreak started in Guangdong, China, and spread to countries in Southeast Asia, North America, Europe, and South Africa. 'The last case occurred in September 2003, after having infected over 8,000 persons and causing 774 deaths with a case fatality rate calculated at 9.5%. MERS-COV is a coronavirus that causes respiratory disease and first appeared in the Middle East in 2011'. MERS-CoV has a higher fatality rate but lower transmission rate than SARS coronaviruses, which helped to contain it. Compounding the sense of governance failure on Covid-19 is the fact that the higher number of deaths exists despite a much lower fatality rate to SARS-COV-1 or MERS-COV. There have simply been more cases (Guarner 2020, 420-1).

[195] The H5N1 avian influenza outbreak was first identified in poultry in East Asia in December 2003. The first cases of human infection occurred in 2004. The disease appeared to peak in 2006 when the highest number of human cases appeared. The highest cumulative totals of human infections (and deaths) were in Indonesia, Egypt, and Viet Nam (Davies et al. 2015, 123-4). For pushback against the argument that the response to H5N1 marked a rejection the 2005 IHR norms see Davies et.al. 2015, 142.

Given these experiences the stock of learning should have been high. That failure, therefore, and the possibility of a repeat experience, demands inquiry into the value of current international practices.

I start my inquiry by explaining how the WHO and the current International Health Regulations (IHRs), which set out how international society should respond to the contagion threat, emerged as a response to the challenges of globalization. A Deweyan-inflected Pragmatic Constructivism helps us understand this, and to see how this community of practice and its norms emerged in response to the lived experience of material change. The experience of the 2003 SARS outbreak is particularly important in this narrative because it prompted what David Fidler (2003) calls a new set of 'post-Westphalian' practices. Because global society lacked faith in states to report outbreaks, the WHO would, post-SARS, include reports from non-governmental sources as part of its decision to declare a public health emergency of international concern (PHEIC). It also involved issuing advice directly to societies and not just states. I argue that the Pragmatic Constructivist would not only be able to explain the emergence of these new norms and practices, they would be able to normatively support them as well. Including non-state reports within an expanded community of inquiry promised increased reflexivity and better deliberations when judging whether to declare a PHEIC. On that basis, these norms and practices pass the two normative tests set by Pragmatic Constructivism.

In the second section I zoom-in on the community of practice at the center of the PHEIC process, the WHO's Emergency Committee. There are parallels here with the discussion of the IPCC in the previous Chapter. Pragmatic Constructivism draws attention to the way in which its epistemic authority is contingent on the boundary work that establishes and maintains relevant expertise; and to the extent the IHR recognize the need for regional representation it is aware of how important it is to consider how expert knowledge is received. This would suggest that the Pragmatic Constructivist could normatively support this community of practice. There does, however, seem to be reason to criticize the habitus that influences WHO practice. More specifically, commentators have pointed to the way in which the Emergency Committee has been predisposed to the highest standards of evidential proof, a predisposition that has normative implications because it exposes populations to a higher risk than if the Committee operated according to the precautionary principle. The point here, which is illustrated with reference to the delayed declaration of the Covid PHEIC, is that Pragmatic Constructivism can not only *explain* the influence of a habitus, it can also pass *normative judgement* on it. In this Chapter, Pragmatic Constructivism offers us a normative critique of the PHEIC practice at the WHO.

In the third section I zoom-out from this focus on micro-practice to consider a wider set of international practices that impact on the public interest in containing Covid: intellectual property practices. I argue that the Pragmatic Constructivist can offer a normative critique of these practices to the extent they are internally inconsistent. While they claim to be in the global public interest they in practice exclude vulnerable populations from the benefits of vaccines by restricting competition among suppliers and driving up prices. That is sufficient to cast doubt on the argument that sustains these practices. In that instance I suggest the Pragmatic Constructivist would find a normative reason to politically support vulnerable publics as a means of balancing the political power of the pharmaceutical companies. That is necessary if the deliberations on the global public interest are to establish epistemic authority. I further argue that because there is a risk that viruses can mutate in unvaccinated populations there is a strong

argument that it is in the self-interest of vaccinated populations to increase the world's capacity to produce and supply vaccines. That, I suggest, tips the balance of judgement in favour of the argument that waiving intellectual property rights is in the global public interest. On that basis, I demonstrate how Pragmatic Constructivism identifies post-pandemic decisions at the World Trade Organization (WTO) as normative progress.

The final section develops a theme of previous Chapters: a critique of top-down approaches to global governance. The failure of international society to limit the cost of the Covid pandemic has led some (Duff et al. 2021) to argue for the legal reform of global health governance, including empowering the WHO in ways that 'supersede' national authorities. These ideas reflect similar proposals in the R2P, nuclear and climate change fields. When set in political context, as Pragmatic Constructivism demands, these ideas look impractical. Nationalism is a powerful ideology, which means states would likely dismiss (or distort) these proposals (again the ICC example cited in Chapter 6 comes to mind). Given the opportunity cost of campaigning for such proposals in this environment, I conclude that international society should not go down that path. The best that might be said is that such proposals may act as pedagogic tools for the social learning that needs to take place at a deeper level. That requires reflecting on the meaning of nationalism in the context of contemporary global challenges. It means cultivating support for internationalist identities that are committed to making existing practices work in the global public interest.

Assessing the WHO as a community of disease control practice

The spread of pathogens, like Covid-19, illustrates one of Dewey's key concerns in *The Public and its Problems.* The changing materiality of industrialization, and later globalization, meant that in his day communities were impacted by the consequences of practices they had no control over. Expanded interaction and intensified interdependence would thus bring into being new forms of association, new publics and new political interests. Indeed, the realization that 'diseases know no borders' (Ferhani and Rushton 2020; Fidler 2003), and that new international communities of practice were needed to monitor and control their spread, was evident in Dewey's time. The International Sanitary Regulations (ISR) were created in ~~in~~ the late 19th Century (Harman 2018, 721; Youde 2017, 591-2). These were adopted by the WHO, which was created as part of the post-1945 UN system. The ISR 'provided the basis for international outbreak surveillance and containment efforts.' (Davies et al. 2015, 14). They identified six diseases that states were obliged to report to the WHO because they were highly contagious, caused widespread human suffering, and disrupted international trade. The WHO would then issue advice on how to contain the spread, which could include action to isolate a state.[196] In 1969, when the ISR were revised and renamed the International Health Regulations (IHR), the scope was reduced to four diseases; and in 1981, following the successful eradication of smallpox, the list was reduced again to three: cholera, plague, and yellow fever (Davies et al. 2015, 18).

---

[196] In this respect, as Klabbers (2019, 276) notes, WHO's 'authority is exercised on the basis of expertise and knowledge' rather than law.

Given the impact these diseases have on the lived experience it is obvious that controlling their spread is in the global public interest. The specific problem that draws the attention of the Pragmatic Constructivist is what has been described as the 'habitual' failure of states to report disease outbreaks to the WHO (Davies et al. 2015, 53). Underpinning these habits was the state's fear that reporting would lead it to suffer reputational costs and material damage through, for instance, a travel ban. The problems created by the non-reporting habit could not be ignored, however. The risk of non-reporting only increased as the material environment in which states operated continued to change. For instance, urbanization increased the risk of zoonotic outbreaks because it led to more interaction between animals and humans, and the growth in international travel and trade exacerbated global transmissibility.[197] These risks were seemingly realized in the 2003 SARS outbreak, including China's refusal to provide outbreak information to the WHO in 'a timely, transparent, and verifiable manner' (Fidler 2003, 492; Davies et al. 2015, 18-22).

This was a major learning experience for global health governance. Davies, Kamradt-Scott and Rushton (2015, 13) write that the SARS outbreak 'highlighted the extent to which globalization had changed the landscape of health and the degree to which local disease outbreaks could quickly become national and international security'. They also note how the lessons drawn from SARS prompted change in WHO practice. For instance, the WHO Director General Gro Harlem Brundtland declared a public emergency and issued travel warnings without SARS being named in the IHR (von Bogdandy and Villareal 2021, 11), and without taking the time to 'ease the way politically' (Heymann 2013). David Fidler described this response as 'post-Westphalian' to the extent the global public interest was identified by an international civil servant and subsequently acted on in ways that largely by-passed states. In response to China's reluctance, the WHO would from that point on 'supplement disease reporting by governments with epidemiological information provided by non-government sources' (Fidler 2003; also Hanrieder and Kreuder-Sonnen 2014, 337; Davies et al. 2015, 103-6; Alvarez 2020, 579). Likewise, Fidler interpreted the WHO's issuance of global alerts and travel advisories to individuals (rather than to state members) as unprecedented. It was a shift from the previous (Westphalian) practice whereby the WHO 'disseminated government-provided information on areas infected with quarantinable diseases to WHO members, which decided whether to apply measures to persons arriving from or traveling to such areas' (Fidler 2003, 494).

The handling of SARS was considered a success (Hanrieder and Kreuder-Sonnen 2014, 337). It was also a learning experience to the extent the new practices were codified in the 2005 update of the IHR. Under article 6 of the IHR, for instance, states must notify the WHO within 24 hours 'of all events which may constitute a public health emergency of international concern within its territory' (IHR, Article 6). Under article 9, however, the WHO 'may take into account reports from sources other than [state] notifications or consultations' (IHR, Article 9). Under article 12, moreover, the WHO Director General can determine a public health emergency of international concern (PHEIC) and issue recommendations (temporary or standing), including travel advisories (IHR, Articles 15-18). In addition, the scope of the 2005 IHR was not limited to any specific disease or manner of transmission, but covered an 'illness or medical condition, irrespective of origin or source, that presents or could present significant harm to humans' (IHR, Article 1).

---

[197] See the WHO Secretariat reports to the WHA on *Global Health Security—Epidemic Alert and Response* in 2001 and *Global Crises—Global Solutions* in 2002 as cited in Davies et al. 2015, 94-5. See also Independent Panel Report 2021b, 19-20.

It further obliges state to develop 'as soon as possible but no later than five years from the entry into force of these Regulations' (IHR Article 5, 13) core capacities for surveillance and response as listed in Annex 1 of the 2005 IHR. National Focal Points were created to be accessible at all times for communications with WHO Contact Points (IHR, Article 4).

But how would Pragmatic Constructivism assess this new practice? Firstly, the SARS experience was clearly a good reason for challenging the habits and predispositions of states, as well as refreshing the outdated International Health Regulations. Secondly, to the extent those habits and predispositions underpinned national practices that withheld information that was in the global public interest the move to bypass states was understandable although not without risks. State cooperation would ultimately be required to contain an outbreak and eradicate disease. Finally, the inclusion of non-state reporting in the community of inquiry promised to encourage greater reflexivity on the question of whether it was within the global public interest for the WHO to declare a public health emergency of international concern (PHEIC). States could not as easily wield influence over that process if they were no longer the only source of knowledge. By expanding the community of inquiry (in effect democratizing knowledge) states were less able to advance a national interest that harmed the global interest. For these reasons I suggest the Pragmatic Constructivist would see the post-SARS practices and IHR norms as progress. They emerged as constructive responses to a problematic experience and by expanding the community of inquiry as a means of transcending that problem, they pass the first normative test, inclusive reflexivity. As noted in previous chapters, however, inclusiveness does not always produce better practical judgements, which is why the second Pragmatic Constructivist test – deliberative practical judgement – is important. I explore how the two tests interact in the following section, which examines the WHO's response to the Covid-19 outbreak.

Before that I want to draw attention to an important pre-Covid critique of the IHR. The 2005 IHRs insist that state authorities should have the capacity to detect unusual disease events, to assess all reports of urgent events within 48 hours, and to notify the WHO immediately through a national IHR Focal Point (IHR 2005, Annex 1). This is a costly commitment for all states, but especially developing states who may decide they have different priorities.[198] In that context, analysts have commented on what they describe as the 'continued failure to deliver the necessary financial and political partnership around IHR compliance'. This may, they have argued, 'lead some governments to believe that the costs and benefits of global health security are not being equitably apportioned' (Davies et al. 2015, 24).[199]

A potential consequence of this is the reconstruction of self-regarding (rather than other-regarding) identities and practices, which would not be consistent with the global public interest and the search for

---

[198] On the Global Health Security Initiative, which was launched in February 2014, partly in response to the lack of compliance with the 2005 IHR implementation, see DeShore et al. 2020. Only 67 states were signed up to the initiative at the moment of the Covid-19 outbreak (Moolenaar, Cassell and Knight 2020). It is not necessarily the case that IHR compliance is linked to state capacity. Contrast, for instance, the Independent Panel's (2021b) conclusion on the response models of South East Asian countries, which were developed in relation to SARs and 'were rapidly adapted' to Covid-19, with the performance of the US where the Trump administration 'gutted' pandemic preparedness (Tracy 2020).

[199] Davies et al. (2015, 24) also point to a possible problem with the securitization of health. It was 'seen in some quarters as a "Western" self-interested political manoeuvre'.

best practice. Indeed, Indonesia's actions during the H5N1 outbreak is an oft cited example of a state acting to protect the national self-interest in ways that harmed the global public interest because it considered the international distribution of health care costs to be unfair. In that instance, Indonesia refused to share viral samples of H5N1 with the WHO because it feared the vaccines that would be developed from such samples would be unaffordable or unavailable to them. This assertion of 'viral sovereignty' had the support of other states in the global South (Davies et al. 2015, 134-43). It is cited here as another example of where a politics of exclusion, in this case the sense that some states will not be able to afford vaccines, negatively impacts on the task of constructing and realizing a global public interest, in this case detecting and responding to PHEIC. I return to the question of vaccine availability below, but first I take a deeper look at PHEIC practices.

Assessing the PHEIC community of practice. Lessons from the pandemic.

The early reporting of outbreaks is key to preventing the global spread of contagious diseases. The WHO 'does not have the means to independently verify outbreak rumors' so it is dependent on state reporting (Hanrieder 2020, 535). As noted, however, states can be reluctant to do that; and indeed, they might do the opposite of what the global public interest requires by covering-up outbreaks to avoid damaging counter-measures. Underpinning the IHR was a 'bargain' (Davies et al. 2015 p.215, 226) that tries to mitigate this problem. States who may be disinclined to declare the existence of pathogens could instead report to the WHO. It would make sure through its advice that the international response was grounded in epidemiological science. States would not be able to act therefore on the basis of rumour (Davies 2015 et al. 230) and could not exploit the situation or the community in question. The WHO would thus reduce the risk of, for instance, unnecessary travel restrictions by only recommending (and therefore legitimizing) responses that were proportional to the actual threat.[200] If international society had faith in the WHO's judgement, states would be deterred from acting disingenuously, and that in turn would encourage other states to get into the habit of early reporting. The IHR, in other words, was designed to help construct other-regarding states, which would, through their practices, serve the global public interest in stopping the spread of contagious diseases.

The community of practice at the centre of this process is the WHO Emergency Committee. This is established by the WHO Director General (DG) under Article 48 of the IHR. This draws on a pool of experts to provide views on whether an event that occurs on the territory of a state constitutes a public health emergency of international concern (PHEIC). While Annex II of the IHR offers guidance on the assessment and notification of events that may constitute a PHEIC, the process is characterized by a large degree of

---

[200] See Klabbers (2019, 279) who calls this 'active epistemic authority', which is 'exercised without the intermediary of proper, generally recognized legal instruments'. If the authority of an organization 'derives from science and knowledge (or, more accurately, is thought to derive from science and knowledge) and is therewith considered objective and a-political' then it does not necessarily have to bother with legal instruments.

indeterminacy. This is because 'pervasive uncertainty' often accompanies the emergence of public health events. As Davies et al. note, that uncertainty

> usually precludes the notion that a predetermined, very specific list of travel and trade measures can be developed in advance. The fact that each disease outbreak is potentially different, with varied epidemiology, infection, morbidity, and mortality rates and requiring diverse control measures, means that each outbreak obliges governments [and the WHO DG] to be flexible in how they respond. In fact, the very nature of PHEICs effectively discounts the normalization of response; they are, by their very definition, exceptional events that warrant a specific, vigorous public health response (Davies et al. 2015, 189-90).

In these circumstances the epistemic authority of a community of practice is very much contingent on its ability to make judgement calls with positive practical consequences. It means in this case containing the spread of an outbreak while not overreacting in ways that damage other public goods (e.g. trade) and the trust states have in the WHO.   The challenge is, in this respect, similar to the communities of practice studied in the previous chapters (e.g. the Security Council and the IPCC); and, I suggest, the same normative tests can apply. Clearly, the technicalities of the problem requires the DG to select experts in appropriate fields. This is referred to in Articles 48 and 49 of the IHR, which calls on the DG to convene meetings of experts according to the fields most relevant to the specific event.

As noted in the previous chapters, however, the purpose of these communities of practice is to serve the global public interest by solving lived problems and not merely acquiring knowledge about the event. That may, from the Pragmatic Constructivist perspective, demand reflection on what is meant by the term 'expert'. The problem solving focus that turns an epistemic community into a community of practice means it is important to know how the technical knowledge that is produced will be received and how it can be used to ameliorate the lived experience. Article 48 (2) shows sensitivity to this. It states the DG should select members of the Emergency Committee 'on the basis of the expertise and experience for any particular sessions *and with due regard to the principles of equitable geographical representation.'* It adds that at least one member of the Emergency Committee 'should be an expert nominated by a State Party within whose territory the event arises'.[201]   As with the IPCC (see previous the Chapter) this kind of inclusivity is important for building confidence in the epistemic authority of the community of practice.

In the abstract then I think there are reasons why the Pragmatic Constructivist would support WHO norms in relation to public health emergencies of international concern. The IHRs demonstrate a sensitivity to the two normative tests Pragmatic Constructivism applies: inclusionary reflexivity and deliberative practical judgement. WHO practice, however, has highlighted a number problems. Armin Von Bogdandy and Pedro Villareal (2020), for instance, have criticized the Emergency Committee for being opaque and

---

[201] Article 50 of the IHR, which empowers the Director-General to create a Review Committee with respect to standing recommendations, is on the surface more inclusionary. Members are to be selected 'on the basis of the principles of equitable geographical representation, gender balance, a balance of experts from developed and developing countries, representation of a diversity of scientific opinion, approaches and practical experience in various parts of the world, and an appropriate interdisciplinary balance.'

exclusionary.[202]　　They recognize that the 'benefits of rapid decision-making can justify costs in inclusiveness'.　They add, however, that 'a more detailed exposition of the reasons on why a PHEIC was declared or not would foster trust in the WHO' (Bogdandy and Villareal 2020, 14).　They point to a report issued at the World Health Assembly in 2019, which highlighted 'the insufficient regional diversity in members of the IHR Roster of Experts.　Improving this state of affairs would serve the interests of inclusion and of trust in the WHO' (see also Mullen et al. 2020).　This is particularly important, Bogdandy and Villareal (2020) conclude, because the decision to call a PHEIC 'is not a purely technical matter, but requires choices'. Indeed, *the political* character of those choices is inevitable given the task of balancing health and other (e.g. economic) objectives, and that adds a different dimension to the decision and the authority of an Emergency Committee based on technical (i.e. epidemiological) expertise.[203]

This is also noted by Gruszczynski and Melillo (2022, 13).　They point to the way the 'regulatory' – or problem solving - scientific process 'involves various normative judgments, which may sometimes remain undisclosed or even unconscious'.[204] For example:

> Questions such as how to deal with uncertainties – i.e. what weight to attach to contradictory evidence; how much precaution to apply in a given context; how to translate a tentative language of science into the binary logic of policy-legal recommendations (i.e. something is recommended/required or not) … clearly have a normative component that may depend on the individual preferences of a risk assessor, institutional culture of a body within which assessment is undertaken or a character of risks/threats that are investigated.

This is potentially problematic in the WHO context because there is an 'institutional culture', one might say habitus, which tends to deny the political character of those normative assumptions.　As evidence for this claim, Gruszczynski and Melillo quote the WHO DG, Tedros Adhanon Ghebreyesus, at a virtual Covid press conference held on 8 April 2020.　Tedros affirmed that his focus was on 'saving lives', adding 'we don't do politics in the WHO'.　He also called on member states to 'quarantine the pandemic from politics' (Gruszczynski and Melillo 2022, 8).　The risk is that this habitus means the decision on when to declare a PHEIC is not as well-informed as it could be because it is not conscious of the normative / political biases that are informing it.　The scientific habitus, for instance, might skew deliberations to favour 'the most rigorous medical culture', which means 'we cannot act if we do not have the evidence' (Gruszczynski and Melillo 2022).[205]　Without what Dewey would call 'conscientious reflection', this normative position appears natural and uncontested, when in fact that predisposition might not be shared beyond the particular

---

[202] Hanrieder and Kreuder-Sonnen (2014, 332) write that the PHEIC during the 2009 H1N1 outbreak was declared by the 'secret Emergency Committee'.

[203] See also Alvarez 2020, 583-6.　On the contribution that broader social sciences make to epidemic preparedness and response see Bardosh et al. 2020.　For debate surrounding the political judgement of the decision not to declare a PHEIC during the 2019 outbreak of Ebola in the DRC see Lancet 2019, Giesecke 2019.

[204] The term 'regulatory science' is taken from the Science, Technology and Society literature, which refers to a distinct domain of science that is accountable to epistemic as well as normative demands (Gruszczynski and Melillo 2020, 12).

[205] Or, as Alvarez (2020, 586) puts it: 'the WHO's singular reliance on public health professionals may cause it to be less nimble with respect to reasonable state measures that are not (yet) backed by rigorous testing or peer-reviewed studies but which are warranted by the precautionary principle'.　On the unveiling of politics to encourage greater reflexivity see Shiffman 2014 and Lee 2015.

community of practice. That is problematic from the Pragmatic Constructivist perspective because being unaware of how knowledge and recommendations are received can damage the political task of building the support that is necessary to formulate an effective way forward.

Indeed, the second report of the Independent Panel (2021b), which was set up to assess the Covid-19 PHEIC, addressed this very problem.[206] It noted how the PHEIC process was based on the established practice of 'issuing advice on the balance of existing evidence'. In this case that meant the declaration of a PHEIC was delayed because the Emergency Committee saw only *the possibility* of human-to-human transmission. Had the Committee been operating with a different normative predisposition, one that emphasized the 'precautionary principle' (Alvarez 2020, 586), it would have called a PHEIC sooner and told countries that they should *assume* human-to-human transmission was occurring. In the judgement of the Independent Panel that would have been a better path to take. Declaring a PHEIC when the Emergency Committee met early in January 2020, rather than wait until 30 January, would have sounded 'the loudest alarm', which could have moved states to make preparations sooner. Indeed, the Independent Panel's report further notes how the PHEIC, when it was called, was not followed by forceful and immediate emergency state responses because it did not cut through normal political discourse. It was not until 11 March 2020, after Covid-19 was characterized as a 'pandemic' by the WHO, and when states had already seen widespread cases locally, 'that concerted government action was finally taken' (Independent Panel 2021b, 28).

One lesson a Pragmatic Constructivist might draw from this is that communities of practice within the WHO have to be reconstituted to change a maladapted habitus. Of course technical advice is needed, but is the public interest served by a process that is reluctant to declare a PHEIC until it is certain that the evidence justifies it? Without directly drawing on the language of habitus, Sara Davies and Claire Wenham have pointed to the risks of an exclusionary culture. 'During emergencies', they write, 'invitations to the table often come down to personal, professional and strategic networks: who is known to the key team, who is respected or feared'. They make a specific case, moreover, that 'the absence of IR [International Relations] knowledge and expertise is problematic for pandemic response as it means that the political effects of representation, power and inclusion may be overlooked as secondary to the value of technical epidemiological advice' (Davies and Wenham 2020, 1233). This is important, but it is difficult to see exactly how IR experts would have advised the DG to act differently, especially when 'the precautionary principle' was associated in that discipline with overreactions to non-existent threats (e.g. the US-led war to disarm Iraqi WMDs).

The WHO's reluctance to recommend travel restrictions after its declaration of a PHEIC was in fact motivated in part by a concern for international relations. Indeed, the WHO was predisposed to the view that borders should remain open and that pandemic responses should not harm international relations or

---

[206] The Independent Panel was established by the WHO Director-General in response to the World Health Assembly resolution 73.1. The mission was 'to provide an evidence-based path for the future, grounded in lessons of the present and the past to ensure countries and global institutions, including specifically WHO, effectively address health threats'. See https://theindependentpanel.org/about-the-independent-panel/

the relations between member states and the WHO.[207] As noted above, the problem of containing diseases requires states to report breakouts early so that international society can respond and prepare before it is overwhelmed. To maintain that trust, and to maintain communication channels open, the WHO does not want to be seen to be recommending actions like embargos or travel restrictions that harm the state's economy. Despite what the WHO DG says, that is indeed a political strategy. The question the Pragmatic Constructivist would ask is whether it serves the global public interest, and the answer to that can only be given on a case by case basis. Two examples from the response to the Covid-19 experience illustrate the point.

On the one hand, the WHO DG was criticized for what some saw as a lenient political stance towards China. Evidence for this was the DG 'accepting delays in sharing information and not publicly condemning it' (Gruszczynski and Melillo 2022, 17). That political strategy has to be understood, however, in political context. The WHO is an organization with 'no legal and limited political means to force its Members to cooperate with it' (Gruszczynski and Melillo 2022, 18). It thus 'tends to work on a consensual basis, mitigating rather than increasing political tensions among its Members and avoiding any forms of stigmatization' (Gruszczynski and Melillo 2022, 18). In their analysis, Gruszczynski and Melillo (2022, 20) in fact link the DG's praise for China to those moments when the WHO most needed its collaboration in sharing information. 'Rather than being lenient, the WHO simply adopted a political strategy to fulfil one of its functions'. This would be enough, I suggest, for the Pragmatic Constructivist to defend WHO practice, at least against the charge of nationalists like US President Trump, who tried to use the organization's interaction with China to distract from 'a floundering national pandemic response during an election year' (Lee and Piper 2020, 524).[208]

On the other hand, the WHO concern that recommending travel bans would constitute the kind of overreaction that would lose it the support and cooperation of states was a political misjudgement that conscientious reflection may have avoided. On that basis it is something Pragmatic Constructivism would not defend. The failure to back up the 30 January declaration of a PHEIC with such recommendations dampened the sound of its alarm call, and indeed the WHO repeated its advice against travel and trade restrictions on the 29 February. By the time of its 3rd statement on 1 May the Emergency Committee's advice had been overtaken by events, with states instituting their own restrictions. In retrospect then by not recommending travel restrictions the WHO was guarding against the wrong danger (a breakdown of international cooperation) and failing to properly signal the need to take preparatory action against the greater danger (the spread of the virus). Because of WHO practice, in other words, and in the conclusion of the Independent Panel, international society lost time in its race against the virus.

---

[207] As Lee and Piper (2020, 524) remind us, the 'control of the international spread of disease', while avoiding unnecessary interference with 'traffic and trade', is a central and historic function of the WHO. On the predisposition against border controls, see Ferhani and Rushton 2020.

[208] For Alvarez (2020, 583) 'the absence of "name and shame" techniques, much less sanctions of any kind, for WHO members that ignore or openly defy their legal obligations under the IHR is a problem that needs fixing'. His assignment of those techniques to 'observers' (rather than the WHO DG) alludes to the political dilemma faced by WHO practitioners.

Both examples illustrate the importance of the second Pragmatic Constructivist test – deliberative practical judgement. In situations of radical uncertainty such as the onset of a global pandemic how to act is inevitably a judgement call, and no one should be under the illusion that the choice of which path to take is an easy one. That should qualify the retrospective assessment of practitioners and nuance the way in which we draw lessons from this particular experience. The Pragmatic Constructivist is conscious of how the stock of learning (or experience) may not necessarily be relevant to the next crisis. A normative commitment to the precautionary approach, which the Independent Panel argues would have been appropriate in early 2020, may well be considered an over-reaction in the next crisis.[209] There is no replacement for conscientious reflection on what best serves the public interest in the specific context of the problem in view. Yet I have demonstrated in this section how are community of practice with a particular habitus – in this case one dominated by the medical sciences – may be blind to the normative assumptions that guide their analysis, and underestimate the political implications of their recommendations. In that respect, the section demonstrates not only the importance of deliberative practical judgement. The first Pragmatic Constructivist test is also important, because there are instances when including different expertise can help communities of practice reflect on how their predispositions may be failing them and the public interest.

Global health publics and intellectual property practices

In May 2020 at its virtual *de minimis* session, the Seventy-third World Health Assembly adopted resolution WHA73.1 on the COVID-19 response. It recognized 'the role of extensive immunization against COVID-19 as a global public good for health in preventing, containing and stopping transmission in order to bring the pandemic to an end, once safe, quality, efficacious, effective, accessible and affordable vaccines are available' (WHA 2020, 3). It also alluded to a reason why such vaccines may *not* be accessible and affordable: intellectual property rights. These rights supposedly serve a public interest by encouraging innovation. The practice of issuing patents on new knowledge and its associated product, for instance, means the innovator is appropriately rewarded. The background knowledge authorizing such a practice suggests that without such rewards there would be less incentive to innovate and pharmaceutical companies would not produce the drugs necessary to combat new diseases. The Pragmatic Constructivist would view this claim as a hypothesis to be tested in light of the practical consequences for those directly and indirectly affected by the practice of issuing patents. The evidence, I suggest, gives good reason to contest the claim that intellectual property practices serve the public interest.

If the direct consequence of intellectual property practices in this area is the reward of innovators, the indirect consequence is that competition in the production of new drugs is limited. That drives up the price of the drug, and that increases the likelihood that vulnerable populations are excluded from their benefits.

---

[209] As Hanrieder and Kreuder-Sonnen (2014, 332) note, once the H1N1 passed and the severity of the outbreak was found to be rather mild, journalists, state representatives and European parliamentarians criticized the WHO declaration of a PHEIC, as well as the lack of transparent decision making procedures within WHO. See also Lee and Piper 2020, 525; Alvarez 2020, 584.

In this way, intellectual property practices, create Deweyan 'publics' (see Chapter 4 and 5). Dewey used this term to describe those 'who are affected by indirect consequences [of a practice] to such an extent that it is deemed necessary to have those consequences systematically cared for' (Dewey 1927b [1998] 284). The point here is that because the lived experience of these publics is being harmed by intellectual property practice there is 'real and living doubt' (Peirce 1877) about whether these practices serve the global public interest. That is reason for inquiry. But more than that, from the Pragmatic Constructivist perspective it is reason for normatively and politically supporting, as publics, vulnerable populations so that their experience is given due consideration in the community of inquiry that lends epistemic authority to global health practices. There is clearly a clash of interests here. That does not mean deliberation on what *the* public interest is has no use. It does, however, suggest that power needs to be rebalanced so that the interests of those excluded from, but clearly affected by, the community of intellectual property practices are properly considered.

Against this standard, there is evidence of tentative progress in the field of global health. The Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), for instance, was negotiated during the 1986-94 Uruguay Rounds of trade talks. In theory, TRIPS facilitates trade in knowledge and creativity and resolves disputes over intellectual property. In practice, however, it is an obstacle to the local production of life-saving drugs. Overcoming that obstacle would drive down the price of drugs and make them more widely available across the developing world. The US, for example, held Brazil to be in breach the TRIPS agreement when it started to produce antiretroviral drugs in its fight against HIV/AIDS. The US ultimately backed down from legal action against Brazil following campaigns across civil and international society. On the back of that the World Trade Organization (WTO) Doha Declaration on public health was adopted (Fraundorfer 2015, 40-60). This stated that 'the TRIPS Agreement does not and should not prevent Members from taking measures to protect public health'. It added 'that the Agreement can and should be interpreted and implemented in a manner supportive of WTO Members' right to protect public health and, in particular, to promote access to medicines for all'.

Among the 'flexibilities' that the Declaration introduced was a broader right to grant compulsory licenses, especially in public health emergencies. This means a company seeking to use another's intellectual property can do so without seeking the rights holder's consent. The May 2020 Resolution by the World Health Assembly on the Covid-19 response reminded international society of this flexibility in its call for 'universal, timely and equitable access to, and fair distribution of, all quality, safe, efficacious and affordable essential health technologies' (WHA 2020). Such statements might not always be sufficient to move practice – the Trump administration for instance resisted such moves - but it is evidence that activism across international and global society can begin a process of progressive change.[210]

---

[210] The United States objected to the language on TRIPs and disassociated itself from the relevant operative paragraphs of WHA Resolution A73.1. In its statement to the WHA it noted that '[t]he United States recognizes the importance of access to affordable, safe, high-quality, and effective health products and the critical role that intellectual property plays in incentivizing the development of new and improved health products. However, as currently drafted, paragraphs 4, 8.2 and 9.8 send the wrong message to innovators who will be essential to the solutions the whole world needs' (US Mission Geneva 2020).

It is possible that the Covid pandemic will act as a learning experience that changes the background knowledge underpinning international society's intellectual property practices. Some argued in that context, for instance, that international society needed to go further and completely waive intellectual property rights on Covid-19 vaccines (Krishtel and Malpani 2021; Erfani et al. 2021). Their argument was that compulsory licensing practices take too long to have an effect and that a waiver would enable the level of production and accessibility that is needed to properly tackle the global problem. Those proposing a waiver, moreover, rejected the claim that manufacturers in lower income countries do not have the required capabilities, pointing out that this counter-argument is used to protect the particular interests of established companies and has been proven wrong in the past. On the 5 May 2021 the Biden administration reversed the US position on this argument and announced its intention to support a proposal temporarily waiving intellectual property rights on Covid-19 vaccines (Krishtel and Malpani 2021). This is further evidence that the change Pragmatic Constructivists would identify as progressive is possible. At the time of writing, WTO member states had agreed to a limited five year waiver. Global health activists regretted that it only covered vaccines, not treatments or diagnostics, but the pharmaceutical industry also complained that it was dismantling the rules that had actually helped to develop Covid vaccines (Rosen 2022).

The Covid pandemic was a reminder of how the lived experiences of nations are interconnected. A possible lesson from this is that states must be internationalist and globally oriented as they work with the WHO to better prepare themselves and others for the next pandemic. Faced with the threat of viruses, in other words, it made sense to prepare and protect others as a means of countering the threat to oneself. The development of vaccines, which helped bring the virus under control, however, has the potential to perpetuate self-regarding practices and deconstruct the emergence of a global public health interest. This is the implication of so-called 'vaccine nationalism' (Eaton 2021), which refers to the practice of over-prioritizing the health of nationals by, for instance, stockpiling vaccines when other populations remain unvaccinated. There are, however, internal inconsistencies in the background knowledge underpinning such practices, which I think would lead the Pragmatic Constructivist to argue against them. Given the nature of the threat there is strong evidence to suggest vaccine nationalism is self-defeating. This is because it is within the unvaccinated population that a new variant of Covid can emerge, and that could render a nation's stockpiles of the vaccine useless. Indeed, scientific modelling has shown that the 'prompt redistribution of vaccine surpluses is likely advantageous in terms of epidemiological and evolutionary outcomes in both countries and, by extension, globally' (Wagner et al. 2021). That evidence would suggest that the national self-interest is best advanced in the context of a global public-interest, and that the global public-interest is best served by practices of vaccine *inter*nationalism.

I suggest therefore that having expanded the community of inquiry to include relevant publics, and deliberated on the practical consequences of existing practices, as well as the relative merits of alternative practices, the Pragmatic Constructivist would be able to make some fairly specific policy recommendations in the field of global health. Continuing reform to intellectual property practices is one. Supporting vaccine sharing initiatives like COVAX is another. COVAX is the vaccine of the WHO Access to COVID-19 Tools (ACT) programme. It was established in April 2020 and is co-led by the GAVI vaccine alliance and the Coalition for Epidemic Preparedness Innovations (CEPI), which bring together partnerships across NGOs, CSOs and

IGOs. The principle informing COVAX is that states collectively source and equitably distribute vaccines globally. By pooling purchasing power states can negotiate more competitive prices from manufacturers and the initial aim was to vaccinate 20 per cent of the population in 92 low and middle income countries by the end of 2021. By the end of April that year, however, COVAX had shipped only one fifth of its projected estimates and lacked critical resources for distribution. The main problem was when exports of COVID-19 vaccines from India – the world's biggest COVID-19 vaccine manufacturer – were suspended. India's vaccines were in fact redirected to domestic supply in light of the country's devastating second wave (Horner 2021).[211] For some, this experience simply reinforced the need to change intellectual property practices and waive the provisions of the TRIPS agreement for Covid-19 technologies (Erfani et al. 2021). The precautionary principle favoured by the WHO Independent Panel suggests that waiver should be permanent so that developing countries can develop capacity before the next pandemic.

The practical value of a public health treaty

It has been a feature of the analyses offered in the previous two Chapters that top-down solutions to global challenges have been found wanting. While they make sense in theory they are not compelling when exposed to practice. Aidan Hehir's (2012, 2019) proposal to create a judicial body that separates the decision to authorize humanitarian intervention from the UN Security Council does not consider why states would do that, especially when he assumes they are self-interested rather than publically-oriented agents. As the evidence suggests, states can indeed be self-interested and that that casts doubt on the practicality of his proposed solution. Applying Pragmatic Constructivist insights does not rule out the possibility that practice might one day enable such reforms, but it does our focus attention on the bottom-up processes that are needed to realize that. That involves a social learning process that reconstructs the identity and interests of states so that they are publically-oriented and better adapted to ameliorating the security challenges that confront them.

A similar finding emerges from an analysis of climate change governance. After the 2009 Copenhagen COP it became evident that the search for a comprehensive treaty to impose carbon reduction targets was likely to end in failure. International society pragmatically adjusted its strategy and put its faith in a bottom-up approach to reducing carbon emissions. As Chapter 7 noted, there remains doubt about the value of 'nationally determined contributions', and I argued that progress depended on social learning at a deeper level. The point here, however, is that these insights at least qualify the value of top-down approaches to global governance.

It is in that context that post-pandemic proposals for the future of global health governance can be analyzed. Legal scholars for instance identify the problem in the WHO's lack of enforcement capability. For instance, Duff et al. (2021 e428) write that the 'primary barrier to global achievement of IHR goals lies in

---

[211] Other reasons for COVAX's difficulties include the fact that high-income countries had already spent heavily to secure commitments to early COVID-19 vaccine candidates for their domestic needs. This example of vaccine nationalism left only an inequitable fraction of the global supply available to COVAX (Gostin et al. 2020). Others pointed to how 'rich countries that have joined [COVAX] are entering into bilateral deals with pharmaceutical companies to buy up the supply' (Hassoun 2021).

its enforceability … there is no penalty for non-compliance'. The 'absence of explicit WHO authority to meaningfully monitor and enforce the IHR', they add, 'results in a world that is inadequately prepared' to prevent a pandemic. The WHO needs, from this perspective, to go beyond the advisory role it plays to the state-led World Health Assembly and act as a global 'executive', which holds states to account and enforce the required change (Duff et al. 2021, e428).

To this end, Duff et al. propose a 'convention' that establishes an autonomous international agency with 'the necessary authority to monitor, share data, and coordinate activities across countries'. It would go further than the IHR by enabling the agency to 'supersede other authorities and bypass existing regulatory structures, including national jurisdictional authorities'. States would be expected 'to share some degree of authority so that the governing agency can effectively coordinate activities whenever and wherever they are needed.' (Duff et al. 2021, e429). The convention would also establish a 'singular authoritative source for information, data, and technical assistance', as well as an 'executing' or 'governing body' that could evaluate state practice, offer incentives for participation and impose appropriate penalties for non-compliance (Duff et al. 2021, e429-30). The new agency would be funded by 'compulsory' state contributions and 'a tax on global private industry or international trade' (Duff et al. 2021, e430). It would operate with 'autonomy to decide and act in the best interest of global public health and with 'immunity from undue political influence'.

The hope behind such proposals is that the costs of the pandemic will convince states of the value of strengthening global governance in this way, and one cannot deny that a post-pandemic moment exists for rethinking international practice. Yet I think a Pragmatist reading of such proposals, like those offered elsewhere in the book, cautions against turning hope into expectation. Indeed, the WHO Director General was under no illusions in this respect. He too called on states to negotiate a treaty on pandemic preparedness and response. In his closing remarks to the May 2021 World Health Assembly, for instance, Tedros acknowledged that 'pathogens have greater power than WHO'. The defining characteristic of the pandemic, he added, was 'the lack of sharing: of data, information, pathogens, technologies and resources'. A treaty

> would foster improved sharing, trust and accountability, and provide the solid foundation on which to build other mechanisms for global health security: For peer review of national capacities; For research and innovation; For early warning; For stockpiling and production of pandemic supplies; For equitable access to vaccines, tests and treatments; For an emergency workforce (WHA 2021).

This it seems was a less radical proposal. Unlike the Duff et al. proposal there was no assumption that the WHO should (or would be able to) supersede national authorities. There was, moreover, a sense in this formulation that a treaty was not a panacea or end in itself. To have a practical effect that mitigated the problem of contagious diseases the treaty would only help to 'foster' - one might say construct – states that were publically oriented. If a treaty that is not so radical to be dismissed out of hand can concentrate the nationalist's mind on the problem, and change their view on, for instance, the sharing of data and the equitable access to vaccines, then a treaty might be of practical value. The point again, however, is that there is no substitute for this kind of bottom-up learning process. Indeed, such a conclusion is inspired by

a point I made at the beginning of the book, which was that Dewey's commitment to the Outlawry of War movement and treaty was motivated by his belief that it was a pedagogic tool that could prompt a deeper form of social learning. That proved to be wishful thinking of course because ultimately nationalism and its interest in war proved stronger than the message that movement was trying to convey. But then that only confirms the wider point. The top-down strategies that focus on international legal reform have limited impact if they are not accompanied by a deeper process of social learning, which should reflect on the meaning of nationalism in a context of global challenges to the lived experience.

An alternative take on the pandemic is perhaps less eye-catching but probably more practical; it is that the IHR's remain fit for purpose but that the practices inspired by them need adjustment.[212] One lesson is that a more precautionary approach to the PHEIC process is needed, as well as an understanding that recommending travel restrictions might be necessary to amplify its intended effect, which is to shake states out of any complacency. Relatedly, and in line with the Pragmatic Constructivist normative tests, a community of inquiry that is more inclusive of political expertise (contra Duff et al.) may help bring about that change or at least help with deliberations on a case by case basis. As noted, these are less radical than the arguments for wholesale legal reform, but those arguments fail to take into account the fact that some states, especially those who had experienced and learned from the 2003 SARS outbreak, did relatively better than western states who had not had that experience and were therefore more sanguine about the Covid outbreak in China. A lesson here is that global learning can flow from East to West and that global governance need not be radically reinvented because certain western states failed to perform well within the existing framework.

Finally, in making a judgement on which path to take post-pandemic, a Pragmatic Constructivist would be conscious of the opportunity cost of negotiating a public health convention, especially one that promises wholesale legal reform that is unlikely to be delivered because such proposals are politically premature. For some, proposals for a public health convention risk diverting political attention away from the more concrete action that can be taken within the existing legal framework. This risk is captured by Frieden and Buissonnière (2021). They note a degree of surface-level attraction to the proposals for a treaty but add that they carry 'substantial' risks. The treaty process, they note

> is slow, and takes time that we simply do not have to strengthen global pandemic response capacity. The focus on developing a treaty could derail momentum for action on the ground to improve preparedness now. Wordsmithing, and interpretation of that wordsmithing, can supplant action (Frieden and Buissonnière 2021).

They do not rule out support for a treaty, but qualify it in a way similar to the Deweyan approach described above. The legal process 'might help catalyze progress to improve our preparedness for future pandemics and other health emergencies', but, they conclude, progress cannot be judged by the completion of a new treaty. Their conclusion, I suggest, articulates the Pragmatic Constructivist's contribution to such a debate. Without reformed practice, they write, 'a treaty could hurt more than it helps' (Frieden and Buissonnière 2021).

---

[212] On the separation of legal reform from reformed practices see Sadat 2021, 16-18.

Conclusion

What then does Pragmatic Constructivism, with its two normative tests – inclusive reflexivity and deliberative practical judgement – tell us about actual practices and communities of practice in the field of global health governance? There are parallels between the WHO, and especially its Emergency Committee, and the IPCC in the field of global climate governance. Both are expert communities that, in view of the specific problems they confront, need to manage boundaries to protect their reputation. That means excluding non-expert opinion, but as I noted in this Chapter it might mean broadening the definition of what constitutes expertise and including other forms of knowledge. At issue is the dominance of medical expertise and a culture or habitus that is insufficiently reflexive toward its normative assumptions. That, it was argued, ruled out a more precautionary approach to the Covid-19 pandemic. By focusing on the background knowledge of communities of practice, Pragmatic Constructivism draws our attention to such problems. It would, in this instance, recommend a widening of the community of inquiry to include different forms of knowledge, not as a means of second guessing expert knowledge, but as a means of judging what steps better serve the public interest when deciding how to respond to it. It is important to reiterate, however, that in circumstances of radical uncertainty such as the spread of a contagious disease, there is no guarantee that greater inclusion and more reflection would produce better outcomes. Inclusionary reflexivity can improve decision-making and improve political buy-in on the decisions that are made, but the PHEIC process is still a judgement call the effectiveness of which is contingent on a wide range of factors.

There are also parallels to other Chapters to the extent that micro-adjustments in specific communities of practice like the Emergency Committee are necessary but not sufficient to address wider global health challenges. The biggest step toward effectively tackling the Covid-19 challenge, of course, was the discovery and distribution of vaccines. I have demonstrated in this Chapter how Pragmatic Constructivism alerts us to the benefits and problems of intellectual property practices and, I argued, how on balance those practices were contrary to the global public interest. At this macro-level, the social learning required to adjust practices is not as straightforward as that at the elite level of the Emergency Committee. Intellectual property practices do of course involve a set of immensely powerful interests, namely the large pharmaceutical companies, but to the extent Pragmatic Constructivism identifies their practices as problematic in the context of the global public interest it can normatively commit to a critical position. Better practices could be implemented if intellectual property practices were reformed. Pragmatic Constructivism can also explain the recent moves to waive intellectual property rights over vaccine production in terms of the social mobilization of groups motivated by a normative position. More than that, however, Pragmatic Constructivism can describe those moves as normative *progress* because such a path promises, at least in terms what we know right now, to ameliorate the lived experience.

Chapter 9

Conclusion. *American* Pragmatism and *Global* IR

> With IR scholars around the world seeking to find their own voices and reexamining their own traditions, our challenge now is to chart a course toward a truly inclusive discipline, recognizing its multiple and diverse foundations … redefining existing IR theories and methods and building new ones from societies hitherto ignored as sources of IR knowledge [and] … expanding our investigations into the two-way diffusion of ideas and norms, and investigating the multiple and diverse ways in which civilizations encounter each other, which includes peaceful interactions and mutual learning. The challenge of building a Global IR does not mean a one-size-fits-all approach; rather, it compels us to recognize the diversity that exists in our world, seek common ground, and resolve conflicts.
>
> Amitav Acharya 2014, 647.

I suggested at the beginning of the book that my focus on American Pragmatism cannot avoid the charge of Western-centrism. My mitigating plea at that point was that those interested in what some call 'post-Western' (Shani 2008), 'non-Western' (Acharya and Buzan 2007; Bilgin 2008) or 'Global' International Relations (Acharya, 2011, 2014, 2016; Acharya and Buzan 2019; Behera 2016; Bilgin 2016; Thakur and Smith 2021) may find an ally in my reading of American Pragmatism.[213] As the above quote indicates, the call for Global IR includes an emphasis on learning and, as I have demonstrated, Pragmatic Constructivism values fallibilism, sympathy, pluralism, inclusion, conscientious reflection, deliberation and democracy because these sensibilities facilitate learning. At this point of the book, moreover, I am reminded of an argument Ken Booth used to defend the concept of human rights. 'To say that human rights come from somewhere', he argued, 'should never be allowed to be the end of the story: it is only the starting point for discussion of

---

[213] Some see differences across these concepts. Shani (2008, 722) for instance, defines post-Western IR as going 'beyond mere mimicry of the "derivative discourses" of the modern West by identifying critical discourses on the political from within nonwestern traditions'. Acharya and Buzan (2019, 296) reject the 'post-Western' label because in their view it 'assumes the end of Western dominance as an objective fact or a normative aspiration, neither of which is accurate or helpful for the purpose of making IR theory more inclusive'. In response, Shani (2008, 724) might repeat his reference to the work of Inayatullah and Blaney who pointed out that moving 'beyond the West' entails not its rejection but its 'rediscovery and reimagination'. Bilgin (2008, 5-6) uses the label 'non-Western' but rejects the binary thinking that it might imply, noting that we should 'ask awkward questions about the "Westernness" of "Western" IR and the "non-Westernness" of others. This is because there may be elements of "non-Western" experiences and ideas built in to those ostensibly "Western" approaches to the study of world politics. The reverse may also be true'.

how we should live, as humans, on a global scale'. It is 'trivial' (Booth 1999a, 52) in this respect, to dismiss an idea just because it comes from somewhere.

The value of an idea is to be found in what *it does*, not its origin. Indeed, the ideas behind the *Oxford* Astra-Zeneca vaccine have travelled fairly well (if not uncontested). There is nothing inevitable, moreover, about the direction in which useful ideas travel. As the previous Chapter noted, certain Western states may learn from the relatively more successful practices of certain Asian states during the pandemic. But then this too should be qualified with the understanding that there was nothing inherently 'Asian' about those practices. They too were informed by the prior experience of dealing with a universal problem, in that case the 2003 SARS outbreak. The consequences of that outbreak happened to be concentrated (although not contained) in Asia; and that meant the universal lesson of how to deal with coronaviruses was more keenly appreciated there. Those states subsequently knew how to better frame and mitigate the problem that emerged in 2020. The point here is that there is nothing intrinsically 'Asian' or 'non-Western' about that knowledge.

I do not want to end my investigation into Pragmatic Constructivism, however, by only entering a mitigating plea. I want instead, in this concluding chapter, to make a stronger defence of my focus. I want to argue that by offering an alternative that engages and challenges the disciplinary mainstream, Pragmatic Constructivism can facilitate the dialogue that others seek as they construct Global IR. As Acharya and Buzan note, the challenge is 'how to invent a Global IR and still engage with those schooled in the existing IR traditions in a meaningful two-way dialogue' (Acharya and Buzan 2019, 298; see also Acharya and Buzan 2021, 22). In this respect, Global IR 'subsumes rather than supplants existing IR theories and methods, and pays attention to both material and ideational/normative causes and consequences' (Acharya and Buzan 2019, 300). Yet despite recognising this, and despite the stress on 'mutual learning' (Acharya and Buzan 2019, 310), Acharya and Buzan do not refer to Pragmatist thought.[214] This is a missed opportunity because the processes that can constitute Global IR will be easier, I would argue, if those existing, Western-centric, traditions are read with a Pragmatist sensibility. In this way Pragmatic Constructivism can, I suggest, complement the Feminist and Postcolonial scholarship that Acharya and Buzan (2019, 305) do identify as being at the 'nexus' of Western and Global IR. I agree, then, with Pinar Bilgin (2016, 142). 'Global IR is not about rejecting ideas simply because of their geographical origin'; and in that spirit I argue classical American Pragmatism can make an important contribution to the processes that are decolonising and globalising IR theory.

To develop this argument I draw parallels between the reading of classical American Pragmatism that I offered in Part One of the book and the recent IR interest in non-Western 'cosmologies', building especially on the work of those who have identified 'the many resonances between Deweyan pragmatism and Confucian philosophy' (Ames, Chen and Hershock 2021, 12).[215] As noted in Chapter 1, Pragmatism cannot

---

[214] Nordin et al. (2019, 575) similarly refer to need 'to learn from others' (Ling and Nordin 2019, 655) in order to constitute Global IR. They put Pragmatism alongside other commitments that can contribute to this process. See also Jackson and Nexon 2019. Acharya and Buzan (2021, 67) do note that Western Constructivist IR theory makes similar arguments to Confucian thought 'albeit mostly without either the normative content or the specific cultural rooting'.

[215] 'A cosmology seeks to explain the origins of the cosmos in which we find ourselves and our place within it. As such, it shares many similarities with ontology and epistemology but differs from both as it has a sacred dimension that is often, though at times erroneously, translated into the concept of 'religion'. Therefore, it cannot be reduced to 'ontology' or 'epistemology' without violating its sacred core' (Shani and Behera 2021, 2). See also Milja Kurki (2020,

be considered part of the rationalist IR 'mainstream', and it is not therefore subject to recent non-Western critiques of the discipline (see for example Qin 2016, 2018). If the Pragmatist turn in Western IR continues then it can, I suggest, be more easily harmonised – contrapuntally (Bilgin 2016) - with the non-Western cosmologies that underpin these critiques. This at least signposts a path 'toward' Global IR, even if it does not fix the path's end point. Indeed, I suggest we follow such signs *because* they do not fix the destination. No doubt this Chapter, which draws parallels between American Pragmatism and a single non-western cosmology, will again be criticised for being exclusionary. If that is this case then I can only plead 'less guilty', and supplement that second mitigating plea with the suggestion that I have signposted an appropriate path for future research.

My hope then is that after these concluding pages I am a little further along the path that helps constitute the 'Global IR community'. By summarising the way Pragmatic Constructivism helps IR analyse and assess global governance I hope also to demonstrate how Global IR can be more engaged with the task of meeting challenges to the lived experience. This is important. The 'pragmatic' reason for Global IR is not, as Acharya and Buzan (2019, 299) imply, to save the academic discipline. Rather the reason we need Global IR is because it can, done properly, demonstrate how epistemic authority is established through complex learning processes built on humility, inclusiveness, reflexivity and deliberation. It can be an important example of a community of practice that is in a constant process of global learning; and to the extent Global IR adopts the Pragmatist focus and engages with practical problem solving it is well-placed to assess and inform the practices of global governance (Fierke and Jabri 2019, 507; Kratochwil 2018, 475). I start the chapter, therefore, by summarising Pragmatic Constructivism and how it informs an answer to my three starting research questions: (1) what can classical Pragmatism bring to debates in IR, including those centered on the perennial question of how norms, practices and interests interact to influence international practitioners? (2) How, if at all, should international practices and practitioners adapt in the face of pressing global security, climate and health challenges? (3) Given the Pragmatist answer to these first two questions, what normative conclusions can we come to about actual practice in contemporary international society? I then make the comparison to Confucian IR, especially the shared focus on 'relationality'.

American Pragmatism and Pragmatic Constructivism

Pragmatic Constructivism is distinct to the extent it extends the New Constructivist (McCourt 2022) research agenda in a normative direction. To do this, it draws on the tradition of American philosophical Pragmatism and the social and political theory that emerged from it. It shares with New Constructivism an anti-essentialist approach. From that perspective, social reality is constructed through practices that are given meaning by norms and interests, and it can change as individuals and communities reflect on the value of those norms and interests in the light of lived experience. This is a natural process. Like the flower that follows the sun in order to grow, human practices change direction as a result of experience. The

---

24), who notes that for 'literary analysts, anthropologists, sociologists, and historians, cosmology is at its core about studying the social belief systems humans have held at different times and in different places about the order of the world, the universe, and themselves in it'.

question that confronts complex human societies is how to render that process intelligent; how to make sure the path that is taken ameliorates the lived experienced.

Faced with that question, Pragmatic Constructivism values those temperaments – fallibilism, conscientious reflection, practical judgement, creativity and imagination – that enable intelligent decision-making. In addition to these values, intelligence involves an openness to the surrounding environment because this will inevitably mediate the consequences of practice. An individual, or a society, cannot know the consequences of their practice if they do not include in their community of inquiry external others, either through empathetic understanding or direct forms of deliberation. If they are not open to the views of the affected other then they cannot necessarily claim that a particular practice rests on background knowledge that is epistemologically authoritative. Communities of practice will not know what they are doing. To the extent they do know what they are doing they cannot be certain that it is best practice in the circumstances. As a result there will be a sense of epistemic insecurity or doubt. Pragmatic Constructivism thus values democracy because it includes experiences that improve the social inquiry directed at resolving doubt. It also operates with a broad, decentered and demanding conception of democracy. Democracy is not simply a state level process. It is a temperament that is other-regarding and publicly-oriented at all levels of the human experience. This is because democracy helps to promote learning, which in turn enables the kind of growth that sustains and improves the lived experience.

These themes were developed in Part One of the book, which related them to key debates in IR. Chapter 2 applied them to IR Norm theory to critique various waves of its scholarship, including the idea that norms are 'taken for granted', as well as the critique centered on the idea of 'norm contestation'. Chapter 3 applied them to IR Practice theory to highlight the risks involved when 'pre-reflexive' practice is associated with 'competence'. Pre-reflexive or habitual practice can be useful, but not if circumstances change in ways that make existing practice maladapted and 'background knowledge' redundant. At that point learning takes place, which IR Practice theory has acknowledged. What Pragmatic Constructivism adds is a theory of learning based on Dewey's 'pedagogic creed'. It criticizes the learning that emerges from hierarchical and exclusionary practices. This kind of learning is 'simple' learning, to adapt a term from the IR literature (Nye 1986). It is simple (rather than complex) because it hides consequences and possibilities from the community of practice. Finally, Chapter 4 applied Pragmatist themes to the Realist critique of Deweyan ideas, which centers on the role of self-interest as an obstacle to social learning. This provided the opportunity to clarify an important point: social learning is as much a political concept as it is a cognitive one. It requires supporting those who are affected by a practice but are excluded from the communities of inquiry that lend epistemic authority (i.e. background knowledge) to practitioners. Without a balance of power that enables deliberation between affected stakeholders there cannot be effective social learning and communities of practice cannot claim to be properly adapted to the changing environment. When there is inclusive and deliberative inquiry, moreover, it is possible that the interests and identities that tend to be fixed in some Realist theories, can better adapt to the changing environment.

It is difficult to reduce Pragmatist thought to an analytical and normative approach that can be operationalized by the IR discipline. I attempted to do this in Chapter 5. I identified 'communities of practice' as a useful heuristic concept to organize the complex empirical data on global governance. These communities are themselves decentered forms of governance in that they can, but do not necessarily have

to, map on to the nation-state or international organization. They are 'spatial-organizational platforms where practitioners interact, learn, and end up creating and diffusing practices and promoting their adoption by future practitioners' (Adler 2019, 41). As 'intersubjective social structures that constitute the normative and epistemic ground for action' their boundaries are in fact fluid. They are, of course, 'made up of real people' and they 'make things happen in the world' (Adler 2019) by claiming that their practices command epistemic authority. To do that, however, they have to manage their own boundaries, which means finding the right balance between inclusionary and exclusionary practices. It is at this point that the Pragmatic Constructivist's normative commitment to learning, and the values that facilitate it, can be applied to pass normative judgement on communities of practice and their epistemic predispositions. Applying these Pragmatist values independently would have made the empirical analysis unwieldy. Chapter 5, therefore, reduced them to two normative tests: inclusive reflexivity and deliberative practical judgement. Where the former helps the community of practice to challenge an unwarranted habitus and reveal possible alternative practices, the latter reminds the community of its problem-solving focus and the need to judge alternative practices in that light. That can mean starting in indeterminate situations with what Dewey called a 'stock of learning' and excluding some (unqualified) views, or at least valuing some (expert) opinions more highly than others.

I do not want to repeat the conclusions that I make in each of the Chapters of Part Two, where I apply these normative tests to communities of global security, climate and health practice. I want instead to draw, by way of conclusion, some common themes across these areas. That hopefully will give a general sense of what a Pragmatic Constructivist view of contemporary international practice and global governance looks like. I make three general points. The first is the role that international hierarchy is playing in defining and realizing a global public interest that meets contemporary global challenges. The Pragmatic Constructivist, I suggest, judges the value of hierarchy in terms of what it does for solving the problem in view. In some of the problems I have discussed there are good reasons why communities of practice should work to maintain a respect for the expert / non-expert hierarchy. The discussion in Chapter 7 on the IPCC and Chapter 8 on the WHO Emergency Committee illustrate the importance of Putnam's warning about critical thinking and political contestation. 'Thinking for oneself does not exclude – indeed it requires –learning when and where we seek expert knowledge' (Putnam 2004 quoted in Hilde 2012, 94). This does not mean hierarchies established on the basis of expert technical knowledge should go unchallenged. Indeed, the analysis in these Chapters demonstrated how these communities have reflected on the kind of knowledge that is required as their challenge begins to change. But on the whole these are examples of hierarchies that command epistemic authority and work in the public interest.

Other hierarchies are less useful because they do not work in the public interest. In Chapter 6, for instance, the hierarchy that binds the great powers to the UN Security Council might be warranted. However, the hierarchy that sees the P3 assuming leadership on the basis that their diplomats are 'competent' in the micro-practice of penholding has alienated stakeholders who can otherwise make a valuable contribution to effective atrocity prevention. The most extreme example of this was the international backlash against the Western-led intervention in Libya. That complicated the international response to Syria and created a general suspicion about R2P practice. The hierarchy that assumes some states are incapable of learning nuclear deterrence practice is also helpful, especially when it is set against a post-colonial discourse of

sovereign equality. A more complex form of 'nuclear learning' (Nye 1987) is needed here because the hierarchy – some might say hypocrisy – in the current nuclear order is failing to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and reduce the risk of nuclear atrocity. Other unhelpful hierarchies based on unwarranted exclusions include the discussion of 'minilateralism' in Chapter 7, as well as the discussion in Chapter 8 on intellectual property practices and vaccine nationalism. The fact that these elevate the particular respective interests of the great powers, pharmaceutical companies and the nation is not necessarily a problem for Pragmatic Constructivism. As noted, hierarchies can sometimes serve the wider public interest. Arguments were made in these Chapters, however, that these specific practices were, in this moment and on balance, working against the public interest. They should therefore be normatively and politically contested.

The second theme to emerge from the Chapters in Part Two is a skepticism toward proposed 'top-down' solutions. While the failure of current international practice to adequately serve the global public interest demands creative thinking, these proposals for radical reform, which usually means the creation of a new legal infrastructure, are unconvincing. This is mainly because they fail to tackle the obstacles caused by nationalism and the sovereign practices it enables. Pragmatic Constructivism shares with Realism an appreciation of nationalism. It remains, at least for the moment, politically significant. It cannot therefore be ignored. Thus, Hehir's (2012, 2018) proposals for a judicial body that would bypass states and authorize humanitarian intervention fails to explain why nation-states would delegate such authority or why the self-interested behaviour he observes paralyzing R2P practices would disappear when states consider his proposal (see Chapter 6). Likewise, the proposal for an international health convention that could empower the WHO to impose penalties on states for non-compliance (see Chapter 8) overestimates the current willingness of states to subject themselves to supranational authority. Even when there was sufficient momentum behind similar ideas in the field of international criminal justice, powerful nation-states influenced the process to make sure they could operate outside of the ICC's jurisdiction. That simply created another unhelpful and unsustainable hierarchy (see Ralph 2007; Ralph and Gallagher 2015).

The implication of this is that the international hierarchies that stand in the way of publicly-oriented practice must be contested from the bottom-up. Transnational publics have to explain how and why the habits of nationalism, and the international practices they enable, are failing to address global security, climate and health problems. The best that can be said for the top-down proposals is that they can serve as pedagogic tools that prompt the inclusive reflection and deliberative practical judgement on existing practices. That can lead to the restructuring of the national interest in ways that are not contrary to the global public interest. In Chapter 6 for instance, I drew on the experience of the transnational arms control movement of the late Cold War period to demonstrate how what Deudney (2019) calls 'deep arms control' helped transform the concept of national security so that it was – at least for a brief moment – other-regarding and publicly oriented. Similarly, in Chapter 7, I argued that global climate governance had go further in its shift toward adopting bottom-up processes. The NDC practices instituted after the 2015 Paris COP promise a degree of progress, and nation-states will be an important community of climate control practice. But if the meaning of 'national-interest' is not reoriented in ways that mean it is attained by realizing the global public interest then NDC practices will not deliver what is required to solve the problem.

To help that reorientation I suggested that the practices of Citizens Assemblies can help deliver the more complex form of learning that is required.

The final point suggests that these arguments fit the gradualist, or middle-way, thinking associated with Pragmatism (Cochran 2013). I would accept that by noting that Pragmatic Constructivism can be used to identify and defend practices that serve the global public interest while simultaneously identifying and opposing practices that fail to do that. In this respect, the middle-path is not business as usual. To propose deep arms control in the current context, for example, may appear radical; but committing to the UN Security Council as a useful institution of R2P practice (see Chapter 6) will appear conservative. The important point is that creative proposals have to convince power to serve the public interest. If they do not then they are of course vulnerable to the Realist charge of naïve utopianism. It is not inevitable that power serves only the private or the national interest to the detriment of the public interest. If that was the case then public institutions like the state would not have emerged (accepting, of course, that states can and do fail to serve such interests). That required (and requires) a social learning process to address the challenges of a changing material environment. A world state is not inevitable because it is not necessary to serve the global public interest. Publically oriented communities of practice can do that. What is required, however, is complex global learning that binds power to practices that do address current global challenges.

Pragmatism, Relationalism and Confucianism

In Chapter 5, I elaborated on the idea that Pragmatism is a vocation to the extent its academic analysis is part of a broader commitment to ameliorating the lived experience, which might include social and political activism. Embracing this idea, Abraham and Abramson (2015) challenge the discipline of IR to look at its own practices. In their view, that meant breaking down the academic-public binary by including Deweyan 'publics' in academic conferences like the International Studies Association. The so-called movement toward 'Global IR' is I suggest travelling along similar lines. Pragmatists would of course sympathize with the argument that as a community of practice IR cannot understand international relations if it excludes certain experiences. By democratizing that community therefore, by including non-Western experiences that have been eclipsed by the Western mainstream, we can better understand our subject. This section attempts to build on that, as well as reassure those committed to Global IR that engaging with American Pragmatism is not a betrayal of their project. In fact my purpose is to briefly show how Pragmatic Constructivism can be read contrapuntally (Bilgin 2016) alongside a prominent non-Western approach to IR, Yaqing Qin's (2018) *A Relational Theory of World Politics*. A critical reading is offered but not in order to assert the authority of the American Pragmatist approach. Rather the intention is to consider how these Western and non-Western traditions might contribute to the global approach that emerges from a transnational dialogue.

Qin's (2018) work criticizes the Western IR mainstream, which he sees as dominated by rationalism. He advocates the relational perspective that he finds in Confucianism.[216] Confucianism is used to help

[216] This is not the only perspective on relationality in Confucian IR. For discussion of the hierarchical relationalism in Zhao Tingyang's Confucian philosophy, as opposed to the dialectical approach of Qin's, see Nordin and Smith 2019. I

construct a distinctly Chinese School of IR because, as he puts it, '"relationality" is perhaps to Chinese what rationality is to Westerners' (Qin 2018, x; see also 45, 150; also Nordin et al 2019, 574; Qin and Nordin 2019, 606).[217] My argument is that a similar criticism of mainstream Western IR can be made by drawing on American Pragmatism, which Qin refers to only in a passing and attenuated way.[218] Of course, mainstream Western IR, including Realism, did take the rationalist turn that Qin criticizes, but he overstates the point when he sees that turn as a feature of 'Western philosophy'. Western philosophy for Qin is characterized as believing 'that there are transcendental principles that exist eternally, immutably, and immaterially, providing an explanation for everything else in the universe' (Qin 2018, 47 see also 61, 108). He contrasts that with Confucian philosophy, which is said to be more interested in what is immanent in humans, human practices, their relations and their societies (Qin 2018, 115).[219]

A Pragmatic Constructivist would only partially recognise this characterization of Western philosophy. Indeed, as noted at the outset of this book, philosophical Pragmatism evolved out of the realization that the modern 'quest for certainty' (Dewey 1929) was futile because knowledge is historically and socially contingent. That quest was itself a response to the social conditions of 17th Century Europe. The appropriate response to this realization, the Pragmatists argued, was to 'reconstruct' philosophy (Dewey 1920 [1972]) so that it concentrated on the social problems of the everyday, which included transcending the problems caused by the abstract search truth, the claims to absolute knowledge, and the social hierarchies that underpinned them. Philosophy was to be put to use as a form of inquiry that recognized the relative and relational character of everyday problems and sought to improve the lived experience by breaking down those hierarchies.

Contrary to Qin's broad brush portrayal of Western philosophy, therefore, the Pragmatism of Addams and Dewey did not remove human experience from the study of social relations in order to make space for the kind of atomistic agents that populate rationalist inquiry.[220] At the centre of the Pragmatist's concern was the task of (re)establishing the kind of relations that could ameliorate the human experience in the face of a rapidly changing physical and social environment.[221] The background knowledge that Qin equates with

---

focus on Qin's work because it is 'akin' to Pragmatism and other 'theoretical approaches that focus on deconstructing essentialist binaries and demonstrating their contingency' (Nordin and Smith 2019 646).

[217] This point is qualified in the later publication. 'We do not suggest that rationality is unique to some imagined Western community of practice, nor do we suggest that rationality fully encompasses such an imagined community' (Qin and Nordin 2019, 602).

[218] Qin does cite Western Practice and Pragmatist theory (2018 32-6, 49, 150), including a reference to Dewey (2018 109), but only to support his invocation of habitus rather than a normative critique of its relationship to learning. This perhaps leads to the unwarranted conflation of culture and knowledge (Qin 2018, 43). For an attempt to bridge Western and Confucian conceptions of IR using the symbolic interactionism of George Herbert Mead and foreign policy role theory, see Shih 2021.

[219] See Acharya (2011, 635-6) on the emptiness of 'Newtonian rationality'; see also Shani and Behera (2021, 4-5) on the secularized Judeo-Christian thought that accepts the transcendent, even divine, quality of a 'Newtonian cosmology', and how that found expression in rationalist Western IR.

[220] Specifically on this point, Yang (2021 106) quotes James: 'The essential contrast is that for rationalism reality is ready-made and complete from all eternity, while for pragmatism it is still in the making, and awaits part of its complexion from the future.'

[221] As Chen (2021b, 43-5) the 'primary dimension of the radical empiricism of pragmatism is its humanism … Similar to a pragmatist's view, Confucius' primary concern is also about life and how people live their lives in this world'.

culture is also at the core of Pragmatist thinking. This included asking how individuals and their communities can reflect on whether such knowledge is fit for the evolutionary purpose. Indeed, the way Dewey's 'pedagogic creed' (see Chapter 3) encourages critical reflection on otherwise reified knowledge in order to sustain and improve the human experience challenges Qin's East-West binary. 'The West may teach more about how to understand nature and find natural laws', Qin writes, 'while education in traditional China was first of all the most important means to cultivate one's heart/mind' (Qin 2018 23-4).[222] Again, Pragmatists would not recognize this description of Western pedagogy (even if it might adequately describe certain streams of Western IR).

My argument here then is that while Qin's critique of rationalist IR is well-placed, rationalism does not cover the entire spectrum of Western thinking; and had his investigation taken him beyond the rationalist IR 'mainstream' he may have found lines in Western philosophy that resonate harmoniously with his reading of Confucianism.[223] For instance, Confucianism on Qin's reading overlaps with the relational (Jackson and Nexon 1999; Fierke and Jabri 2019) and processural (Adler 2018) ontologies found in Western and Global IR (Trownsell et al. 2021) These accept that social entities are in a constant state of becoming rather than being and studying relations rather than things helps us understand that. A social entity's sense of self is embedded in and constituted by dynamic relations with other entities. Barry Allen's (2021, 64) description of the Confucian ontology captures this: it is one 'of continuity, not identity; movement, not being; change, not presence, and how to live with change, not how to rise beyond it'. The normative challenge in this context is to find the harmony that is immanent in relationships, and to cultivate that by acting in ways that nurture the trust and intimacy of friendship within expanding associations (Qin 2018 300-1; see also Nordin and Smith 2018; Kavalski 2018; Qin and Nordin 2019, 607-8).[224] This is captured by the *zhongyong dialectics* in Confucian thought. Social entities are in fact internal to each other. The 'Yin is within yang, and yang is within yin' (Qin 2018, 171).

The existence of similar thinking in Western relationalism, including Pragmatism, is overlooked by Qin. To create the Western-Chinese difference, for instance, Qin contrasts Confucian dialectics with what he sees as the oppositional characteristics of Hegelian dialectics and the replacement of the self and the other as the thesis and antithesis give way to a synthesis (Qin 2018, 160-8). Qin prefers instead to talk about a 'co-thesis', or a process of 'coevolutionary harmony' (Qin 2018 122 125-30, 135-40, 151) that inherits from the

---

[222] See He (2013) on the common themes across Confucian and Deweyan thought on education, including a 'humanism that aims to educate for creative, harmonious, associated, joyful, and "worthwhile" … living'. See also Ames, Chen and Hershock (2021 16; Chen 2021a; Yang 2021) on the humanistic insight into the social and the educational role of art that is shared across Confucian thought and Pragmatism. Although see Chih 2021 who like Qin contrasts Confucian and Western education.

[223] Qin (2018, 187) also mobilises the music metaphor. Harmony, he writes, 'does not seek to cancel out or eliminate differences, but believes that differences exist naturally as the existence of yin and yang does. It is the opposite of difference, similarity or homogeneity, that denies the premise of and need for harmony. For any piece of good music, it is the result of different sounds, appropriately adjusted and combined'.

[224] Or as Shih (2021, 10) puts it: 'Socialising self/stranger is the major agenda of Confucian relations'. In terms more related to IR, he adds: 'Confucian foreign policy is the practice of self-socialising through gift giving, with the purpose of: (1) ensuring that the self's roles are accepted by each different alter; (2) releasing all to pursue their own interests without worrying about becoming mutually estranging; and (3) preparing for friendly renegotiation whenever interests collide'.

self and other without replacing them.[225] I suggest there are strong echoes here of Pragmatist themes, including Du Bois's 'double consciousness' (see Chapters 1 and 5) and Dewey's conception of the 'expanded personality' (see Chapter 2; see also Trownell et al. 2021). Thus, Qin (2018 xvii) writes that Confucian thought is characterized by a "both-and", rather than an "either-or", mindset. Mirroring this is the resistance / accommodation binary that is replaced in Du Bois's thinking by a both / and aspiration. Black consciousness in this view is African and American (Rath 1997, 483). Likewise Qin tells us that Confucian thought has 'an appreciation of the "middle" rather than its exclusion'. It is in the middle of opposites that Confucian thought finds the 'life generating' process of 'co-becoming' (Qin 2018, 179-80). That thought resonates with the Deweyan idea of 'growth'. The self can grow beyond the narrow conceptions created by limited experience, and in that process the problems created by contingent identities can be transcended. Transposing that beyond the individual means properly constituted social inquiry and conscientious deliberation can nurture a conception of *the* public interest that meets self *and* other interests.

While the shared processural ontology means Pragmatist and Confucian lines can resonate in harmony, there is potential discord around the Confucian claim that 'the "due" middle' is where we find 'appropriateness and reasonableness' (Qin 2018, 185). A lot rests on how we interpret that word "due". It suggests that in the face of contested practice compromise is appropriate, and that chimes with the Pragmatist sense that knowledge claims are fallible. It suggests, moreover, that the process of settling on the appropriate practice involves more than a 'split the difference' logic. It involves a judgement on the merits of various alternatives, and that too resonates with the Pragmatist's commitment to deliberative practical judgement. But beyond that there is not much guidance in Qin's relational theory on the epistemological question of how we know that what we are doing is appropriate. At this point, I think Dewey's line on the 'stock of learning' is more prominent.

The sense that background 'knowledge' (in contrast to 'culture') is the product of a deliberative and inclusive community of inquiry was key to the Deweyan idea that democracy is a means of effective social inquiry. It is important to recall, moreover, that for Dewey an inclusive approach to inquiry was 'a way of life' that operated at all levels. From individual reflection and the constitution of 'the self', to the relations forged across of the 'great community' (Dewey 1927c), the process was the same. Including the experiences of the other, especially those indirectly affected by practice, was necessary to establish the epistemic authority of the background knowledge that enabled that practice. It is important to recall this, not least because it has been claimed that it was during Dewey's two-year trip to China that he began to think how this decentered conception of social or relational democracy operated to create the strong communities that sustained and enriched the lived experience (Ames, Chen and Hershock 2021, 18; Ames 2021, 190-2; Behuniak 2021, 137; Wang 2007 loc.1520-1753).[226]

---

[225] See also *Gongsheng* theory introduced to IR by Shanghai-based scholars. It focuses on the constructive interaction across diversity, which 'does not lead to a result of one swallowing or assimilating the other. Rather, through comparison and mutual learning, they are able to appreciate each other. Acting autonomously allows them to achieve progress and development together' (Ren 2020, 406).

[226] See also He (2013) who draws parallels across the Confucian interest in harmony and Dewey's social democracy as a mode of associated living. Ames, Chen and Hershock (2021, 13) also see parallels between Dewey's idea of

There might in this way be a further parallel between Pragmatic Constructivism and Confucianism. There is a sense when reading Qin's account, however, that Confucian dialectics is vulnerable to the Realist critique that was leveled at Dewey (see Chapter 4). This is because Qin's account is not clear on the political implication of power. Unlike Dewey and Addams, who considered power and embraced politics (including political activism) as a means of defending and constructing publicly oriented communities of practice, Qin's Confucian inspired relational theory is seemingly silent on how power may work behind a veil of 'harmony'. The possibility exists that such a veil can hide exploitative relationships.[227] This is not necessarily the case, however. The emphasis that *zhongyong* dialectics places on 'inclusive mutuality' (Qin 2018, 180) as a condition of existence and coexistence should mitigate against that. Similarly, the expressed need to respect difference and to learn from it closely reflects the Pragmatist temperament (Qin 2018 229-30); and yet, without a clearer discussion of power, it is not entirely obvious how such sentiments can influence practice.

Thoughts on future research

The work that needs to be done to construct Global IR is ongoing and continuous. It involves a process of contrapuntal readings and transnational / transcultural dialogue. The above section is offered only as an example of what that might look like if Pragmatic Constructivism is considered as being a feature of 'Western IR'. Clearly what I have discussed here is far too brief and cannot do justice to the complexity of thought across the two traditions. There is therefore a need for further research in this area. In particular, given the Pragmatic Constructivist research agenda is empirically driven - it is, for instance, focused on mitigating social problems that emerge from actual practice – future research might consider what a shared Pragmatist/Confucian approach to IR would say about the communities of international practice that purportedly addresses global challenges. Would Confucian IR reach the same normative conclusions about particular practices as the Pragmatic Constructivist analysis I have offered in this book? As noted in Chapter 1, Pragmatists (like Realists) have reached different conclusions on substantive policy questions, so there

---

democracy as a 'vision of the flourishing communal life made possible by the contributions of the uniquely distinguished persons that constitute it', and Tang Junyi's Confucianism pragmatic naturalism, which is directed at 'achieving the most highly integrated cultural, moral, and spiritual growth for the individual-in-community'. In both Pragmatism and Confucianism, 'we find an affirmation of communal harmony as a process "starting here and going there" through which those involved learn together to do ordinary things in extraordinary ways'.

[227] Indeed the suggestion that when one of the couple in marriage 'is inflexible and aggressive by temperament, the other should be basically peaceful and mild' (Qin 2018, 177) suggests appeals to 'harmony' can in practice disguise relations that are determined by coercive power. By placing value on communication, deliberation and consensus, Pragmatism more explicitly guards against this. Nordin and Smith (2019, 648) reach a similar conclusion when they write that more needs to be said about the conceptualization of power and hierarchy in Qin's relationalist theory. See also Acharya and Buzan (2021, 60) who note how in Confucian thinking 'social harmony rests on the precondition of stable hierarchy'. This, they add (2021, 61), 'imparts a worryingly imperial implication to China's current discourse about harmony. China's official foreign policy rhetoric has a lot to say about harmonious relations and 'win–win' but is generally silent or evasive about the hierarchical assumption that lies behind it'.

should be no expectation that a rigid policy consensus would emerge from such research. What is shared across philosophical starting points, however, might lead to interesting practical insight.

There are also limitations to an argument that concentrates only on the harmonies across Pragmatic Constructivism and Confucian IR. The 'conversation' (Fierke and Jabri 2019) that will construct Global IR must be more inclusive. There is then another research agenda that examines other non-Western cosmologies (see Trownsell et al. 2021) and relates them to not just mainstream Western IR but to Pragmatic Constructivism. Another interesting line of inquiry in this respect is the introduction to Western IR of the ancient Indian cosmology of *dharma* (Shani and Behera 2021). There is reason for suggesting that harmonious lines exist across this and my reading of Pragmatism. For instance, the Pragmatic Constructivist would agree with the *dharmic* rejection of time as a linear movement from a beginning to an end. This is another false binary to be rejected because of the way it restricts creative thinking. Pragmatist philosophy enters 'in the middle' of knowledge cycles (Kratochwil 2018; Fierke 2020, 20; Lynch 2020, 44), it assesses the value of the existing 'stock of learning' in terms of what it is doing to (and for) the lived experience, and it makes normative and political judgements on that basis. There is no end to that process. Similarly, the *dharmic* notion that self/other divisions are not permanent or irreconcilable (Shani and Behera 2021, 15) resonates with Pragmatic Constructivism's processural ontology and its normative commitment to discovering a public interest that commands authority across the self and the other. That this is best thought of as an 'inside-out' rather than 'outside-in' process (Shani and Behera 2021, 17) also chimes with the Pragmatic Constructivist emphasis on conscientious reflection and learning.

If these two areas of further research are driven by the importance of constructing Global IR, the last area is driven by the vocational sense that aims to ameliorate the lived experience by constructing a public interest in practices that meet the global challenges of our time. This research would work to support the same goals as Global IR, but it would be more engaged with global 'publics', or those groups that are affected by, but excluded from, communities of practice. Rebalancing political power so that their experiences are included in such communities is necessary if the practitioners' claim to be advancing the public good are authoritative. Research that draws attention to instances where such claims are unwarranted is only part of the Pragmatic Constructivist project. Defending a decentered and deliberative form of democracy is also important because it is through that process that communities of practice are more likely to discover the alternative approaches that lay better claim to addressing the public good. How that is done in practice is a question that will persist and be specific to particular fields. A lot of weight has been placed in this book on the shoulders of Deweyan 'publics' as political actors that hold communities of practice accountable and encourage complex global learning. Further research is required into how well global publics can bear that weight and what is needed to strengthen them in the face of global challenges. While this is a question of power, creative strategies for strengthening the global public sentiment should be considered. For instance, Pragmatist thought has stressed the value of art as means of educating the sentiments (Rorty 1993). That points to a decentered conception of politics. How it can mobilize support for international practices that address our global challenges is worth considering.

References

Abbott, Frederick M. (2021). Child-Proofing Global Public Health in Anticipation of Emergency. https://www.ila-americanbranch.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/05/White-Paper-COVID19-Global-Governance-FINAL-April-2021.pdf.

Abraham, Kavi J. (2017). Politics Lost? In DeRaismes Combes (ed.) *Can Networks Govern? An International Studies Quarterly Online Symposium*, 6 October, 7-8 at http://www.dhnexon.net/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/ISQSymposiumAvant.pdf.

Abraham, Kavi J. and Yoni Abramson (2015). A pragmatist vocation for International Relations: The (global) public and its problems. *European Journal of International Relations*, 23 (1), 26-48.

Acharya, Amitav (2004). How Ideas Spread. Whose Norms Matter? Norm Localization and Institutional Change in Asian Regionalism. *International Organization*, 58 (2), 239-75.

Acharya, Amitav (2011). Dialogue and Discovery: In Search of International Relations Theories beyond the West. *Millennium. Journal of International Studies*, 39 (3), 619–37

Acharya, Amitav (2014). Global International Relations (IR) and Regional Worlds. A New Agenda for International Studies. *International Studies Quarterly*, 58 (4), 647–59.

Acharya, Amitav (2016). Advancing Global IR: Challenges, Contentions, and Contributions. *International Studies Review*, 18 (1), 4-15.

Acharya, Amitav and Barry Buzan (2007). Why is there no non-Western international relations theory? An introduction. *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific,* 7 (3), 287–312.

Acharya, Amitav and Barry Buzan (2019). *The Making of Global International Relations. Origins and Evolution of IR at its Centenary*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Acharya, Amitav and Barry Buzan (2021). *Re-imagining International Relations: World Orders in the Thought and Practice of Indian, Chinese, and Islamic Civilizations*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Ackerly, Brooke A. and Jacqui True (2008). An Intersectional Analysis of International Relations. *Politics and Gender* 4 (1), 1-18.

Addams, Jane (1895 [2002]). 'The Settlement as a Factor in the Labor Movement'. First Published in *Hull House Maps and Papers*, New York: Thomas Y. Crowell. Republished in Jean Bethke Elshtain ed., *The Jane Addams Reader*, New York: Basic Books.

Addams, Jane (1902). *Democracy and Social Ethics*, New York: Macmillan. Kindle edition.

Addams, Jane (1909 [2002]). The Thirst of Righteousness. In *The Spirit of Youth and City Streets*, New York, Macmillan. Republished in Jean Bethke Elshtain ed., *The Jane Addams Reader*, New York: Basic Books.

Addams, Jane (1922 [2019]) *Peace and Bread in Time of War. Activists on the Way to a 1915 Peace Conference*, Ebooks for Students Ltd, Kindle edition.

Adler, Emanuel (1992). The Emergence of Cooperation: National Epistemic Communities and the International Evolution of the Idea of Nuclear Arms Control. *International Organization,* 46 (1), 101-46.

Adler, Emanuel (2005). *Communitarian International Relations. The epistemic foundations of International Relations*, London and New York: Routledge.

Adler, Emanuel (2008). The Spread of Security Communities: Communities of Practice, Self-Restraint, and NATO's Post—Cold War Transformation. *European Journal of International Relations*, 14 (2), 195–230.

Adler, Emanuel (2019). *World Ordering. A Social Theory of Cognitive Evolution,* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Adler, Emanuel and Michael Barnett (1998). Security Communities in theoretical perspective. In Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett, eds. *Security Communities*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 3-28.

Adler, Emanuel and Steven Bernstein (2004). Knowledge in power: The epistemic construction of global governance. In Michael Barnett and Raymond Duvall, eds. *Power in Global Governance* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 294-318.

Adler, Emanuel and Alena Drieschova (2021). The Epistemological Challenge of Truth Subversion to the Liberal International Order. *International Organization*, 75 (2), 359–86.

Adler, Emanuel and Michael Faubert (2022). Epistemic Communities of Practice. In Alena Drieschova, Christian Bueger and Ted Hopf, eds. *Conceptualizing International Practices*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Kindle Edition, 47-76.

Adler, Emanuel and Peter Haas (1992). Conclusion: Epistemic Communities, World Order and the creation of a Reflective Research Program. *International Organization*, 46 (1), 367-390.

Adler, Emanuel and Vincent Pouliot (2011). *International Practices*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Adler-Nissen, Rebecca (2008). The Diplomacy of Opting Out: A Bourdieudian Approach to National Integration Strategies. *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 46 (3), 663-684.

Adler-Nissen, Rebecca (2011). On a Field Trip with Bourdieu. *International Political Sociology*, 5 (3), 327-30.

Adler-Nissen, Rebecca and Pouliot, Vincent (2014). Power in practice: Negotiating the international intervention in Libya. *European Journal of International Relations*, 20 (4), 889-911.

Alexander, Thomas M. (1993). John Dewey and the Moral Imagination: Beyond Putnam and Rorty toward a Postmodern Ethics. *Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society*, 29 (3), 369-400.

Allan, Barry (2021). Pragmatism and Confucian Empiricism. In Roger T. Ames, Chen Yajun and Peter D. Hershock, eds. *Confucianism and Deweyan Pragmatism. Resources for a New Geopolitics of Interdependence*, Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 59-69.

Alvarez, José E. (2020). The WHO in the Age of the Coronavirus. *American Journal of International Law*, 114 (4), 578-87.

Ames, Roger T. (2021). On the Cusp of a New World Order? A Dialogue between Confucianism and Deweyan Pragmatism. In Roger T. Ames, Chen Yajun and Peter D. Hershock, eds. *Confucianism and Deweyan Pragmatism. Resources for a New Geopolitics of Interdependence* Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 176-205.

Ames, Roger T., Chen Yajun and Peter D. Hershock, eds. (2021). Introduction. *Confucianism and Deweyan Pragmatism. Resources for a New Geopolitics of Interdependence* Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 11-24.

Ansell Christopher (2011). *Pragmatist Democracy: Evolutionary Learning as Public Philosophy*, Oxford: University Press.

Auteserre, Séverine (2014). *Peaceland. Conflict Resolution and the Everyday Politics of International Intervention*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Avant, Deborah (2016). Pragmatic networks and transnational governance of private military and security services. *International Studies Quarterly*, 60 (2), 330–42.

Avant, Deborah (2017). A Pragmatic Response. In DeRaismes Combes (ed.) *Can Networks Govern? An International Studies Quarterly Online Symposium*, 6 October, 13-15 at http://www.dhnexon.net/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/ISQSymposiumAvant.pdf.

Avant, Deborah (2021). Mainstream Allergy to Pragmatism's Femininities. In Simon Frankel Pratt et al. Forum. Pragmatism in IR: The prospects of substantive theorizing. *International Studies Review*, 23 (4), 1940-2.

Bäckstrand, Karin and Jonathan W. Kuyper (2017). The democratic legitimacy of orchestration: the UNFCCC, non-state actors, and transnational climate governance. *Environmental Politics*, 26 (4), 764–88.

Baier, Annette (1991). *A Progress of Sentiments: Reflections on Hume's Treatise*, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Bardosh, Kevin L. et al. (2020). Integrating the social sciences in epidemic preparedness and response: A strategic framework to strengthen capacities and improve Global Health security. *Globalization and Health*, 16, 1-18.

Bargués, Pol (2020). Peacebuilding without peace? On how pragmatism complicates the practice of international intervention. *Review of International Studies,* 46 (2), 237-55.

Barkin, J. Samuel (2010). *Realist Constructivism*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Barkin, J. Samuel and Laura Sjoberg (2019). *International Relations' last synthesis? Decoupling constructivist and critical approaches*, New York: Oxford University Press.

Barnes, Amy and Garrett Wallace Brown (2011). The Global Fund to fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria. Expertise, Accountability and the Depoliticisation of Global Health Governance. In Owain Williams and Simon Rushton, eds. *Partnerships and Foundations in Global Health Governance*, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 53-75.

Barnett, Michael and Emanuel Adler (1998). Studying security communities in theory, comparison and history. In Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett, eds. *Security Communities*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 413-41.

Barnett, Michael and Thomas G. Weiss (2011). *Humanitarianism Contested. Where Angels Fear to Tread,* New York: Routledge.

Bauer, Harry and Elisabetta Brighi, eds. (2009) *Pragmatism in International Relations*, London: Routledge.

Beardsworth, Richard (2020). Climate science, the politics of climate change and futures of IR. *International Relations*, 34 (3), 374–90.

Beaumont, Peter and Boseley, Sarah (2020) 'What does the WHO do, and why has Trump stopped supporting it?' *The Guardian* 15 April https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/apr/15/world-health-organization-why-has-trump-suspended-funding.

Beck, Silke and Tim Forsyth (2017) Environmental Science and International Relations. In Olaf Corry and Hayley Stevenson, eds. *Traditions and trends in global environmental politics : international relations and the Earth*, New York: Routledge, 81-99.

Beck, Silke and Martin Mahony (2018). The IPCC and the new map of science and politics. *WIREs Climate Change* 3 July at https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1002/wcc.547.

Behera, Navnita Chadha (2016). Knowledge Production. *International Studies Review*, 18 (1), 153-155.

Behuniak, Jim (2021). Toward a Social Philosophy Dewey's Newly Restored China Lectures. In Roger T. Ames, Chen Yajun and Peter D. Hershock, eds. *Confucianism and Deweyan Pragmatism. Resources for a New Geopolitics of Interdependence*, Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 128-43.

Bell, Duncan (2018). Pragmatism and Prophecy: H. G. Wells and the Metaphysics of Socialism. *The American Political Science Review*, 112 (2), 409–22.

Bellamy, Alex J. (2002). Pragmatic Solidarism and Dilemmas of Humanitarian Intervention. *Millennium. Journal of International Studies,* 31 (3), 683-719.

Bellamy, Alex J. and Edward Luck (2018). *The Responsibility to Protect: From Promise to Practice,* Cambridge: Polity.

Bellamy, Alex. J., & Šimonović, Ivan (2021). Introduction. Towards Evidence Based Atrocity Prevention. *Journal of International Peacekeeping*, 24 (3-4), 285-304.

Bellamy, Rob, Jason Chilvers, Naomi Vaughan (2016). Deliberative Mapping of options for tackling climate change: Citizens and specialists "open up" appraisal of geoengineering. *Public Understanding of Science*, 25 (3), 269–86.

Benhabib, Seyla (1986). *Critique, norm, and utopia: a study of the foundations of critical theory*, New York: Columbia University Press.

Berling, Trine Villumsen (2012). Bourdieu, International Relations, and European security. *Theory and Society*, 41 (5), 451–78.

Berling, Trine Villumsen (2015). *The International Political Sociology of Security: Rethinking Theory and Practice*, New York: Routledge.

Bernstein, Richard J (2013). Hegel and Pragmatism. In Alan Malachowski, ed., *The Cambridge Companion to Pragmatism,* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 105-123.

Bernstein, Richard J. (2021). John Dewey. Exemplar of the Democratic Public Intellectual. In Roger T. Ames, Chen Yajun and Peter D. Hershock, eds. *Confucianism and Deweyan Pragmatism. Resources for a New Geopolitics of Interdependence*, Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 26-40.

Bernstein, Steven and Marion Laurence (2022). Practices and Norms: Relationships, Disjunctures and Change. In Alena Drieschova, Christian Bueger and Ted Hopf, eds. *Conceptualizing International Practices*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Kindle Edition, 77-99.

Biesta, Gert (2006). "Of all affairs, communication is the most wonderful". The Communicative Turn in Dewey's *Democracy and Education*. In David T. Hansen, ed., *John Dewey and Our Educational Prospect. A Critical Engagement with Dewey's Democracy and Education*, New York: State University of New York Press, 23-37.

Bigo, Didier (2002). Security and immigration: toward a critique of the governmentality of unease. *Alternatives*, 27 (1), 63-92.

Bigo, Didier (2013). Security. Analyzing transnational professionals of (in)security in Europe. In Rebecca Adler-Nissen, ed., *Bourdieu in International Relations. Rethinking Key Concepts in IR*, London: Routledge.

Bigo, Didier (2016). International Political Sociology. In Raphael Bossong and Mark Rhinard, ed., *Theorising Internal Security in the European Union,* Oxford: Oxford University Press, 64-81.

Bilgin, Pinar (2008). Thinking Past "Western" IR? *Third World Quarterly*, 29 (1), 5-23.

Bilgin, Pinar (2016). Contrapuntal Reading as a Method, an Ethos, and a Metaphor for Global IR. *International Studies Review,* 18 (1), 134–46.

Biswas, Shampa (2001). "Nuclear Apartheid" as Political Position: Race as a Postcolonial discourse. *Alternatives*, 26 (4), 485-522.

Blanchard, Eric M. (2020). Combing the same beach: Analytic eclecticism and the challenge of theoretical multilingualism. *International Journal*, 75 (3), 404-19.

Bloomfield, Alan (2016). Norm antipreneurs and theorising resistance to normative change. *Review of International Studies*, 42 (2), 310–33.

Bohm, Alexandra and Garrett Wallace Brown (2020). R2P and Prevention: The International Community and Its Role in the Determinants of Mass Atrocity. *Global Responsibility to Protect*, 13 (1), 60–95.

Bohman, James (1999a). Citizenship and Norms of Publicity: Wide Public Reason in Cosmopolitan Societies. *Political Theory*, 27 (2), 176–202.

Bohman, James (1999b). Democracy as inquiry, inquiry as democratic: Pragmatism, social science, and the cognitive division of labor. *American Journal of Political Science*, 43 (2), 590-607.

Bookman, Myra (2002). Forming Competence. Habermas on reconstructing worlds and context-transcendent reason. In Mitchell Aboulafia, Myra Bookman, and Catherine Kemp, eds. *Habermas and Pragmatism*, London and New York: Taylor and Francis, 65-80.

Boot, Max (2004). Neocons. *Foreign Policy* 140, 20-8.

Booth, Ken (1994). Military Intervention: Duty and Prudence. *Political Quarterly* special issue, 56-72.

Booth, Ken (1997). Security and self: Reflections of a Fallen Realist. In Keith Krause and Michael C. Williams, eds. *Critical Security Studies: Concepts and Cases*, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 83-119.

Booth, Ken (1999a). Three Tyrannies. In Tim Dunne and Nicholas J. Wheeler, eds. *Human Rights in Global Politics*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 31-70.

Booth, Ken (1999b). Nuclearism, human rights and construction of security (part 1). *The International Journal of Human Rights*, 3 (2), 1–24.

Booth, Ken (1999c). Nuclearism, human rights and constructions of security (part 2). *The International Journal of Human Rights*, 3 (3), 44-61.

Booth, Ken ed., (2005). *Critical Security Studies and World Politics* London and Boulder: Lynne Reinner Publishers.

Booth, Ken (2007). *Theory of World Security*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Booth, Ken and Tim Dunne (1999). Learning beyond frontiers. In Tim Dunne and Nicholas J. Wheeler, eds. *Human Rights in Global Politics*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 303-29.

Bosco David L. (2014). Assessing the UN Security Council: A Concert Perspective. *Global Governance* 20 (4), 545-61.

Bower, Adam (2020). Entrapping Gulliver. The United States and the Antipersonnel Mine Ban. *Security Studies*, 29 (1), 128-61.

Boyte, Harry C. (2007). Populism and John Dewey Convergences and Contradictions. University of Michigan Dewey Lecture, March 29 at academia.edu

Bray, Daniel (2009). Pragmatic Cosmopolitanism. A Deweyan Approach to Democracy beyond the Nation-State. *Millennium. Journal of International Studies*, 37 (3), 683-719.

Bray, Daniel (2011). *Pragmatic Cosmopolitanism: Representation and Leadership in Transnational Democracy*, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Bray, Daniel (2013). Pragmatic ethics and the will to believe in cosmopolitanism. *International Theory*, 5 (3), 446-76.

Breslauer, George W. and Philip E. Tetlock (1991). Introduction. In George W. Breslauer and Philip E. Tetlock, eds. *Learning in U.S. and Soviet Foreign Policy*, Boulder: Westview Press, 1-19.

Brown, Chris (2012). The 'Practice Turn', Phronesis and Classical Realism: Towards a Phronetic International Political Theory? *Millennium. Journal of International Studies*, 40 (3), 439-56.

Brown, Chris (2022a). If Not Rome or The Hague, Where? Reflections on Sanctioning and Punishing. In Gunther Hellmann and Jens Steffek, eds. *Praxis as a Perspective on International Politics* Bristol: Bristol University Press, 97-111.

Brown, Faye (2022b). Putin ramps up nuclear threat: 'We don't brag, we will use them'. *Metro* 27 April https://metro.co.uk/2022/04/27/vladimir-putin-ramps-up-nuclear-threat-we-dont-brag-we-will-use-them-16546440/

Brown, Garrett Wallace (2010). Safeguarding deliberative global governance: the case of The Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria. *Review of International Studies*, 36 (2), 511-30.

Brown, Garrett Wallace (2015). Knowledge, politics and power in global health: Comment on "Knowledge, moral claims and the exercise of power in global health". *International Journal of Health Policy Management,* 4, 111–3.

Brunkhorst, Hauke (2002). Globalising Democracy Without a State: Weak Public, Strong Public, Global Constitutionalism. *Millennium. Journal of International Studies,* 31 (3), 675–90.

Bueger, Christian (2014). Pathways to practice: praxiography and international politics. *European Political Science Review*, 6 (3), 383 –406.

Bueger, Christian (2015). Making Things Known: Epistemic Practices, the United Nations, and the Translation of Piracy. *International Political Sociology*, 9 (1), 1–18.

Bueger, Christian (2018). Territory, authority, expertise: Global governance and the counter-piracy assemblage. *European Journal of International Relations*, 24 (3), 614–37.

Bueger, Christian and Tim Edmunds (2021). Pragmatic Ordering. Informality, experimentation and the maritime security agenda. *Review of International Studies*, 47 (2), 171-91.

Bueger, Christian and Frank Gadinger (2014). *International Practice Theory. New Perspectives*, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Bueger, Christian and Frank Gadinger (2015). The Play of International Practice. *International Studies Quarterly* 59 (3), 449-60.

Bull Hedley (1977). *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics*, Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Buzan, Barry and George Lawson (2015). *The Global Transformation. History, Modernity and the Making of the Making of International Relations*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Capie, David (2012). The Responsibility to Protect Norm in Southeast Asia: Framing, Resistance and the Localization Myth. *The Pacific Review*, 25 (1), 75-93.

Checkel, Jeffrey (2001). 'Why Comply? Social Learning and European Identity Change. *International Organization*, 55 (3), 553–88.

Chernoff, Fred (2020). Pragmatism, pluralism, and eclecticism: Sil and Katzenstein's "Analytic eclecticism" in Beyond Paradigms. *International Journal*, 75 (3), 392–403.

Chernoff, Fred, Jérémie Cornut, Patrick James (2020). Analytic eclecticism and International Relations: Promises and pitfalls. *International Journal*, 75 (3), 383–91.

Chen, Jia (2021a). Harmony in the Arts. The Sense of Communication in Confucian and Deweyan Aesthetics. In Roger T. Ames, Yajun Chen and Peter D. Hershock, eds. *Confucianism and Deweyan Pragmatism. Resources for a New Geopolitics of Interdependence,* Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 70-84.

Chen, Yajun (2021b). The Core of Pragmatism and Its Echo in Chinese Philosophy. In Roger T. Ames, Yajun Chen and Peter D. Hershock, eds. *Confucianism and Deweyan Pragmatism. Resources for a New Geopolitics of Interdependence*, Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 42-57.

Christoff, Peter (2010). Cold climate in Copenhagen: China and the United States at COP15. *Environmental Politics*, 19 (4), 637–56.

Claude Jr. IL. (1971). *Swords into Plowshares. The Problems and Progress of International Organization*, New York: Random House.

Cochran, Molly (1999). *Normative Theory in International Relations. A Pragmatic Approach,* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Cochran (2002). A Democratic Critique of Cosmopolitan Democracy: Pragmatism from the Bottom-Up. *European Journal of International Relations*, 8 (4), 517-48.

Cochran, Molly (2002). Deweyan Pragmatism and Post-Positivist Social Science in IR. *Millennium. Journal of International Studies*, 31 (3), 525-48.

Cochran, Molly (2009). Conceptualizing the power of transnational agents: Pragmatism and international public spheres. In Raf Geenens and Ronald Tinnevelt, eds. *Does Truth Matter? Democracy and Public Space*, Springer, 167-86.

Cochran, Molly (2010). Dewey as an International Thinker. In Molly Cochran, ed*., The Cambridge Companion to Dewey*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 309-336.

Cochran, Molly (2012). Pragmatism and International Relations. A Story of Closure and Opening. *European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy,* 4, 1-22.

Cochran, Molly (2013). Hedley Bull and John Dewey: Two Middle Grounders and a Pragmatic Approach to the Nuclear Dilemma. In Cornelia Navari, ed., *Ethical Reasoning in International Affairs: Arguments from the Middle Ground*, Basingstoke: Macmillan, 158-81.

Cochran, Molly (2017). The "Newer Ideals" of Jane Addams's Progressivism. In Molly Cochran and Cornelia Navari, eds. *Progressivism and US Foreign Policy between the World Wars*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 143-65.

Cochran, Molly (2021). Whose Pragmatism? Which IR? In Simon Frankel Pratt et al. Forum. Pragmatism in IR: The prospects of substantive theorizing. *International Studies Review*, 23 (4), 1943-5.

Coll, Alberto R. (1991). Normative Prudence as a Tradition of Statecraft. *Ethics and International Affairs*, 5 (1), 33-51.

Collins, Alan (2013). Norm diffusion and ASEAN's adoption and adaption of global HIV/AIDS norms. *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific*, 13 (3), 369–97.

Cooper, Andrew F. and Pouliot, Vincent (2015). How much is global governance changing? The G20 as international practice. *Cooperation and Conflict*, 5 (3), 334–50.

Cormier, Harvey (2012). Reconsidering Obama the Pragmatist. *The New York Times* 14 October at http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com

Cornut, Jérémie (2015). To be a diplomat abroad: Diplomatic practice at embassies. *Cooperation and Conflict*, 50 (3), 385–401.

Cornut, Jérémie (2018). Diplomacy, Agency, and the Logic of Improvisation and Virtuosity in Practice. *European Journal of International Relations*, 24 (3) 712-36.

Corry, Olaf (2019). Nature and the international: towards a materialist understanding of societal multiplicity. *Globalizations*, 17 (3) 419-435.

Craig, Campbell (2003). *Glimmer of a New Leviathan. Total War in the Realism of Niebuhr, Morgenthau and Waltz*, New York: Columbia University Press.

Craig, Campbell (2019). Solving the nuclear dilemma: Is a world state necessary? *Journal of International Political Theory*, 15 (3), 349-66.

Dancy, Geoff (2016). Human rights pragmatism: Belief, inquiry, and pragmatism. *European Journal of International Relations*, 22 (3), 512-35.

Danielsson, Anna (2020). Reconceptualising the politics of knowledge authority in post/conflict interventions: From a peacebuilding field to transnational fields of interventionary objects. *European Journal of International Security,* 5 (1), 115-33.

Davies, Sara E. (2019). *Containing Contagion*. *The Politics of Disease Outbreaks in South East Asia*, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Davies, Sara E., Adam Kamradt-Scott, Simon Rushton (2015). *Disease Diplomacy. International norms and global health security*, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. Kindle Edition.

Davies, Sara E. and Clare Wenham (2020). Why the COVID-19 response needs International Relations. *International Affairs*, 96 (5), 1227–51.

De Búrca, Gráinne, Robert Keohane, and Charles Sabel (2014). Global Experimentalist Governance. *British Journal of Political Science,* 44 (3), 477-86.

Deer, Cécile (2008). Reflexivity. In Michael Grenfell, ed., *Pierre Bourdieu. Key Concepts*, Durham: Acumen, 199-212.

Deitelhoff, Nicole and Lisbeth Zimmermann (2019). Norms under Challenge: Unpacking the Dynamics of Norm Robustness. *Journal of Global Security Studies*, 4 (1), 2–17.

Depledge, Joanna, Miguel Saldivia and Cristina Peñasco (2022). Glass half full or glass half empty? The 2021 Glasgow Climate Conference. *Climate Policy*, 22 (2), 147-57.

DeShore, Naomi et al. (2020). An evaluation of the global health security agenda steering group governance interventions. *European Journal of Public Health*, 30 (5), at https://academic.oup.com/eurpub/article/30/Supplement_5/ckaa166.174/5913978.

Deudney, Daniel H. (2007). *Bounding Power. Republican Security Theory from the Polis to the Global Village*, Oxford and Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Deudney, Daniel H. (2019). Going critical: Toward a modified nuclear one worldism. *Journal of International Political Theory*, 15 (3), 367-85.

Dewey, John (1897 [1998]). My Pedagogic Creed. First published in *School Journal* LIV, 77-80. Republished in Larry A. Hickman and Thomas M. Alexander, eds. *The Essential Dewey. Volume 1. Pragmatism, Education Democracy*, Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 229-35.

Dewey, John (1908a [1965]). The influence of Darwin on Philosophy. In John Dewey, ed., *The Influence of Darwin on Philosophy, and Other Essays in Contemporary Thought*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1-19.

Dewey, John (1908b [1965]). Intelligence and Morals. In John Dewey ed., *The Influence of Darwin on Philosophy, and Other Essays in Contemporary Thought*, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 46-76.

Dewey, John (1915 [1998]). The Logic of Judgments of Practice. First published in *Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods* 12, 505-23, 533-43. Republished in Larry A. Hickman and Thomas M.

Alexander, eds. *The Essential Dewey. Volume 2. Ethics, Logic, Psychology*, Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 236-271.

Dewey, John (1916 [2011]). *Democracy and Education*, Milton Keynes: Simon and Brown.

Dewey, John (1916 [1998]). Nationalizing Education. First published in *Journal of Education* 84, 425-28. Republished in Larry A. Hickman and Thomas M. Alexander, eds. *The Essential Dewey. Volume 1. Pragmatism, Education Democracy*, Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 265-9.

Dewey, John (1920 [1972]). *Reconstruction in Philosophy*, Boston: Beacon Press.

Dewey, John (1922a [1998]). The Place of Habit in Conduct. From *Human Nature and Conduct*. Republished in Larry A. Hickman and Thomas M. Alexander, eds. *The Essential Dewey. Volume 2. Ethics, Logic and Psychology*, Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 24-49.

Dewey, John (1922b [1998]). Valuation and Experimental Knowledge. First Published in *Philosophical Review* (31), 325-51. Republished in Larry A. Hickman and Thomas M. Alexander, eds. *The Essential Dewey. Volume* 2. *Ethics, Logic, Psychology*. Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 272-86.

Dewey, John (1922c [1998]). The Good Activity. From *Human Nature and Conduct.* Republished in Larry A. Hickman and Thomas M. Alexander, eds. *The Essential Dewey. Volume* 2. *Ethics, Logic, Psychology*, Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 321-8.

Dewey, John (1925a [1998]). The Development of American Pragmatism. First published in *Studies in the History of Ideas,* ed., Department of Philosophy, Columbia University. Republished in Larry A. Hickman and Thomas M. Alexander, eds. *The Essential Dewey. Volume 1. Pragmatism, Education*, *Democracy*, Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 3-13.

Dewey, John (1925b [1998]). Existence, Value and Criticism. From *Experience and Nature* in Larry A. Hickman and Thomas M. Alexander, eds. *The Essential Dewey. Volume 1. Pragmatism, Education*, *Democracy*, Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 84-101.

Dewey, John (1925c [1998]). Nature, Communication and Meaning. From *Experience and Nature* in Larry A. Hickman and Thomas M. Alexander, eds. *The Essential Dewey. Volume* 2. *Ethics, Logic, Psychology*, Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 50-66.

Dewey, John, (1927a). The Pragmatic Acquiescence. First published in *New Republic* 49, 186-9. Republished in Larry A. Hickman and Thomas M. Alexander, eds., *The Essential Dewey. Volume 1. Pragmatism, Education Democracy*. Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 33-6.

Dewey, John (1927b [1998]). The Search for the Public. First published in *The Public and its Problems*. Republished in Larry A. Hickman and Thomas M. Alexander, eds. *The Essential Dewey. Volume 1. Pragmatism, Education Democracy*. Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 281-92.

Dewey, John (1927c). *The Public and its Problems*, London: George Allen and Unwin.

Dewey, John (1928a [1998]). The Inclusive Philosophic Idea. First published in *Monist* 38, 161-77. Republished in Larry A. Hickman and Thomas M. Alexander, eds. *The Essential Dewey. Volume 1. Pragmatism, Education Democracy*, Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 308-15.

Dewey, John (1928b [1998]). A critique of American Civilization. First published in *World Tomorrow* 11, 391-95. Republished in Larry A. Hickman and Thomas M. Alexander, eds. *The Essential Dewey. Volume 1. Pragmatism, Education Democracy*, Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 316-22.

Dewey, John (1929). *The Quest for Certainty. A Study of the Relation of Knowledge and Action*, London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd.

Dewey, John (1932a [1998]). Moral Judgment and Knowledge. From *Ethics*. Republished in Larry A. Hickman and Thomas M. Alexander, eds. *The Essential Dewey. Volume 2. Ethics, Logic and Psychology*, Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 328-40.

Dewey, John (1932b [1998]). The Moral Self. From *Ethics*. Republished in Larry A. Hickman and Thomas M. Alexander, *The Essential Dewey. Volume 2. Ethics, Logic and Psychology*, Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 341-54.

Dewey, John (1932c [1998]). The Good Activity. From *Human Nature and Conduct.* Republished in Larry A. Hickman and Thomas M. Alexander, eds. *The Essential Dewey. Volume 2. Ethics, Logic and Psychology* Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 321-7.

Dewey, John (1934a). Intelligence and Power. *New Republic* 25 April at https://newrepublic.com/article/100340/intelligence-and-power.

Dewey, John (1934b [1967]). *A Common Faith*, New Haven: Yale University Press.

Dewey, John (1935 [1998]). Renascent Liberalism. From *Liberalism and Social Action*. Republished in Larry A. Hickman and Thomas M. Alexander, eds. *The Essential Dewey. Volume 1. Pragmatism, Education Democracy*, Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 323-36.

Dewey, John (1938 [2015]). *Experience and Education*, New York: Free Press.

Dewey, John (1939 [1998]). Creative Democracy – The Task Before Us. First published in *John Dewey and the Promise of America,* Progressive Education Booklet No.14 (Columbus Ohio: American Education Press) 12-17. Republished in Larry A. Hickman and Thomas M. Alexander, eds. *The Essential Dewey. Volume 1. Pragmatism, Education Democracy*, Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 340-3.

Dewey, John (1948 [1972]). *Reconstruction in Philosophy*, Boston: Beacon Press.

Docherty, Benedict, Xavier Mathieu, and Jason Ralph (2020). R2P and the Arab Spring. Norm Localization and the US response to the early Syria crisis. *Global Responsibility to Protect*, 12 (3), 246-70.

Drieschova, Alena and Christian Bueger (2022). Conceptualizing International Practices. Establishing a Research Agenda in Conversations. In Alena Drieschova, Christian Bueger and Ted Hopf, eds. *Conceptualizing International Practices*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Kindle Edition, 3-27.

Drolet, Jean-François (2011). *American Neoconservatism. The Politics and Culture of a Reactionary Idealism*, London: Hurst.

Dryzek, John S. (2004). Pragmatism and Democracy: In Search of Deliberative Publics. *The Journal of Speculative Philosophy*, 18 (1), 72-9.

Dryzek, John S., Bächtiger, André and Milewicz, Karolina (2011). Toward a Deliberative Global Citizens' Assembly. *Global Policy*, 2 (1), 33-42.

Dryzek, John and Jonathan Pickering (2019). *The Politics of the Anthropocene*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Duff, H. Jonathan et al. (2021). A global public health convention for the 21st century. *The Lancet Public Health*, 5 May at https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/33964227/.

Duvall, Raymond and Arjun Chowdhury (2011). Practices of theory. In Emanuel Adler and Vincent Pouliot eds *International Practices* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 335–54.

Eaton, Lynn (2021). Covid-19: WHO warns against "vaccine nationalism" or face further virus mutations. *BMJ* 372 at https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/33526414/.

Eckersley, Robyn (2012). Moving Forward in the Climate Negotiations: Multilateralism or Minilateralism? *Global Environmental Politics*, 12 (2), 24-42.

Elshtain, Jean Bethke ed., (2002). *The Jane Addams Reader*, New York: Basic Books.

Epstein, Charlotte (2013). Norms. Bourdieu's *Nomos,* Or the structural power of norms. In Rebecca Adler-Nissen ed., *Bourdieu in International Relations. Rethinking Key Concepts in IR*, London: Routledge, 165-78.

Ercan, Pinar Gözen (2016). *Debating the Future of the Responsibility to Protect*, London: Palgrave Macmillan.

Erfani, Parsa et al. (2021). Intellectual property waiver for covid-19 vaccines will advance global health equity. *BMJ* 374 August at https://www.bmj.com/content/374/bmj.n1837.

Erskine, Toni (2012). Whose progress, which morals? Constructivism, normative IR theory and the limits and possibilities of studying ethics in world politics. *International Theory*, 4 (3), 449-68.

Erskine, Toni (2016). Moral agents of protection and supplementary responsibilities to protect. In Alex Bellamy and Tim Dunne, eds. *The Oxford Handbook of the Responsibility to Protect*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 167-85.

Evangelista, Matthew (1995). The paradox of state strength: transnational relations, domestic structures, and security policy in Russia and the Soviet Union. *International Organization*, 49 (1), 1–38.

Evangelista, Matthew (1999). *Unarmed Forces. The Transnational Movement to End the Cold War*, Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press.

Falkner, Robert (2016a). The Paris Agreement and the New Logic of International Climate Politics. *International Affairs*, 92 (5), 1107–25.

Falkner, Robert (2016b). A minilateral solution for global climate change? On bargaining efficiency, club benefits and international legitimacy. *Perspectives on Politics*, 14 (1), 87-101.

Falkner, Robert (2017). International Climate Politics between Pluralism and Solidarism. An English School perspective. In Olaf Corry and Hayley Stevenson, eds. *Traditions and trends in global environmental politics: International Relations and the Earth*, London: Routledge, 26-44.

Farrell, Theo and Hélène Lambert (2001). Courting controversy: international law, national norms and American nuclear use. *Review of International Studies*, 27 (3), 309–26.

Ferhani, Adam and Simon Rushton (2020). The International Health Regulations, COVID-19, and bordering practices: Who gets in, what gets out, and who gets rescued? *Contemporary Security Policy*, 41 (3), 458-77.

Fesmire, Steven (2020). Pragmatist Ethics and Climate Change. In Dale Miller and Ben Eggleston, eds. *Moral Theory and Climate Change: Ethical Perspectives on a Warming Planet*, London: Routledge. Preprint Online.

Festenstein, Matthew (1997). *Pragmatism and Political Theory: From Dewey to Rorty*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Festenstein Matthew (2004). Deliberative Democracy and Two Models of Pragmatism. *European Journal of Social Theory*, 7 (3), 291-306.

Fidler, David P. (2003). SARS: Political Pathology of the First Post-Westphalian Pathogen. *Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics*, 31 (4), 485-505.

Fierke, Karin M. (2013). Constructivism. In Tim Dunne, Milja Kurki and Steve Smith, eds. *International Relations Theories. Discipline and Diversity*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 161-78.

Fierke, Karin M. and Vivienne Jabri (2019). Global conversations: Relationality, embodiment and power in the move towards a Global IR. *Global Constitutionalism*, 8 (3), 506–35.

Fierke, Karin M. (2020). Knowing, Remembering, Showing But Still Not Seeing: Critical Praxis, Slavery and the Modern "We". In Gunther Hellmann and Jens Steffek, eds. *Praxis as a Perspective on International Politics*, Bristol: Bristol University Press, 19-32.

Finnemore, Martha and Sikkink, Kathryn (1998). International Norm Dynamics and Political Change. *International Organization*, 52 (4), 887-917.

Franke, Ulrich and Weber, Ralph (2011). At the Papini hotel: On pragmatism in the study of international relations. *European Journal of International Relations*, 18 (4), 669-91.

Fraundorfer, Markus (2015). *Brazil's Emerging Role in Global Governance: Health, Food Security and Bioenergy*, Palgrave, Macmillan.

Fraundorfer, Markus (2022). *Global Governance and the Anthropocene*, Cham: Palgrave Macmillan.

Freedman, Lawrence (1988). I exist; therefore I deter. *International Security*, 13 (1), 177-195.

Frega, Roberto (2014a). Between Pragmatism and Critical Theory: Social Philosophy Today. *Human Studies*, 37 (1), 57–82.

Frega, Roberto (2014b). The Normative Creature: Toward a Practice-Based Account of Normativity. *Social Theory and Practice*, 40 (1), 1- 27.

Frega, Roberto (2017). Pragmatism and democracy in a global world. *Review of International Studies*, 43 (4), 720-41.

Frega, Roberto (2019). *Pragmatism and the Wide View of Democracy*, Cham: Palgrave Macmillan.

Fricker, Miranda (2007). *Epistemic Injustice: Power and the Ethics of Knowing. In Epistemic injustice: power and the ethics of knowing*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Frieden, Thomas R and Marine Buissonnière (2021). Will a global preparedness treaty help or hinder pandemic preparedness? *BMJ Global Health* (6) at https://gh.bmj.com/content/6/5/e006297

Friedrichs, Jörg and Friedrich Kratochwil (2009). On Acting and Knowing: How Pragmatism Can Advance International Relations Research and Methodology. *International Organization* 63 (4), 701-31.

Gadinger, Frank (2016). On Justification and Critique: Luc Boltanski's Pragmatic Sociology and International Relations. *International Political Sociology*, 10 (3), 187–205.

Gadinger, Frank (2022). The Normativity of International Practices. In Alena Drieschova, Christian Bueger, Ted Hopf, eds. *Conceptualising International Practices*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 100-21.

Gallagher Adrian (2014). What constitutes a 'Manifest Failing'? Ambiguous and inconsistent terminology and the Responsibility to Protect. *International Relations*, 28 (4), 428-44.

Garrison, Jim (2006). The "Permanent Deposit" of Hegelian Thought in Dewey's Theory of Inquiry. *Educational Theory,* 56 (1), 1-37.

Giesecke, Johan (2019). The Truth about PHEICs. *The Lancet* July 5 at https://www.thelancet.com/action/showPdf?pii=S0140-6736%2819%2931566-1.

Glanville, Luke (2014). *Sovereignty and the Responsibility to Protect. A New History*, Chicago and London: Chicago University Press.

Glanville Luke (2016). Does R2P matter? Interpreting the impact of a norm. *Cooperation and Conflict*, 51 (2), 184-99.

Gostin, Lawrence O., Suerie Moon, and Benjamin Mason Meier, (2020). Reimagining Global Health Governance in the Age of COVID-19. *American Journal of Public Health* 110, 1615-19, https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/33026872/.

Goldstein, Judith and Robert O. Keohane, eds. (1993) *Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions, and Political Change*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Grimmel, Andreas and Gunther Hellmann (2019). Theory Must Not Go on Holiday. Wittgenstein, the Pragmatists, and the Idea of Social Science. *International Political Sociology,* 13 (2), 198–214.

Gruszczynski, Lukasz and Margherita Melillo (2022). The Uneasy Coexistence of Expertise and Politics in the World Health Organization. Learning from the Experience of the Early Response to the COVID-19 Pandemic. *International Organizations Law Review*, 1-31.

Guarner, Jeannette (2020). Three Emerging Coronaviruses in Two Decades: The Story of SARS, MERS, and Now COVID-19. *American Journal of Clinical Pathology*, 153 (4), 420–421.

Guéhenno, Jean-Marie (2015). *The Fog of Peace. A Memoir of International Peacekeeping in the 21st Century*, Washington D.C.: Brooking Institution Press. Kindle edition.

Haas, Ernst B. (1991). Collective Learning: Some Theoretical Speculations. In George W. Breslauer and Philip E. Tetlock, eds. *Learning in U.S. and Soviet Foreign Policy*, Boulder: Westview Press, 62-99.

Haas, Peter M. (2017). The epistemic authority of solution-oriented global environmental assessments. *Environmental Science and Policy*, 77, 221–224.

Haas, Peter M. and Ernst B. Haas (2002). Pragmatic Constructivism and the Study of International Institutions. *Millennium. Journal of International Studies*, 31 (3), 573-601.

Habermas, Jürgen (1993). *Justification and Application*, Cambridge: MIT Press.

Habermas, Jürgen (1996). *Between Facts and Norms. Contributions of Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy*, Cambridge: Polity Press.

Habermas, Jürgen (2003). *Truth and Justification*, Cambridge: Polity.

Hanrieder, Tine (2020). Priorities, Partners, Politics: The WHO's Mandate beyond the Crisis. *Global Governance*, 26 (4), 535–43.

Hanrieder, Tine and Kreuder-Sonnen, Christian (2014). WHO decides on the exception? Securitization and emergency governance in global health. *Security Dialogue*, 45 (4), 331–34

Harrabin, Roger (2021). US Climate Envoy criticized for optimism over clean tech. *BBC News* 17 May at bbc.co.uk/news/science-environment-57135506.

Harris, John (2020). If democracy looks doomed, Extinction Rebellion may have an answer. *The Guardian* 30 August at https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2020/aug/30/extinction-rebellion-democracy-climate-emergency-bill-citizens-assembly.

Hassoun, Nicole (2021). Against vaccine nationalism. *Journal of Medical Ethics*, 15 February at https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/33589473/.

Havercroft, Jonathan (2017). Introduction. Symposium on Contestation and International Relations. *Polity*, 49 (1), 100-8.

Havercroft, Jonathan (2018). Social Constructivism and International Ethics. In Brent J. Steele and Eric A. Eric Heinze, eds. *Routledge Handbook of Ethics and International Relations*, London: Routledge, 116-29.

He, Ming Fang (2013). East~West Epistemological Convergence of Humanism in Language, Identity, and Education: Confucius, Makiguchi and Dewey. *Journal of Language, Identity, and Education,* 12 (1), 61–70.

Hehir, Aidan (2012). *The Responsibility to Protect. Rhetoric, Reality and the Future of Humanitarian Intervention,* Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Hehir, Aidan (2013). The Permanence of Inconsistency. Libya, the Security Council, and the Responsibility to Protect. *International Security*, 38 (1), 137-59.

Hehir, Aidan (2019). *Hollow Norms and the Responsibility to Protect,* Cham: Palgrave Macmillan.

Hewlett, Charles F. (1976). A Dissenting Voice: John Dewey against Militarism in Education. *Peace and Change*, 3 (4), 49-60.

Hewlett, Charles F (2017). John Dewey: A Pragmatist's Search for Peace in the Aftermath of Total War. In Molly Cochran and Cornelia Navari, eds. *Progressivism and US Foreign Policy between the World Wars*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 117-40.

Hellmann, Gunther (2003). In conclusion: Dialogue and Synthesis in Individual Scholarship and Collective Inquiry. *International Studies Review*, 5 (1), 147–50.

Hellmann, Gunther (2009). Beliefs as Rules for Action: Pragmatism as Theory of Thought and Action. *International Studies Review*, 11 (3), 638-41.

Hellmann, Gunther (2022). Practising Theorizing in Theorizing Practice: Friedrich Kratochwil and Social Inquiry. In Gunther Hellmann and Jens Steffek, eds. *Practice as a Perspective on International Politics* Bristol: Bristol University Press, 72-93.

Herman, Robert G. (1996). Identity, Norms and National Security: The Soviet Foreign Policy Revolution and the End of the Cold War. In Peter J. Katzenstein, ed., *The Culture of National Security. Norms and Identity in World Politics*, New York: Columbia University Press, 272-316.

Herz, John (1960). *International Politics in the Atomic Age,* New York: Columbia University Press.

Heymann, David L. (2013). How SARS Was Contained. *New York Times* March 14 at https://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/15/opinion/global/how-sars-was-contained.html.

Hilde, Thomas C. (2012). Uncertainty and the epistemic dimension of democratic deliberation in climate change adaptation. *Democratization*, 19 (5), 889-911.

Hildebrand, David (2013). Dewey's pragmatism: instrumentalism and meliorism. In Alan Malachowski, ed., *The Cambridge Companion to Pragmatism,* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 55-82.

Hildreth, Roudy W. (2009). Reconstructing Dewey on Power. *Political Theory*, 37 (6), 780-807.

Hofius, Maren (2021). Practice Approaches in International Political Theory. In Vassilios Paipais, ed., *Perspectives on International Political Theory in Europe*, London: Palgrave Macmillan 87–106.

Hofius, Maren (2022) Diplomats on the Frontlines: Knowing and Ordering in Crisis*, The Hague Journal of Diplomacy,* 18 (1), 1-34

Hoffmann, Matthew J. (2009). Is Constructivist Ethics an Oxymoron? *International Studies Review*, 11 (2), 231-52.

Hoffmann, Matthew J. (2018). Climate Change. In Thomas Weiss and Rorden Wilkinson, eds. *International Organization and Global Governance,* London: Routledge, 655-66.

Honneth, Axel (1998). Democracy as reflexive cooperation. John Dewey and the Theory of Democracy Today', *Political Theory,* 26 (6), 763-83.

Hook, Sidney, (1959-60). Pragmatism and the Tragic Sense of Life. *Proceedings and Address of the American Philosophical Association* 33, 5-26.

Hook, Sidney, (1974). *Education and the Taming of Power*, London: Alcove Press.

Hoover, Joe (2016). *Reconstructing Human Rights. A Pragmatist and Pluralist Inquiry in Global Ethics,* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Hopf, Ted (2010). The logic of habit in International Relations. *European Journal of International Relations*, 16 (4), 539-61.

Hopf, Ted (2018). Change in international practices. *European Journal of International Relations,* 24 (3), 687-711.

Hopf, Ted (2022). Critiques of the Practice Turn in IR Theory: Some Responses. In Alena Drieschova, Christian Bueger and Ted Hopf, eds. *Conceptualizing International Practices*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Kindle Edition, 28-44.

Hookway, Christopher (2013). "The Principle of Peirce" and the Origins of Pragmatism. In Alan Malachowski ed., *The Cambridge Companion to Pragmatism,* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 17-35.

Horner, Rory (2021). Covax misses its 2021 delivery target – what's gone wrong in the fight against vaccine nationalism? *The Conversation* 17 September https://theconversation.com/covax-misses-its-2021-delivery-target-whats-gone-wrong-in-the-fight-against-vaccine-nationalism-167753.

Howlett, Charles F. (2017). John Dewey: A Pragmatist's Search for Peace in the Aftermath of Total War. In Molly Cochran and Cornelia Navari, eds. *Progressivism and US foreign policy between the World Wars*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 117-142.

Hughes, Hannah (2015). Bourdieu and the IPCC's Symbolic Power. *Global Environmental Politics*, 15 (4), 85–104.

Hughes, Hannah and Paterson, M. (2017). Narrowing the Climate Field: The Symbolic Power of Authors in the IPCC's Assessment of Mitigation. *The Review of Policy Research*, 34 (6), 744–766

Hughes, Lesley and Wesley Morgan (2021). Good COP, bad COP: Climate wins and losses from Glasgow. *Sydney Morning Herald* 14 November at https://www.smh.com.au/politics/federal/good-cop-bad-cop-climate-wins-and-losses-from-glasgow-20211114-p598rq.html.

Hurrell, Andrew (1998). An emerging security community in South America. In Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett, eds. *Security Communities*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 228-264.

Independent Panel for Pandemic Preparedness and Response for the WHO Executive Board (2021a). Second Progress Report, January at https://theindependentpanel.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/Independent-Panel_Second-Report-on-Progress_Final-15-Jan-2021.pdf.

Independent Panel for Pandemic Preparedness and Response for the WHO Executive Board (2021b). *COVID-19: Make it the Last Pandemic* May at https://theindependentpanel.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/05/COVID-19-Make-it-the-Last-Pandemic_final.pdf.

International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) (2001). *The Responsibility to Protect.* Ottawa: International Development Research Centre.

International Court of Justice (1996). Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons. Advisory Opinion. 8 July at https://web.archive.org/web/20171013111831/http://www.icj-cij.org/files/case-related/95/095-19960708-ADV-01-00-EN.pdf.

IPCC (2014). *Climate Change 2014: Synthesis Report. Contribution of Working Groups I, II and III to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change*. IPCC, Geneva, Switzerland.

IPCC (2021). Summary for Policymakers. In: *Climate Change 2021: The Physical Science Basis. Contribution of Working Group I to the Sixth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change* Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, United Kingdom and New York, NY, USA, pp. 3–32.

Jackson, Patrick Thaddeus (2021). Pragmatism and Academic Responsibility. In Simon Frankel Pratt et al. Forum. Pragmatism in IR: The prospects of substantive theorizing. *International Studies Review*, 23 (4), 1945–8.

Jackson, Patrick Thaddeus (2022). Between Science and Politics: Friedrich Kratochwil's Praxis of 'Going On'. In Gunther Hellmann and Jens Steffek, eds. *Praxis as a Perspective on International Politics* Bristol: Bristol University Press, 234-54.

Jackson, Patrick Thaddeus and Daniel H. Nexon (1999). Relations Before States: Substance, Process and the Study of World Politics. *European Journal of International Relations*, 5 (3), 291-332.

Jackson Patrick Thaddeus and Daniel H. Nexon (2019). Reclaiming the social: relationalism in anglophone international studies. *Cambridge Review of International Affairs,* 32 (5), 582-600.

Jackson, Robert (2000). *The Global Covenant. Human Conduct in a World of States*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Jacob, Cecilia and Martin Mennecke (2019). *Implementing the responsibility to protect: a future agenda* London: Routledge.

James, William ([2000]) Giles Gunn, ed., *Pragmatism and Other Writings*, Penguin Classics, Kindle Edition.

James, William (1896 [2005]). The Will to Believe. In John M. Capps and Donald Capps, eds. *James and Dewey on Belief and Experience*, Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press.

James, William (1907 [2019]). *Pragmatism*. DigiReads.com Publishing.

Jarvis, Samuel (2022). *The Limits of Common Humanity. Motivating the Responsibility to Protect in a Changing Global Order*, Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press.

Jetschke, Anja and Andrea Liese (2013). The power of human rights a decade after: from euphoria to contestation? In Thomas Risse, Stephen Ropp and Kathryn Sikkink, eds. *The Persistent Power of Human Rights: From Commitment to Compliance*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 26-42

Joas, Hans (1992). An Underestimated Alternative: America and the Limits of "Critical Theory". *Symbolic Interaction*, 15 (3), 261–75.

Joas, Hans (1996). *The Creativity of Action*, Cambridge: Polity Press.

Jones, Richard Wyn (2005). On Emancipation: Necessity, Capacity, and Concrete Utopias. In Ken Booth, ed., *Critical Security Studies and World Politics*, Boulder, London: Lynne Rienner, 215-35.

Kaag, John (2013). Pragmatism, Militarism and Political Unity. In Shane Ralston, ed., *Philosophical Pragmatism and International Relations*, Plymouth, UK: Lexington Books, 71-85.

Kaag, John and Sarah Kreps (2012). Pragmatism's contributions to international relations. *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, 25 (2), 191-208.

Katzenstein, Peter J. ed., (2006). *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics*, New York: Columbia University Press.

Kavalski, Emilian (2018). Guanxi or What is the Chinese for Relational Theory of World Politics. *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific*, 18 (3), 397–420.

Kenkel, Kai Michael and Felippe De Rosa (2015). Localization and Subsidiarity in Brazil's Engagement with the Responsibility to Protect. *Global Responsibility to Protect*, 7 (3-4), 325-49.

Kikoler, Naomi (2016). Guinea: An Overlooked Case of the Responsibility to Prevent in Practice. In Serena K. Sharma and Jennifer Welsh, eds. *The Responsibility to Prevent. Overcoming the Challenges of Atrocity Prevention* Oxford: Oxford University Press, 304-23.

King, Anthony (2000). Thinking with Bourdieu Against Bourdieu: A 'Practical' Critique of the Habitus. *Sociological Theory*, 18 (3), 417–33.

Klabbers, Jan (2019). The Normative Gap in International Organizations Law: The Case of the World Health Organization. *International Organizations Law Review,* 16 (2), 272–98.

Klotz, Audie (1995). Norms reconstituting interests: Global racial equality and U.S. sanctions against South Africa. *International Organization*, 49 (3), 451-78.

Klotz, Audie (1999). *Norms in International Relations: The Struggle Against Apartheid* Cornell University Press.

Knafo, Samuel (2016). Bourdieu and the Dead End of Reflexivity: On the Impossible Task of Locating the Subject. *Review of International Studies*, 42 (1), 25-47.

Knopf, Jeffrey W. (2012). The Concept of Nuclear Learning. *The Nonproliferation Review*, 19 (1), 79–93.

Knorr Cetina, Karin (2001). Objectual Practice. In Theodore R. Schatzki, Karin Knorr Cetina and Eike von Savigny, eds. *The Practice Turn in Contemporary Theory*, London: Routledge.

Kratochwil, Friedrich (2009). Ten points to ponder about pragmatism: some critical reflections on knowledge generation in the social sciences. In Harry Bauer and Elisabetta Brighi, eds. *Pragmatism in International Relations*, New York: Routledge, 11-25.

Kratochwil, Friedrich (2011). Making Sense of International Practices. In Emanuel Adler and Vincent Pouliot, eds. *International Practices*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 36-60.

Kratochwil, Friedrich (2018). *Praxis. On Acting and Knowing*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Krishtel, Priti, and Rohit Malpani (2021). Suspend intellectual property rights for covid-19 vaccines. *BMJ* 28 May at https://www.bmj.com/content/373/bmj.n1344.short.

Krook, Mona L. and Jacqui True (2012). Rethinking the life cycles of international norms: The United Nations and the global promotion of gender equality. *European Journal of International Relations*, 18 (1), 103-27.

Kurki, Milja (2020). *International Relations in a Relational Universe*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Kuyper, J., 2015. Gridlock in global climate change negotiations: two democratic arguments against minilateralism. In Catriona McKinnon and Aaron Maltais, eds. *The ethics of climate governance*, New York: Rowman and Littlefield Press, 67–88.

Lachs, John (2005). Stoic Pragmatism. *The Journal of Speculative Philosophy*, 19 (2), 95-106.

Lake, David A. (2013). Theory is dead, long live theory: the end of the great debates and the rise of eclecticism in International Relations. *European Journal of International Relations* 19 (3), 567–87.

Lakhani, Nina (2021). Cop26 legitimacy questioned as groups excluded from crucial talks. *The Guardian* 8 November at https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2021/nov/08/cop26-legitimacy-questioned-as-groups-excluded-from-crucial-talks.

Lambert, Harry (2022). Tobias Ellwood: The UK should support a no-fly zone over Ukraine. *New Statesman* 25 February https://www.newstatesman.com/politics/uk-politics/2022/02/tobias-ellwood-the-uk-must-support-a-no-fly-zone-over-ukraine.

Lancet (2019). The politics of PHEIC. *The Lancet* June 18 at https://www.thelancet.com/pdfs/journals/lancet/PIIS0140-6736(19)31406-0.pdf.

Lantis, Jeffrey S. and Carmen Wunderlich (2018). Resiliency dynamics of norm clusters: Norm contestation and international cooperation. *Review of International Studies*, 44 (3). 570-93.

Larsson, Oscar Leonard (2022). The Swedish Covid-19 strategy and voluntary compliance: Failed securitization or constitutional security management? *European Journal of International Security*, 7 (2), 226-47.

Leander, Anna (2011). The Promises, Problems, and Potentials of a Bourdieu-Inspired Staging of International Relations. *International Political Sociology*, 5 (3), 294–313.

Lechner, Silviya and Mervyn Frost (2018). *Practice Theory and International Relations*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Lee, Kelley (2015). Revealing power in truth: Comment on "Knowledge, moral claims and the exercise of power in global health". *International Journal of Health Policy Management*, 4 (4), 257–9.

Lee, Kelley and Julianne Piper (2020). The WHO and the COVID-19 Pandemic: Less Reform, More Innovation. *Global Governance*, 26 (4), 524–33.

Levitt, Peggy and Merry, Sally (2009). Vernacularization on the ground: Local uses of global women's rights in Peru, India, China, and the US. *Global Networks*, 9 (4), 441–61.

Levy, Jack S. (1994). Learning and Foreign Policy: Sweeping a Conceptual Minefield. *International Organization* 48 (2), 279-312.

Lewis, Simon and Mark Maslin (2021). Five things you need to know about the Glasgow Climate Pact. *The Conversation* 13 November https://theconversation.com/five-things-you-need-to-know-about-the-glasgow-climate-pact-171799

Light, Andrew and Eric Katz, eds. (1996) *Environmental Pragmatism*, London: Routledge.

Light, Andrew (2017). Climate Diplomacy. In Stephen Mark Gardiner and Allen Thompson, eds. *The Oxford handbook of environmental ethics*, New York: Oxford University Press, 487-500.

Ling L.H.M. and Astrid H. M. Nordin (2019). On relations and relationality: a conversation with friends. *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, 32 (5), 654-68.

Linklater, Andrew (1998). *The Transformation of Political Community*. *Ethical Foundations of the Post-Westphalian Era*, Cambridge: Polity Press.

Linsenmaier, Thomas, Dennis R. Schmidt and Kilian Spandler (2021). On the meaning(s) of norms: Ambiguity and global governance in a post-hegemonic world. *Review of International Studies*, 47 (4), 508–27.

Lippmann, Walter (1925 [2021]). *The Phantom Public*, United States: Wilder Publications.

Livingston, James (2003). War and the Intellectuals: Bourne, Dewey, and the Fate of Pragmatism. *The Journal of the Gilded Age and Progressive Era*, 2 (4), 431-50.

Livingston, Alexander (2017). Between Means and Ends: Reconstructing Coercion in Dewey's Democratic Theory. *American Political Science Review*, 111 (3), 522–34.

Luck Edward C (2019). Could a United Nations Code of Conduct Help Curb Atrocities? A Response to Bolarinwa Adediran. *Ethics and International Affairs*, 33 (1), 79-87.

Lynch, Cecilia (2020). Friedrich Kratochwil: Prophet of Doubt? In Gunther Hellmann and Jens Steffek, eds. *Praxis as a Perspective on International Politics*, Bristol: Bristol University Press, 33-50.

MacGilvray, Eric A. (2000). Five Myths about Pragmatism, or Against a Second Pragmatic Acquiescence. *Political Theory*, 28 (4), 480-508.

Malachuk, Daniel (1999). Walt Whitman and the Culture of Pragmatism. *Walt Whitman Quarterly Review*, 17 (1/2), 60-8.

Marchetti, Sarin (2015). *Ethics and Philosophical Critique in William James*, Palgrave, Macmillan.

Marlier, Grant and Neta C. Crawford (2013). Incomplete and Imperfect Institutionalisation of Empathy and Altruism in the "Responsibility to Protect" Doctrine. *Global Responsibility to Protect*, 5 (4), 397-422.

McAfee, Noëlle (2004a). Public Knowledge. *Philosophy & Social Criticism*, 30 (2), 139–57.

McAfee, Noëlle (2004b). Three Models of Democratic Deliberation. *The Journal of Speculative Philosophy*, 18 (1), 44-59.

McCourt, David M. (2022). *The New Constructivism in International Relations Theory*, Bristol: Bristol University Press.

McDonald, Matt (2021). *Ecological Security: Climate Change and the Construction of Security*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

McGrath, Matt (2021). COP26: Fossil fuel industry has largest delegation at climate summit. *BBC News*, 8 November at https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/science-environment-59199484.

McLaren, Duncan and Olaf Corry (2021). Clash of Geofutures and the Remaking of Planetary Order: Faultlines underlying Conflicts over Geoengineering Governance. *Global Policy,* 12 (S1), 20–33.

Miller, David (2001). Distributing responsibilities. *Journal of Political Philosophy*, 9 (3), 453-71.

Miller, Marjorie C. (2013). Pragmatism and feminism. In Alan Malachowski, ed., *The Cambridge Companion to Pragmatism,* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 231-248.

Mearsheimer, John J. (2003). *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*, W. W. Norton and Company. Kindle Edition.

Mearsheimer, John J. (2014). Why the Ukraine Crisis Is the West's Fault: The Liberal Delusions That Provoked Putin. *Foreign Affairs*, 93 (5), 77-89.

Mearsheimer, John J. (2018). *The Great Delusion: Liberal Dreams and International Realities*, United States: Yale University Press. Kindle Edition.

Menand, Louis (2002). *The Metaphysical Club*, London: Flamingo.

Morgan, Patrick (2011). The Practice of Deterrence. In Emanuel Adler and Vincent Pouliot, eds. *International Practices*, Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press, 139-73.

Morgenthau, Hans J. (1946 [1974]). *Scientific man vs. power politics*, Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press.

Morgenthau, Hans J. (1948 [1967]). *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, New York: Knopf.

Morgenthau, Hans J. (1964). The Four Paradoxes of Nuclear Strategy. *The American Political Science Review*, 58 (1), 23–35.

Mumford, Lewis (1926). *The Golden Dawn. A Study in American Experience and Culture*, New York: W.W.Norton.

Miller, Marjorie C. (2011). Pragmatism and feminism. In Alan Malachowski, eds. *The Cambridge Companion to Pragmatism,* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 231-248.

Minteer, Ben (2012). *Refounding Environmental Ethics: Pragmatism, Principle and Practice,* Philadelphia: Temple University Press.

Minteer, Ben A., and James P. Collins (2005). Ecological ethics: Building a new tool kit for ecologists and biodiversity managers. *Conservation Biology*, 19 (6), 1803–12.

Misak, Cheryl (2004). Making Disagreement Matter: Pragmatism and Deliberative Democracy. *The Journal of Speculative Philosophy*, 18 (1), 9-22.

Mitzen, Jennifer (2006). Ontological Security in World Politics. State Identity and the Security Dilemma. *European Journal of International Security*, 12 (3), 341-70.

Mitzen, Jennifer (2013). *Power in Concert: The Nineteenth-Century Origins of Global Governance*, Chicago: Chicago University Press.

Mor, Ben D. and Zeev Moaz (1999). Learning and the Evolution of Enduring International Rivalries: A Strategic Approach. *Conflict Management and Peace Science*, 17 (1), 1-48.

Molloy, Seán (2014). Pragmatism, Realism and the ethics of crisis and transformation in international relations. *International Theory*, 6 (3), 454-89.

Moolenaar, Ronald L., Cynthia H. Cassell, and Nancy W. Knight (2020). Lessons Learned in Global Health Security Implementation. *Health Security* 18 (S1) at https://doi.org/10.1089/hs.2019.0157.

Morris Justin (2015). The Responsibility to Protect and the Great Powers: The Tensions of Dual Responsibility. *Global Responsibility to Protect*, 7 (3-4), 398-421.

Morris Justin and Wheeler, Nicholas J. (2016). The Responsibility not to Veto: A Responsibility too Far? In Alex J. Bellamy and Tim Dunne, eds. *The Oxford Handbook of the Responsibility to Protect*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 227-48.

Mullen, Lucia et al. (2020). An analysis of International Health Regulations Emergency Committees and Public Health Emergency of International Concern Designations. *BMJ Global Health* 5 at https://gh.bmj.com/content/bmjgh/5/6/e002502.full.pdf.

Murphy, Craig N. (2018). The Emergence of Global Governance. In Thomas G. Weiss and Rorden Wilkinson, eds. *International Organization and Global Governance*, Abingdon and New York: Routledge.

Murray, Robert W. (2013). Humanitarianism, responsibility or rationality? Evaluating intervention as state strategy. In Aidan Hehir and Robert W. Murray, eds. *Libya: The Responsibility to Protect and the Future of Humanitarian Intervention*, New York: Palgrave 15–33

Naim, Moisés (2009). Minilateralism: The Magic Number to Get Real International Action. *Foreign Policy*, 173, 135–6.

Nance, Mark T. and M. Patrick Cottrell (2014). A turn toward experimentalism? Rethinking security and governance in the twenty-first century. *Review of International Studies*, 40 (2), 277-301.

Narayan, John (2016). *John Dewey. The Global Public and its Problems*, Manchester: Manchester University Press.

Navari, Cornelia (2011). The concept of practice in the English School. *European Journal of International Relations*, 17 (4), 611–630.

Negrón-Gonzales, Melinda and Michael Contarino (2014). Local Norms Matter: Understanding National Responses to the Responsibility to Protect. *Global Governance: A Review of Multilateralism and International Organizations*, 20 (2), 255-276.

Neubert, Stefan (2008). Dewey's Pluralism Reconsidered. Pragmatist and Constructivist Perspectives on Diversity and Difference. In Jim Garrison, ed., *Reconstructing Democracy, Recontextualizing Dewey: Pragmatism and Interactive Constructivism in the Twenty-first Century*, Albany: SUNY Press. Kindle Edition.

Neumann, Iver B. (2002). Returning Practice to the Linguistic Turn: The Case of Diplomacy. *Millennium. Journal of International Studies*, 31 (3), 627-51.

Neumann Iver B. (2002b). The English School on Diplomacy. *Discussion Papers in Diplomacy* The Hague: Netherlands Institute of International Relations.

Neumann, Iver B. (2009). Returning Practice to the Linguistic Turn: The Case of Diplomacy. In Harry Bauer and Elisabetta Brighi, eds. *Pragmatism in International Relations*, London: Routledge, 82-99.

Neumann Iver B. and Pouliot, Vincent (2011). Untimely Russia: Hysteresis in Russian–Western relations over the past millennium. *Security Studies*, 20 (1), 105–37.

Nicholson, Carol (2013). Education and the pragmatic temperament. In Alan Malachowski, ed., *The Cambridge Companion to Pragmatism,* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 249-71.

Niebuhr, Reinhold ([1932] 2001). *Moral Man and Immoral Society. A Study of Ethics and Politics*, London: John Knox Press.

Nordin, Astrid H M and Graham M Smith (2018). Reintroducing friendship to international relations: relational ontologies from China to the West. *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific*, 18 (3), 369–96.

Nordin, Astrid H.M. & Graham M. Smith (2019). Relating self and other in Chinese and Western thought. *Cambridge Review of International Affairs,* 32 (5), 636-53.

Nordin Astrid H. M., et al. (2019). Towards global relational theorizing: a dialogue between Sinophone and Anglophone scholarship on relationalism. *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, 32 (5), 570-81.

Nussbaum Martha C. (2006). Education and Democratic Citizenship: Capabilities and Quality Education. *Journal of Human Development*, 7 (3), 385-95.

Obergassel, Wolfgang, et al. (2021). Turning Point Glasgow? An Assessment of the Climate Conference COP26. *Carbon and Climate Law Review*, 15 (4), 271–81.

Orr, Shannon K. (2016). Institutional Control and Climate Change Activism at COP 21 in Paris. *Global Environmental Politics*, 16 (3), 23-30.

Owen, David (2002). Re-orienting International Relations: On Pragmatism, Pluralism and Practical Reasoning. *Millennium. Journal of International Studies*, 31 (3), 653-73.

Pappas, Gregory Fernando (2012). What would John Dewey say about Deliberative Democracy and Democratic Experimentalism? *Contemporary Pragmatism*, 9 (2), 57–74.

Paterson, Matthew (2014). Climate re-public: practicing public space in conditions of extreme complexity. In Jacqueline Best and Alexandra Gheciu, eds. *The Return of the Public in Global Governance*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 149-72.

Paul, Elisabeth, Garrett W. Brown and Valery Ridde (2020). COVID-19: time for paradigm shift in the nexus between local, national and global health. *BMJ Global Health*, (5) 1-4.

Peet, Jessica (2020). Eclecticism or exclusivity? The (critical) pragmatist ethos of (intersectional) analytic eclecticism. *International Journal*, 75 (3), 420–32.

Peirce Charles S. (1877). The Fixation of Belief. *Popular Science Monthly*, November, 1-15 at http://peirce.org/writings/p107.html.

Peirce, Charles S. (1878). How to Make Our Ideas Clear. *Popular Science Monthly*, January, 286-302 at https://courses.media.mit.edu/2004spring/mas966/Peirce%201878%20Make%20Ideas%20Clear.pdf.

Petrova, Margarita H. (2016). Rhetorical Entrapment and Normative Enticement: How the United Kingdom Turned From Spoiler Into Champion of the Cluster Munition Ban. *International Studies Quarterly,* 60 (3), 387–99.

Plant, Tom and Matthew Harries (2021). Going Ballistic: The UK's Proposed Nuclear Build-up. Royal United Services Institute, 16 March at https://rusi.org/commentary/going-ballistic-uk-proposed-nuclear-build.

Podesta, John (2019). The climate crisis, migration, and refugees. 25 July at: https://www.brookings.edu/research/the-climate-crisis-migration-and-refugees/.

Porter, Tony (2014). Constitutive public practice in a world of changing boundaries. In Jacqueline Best and Alexandra Gheciu, eds. *The Return of the Public in Global Governance*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 223-242.

Porter, Patrick (2020). *The False Promise of Liberal Order. Nostalgia, Delusion and the Rise of Trump*, Cambridge: Polity.

Pouliot, Vincent (2008). The Logic of Practicality: A Theory of Practice of Security Communities. *International Organization,* 62 (2), 257-88.

Pouliot, Vincent (2010). *International Security in Practice: The Politics of NATO-Russia Diplomacy*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Pouliot, Vincent (2013). Methodology. In Rebecca Adler-Nissen, ed., *Bourdieu in International Relations*. London and New York: Routledge, 45–58.

Pouliot, Vincent (2016a). *International Pecking Orders. The Politics and Practice of Multilateral Diplomacy.* New York: Cambridge University Press, Kindle edition.

Pouliot, Vincent (2016b). Hierarchy in practice: Multilateral diplomacy and governance of international security. *European Journal of International Security*, 1 (1), 5-26.

Pouliot, Vincent (2021). Global governance in the age of epistemic authority. *International Theory*, 13 (1), 144-56.

Pouliot, Vincent. (2022). Evolution in International Practices. In Alena Drieschova, Christian Bueger and Ted Hopf, eds. *Conceptualizing International Practices*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Kindle Edition, 170-90.

Pouliot, Vincent and Cornut, Jérémie (2015). Practice theory and the study of diplomacy: a research agenda. *Cooperation and Conflict*, 50 (3), 297–315.

Pouliot, Vincent and Thérien, Jean-Philippe (2014). The politics of inclusion. Changing patterns in the governance of international security. *Review of International Studies*, 41 (2), 211-37.

Pouliot, Vincent and Thérien, Jean-Philippe (2018). Global Governance in Practice. *Global Policy*, 9 (2), 163–72.

Posner, Richard (2003). *Law, Pragmatism and Democracy*, Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press.

Prantl, Jochen and Nakano, Ryoko (2011). Global Norm Diffusion in East Asia: How China and Japan Implement the Responsibility to Protect. *International Relations*, 25 (2), 204-23.

Pratt, Simon Frankel (2020). From norms to normative configurations: A pragmatist and relational approach to theorizing normativity in IR. *International Theory*, 12 (1), 59-82.

Pratt, Simon Frankel (2021). To be a Pragmatist in Explaining in International Politics. In Pratt, Simon Frankel Pratt et al. Forum. Pragmatism in IR: The prospects of substantive theorizing. *International Studies Review,* 23 (4), 1933-8.

Price, Richard (1997). *The Chemical Weapons Taboo,* London and Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Price, Richard (1998). Reversing the Gun Sights: Transnational Civil Society Targets Land Mines. *International Organization*, 52 (3), 613-644.

Price, Richard ed., (2008a). *Moral Limit and Possibility in World Politics* New York: Cambridge University Press.

Price, Richard (2008b). Moral Limit and Possibility in World Politics. In Richard Price, eds. *Moral Limit and Possibility in World Politics*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1-52.

Price, Richard (2008c). Progress with a Price. In Richard Price, eds. *Moral Limit and Possibility in World Politics*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Price, Richard (2008d). The Ethics of Constructivism. In Christian Reus-Smit and Duncan Snidal, eds. *The Oxford Handbook of International Relations*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Price, Richard (2008e). Moral Limit and Possibility in World Politics. *International Organization,* 62 (2), 191-220.

Price, Richard M. (2012). On pragmatic and principled limits and possibilities of dialogue. *International Theory*, 4 (3) 477-92.

Propp, Daniel (2021). A Turning Point? COP26 and the Global Fight Against Climate Change. *Columbia. SIPA Journal of International Affairs*, December 31 at https://jia.sipa.columbia.edu/online-articles/turning-point-cop26-and-global-fight-against-climate-change.

Putnam, Hilary (2004). *Ethics without Ontology*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2004.

Qin, Yaqing (2016). A Relational Theory of World Politics. *International Studies Review*, 18 (1), 33–47.

Qin, Yaqing (2018). *A Relational Theory of World Politics*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Kindle Edition.

Qin, Yaqing and Astrid H. M. Nordin (2019). Relationality and rationality in Confucian and Western traditions of thought. *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, 32 (5), 601-14.

Ralph, Jason (2013). *America's War on Terror. The State of the American Exception from Bush to Obama*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Ralph, Jason (2015a). Symposium: international criminal justice and the responsibility to protect. *Criminal Law Forum*, 26 (1), 1-12.

Ralph, Jason and Gallagher, Adrian (2015b). Legitimacy faultlines in international society: The responsibility to protect and prosecute after Libya. *Review of International Studies*, 41 (3), 553-573.

Ralph, Jason (2016). The International Criminal Court. In Alex Bellamy and Tim Dunne, eds. *The Oxford Handbook of the Responsibility to Protect*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 259-94.

Ralph, Jason (2018). What Should be Done? Pragmatic Constructivist Ethics and the Responsibility to Protect. *International Organization*, 72 (1), 173-203.

Ralph, Jason (2022). 'Ukraine and the Responsibility to Protect: the consequences for the vulnerable (and the not yet vulnerable) should be front and centre of our reasoning', *Fresh Perspectives* European Centre for the Responsibility to Protect 8 March at https://ecr2p.leeds.ac.uk/ukraine-and-the-responsibility-to-protect-the-consequences-for-the-vulnerable-and-the-not-yet-vulnerable-should-be-front-and-centre-of-our-reasoning/.

Ralph, Jason (2023). Norms, Normativity and Pragmatist Justification. Advancing the 'third move' in Norm Studies. In Phil Orchard and Antje Wiener, eds. *Contesting the World: Norm Research in Theory and Practice,* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, forthcoming.

Ralph, Jason and Souter, James (2015). A special responsibility to protect: The UK, Australia and the Rise of Islamic State. *International Affairs*, 91 (4), 709-23.

Ralph, Jason and Gifkins, Jess (2017). The Purpose of Security Council Practice. Contesting competence claims in the normative context created by the Responsibility to Protect. *European Journal of International Relations*, 23 (3), 630-53.

Ralph, Jason, Jack Holland and Kalina Zhekova (2017). Before the vote: UK foreign policy discourse on Syria 2011–13. *Review of International Studies*, 43 (5), 875–97.

Ralston, Shane J. ed., (2013). *Philosophical Pragmatism and International Relations. Essays for a Bold New World*, New York: Lexington Books.

Rath, Richard Cullen (1997). Echo and Narcissus: The Afrocentric Pragmatism of W. E. B. Du Bois. *The Journal of American History*, 84 (2), 461-95.

Ray, Larry (2004). Pragmatism and Critical Theory. *European Journal of Social Theory*, 7 (3), 307–21.

Reich, Kersten (2008). Democracy and Education after Dewey – Pragmatist Implications for Constructivist Pedagogy. In Jim Garrison, ed., *Reconstructing Democracy, Recontextualizing Dewey: Pragmatism and Interactive Constructivism in the Twenty-first Century*, Albany: SUNY Press. Kindle Edition.

Ren, Xiao (2020). Grown from within: Building a Chinese School of International Relations. *The Pacific Review,* 33 (3-4), 386-412.

Reus-Smit, Christian (2005). Liberal hierarchy and the license to use force. *Review of International Studies*, 31 (S1), 71–92.

Reus-Smit, Christian (2008). Constructivism and the structure of ethical reasoning. In Richard Price, ed., *Moral Limit and Possibility in World Politics*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 53-82.

Reus-Smit, Christian (2013). Beyond Metatheory? *European Journal of International Relations*, 19 (3), 589-608.

Rice, Daniel F. (1993). *Reinhold Niebuhr and John Dewey. An American Odyssey*, Albany: SUNY Press.

Risse-Kappen, Thomas, Stephen C. Ropp and Kathryn Sikkink (1999). *The Power of Human Rights. International Norms and Domestic Change*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

Risse-Kappen, Thomas (1994). Ideas do not float freely. Transnational coalition, domestic structures and the end of the Cold War. *International Organization*, 48 (2), 185-214.

Risse, Thomas (2000). Let's Argue!" Communicative Action in World Politics. *International Organization*, 54 (1) 1-39.

Roff, Heather (2013). *Global Justice, Kant and the Responsibility to Protect. A Provisional Study*, Abingdon: Routledge.

Rorty, Richard (1989). *Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity*, New York: Cambridge University Press.

Rorty, Richard (1993). Human rights, Rationality and Sentimentality. In Stephen Shute and Susan L. Hurley, eds. *On Human Rights* New York: Basic Books, 111-34.

Rorty. Richard (1999). *Philosophy and Social Hope*. Penguin Books.

Rosen, Michael (2022). The COVID-19 Patent Waiver Compromise Finally Breaks Through (And Nobody's Happy). American Enterprise Institute July 8 at https://www.aei.org/technology-and-innovation/the-covid-19-patent-waiver-compromise-finally-breaks-through-and-nobodys-happy/.

Royer, Christof (2019). Fig Leaves, Paradoxes and Hollow Hopes – The Politics (and Antipolitics) of Protecting Human Rights. *Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding*, 13 (4), 531-37.

Rowling, Megan (2021). Climate 'loss and damage' earns recognition but little action in COP26 deal. *Reuters* 13 November at https://www.reuters.com/business/cop/climate-loss-damage-earns-recognition-little-action-cop26-deal-2021-11-13/.

Rubaii, Nadia; Wright, Stephanie; and Prentice, Sarah (2021). Expanding the ranks of atrocity prevention: bringing a prevention lens to professional graduate education." AIPG Sherri P. Rosenberg Policy Papers in Prevention and I-GMAP Mechanisms of Atrocity Prevention Report 2, https://orb.binghamton.edu/mechanisms-of-atrocity-prevention/2.

Rummel R.J. (2017). *Death by Government*. Abingdon: Routledge.

Rushton, Simon (2015). The politics of researching global health politics: Comment on "Knowledge, moral claims and the exercise of power in global health". *International Journal of Health Policy Management* (4), 311–314.

Ruzicka, Jan (2019). The Next Great Hope: The Humanitarian Approach to Nuclear Weapons. *Journal of International Political Theory*, 15 (3), 386-400.

Sadat, Leila Nadya (2021). Pandemic Nationalism, Covid-19 and international law. In Whitney Harris Institute, *Global Governance: The World Health Organization and the Need for Post-COVID-19 Reform*, 13-22 at https://www.ila-americanbranch.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/05/White-Paper-COVID19-Global-Governance-FINAL-April-2021.pdf.

Sagan, Scott D. and Kenneth N. Waltz (2010). Is Nuclear Zero the Best Option? *The National Interest* 109, 88-96.

Schmidt, Sebastian (2014). Foreign Military Presence and the Changing Practice of Sovereignty: A Pragmatist Explanation of Norm Change. *American Political Science Review*, 108 (4), 817–29.

Schimmelfennig, Frank (2001). The Community Trap: Liberal Norms, Rhetorical Action, and the Eastern Enlargement of the European Union. *International Organization*, 55 (1), 47-80.

Schindler, Sebastian and Wille, Tobias (2015). Change in and through Practice: Pierre Bourdieu, Vincent Pouliot, and the End of the Cold War. *International Theory*, 7 (2), 330-59.

Schindler, Sebastian and Wille, Tobias (2019). How can we criticize international practices? *International Studies Quarterly*, 63 (4), 1014-24.

Schou Tjalve, Vibeke (2013). Realism, pragmatism and the public sphere: Restraining foreign policy in an age of mass politics. *International Politics*, 50 (6), 784–97.

Schouten, Peer (2013). Security in Action. How John Dewey can help us follow the production of security assemblages. In Michelle Acuto and Simon Curtis, eds. *Reassembling International Theory. Assemblage Thinking and International Relations*, Basingstoke: Palgrave Pivot, 83-90.

Security Council Report (2018). The Penholding System. Research Report, 21 December at https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Penholders.pdf.

Seigfried, Charlene Haddock (1996). *Pragmatism and Feminism. Reweaving the Social Fabric*, Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press.

Seigfried, Charlene Haddock (1999). Socializing Democracy: Jane Addams and John Dewey. *Philosophy of the Social Sciences*, 29 (2), 207-30.

Sending, Ole Jacob and Iver Neumann (2011). Banking on Power: How Some Practices in an International Organization Anchor Others. In Emanuel Adler and Vincent Pouliot, eds. *International Practices*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 231-254.

Shalin, Dmitri (1992). Critical Theory and the Pragmatist Challenge. *American Journal of Sociology*, 98 (2), 237-79.

Shani, Giorgio (2008). Toward a Post-Western IR: The *Umma, Khalsa Panth,* and Critical International Relations Theory. *International Studies Review*, 10 (4), 722-34.

Shani, Giorgio and Navnita Chadha Behera (2021). Provincialising International Relations through a reading of dharma', *Review of International Studies*, online first 1-20.

Shaw, W. David (1986). The Poetics of Pragmatism: Robert Frost and William James. *The New England Quarterly* 59 (2), 159-88.

Sharma, Serena. K (2016). The 2007-2008 Post Election Crisis in Kenya: A Case of Escalation Prevention. In Serena K. Sharma and Jennifer Welsh, eds. *The Responsibility to Prevent. Overcoming the Challenges of Atrocity Prevention*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 280-303

Shiffman, Jeremy (2014). Knowledge, moral claims and the exercise of power in global health. *International Journal of Health Policy and Management*, 3 (6), 297–299.

Shih, Chih-yu. (2021). Role and relation in Confucian IR: Relating to strangers in the states of nature. *Review of International Studies*, online first 1-20.

Sidhu, Waheguru Pal Singh (2016). Weapons of Mass Destruction: Managing Proliferation. In Sebastian von Einsiedel, David M. Malone and Bruno Stagno Ugarte, eds. *The UN Security Council in the 21st Century*, Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 323-345.

Sikkink, Kathryn (2008). The Role of Consequences, Comparison, and Counterfactuals in Constructivist Ethical Thought. In Richard Price ed., *Moral Limit and Possibility in World Politics* New York: Cambridge University Press, 83-111.

Sil, Rudra and Peter Katzenstein (2010). Analytic eclecticism in the study of world politics: Reconfiguring problems and mechanisms across research traditions. *Perspectives on Politics*, 8 (2), 411–31.

Sil, Rudra (2020). Analytic eclecticism—continuing the conversation. *International Journal*, 75 (3), 433-43.

Singh, Jaswant (1998). Against nuclear apartheid. *Foreign Affairs,* 77 (5), 41–52.

Sirur, Simrin (2021). What is the Glasgow Climate Pact and why India did not commit to coal phase out. *The Print*, 18 November at https://theprint.in/theprint-essential/what-is-the-glasgow-climate-pact-why-india-did-not-commit-to-coal-phase-out/767329/.

Snyder, Jack (2020). Backlash against Naming and Shaming: The Politics of Status and Emotion. *British Journal of Politics and International Studies*, 22 (4), 644–53.

Snyder, Jack (2022). *Human Rights for Pragmatists*, Princeton: Princeton University Press. Kindle Edition.

Snyder, William M. and Etienne Wenger (2004). Our world as a learning system: a communities-of-practice approach. In Marcia L. Conner and James G. Clawson, eds. *Creating a Learning Culture. Strategy, Technology and Practice*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 35-58.

Solomon, Ty and Steele, Brent J. (2017). Micro-moves in International Relations theory. *European Journal of International Relations*, 23 (2), 267–91.

Sondarjee, Maïka (2021). Collective Learning at the Boundaries of Communities of Practice: Inclusive Policymaking at the World Bank. *Global Society*, 35 (3), 307-26.

Sorrell, Kory (2014). Our Better Angels: Empathy, Sympathetic Reason, and Pragmatic Moral Progress. *Pluralist*, 9 (1), 66–86.

Spandler, Kilian and Fredrik Söderbaum (2021). Populist (De)legitimation of International Organizations: From Procedural and Functional toward Representational Frames. Paper for presentation at the DVPW Convention, 14–16 September.

Spilman, Alice and Suzanne Claeys (2022). How does the Worsening Security Environment Impact Nuclear Disarmament? *Centre for Strategic and International Studies*, 13 September at https://www.csis.org/analysis/how-does-worsening-security-environment-impact-nuclear-disarmament.

Srivastava, Swati (2013). Assembling International Organizations. *Journal of International Organization Studies*, 3 (1), 72–83.

Stappert, Nora (2020a). Practice theory and change in international law: theorizing the development of legal meaning through the interpretive practices of international criminal courts. *International Theory* 12 (1), 33-58.

Stappert, Nora (2020b). The art of aiming at a moving target: A critique of Lechner and Frost's Practice Theory and International Relations. *Global Constitutionalism,* 9 (1), 183-98.

Staunton, Denis (2021). What has happened in Glasgow is nothing less than a reorientation of global capitalism towards a carbon neutral future. *Irish Times*, 13 November https://www.irishtimes.com/news/environment/cop26-everyone-looks-seven-years-older-than-they-did-at-the-beginning-1.4726797.

Staunton, Eglantine and Jason Ralph (2020). The Responsibility to Protect norm cluster and the challenge of atrocity prevention: an analysis of the European Union's strategy in Myanmar. *European Journal of International Relations*, 26 (3), 660–86.

Stefan, Cristina G. (2017). On Non-Western norm shapers: Brazil and the Responsibility while Protecting. *European Journal of International Security*, 2 (1), 88-110.

Steffek, Jens (2022). Praxis, Humanism and the Quest for Wholeness. In Gunter Hellmann and Jens Steffek, eds. *Praxis as a Perspective on International Politics*, Bristol: Bristol University Press, 255-72.

Stein, Janice Gross (1994). Political learning by doing: Gorbachev as uncommitted thinker and motivated learner. *International Organization*, 48 (2), 155-83.

Steinhilper, Elias (2015). From "the Rest" to "the West"? Rights of Indigenous Peoples and the Western Bias in Norm Diffusion Research. *International Studies Review*, 17 (4), 536–55.

Stevenson, Hayley (2016). The Wisdom of the Many in Global Governance: An Epistemic-Democratic Defence of Diversity and Inclusion. *International Studies Quarterly*, 60 (1), 400-12.

Stevenson, Hayley and John Dryzek (2014). *Democratizing Global Climate Governance*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Kindle Edition.

Sylvester, Christine (1994). Empathetic cooperation: A feminist method for IR. *Millennium. Journal of International Studies*, 23 (2), 315-32.

Talisse, Robert B. (2004). *Democracy After Liberalism: Pragmatism and Deliberative Politics*, New York: Routledge.

Talisse, Robert B. (2007). *A Pragmatist Philosophy of Democracy*, New York: Routledge.

Tan, Sor-hoo (2021). Intrinsic Values of Confucian Democracy and Dewey's Pragmatist Method. In Roger T. Ames, Yajun Chen and Peter D. Hershock, eds. *Confucianism and Deweyan Pragmatism. Resources for a New Geopolitics of Interdependence*, Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 249-61.

Tannenwald, Nina (1999). The Nuclear Taboo: The United States and the Normative Basis of Nuclear Non-Use. *International Organization*, 53 (3), 433-68.

Tannenwald, Nina (2005). Stigmatizing the Bomb: Origins of the Nuclear Taboo. *International Security*, 29 (4), 5-49.

Tannenwald, Nina (2009). *The Nuclear Taboo. The United States and the Non-Use of Nuclear Weapons since 1945*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Tesón, Fernando R. (2006). The Vexing Problems of Authority in Humanitarian Intervention: A Proposal. *Wisconsin Journal of International Law*, 24 (3), 761-72.

Tetlock, Philip (1991). Learning in U.S. and Soviet Foreign Policy: In Search of an Elusive Concept. In George W. Breslauer and Philip E. Tetlock, eds. *Learning in U.S. and Soviet Foreign Policy*, Boulder: Westview Press, 20-61.

Tetlock, Philip. (2005). *Expert Political Judgment: How Good Is It? How Can We Know?* Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Thakur, Ramesh (2017). The Nuclear Ban Treaty: Recasting a Normative Framework for Disarmament. *The Washington Quarterly*, 40 (4), 71-95.

Thakur, Ramesh (2018). Nuclear Turbulence in the Age of Trump. *Diplomacy & Statecraft*, 29 (1), 105-28.

Thakur, Vineet and Smith, Karen (2021). Introduction to the Special Issue: The multiple births of International Relations. *Review of International Studies*, 47 (5), 571-79.

Tickner, J. Ann and True, Jacqui (2018). A Century of International Relations Feminism: From World War I Women's Peace Pragmatism to the Women, Peace and Security Agenda. *International Studies Quarterly*, 62 (2), 221-33.

Tracy, Abigail (2020). How Trump Gutted Obama's Pandemic-Preparedness Systems. *Vanity Fair*, 1 May at https://www.vanityfair.com/news/2020/05/trump-obama-coronavirus-pandemic-response.

Trownsell, Tamara et al. (2021). Forum: Differing about Difference: Relational IR from around the World. *International Studies Perspectives*, 22 (1), 25–64.

Tooze, Adam (2021). The Cop26 message? We are trusting big business, not states, to fix the climate crisis. *The Guardian*, 16 November at https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2021/nov/16/cop-26-big-business-climate-crisis-neoliberal.

UN (United Nations) (1999a). Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to General Assembly Resolution 53/35: The Fall of Srebrenica. 15 November at https://undocs.org/A/54/549.

UN (United Nations) (1999b). Report of the Independent Inquiry into the Actions of the United Nations during the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda. 15 December at https://reliefweb.int/report/rwanda/report-independent-inquiry-actions-united-nations-during-1994-genocide-rwanda.

UN (United Nations (2000). Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (Brahimi Report). 21 August at https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/a_55_305_e_brahimi_report.pdf.

UN (United Nations) (2009). Implementing the responsibility to protect Report of the Secretary-General A/63/677. 12 January at http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/SGRtoPEng%20(4).pdf.

UN (United Nations) (2013). State responsibility and prevention Report of the Secretary-General A/67/929–S/2013/399 A/67/929–S/2013/399. 9 July at http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/SG%20report%202013(1).pdf.

UN (United Nations) (2014). *Framework of Analysis for Atrocity Crimes: A Tool for Prevention*. https://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/documents/atrocity-crimes/Doc.49_Framework%20of%20Analysis%20for%20Atrocity%20Crimes_EN.pdf.

UNEP (United Nations Environment Report) (2021). *Emissions Gap Report*. 26 October at https://www.unep.org/resources/emissions-gap-report-2021.

US DoD (Department of Defense) (2018). *Nuclear Posture Review* at https://media.defense.gov/2018/Feb/02/2001872886/-1/-1/1/2018-NUCLEAR-POSTURE-REVIEW-FINAL-REPORT.PDF.

US Mission Geneva (2020). US Explanation of Position. 19 May at https://geneva.usmission.gov/2020/05/19/explanation-of-position-covid-19-response-resolution/

Vilmer Jean-Baptiste Jeangène (2018). The Responsibility Not to Veto: A Genealogy. *Global Governance*, 24 (3), 331349.

Wagner, Caroline E. et al. (2021). Vaccine nationalism and the dynamics and control of SARS-CoV-2' *Science,* 17 August at https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/34404735/.

Walt, Stephen (2016). Obama Was Not a Realist President. *Foreign Policy* 7 April.

Walters, W., and D'aoust, A. (2015). Bringing Publics into Critical Security Studies: Notes for a Research Strategy. *Millennium. Journal of International Studies*, 44 (1), 45–68.

Waltz, Kenneth N. (1981). *The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More May Be Better*, Adelphi Papers 171.

Waltz, Kenneth N. (1990). Nuclear Myths and Political Realities. *The American Political Science Review*, 84 (3), 731-45.

Waltz, K. (2012). Why Iran Should Get the Bomb: Nuclear Balancing would mean Stability. *Foreign Affairs*, 91 (4), 2-5.

Wang, Jessica Ching-Sze (2007). *Dewey in China. To teach and to learn*, Albany. SUNY Press.

Watts, Jonathan and Kommenda, Niko (2020). Coronavirus pandemic leading to huge drop in air pollution. *The Guardian*, 23 March at https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2020/mar/23/coronavirus-pandemic-leading-to-huge-drop-in-air-pollution.

Weber, Martin (2014). Between "isses" and "oughts": IR constructivism, Critical Theory, and the challenge of political philosophy. *European Journal of International Relations,* 20 (2), 516–43.

Weiss, Thomas G. (2016). The Turbulent 1990s: R2P Precedents and Prospects. In Alex Bellamy and Tim Dunne, eds. *The Oxford Handbook of the Responsibility to Protect*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 56-74.

Wendt, Alexander (1992). Anarchy is what states make of it: the social construction of power politics. *International Organization*, 46 (2), 391–425.

Wendt, Alexander (1999). *Social Theory of International Politics*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Wenger, Etienne (2005). *Communities of Practice. Learning, Meaning, and Identity*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Welsh, Jennifer M. (2013). Norm Contestation and the Responsibility to Protect. *Global Responsibility to Protect*, 5 (4), 365-96.

Welsh, Jennifer M. (2019). Norm Robustness and the Responsibility to Protect. *Journal of Global Security Studies*, 4 (1), 53–72.

Wenham, Clare (2021). What went wrong in the global governance of covid-19? *British Medical Journal*, 372 at https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/33536160/.

West, Cornel (1989). *The American Evasion of Philosophy: A Genealogy of Pragmatism*, Madison: University of Wisconsin Press.

WHA (World Health Assembly) (2020). COVID-19 response' Seventy-third World Health Assembly. 18 May at https://apps.who.int/gb/ebwha/pdf_files/WHA73/A73_CONF1Rev1-en.pdf.

WHA (World Health Assembly) (2021). Director-General's closing remarks at the World Health Assembly. 31 May at https://www.who.int/director-general/speeches/detail/director-general-s-closing-remarks-at-the-world-health-assembly---31-may-2021.

Wheeler, Nicholas J. (2000). *Saving Strangers. Humanitarian Intervention in International Society*, Oxford University Press.

Wheeler, Nicholas J. (2009). Beyond Waltz's Nuclear World: More Trust May be Better. *International Relations*, 23 (3), 428-45.

Wheeler, Nicholas J. (2018). *Trusting Enemies. Interpersonal Relationships in International Conflict*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Widmaier, Wesley (2004). Theory as a Factor and the Theorist as an Actor: The "Pragmatist Constructivist" Lessons of John Dewey and John Kenneth Galbraith. *International Studies Review*, 6 (3), 427–45.

Whipps, Judy and Lake, Danielle (2017). Pragmatist Feminism. In Edward N. Zalta ed., *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* at https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2017/entries/femapproach-pragmatism/.

Wiener, Antje (2004). Contested Compliance: Interventions on the Normative Structure of World Politics. *European Journal of International Relations*, 10 (2), 189-234.

Wiener, Antje (2009). Enacting meaning-in-use: qualitative research on norms and international relations. *Review of International Studies,* 35 (1), 175-93.

Wiener, Antje (2014). *A Theory of Contestation*, Berlin Heidelberg: Springer.

Wiener, Antje (2018). *Contestation and Constitution of Norms in Global International Relations*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

Wiener, Antje (2022). Practicing Academic Intervention. An Agonistic Reading of *Praxis*. In Gunther Hellmann and Jens Steffek, eds. *Praxis as a Perspective on International Politics*, Bristol: Bristol University Press 215-33.

Wiener, Antje and Puetter, Uwe (2009). Quality of Norms is What Actors Make of It Critical - Constructivist Research on Norms. *Journal of International Law and International Relations*, 5 (1), 1-16.

Winston, Carla (2018). Norm structure, diffusion, and evolution: A conceptual approach. *European Journal of International Relations*, 24 (3), 638–661.

William, Michael C. (2005). *The Realist Tradition and the Limits of International Relations*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Williams, Michael C. (2007). *Culture and security. Symbolic Power and the Politics of International Security*, London and New York: Routledge.

Wolff, Jonathan (2017). Everything must be measured: how mimicking business taints universities. *The Guardian* 8 August at https://www.theguardian.com/education/2017/aug/08/business-taints-universities-research-teaching.

Wolff, Jonas and Zimmerman, Lisbeth (2016). Between Banyans and battle scenes: Liberal norms, contestation, and the limits of critique. *Review of International Studies*, 42 (3), 513-34.

Wyn Jones, Richard (2005). On Emancipation: Necessity, Capacity, and Concrete Utopias. In Ken Booth, ed., *Critical Security Studies and World Politics*, Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 215-35.

Yang Guorong (2021). Confucianism and Pragmatism. The Intrinsic Philosophical Themes and Their Diverse Developments. In Roger T. Ames, Yajun Chen and Peter D. Hershock, eds. *Confucianism and Deweyan Pragmatism. Resources for a New Geopolitics of Interdependence*, Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 103-27.

Youde, Jeremy (2017). Global Health Governance in International Society. *Global Governance*, 23 (4), 583-600.

Zimmermann Lisbeth (2017). "Inter-National" Habermas: Contestation and Understanding under Conditions of Diversity. *Polity*, 49 (1), 149-55.

Zürn, Michael, (2018). *A Theory of Global Governance. Authority, Legitimacy and Contestation,* Oxford: Oxford University Press.