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Stevens, S. orcid.org/0000-0002-5967-4136 (2013) *Why South Africa? The Politics of Anti-Apartheid Activism in Britain in the Long 1970s*. In: Eckel, J. and Moyn, S., (eds.) *The Breakthrough: Human Rights in the 1970s*. Pennsylvania Studies in Human Rights . University of Pennsylvania Press , pp. 204-225. ISBN 9780812208719

<https://doi.org/10.9783/9780812208719.204>

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Why South Africa? The Politics of Anti-Apartheid Activism in Britain in the Long 1970s

The global anti-apartheid movement, one scholar argues, “was the first successful transnational social movement in the era of globalization... What is unique about the anti-apartheid movement is the extent of support it received from individuals, governments, and organizations on all continents. Few social movements garner anywhere near the international support mobilized against the racist apartheid regime in South Africa.”¹ Such claims reflect the considerable interest scholars have recently begun to take in anti-apartheid activism. Despite this interest, however, and scholars’ emphasis on “the extent of support” that the anti-apartheid movement received, historians have so far shown only limited interest either in examining and explaining how the extent of that support varied and changed over time or in addressing the question of *why* particular individuals and organizations came to direct their energies against apartheid in South Africa.

This chapter seeks to address the question of why South Africa became a focus of activism in the case of Britain, the location of some (though by no means all) of the most high profile anti-apartheid campaigns outside South Africa. In doing so, it also seeks to throw light on three further themes: the chronology of anti-apartheid activism in Britain, the relationship between transnational and national explanations for that activism, and the role of concern for human rights in anti-apartheid activism in the 1970s.

Scholarship on anti-apartheid activism in Britain has taken off since the 2002 opening of the papers of the British Anti-Apartheid Movement (that is, the organization that was formed in 1959 as the “Boycott Movement” and renamed itself “The Anti-Apartheid Movement” [AAM] the following year).² In the rapidly expanding literature on anti-apartheid activism in Britain,

however, there has been remarkably little attention to the issue of the motivations and purposes of anti-apartheid activists, or the circumstances that led them to focus their attentions on South Africa rather than on other international or domestic issues. Such lack of attention appears to reflect a widespread assumption that those motivations and circumstances are self-evident. Other historians have recently made this point regarding the historiography of other activist campaigns. Jan Eckel notes in his study of the international campaign against the Pinochet regime in Chile in the 1970s, for example, that, “In much of the historiography, the fact that the Pinochet regime was targeted for international action has not provoked much explanation. Historians have tended to describe the worldwide public concern as a kind of natural reaction to the atrocities committed, which by their horrendous nature forced politicians and private individuals into immediate action.” Rejecting this as inadequate, Eckel instead directs his research towards the key question: “Why Chile?”³

This chapter seeks to contribute to answering the equally important question – “Why South Africa?” – through a study of two prominent anti-apartheid campaigns in Britain that bracketed the “long 1970s.”⁴ Whereas most of the existing scholarship tends to focus on the national organization of the AAM, and – to some extent – to treat the AAM as a single entity with a “hegemonic ideology,”⁵ this chapter shifts focus to two of the groups that made up the broader anti-apartheid coalition in Britain and that played key roles in organizing two of the most high profile anti-apartheid campaigns in this period: Stop the Seventy Tour’s campaign against South African sports tours to Britain in 1969-70, and the City of London Anti-Apartheid Group’s protests outside the South African embassy in Trafalgar Square, including its non-stop picket for eighty-six days in 1982. In both cases, I focus on the motivations and purposes of the organizers

of the campaigns, rather than the rank-and-file activists who participated in them. My objective is to explain why it was that the campaigns were started at all.⁶

Explaining why particular groups came to mobilize around the issue of apartheid in this period is particularly important because, in general, anti-apartheid activism attracted relatively limited support in Britain in the 1970s, a period that Gurney characterizes as the British AAM's "difficult decade."⁷ There had been considerable British public interest in and condemnation of apartheid earlier, in the late 1950s and early 1960s, a period when apartheid was seen in Britain as a "temporary aberration" being promoted by anti-British and Nazi-associated Afrikaner nationalists, which ran counter to British ideals of race relations and which threatened both the stability of British rule elsewhere in colonial Africa and the unity of the British Commonwealth.⁸ This interest and condemnation peaked in 1959-60, with the result that the founders of the "Boycott Movement" in 1959 were able to mobilize considerable publicity and support for their consumer boycott of South African goods, even before the spate of worldwide attention and condemnation that followed the "Sharpeville massacre" of sixty-nine protesters by South African police on March, 21 1960. From the early 1960s, British interest and activism on apartheid waned, however, for a number of reasons: internal resistance was crushed following the banning of the African National Congress (ANC) and the Pan Africanist Congress in 1960 and the imprisonment of Nelson Mandela and other key ANC leaders following the Rivonia trial in 1963-64; decolonization and disillusionment with the Commonwealth reduced British interests in Africa (and the perceived threat that apartheid could pose to them); apartheid came to be seen as broadly supported by the white population of South Africa, including the English-speaking "British" population; and South Africa's seeming stability and prosperity appeared to contrast with the poverty and political turmoil of many postcolonial African states. The Anti-Apartheid

Movement, as the Boycott Movement renamed itself, was unable to mobilize again the kind of support it had received in 1960 for more than two decades: the Movement's demonstrations in London of between 6,000 and 15,000 people to launch its "month of boycott action" on February 28, 1960, and to protest the Sharpeville killings on March 27, 1960, were the largest anti-apartheid events held in Britain until the AAM's "Southern Africa – Time to Choose" rally in London of approximately 15,000 people in March 1982.⁹

Figures for the membership of the national AAM are very patchy, and by no means reflect the total number of people prepared to take part in some form of anti-apartheid activism. Even many members of local anti-apartheid groups affiliated to the AAM were not members of the national organization, for example, and the AAM was able to mobilize much larger numbers of people to participate in campaigns and demonstrations and to sign petitions than to become members. Nevertheless, a graph of the national AAM's total individual membership following its decision to become a membership organization in 1963 provides a rough index of levels of interest and activism on this issue, especially when the membership figures are supplemented with figures for the AAM's total annual income from subscriptions. Figure 1 shows that membership of the national AAM – though it may have spiked in the early 1970s following Stop the Seventy Tour's campaign in 1969-70 – appears to have remained fairly constant at between 2,000 and 2,500 members throughout the late 1960s and 1970s. Strikingly, although the Soweto uprising that began in June 1976 is often characterized as a turning point in international as well as domestic mobilization against apartheid, AAM membership appears not to have increased significantly in 1976, and actually declined the following year. British public reaction to Soweto appears to have been considerably more muted than it had been to Sharpeville in 1960 or would be to the uprising in South Africa's townships in the mid-1980s.¹⁰

Figure 1 suggests that AAM membership may have begun to increase in the early 1980s, and then began to take off in 1985-86, following the township uprising that began in 1984. British public and media interest in apartheid – and in particular the issue of whether to impose economic sanctions on South Africa – reached by far its most intense level in 1985-86: the AAM’s success in rallying 15,000 people to demonstrate in London against apartheid in November 1982 was subsequently dwarfed by rallies of 50,000 people in June 1984 (to protest South African President P.W. Botha’s visit to Britain), 150,000 in November 1985, and 250,000 in June 1986.¹¹ Membership of the AAM actually peaked in 1988-89, however, as a consequence of the AAM’s phenomenally successful “Nelson Mandela: Freedom at 70” campaign in 1988, which included, most prominently, a massive televised pop concert at Wembley Stadium on June 11, 1988.

In the long 1970s then, when anti-apartheid activism generally garnered relatively limited support in Britain compared to the mid-to-late 1980s, why did particular groups come to focus much of their energies on South Africa, while many other seemingly similar groups did not? One of the key contentions of this chapter is that the question “why South Africa?” can only be answered comprehensively by disaggregating the anti-apartheid movement into its key constituent parts: opposing apartheid meant very different things for different people, and served very different purposes.

This chapter suggests two conclusions regarding the origins and nature of the two campaigns studied here. First, the organizers of these anti-apartheid campaigns hoped that their campaigns would ultimately transform the political and economic order not only in South Africa, but also in Britain itself. This is an interpretation rejected by Håkan Thörn, who instead focuses

on the “transnational processes,” responsible for enabling the “globalization of politics” of which the global anti-apartheid movement was a part: new means of transnational communication; new opportunities for international travel, making possible the creation of transnational networks of activists; and “the rise and consolidation of new ‘global’ organizations and institutions.” These processes, Thörn argues, enabled the creation of an “imagined global community of solidarity activists.”¹²

These transnational processes, however, are not sufficient to explain why particular groups within various countries came to focus on South Africa. While this chapter does not seek to diminish the significance of such transnational processes, it does suggest that they only became significant through their interaction with “the internal dynamics of the nation state,” that Thörn explicitly dismisses – specifically the domestic political objectives of the individuals and groups that became heavily involved in anti-apartheid activism.

Second, the circumstance that led the particular British political groups studied here to make anti-apartheid activism one of their most prominent concerns was the initiative of South African exiles who were able to focus the attention of those groups on the issue of apartheid. There were many political groups in Britain whose ideologies could have predisposed them towards opposition to apartheid in South Africa. The fact that the Young Liberals came to focus a significant proportion of their energies on anti-apartheid activism in a way that the youth wing of the Labour Party or the Young Communist League did not, and that the Revolutionary Communist Group came to focus much more strongly on anti-apartheid activism than other far left and Trotskyist groups such as the Socialist Workers Party or Militant, reflected the initiative

of individual South African exiles who had established close relationships with members of Young Liberals and the Revolutionary Communist Group.

This second conclusion overlaps to some extent with Thörn's argument that "new possibilities of travel" facilitated the creation of transnational networks of activists; in particular, Thörn suggests that new possibilities of travel enabled South African exiles to play "an important role as organizers and mobilizers, travelling extensively around the world, making speeches at solidarity meetings and thus giving 'the other' a public face."¹³ This chapter provides further evidence for the argument that exiled South Africans played crucial roles as organizers and mobilizers of anti-apartheid activism in Britain. At the same time, however, it also qualifies this argument: the South African exiles who were particularly significant in the cases studied here were not those who made use of new opportunities to travel "extensively around the world," but those who, having arrived in Britain (by sea, in one case) became most rooted in British politics.

Stop the Seventy Tour

On September 10, 1969, a new anti-apartheid organization calling itself the Stop the Seventy Tour Committee (STST) convened a press conference to announce its formation and objectives. Peter Hain, STST's Spokesman, called for the cancellation of the planned 1970 tour of Britain by South Africa's cricket team as a way of challenging racist selection policies in South African sport and, more broadly, of challenging apartheid itself. Hain threatened "mass demonstrations and disruptions throughout the tour" should it go ahead, and warned British sporting authorities that "their complicity in apartheid sport will no longer be tolerated – all future tours, including the [South African] Rugby tour starting in November [1969], will be severely disrupted."¹⁴ Subsequently, in what one scholar has characterized as "arguably the most successful mass

action in post-WWII British history,” STST was able to mobilize up to fifty thousand demonstrators during the twenty-five match rugby tour, over four hundred of whom were arrested as they demonstrated at and attempted to disrupt matches: one match was abandoned and two were forced to change their venues.¹⁵ In May 1970, following a direct request from the British government, the English Cricket Council announced that it was cancelling the South African cricket tour.¹⁶

The 1969-70 Stop the Seventy Tour campaign provides a clear example of the importance of South African exiles in mobilizing particular groups and organizations to focus their attention and energies on major campaigns against apartheid. In this case, the role of Peter Hain, STST’s nineteen-year-old chairman and spokesman, was crucial: one journalist commented in May 1970 that “Peter Hain may go down in history as the man who made apartheid a national issue in Britain.”¹⁷ Hain had grown up in South Africa, where his parents, both English-speaking white South Africans, had been prominent members of the anti-apartheid Liberal Party. The family had endured prolonged harassment from the South African police for their opposition to the National Party government; both parents were briefly imprisoned in 1961 and were later served with banning orders.¹⁸ The banning of his parents meant that as a teenager Peter was increasingly drawn into political activity, acting on their behalf. He passed messages to journalists and other banned people with whom they could not communicate, for example, and in April 1965 Peter, then aged fifteen, was drafted at the last moment to read the oration at the funeral of John Harris, a family friend and Liberal Party member who was hanged for having planted a bomb in Johannesburg railway station. In early 1966 continued police harassment finally led the family to take a Union Castle liner into exile and move to London.¹⁹

Peter Hain's role in the Stop the Seventy Tour campaign was crucial not only because he founded STST, but because from the start he involved in it the Young Liberals, the youth wing of the Liberal Party, Britain's third largest political party after the dominant Labour and Conservative Parties. Hain was perhaps unusual among South African exiles in the extent to which he became involved in domestic British politics. He later recalled: "My father was quite clear: what we must do is become members of the community. There was among South African exiles – true of all exiles – a limbo existence. People were constantly waiting to go back and never settling... We sunk ourselves into domestic politics. We were never going back."²⁰ The combination of his family's association with the South African Liberal Party, his disillusionment with the policies of Harold Wilson's Labour government on Rhodesia and Vietnam, and his perception that "the British Young Liberals were then a vibrant, irreverent force for radicalism," led Hain to join the Young Liberals.²¹ By 1969 he had become chair of their Putney branch and vice-chair of the National League of Young Liberals.

In the mid-to-late 1960s the Young Liberals had become a prominent focus for student radicalism, especially on international issues. A small group of senior Young Liberal national officers had decided in 1966 to convert their previously largely quiescent organization into a radical youth movement. This new approach first came to the attention of the national media at the Liberal Party's annual assembly in September 1966, at which the Young Liberals, soon dubbed the "Red Guards" in the press, played a major role in the defeat of the Party's executive on the issue of Britain's role in NATO. Subsequently, the Young Liberals became particularly active in campaigning on two international issues: the Vietnam War and southern Africa. Southern Africa had become a particularly prominent issue in British politics following the "Unilateral Declaration of Independence" (UDI) by white settlers in the British colony of

Southern Rhodesia in November 1965, and what many on the British left perceived as the Labour government's weak and vacillating response to it. One of the Young Liberals' first actions on southern Africa was to organize a demonstration in London on the first anniversary of UDI in November 1966. Subsequently, the Young Liberals sought to organize a national campaign on South Africa in 1967 (though, as George Kiloh – their chair from 1966 to 1968 – later recalled, this “essentially sunk”), and established a Young Liberal Southern Africa Commission in early 1968 to coordinate activism on the issue.²²

Though he had joined the Young Liberals only a few months earlier, Hain, the only South African involved, quickly came to play a leading role in the Southern Africa Commission, and was appointed vice-chair.²³ It was Hain who at a Southern Africa Commission meeting in January 1969 first proposed that the Commission's members pledge themselves “to take direct action to prevent scheduled matches from taking place unless the 1970 [cricket] tour is cancelled.”²⁴ The resolution was passed and, to reinforce the threat, Hain subsequently organized a series of “Young Liberal direct-action demonstrations” in July 1969 at the matches of the Wilf Isaacs XI, an all-white invitational South African cricket team then touring Britain, and at a Davis Cup tennis match in Eastbourne between Britain and South Africa. The protests were initially tiny: Hain and seven other Young Liberals occupied the pitch at the Wilf Isaacs XI's first match, and Hain and just three others invaded the court at the Davis Cup match.²⁵

Part of Hain's purpose in founding STST in autumn 1969 was to “reach beyond the ranks of the Young Liberals and draw in all who were prepared to take action against apartheid sport.” Organizations affiliated to STST included the National Union of Students, the United Nations Student Association, United Nations Youth, the radical Christian group CHURCH, the

International Socialists, and the Young Communist League, and those who took part in STST protests in 1969-70 reached far beyond the ranks of Young Liberals.²⁶ Nevertheless, Young Liberals continued to play a central organizing role. Hain himself cooperated closely with Louis Eaks, national chair of the of the Young Liberals in 1969-70, and several of STST's regional organizers such as Simon Hebditch in London and Gordon Lishman in Manchester were also current or former officers of the Young Liberals and/or their Southern Africa Commission.

Why did Young Liberals so enthusiastically target South Africa in the late 1960s? It seems highly unlikely that without Hain the Young Liberals would have played nearly such a prominent role in anti-apartheid activism in 1969-70. But for Hain to be successful in mobilizing the Young Liberals both his objectives and his proposed tactics for achieving them had to appeal to them. Young Liberals framed their opposition to apartheid in strongly exceptionalist terms. South Africa was, George Kiloh argued, "the most outstanding affront to liberal values in the non-communist world," and even compared to communist countries it was "a special case. Its policies were utterly repugnant, in a way that was very different from those of Russia or China." Young Liberals frequently compared South Africa to Nazi Germany: the theme of their 1967 campaign on apartheid was that the South African regime was "essentially Nazi."²⁷ Moreover, though Britain did not have the same kind of ongoing direct responsibility for South Africa that it did for the rebellious colony of Rhodesia, Young Liberals contended that Britain nonetheless bore some responsibility for South African apartheid: Hain argued that Britain had "a great historical responsibility for the continuance of racialism throughout South African society."²⁸

In general, the language of human rights appears to have played little role in Young Liberals' framing of their opposition to apartheid. In a "Background Briefing" on Southern

Africa produced by the Southern Africa Commission in 1968, the Commission's chair, Douglas Marchant, did note that the United Nations had designated 1968 as "Human Rights Year," and claimed that South Africa was "the only country in the world not only to have passed legislation in direct opposition to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, but the only country to have violated every single one of the Universal Declaration's thirty articles."²⁹ Such language appears to have been uncommon, however. Much more frequently, Young Liberals and STST framed their campaign as one against "racialism." "Racialism" was, Hain wrote in 1971, "the issue on which we were campaigning": STST's objection to the proposed 1970 cricket tour was that the South African team was "selected on a racial basis and representing a racist system."³⁰ For the Young Liberals and STST it was South Africa's "racialism" that made it exceptional in world politics:

We pick on apartheid because it is the one system in the world which is founded on basis of racialism – and the cruellest, most institutionalized form of racialism the world has ever seen. We pick on the 'absolute tyranny' of racialism in South Africa because it condemns 14 million non-white South Africans to inferiority, exploitation and humiliation solely because of their colour, a factor beyond their control initially and which they can never change.

When conservative critics demanded to know why STST was not also demonstrating against Russian sports teams, STST's standard response was that simply there was "no evidence that any Russian has been excluded from a Russian team for racial reasons. Russia has no racial laws similar to South Africa's, so that in this respect there is no comparison with apartheid."³¹

The particular form of anti-apartheid activism that STST adopted was also critical. Two key features of STST's campaign against the rugby and cricket tours were its emphasis on "direct action" – that is, the actual disruption of sports events – and its local orientation. Hain argued that "direct action tactics are much more sophisticated than stereotyped conventional demonstrations, because it involves people in such a positive and committed manner," and concluded afterwards that "the whole momentum and strength of the campaign were helped by the fact that the target of protest was locally oriented... we were not all coming to London to let off steam outside South Africa House, but were able to protest on our own doorsteps, as it were. No campaign has ever had quite this degree of local orientation and, so, of mass support."³²

Both of these features of STST's campaign fitted closely with the focus of leading Young Liberals in this period on the interlinked ideas of "direct action" and "community politics." From about 1967 onwards, Young Liberal leaders' rising frustration with their inability to influence the parliamentary Liberal Party prompted an increasing disillusionment with conventional parliamentary politics as a means of achieving the transformation of society they believed necessary. Instead, they came to argue – as did a memorandum on "Direct Action" probably written in late 1968 by Young Liberal chair Malcolm MacCallum – that Young Liberals must focus on organizing people "to solve their immediate problems in their schools, factories and local communities" through direct action. "Local direct action," the memorandum argued, was "the only way to persuade the public... that real change is needed": the memorandum concluded that Young Liberals "must look to non-violent direct action on a huge scale as the only way of mobilising people and achieving change."³³

In November 1969, prominent Young Liberals Gordon Lishman (STST's Manchester organizer) and Lawrence Freedman coined the term "community politics" to refer to this approach, which was then enshrined in the "community politics resolution" that the Young Liberals succeeded in having passed at the September 1970 Liberal Party conference. This committed Liberals "to help organise people in their communities to take and use power."³⁴ The ideologues of community politics saw the encouragement of "participation" in the solving of multiple different local issues as the first step towards the ultimate – if vague and usually undefined – objective of "community self-government." Lishman explained that "the most basic article of faith to the [community politics] movement is the belief that the aggregation and development of community activity will lead to the habit of participation... The confrontation between the habit and the systems it confronts will lead to the development of new structures which are more open and more effective and clearly controlled." The starting point, then, was to mobilize people around single, usually local, issues, since the habit of participating in local direct action – in what Hain called "the experience of taking and using power on their own behalf and on their community's behalf" – would give people the experience of achieving change for themselves and lead them to connect the local problem around which they had initially mobilized to broader questions of the organization of society.³⁵

Much of the focus of Young Liberal community politics ideologues was on local community issues, such as solving problems in schools and workplaces. Nonetheless, local direct action against South African sports teams could clearly be accommodated into this approach, based as it was on the idea that, in MacCallum's words, "the key to real change is the praxis of dissent at local level."³⁶ Indeed, several of the most enthusiastic promoters of the concept of community politics, including Lishman, Simon Hebditch, and Hain, were among the key STST

organizers. Hain argued in 1971 that “the success of the [STST] campaign and its impact in Britain went far beyond the issue of apartheid sport, and indeed, beyond apartheid. The movement threw up a seemingly endless number of associated issues, and, in this light, the campaign was of immense importance almost because of itself.” Hain and his fellow Young Liberals at the center of the anti-apartheid mobilization in 1969-70 saw their campaign, as Hain told one journalist, as “a beginning, not an end, for protest movements in Britain for what you can do with direct action and militant non-violence”: they targeted South African sports tours with the hope of transforming society not only in South Africa, but also in Britain itself.³⁷

City AA and the South Africa House Pickets

In the 1980s one of most visible forms of anti-apartheid activism in Britain were the pickets demonstrating outside the South African embassy in Trafalgar Square. The embassy picket became a popular tourist attraction: former African National Congress (ANC) activist Paul Trehwela recalled in 2002 that “For thousands of visitors to London... the noisy picket... provided the most visible evidence of public opposition to apartheid.” Journalist Denis Herbstein recalled the “state of siege” the pickets created inside South Africa House when he visited it during the 1980s: recent Freedom of Information Act releases show that the South African embassy repeatedly contacted the Foreign Office to complain about the “disruptive and abusive” demonstrations.³⁸

The pickets outside South Africa House – which began with a non-stop day-and-night picket for 86 days from August 25 to November 18, 1982, followed by regular pickets every Friday thereafter, and later another non-stop picket from 1986 until 1990 – were organized by the

City of London Anti-Apartheid Group, known as “City AA” or “City Group,” which was founded in January 1982 as a local anti-apartheid group affiliated to the national AAM. Once again, a single South African exile played a crucial role. Norma Kitson (1933-2002) had been born into a wealthy Jewish family in Durban and had first begun to turn against apartheid when she observed the crude racism and cruelty of her white colleagues towards black miners while she was working as a secretary in the mining town of Odendaalsrus in the Orange Free State in the late 1940s. She had joined the Congress of Democrats, the white wing of the Congress Alliance, in 1953, and the underground South African Communist Party (SACP) in 1959.³⁹ Her husband, David Kitson, who was also an SACP member, had joined Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK), the ANC’s armed wing, when it was formed in 1961, and after the arrest of the MK leadership at Rivonia in 1963, had been co-opted onto the new four-person MK High Command, until he too was arrested a year later, and sentenced to twenty years in prison.⁴⁰

Suffering continued harassment from the security police following her husband’s sentence, Norma Kitson and her two children had left South Africa for London in 1967. Initially Kitson avoided political activity in Britain so as not to endanger the chances that she would be allowed to return to South Africa periodically to visit her husband in prison. After visiting him in 1976, however, she decided that she would never again return to South Africa, and on her return to Britain applied for admission to the ANC in exile. Though she was assigned to an ANC unit to work on propaganda, Kitson became increasingly frustrated with what she perceived to be the failure of the ANC, the SACP and the AAM (with which the ANC and SACP cooperated closely) to mobilize Britons against apartheid: “even after more than twenty years of existence,” she wrote, the AAM’s “membership was small, it had almost no influence or active support from any group of British people, and there was virtually no regular activity they could take part in.”⁴¹

These concerns came to a head when Kitson's son Steven was detained in South Africa in January 1982 during a trip to visit his father in prison. Frustrated with the response of the AAM and the ANC, and convinced that her only hope was "to create an uproar of protest in England that would embarrass the South African authorities enough to force them to release Steven," Kitson formed on her own initiative a "Free Steven Kitson Campaign," whose first activities included an "emergency picket" outside South Africa House. Steven Kitson was released after six days in detention, but in that short time the campaign had succeeded in mobilizing hundreds of people. Kitson was concerned not to lose the support of those who had joined the campaign for the anti-apartheid cause, and following Steven's release, the Free Steven Kitson Campaign converted itself into the City of London Anti-Apartheid Group. Norma Kitson became the treasurer, and most of the other members of the committee were drawn from the staff of Red Lion Setters, the women's typesetting cooperative that Kitson ran.

Reflecting its origins and Norma Kitson's concerns, City AA retained a particular focus on the issue of political prisoners in South Africa, including David Kitson.⁴² Norma Kitson was convinced that the Free Steven Kitson Campaign's protests had been responsible for her son's rapid release from detention, and that demonstrations in Britain could have a direct effect on the conditions in which prisoners were held in South Africa – and even get them released:

Our experience over the years had shown that when there were campaigns for the prisoners, there were direct positive results. When activity died down, conditions for them worsened... Whenever we managed to join or mount a campaign, there was always some result, sometimes tiny and seemingly insignificant, but always a result. The South African regime was forced to make

little adjustments in the face of Western criticism. These small gains – better food, a film once a week, better clothing – seemed paltry to many hard-pressed campaigners in Britain who could not gauge whether their efforts were any use, but they made a difference to the lives of our prisoners. When the prisoners were upgraded, it meant a remarkable improvement in the quality of their lives.⁴³

Thus, City AA's first non-stop picket, for eighty-six days in autumn 1982, was prompted by concerns for the health of David Kitson and other political prisoners, who had been moved into death row cells in 1979: the slogan used to advertise the picket was "Free All South African Political Prisoners: Save Dave Kitson's Life."⁴⁴ For Norma Kitson such campaigns were also an essential form of consciousness-raising: not only did they improve the conditions of prisoners in South Africa, but they also "made more British people aware of what was going on in South Africa and brought them into activity against apartheid."⁴⁵

Besides the key role once again of a South African exile, City AA's success in mobilizing considerable support for its campaigns also reflected the organizational support it received from the Revolutionary Communist Group (RCG). Like the Young Liberals, RCG leaders believed that supporting and participating in anti-apartheid activism would enable them to contribute to the transformation of society not only in South Africa, but also in Britain itself. The RCG had been founded in 1974, after its members were expelled from the International Socialists (the British Trotskyist group that in 1977 renamed itself the Socialist Workers' Party) following an ideological dispute. The RCG saw its central role as creating and training a vanguard of the working class that would be able to break with bourgeois ideology, abandon the struggle for reforms within the capitalist system, and instead fight for state power.

The RCG's objective of creating a revolutionary vanguard led it to focus much of its energy on campaigns on international issues. As the RCG's October 1974 founding document put it, "a small cadre group such as ours must seek out those areas in which it can intervene to win cadres and develop the potential vanguard." Given that the RCG lacked the resources to mount such a campaign within the labor unions, the document concluded that "in Britain's present conditions a group such as ours can best employ its forces in work in international solidarity movements." By working alongside those who participated in such movements and highlighting the role of the British bourgeoisie "in aiding the oppression of other nations and their workers," RCG cadres would be able to demonstrate to British workers "how the Labour Party and the Trades Unions leadership attempt to throw the support of the [working] class behind defence of the national interest and behind the interest of the bourgeoisie, and at the same time we will show the necessity for an independent programme." In this way, the RCG hoped "to draw sections of the potential vanguard into work with us in these movements and convince them of the necessity of mounting a campaign in the class on these political questions. Through this we aim to begin to develop a base in the trades unions."⁴⁶

Although the two international campaigns that the RCG's founding document mentioned were the Troops Out Movement, which campaigned for the withdrawal of British troops from Northern Ireland, and the Chile Solidarity Campaign, the RCG's arguments for working in international solidarity movements could also clearly be applied to the Anti-Apartheid Movement. The RCG first appears to have become interested in South Africa in 1976, when its theoretical journal republished a paper commissioned by the AAM entitled "South Africa: the Crisis in Britain and the Apartheid Economy," alongside a long piece by David Yaffe, the RCG's

chief theoretician. Yaffe concluded his article by urging RCG members: “Above all, always link the struggle for liberation in South Africa with the struggle for socialism in Britain.”⁴⁷

Yaffe had emphasized that “Support for the liberation struggle must go beyond resolutions.” There appears to be no evidence, however, that the RCG went beyond rhetorical support of anti-apartheid activism until the arrest of Steven Kitson in 1982 and the decision by Norma Kitson to found City AA. Kitson had first come into contact with the RCG in the mid-1970s, when her cooperative typeset their publications. Though Kitson was a member of both the SACP and the Communist Party of Great Britain (which the RCG spent much energy attacking) she quickly developed a friendship with David Reed, one of the RCG’s leaders, whom she considered “a brilliant Marxist-Leninist.”⁴⁸ In 1976, moreover, Carol Brickley, another member of the RCG, had joined Kitson’s cooperative as an artworker and quickly became her closest friend. These connections played a crucial role following the arrest of Steven Kitson in 1982. As Brickley later recalled, the RCG was “centrally involved” in City AA: Brickley worked together with the Kitson family to found the group, and “together with other RCG members, we mobilized and worked to build events in London.” Brickley herself was appointed the group’s convenor.⁴⁹

Once Norma Kitson had focused the RCG’s attention on apartheid, the issue became one of the group’s primary concerns, alongside its ongoing concern with Ireland. The RCG’s focus on these two issues was vividly illustrated by the slogan on the front cover of the group’s manifesto, published in 1984:

COMPLETE BRITISH WITHDRAWAL FROM IRELAND
SMASH APARTHEID

FIGHT RACISM!

FIGHT IMPERIALISM!⁵⁰

The manifesto itself contained long sections on “Ireland and British Imperialism” and “South Africa and British Imperialism.” The manifesto justified its focus on these two issues in very similar terms to the RCG’s founding document’s emphasis on international solidarity movements a decade earlier: “The working class in Britain, the Irish people and the black masses in Southern Africa have a common interest – the destruction of British imperialism. Only by making common cause with oppressed people fighting British imperialism can the British working class liberate itself. By uniting with the struggles of the oppressed in Ireland and South Africa the British working class not only hastens their victory but also weakens the grip of opportunist and pro-Imperialist Labour and Trades Union leadership over itself. By so doing it paves the way for the victory of communism in Britain.”⁵¹

This orientation was generally much less explicit in the flyers and songsheets City AA produced to advertize its pickets of South Africa House. In these the language of human rights was sometimes used: one flyer explained that the South African government had “deprived the majority of the population in South Africa... of all democratic and human rights simply because they are black,” while one of City AA’s picket songs asked in rhyme whether the listener was on the side of “racist whites” and “parasites” or “on the side of human rights.” This was only one language among many that were used, however. City AA materials drew upon a number of different tropes in their virulent and wide-ranging condemnation of the South African regime: they routinely condemned the South African government as “racist” and “fascist,” and placed great emphasis on its violent, brutal and repressive character, particularly in its treatment of political prisoners, but also more broadly. The regime had “systematically murdered, tortured,

imprisoned and detained its opponents”; the deprivation it imposed on the black population of South Africa amounted to “genocide”; apartheid was a system of “barbaric racism”; and the South African embassy represented “death and hate.” City AA materials most commonly characterized the struggle of the ANC and the black population of South Africa as a “struggle for freedom and democracy,” without examining further what they understood by either of those terms. They emphasized the importance of solidarity with the ANC and celebrated its armed struggle: one of the picket songs declared that the demonstrators would “not be moved” until Umkhonto we Sizwe had “won the war,” and apartheid had been “completely smashed.”⁵²

At the same time, City AA sought to emphasize through its approach to anti-apartheid activism the need to campaign against what it saw as the oppressive state in Britain, as well as that in South Africa. In response to what it perceived as the introduction of racist immigration and policing legislation by the Thatcher government, City AA campaigned under the slogan “Britain Out of Apartheid, Apartheid Out of Britain,” and campaigned within the Anti-Apartheid Movement to have AAM campaign against racism in Britain as well as in southern Africa. At the Movement’s 1984 Annual General Meeting, for example, City AA succeeded in getting a resolution passed that declared that “the struggle against apartheid cannot be separated from the fight against racism in Britain.”⁵³

City AA also sought to expose what it perceived as harassment of anti-apartheid activists by the British police. In June 1983 when nine members of the group were arrested during a picket of South Africa House to protest South Africa’s execution of three ANC cadres who had become known as the “Moroka 3,” City AA immediately formed a separate organization to defend them: the very name of “The Trafalgar 9 Defence Campaign” sought to establish an equivalence between opponents of apartheid detained by the British state, and its opponents

detained by the South African state.⁵⁴ A year later, when the police imposed a temporary ban on demonstrations outside South Africa House, twenty-four members of City AA, including Norma and Steven Kitson, Carol Brickley and other RCG members, deliberately violated the ban by crossing the street to the pavement in front of the embassy and were arrested. Once again, City AA formed another organization, the South African Embassy Picket Campaign (SAEPC), to campaign for the lifting of the ban and to defend those arrested. An SAEPC flyer argued: “The ever more open alliance of the British government with the racist South African state is inevitably leading to greater attacks on democratic rights in Britain. To protest effectively against apartheid now means to fight to defend democratic rights in Britain.”⁵⁵

There is also considerable evidence that City AA sought to convert the many activists who participated in its pickets who were not members of the RCG to the RCG’s political orientation. Though City AA strenuously denied to the national AAM that it promoted the literature of any British political organization, the AAM national office repeatedly expressed its concern about the promotion of the RCG’s newspaper, *Fight Racism! Fight Imperialism!*, at City AA pickets. During the non-stop picket in 1982 a “Pavement University” was held every night, consisting of two or three ten-minute lectures and then discussion among the “Pickies.” Though anyone could put down their name and the subject on which they wished to speak, and all those present voted each night on who should speak, the RCG apparently saw this as a means of educating the “Pickies” about the connection it drew between the struggle against apartheid in South Africa and its own struggle for communism in Britain: City AA Secretary Chris Fraser wrote in June 1983 that “Often these ‘university’ sessions were addressed by 15-year-old youth about their own lives and many made the link between their oppression and the oppression of their peers in South Africa.”⁵⁶

Conclusions

In the long 1970s British media and public interest in apartheid and in anti-apartheid campaigns was much lower than it would be in the mid-to-late 1980s. Two factors in particular seem to have contributed to that subsequent explosion of interest in and campaigning against apartheid in the 1980s. First, the uprising in South Africa's townships between 1984 and 1986, and the South African government's attempts to suppress it generated sustained media coverage: reports from South Africa were on Britain's television, radio and newspapers daily for much of 1985. The South African government's high profile efforts both to suppress the uprising and to counter the international condemnation the uprising generated – including its declarations of States of Emergency in July 1985 and June 1986, and President P.W. Botha's notorious "Rubicon" speech in August 1985 – only generated further media interest and public activism. Moreover, in contrast to the more amorphous character of the Soweto uprising in 1976, the formation of the United Democratic Front (UDF) in South Africa in 1983 gave domestic South Africa resistance to apartheid a public face and media-savvy domestic spokesmen – most notably Bishop Desmond Tutu and Reverend Allan Boesak – who could articulate the demands of the South African opposition for an international audience.

Second, in the British context it was also important that Conservative Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher's outspoken opposition to imposing sanctions on South Africa, and the perception that she was sympathetic to the South African regime, contributed to generating further British activism. The fact that Britain had a Labour government between 1974 and 1979 probably contributed to the relative lack of public support for anti-apartheid campaigns in the 1970s. Those on the left opposed to apartheid were more likely to believe that the Labour

government's denunciations of the South African government were sincere, even if they believed its actions against it did not go far enough. Some may also have been more reluctant to campaign directly and openly against the policies of a Labour government. There were no such inhibitions to anti-apartheid activism under Thatcher, and, indeed, campaigning against apartheid probably garnered additional support precisely because it was a means of expressing opposition to the Thatcher government.

The relatively limited support that anti-apartheid activism attracted in Britain in the long 1970s compared to the mid-1980s highlights the importance of paying attention to multiple chronologies in the histories of human rights and humanitarian activism. Not only did international campaigns on different humanitarian issues follow significantly different courses, but international campaigns on the same issue, such as apartheid, may have followed significantly different courses in different countries. The mid-1980s witnessed an explosion of interest in and campaigning against apartheid not only in Britain but also in the United States and many other countries, a phenomenon that requires much further research. At other times, however, anti-apartheid activism appears to have followed distinctly national rhythms, depending on the interaction in each country of transnational factors with the kind of national factors examined here.

Thus, this chapter has highlighted the importance of disaggregating and paying attention to the motivations and purposes of the particular groups and individuals who initiated and led anti-apartheid campaigns in the 1970s, and to the circumstances that led them to focus their attention on South Africa rather than on other international or domestic issues. In the cases of the campaigns studied here, two key conclusions stand out. First, both the Young Liberals and the RCG believed that their activism against apartheid would transform the political and economic

order in Britain itself, as well as in South Africa. For the Young Liberals, direct action against South African sports teams playing in Britain would not only deal a blow to apartheid by increasing South Africa's international isolation. It would also give those who took part the experience of "participation" in the exercise of power in their local community, and would thus be a first step towards the establishment of "community self-government." For the RCG, participation in anti-apartheid activism would enable them to recruit and educate cadres who would form the vanguard of the working class and lead a communist revolution in Britain.

It was the combination of these domestic political concerns with outrage at apartheid that made the apartheid issue important and urgent enough for these groups to devote so much of their attention and energy to campaigning against it. In neither case was that campaigning framed primarily in terms of human rights. Human rights appear rather to have been an incipient protest language: both the Young Liberals and City AA did sporadically draw upon the language of human rights to express their opposition to apartheid, but this was only one of several languages used. In both cases, for example, the language of anti-racism was much more prevalent.

What was perhaps to some extent unique about the issue of apartheid in South Africa, compared to some of the other repressive regimes of the period, was that it offered multiple entry-points for activists of many different political persuasions and with a diverse range of international and domestic objectives. This was particularly the case in Britain, where the earlier imperial relationship with South Africa meant that there were a variety of long-standing ties between the two countries that activists could exploit. Those entry-points ranged from the South African produce sold in British stores; to the prominent British corporations with investments in South Africa; to the close sports relations targeted by STST; to the close diplomatic ties

represented by the South African embassy right in Trafalgar Square (long a rallying point for protests and demonstrations), which provided a focal point for the campaigns of City AA.

In the cases of both the Young Liberals and the RCG there were many issues other than apartheid in South Africa that would have served equally well as means to promote community politics and communist revolution respectively. This points to a second conclusion from these cases. The turn of the Young Liberals and the RCG to apartheid as such a major focus reflected to a large extent the initiative in each case of a single white South African exile: Peter Hain and Norma Kitson were each able to focus the attention of the Young Liberals and the RCG respectively on targeting South Africa as a means of promoting those groups' domestic – as well as their international – objectives. Similarly, South African exiles and other individuals with personal connections to South Africa appear to have played a crucial role in other major anti-apartheid groups and campaigns in Britain; Britain's former imperial relationship with South Africa meant that many people had such connections, and that many exiled opponents of the South African regime settled in Britain.

Anti-apartheid activism in Britain, then, must be understood as simultaneously both a transnational and a national phenomenon. At some moments, such as in the mid-1980s, developments inside South Africa itself played a crucial role in determining the chronology of anti-apartheid activism around the world. And anti-apartheid activists developed a range of techniques to exploit transnational connections between South Africa and the rest of the world – such as those developed by sports organizations and multinational corporations – in order to exert pressure on the South African regime. Ideas about such techniques circulated transnationally. But anti-apartheid activism in different countries also followed distinct national patterns and chronologies. The transnational processes highlighted by some scholars – such as

the development of new forms of travel and communications – may have been necessary conditions for such activism, but they are not sufficient to explain why particular individuals and groups in Britain (and elsewhere) came to focus on apartheid, and why they did so at particular moments. The evidence from the British cases analyzed here suggests that such an explanation requires attention both to the specific objectives – including *domestic* political objectives – of the various groups and individuals who became heavily involved in anti-apartheid activism, and to the particular individuals – often South African exiles or others with personal connections to South Africa – who provided the initial impetus for those groups to focus on the issue.

¹ Francis Nesbitt, “A ‘Postmodern’ Interpretation of the Anti-Apartheid Movement,” review of *Movement Matters: American Antiaptheid Activism and the Rise of Multicultural Politics*, by David L. Hostetter, *H-SAfrica* (June 2007), accessed February 21, 2010, <http://www.h-net.org/reviews/showrev.php?id=13284>). Nesbitt is the author of *Race for Sanctions: African Americans Against Apartheid, 1946-1994* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2004).

² Roger Fieldhouse, *Anti-Apartheid: A History of the Movement in Britain* (London: Merlin Press, 2005); Christabel Gurney, “In the Heart of the Beast: The British Anti-Apartheid Movement 1959-1994” in *The Road to Democracy in South Africa: International Solidarity and Support* (Cape Town: Zebra Press, 2004), 255-351; Christabel Gurney, “‘A Great Cause’: the Origins of the Anti-Apartheid Movement, June 1959-March 1960,” *Journal of Southern African Studies* 26 (March 2000): 123-44; Christabel Gurney, “The 1970s: The Anti-Apartheid Movement’s Difficult Decade,” *Journal of Southern African Studies* 35 (June 2009): 471-87; Håkan Thörn, *Anti-Apartheid and the Emergence of a Global Civil Society* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006).

³ Jan Eckel, “‘Under a Magnifying Glass’: The International Human Rights Campaign Against Chile in the Seventies,” in *Human Rights in the Twentieth Century*, ed. Stefan-Ludwig Hofman (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 326.

⁴ The phrase “long 1970s” is borrowed from Bruce Schulman, who uses it to characterize the period 1969 to 1984 in the United States. See Bruce J. Schulman, *The Seventies: The Great Shift in American Culture, Society and Politics* (New York: Free Press, 2001). This periodization makes

sense in terms of the chronology of British anti-apartheid activism discussed below: 1969 was characterized by the upswing in public interest and activism on apartheid brought about by Stop the Seventy Tour's campaign against South African sports tours, while 1984 was the year in which anti-apartheid activism in Britain began to take off and reached previously unprecedented levels.

⁵ Fieldhouse, *Anti-Apartheid*, 466.

⁶ Stop the Seventy Tour was an entirely separate organization from the Anti-Apartheid Movement: the AAM collaborated with STST (and Peter Hain, STST's chairman, also sat on the AAM's National Committee), but concerns about STST's embrace of "direct action" also led the AAM to maintain its distance and stress that STST was independent. The City of London Anti-Apartheid Group was an affiliated local group of the AAM from City Group's founding in January 1982 until February 1985, when the ongoing tensions between City Group and the AAM National Office culminated in the AAM National Committee withdrawing its recognition of the group.

⁷ Gurney, "The 1970s."

⁸ Ronald Hyam and Peter Henshaw, *The Lion and the Springbok: Britain and South Africa Since the Boer War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 307, 314-20.

⁹ Hyam and Henshaw, *The Lion and the Springbok*, 307-42; Gurney, "In the Heart of the Beast," 266, 317.

¹⁰ See also Gurney, “In the Heart of the Beast,” 295; Gurney, “The 1970s,” 481; Hyam and Henshaw, *The Lion and the Springbok*, 330-32.

¹¹ Gurney, “In the Heart of the Beast,” 324-330.

¹² Thörn, *Anti-Apartheid*, 12, 4-5, 196-202.

¹³ Thörn, *Anti-Apartheid*, 199-200.

¹⁴ Peter Hain, *Don't Play With Apartheid: The Background to the Stop the Seventy Tour Campaign* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1971), 121-22, 148.

¹⁵ Rob Nixon, *Homelands, Harlem, and Hollywood: South African Culture and the World Beyond* (New York: Routledge, 1994), 132; Hain, *Don't Play With Apartheid*, 148.

¹⁶ See Bruce K. Murray, “The Sports Boycott and Cricket: The Cancellation of the 1970 South Africa Tour of England,” *South African Historical Journal* 46 (May 2002): 219-49.

¹⁷ Christopher Ford, “Hain Stopped Play,” *Guardian*, May 23, 1970, 11.

¹⁸ Under the apartheid regime, such orders limited an individual's freedom of movement and association, and prevented the publication of anything they said or wrote.

¹⁹ Peter Hain, *Sing the Beloved Country* (London: Pluto Press, 1996), 32-43; Kevin Toolis, “Hain's World,” *Guardian*, February 10, 2001, Weekend 18.

²⁰ Toolis, “Hain's World.” See also Hain, *Sing the Beloved Country*, 44, and Hain, *Don't Play with Apartheid*, 115.

²¹ Hain, *Sing the Beloved Country*, 48. See also Ruth Fox, “Young Liberal Influence and Its Effects, 1970-74,” *Liberal Democrat History Group Newsletter* 14 (March 1997): 16.

²² George Kiloh, “Forty Years Off: A Personal Account of the Young Liberals and the Liberal Party 1965-69,” 47-50, Bundle 12, George Kiloh Papers, London School of Economics Library, London, UK [hereafter Kiloh Papers].

²³ “National League of Young Liberals’ Southern Africa Commission,” AAM 861, Bodleian Library of Commonwealth and African Studies at Rhodes House, Oxford, UK [hereafter Rhodes House].

²⁴ Hain, *Don’t Play With Apartheid*, 115; Ford, “Hain Stopped Play,” 11.

²⁵ Hain, *Don’t Play With Apartheid*, 115-19.

²⁶ Hain, *Don’t Play With Apartheid*, 120-21.

²⁷ Kiloh, “Forty Years Off,” 49-51, Bundle 12, Kiloh Papers.

²⁸ Hain, *Don’t Play with Apartheid*, 103, 88.

²⁹ Douglas Marchant, “South Africa: The Kingpin,” in “Southern Africa: A Background Briefing by Members of the Southern Africa Commission,” Easter 1968, AAM 861, Rhodes House.

³⁰ Hain, *Don’t Play with Apartheid*, 200, 171.

³¹ Hain, *Don’t Play with Apartheid*, 87-88.

³² Hain, *Don’t Play with Apartheid*, 148, 199.

³³ [Malcolm MacCallum?], “Direct Action,” c. late 1968, Bundle 9, Kiloh Papers.

³⁴ John Meadowcroft, “The Origins of Community Politics: New Liberalism, Grimond and the Counter-Culture,” *Journal of Liberal Democrat History* 28 (Autumn 2000): 3; David Boyle, “Communities Actually: A Study of Liberal Democrat Localism in Action,” 16-17, accessed February 21, 2010, <http://www.libdemgroup.lga.gov.uk/lga/aio/989180>.

³⁵ Gordon Lishman, “The Framework for Community Politics,” in *Community Politics*, ed. Peter Hain (London: J. Calder, 1976), 80; Peter Hain, “The Future of Community Politics,” in *Community Politics*, ed. Hain, 21.

³⁶ Malcolm MacCallum, “Officers Weekend Cambridge 12th/13th October: Summary of NLYL Problems,” [circa October 1968], Bundle 9, Kiloh Papers.

³⁷ Ford, “Hain Stopped Play,” 11.

³⁸ Paul Trehwela, “Norma Kitson,” *Independent*, June 14, 2002, accessed February 21, 2010, <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/obituaries/norma-kitson-645283.html>; Denis Herbstein, “Norma Kitson,” *Guardian*, July 12, 2002, accessed February 21, 2010, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/news/2002/jul/12/guardianobituaries> ; “City of London Anti-Apartheid Group,” Freedom of Information release, November 22, 2005, accessed February 21, 2010, <http://collections.europarchive.org/tna/20080205132101/http://www.fco.gov.uk/servlet/Front?pagename=OpenMarket/Xcelerate/ShowPage&c=Page&cid=1109172327551>.

³⁹ The Congress Alliance included the African National Congress, the South African Indian Congress, the Coloured People's Congress, and the Congress of Democrats.

⁴⁰ For Norma Kitson's account of her life, see Norma Kitson, *Where Sixpence Lives* (London: Hogarth Press, 1987).

⁴¹ Kitson, *Where Sixpence Lives*, 214, 238.

⁴² See, for example: "The Free Steven Kitson Campaign Now to Become Impetus to Free Dave Kitson and Release Political Prisoners," January 17, [1982], AAM 502, Rhodes House.

⁴³ Kitson, *Where Sixpence Lives*, 253, 260-61.

⁴⁴ "Free All South African Political Prisoners: Save Dave Kitson's Life" (flyer), AAM 502, Rhodes House.

⁴⁵ Kitson, *Where Sixpence Lives*, 261. See also 238, 284.

⁴⁶ Political Committee of the Revolutionary Communist Group, "Our Tasks and Methods: The Founding Document of the RCG," *Revolutionary Communist* 1 (January 1975): 11.

⁴⁷ David Yaffe, "South Africa: International Solidarity and the British Working Class," *Revolutionary Communist* (1976): 56-63.

⁴⁸ Kitson, *Where Sixpence Lives*, 249-50.

⁴⁹ Carol Brickley, "Norma Kitson," *Fight Racism! Fight Imperialism!*, August/September 2002, accessed February 21, 2010, <http://www.revolutionarycommunist.org/index.php/rest-of-the->

world/907-norma-kitson--frfi-168-aug--sep-2002.html. See also Kitson, *Where Sixpence Lives*, 250.

⁵⁰ *The Revolutionary Road to Communism in Britain: Manifesto of the Revolutionary Communist Group* (London: Larkin Publications, 1984). The cover was designed by Carol Brickley.

⁵¹ *The Revolutionary Road to Communism in Britain*, 67-68. See also vii, 43-46.

⁵² South African Embassy Picket Campaign, “Close Down the Terrorist South African Embassy” (flyer); City of London Anti-Apartheid Group, “Songs” (flyer), AAM 503; “No Talks with Botha while Mandela is in Jail” (flyer), circa May-June 1984; City Anti-Apartheid Movement, “24 Hour Picket: Join Us!” (flyer); “We Shall Not Be Moved” (flyer); “One Week Picket: 26 May – 1 June 1984: Songs” (flyer), AAM 502, Rhodes House.

⁵³ Carol Brickley, Terry O’Halloran and David Reed, *South Africa: Britain out of Apartheid, Apartheid out of Britain* (London: Larkin Publications, 1985); City of London Anti-Apartheid Group, “Mid-September Bulletin,” [September 1984]; “The Following Resolutions have been Received...,” AAM 502, Rhodes House.

⁵⁴ “Trafalgar 9 Defence Campaign”; Chris Fraser to Trevor Huddleston, letter, June 21, 1983, AAM 502, Rhodes House.

⁵⁵ City of London Anti-Apartheid Group, “Police Attempt to Ban City of London Anti-Apartheid Group Pickets Outside South Africa House, Trafalgar Square,” press statement, June 10, 1984; “We Shall not be Moved! Defend the Right to Demonstrate Outside the South African Embassy!” [flyer], AAM 502, Rhodes House.

⁵⁶ Kitson, *Where Sixpence Lives*, 277; Chris Fraser to Trevor Huddleston, letter, June 21, 1983, AAM 502, Rhodes House.