Ethnic and Racial Studies

ISSN: (Print) (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rers20

Genocidal processes: social death in Xinjiang

David Tobin

To cite this article: David Tobin (2021): Genocidal processes: social death in Xinjiang, Ethnic and Racial Studies, DOI: 10.1080/01419870.2021.2001556

To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/01419870.2021.2001556

Published online: 22 Nov 2021.

ETHNIC AND RACIAL STUDIES
https://doi.org/10.1080/01419870.2021.2001556

Routledge
Taylor & Francis Group

Genocidal processes: social death in Xinjiang

David Tobin

School of East Asian Studies, University of Sheffield, Sheffield, UK

ABSTRACT

Genocide is a series of long-term processes emerging from "states of emergency" to convert targeted groups and secure the nation. This paper builds on Critical Genocide Studies literature to historically contextualize China's "fusion" policy, a narrative of emergency officially explaining extra-legal internment camps and inter-generational separation in Xinjiang. Although China's policymakers traditionally frame "one-nation-one-state thinking" as Western colonialism, critical approaches to Chinese politics show the party-state frames ethnic identities through colonial binaries of backward/modern and savagery/civilization. How does the party-state's "historic mission" to overcome colonial "humiliation" promote colonialism? The paper analyses how routine, dehumanizing official narratives of identity and danger enable genocides, conceptualized as planned processes of social death by attrition. It argues that contemporary "fusion" policy interweaves cultural superiority and ethnocentric developmentalism, seeking to resolve China's "ethnic problem" and decolonize Xinjiang through social death of Turkic Muslims.

ARTICLE HISTORY Received 22 July 2021; Accepted 28 October 2021

KEYWORDS Ethnicity; genocide; China; Xinjiang; Uyghurs; security

Introduction

China's policymakers traditionally frame "one-nation-one-state thinking" as Western colonialism and ethno-nationalism.[1] Yet critical approaches to China's ethnic politics[2] and literature on identities in Xinjiang[3] show how colonial narrative binaries of backward/modern and savagery/civilization are not peculiarly Western. Similarly, comparative approaches analyse comparable violence against minorities in postcolonial societies.[4] Nevertheless, China's ethnic policy scholars framed fixed identity boundaries between Western nationalism and Chinese civilization[5] to argue that ethnic theory must be Sinicized to resolve China's "ethnic problem".[6] Xi Jinping's[7]

CONTACT David Tobin d.tobin@sheffield.ac.uk

subsequent declaration that "cultural identity" is the "soul of every *minzu*"[8] confirmed China's ethnic policy shift from nominal cultural pluralism to "fusion" (*jiaorong*), an assimilation model.[9] How does the Chinese Communist Party's (CCP) "historic mission" to overcome colonial "humiliation" promote colonialism? The paper shows how "fusion" interweaves colonial and nationalist thought in "semantic hybridity",[10] securing China's "Great Revival" by resolving the "ethnic problem" of Turkic-speaking Muslims.

Genocide is a process, not an event,[11] emerging from perpetual "states of emergency" to convert barbarians for civilization's survival.[12] This paper historicizes "fusion", a narrative of emergency in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR), which explains practices of extra-legal internment, inter-generational separation, forced labour, and forced sterilization.[13] The term "genocidal practices", analytically distinct from legal conceptualizations,[14] builds on new directions in genocide studies.[15] Genocide emerges from gradual assertions of power to reorganize identities considered superfluous or threatening in long-term ethnocentric narratives, rather than rapid, irrational descents into barbarism.[16] In official Chinese narratives, the Han majority are imagined as a continuation of 2,000-year-old military settlements in Xinjiang, whose "settler culture" and teleological "function" as "embodiment of China's active spirit" secure and "settle the frontier" (*tunken shubian*).[17] Fei Xiaotong, China's most celebrated social scientist and key influence on official historiography, narrates China's historical formation through expansion of Han armies and "barbarians" "attraction" to China's superior civilization as "new blood for the Hans".[18] In official narratives, these older imperial desires to attract and "Sinicise" (*jiaohua*) barbarians interweave with resistance to colonialism, perplexing Anglophone audiences drawing from canonical genocide cases.

Long-term state violence in Xinjiang reflects different elements of Feierstein's four types of genocide: constituent, colonial, postcolonial, and reorganizing.[19] Post-1949 state violence "destroys ideologically unacceptable populations", from armed Kazakhs dismissed in the 1950s as "bandits" after skirmishes with Chinese troops following "peaceful liberation"[20] to twenty-first century "ideological viruses".[21] Land seizures, coerced labour, and extra-legal treatment of Xinjiang's Indigenous peoples resemble older colonial genocides,[22] "to rid a territory of Indigenous inhabitants and appropriate it", stigmatizing them as outsiders and undeveloped "savages who ought to make way for civilisation".[23] The intent of state-run paramilitary organization, the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps (*Bingtuan*), to "turn pastureland into collective farms" with "gun in one hand and plough in other",[24] sparked food shortages and mass Kazakh migration to the Soviet Union (1959–1962).[25] Today, the party-state targets local populations for "re-education" and "fusion" in internment camps and forced labour in *ongoing* postcolonial independence movements against "Westernisation" and local "separatism", described by Xi as interlinked, intensifying "long-term struggles".[26] Since 1949, policy has fluctuated, defying

mechanical explanation but state violence is enabled by long-term dehumanization of non-Chinese peoples on PRC territory.

Critical Genocide studies[27] historicizes contemporary genocidal practices, unpacking case-specific context while identifying common themes linking broad conditions promoting group annihilation and policy creating those conditions.[28] Dehumanization of Xinjiang's Turkic Muslims is complex because China is postcolonial with reference to its own imperial past in Central Asia and in relations with Europe.[29] The idea of China as unified nation and state, emerged through intertwined political anxieties about internal Manchu dominance and external European colonialism. Sun Yat-Sen strove to "restore the Han" and save China from networks of corrupt Manchu and Western imperialists.[30] Mao Zedong vilified GMD ministries as "counting houses of our foreign masters", threatening China's survival.[31] Today, perpetual emergency narratives persist in ubiquitous slogans: "without the CCP, there can be no new China". The CCP identifies "hostile foreign forces" and domestic "backwardness" as intertwined perpetual threats, describing Turkic identities as "historical leftovers" of nineteenth century European "colonial manipulation", threatening to dismember China by running against the "flow of history" and the Great Revival's "sacred mission".[32] Xi's signature slogan, "never forget our original mission, continue our progress" captures the long-term intent of ethnic policy and explains internment camps as eliminating inauthentic "colonial" identities hindering China's mission.[33] The party-state narrates internment camps and inter-generational separation, typical genocidal practices, as securing China from terrorism and colonialism.[34]

This paper focuses on how routinized, dehumanizing official narratives of identity transformation enable genocidal processes. The first section conceptualizes genocide as planned, permissive processes of social death by attrition, enabled by narratives of existential need for reorganization of identity. Section two historicizes "fusion" policy in long-term official narratives on state power and ethnicity, which frame Xinjiang's peoples as culturally inferior, existential threats. The final section analyses implementation and impact of "fusion" in "re-education" camps and state-run "boarding facilities" for children, depicted by Indigenous artists as daily, felt experiences of social death. The paper's core argument is that "fusion" interweaves cultural superiority and developmentalism, framing planned social death of Turkic Muslim identities as decolonization and modernization of Xinjiang with Chinese traditions. This resolution to China's "ethnic problem" reflects cyclical human tragedies of state violence to counter violence, irreducible to evil states or cultures.[35]

Section 1: Genocidal processes

This section theorizes genocide as planned and permissive processes of social death by attrition. Destruction of the "essential foundations of a group's life"

depends on co-ordinated state plans to categorize groups according to contribution to political goals.[36] However, "most foreseeable intolerable harms produced by inexcusable wrongs" to groups are social and diffuse, permitted and enabled, rather than physically enacted by individuals.[37] Long-term genocidal practices are neither primarily murderous nor traced to individual culpability.[38] Nevertheless, non-specialist usage of "genocide", the "crime of crimes" in International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda's (ICTR) prosecution case,[39] excludes planned, permissive group destruction, fixated on physical killings *by hand* in death camps. Popular physical conceptions of suffering reflect implicit biological conceptualizations of identity, de-escalating the urgency of gradual deprivation of essential life conditions. Critical Genocide Studies shows that by "always looking for Birkenau", biases towards traditional interpretations of canonical cases inhibit detection and understanding of new genocidal practices.[40] One in five German Jews died in the Warsaw Ghetto before 1942 deportations or "final solution".[41] Until the publication of official sterilization documents in Xinjiang, Turkic peoples' claims of genocide were overlooked across the social sciences. Focusing on physical outcomes and legal definitions reflects twentieth century state-centric geopolitics, overlooking threats to stateless peoples and depoliticizing state-violence unless state sovereignty is violated.[42] Instead, framing genocide as social death enables analysis of nonlinear genocidal processes that reorganize social relations and identity.[43]

Genocide scholars agree "the word is new, the crime ancient" when describing annihilation of Melos (fifth-century BCE) and Carthage (146 BCE).[44] Genghis Khan's thirteenth century genocides integrated Western Xia territory into the Mongol empire, while eighteenth century Manchu expansion incorporated eastern Turkestan into China, annihilating surrendering Zunghars and renaming the territory, Xinjiang ("new frontier").[45] However, genocides are neither mechanical nor have all predictors been catalogued.[46] Arendt's "total domination" in concentration camps referred to deprivation of group social vitality, not predictable, machine-like order.[47] Genocides are socially enacted, driven by connected and disconnected individuals and institutions, mechanistic in identifying peoples as threats yet often chaotically implemented. Stanton's "eight stages of genocide", defined through the UN Genocide Convention (UNCG),[48] begins with "us and them" classification and dehumanization, culminating in extermination.[49] Fein's "genocide by attrition" proceeds in five stages (identification, rights-stripping, segregation, isolation, and concentration).[50] Nevertheless, different relations between variables make genocides non-linear, with Kuper's famous conclusion that a theory of genocide is impossible informing Semelin's study of how historical context shapes implementation.[51]

Genocide is often interpreted in international law as mass killings with intent to physically destroy groups, preserving "the body of the group but

allowing its very soul to be destroyed".[52] Lemkin coined the genocide term to capture its cultural intent and effect, yet engineered weakening of targeted groups' social practices is often dismissed as inevitable effects of modernization or cultural diffusion. Such politically dominant perspectives overlook how anthropologists and Indigenous peoples conceive group maintenance through social practices, reducing people to identity-less bodies.[53] Social death, Claudia Card's term, builds on how social practices constitute groups as groups, structuring and giving meaning to individuals' lives. Physical death is not necessarily worse than "intolerable harms" of language loss, trauma, and disconnection from community, therefore mass killings are inessential to deprive groups of vitality and reproductive capacities.[54]

Describing German occupation across Europe, Lemkin explained, "genocide does not necessarily mean immediate destruction of a nation" but refers to "coordinated plans of different actions aiming at destruction of essential foundations of the life of national groups". [55] Genocide predates industrialization and exterminatory racism was never a necessary component of Fascism but German fascism industrialized genocide.[56] Following Lemkin's lobbying, initial UNCG drafts included cultural dimensions but UN debates concluded they could not be included alongside biological annihilation, "mass murders in gas chambers", and industrialized total war.[57] Genocide's meaning was a negotiated compromise in inter-state negotiations amidst total war. Nevertheless, convention drafters described cultural genocide as legitimate and it plays a subsidiary role in the detection of group destruction in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, qualifying as war crimes and crimes against humanity. The International Criminal Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and ICTR found individuals guilty of genocide based on small-scale acts in contexts of broader genocidal intent and practices to "destroy, in whole or in part" national, ethnic, or religious groups.[58] The UNCG's focus on intent acknowledges cultural dimensions and that physical destruction is inessential because, unlike homicide, genocide does not refer to perpetrators' success.[59]

Contemporary Genocide Studies reinvigorated Lemkin's theory of genocide as cultural, problematizing quantifying outcomes based on biological-racial survival.[60] The UNCG's definition of group destruction "in whole or in part", based on Lemkin's conceptualization, is often assumed to refer to quantities of killings but Card shows how "in part" referred to "part" of a group's essential foundations, including language, religion, and child-rearing.[61] Therefore, removal of Uyghur language as medium of instruction in 2004 represents destruction of group capacity to reproduce its cultural foundations.[62] Genocidal processes emerge in postcolonial societies, including Thailand and Indonesia, where identification and targeting of internal enemies are elite-led state-building processes.[63] Identifying these processes' emergence in pre-existing asymmetrical ethnic relations, supported by official narratives of

dehumanization and transformation, helps detect genocide by attrition prior to mass violence and when it does not include mass killings.[64] Early warning indicators in Xinjiang include the CCP's 1950 decision to enlist Xinjiang's Muslims before they must "give up religion".[65]

Critical Genocide Studies critiques "sociologically inadequate" dominant understandings of genocide as rapid, mass killings.[66] Going further, these physical framings *enable* genocides by recirculating biological conceptions of groups, de-escalating the moral urgency of gradual deprivation of identities and social vitality. The implications of language eradication and economic exclusion of minorities and Indigenous peoples in democratic states relegated these practices to cultural genocide at the Genocide Convention deliberations.[67] The UNCG debates enabled genocide by attrition of Indigenous peoples as *only* cultural or value-neutral modernization, tragically recycling German Fascism's biological-racial conceptualization of groups that these deliberations were to prevent.

Genocides are never singular outbursts of irrational, quantifiable harm. Empirical evidence from Cambodia, Warsaw ghetto, and Sudan, show how genocides are complex, long-term processes of cultural annihilation, not "directly murderous events" "tracked back to individual culpability".[68] Dualistic separation of physical and social is reinforced by centring mass killings while exempting gradual genocides, which are neither peculiarly Western nor modern. Genocides unfold gradually in many forms, justified using different logics embedded in different social contexts, but cause intolerable harm, qualitatively experienced as social death. Subsequent sections analyse how official narratives on China's ethnic politics enable genocidal processes and social death.

Section 2: "Fusion" as social death

This section historicizes contemporary CCP "fusion" policies, specifically how narratives of China's historic "ethnic problem" (*minzu wenti*) shape inclusion and exclusion of Turkic-speaking Muslims. PRC policymakers and anthropologists have debated "fusion" narratives since the 1950s. However, "fusion" emerged as explicit policy from the first Xinjiang Working Group Meetings, responding to Han-Uyghur violence in 2009, with Hu Jintao declaring "contact, communication, fusion" as party policy to end "relentless struggle with Xinjiang's separatist forces" and resolve the "ethnic problem".[69] Xi has maintained a narrative emphasis on "long-term security", "fusion", and "leapfrog development" in the party-state's "glorious mission" in Xinjiang: "settling the frontier is China's millennia-long historical inheritance to develop and defend the frontier".[70] However, explicit "Sinicisation of religion" policy and Xi's "furnace" metaphor to "fuse every *minzu*"[71] de-emphasizes contact and communication in favour of "fusion", even reversing the ubiquitous "plurality

and unity" (*duoyuan yiti*) concept to assert China's cultural unity.[72] James Leibold argues Xi's narrative of "cultural identity" as "soul of every *minzu*" reoriented policy from "ethnocultural heterogeneity" to "virulent" "cultural nationalism".[73] However, our analysis historicizes how "fusion" reflects gradual shifts from *nominal* cultural pluralism towards explicit assimilation to resolve the "ethnic problem" in China's ethnic policy since 1949.

Xi Jinping[74] and public intellectuals[75] describe "*new* conditions" of Western decline in a "post-American century" as unparalleled strategic "window of opportunity" to transform international and ethnic relations. "Fusion" policy's timing is explained through a "window of opportunity" in a "critical stability period", while the West turns inward and Belt-and-Road-Initiative (BRI) expands.[76] Throughout perpetual "opening-and-reform" (1978-onwards), Stalin's 1931 slogan, "backward nations get beaten", has been reformulated by public intellectuals as nineteenth-century resistance against the Manchu and European colonialism, explaining twenty-first-century desires to "modernise" and secure China.[77] Nevertheless, these explanations of "fusion" are embedded in narratives of China's unbroken "settler culture" and its frontiers' "ethnic problem".

Following Manchu imperial expansion into "barbarian"-populated "Western Regions" (*xiyu*), Eastern Turkestan was renamed "new frontier" (*Xinjiang*) in 1884.[78] Uyghurs widely reject this naming as colonial, generally preferring "East Turkestan" or "homeland" (*weten*). Nineteenth century imperial debates over whether to permit self-rule described Xinjiang as "barren wasteland".[79] Mao and Zhou Enlai considered the territory and its peoples as pieces in China's geopolitical "strategic chess game",[80] with "peaceful liberation" by Chinese troops sparking skirmishes with armed Kazakhs, officially described as "bandits", until the mid-1950s.[81] Mao and Zhou promised "self-determination" (*zijue*) for "every *minzu*"[82] but after 1949, stressed that "self-determination" under socialism was "reactionary" and regional autonomy (*zizhi*) will maintain territorial control of non-Han regions.[83] Party-state narratives and PRC constitution present formal equality of China's 56 *minzu*.[84] However, the *National Law on Regional Autonomy* was designed to ensure minority regions can "never be separated" and is explained through binary colonial narratives that minorities must be "modernised" and their "scientific level" raised by the state.[85]

Prior to 2012, the CCP's *nominal* cultural pluralism celebrated diversity but was confined within institution-building and policymaking to promote gradual assimilation. Developmentalist binary identity narratives structured party-state historiography, with policy documents explaining barbarians' willingness to become Chinese because before "liberation" by "advanced" Central Plains, Xinjiang's peoples were "backward" and enslaved in natural "frontier" subsistence.[86] Trading "simple, uncomplicated assistance", horses, and other natural goods with Han "frontier-builders", who supply "everything

they need for daily living", integrated barbarians into the "mutually complementary economy" (*jingji hubu*) forming the Chinese people "since ancient times".[87] These Han-centric official narratives interweave historical materialism and civilizational superiority, defining Kazakh and Uyghur identity construction by "mode of production" (nomadism or animal husbandry), while the Han's timeless "active spirit" and "transcendent" "frontier-building culture" (*tunken wenhua*) surpass material origins.[88] China's official founding narratives in Xinjiang resemble Roosevelt's "settler and pioneer" rescuing a "great continent" from "squalid savages" and General Roca's "virile people" occupying "fertile lands" of "savages" for progress and security.[89]

From 1949 until the Xi-era, official and scholarly consensus was that "one-nation, one-state" thinking contradicts China's "national conditions" as a non-Western multi-ethnic state.[90] The party-state described tensions between ethnic and national identity as the "ethnic problem", resolved by "scientifically" identifying ethnic groups and providing *de jure* equality for all.[91] Historical materialist class consciousness was to end China's history of "ethnic oppression" and promote "natural" assimilation (*tonghua*).[92] The explicitly geopolitical lens framing Xinjiang's position in China shifted as the CCP's ethnic classification project (*minzu shibie*) reformulated *Zhonghua Minzu* to mean 56 ethnic groups, replacing Liang Qichao's and Sun Yat-sen's conceptualization as "Han race" descending from Yellow Emperor.[93] The CCP emphasized "scientific Marxism" in its China's ethnic classification project but used lineage records,[94] focusing on differentiating majority Han from "non-Han", termed China's "odd calculus" of "55 + 1".[95] Mao and Zhou's framing of ethnic relations as geopolitical "strategic chess game" to create safe frontiers between Han China and European empires, considered "great Han chauvinism" and "local minority nationalism" significant obstacles to the state's goals.[96] However, Han's "higher levels" of "political, economic, and cultural development" conferred "special responsibility" to "develop minorities' economy and culture".[97] Deng Xiaoping considered "lingering" discrimination as "haunting" by "bourgeois nationalist thought" and that "the economy is foundation of resolving the *minzu* problem".[98] However, his imagined teleological end was *Chinese* identity (*Zhonghua Minzu*). Adopting historical materialism superimposed ethnocentric notions of progress onto China's imperial binaries (*hua-yi*), rather than decolonizing an imperial past.

Official resolution to the ethnic problem was traditionally framed through narration of China as 56 *minzu* in "plurality and unity" (*duoyuan yiti*) with Han as "centripetal force" (*ningjuli*).[99] This configuration drew from Fei Xiaotong, LSE-trained structural functionalist, who narrated China's formation through Han territorial expansion and assimilation of barbarians ("new blood for the Han").[100] Mongolian anthropologist, Jian Bozan, advised that "fusion" conceals China's history of "ethnic oppression" and promotes chauvinist assimilation.[101] However, official endorsement of Han-centric "fusion" recirculates

chauvinist historiography, associated with Fan Wenlan of the Zhejiang school, which considered Han identity authentic, superior, and continuous since the Qin-Han era (221BCE-220CE), contrasted against minority identities as modern Chinese political constructions.[102] Today, Turkic and Islamic identities are officially described as inauthentic Western "colonial manipulations".[103] "Ethnic unity" textbooks in Xinjiang's schools, universities, and cadre-training, narrate Han as "transcendent *minzu*" and "extinction" (*xiaowang*) of minority languages as progressive, "inevitable outcomes" of "modernisation".[104] The party-state narrates *Zhonghua Minzu* on terms by which it critiques Western colonialism, by framing Indigenous cultures as teleologically superfluous and cultural annihilation as value-neutral "modernisation". Nation-building goals of securing territory and transforming identities renders Xinjiang's Turkic peoples superfluous in the same teleological understanding of history[105] that justified European colonial and fascist genocides.

The twenty-first century CCP re-imagines Xinjiang through 5,000 years of unbroken Chinese civilization and "fusion", interweaving imperial traditions, European colonial thought, and historical materialism. Mao's "class struggle" and Hu Jintao's "scientific development" offered different economic plans but both conceived minority identities as passively superstructural to the economy and that material conditions naturally resolve the "ethnic problem" through gradual assimilation.[106] Jian Bozan described "ethnic extinction" (*minzu xiaowang*) as violent, Western colonization, contrasted against natural cultural fusion (*tonghua*)[107] but *xiaowang* and Cultural Revolution-era slogans, including "only if *minzu* exists can there be a *minzu* problem", re-emerged under Hu.[108] Post-2009 "ethnic unity education" textbooks teach that "fusion" (*jiaorong*) denotes "ethnic extinction" of minorities as "highest stage" of "historical development".[109] Xi's thinking builds on long-term Chinese debates and gradual shifts towards assimilation, for example, with "contact, communication, fusion" official policy following the Xinjiang Working Group Meeting in 2010. However, Xi's ethnic policy is officially celebrated as resolving China's national "contradictions" by prioritizing state-engineered "fusion", unity, and security, over diversity and development.[110]

Following the first Xinjiang Working Group meeting, a "2nd generation" of *minzu* policy scholars were unusually granted an online platform by the State Ethnic Affairs Commission in 2012 to debate sensitive policy matters. They insisted policymakers must resolve contradictions between plurality and unity with "fusion" into *Zhonghua Minzu* or race-state (*guozu*), recommending derecognizing the minority category, abandoning regional autonomy, and Mandarin-medium-only education.[111] The historical materialist "1st generation" argued that regional autonomy and ethnic equality preserve China's territorial integrity and ethnicity will naturally disappear with development.[112] The "first generation" warned China's leaders "not to repeat the same mistakes as the West", framing diversity as Chinese tradition and

fusion as "Han chauvinism", whilst arguing for gradual assimilation.[113] This state-sponsored platform recirculated the logics of China's Republican-era debates between reformers and revolutionaries on assimilation or exclusion of the "5 races" in struggles against the Manchu and European imperialism.[114] The underlying logics of the 2012 debates was that securing China requires resolving the "ethnic problem" of backward non-Han by enabling or promoting their social death.[115]

Xi's 19th Party Congress speeches subsequently de-recognized the ethnic minorities concept, referring only to cadre recruitment but describing a singular *Zhonghua Minzu* forty-three times, collocating with Great Revival in twenty-seven instances.[116] *Minzu* now officially refers to *Zhonghua Minzu* and more accurately translates as "Chinese race". Ma Rong celebrates how Xi's era "does not emphasise *our* minorities' special nature or rights", having "fused into one big family" and "direction of history".[117] Xi's approach of "collective consciousness"[118] drives organic unity (*yiti*) to supersede plurality (*duoyuan*) and transcends "*minzu* discourse". [119] Xi's "historic" reorganization of identity reinvigorates older imperial traditions that non-Han peoples are "less civilised" and *behind*, not different. Abandoning "Western" *minzu* thinking and derecognizing minorities is framed as reinvigorating imperial traditions of "teaching barbarians to be Chinese" (*jiaohua*) through "attraction", the opposite of Western assimilation.[120] *Jiaohua* appears in the camp system's "transformation education" titles and promotional videos illustrating "vocational training" (learning Mandarin and chanting praise to Xi).[121] The Xinjiang Museum's 2015 "Uyghur Culture" exhibit (Figure 1) publicly celebrated these binary relations of inferior, disappearing relics being consumed by modern Han "frontier-builders". The imagined teleological end of "fusion"



Figure 1. "Uyghur Culture". Exhibit from Xinjiang Regional Museum, 2015. Photograph by the author.

is a non-Western China and the Sinicization of backward frontier barbarians by modernizing Central Plains Han.

Since 1949, genocidal processes interweaving Han-centric "fusion" and "modernisation" have promoted gradual social death of Turkic peoples. "Fusion" physically contains and culturally reconstitutes Uyghurs in teleological progress, as "backward" "historical leftovers", "colonial manipulations", and obstacles to the "direction of history". China's multi-ethnic regional autonomy system was originally designed to maintain territorial control of frontiers and "modernise" peoples colonized by the Manchu. The CCP's *gradual* reorientation towards assimilation builds on long-term narratives of "setter culture" and "modernisation" framing shifts to monolingual-medium education in 2004 and "fusion" after 2009. Ma Rong considered this policy necessary for China to reinvigorate its own traditions and "develop into a modernised nation".[122] Official texts explained Mandarin is a "transcendent language" communicating "modern information", unlike Turkic languages, because the Han are a "transcendent group".[123] "Fusion" crystallized during 2012 ethnic policy debates as explicit policy to reorganize identities and save China in a "new era" (*xin shidai*) of global power and domestic insecurity.

Section 3: Social death in Xinjiang

This section analyses the application and impact of "fusion" in Xinjiang, focusing on narrative framings of internment camps and secure "centralised boarding facilities" for children. Following Han-Uyghur violence in 2009 and 2014–2015, camps and inter-generational separation were explained as processes of "modernisation" and "de-extremification" to promote "fusion". The party-state interpreted inter-ethnic violence through its pre-existing narrative lens that framed Xinjiang's peoples as "backward" problems. In 2009, Xinjiang's high-school textbooks taught ethnic unity is built on relations between advanced Han and undeveloped minorities, the basis of "national strength" and China's Great Revival.[124] Genocides are often sparked by threatened states[125] but the referent of security here is politically constructed identity, not material survival, and non-Chinese identity is an existential threat. By "looking for Birkenau", international media overlooks longer-term narratives of social death described by Indigenous artists and intellectuals, enabling genocidal practices to persist unchallenged *as* genocide.

"Fusion" policy emerged in party-state meetings on breaking cycles of ethnic violence. Universalized Ethnic Unity education texts explained the violence by reorganizing identity narratives in ways which invisibilized Uyghur history and framed Turkic identities as threats: only "the Three Evils" (separatists, terrorists, and extremists) dispute party-state narratives that Uyghurs are "not a Turkic group" and "not an Islamic group".[126] The 2009 mass violence[127] was described as "zero-sum political struggle of life or death" for China's

survival against "Three Evils" and "scum of the nation".[128] The CCP under Xi attempts to break these cycles and resolve narrative tensions between imperialism, nationalism, and chauvinism, by reconstituting identities through "fusion" to tightly hold Xinjiang's peoples together "like pomegranate seeds".[129] Since 2017, "fusion" includes mass extra-legal internment camps as "Education and Transformation Centres" (*jiaoyu peixun zhongxin*) and inter-generational separation as "children's rescue care centres" (*ertong jiuzhu guanaibaohu zhongxin*). By 2018, scholars extrapolated from official figures, estimating that 1.5 million people have been interned since appointment of regional party-chief, Chen Quanguo and intensification of "de-extremification" in 2015.[130] The CCP describes internment and inter-generational separation in North America and Australia as settler colonialism but its comparable "fusion" practices as rational responses to Uyghur violence because "happiness is the most important human right".[131]

Commemorating the 2009 violence, Chinese artist, Baidiucao, captured the global phenomena of genocide using Auschwitz gates to "remind the world how evil China's genocide is" (Figure 2).[132] *Xinjiang Auschwitz* draws parallels between Xinjiang's camp system and Nazi concentration camps, collapsing East–West binaries and communicating moral urgency to Anglophone audiences "always looking for Birkenau". Unlike "ethnic cleansing" in former Yugoslavia or mass killings at Auschwitz, CCP "fusion" desires barbarians' attraction to China and recognition of their own inauthenticity. Inter-generational separation in secure boarding facilities, described as "loving heart nurseries" and "kindness kindergartens", raise and educate around 100,000 Uyghur children

Figure 2. Baidiucao (2020) *Xinjiang Auschwitz*.

from a few months old.[133] Local government documents explain inter-generational separation helps children of parents "detained in re-education" and those who "work", "happily grow up under loving care of the Party".[134] Nevertheless, Uyghur parents describe how these practices coercively "separate" all families with children "living like orphans" in "jail".[135] One Han teacher's clothing donations appeal described children in "thin, torn, dirty, and smelly clothing", working in freezing winter classrooms,[136] while parents engage in seasonal work.[137] These genocidal practices go "beyond physical annihilation", using "mechanisms of symbolic enactment" to re-organize social relations and identity for China's "happiness".[138]

China's internment camps target groups' cultural foundations, irreducible to politicide, counterterrorism, or Islamophobia. XUAR Justice Department Party Secretary, Zhang Yun, explained policies target Uyghurs because at least 30 per cent must be "re-educated" as "extremists" while 70 per cent are vulnerable to "extremism", linked to "ideological viruses" of Uyghur attachments to language and religion.[139] *Xinjiang Victims Database* records disappearances and family testimonies, listing most known Uyghur intellectuals and artists: Rahile Dawut for academic research on pre-Islamic shrines, Sanubar Tursun and Abdurehim Heyit for performing folk music, and Adil Mijit, a government arts troupe comedian.[140] Targeting cultural institutions and highly-trained intellectuals for "re-education" and "vocational training" illustrates their goal of re-organizing Uyghur-ness. Eliticide,[141] systematic targeting of community figures to prevent resistance to genocides, is well-documented in diaspora art. *Sulu Artco*, an "artivist collective raising awareness about disappearing Uyghur artists, intellectuals, and scholars" captured international attention using social-media hashtags, *#MeTooUyghur* (Figure 3), illustrating the silencing of moderate intellectuals as metaphor for elimination of Uyghur cultural foundations.[142]

Beyond eliticide, "population Data Collection Forms" use AI facial-recognition technology, determining detainments in bureaucratic exercises collating scores by "ethnicity", "religion", "holding a passport", "having foreign contacts", or "relatives in detention".[143] The group is targeted as a group, dividing people as "safe, average, and unsafe", constituting "average" Uyghurs as potential threats. Administrative classification of detainees defines 3 categories of participants in "terrorist or extremist activities": those "not serious enough to constitute a crime", those who "demonstrated willingness to receive training", and those completing prison sentences but "ordered by people's courts to receive education".[144] These categories' scope is limitless and represent superficial organizational measures that conceal essential principles of arbitrary, extra-legal selection to deprive Xinjiang's peoples of any "right to rights".[145]

Detainees' families are ordinarily given no reasons for disappearances. Explanations given to released detainees recorded by XVD are mirrored in

Figure 3. Sulu.art.co (2020) *#MeTooUyghur*.

official documents leaked by the ICIJ, including extra-legal sentences for "wearing a headscarf" or "bearing more children than permitted".[146] Reasons given to families publicly campaigning for information about disappeared relatives include: not greeting officials appropriately, not smoking, not watching state television, using *whatsapp* messenger, "contractual requirements" to maintain employment, being born in the 1980s–1990s ("untrustworthy generation"), "staying too long in Kazakhstan" and being exposed to "foreign thought", "applying for a foreign visa", and writing letters to gain information about family whereabouts.[147] Official government documents summarize the system's immediate goals as "de-extremification" and "vocational training", using Xi's slogans, "preparing for dangers in advance" and "never forget our original mission".[148] The system targets Xinjiang's Indigenous peoples per se by framing innocuous behaviours as "terrorist activities" and threats to China's "mission" demanding extra-legal detainment.

Isolating and concentrating peoples in camps creates conditions where they exist outside law and no longer belong to community, confirming

"the fundamental belief of totalitarianism that everything is possible".[149] Former detainees' testimonies to US Congress, human rights organizations, journalists, and scholars, describe camp conditions: cramped rooms with no sanitation, beatings and torture for crying or using Uyghur language, poor nutrition, daily renunciations of Islam and praising Xi for food, and multiple gang-rapes by guards as punishment with prisoners forced to watch the violence.[150] Gulzira Auelhan had been "exposed to foreign thought" by staying "too long" in Kazakhstan, testifying how she and detainees, aged 17–72 were kept in rooms with up to 60 people and repeatedly hit with electric batons ("always on the head") when exceeding two-minute toilet breaks. Surveillance cameras monitor detainees' behaviour and emotional responses, with crying leading to punishment of 14 hours sitting upright on hard chairs for being "infected with bad thoughts". [151] Amanzhan Seiituly described beatings and solitary confinement for using "wrong words" or being unable to sing the national anthem.[152] These violent performative rituals show Uyghurs "everything is possible", reversing humiliation through sexual violence against Uyghur bodies as "colonial manipulations" and superfluous objects in China's "historic mission".

Uyghur diaspora artists and intellectuals describe the absence of information on family wellbeing as "trauma". Families know anything is possible, triggering experiences that mirror Indigenous "suicidal despair" "under colonial genocide" and concentration camp survivors' trauma.[153] UK-based Uyghur writer, Aziz Isa's dramatized short film, *Unanswered Telephone Call,* documents his experiences after being denied a visa and telephone access to his grieving mother following his father's death. Aziz writes, "I had become so powerless that I couldn't even protect my own right to speak to my own parents, and had no idea whether they were alive or dead", yet this "still continues".[154] Aziz describes CCP policy since 1949 as "slow genocide": "they don't use machine guns or gas chambers … they believe they can do *anything* … the aim is to make you mentally ill".[155] Uyghur linguist Ablimit Baki's diaspora narratives project explains how family separation is felt "as trauma, but also as torture".[156] Yusuf, a UK-based Uyghur described three years of family separation: "not knowing their health and wellbeing is slowly pushing my anxiety to an abyss of depression". Abdul in Norway, described mental "torture", asking "what is my crime to be separated from my family?". Camp survivors and separated relatives experience social death and suffer post-traumatic stress, well-documented humiliation techniques in European genocides.[157] Gulzira Auelhan testified to repeated triggering of experiences of sexual violence when her identity card activates metal detectors across Xinjiang's public spaces, resulting in automatic police interrogation.[158]

Diaspora artist, Yi Xiaocuo considers "not knowing" as "trauma" and provides an online art platform, *Camp Album*, to support separated families.[159]

Daily Reflection of a Xinjiang Person (Figure 4) portrays "perpetual silence, stigma, and representational violence they always have to face alone", reflecting Indigenous trauma that "anything is possible" in perpetual states of emergency.[160] The body is overwhelmed and identity invisibilized by inscriptions of long-term official narratives enabling genocide: "Western region, good at drinking, separatism, uncivilized, backward, frontier, good at singing and dancing, kebab, ethnic minority, East Turkistan, poverty, superstitious, independence, hand-pulled noodle, backward, traitor, thief district, terrorism, extremism, exotic, little sister, undeveloped, sexy, foreign forces". *Daily Reflection* illustrates how ethnic groups survive physical violence but experience

Figure 4. Yi Xiaocuo (2020) *Daily Reflection of a Xinjiang Person*.

long-term social death, invisibilized by official celebrations of modernization and cultural unity.

Conclusions

This paper showed how genocidal practices in China seek to secure an imagined non-Western, civilizational identity, enabled by narratives on Turkic otherness, backwardness, and threat. CCP "fusion" policy interweaves semantically hybrid Western and Chinese narratives, colonial and anti-colonial, seeking to reverse nineteenth century colonial humiliation in twenty-first century elimination of Xinjiang's Turkic Muslim identities. Popular understandings of genocide as physical destruction reflect mid-twentieth century biological conceptions of identity, limiting practitioners' ability to detect and understand new genocides by attrition. Internment camps and inter-generational separation promote social death and "destruction of essential foundations" of Xinjiang's Turkic peoples by preventing transmission of identity practices.[161] Although China Studies effectively critiques assertions of China's ethnic homogeneity in eurocentric nationalism literature, it is less effective in addressing the implications of ethnocentrism in Xinjiang, partly because camps to isolate peoples are associated with colonial genocides and fascism, outside its traditional knowledge boundaries.

CCP ethnic policy documents explain concrete decision-making through teleological progress towards China's modernization and "original mission". The Great Revival's elimination of ethnic difference blurs historical materialist progress and culturalist romanticism, resembling German Fascism's paradoxical mission of national progress to revive "great cultural achievements of antiquity" by "radical removal" of "inferior elements" opposed to the state's philosophy.[162] However, China's "re-education" camp system practices isolation not expulsion, demanding Uyghur recognition of Han cultural superiority and their own "backwardness". "Fusion" policy destroys, in part, the foundations of groups' life, language, religion, and inter-generational cultural transmission, resolving the "ethnic problem" through social death of Turkic Muslims. The trauma of sexual violence, posting of male cadres to sleep with wives of interned men, and sterilization are well-documented in personal testimonies.[163] These genocidal practices emerge from generations of debate about how to socially organize ethnic identities to enhance China's state power.

Genocide is always cultural in intent and effect. China's 2012 ethnic policy debates on resolving the "ethnic problem" with economic development or identity-engineering recycled Republican-era contestations over saving China through assimilation or separation for the "5 races" in Xi's "new era". These narratives are consistent with Card's idea of social death and Feierstein's conceptualization of genocide as technologies of power to

reconstitute group identities. "Fusion" in Xinjiang's internment camps aims to transform adults while inter-generational separation prevents cultural transmission of language and religion, framed as security measures against threats of terrorism and backwardness to progress and "happiness". Former detainees are monitored and families abroad disconnected after leaving the camp system, perpetuating trauma that anything is possible. The camps "teach barbarians to be Chinese" through violent humiliation and "re-education". "Re-education" and torture in camps cannot attract barbarians or transform identities but prevent their maintenance through trauma and severing intra-ethnic contact.

China's genocidal "fusion" politics projects global power anxieties ("backward nations get beaten") inwards onto Xinjiang's Turkic peoples. The CCP describes Western decline as "window of opportunity", explaining that mass internment camps will defeat the "foundations of separatism", Turkic and Islamic identities, "*forever*".[164] The party-state's conceptualization of China has gradually shifted from nominal cultural pluralism (56 *minzu*) to cultural nationalism (*Zhonghua Minzu*) but preserves long-term narratives that non-Han frontiers are cultural and political problems for China. The self-perceived threatened state's genocidal narratives persisted in plain sight and are now implemented in monolingual-medium education in Inner Mongolia[165] and Hui Muslim communities.[166] Internment camps, used by European settlers to isolate Native Americans and Australian Aboriginal peoples as threats to colonial state-building, seek to convince Xinjiang's peoples of the paradox that they have always been Chinese *and* culturally behind the Han. The party-state adapts sovereignty, a principle it considers European, to assert China's right to practice genocide. Disagreements on "fruitful results of de-radicalization measures in Xinjiang" are considered intervention and "disrespect for the modernization process of the Chinese people". [167] History's tragic "cyclical order" defies modernist teleological conceptualizations from China and the West, recurring "the first time as tragedy, the second as farce".[168]

Notes

1. Pan (2008).
2. Anand (2019); Barabantseva (2011); Gladney (2004); Schein (2000).
3. Bovingdon (2020); Cliff (2016); Dautcher (2009); Roberts (2020); Smith Finley (2013).
4. Miller (2011).
5. Ma (2007).
6. "Sinicisation of religion" is now official policy. See: Xi (2020).
7. Xi (2019).

8. Official translation of *minzu* changed from "nationality" to "ethnicity" during the 1990s to avoid associations with self-determination. *Minzu* does not entail self-identification and Chinese scholars prefer it left untranslated.
9. Ethnic integration models contrast cultural pluralism (maintenance of difference alongside social inclusion) and assimilation (minorities adopt dominant culture). See: Giddens and Sutton (2017).
10. Chow, Doak, and Fu (2001).
11. Rosenberg (2012).
12. Benjamin (1940).
13. Byler (2021); Murphy and Elimä (2021); Thum (2021); Zenz (2019a, 2019b, 2020).
14. Feierstein (2014).
15. Card (2010); Fein (1997); Hinton (2012); Kingston (2015); Semelin (2007).
16. Feierstein (2014, 1 & 205).
17. See: Yue (2007). Also, see: *Bingtuan Jingshen*, chapter 1. This party-state training manual teaches official Chinese history in Xinjiang.
18. Fei (1988).
19. Feierstein (2014, 46–48).
20. Zhou (1950).
21. Roberts (2018).
22. Smith Finley (2021).
23. Maybury-Lewis (2002).
24. These are standardised slogans on China's ancient and progressive "settler culture" (*tunken wenhua*). See: State Council (2014a).
25. Benson and Svanberg (1998).
26. Xi (2014).
27. Hinton (2012).
28. Card (2010); Rosenberg (2012).
29. Fiskesjö (2017).
30. Chow, Doak, and Fu (2001, 53); Leibold (2007).
31. Mao (1923, 1926).
32. Ethnic Unity Education Board (EUAB) (2009); Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Regional Government (XUAR) (2009).
33. XUAR (2018).
34. State Council (2019a, 2019b); XUAR (2018).
35. Card (2010, 4).
36. Lemkin (1944).
37. Card (2010, 8–9, 16–17).
38. Rosenberg (2012, 20).
39. Clark (2015).
40. Hinton (2012, 11–13); Straus (2007); Moses (2021); Stroehlein (2009).
41. Fein (1997, 14).
42. Bloxham and Moses (2010); Shapiro (1989).
43. Feierstein (2014); Green, MacManus and Venning (2015).
44. Card (2010, 264); Kuper (2011); Lemkin (1944, 79); Maybury-Lewis (2002, 43).
45. Perdue (2005).
46. Cushman (2003, 537).
47. Arendt (2000).
48. United Nations (1948).
49. Stanton (1998).
50. Fein (1979).

51. Kuper (1981, 2011, 101); Semelin (2007).
52. Kingston (2015, 63); Nersessian (2005).
53. Kingston (2015, 63–64); Short (2010).
54. Card (2010, 97 & 284).
55. Lemkin (1944, 79).
56. Kuper (2011, 325).
57. Nersessian (2005).
58. UN (1948) art. 2. See Clark (2015) on how establishing "intent" requires evidence of planning not control.
59. Card (2010, 274).
60. See: Bloxham and Moses (2010); Fein (1997); Rosenberg (2012); Semelin (2007).
61. Card (2010, 296–297).
62. The Xinjiang Ministry of Education announced "Bilingual Education" policy in 2004, denoting adoption of Mandarin as medium-of-instruction, except four hours per-week minority literature studies for non-Han students. See: Schluessel (2007).
63. Miller (2011); Winichakul (1994).
64. Card (2010, 303–304); Fein (1997, 13).
65. CCPCC (CCP Central Committee) (1950).
66. Short (2010, 833).
67. Bilsky and Klagsburn (2018).
68. Rosenberg (2012, 20).
69. Hu (2010).
70. State Council (2014b).
71. See: Li (2012).
72. State Council (2014c).
73. Leibold (2019); Xi (2019).
74. Xi (2015, 2017a, 2017b).
75. See: Hu (2012); Zhang (2012).
76. XUAR (2018), section 2.
77. See: Wang (2014, 8); Zhu (2017).
78. Perdue (2005).
79. Millward (2007).
80. Leaders still explain policy and Han behaviour towards Uyghurs through "chess thinking" to maintain control of non-Han frontiers. See: Li (2014).
81. Zhou (1950, 63).
82. Zhou (1949).
83. Clarke (2007); Leibold (2007).
84. PRC Constitution (2004).
85. *Zhonghua Renmingongheguo Minzu Diquyu Zizhifa* (2001).
86. State Council (2009a, 2009b).
87. State Council (2009a, 6); State Ethnic Affairs Commission (SEAC) (2009).
88. SEAC (2009, 2–8, 56–97). *Tunken wenhua* literally translates as "station-troops-to-open-up-wasteland" culture.
89. Maybury-Lewis (2002, 46–48).
90. Pan (2008).
91. PRC Constitution (2004); Fei (1980); Mullaney (2011).
92. Jian (1960).
93. Callahan (2008, 134); Chow, Doak, and Fu (2001, 53); Leibold (2007, 32–33).
94. Fei (1980, 166).

95. Mullaney (2011).
96. Mao (1949); Zhou (1950, 63; 1951).
97. Liu (1954); Mao (1956).
98. Deng (1953).
99. Liu (1954, 118–122); Ma (2018).
100. Fei (1988).
101. Jian (1960, 14 & 19–21).
102. Fan (1954).
103. State Council (2019a), Section 2; XEP (Xinjiang Education Press) (2009).
104. XEP (2009, 91–95).
105. Arendt (1958).
106. Hu (2007).
107. Jian (1960).
108. EUAB (2009, 37); Shijian Bianjibu (Practice – Editorial) (1965).
109. EUAB (2009, 17 & 79).
110. XUAR (2018), Section 2.
111. Hu and Hu (2012); Ma (2012).
112. Shengli (2011); Hao (2012).
113. Shengli (2011); Hao (2012).
114. Chow, Doak, and Fu (2001, 53); Leibold (2007, 30).
115. See: Leibold (2013).
116. Xi (2017a, 2017b).
117. Ma (2018).
118. Xi (2017b).
119. Ma (2018, 121).
120. Ma (2007, 5–7).
121. Xinjiang Victims Database (XVD) (2018); Tursun (2018).
122. Ma (2007, 240–241).
123. XEP (2009, 91–93).
124. MOI (Ministry of Information, Theoretical Department) (2009).
125. Maybury-Lewis (2002, 51).
126. XEP (2009, 55); State Council (2019a), section 1.
127. Armed police distributed wooden truncheons to Han rioters attacking Uyghurs. See: UHRP (2011).
128. XEP (2009, 15).
129. China Daily (2017).
130. Roberts (2018, 246–250); Zenz (2019a).
131. State Council (2019a), section 6.
132. See: https://camp-album.com/2020/01/30/badiucaos-chilling-images-of-xinjiang-camps/
133. Zenz (2019b).
134. Hetian Ling Juli (2018); Kashgar Government Public Information Platform (2018).
135. AP (2018).
136. Wang (2019).
137. It is common practice for rural families across China to find seasonal work, leaving children in grandparents' care.
138. Feierstein (2014, 205).
139. Chinese Human Rights Defenders (CHRD) (2018).
140. XVD, https://shahit.biz/eng/.

141. Pakulski (2016).
142. Camp Album Project (2020).
143. Chin (2019); Human Rights Watch (HRW) (2019).
144. State Council (2019a), Section 5; State Council (2019b), Section 2.
145. Arendt (2000, 450–451).
146. ICIJ (2019).
147. XVD records over 13,000 detainment cases. Reasons listed here draw solely from "exemplary entries", verified by multiple witnesses and written in detail: https://shahit.biz/eng/#lists.
148. *Lingdao Juece Xinxi* (Leader's Policy News) (2018); State Council (2019a), Section 5; (2019b), preface.
149. Arendt (2000, 36–37, 119).
150. Ayup (2021); Haitiwaji (2021); Bekali (2021); Sidik (2021); HRW (2018); Mauk (2019); Tursun (2021).
151. XVD (2018); Gulzira Auelhan, https://shahit.biz/eng/viewentry.php?entryno=1723; Auelhan (2021).
152. XVD (2018).
153. Card (2010, 306–307); Maybury-Lewis (2002, 49).
154. Aziz (2018).
155. Interview with Aziz Isa, April 2021.
156. Ablimit (2022).
157. Card (2010, 303–304).
158. XVD (2018).
159. Camp Album Project (2019).
160. Yi (2020).
161. Lemkin (1944, 79–81).
162. Kogon (2006, 3–4).
163. Mauk (2019).
164. XUAR (2018), Section 3.1.
165. Leibold and Roche (2020).
166. Stroup (2019).
167. PRC Embassy, UK (2020).
168. Arendt (1958, 279); Marx (1972).

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

ORCID

David Tobin http://orcid.org/0000-0003-1212-111X

References

Ablimit, Baki. 2022. "The Effect of Xinjiang's Virtual Lockdown on the Uyghur Diaspora." In *The Xinjiang Emergency*, edited by Michael Clarke. Manchester: University of Manchester Press, forthcoming.

Anand, Dibyesh. 2019. "Colonization with Chinese Characteristics." *Central Asian Survey* 38: 129–147.

AP. 2018. *China Treats Uighur Kids as Orphans after Parents Seized*. https://apnews.com/903a97b7c62a47b98553b6f422827dd7.
Arendt, Hannah. 1958. "The Modern Concept of History." *The Review of Politics* 20: 4.
Arendt, Hannah. 2000. *The Origins of Totalitarianism*. London: Penguin Books.
Auelhan, Gulzira. 2021. "Witness Statement." *Uyghur Tribunal*, September 13.
Ayup, Abduweli. 2021. "Witness Statement." *Uyghur Tribunal*, June 4.
Aziz, Isa. 2018. *An Unanswered Telephone Call*. http://www.azizisa.org/en/an-unanswered-telephone-call/.
Baidiucao. 2020. *Xinjiang Auschwitz*. https://camp-album.com/2020/01/30/badiucaos-chilling-images-of-xinjiang-camps/
Barabantseva, Elena. 2011. *Overseas Chinese, Ethnic Minorities, and Nationalism*. Oxon: Routledge.
Bekali, Omir. 2021. "Witness Statement." *Uyghur Tribunal*, June 4.
Benjamin, Walter. 1940. *On the Concept of History*. http://www.sfu.ca/~andrewf/CONCEPT2.html.
Benson, Linda, and Ingvar Svanberg. 1998. *China's Last Nomads: The History and Culture of China's Kazakhs*. New York: ME Sharpe.
Bilsky, Leora, and Rachel Klagsburn. 2018. "The Return of Cultural Genocide?" *European Journal of International Law* 29 (2): 373–395.
Bloxham, Donald, and Dirk Moses. 2010. "Changing Themes in the Study of Genocide." In *Oxford Handbook of Genocide Studies*, edited by Donald Bloxham, and Dirk Moses, 8. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Bovingdon, Gardner. 2020. *The Uyghurs: Strangers in Their own Land*. New York: Columbia University Press.
Byler, Darren. 2021. *In the Camps*. New York: Columbia University.
Callahan, William A. 2008. *China: The Pessoptimist Nation*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Camp Album Project. 2019. *Camp Album Project - Art to Fight Xinjiang Abuse*. https://camp-album.com/about/.
Camp Album Project. 2020. "Sulu.art.co". *Camp Album Project*. https://camp-album.com/2020/01/30/sulu-art-co/.
Card, Claudia. 2010. *Confronting Evils*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
CCPCC (CCP Central Committee). 1950. *Zhonggong Zhongyang Guanyu Tongyi Xinjiang Jiandang Jige Wenti de Guiding de Pifa* [Reply from CCPCC on Several Issues Regarding the Party's Establishment in Xinjiang]. In CCPCC Document Research Office (ed) (2010).
Chin, Josh. 2019. "Twelve Days in Xinjiang." *Wall Street Journal*. https://www.wsj.com/articles/twelve-days-in-xinjiang-how-chinas-surveillance-state-overwhelms-daily-life-1513700355.
China Daily. 2017. *Cherish Ethnic Unity*. www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2017twosession/2017-03/11/content_28515253.htm.
Chinese Human Rights Defenders (CHRD). 2018. *China: Massive Numbers of Uighurs and other Ethnic Minorities Forced into Re-Education Programs*. https://www.nchrd.org/2018/08/china-massive-numbers-of-uyghurs-other-ethnic-minorities-forced-into-re-education-programs/.
Chow, Kai-Wing, Kevin M. Doak, and Poshek Fu, eds. 2001. "Narrating the Nation, Race, and National Culture." In *Constructing Nationhood in Modern East Asia*, edited by Kai-Wing Chow, Kevin M. Doak, and Poshek Fu, 47–85. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
Clark, Janine Natalya. 2015. "Elucidating the Dolus Specialis." *Criminal Law Forum* 26: 531.

Clarke, Michael. 2007. "The Problematic Progress of 'Integration' in the Chinese State's Approach to Xinjiang." *Asian Ethnicity* 8 (3): 261–289.
Cliff, Tom. 2016. *Oil and Water: Being Han in Xinjiang*. Chicago: Chicago University Press.
Cushman, Thomas. 2003. "Is Genocide Preventable? Some Theoretical Considerations." *Journal of Genocide Research* 5 (4): 523–542.
Dautcher, Jay. 2009. *Down a Narrow Road*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Deng, Xiaoping. 1953. *Jiejue Minzu Wenti de Jichu shi Jingji* [The economy is foundation of resolving *minzu* problem]. In CCPCC Document Research Office (ed) (2010), 104–105.
Ethnic Unity Education Board (EUAB). 2009. *Minzu Lilun Changshi ('Common Knowledge of Ethnic Theory')*, 60. Beijing: Central Television and Broadcasting Publishing House.
Fan, Wenlan. 1954. *Shilun Zhongguo zi Qin-Han shi Chengwei Tongyi Guojiade Yuanyin* [Analysis of reasons China became a Unified Nation during Qin-Han Period]. In Peng et al. (2013), 12–13.
Fei, Xiaotong. 1980. *Guanyu Woguo Minzu Shibie Wenti* [China's Ethnic Classification Project]. Zhongguo Shehui Kexue, 1.
Fei, Xiaotong. 1988. "Plurality and Unity in the Configuration of the Chinese People." *Tanner Lectures on Human Values*. https://tannerlectures.utah.edu/_documents/a-to-z/f/fei90.pdf.
Feierstein, Daniel. 2014. *Genocide as Social Practice*, 14. New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press.
Fein, Helen. 1979. *Accounting for Genocide*. New York: Free Press.
Fein, Helen. 1997. "Genocide by Attrition." *Health and Human Rights* 2 (2): 10–45.
Fiskesjö, Magnus. 2017. "The Legacy of the Chinese Empires." *Education About Asia* 22 (1): 6.
Giddens, A., and P. Sutton. 2017. *Sociology*. Cambridge: Polity.
Gladney, Dru. 2004. *Dislocating China*. London: Hirst & Co.
Green, Penny, Thomas MacManus, and Alice de la Cour Venning. 2015. *Countdown to Annihilation: Genocide in Myanmar*. http://statecrime.org/data/2015/10/ISCI-Rohingya-Report-PUBLISHED-VERSION.pdf, p. 14.
Haitiwaji, Gulbahar. 2021. "Witness Statement." June 6.
Hao Shiyuan. 2012. "Zhongguo Minzu Zhengce de Hexin Yuanze bu rong Gaibian." [China's Ethnic Policies are Hard to Improve]. *CCP News Online*. http://theory.people.com.cn/GB/17106132.html.
Hetian Ling Juli. 2018. *Dian zan! Hetian zhequn liaobuqi de haizi yong yishu de lilliang cujin guojia tongyong yuyan wenzi de xuexi* [Hotan's Great Children Use Art to Promote Study of National Language]. https://archive.fo/JNf4s.
Hinton, Alexander. 2012. "Critical Genocide Studies." *Genocide Studies and Prevention* 7 (1): 4–15.
HRW (Human Rights Watch). 2018. *Eradicating Ideological Viruses*. https://www.hrw.org/report/2018/09/09/eradicating-ideological-viruses/chinas-campaign-repression-against-xinjiangs.
HRW (Human Rights Watch). 2019. *China's Algorithms of Repression*. https://www.hrw.org/report/2019/05/01/chinas-algorithms-repression/reverse-engineering-xinjiang-police-mass-surveillance.
Hu, Jintao. 2007. "Hold High the Great Banner of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics and Strive for New Victories in Building Moderately Prosperous Society in all Respects." In *Documents of the 17th National Congress of the CPC, 13–14. Beijing: Foreign Languages Press*.

Hu, Jintao. 2010. *Nüli Tuijin Xinjiang Kuayueshi Fazhan he Changzhijiu'an* [Earnestly Promote Leapfrog-Development and Long-term Security]. In Central Party Documents Research Office (2014) *Xinjiang Shengchan Jianshe Bingtuan Gongzuo Wenxuan Xuanbian* (Xinjiang Bingtuan – Selected Documents), 293, 302–304. Beijing: Zhongyang Wenxian Chubanshe.

Hu, Angang. 2012. *Zhongguo 2020: Yige Xinxing Chaoji Daguo (China 2020: A New Type of Superpower)*. Zhejiang: Zhejiang People's Press.

Hu, Angang, and Lianhe Hu. 2012. *Di Er Dai Minzu Zhengce: Cujin Minzu Jiaorong Yiti he Fanhua Yiti* [2nd Generation of *Minzu* Policies: Promoting *Minzu* Fusion and Prosperity in an Organic Whole], *China Ethnicity and Religion Online*. http://www.mzb.com.cn/html/Home/report/293093-1.htm.

ICIJ. 2019. China Cables, https://www.icij.org/investigations/china-cables/.

Jian, Bozan. 1960. "Guanyu Chuli Zhongguosho shang de Minzu Guanxi Wenti" [On the Question of how to Deal with Ethnic Relations in Chinese History]." In *(2013) Zhongguo Jindai Minzushi Yanjiu Wenxian (Research Documents on Modern China's Ethnic History)*, edited by Wulin Peng, 14–28. Beijing: Social Science Academic Press.

Kashgar Government Public Information Platform. 2018. *Guanyu Zuohao Chengxiang Jumin Canjia 2019 Yiliao Baoxian de Tongzhi* [Notice on Urban and Rural Residents Participation in Medical Insurance]. https://archive.fo/pXZbj.

Kingston, Lindsey. 2015. "Destruction of Identity: Cultural Genocide and Indigenous Peoples." *Journal of Human Rights* 14 (1): 63–83.

Kogon, Eugen. 2006. *The Theory and Practice of Hell*. New York: Farrar Struas and Giroux.

Kuper, Leo. 1981. "Theories of Genocide." *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 4 (3): 320.

Kuper, Leo. 2011. *Genocide*, 11. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Leibold, James. 2007. *Reconfiguring Chinese Nationalism*, 30–31. New York: Palgrave.

Leibold, James. 2013. "Ethnic Policy in China: Is Reform Inevitable?" *East-West Center Policy Studies*, 1–65. https://www.eastwestcenter.org/sites/default/files/private/ps068.pdf.

Leibold, James. 2019. "Planting the Seed." *China Brief* 19 (22). https://jamestown.org/program/planting-the-seed-ethnic-policy-in-xi-jinpings-new-era-of-cultural-nationalism/

Leibold, James, and Gerald Roche. 2020. "China's Second-Generation Policies are Already Here." *Made in China Journal*. https://madeinchinajournal.com/2020/09/07/chinas-second-generation-ethnic-policies-are-already-here/.

Lemkin, Rafael. 1944. *'Axis Rule in Occupied Europe'*. DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

Li, Keqiang. 2012. "Fahuihao Xinxingshi xia Bingtuan Wending Shubian de Teshu Zuoyong." In Central Party Documents Research Office (2014), 329.

Li, Keqiang. 2014. "Fahuihao Xinxingshixia Bingtuan Weiwenshubian de Teshu Zuoyong." In Central Party Documents Research Office, 330.

Lingdao Juece Xinxi (Leader's Policy News). 2018. "Dahao Xinshidai Kaojuan Zuodao Sange Yiyiguanzhi" [Answering Examination of the New Era with 3 Consistents], 18, p. 4.

Liu, Shaoqi. 1954. "Guanyu Minzu Quyu Zizhi Wenti" [Regarding the Problem of Ethnic Regional Autonomy]. In CCPCC Document Research Office (ed) (2010), 120.

Ma, Rong. 2007. *New Perspective in Guiding Ethnic Relations in the Twenty-First Century*, 21: University of Nottingham China Policy Institute.

Ma, Rong. 2012. "Dangqian Zhongguo de Minzu Wenti de Zhengjie yu Chulu" [Crux and Solution to the Ethnic Problem in Contemporary China]. *China Ethnicity and Religion Online*. http://www.mzb.com.cn/html/Home/report/293002-1.htm.
Ma, Rong. 2018. "'Xi Jinping Tongzhi Jinqi Jianghua Zhudao Woguo Minzu uo de Fangxiang' ('Xi Guides our Country's Minzu Policy Direction')." *Journal of the Central Institute of Socialism* 3 (213): 121–126.
Mao, Zedong. 1923. *Cigarette Tax*. http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/mao/selected-works/volume-6/mswv6_08.htm.
Mao, Zedong. 1926. *Analysis of the Classes in Chinese Society*. http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/mao/selected-works/volume-1/mswv1_1.htm.
Mao, Zedong. 1949. "Zhonggong Zhongyang Guanyu Xinjiang Wenti gei Peng Dehui de Dianbao" [Telegram from CCPCC to Peng Dehui regarding Xinjiang Problem]. In CCPCC Document Research Office (ed) (2010), 21.
Mao, Zedong. 1956. "Hanzu he Shaoshu Minzu de Guanxi" [Relations between Han and *Shaoshu Minzu*]. In CCPCC Document Research Office (ed) (2010), 143.
Marx, Karl. 1972. *The 18th Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte*, 10. Moscow: Progress Publishers.
Mauk, Ben. 2019. "Weather Reports." *The Believer*. https://believermag.com/weather-reports-voices-from-xinjiang/.
Maybury-Lewis, David. 2002. "Genocide Against Indigenous Peoples." In *Annihilating Difference*, edited by Alexander Hinton, 43–45. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Miller, Michelle Ann. 2011. "Why Scholars of Minority Rights in Asia Should Recognise the Limits of Western Models." *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 34 (5): 808–809.
Millward, James. 2007. *Eurasian Crossroads: A History of Xinjiang*, 126. London: Hurst and Company.
MOI (Ministry of Information, Theoretical Department). 2009. *Lilun Redian Mianduimian* [Face to Face Hot Theory Topics]. Beijing: People's Publishing Press.
Moses, Dirk. 2021. *Problems of Genocide*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Mullaney, Thomas. 2011. *Coming to Terms with the Nation*, 1–4. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Murphy, Laura, and Nyrola Elimä. 2021. *In Broad Daylight*. Sheffield Hallam University. https://www.shu.ac.uk/helena-kennedy-centre-international-justice/research-and-projects/all-projects/in-broad-daylight.
Nersessian, David. 2005. "Rethinking Cultural Genocide under International Law." *Human Rights Dialogue*. https://www.carnegiecouncil.org/publications/archive/dialogue/2_12/section_1/5139.
Pakulski, Jan. 2016. "State Violence and the Eliticide in Poland." In *Violence and the State*, edited by Matt Killingsworth et al., 40–62. Manchester: University of Manchester Press.
Pan, Jiao, ed. 2008. *Zhongguo Shehui Wenhua Renleixue / Minzuxue Bainian Wenxuan* [Selected Works of 100 Years of Chinese Social and Cultural Anthropology / Minzu Studies]. Beijing: Zhishi Chanquan Chubanshe.
Perdue, Peter. 2005. *China Marches West: The Qing Conquest of Central Eurasia*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
PRC Constitution. 2004. Beijing: Foreign Languages Press.
PRC Embassy, UK. 2020. *Wang Yi Stresses that all Countries Should not Interfere in Other's Internal Affairs*. http://www.chinese-embassy.org.uk/eng/zgyw/t1811743.htm.
Roberts, Sean. 2018. "The Biopolitics of China's 'War on Terror'." *Critical Asian Studies* 50 (2): 232–258.

Roberts, Sean. 2020. *The War on Uyghurs*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Rosenberg, Sheri. 2012. "Genocide is a Process, not an Event." *Genocide Studies and Prevention* 7 (1): 16–23.
Schein, Louisa. 2000. *Minority Rules*. London: Duke University.
Schluessel, Eric. 2007. "Bilingual Education and its Discontent in Xinjiang." *Central Asian Survey* 26 (2): 251–277.
Semelin, Jacques. 2007. *Purify and Destroy*. New York: Columbia University Press.
Shapiro, Michael. 1989. "Textualizing Global Politics." In *International/Intertextual Relations*, edited by Shapiro et al., 21–22. New York: Lexington Books.
Shengli, Bao. 2011. "Ye Tan Zhongguo ke Jinyibu Wanshan Minzu Zhengce [Discussion on Perfection of Ethnic Policy]. *CCP News Online*. http://theory.people.com.cn/GB/16057587.html.
Shijian Bianjibu (Practice – Editorial). 1965. "Bixu Bawo Minzu Wenti de Jieji Shizhi [We Must Grasp Class Essence of the Ethnic Problem]. In Pan (2008), 220.
Short, Damien. 2010. "Cultural Genocide and Indigenous Peoples." *The International Journal of Human Rights* 14 (6): 844.
Sidik, Qelbinur. 2021. "Witness Statement." *Uyghur Tribunal*, June 4.
Smith Finley, Joanne. 2013. *The Art of Symbolic Resistance*. Leiden: Brill.
Smith Finley, Jo. 2021. "Why Scholars and Activists Increasingly Fear a Uyghur Genocide in Xinjiang." *Journal of Genocide Research* 23 (3): 348–370.
Stanton, Gregory H. 1998. http://genocidewatch.net/2013/03/14/the-8-stages-of-genocide/.
State Council. 2009a. *Zhongguo de Minzu Zhengce yu ge Minzu Gongtong Fanrong Fazhan* [China's Ethnic Minority Policy and the Common Prosperity of all Ethnic Groups], 6. Beijing: People's Publishing Press.
State Council. 2009b. *Xinjiang de Fazhan yu Jinbu* [Progress and Development of Xinjiang], 4. Beijing: People's Publishing Press.
State Council. 2014a. *Xinjiang Shengchan Jianshe Bingtuan de Lishi yu Fazhan*. sec.4. http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/2014-10/05/content_2760794.htm.
State Council. 2014b. "Xinjiang Shengchan Jianshe Bingutuan de Lishi yu Fazhan." In Central Party Documents Research Office (2014), 345 & 356.
State Council. 2014c. *Central Party Documents Research Office*, 357.
State Council. 2019a. *The Fight Against Terrorism and Extremism and Human Rights Protection in Xinjiang*. Section 6, http://english.www.gov.cn/archive/white_paper/2019/03/18/content_281476567813306.htm.
State Council. 2019b. *Vocational Education and Training in Xinjiang*. http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2019-08/16/c_138313359.htm.
State Ethnic Affairs Commission (SEAC). 2009. *Xinjiang Wenhua Zhishi Duben* [Xinjiang Cultural Knowledge Study Guide]. Beijing: People's Publishing Press.
Straus, Scott. 2007. "Second-Generation Research on Comparative Genocide." *World Politics* 59 (3): 479.
Stroehlein, Andrew. 2009. *Never Again*?. https://foreignpolicy.com/2009/12/02/never-again/.
Stroup, David. 2019. *Arabic Language in Hui Communities*. https://davidrstroup.wixsite.com/china-crossroads/single-post/2019/08/05/Photo-Essay-Arabic-language-in-Hui-communities.
Sulu.art.co. 2020. #*MeTooUyghur*. *Camp Album Project*. https://camp-album.com/2020/01/30/sulu-art-co/.
Thum, Rian. 2021. "Child Separation and Coercive Birth Controls." In *State Violence in Xinjiang: A Comprehensive Assessment, Report for the Uyghur Tribunal*, edited by

David Tobin, 25–33. https://www.shu.ac.uk/-/media/home/research/helena-kennedy-centre/projects/pdfs/state-violence-in-xinjiang---a-comprehensive-assessment.pdf.
Tursun, Mihrigul. 2018. "Congressional-Executive Commission on China: Testimony of Tursun Mihrigul." November 28. https://www.cecc.gov/events/hearings/the-communist-party%E2%80%99s-crackdown-on-religion-in-china.
Tursun, Mihrigul. 2021. "Witness Statement." *Uyghur Tribunal*, June 6.
UHRP. 2011. *A City Ruled by Fear and Silence*. www.uhrp.org/uaa-and-uhrp-reports-press-releases/new-uhrp-report-city-ruled-fear-and-silence-urumchi-two-years.
United Nations. 1948. *Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide*. https://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/genocide-convention.shtml.
Wang, Haoren. 2019. *Zhijiao hao laoshi dai haojie zhagen jiceng fuwu bianjiang* [Support good teacher Dai Haojie and serve the frontier]. https://archive.fo/F9WMH.
Wang, Yiwei. 2014. "The Security Concept of Great Powers in the Era of Globalization". *Frontiers* 6: 6–13.
Winichakul, Thongchai. 1994. *Siam Mapped*. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press.
XEP (Xinjiang Education Press). 2009. *50ge 'Weishenme': Weihu Guojia Tongyi, Fandui Minzu Fenlie, Jiaqiang Minzu Tuanjie Duben* [The 50 Whys: Protecting National Unification, Opposing Ethnic Separatism, Strengthening Ethnic Unity Study Book]. Wulumuqi: Xinjiang Education Press.
Xi, Jinping. 2014. *Xi Jinping Kaocha Xinjiang*. http://www.chinanews.com/gn/2014/06-16/6282885.shtml.
Xi, Jinping. 2015. *Speech on China-US Relations in Seattle*. http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2015-09/24/c_134653326.htm.
Xi, Jinping. 2017a. *Speech at Opening of Belt and Road Forum*. http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2017-05/14/c_136282982.htm.
Xi, Jinping. 2017b. *Report at 19th CPC National Congress*. http://www.xinhuanet.com//english/special/2017-11/03/c_136725942.htm.
Xi, Jinping. 2019. *Zai Quanguo Minzu Tuanjie Jinbu Biaozhang Dahuishang de Jianghua* [Xi's Speech - Ethnic Unity Progress Plenary Session]. http://www.xinhuanet.com/politics/leaders/2019-09/27/c_1125049000.htm.
Xi, Jinping. 2020. *Xi's speech at 3rd Xinjiang Working Group meeting*. http://www.bingtuannet.com/btrb_rmbd/jpzt/zyxjgz/tt/top/202009/t20200926_88694.html.
Xinjiang Victims Database (XVD). 2018. *Interview with Amanzhan Seiituly*. https://shahit.biz/supp/4981_8.pdf.
XUAR (Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Regional Government). 2009. *Xinjiang Fazhan Wending Liutii ('Xinjiang's Development and Stability: 6 Questions')*, 84.Wulumuqi: Xinjiang People's Press.
XUAR (Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Regional Government). 2018. "2018nian Xinjiang Weiwuer Zizhiqu Zhengfu Baogao" ["2018 XUAR Government Work Report"]. http://cn.chinagate.cn/reports/2018-03/02/content_50636629.htm.
Yi, Xiaocuo. 2020. *Daily Reflection of a Xinjiang Person*. https://camp-album.com/2020/01/29/daily-reflection-of-a-xinjiang-person/.
Yue, Yanjun. 2007. *Xinjiang Bingtuan: Shengchan Jinanshe Bingtuan Jianshi*. Wulumuqi: Xinjiang University Press.
Zenz, Adrian. 2019a. "Thoroughly Reforming Them Towards a Healthy Heart Attitude." *Central Asian Survey* 38: 102–128.
Zenz, Adrian. 2019b. "Break Their Roots: Evidence for China's Parent-Child Separation Campaign in Xinjiang." *Journal of Political Risk* 7 (7). https://www.jpolrisk.com/break-their-roots-evidence-for-chinas-parent-child-separation-campaign-in-xinjiang/

Zenz, Adrian. 2020. *Sterilizations, IUDs, and Mandatory Birth Control*. Washington, DC: Jamestown Foundation.
Zhang, Weiwei. 2012. *Zhongguo Chudong ('China Shock')*. Shanghai: Shanghai People's Press.
Zhonghua Renmingongheguo Minzu Diquyu Zizhifa ('National Law on Regional Autonomy'). 2001. http://hyconference.edu.cn/chinese/2001/Mar/22466.htm, Articles 9, 14, 55, and 71.
Zhou, Enlai. 1949. 'Women Zhuzhang Minzu Quyu Zizhi, ba ge Minzu Tuanjie Cheng Yige Dajiating', in CCPCC Document Research Office (ed) (2010): 4.
Zhou, Enlai. 1950. "'*Renzhen Shixing Dang de Minzu Zhengce*' ('Earnestly Implement Party *Minzu* Policy')." In *Zhonggong Zhongyang Wenxian Yanjiushi (CCPCC Document Research Office) (ed) (2010) Xinjiang Gongzuo Wenxian Xuanbian ('Xinjiang Work – Selected Documents')*, 63. Beijing: Zhongyang Wenxian Chubanshe.
Zhou. 1951. *Zhengwuyuan Guanyu Chuli Daiyou Qishi huo Wuru Shaoshu Minzu Xingzhi de Chengwei, Diming, Beijie, Bianlian de Zhishi* [State Council Directives on dealing with names, stone-tablets, and placards discriminating against or humiliating Minorities], In CCPCC Document Research Office (ed) (2010), 66.
Zhu, Jianjun. 2017. "Bujiaolǚ ye shi Aiguo." ["Not Being Anxious Can Also be Patriotic"]. *Jingcai Wenzhai* 276: 89.