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Is Hegelian recognition second-personal? Hegel says "no"

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Abstract

The aim of this paper is to consider the relations between the Hegelian conception of recognition, which is championed by Axel Honneth and others, and the conception of second-personal authority put forward by Stephen Darwall. It is argued that despite appearances to the contrary, they are not to be as easily aligned as some might suspect or hope, and in particular that an individual can be granted recognition in an Hegelian sense, without being granted second-personal authority. This view is defended by appeal to key texts on Hegelian recognition from Hegel's *Phenomenology of Sprit*: the account of confession and forgiveness, and of the master/slave dialectic.

1 | INTRODUCTION

On the face of it, it makes a lot of sense to consider the connections between the notion of recognition associated with Hegel and some of his successors, such as Axel Honneth,[1] and the idea of the second-personal, which has recently been labelled as such by Stephen Darwall, but which may be traced back to earlier writers such as Martin Buber and Emmanuel Levinas, among others.[2] While neither side has made anything of this connection until recently, nonetheless given that both center on our inter-personal relations and how we view each other and our mutual status, the idea of putting the two approaches into some sort of dialogue would seem an inevitable step forward. However, perhaps somewhat perversely, my aim in this paper is to cast doubt on how far this convergence should be expected to go. More specifically, I want to raise this question: Is what Hegel means by recognition really second-personal: that is, does recognition of person X by person Y necessarily involve Y seeing X as standing in a second-personal relation to Y? In asking this question, throughout I will be adopting Darwall's technical conception of the second-personal, which treats this relation as some sort of authority relation, and thus as deontic, as in the following characterization: "When someone attempts to

give another a second-person reason, she purports to stand in a relevant authority relation to her addressee" (Darwall, 2006, p. 4).[3] I will therefore not be questioning whether Hegelian recognition is second-personal in some broader sense, such as being interpersonal, reciprocal or dialogical (which I believe it is).

It is worth contrasting the question I want to ask from the converse question, namely, does a second-personal relation have to involve recognition? It would seem that the answer to this question is straightforwardly positive, as in giving someone a second-personal reason to act, I "address" the other, in a way that presumes they recognize my entitlement to do so, and so recognize me—otherwise they would see me as merely coercing them. But a slightly harder question is whether a second-personal relation has to involve *mutual* recognition? Here, again, however, it looks like the answer should be positive, as in this relation I recognize the other person's capacity and entitlement to see my authority over them as legitimate, otherwise I would again be setting out merely to coerce them—so I must also recognize them. It thus seems right to say that the second-personal relation has to involve mutual recognition. But this does not entail that the relation has to involve recognition of each other as *equals*: a commanding officer may have to recognize me to some degree, but my recognition of the officer may accord them standing and authority over some matters in relation to me that I lack in relation to them. However, it could be argued that if the second-personal relation concerns *moral* reasons, then recognition has to be equal as well as mutual.[4]

Having briefly explored the connection in this one direction, let us now return to my original question, and explore it in the other direction: given that the second-personal relation has to involve recognition, does recognition have to be second-personal? Of course, it is pretty clear that it *can* be second-personal: but the question is whether it *has* to be?

It may seem that from a Hegelian perspective (to be discussed further below) it is again clear that the answer to this question also has to be positive. And even aside from Hegelian considerations, there may seem to be strong grounds on which to answer this question positively, based on something like the following argument:

1. Recognition is of individuals as persons.
2. To recognize someone as a person is to see them as standing in a second-personal relation to you.
3. Therefore, recognition is second-personal.

In what follows, however, I am going to challenge these claims, both those based on Hegelian considerations, and the more general argument outlined above. To do so, I am going to focus on two key Hegelian text in this area, from Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit*. First, in Section 2, I am going to consider the discussion of conscience, evil and forgiveness at the end of the Chapter 6 on "Spirit," which comes just before the discussion of "Religion" in Chapter 7, and in which Hegel presents his central case of what he means by mutual recognition. I take it that if I can establish that in this text, Hegelian recognition can be understood in a way that does not involve a second-personal relation as characterized above, then this is enough to show there are Hegelian grounds to deny that the latter is necessary for the former. However, then in Section 3 I will consider a second key text, which is of course the master/slave dialectic in the "Self-Consciousness" chapter. This text, and particularly the "life and death struggle" which lies at its heart, is often interpreted precisely as a struggle for second-personal authority. I will argue, however, that my reading of the forgiveness section puts pressure on this reading, and that there is a more textually plausible interpretation, which shows that even here, second-personal authority is not the issue, so that this struggle for recognition should not be read in these terms. I will then suggest in Section 4 that what we can learn from these Hegelian texts gives us enough to reject the general argument outlined above. Having said what I think Hegelian recognition is not, in the last main section, I will briefly offer a positive account of what it is instead, and how on this account there can also be an argument for it having to involve mutuality or reciprocity.

2 | RECOGNITION, CONFESSION, AND FORGIVENESS

While Hegel offers a brief and schematic account of what he means by mutual recognition in the prelude to the master/slave dialectic (Hegel, 1988b, pp. 127–129, §§177–184), which includes his famous comment that through this

recognition Spirit will be an "'I' that is 'We' and a 'We' that is 'I'" (Hegel, 1988b, p. 127, §177),[5] it is only several hundred pages later that we are given a concrete and substantive example of such mutual recognition, namely in the section on "Conscience" at the end of the chapter on "Spirit," and discussion there of confession and forgiveness. In assessing the relation between recognition and second-personal authority, therefore, this is a crucial text.

Now, in this section, it has seemed to many readers that Hegel offers an account of mutual recognition where each consciousness accepts that the other has the authority to act as judge over it, and thus that each accepts a second-personal relation with the other, in acknowledging the legitimacy of the other to hold them to account, while they can do likewise to the other. Thus, it has often been assumed, this text involves key second-personal elements, in a way that demonstrates precisely the link between recognition and the second-personal which I want to challenge.

Molly Farneth has recently offered a reading of this later section along these lines, as follows:

> Through their acts of confession and forgiveness, the two consciousnesses recognize themselves and one another as loci of authority and accountability. They acknowledge their selfsameness as acting and judging subjects who can be held accountable for their actions and judgments by others. These others, likewise, are also acting and judging subjects, fit to be held accountable. The wicked and judging consciousnesses acknowledge this fact not only in word but also in deed, in the confession and forgiveness that symbolize and actualize their agency, authority, and accountability. They perform— and they bring into being—a relationship of reciprocal recognition (Farneth, 2017, p. 76).[6]

Thus, on this reading of this section, mutual recognition is achieved through shared confession and forgiveness: to confess and seek forgiveness is to see the other as a judge, with the authority to hold one to account; to hold someone to account is to adopt a second-personal relation to them, which is itself mutual; therefore, on this reading, Hegel's treatment of reciprocal recognition is fundamentally and inherently second-personal.

However, I want to suggest that this second-personal approach to the text is harder to substantiate than it may appear, and that in fact when read more carefully, there is no role for second-personal authority in the account it offers of forgiveness here, and thus there is also no such role in the mutual recognition that this forgiveness involves. But before making my case, it is necessary to set out this part of Hegel's text in a little more detail, so we can see more clearly where the second-personal reading goes wrong.

Hegel's account of confession and forgiveness arises out of his prior critique of conscience, where conscience itself is a response to the difficulties with morality, and the claims to moral knowledge based on various methods such as Kant's test of universalizability. When these tests are shown to fail, it seems that individual conscience is all that is left as an arbiter of moral truth. However, conscience itself becomes solipsistic and subjectivist, thinking that all that matters is that it follows its good intentions. It then becomes accused of evil and hypocrisy by the consciousness which abides by the duties laid down by the moral order: evil because it breaks those obligations, and hypocritical because it claims to be interested in morality while flouting moral rules. This judging consciousness thus accuses the other consciousness of wickedness. But the judging consciousness can be accused of wickedness in its turn, as it too has elements of evil and hypocrisy. The wicked consciousness then sees this, and so feels able to confess its wickedness to the judging consciousness, expecting this confession to be reciprocated, as it expects the judging consciousness to acknowledge that they are both equally wicked—leading to mutual recognition.

But the judging conscience does *not* reciprocate, but instead becomes the "hard heart" who continues to condemn the wicked consciousness:

> But the admission of the one who is evil, *It's me*, is not reciprocated with the same confession. This is not what the judging consciousness had in mind—quite the contrary! The judging consciousness repulses this community away from itself; and it is the hard heart which exists for itself and which rejects any continuity with the other (Hegel, 1988b, pp. 438–9, §667).

The hard-hearted judging consciousness then becomes the one who can be accused of wickedness, while it descends into the deranged pure interiority of the "beautiful soul." As a result, the hard heart itself breaks, finally giving rise to mutual forgiveness between the two consciousnesses, out of which recognition arises.

Now, for Farneth, this recognition takes the form of each consciousness seeing the other as standing in judgement over it, while it reciprocally stands in judgement over the other, in a way that would fit Darwall's account of second-personal recognition within a community of equals. She writes as follows:

> The relationship of reciprocal recognition is premised on the epistemic and practical acknowledgment that oneself and the other are both subject and object, and that oneself and the other stand in equal positions of responsibility to one another for one's commitments. Confession and forgiveness are practices of contesting and revising norms and judgments within this structure of reciprocal recognition. In this view, practices of conflict and reconciliation are ongoing within relationships of reciprocal recognition (Farneth, 2017, p. 79).

On an account like Farneth's, therefore, this section is all about achieving a mutual recognition of authority relations, as we each come to accept judgement from the other while seeing that we can judge them in turn, so that the recognition arrived at here is intrinsically second-personal. But is Farneth right in her reading of this section?

To see why she might not be, it is useful to distinguish two forms of forgiveness:

a. I forgive you because I realize I am not in a position to judge you, as I realize I could have acted as badly as you have done, given my own limitations.
b. I forgive you, because I have the authority to waive my judgement over you, so I no longer hold you to account.

Forgiveness of type (b) is second-personal, as here I have authority over you, but I choose to set aside your wrong-doings; and to seek forgiveness in this situation is to recognize the accuser as a judge who holds you to account, in a second-personal manner. But forgiveness of type (a) is arguably not second-personal, as in forgiving you because I see that we are both equally sinners, I forgive you because I precisely see that I *cannot* judge you or hold you to account; and in confessing, you do not recognize me as a judge, but as a fellow sinner, who therefore cannot stand in judgement over you, so again this is not a second-personal relation of authority, as authority is exactly what is suspended in this situation, once our shared sinfulness is acknowledged.[7]

Given this distinction, it can then I think be argued that it is precisely this non-second-personal notion of forgiveness (forgiveness of type (a)) that is in play in Hegel's text, so that the recognition involved is also not second-personal. For, when the wicked consciousness confesses to the supposed judge, the former expects the latter not to waive his authority over him, but instead to admit that he *has* no such authority, as the "judge" is just as bad as himself, the so-called sinner. So the wicked consciousness does not seek second-personal forgiveness, as forgiveness from someone who he thinks can legitimately judge him (forgiveness of type (b)). Rather, he expects the "judge" to acknowledge the fundamental similarity between them, as fellow sinners, and so therefore admit that the "judge" *has* no authority, and so is not really entitled to be a judge at all, as they are both on a par. So the recognition the wicked consciousness seeks from the judge is as a fellow-sinner, not as someone who is forgiven by the judge qua judge.

I think that this is Hegel's view of the situation is made clear in the following passages:

> As [the wicked consciousness] sees this likeness [*Gleichheit*: cf. equality] and *declares it*, he *confesses* to the other, and he equally expects that the other, who has in fact put himself in a position that is on a par with his own, will reciprocate his speech and in his own *words* will declare their likeness so that recognitional existence [*das anerkennende Dasein*] will make its appearance. His confession is not an abasement, nor a humiliation, nor a casting aside of himself [*Wegwerfung*] in his relationship with the

other, for this declaration is not something one-sided through which he would posit his *unlikeness* [*Ungleichheit*] with the other. On the contrary, he expresses himself solely on account of his intuition of the *likeness* of the other with him, that is, he gives expression on his own part to their *likeness* in his confession, and he does this because language is the *existence* [*Dasein*] of spirit as the immediate self. He thus expects that the other will make his own contribution to this existence [*Dasein*] (Hegel, 1988b, p. 438, §666).

As I would read this passage, the key thing is that the wicked consciousness, having confessed his wickedness, expects the other consciousness to do likewise, and so express their equality or likeness in this regard—that when it comes to wickedness, they are both on a par. It is only this step that leads to "recognitional existence" (anerkennende Dasein) making its appearance. For, it is only where this likeness is being recognized, that recognition begins to fully constitute its own sphere of existence (the ethical substance, if you will). Before that, we have not arrived at "recognition" in the full sense of the word.

But the problem is that the judge keeps insisting that he *does* have authority over the wicked consciousness, by insisting that they are *not* equal in this respect, so that he *is* better than the consciousness who has declared his wickedness, and so can stand as judge over the latter: this claim to parity "is not what the judging consciousness had in mind—quite the contrary! The judging consciousness repulses this community away from itself," a community which the wicked consciousness was seeking through confession, through a recognition of shared sinfulness. The judging consciousness thus fails to see the fundamentally Lutheran point, that we are all equally sinners, and that the only being capable of judging us is beyond any particular other individual—and by whom (for all the "judge" knows) the wicked consciousness is in fact already forgiven:

> It [i.e., the hard-hearted judging consciousness] thereby shows itself as the spirit-forsaken and spirit-denying consciousness; for it does not recognise that spirit is the absolute certainty of itself, is master [*Meister*] over every deed and actuality, and can cast them off [*abwerfen*] and make them as if they had never happened… It is therefore the hard heart himself who is putting obstacles in the way of the other's return from the deed into the spiritual existence [*Dasein*] of speech and into the likeness [*Gleichheit*] of spirit, and by virtue of its hardness of heart, it engenders the unlikeness [*Ungleichheit*] which is still present (Hegel, 1988b, p. 439, §667).

So, the problem with the judge's hard heart is not that he chooses to continue to condemn when really he should waive that condemnation and forgive in this sense (type (b) forgiveness); rather, the problem is that he chooses to *continue to act as a judge at all*—when by recognizing his likeness or equality [Gleichheit] with the wicked consciousness, this is a form of authority he should give up entirely and so forgive in sense (a). Instead, he should acknowledge that when it comes to the capacity for casting judgement,[8] this is a capacity that belongs to a "Master," which stands over them both, and may (for all they know) have forgiven the other person who the hard hearted judge is trying to condemn—where it is then no accident that Hegel now makes the transition into a chapter on Religion, in pointing to a higher source of authority that lies beyond our own as sinful human beings, albeit one that itself "appears in [our] midst" (Hegel, 1988b, p. 442, §671), by also appearing to us in human form and thus as a sinner like ourselves, who can thereby take on our sins, while assuring us that we will find forgiveness in an authority which also loves us.

If this reading of these passages is correct, then the recognition the wicked consciousness seeks, and which the judge finally gives when his hard heart is broken and he no longer is a judge, is not second-personal, as there is no authority relation present, precisely because in having his heart broken, the consciousness forsakes any such authority over others. Thus, the wicked consciousness wants to be recognized as a *fellow* sinner, which gives him no authority over the judge; and once the hard heart of the judge breaks, the judge no longer wants to be recognized as a judge, but likewise as a sinner who learns to "judge not!" The wicked consciousness therefore learns to confess,

while once its hard heart is overcome, the judging consciousness learns not to judge, and so renounces the "divisive thought, and the hard-heartedness of the Being-for-itself which clings to it, because it in facts intuits itself in the first [consciousness, namely the wicked one]" (Hegel, 1988b, p. 440, §670). So the recognition each seeks is recognition of their shared ontological status, as sinners, but not of anything second-personal; and the forgiveness each seeks from the other is not that of a judge either, but that of a fellow sinner, which (I have argued) is also not second-personal. Thus, the standpoint of the authoritative judge is, in a certain way, *overcome* in the very course of Hegel's presentation: that is to say, this picture is actively taken up but then transcended. It would thus seem that we make a serious error if we simply remain within the authority picture, because it is Hegel's very point that it has to be set aside. If that is right, then not only is Hegel's conception of recognition not second-personal—his ultimate conception of mutual recognition is only reached in overcoming the limited perspective of a second-personal relation.

Thus, while Hegel's discussion of confession and forgiveness in this "Conscience" section presents us with an important culminating account of mutual recognition, it nonetheless seems not to be recognition of a second-personal kind. If this is right, it would then follow that for Hegel, recognition is not fundamentally a second-personal relation: for, one can seek mutual recognition as a fellow sinner, which ipso facto involves the waiving of any such relation. It thus seems that there is conclusive textual evidence that on Hegel's conception at least, there is no necessary relation between recognition and the second-personal.

The question might now be asked, however, how much does Hegel's conception of recognition without second-personal authority rely on the explicitly theological context in which it is developed? That is, in Hegel's view, does recognition of ourselves as fellow sinners require us to have some conception of a divine authority as judge and if so in what form, or could a shared sense of our moral infirmities be accomplished in a more secular manner?; and in fact does recognition of others in a way that is not second-personal require us to view ourselves us sinners at all, or might it be possible without this sense of mutual sinfulness? To answer the first question satisfactorily would require us to go more deeply into Hegel's philosophy of religion than is possible here. But in what follows I will say more that addresses the second question. For, in my view, while Hegel uses the recognition involved in confession at this juncture in the *Phenomenology* as an important transition point from the "Spirit" chapter to the one on religion that follows, as making a natural bridge from the one to the other, he nonetheless is not committed to confession and the theological context it is given here as being the *only* way to recognize others without second-personal authority— and I will now suggest that this is the case by looking at the master/slave dialectic, even though ironically this has been used by many to claim that Hegelian recognition is in fact all about second-personal authority. In the next section, I will therefore first consider this reading of that part of the text, and offer an alternative based on the lessons we have learned from looking at the confession and forgiveness section in the discussion above.

3 | RECOGNITION IN THE MASTER/SLAVE DIALECTIC

One important way in which the reading I have offered here of the forgiveness section could be challenged, is on the basis that it does not make sense of what is obviously another key text on this topic, namely the master/slave dialectic in the *Phenomenology*. For, it may seem that this can only be properly understood if in this text recognition is treated in second-personal terms; and it is doubtless partly because the master/slave dialectic has been treated this way that the forgiveness section has been interpreted likewise. For, based on the master/slave dialectic, it is very natural and tempting to hold that recognition involves a second-personal relation, along the following lines:

1. A second-personal relation is a relation of authority.
2. The struggle for recognition in the master/slave dialectic is a struggle to have one's authority recognized.
3. The resolution of that struggle is when each side recognizes their mutual authority, as fellow members of a moral community.

Let me say a little more about each step, to explain why this argument is tempting.

The first step just follows the conception of the second-personal to be found in Darwall, for example, when he writes: "Second-personal reasons are invariably tied to a distinctively second-personal kind of *practical authority*: the authority to make a demand or claim" (Darwall, 2006, p. 11).

The second step adopts a reading of the master/slave dialectic that has become quite common, which holds that the Hegelian struggle for recognition is a struggle of the one consciousness to have its authority over the other recognized by the other. An influential reading of this sort can be found in the work of Terry Pinkard, for example, who reconstructs the dialectic as follows: As an agent, I need to think I am acting on authoritative reasons for action, where such reasons cannot come from objects, or desires I happen to have, as to treat these as authoritative would undermine my independence. But other subjects can come to see my goals and projects as authoritative over them, in a way that does not undermine my independence, as it gives me authority over these subjects. Thus, by getting my goals and projects to be accepted as authoritative by others because they *are* my goals and projects, I can see myself rather than objects as the source of reasons. And in seeing my goals and projects as authoritative over others, but by refusing to see their goals and projects as authoritative over me, I can maintain my independence. I therefore seek second-personal authority over others, but refuse to recognize their authority over me, and so refuse to accept any accountability to them. In this way, therefore, each consciousness comes to seek one-sided second-personal recognition of the other, as each tries to get the other to acknowledge its authority over them as reason-giving, but without acknowledging the other's authority over them in turn, thus leading to the life-and-death struggle between the two consciousnesses. Finally, the last step is taken later in the process, when each side acknowledges their mutual authority, as fellow members of the moral community. Pinkard thus summarizes Hegel's aim in this text as follows: "The dialectic of master and slave was initiated by each identifying his own projects as authoritative for what counted as good reasons for belief and action, but each has now found that he cannot identify what is *his own* without reference to the other's point of view..." (Pinkard, 1994, p. 62). Read in this way, the incorporation of second-personal relations into it is then very natural, as we are said to move from the one-sided claims to authority involved in the struggle that leads to the master/slave relation, to the mutual authority of the community of persons that then emerges out of the failures of that relation.[9]

However, while it would be wrong to deny that Pinkard's reading is one way of interpreting this highly complex text, it is important to see that the reading offered above in Section 2 concerning the forgiveness section places pressure on this sort of account. For, as is commonly the case with the *Phenomenology*, problems for an outlook at an earlier stage of the book are resolved at a later stage, where the forgiveness section is of course the obvious place to look for the resolution of the difficulties which consciousness faces in the master/slave dialectic. But then, if I am right to have argued that there is no second-personal authority involved in the former, then it would seem we should be cautious about making second-personal authority central to the latter, as it would then be hard to see how the forgiveness section resolves the problems raised in the master/slave dialectic. Thus, it would seem that if we reject Step 3 in the outline of the argument above, we should also revisit Step 2, and question whether "The struggle for recognition in the master/slave dialectic is a struggle to have one's authority recognized."

The puzzle then, however, is to provide an account of that dialectic, and the life and death struggle that lies at its heart, if it is *not* brought about by a struggle over authority, as Pinkard and others claim. How else are we to make sense of what leads to the life and death struggle, if not in these second-personal terms? It is this alternative reading which I will now attempt to provide.

To do so, I will focus on the key passage where the life and death struggle is introduced. This comes immediately after the schematic outline of mutual recognition, which I mentioned previously (Hegel, 1988b, pp. 127–129, §§177–184), where Hegel sets that mutual recognition aside to focus on the case of one-sided recognition and what that involves, as it is only recognition in this form that is possible for consciousness at this stage. The problem for consciousness, however, is that while "one individual is confronted by another individual," and while each consciousness sees *itself* as an individual, it does not yet see the other as such, or know that this is how it is seen by the other. Thus, "[e]ach is indeed certain of its own self, but not of the other, and therefore its own self-certainty still has no

truth" (Hegel, 1988b, §186, p. 130), because it has not yet been recognized by another individual. This is what it now sets out to achieve, in a way that leads to the life and death struggle, as Hegel explains in a crucial passage:

> However, the *presentation* [*Darstellung*] of itself as the pure abstraction of self-consciousness consists in showing itself to be the pure negation of its objective mode [*gegenständlichen Weise*], that is, in showing that it is not tied down [*geknüpft*] to any determinate *existence* [*Dasein*], or to the universal individuality of existence, that it is not tied down to life. This presentation is the *doubled* act, namely, both what the other does and what is done by way of oneself. Insofar as it is what is done by the other, each thus aims at the death of the other. However, the second aspect is also therein present, namely, *what is done by way of oneself*, for the former involves putting one's own life on the line. The relation of both self-consciousnesses is thus determined in such a way that it is through a life and death struggle that each proves themselves, and prove their worth to each other (Hegel, 1988b, p. 130, §187).

On the basis of this passage, which is the key explanation for the life and death struggle, what drives that struggle is not that each consciousness seeks a one-sided recognition of their *authority* over the other, but rather of their *ontological status* as beings who are more than merely animal: to be recognized, the individual consciousness must ensure the other is no mere living being, and it must ensure in turn that the other recognizes that it is no mere living being. To achieve this, at this stage of the dialectic, the demonstration of the capacity to risk its own life is required of each consciousness, which because each seeks to demonstrate this to the other in a "doubled act," leads to the life and death struggle.

Of course, this point has also been noted by other commentators. A classic reading of this sort can be found in Alexandre Kojève's treatment of the *Phenomenology*, to which this dialectic is obviously central. For Kojève, the aim of the struggle is to be recognized by the other person as a subject who is free of their biological nature, by demonstrating a willingness to risk one's life, and that this is what the master manages to achieve in relation to the slave: "[The Master] 'brought to light', proved (*bewährt*), realized, and revealed his *superiority* over biological existence, over *his* biological existence, over the natural World in general and over everything that knows itself and that he knows to be *bound* to this World, in particular, over the Slave" (Kojève, 1947, p. 202, Kojève, 1969, p. 45). This reading is also adopted by those who follow in Kojève's wake, such as Jean-Paul Sartre and Francis Fukuyama.[10]

Based on this Kojèvian account, therefore, it can be argued that the Hegelian struggle for recognition is not second-personal, as the issue of authority of one consciousness over the other is not what is at stake. Likewise, the resolution of this struggle is not a moral community of person's recognizing mutual second-personal authority, but a society in which one's ontological freedom as a person can be recognized *without* needing to engage in life-and-death struggle or master/slave relations, but by acting on a moral basis within state—which is why, Hegel argues, this struggle only pertains to the state of nature and not to life in the modern world.[11] It would therefore seem that at least on this Kojèvian reading, what Hegel understands by recognition in the context of the master/slave dialectic does not involve anything second-personal, while at the same time we have a perfectly adequate account of the genesis of the life and death struggle, which is what was required.

In response, however, it could be argued that the only reason why a consciousness *needs* to show its independence from life is precisely to show that it thereby has the status required to be authoritative over the other, so that it is still a second-personal issue after all. An argument along these lines is suggested by Jay Bernstein when he writes as follows:

> The idea that one's authority to make claims stakes one to that authority such that it becomes the essential component of one's self-understanding is worked out in Hegel's thesis that in order to demonstrate that one *is* a self-consciousness requires the risk of life, the risk of everything for the sake of

that authority, the risk of life for the sake of being recognized as having that status and standing (Bernstein, 2015, p. 189).

Here, Bernstein seems to hold, the reason underlying the staking of life in the life and death struggle precisely is an issue of interpersonal authority, which would make it second-personal after all.

However, once again I think it is possible to read this text differently, along the following lines. First, consciousness thinks of itself as an I, as more than a merely natural being. But for others to appear to it as subjects, they must prove themselves as more than natural beings—while to be seen by such subjects as more than a natural being, consciousness must prove its subjecthood to them. If this did not happen, consciousness would be stuck in dialectic of desire, as consciousness needs *self*-negating *subjects* to escape this dialectic,[12] while such subjects must negate themselves by following consciousness's coercive will (which is not the same as consumption on the one hand or authority on the other), and so see this consciousness as a subject rather than an object. Thus a process by which a consciousness recognises others as subjects, and gets to be recognised as a subject, requires each side to risk its life, as the only way to escape the dialectic of desire is through subjects that are prepared to negate themselves. On this account, therefore, the life and death struggle emerges not from the need of consciousness to get its second-personal authority recognised, but to get itself recognised as an "independent self-consciousness" [*selbständiges Selbstbewußtsein*] (Hegel, 1988b, p. 131, §187) which is free of life, with an ontological status that is not merely that of a living being.

My claim, therefore, is that seen in the light of our conclusions from the forgiveness section, it is then perfectly possible to make sense of the master/slave dialectic without appealing to ideas of second-personal authority, in the way that our earlier conclusions in Section 2 require. To this extent, the master/slave dialectic gives us no grounds to question those conclusions, and there is nothing in the master/slave dialectic that blocks the reading of the forgiveness section which has been developed. But there is also a more positive substantive connection: The master/slave dialectic, I have suggested, is about the attempt to receive ontological recognition for the fact that I am more than merely alive, that I am not tied to life, but a purely spiritual being, in a way that ultimately proves unsuccessful. Correspondingly, the discussion of the forgiveness passage focuses on the fact that we are all equally sinners—so not purely spiritual beings that can fully detach from our limited contingent living existence. So there is a sense in which the mutual recognition of forgiveness acknowledges something about us that the first struggle did not correctly bring into view. That is, full ontological recognition of what it means to be human is not to be had by being recognized as a detached spiritual being, but only by partaking in the mutual recognition of being finite spirits.

Finally, even if my more Kojèvian reading of the master/slave dialectic is rejected, and it is argued that there is indeed a struggle for authority at the heart of the conflict in the life and death struggle, this in itself still does not undermine what I take to be the central lesson of the forgiveness section: namely, that what mutual recognition involves is the *giving up* of second-personal authority, not making it reciprocal in the way that is often supposed, which in light of the forgiveness section is to provide only a rather superficial resolution to the problems raised by the master/slave dialectic. For, this section suggests that the problems of the master/slave dialectic are not to be resolved by making second-personal authority reciprocal, but by abandoning the attempt to claim such authority altogether.

4 | RECOGNITION AND PERSONS

But now, it might still be asked: even if I am right about these various textual claims, what about the more general argument I mentioned at the beginning?

1. Recognition is of individuals as persons.
2. To recognize someone as a person is to see them as standing in a second-personal relation to you.
3. Therefore, recognition is second-personal.

This argument may still seem plausible, independent of anything we find in Hegel. In response, however, I think it can be suggested that on the basis of Hegel's discussion of confession and forgiveness which we have been considering, that there are two reasons to question this argument: first, does it go too far in claiming that recognition of persons must be second-personal?; and second, is the fundamental recognitional relation, at least as Hegel conceives it, of others as *persons* at all?

Regarding the first issue, I think it can be claimed that the argument above fails based on considerations from Hegel's discussion of confession and forgiveness. For, if I am seeking recognition from you as a fellow sinner, is this not necessarily to see us both as persons, even though not second-personally? We could hardly apply the category of sinner to animals or gods, so in being seen as a sinner I must be seen as a person; but if being so recognized involves no second-personal elements (as argued above), it would follow that seeing someone as a person does *not* in fact *require* seeing them as having second-personal authority.

Perhaps, however, this argument might invite a Kantian response. For, it could be suggested, persons are beings to be treated with dignity and respect, and these are inherently hierarchical notions, involving mutual authority and hence second-personal relations. This would be lost if we saw others as sinners like ourselves, and with it our ability to see them as persons; conversely, then, if we do see them as persons, we must see them in second-personal way, for the sort of Kantian reasons Darwall himself gives.[13]

However, even on Kant's view, it is not clear why seeing someone as a sinner means one can no longer see them as a person. I take it that the key aspect of Kant's view is that to see someone as a person is to see them as *capable* of acting on the moral law (unlike my cat or my desk), and to esteem them accordingly—that is, to offer them appraisal respect to this extent,[14] and to treat them as non-fungible, and hence as having dignity, not price.[15] The Kantian view thus fundamentally involves seeing the other as a person who is open to judgement for their moral failures. But it is consistent with this view to hold that as a sinner, *I* cannot judge them, so *I* cannot address a second-personal reason to them—and vice versa. If I say "You should not do that" when thinking of us both as sinners, I am saying that you are open to judgement, but not from *me*, so I am not addressing you second-personally—but I am recognizing you as a person (so we can retain the notion of person as a "forensic term," to use Locke's well-known designation).[16] It would thus appear possible to recognize someone as a person in a Kantian manner, without seeing them as standing in a second-personal relation to you qua judge, or indeed without seeing anyone in our moral community as being able to serve that role, given our propensity for radical evil and the opacity to us of our own motivations[17]; instead, the only second-person relation which involves any such capacity to judge might be between us and someone who lies beyond the human community, namely God. To be clear, I am not claiming that one's conception of a person cannot be richer than this, or that you could not think that as the kinds of persons we are, some of us can in fact hold others to account because some of us are less sinful than the picture above assumes, in which case in fact second-personal relations do hold between us, as we do indeed have the authority to make judgements over others; but then if Hegel's argument is right, we cannot avoid doing so with a hard heart, and so isolating ourselves from our shared recognitional existence. Moreover, while I would allow that persons *can* recognize such authority in others and have it recognized in them, my investigation was into whether this is *necessary* to any relation of mutual recognition, and whether Hegel presents the highest level of mutual recognition in these terms, and once again the right conclusion seems to be that it is not and he does not.

Finally, perhaps there is another argument why seeing someone as a person requires seeing them as having second-personal authority, which is worth considering. For, perhaps the very notion of sinfulness only makes sense if there are norms being violated by the sinner—and that such norms only come into play if people have authority over themselves and others in order to institute such norms, so that the very notion of a shared sinfulness only makes sense if second-personal authority is acknowledged, within a constructivist account of how it is that norms come to be in the first place.

However, of course, this relies on a kind of constructivism about norms, which can certainly be debated in itself, while I have argued elsewhere that such constructivism is implausible as a reading of Hegel's conception of normativity.[18] Moreover, it seems to have taken us away from the conceptual question concerning recognition from which

we began: for even if norms have to be grounded in the shared second-person authority of persons, this seems independent of considerations involving recognition, and so fails to substantiate the conceptual link which has been our central concern.

Turning now to the second issue, namely the question as to whether the fundamental recognitional relation is of others as *persons* at all, it could also be argued that for Hegel, the first premise in the argument above can be challenged, as it takes for granted that the fundamental recognition relation is between *persons* who stand in accountability relations to each other. Now, I am not claiming that Hegel *nowhere* presents recognition in terms of authority between persons in this manner (e.g., he does so in his discussion of personhood and property in the *Philosophy of Right*, §71). But what I think the discussion of the forgiveness section of the *Phenomenology* shows is that the most fundamental or the deepest level of mutual recognition does not take the form of having authority over each other and of holding one another to account, or of recognizing each other as persons with this authority, in the manner of Darwall's "moral community." Rather, it is of a different kind, so that authority and accounting relations are made possible on the basis of a shared ground of a different sort (just as the *Philosophy of Right* argues that abstract right and the recognitive relations of claims and demands it involves are only possible on the basis of a shared ethical life, which go beyond such claims and demands). Thus, when Hegel comes to present his view of the community of mutually recognizing and hence free individuals that constitute "universal self-consciousness" in §436 of *The Philosophy of Mind*, this is far from Darwall's model of the "moral community" of mutual accountable and hence equal persons, but of individuals who can nonetheless see themselves as "identical with one another" despite their individuality in a "speculative manner," on the model of the relationships which constitute the "substance of ethical life" such as family, sexual love or patriotism, in which our relations are much richer than between one person and another.[19] As we have seen, this is also fundamental to Hegel's presentation of mutual recognition in the *Phenomenology*, in which individuals come to acknowledge their "likeness" [*Gleichheit*] not as mutually accountable persons who have equal authority over one another, but as fellow sinners who are bound together in a community of a rather different sort.

5 | HEGELIAN RECOGNITION WITHOUT THE SECOND-PERSONAL

Our discussion thus far has been largely negative, in arguing about what Hegelian recognition is not, or does not have to be. It might be wondered, however, what the positive implications for this view might be: if Hegelian recognition is not second-personal, what is it instead? Moreover, while arguments from second-personal recognition to reciprocity are familiar and fairly easy to make plausible, if this conception of recognition is dropped, how might such arguments for reciprocity still be made to work? These will be our concerns in this final section.

On the first point, what we have learned is that viewed from a Hegelian perspective, second-personal recognition appears to be too narrow: but if so, what has it left out? One answer suggested by the life and death struggle is that what the subject fears is objectification, by being reduced to an object through desire, or to the exemplification of a genus as a living thing, or as a tool for the satisfaction of another, and thus what the subject seeks instead through recognition is to be seen for who they are, as complete individuals—where this is wider than their second-personal competence and authority (Darwall's recognition respect) or their status and standing (his appraisal respect). Thus, for example, what is wrong with the way in which the master views the slave is that by seeing them as a means to their ends, the master does not just fail to accord them the various sorts of respect that they may be due as rational subjects, but also no longer sees the slave for who they are at all, but instead as an object to be used, thereby objectifying them rather than engaging with them as a genuine individual. Likewise, what is wrong with the way in which the judge sees the confessing consciousness is that this consciousness is defined for the judge by their transgressions, which from this perspective means that the confessing consciousness is limited to their deeds which are treated as "imperishable" (Hegel, 1988b, p. 440, §669).[20] Of course, these failures of recognition may mean in part a failure to see the second-personal authority of the other[21]—but it can also be said to be much wider than that, in

failing to see the other as a whole, for themselves, and so as a failure to relate to them for who they are, rather than just what they have done. Hegelian recognition is thus arguably a much broader notion than can be accounted for in purely second-personal terms, which is perhaps more likely to be found in love than in respect.[22]

On the second point, there might nonetheless be a temptation to think that adopting this broader conception of recognition will make it harder to make sense of the mutuality or reciprocity condition than if we adopt a second-personal conception. For, as we mentioned at the outset, Darwall has argued that if I claim second-personal authority over someone, where this is more than mere coercive power, it seems that I must also be committed to acknowledging that they have a corresponding second-personal authority to make claims of me. If recognition is not conceived second-personally, and so we cannot use this argument, which hinges on the related authority/coercion distinction, the concern may be that any grounds for insisting that genuine recognition must be mutual may seem to have been lost.

However, I think that even on this broader conception of recognition, an argument for reciprocity can still be made, along the following lines. The aim would be to establish that to be seen for myself by the other, I have to see the other for themselves.[23] Now, suppose I was not to do this—for example, suppose I see the other as a means, or objectify them, treating them as an "It" rather than a "Thou" in Buber's terms. But then, how can a subject who I view in these terms be expected to see me in anything other than ways that are limited to the terms to which I have reduced them? For example, if I treat the slave as a means, I will expect them to view me in that light, as a way in which they can do what is required of them by me and so be a slave: but then they cannot recognize me for myself, but only as a vehicle for their slavery. Or if I objectify the other, then the other will not be able to see me for myself, as they will be reduced in the ways they can view others by this objectification: for example, how can a person who I view as a sexual object be assumed to be capable of viewing me as anything more than this? For this difficulty to be resolved, even on this model of recognition, it would thus appear that the relation must be reciprocal: the other must see me for myself, and I must see them for themselves, for to view them more narrowly than that is to make any hope of the former forlorn. Introducing this issue of objectification can therefore make clearer why conceiving recognition in purely second-personal terms is likely to be too narrow.

Thus, based on the analysis of some key texts and related arguments, we seem to have grounds to question the tempting suggestion that Hegelian recognition is an essentially second-personal notion. On the contrary, it would seem from the discussion above that it really is not, and that the temptations to claim otherwise should be resisted.[24]

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ENDNOTES

[1] The main text is Honneth (1992) and Honneth (1995). For more recent writings on this theme, see amongst others: Honneth (2002) and Honneth (2018). For helpful collections of articles in this Hegelian tradition, see Schmidt Am Busch and Zurn (2010) and Krijnen (2014).

[2] See Darwall (2006), and also Darwall (2013a) and Darwall (2013b). See also Buber (2008) and Buber (2013) and Levinas (1990) and Levinas (1969); on the latter cf. also my discussion in chap. 9 of Stern (2019, pp. 248–287). For a useful collection of articles which focus on this approach, see Eilan (2016).

[3] Compare also Darwall (2021, p. 1) where he makes explicit that "the second person standpoint" cannot be equated with just "any relating to another, any seeing of another as a 'you'," but is a much more specific stance of authority and accountability. In other recent work, Darwall has broadened out his conception of the second-personal, to include not just the sort of deontic authority relation found in morality, but also the case of love, which as he allows does not involve any such authority, but other forms of mutuality such as "holding," "beholding" and "upholding" (Darwall, 2016). In what follows, I will focus on the original deontological conception, as this is the one which is most commonly associated with Darwall's position, and which may seem to present parallels to those readings of Hegel that also see recognition in terms of authority. As Darwall's later conception is much broader, it may well be less vulnerable to the objections I raise below, but as it has (so far) been less influential I will not consider it in any detail here.

⁴ Cf. Darwall (2006, pp. 269–276), which attributes a view of this sort to Fichte.

⁵ Translations from Hegel are my own. References to section numbers in the *Phenomenology* are to those which are used in English translations from Miller onwards (Hegel, 1977, 2018, 2019), but which are not used in German editions, as they were not employed in this text by Hegel himself. Unfortunately, the English section numbers are not completely consistent between the translations, but where they differ this has been noted.

⁶ Cf. Pinkard (2002, pp. 241–242): "In particular, it is the practice of forgiveness, the Christian recognition that we are all 'sinners' in the eyes of God, transmuted into a secular practice of forgiveness and reconciliation that brings out what is really normatively in play in the appeal to conscience: an appeal not to 'beautiful souls', but to the recognition that, in Hegel's terms, our sociality fundamentally commits us to being the 'masters' and 'slaves' to each other—we are authors of the law to ourselves only as others co-author the law for us. The 'ethical world'—the 'I that is We, and the We that is I' exists only in terms of each holding ourselves to the law by holding others to the law, while at the same time they hold us to the law and hold themselves to the law." This reading is also broadly similar to the one adopted in Brandom (2019): chap. 16. It also closely resembles Darwall's account of the "moral community": "Morality as equal accountability conceives of moral relations in terms of equal *respect*. In seeing ourselves as mutually accountable, we accord one another the standing to demand certain conduct of each other as equal members of the moral community" (Darwall, 2006, p. 119).

⁷ Cf. Harris (1995, p. 503), who writes of this discussion in the *Phenomenology*: "[I]t is more accurate to say, with Madame de Staël, that one becomes 'very indulgent', than that one 'pardons'. For one knows that one is not in a position to pardon. 'There, but for the grace of God, go I' is what one says at best; and often only, 'I am glad it was not me who had to act'. In these formulas one can see already that it is the need for moral judgement that is suspended." It should also be noted that attempts to identify a literary source for Hegel's text here have led back to F. H. Jacobi's philosophical novel *Woldemar* (see Falke, 1996, pp. 318–328, Speight, 2001, pp. 112–115), which concludes with the injunction "Judge not!," while Hegel himself had earlier reflected on this command "Judge not that ye be not judged" (Matthew 7:1) in his early work "The Spirit of Christianity and Its Fate" (Hegel, 1971b, pp. 352–359, Hegel, 1971a, pp. 237–244). Hegel would thus appear to endorse here what has been called "the standard account," that blame or judgment requires a certain standing which incorporates a "no-hypocrisy condition": namely "one forfeits one's standing to blame if one manifests the same flaw that one attempts to criticize in another": see Bell (2013, p. 272), in which Bell herself argues against views of this sort.

⁸ By this I mean judgement in the sense of being able to condemn or forgive as a normative power. Both parties still possess judgement in the sense of being able to assess normative standards, and to apply those standards to themselves and others, and hence assess themselves and others as wicked. But what they cannot do, is blame others for failing to meet those standards, which is what is fundamental to the second-personal approach. As Thomas Khurana has pointed out to me, it is easier to make this distinction in German than in English, where the ability to assess others would correspond to "urteilen" and the ability to judge as a normative power would correspond to "beurteilen" (the term Hegel uses most frequently here) or "richten" (which is the language used by Luther in his German Bible for the translation of Matthew 7:1—see Luther (1883), Abteilung 3: *Die Deutsche Bibel* vols 1–12, vol 6, p. 37; cf. also Hegel, 1971b, p. 352).

⁹ A similar view can be found in Robert Brandom's reading of Hegel: "Hegel understands normative statuses of authority and responsibility as the products of the normative attitudes of subjects, who practically take or treat each other *as* authoritative or responsible, who acknowledge or attribute authority and hold each other responsible. His generic term for social-practical attitudes of taking or treating someone as the subject of normative statuses is 'recognition' [Anerkennung]. He takes that normative statuses such as authority and responsibility are instituted when recognitive attitudes have a distinctive *social* structure: when they take the form of *mutual* or *reciprocal* [gegenseitig] recognition" (Brandom, 2019, p. 12).

¹⁰ Cf. Sartre (1943, p. 311) and Sartre (1958, p. 237): "[T]o the extent that the Other apprehends me as bound to a body and immersed in *life*, I am myself only *an Other*. In order to make myself recognized by the Other, I must risk my own life. To risk one's own life, in fact, is to reveal oneself as not-bound to the objective form or to any determined existence—as not-bound to life." Fukuyama (1992, pp. 150–151): "The reason that I fight is to get another human being to recognize the fact that I am willing to risk my life, and that I am therefore free and authentically human… Only man is capable of engaging in a bloody battle for the sole purpose of demonstrating that he has contempt for his own life, that he is something more than a complicated machine or a 'slave to his passions', in short that he has a specifically human dignity because he is free."

¹¹ Cf. Hegel (1991: §432Z): "[In the state] the individual makes themselves worthy of this recognition [as a free and rational person] by overcoming the naturalness of their self-consciousness and obeying a *universal*, the *will that is in and for itself*, the *law*… In the state, the citizen derives their honour from the post they fill, from the trade they follow, and from their working activity of any other kind… [H]onour of this kind is still lacking in the state of nature where individuals, whatever

they may do, want to force others to recognise them." Hegel notes that duelling may appear to be a counter-example here, but rejects it on the grounds that duelling serves a different role, as a crude way of demonstrating that one has not lost face in relation to the law, rather than one's indifference to life as such. (References to the *Enzyklopädie* are to the section numbers given in German and English editions, where if these come from the students notes appended to these sections, this has been marked with a "Z" for "Zusatz").

[12] Cf. Hegel (1988b, p. 126, §175).

[13] Cf. Darwall (2006, p. 14, pp. 60–61).

[14] See Darwall (1977) and Darwall (2006, pp. 122–126) for further discussion of this notion of appraisal respect.

[15] See Kant (1786:4, pp. 434–435).

[16] Locke (1975, pp. 346–347) [Book II, chap. XXVII, §26]: "[Person] is a Forensick Term appropriating Actions and their Merit; and so belongs only to intelligent Agents capable of a Law, and Happiness and Misery... And conformable to this, the Apostle tells us, that at the Great Day, when every one shall *receive according to his doings*, *the secrets of all Hearts shall be laid open*. The Sentence shall be justified by the consciousness all Persons shall have, that they *themselves* in what Bodies soever they appear, or what Substances soever that consciousnesses adhere to, are the *same*, that committed those Actions, and deserve that Punishment for them." Locke thus also seems to accept that what is distinctive of persons is that they can be *judged*, but not that this necessarily makes them capable of standing *in judgement* over others.

[17] Cf. respectively Kant (1793:6, pp. 32–39) and Kant (1786:4, p. 407).

[18] Cf. Stern (2017).

[19] For Darwall's conception of the moral community, see above Note 6. For a similarly "thin" conception of recognition, cf. Wallace (2019, p. 86): "Interpersonal recognition is achieved when we act in a way that deprives others of a warrant to resent our treatment of them. In acknowledging the significance of their claims against us, as constraints on our decision-making, we also acknowledge their moral standing as individuals whose interests matter equally." Once one sees how inadequate this characterisation would be to the examples Hegel takes from ethical life—of family, sexual love, patriotism—one sees how far short this account falls of his conception of recognition, just as it falls short of his account of the recognition found in mutual confession.

[20] Cf. Hegel's reflections in "The Spirit of Christianity" on the command to "Judge not": "Before the law the criminal is nothing but a criminal. Yet the law is a fragment of human nature, and so is being a criminal; if the law were a whole, an absolute, then the criminal would be nothing but a criminal... [T]he sinner is more than a sin existent, a trespass possessed of personality; he is a man, trespass and fate are in him, but he can return to himself again, and if he does so, then trespass and fate are under him. The elements of reality are dissolved; spirit and body are severed; the deed still subsists, but only as something past, as a fragment, as dead remains" (Hegel, 1971b, pp. 353–354, Hegel, 1971a, p. 238). I take Hegel's claim here to be that viewed from the perspective of the judge, the sinner is nothing more than their sinfulness which they therefore cannot escape and which therefore cannot be forgiven, but viewed from the perspective of a fellow sinner, their personality as a whole becomes visible, rather than being reduced to their deeds, leaving open the possibility of reform. Cf. also Hegel (1983, vol 3, p. 247) and Hegel (1988a, pp. 466–467): "imputation... only applies in the region of finitude, where the subject stands as a single person, not in the region of free spirit. It is characteristic of the region of finitude that all individuals remain what they are. If they have done evil, then they *are* evil: evil is in them as their quality. But already in the sphere of morality, and still more in that of religion, spirit is known to be free, to be affirmative within itself, so that its limitation, which extends to evil, is a nullity for the infinitude of spirit. Spirit can undo what has been done. The action certainly remains in the memory, but spirit strips it away. Imputation, therefore, does not attain to this sphere."

[21] Though this could also be disputed: cf. Butler (2005, p. 43): "'Oh, now I know who you are': at this moment I cease to address you or to be addressed by you."

[22] Heikki Ikäheimo has also suggested that there is more to recognition than the sort of deontological features which figure in second-personal accounts, claiming that there is also an "axiological" dimension: "Many contemporary readings tend to see recognition in Hegel predominantly, and sometimes exclusively, in deontological terms of norms, authority and respect, and underrate or simply leave out the axiological dimension of values, concern, care and love. As important as the deontological dimension is and as valuable as insights about it are, focusing on it alone is both a one-sided reading of Hegel's text and a one-sided view of recognition in general" (Ikäheimo, 2014, p. 30). As he points out elsewhere, Honneth himself distinguishes the recognition involved in love from that of respect and esteem: see Ikäheimo (2007, p. 227) and Honneth (1992) and Honneth (1995).

[23] I take it that this is the most significant relational direction, if we are to look for an argument modelled on the master/slave dialectic, where in my view the central question is whether the master has to recognise the slave as more than just a slave in the end, if they are to achieve recognition for themselves, rather than the converse question whether the slave

can recognise the master in a non-objectifying way even if they are only seen by the master as a slave—where this is less significant to the refutation of the master which is the focus of the dialectic, because even if it were possible, the master would not be able to grasp this possibility, given the way they have themselves objectified the slave. For further discussion of the question of what is meant by reciprocity in discussions of recognition, see Rähme (2013).

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