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The analytic philosophers: Peter Singer's *Animal Liberation* and Tom Regan *The Case for Animal Rights*

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Many of the questions central to vegan studies (VS) have a recognizably philosophical dimension. Conceptual questions about what veganism is (e.g., Quinn and Westwood) and different kinds of veganism (e.g., Jones) are ubiquitous; ethical questions, often reflecting the personal dilemmas faced by scholars (e.g., Salih) are frequent; and political questions underlie the desire to do VS at all (Wright, *The Vegan Studies Project* passim). Indeed, the link between veganism/VS and philosophy/ethics is "overt" (Quinn and Westwood, 16), while VS scholars are themselves vegan for explicitly ethical reasons (Wright, "Vegans in the interregnum" 31). Unsurprisingly, then, VS scholars do look to philosophers. Often, these are *continental* philosophers, reflecting VS's origins in literary and cultural studies. For example, VS scholars look to Jacques Derrida (Schuster) and Judith Butler (McKay), who are not the best authors for those seeking determinate answers to philosophical puzzles. It would be a stretch to call Derrida or Butler *animal ethicists*, anyway; neither spends much time writing about the eating of animals, animals' rights or worth, or the moral dilemmas encountered in the lives of vegans. The animal ethicist most engaged with by VS scholars is probably J.M. Coetzee's Elizabeth Costello – it is not ideal that she is fictional.

Despite this relative exclusion of animal ethics, it is acknowledged that animal ethicists make up an important part of the prehistory of VS (Wright, *The Vegan Studies Project* 11), and that discussions of animal rights and animal liberation form one of the field's building blocks (Wright, "Doing vegan studies" xv). Scholars of VS should thus be aware of historical and contemporary discussions about the moral status of animals and the ethics of eating animal products. Not only will it help them to situate their work in a wider conversation, but it could prove useful in addressing the

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philosophical questions they face. Even if, ultimately, VS scholars are not satisfied with the answers emerging from animal ethics, familiarity with the field will be valuable. They do not need to start from nothing; there is an academic community that has been doing this work for decades.

To that end, this chapter offers an introduction to philosophical animal ethics for the VS scholar. *Animal ethics* is the normative study of human/animal relationships, the study of how humans *should* interact with animals. *Philosophical* animal ethics, meanwhile, is animal ethics using the tools of philosophy. Here, my focus is on *analytic* philosophy, which arose in the UK at the start of the 20th century. Analytic philosophers take their lead from the sciences, valuing rigour, precision, and logic.

This introduction is focussed around the two most influential figures of 20th century animal ethics – those acknowledged as part of VS's prehistory – and what they say about eating. These figures are Peter Singer, a "welfarist" who belongs to the philosophical tradition of utilitarianism, and Tom Regan, a "rightist" who belongs to the philosophical tradition of deontology. Constraints of space mean that this chapter cannot introduce other strands of 20th century animal ethics. Animal-sympathetic approaches in care ethics (Donovan and Adams), for example, have had currency in ecofeminist approaches to animals. These are explored elsewhere in the current volume, and are a central influence on VS. Wittgensteinian approaches to animal ethics, typified by the work of Cora Diamond, are occasionally referred to in VS work (e.g., McKay 259-63). And Mary Midgley's communitarian approach to animals has been influential among philosophers, though, admittedly, less so among VS scholars. Care-based, Wittgensteinian, and communitarian animal ethicists, however, typically situate themselves in opposition to Singer/Regan. Thus, even if we ultimately want to end up with a position like (say) Diamond's, it makes sense to look first to Singer.

Though there are strands of 20th century animal ethics that cannot be explored here, the chapter will not be limited to introducing Singer and Regan. Instead, it will look to some 21st century debates in animal ethics that can be seen as an intellectual legacy of their work. In these debates, scholars of VS will, if they scratch the surface, find a great deal of value for their own work. It is the contention of this chapter that analytic philosophy and animal ethics should be more than a stopping-off point

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on the way to VS. Indeed, animal ethics may be able to provide the kind of *vegan theory* that VS scholars seek (Quinn and Westwood) – or, at least, the normative dimension of such a theory. Thus, though VS and animal ethics are different disciplines, they can be closely allied.

Peter Singer and *Animal Liberation*

Animal ethics is part of the mainstream of analytic philosophy, and the Australian philosopher Peter Singer is (largely) to thank for this. Additionally, he has had a major impact on animal activism worldwide. His work – especially his *Animal Liberation* – is widely read, often rousing people from (to borrow a term with philosophical pedigree) their "dogmatic slumber," helping them to see the wrong in the exploitation of animals. (Singer was awoken from his own dogmatic slumber while a student at Oxford. The "Oxford Vegetarians" played an important part in his intellectual development. *Animal Liberation*, for example, ultimately arose from a review he wrote of the now little-read *Animals, Men, and Morals*, edited by Oxford's Stanley Godlovitch, Ros Godlovitch, and John Harris.)

Singer situates animal liberation as a natural extension of women's liberation, black liberation, and so on. He asks us to consider the basis of moral equality between humans, as held dear in these movements. The moral equality of (say) men and women does not rest upon the fact that there are no differences between men and women. There are differences – or there might be. Instead, moral equality rests upon the fact that both men and women have important *interests* that should be protected. (*Interest* is a primary moral concept and thus hard to define in non-circular way. In short, all beings with a welfare – a life that can go better or worse for them – have interests. The have interests in things that make their life go better or stop it getting worse (Zuolo 173-4).) In some cases, the interests of men and women will be the same – for example, both men and women have an interest in being able to vote. In other cases, they will not be. Singer's own (old-fashioned) example is that men do not have an interest in having access to abortion services. But animals, too, have interests. At least, *sentient* animals, or animals able to experience pleasure/pain, have interests. Crucially, any

animal able to experience pain has an interest in not being in pain – their life will go worse if they are in pain.

It is sexist to exclude the interests of women from equal consideration simply because they do not belong to men, and, according to Singer, it is *speciesist* to exclude the interests of animals from equal consideration simply because they do not belong to humans – and the two *ism*s are equally confused. The word *speciesism* now gets used in all kinds of ways, but Singer's own definition is hard to beat: speciesism "is a prejudice or attitude of bias in favor of the interests of members of one's own species and against those of members of other species" (*Animal Liberation* 6), though we should add that speciesism need not be about favoring members of one's *own* species. (The way many favor dogs over pigs looks like speciesism.)

What interests do animals have? Singer focuses on their interest in not suffering. The suffering of animals is just as bad, from the "point of view of the universe," as the suffering of humans. And their interest in avoiding suffering is just as strong as ours. In order to avoid the charge of speciesism, then, we have to afford equal consideration to the suffering of animals and the suffering of humans. And this gets us a long way towards veganism. After all – and as Singer goes to great lengths to show – animal agriculture and fishing lead to horrendous levels of animal suffering. (Readers can be spared the grisly details.)

However, Singer's arguments do not get us *all* the way to veganism, and, over the next few paragraphs, we will explore some of the reasons that Singer's position is not wholly vegan. A first is that it focuses, as explained, on the possession of interests. It is surely plausible that some animals do *not* possess interests. Certain bivalves may be a case in point. In the first edition of *Animal Liberation*, Singer explicitly allowed that these animals were probably not sentient. Initially, therefore, he continued to eat them. He later went back on this position (*Animal Liberation* 174), though his stance is a little ambiguous, as he seems to recommend their consumption sometimes (Singer and Mason 133). Whatever Singer's personal practice, we can say that *if* oysters (or mussels, or...) are not sentient, *then* Singer's position permits their consumption – or, minimally, does not forbid it for their sake.

In principle, too, it might be permissible on Singer's account to eat *sentient* animals. Singer is allows that we can eat animals who are already dead. No additional suffering is created by my eating a lamb who has been killed on the road ("Utilitarianism and vegetarianism" 237-8). Singer also explicitly argues that animals can be killed and eaten in times of dire need (*Practical Ethics* 122). However, these examples are hardly unique to his position. It would be tricky to find an animal-ethical framework that did not permit genuine subsistence hunting. Meanwhile, there is something of a consensus (though not universal agreement) among animal ethicists that some or all "freegan" practices are permissible (Milburn and Fischer). *Freeganism*, which relates to veganism in ways yet under-explored by scholars of VS, refers to lifestyles (often tied up with anti-establishment/anti-capitalist views) in which individuals seek out and utilise food (and other goods), including animal-based products, which would otherwise go to waste. The paradigm freegan activity is "dumpster diving" (see Singer and Mason 260-9).

A puzzle that is much more distinct to Singer's position – and one that has sparked a large and complex literature – is the "replaceability argument." This will be explained shortly – however, to understand the argument, we first need to think a little about Singer's view of killing animals, and his utilitarianism.

First, killing. That sentient animals have an interest in not suffering does not necessarily mean that they have an interest in not being killed. In principle, someone – let us call them Crofter – could accept Singer's claim that humans and animals have an interest in not suffering, but argue that painlessly killing animals is unproblematic. Singer's response is the "argument from marginal cases" (Dombrowski), better named the "argument from species overlap" (Horta, "The scope"). It is true, Singer says, that many animals have a lower interest in continued life than the person reading this chapter. This is because of their more limited psychological capacities. (There is an easy response accusing Singer of tying worth to being like him. However, Singer holds that there are *good reasons* to believe that animals who cannot conceive of themselves existing over time have a lower interest in continued life. A more compelling challenge to Singer would engage with these reasons, and offer

counter-reasons. We do not have the space to do this here.) But there are also some *humans* who have these more limited capacities: young children, for example. To avoid inconsistency, Crofter would have to accept that it is permissible to kill these *humans*, too – but that, Singer thinks, is implausible.

Note that Singer does *not* argue that all animals and all humans have an equal interest in continued life. Instead, he proposes that *some* humans and *some* animals have less of an interest in continued life than the reader of this chapter. Some might have none at all. This depends upon the level of *personhood* that these beings possess; the extent to which these animals are "rational and self-conscious beings, aware of themselves as distinct entities with a past and a future" (Singer, *Practical Ethics* 94). A *person* is any being with some level of personhood, so is not, for animal ethicists, synonymous with *human*. (Singer's bar, here, is relatively low; other philosophers might reserve the term *person* to refer to anyone with a *sufficiently high* level of personhood.)

Second, utilitarianism. Utilitarianism, which Singer endorses, is an ethical theory concerned with maximising good consequences, and minimising bad consequences. Utilitarians say that the right thing to do in any situation is the thing that will lead to the greatest balance of good over bad. For *preference utilitarians*, the good is preferences being realised, and the bad is preferences being frustrated. For *hedonistic utilitarians*, the good is pleasure, and the bad, pain. Confusingly, Singer changes teams; having spent most of his career a preference utilitarian, he now endorses hedonistic utilitarianism (Singer, "Afterword"). (More confusingly still, *Animal Liberation* itself is not a work of utilitarian philosophy; instead, it relies upon what is called "common-sense morality" (DeGrazia). The replaceability argument, however, rests upon utilitarianism.)

So what is the replaceability argument? Persons generally have an interest in not being killed, as they generally have preferences about ongoing projects or simply about going on living. On the other hand, for Singer, any badness from killing merely conscious animals – that is, animals that are sentient, but not persons – comes from the fact that, with the happiness of these animals out of the picture, there is less happiness in the world. If the author has a group of happy tetras (imagining that these fish are "merely conscious") living in a tank, and he painlessly kills them, the universe is a

slightly less happy place – there is a bit less (tetra) happiness. (There may be third-party effects, too – the author's tetra-loving partner might be unhappy – but let us leave these aside.) But if the author *replaced* these tetras with other equally happy tetras, who would not otherwise exist, it seems like there is no less happiness in the universe, making the initial killing morally unproblematic (from Singer's perspective).

Why does this matter? It opens the door to farming:

> Suppose we could be confident that chickens, for example, are not aware of themselves as existing over time (and as we have seen, this assumption is questionable). Assume also that the birds can be killed painlessly, and the survivors do not appear to be affected by the death of one of their numbers. Assume, finally, that for economic reasons we could not rear the birds if we did not eat them. Then the replaceabiliy argument appears to justify killing the birds, because depriving them of the pleasures of their existence can be offset against the pleasures of chickens who not yet exist and will exist only if existing chickens are killed. (Singer, *Practical Ethics* 120)

Singer has spent a great deal of intellectual energy explaining why this replaceability argument does not extend to persons, thus opening the door to farming any animal (as long as it is done *very "*humanely"). However, it is not clear that he has been successful. What is more, as noted above, Singer has now embraced hedonistic utilitarianism, while his previous discussions of replaceability were explicitly preference utilitarian. If his comments about hedonistic utilitarianism in these discussions are to be believed (*Practical Ethics* 111), he is now committed to the claim that *all* animals are, in principle, "replaceable." This means that all animals, *in principle*, could be farmed.

Where does this leave us? Vegans could still embrace Singer's case for animal liberation. Perhaps discussions of replaceability are a distraction; while the sort of puzzle that excites philosophers, it is only (perhaps) a minor part of Singer's thought, with (perhaps) little practical import. Singer's case will be particularly attractive to those "welfarist" vegans who are concerned about animal *suffering*, but not about animal *death*. Such vegans might well be open to a form of

highly humane pastoral farming *in principle*, and might be willing to sign on with Singer when he is at his most conciliatory. This conciliatory attitude, which has vexed VS scholars (Kirkpatrick 8), is concerned first and foremost with reducing animal suffering rather than with abolishing the institutions that exploit animals. It should not be surprising, given his utilitarianism.

But however influential Singer has been in converting people into activists, and however compelling his approach may be to many vegans, the approach is not a vegan theory. We should not exaggerate Singer's non-veganism. He is most certainly not a critic of veganism, unlike, say, Donna Haraway and other posthumanists – as discussed in the present volume by Eva Giraud. But his theoretical approach does reluctantly take him to some non-vegan places. When we scratch beneath the surface, Singer's philosophy does not sound like a compelling one to undergird a *vegan* society, a *vegan* movement, a *vegan* theory, or a *vegan* studies.

Tom Regan and *The Case for Animal Rights*

Though the name is often applied to Singer, Tom Regan is probably the real "[philosophical] father of animal rights." For a start, unlike Singer, he actually defends animal *rights*, and not just better treatment for animals. His *Case for Animal Rights* is not as widely read as *Animal Liberation*, to which it responds. This is partly because it is a tougher read. Regan is writing primarily for academic philosophers, and his ideas rest upon some tricky philosophical ideas. Nonetheless, the book is a masterpiece, essential reading for those interested in the moral status of animals, and worth the effort. Helpfully, Regan wrote some widely reproduced summaries. These are useful places to start.

Regan seeks to explore the basis of the "inherent value" that we perceive in ourselves and other humans. *Inherent value* is value that we have in and of ourselves, independently of any value we have to others, and of any value our experiences (e.g., pleasure) have. Note, already, the very different starting point to Singer, for whom value rests in the satisfaction of preferences, or pleasure.

Regan concludes that we have inherent value because we are *subjects-of-a-life*, and all subjects-of-a-life have inherent value equally. Someone is a subject-of-a-life

> ...if they have beliefs and desires; perception, memory, and a sense of the future, including their own future; an emotional life together with feelings of pleasure and pain; preference- and welfare-interests; the ability to initiate action in pursuit of their desires and goals; a psychophysical identity over time; and an individual welfare in the sense that their experiential life fares well or ill for them, logically independently of their utility for others and logically independently of their being the object of anyone else's interests. (Regan 243)

Regan thus seems to set a higher bar than Singer, given the latter's reliance on sentience. We will return to this. In *The Case*, Regan uses the example of mammals of at least one year of age as subjects-of-a-life, but these are not the only subjects-of-a-life.

What is the significance of having inherent value? Beings with inherent value are owed *respect.* And they are owed this respect as a matter of *justice* – it would not merely be good, or nice of us to respect animals. We, morally speaking, *must* respect them. Most importantly, we *fail* to treat them with respect when we treat them as if any value they have is dependent on the value they have to others or on the value of their experiences, as if they are just receptacles for valuable things – like pleasure – rather than valuable themselves (Regan 248-9). This position, of course, sharply contrasts with Singer's view. Regan has no time for the replaceability argument.

Regan reaches his ultimate position – the rights view – by arguing that the duty to respect subjects-of-a-life means that subjects-of-a-life have a *right* to respectful treatment. All kinds of things that we do to animals violate their rights. As such, the consequences of the rights view are radical. Crucially, vegetarianism (read: veganism) is obligatory; institutions of farming, hunting, trapping, and fishing must be abolished; animals may no longer be considered property; and more.

Readers now have an idea of the outline of Regan's theory. Naturally enough, there is room for puzzles at the edges. For example, there is a question-mark over the place of genuine subsistence hunting in Regan's theory (Nobis). And there is room for asking whether he would be open to genuinely harm-free forms of non-veganism – though recall that he is not concerned with whether animals are used in ways that are painful, but whether they are used at all (or, at least, used

disrespectfully). Could the rights view permit freeganism, as Singer's welfarism does (Abbate, "Veganism" and "Save the meat for cats")? How might the rights view deal with backyard chickens (Fischer and Milburn)?

There are also fundamental philosophical questions to ask. While we cannot get into them all here, one concerns the mysteriousness of the notions underlying the rights view. Consider inherent value. What *is* this? Where does it come from? Why do we need this idea (Rowlands 86-97)? VS scholars might well be reluctant to rest their theories on such mysterious foundations. Then again, they might value the mystery; some VS scholars celebrate uncertainty (Quinn), and others draw comparisons between veganism and religion (Covey).

In any case, Regan's rights view seems like a much more viable basis for a genuinely *vegan* approach (to scholarship, politics, life…) than Singer's welfarism. However, let us not leave the matter there. To get to the bottom of this debate, it is worth fast-forwarding to the 2020s, and pointing towards some of the live debates in animal ethics that can be seen as taking place in Singer and Regan's shadows. This will help shine a light on the value of Singer and Regan's frameworks – and frameworks they inform.

Singer's legacy: Harm reduction

The influence of Singer's focus on harm reduction can be seen in a range of contemporary debates in animal ethics that will be of interest to VS scholars, either because they address veganism, or because they will show what a vegan life could be. For a flavor, consider two.

First are questions about the causal impact of our dietary choices. Singer, recall, is interested in actually making a difference in the lives of animals. He thus takes very seriously the fact that a refusal to buy a burger from McDonald's likely has no impact upon the lives of any animals. Naturally enough, the animal in question is already dead – but refusing to buy a burger will not have any impact on any *future* animal, either, because the decisions of McDonald's to buy more burgers are not sensitive to one person's refusal. Now, they *are* sensitive to the decision of *lots of people* to *repeatedly*

refuse. But that we *collectively* have a responsibility to do something does not straightforwardly translate to the claim that we *individually* have a responsibility to do that same thing – especially if our *individual* action (unlike the collective action) will have no impact. Similarly, the fact that it is wrong to harm animals on farms when we could all thrive as vegans does not straightforwardly translate to a claim that it is wrong to eat the products of animals harmed on farms – especially, again, when said refusal will have no impact. Trying to get to the bottom of a justification for veganism given consumers' causal impotence is something that concerns a lot of contemporary animal ethicists working in Singer's shadow – for example, it was a real theme of a recent handbook of food ethics (e.g., McPherson; Nefsky). So seriously do philosophers take this problem that at least one vegan philosopher has concluded that, despite the wrong of raising and killing animals for food, it is not impermissible to purchase and eat the products of animal agriulture (Fischer). VS scholars who worry about the causal impotence of veganism (e.g., von Mossner 34-5) may be able to find much of value in these debates, and could do little better than starting with the works just cited.

Second are questions of impactful *activism*. Singer himself has written a considerable amount on this; for example, he has provided the philosophical underpinning for the effective-altruism movement (*The Most Good You Can Do*). Effective altruism is about doing the most good that we can given our finite resources. Better to donate to a charity that will make effective use of my money than one that will not; better to save more lives than fewer. In the animal case, this has some unsurprising results. Given the numbers involved, their comparative neglect by philanthropists, and that we have relatively clear routes to measurable impact, animal activists and animal philanthropists would do better to focus on farmed animals and diet than on (say) companion animals. We can see these trends reflected in the charities recommended by Animal Charity Evaluators. At the time of writing, their "top" charities are the Albert Schweitzer Foundation, Anima International, The Humane League, and The Good Food Institute. But it might also have some results that are uncomfortable. For example, effective animal altruists face criticism (the fairness of which is disputed) for focusing on welfare reform at the expense of system change – in part because the former is more measurable, and

we have clearer ideas about how it is achieved. Some of these will not sit easily even with those who reluctantly support welfare reform, such as encouraging people to change from eating chicken and fish to eating beef: Chickens and fishes are smaller than cows, which means more death and more suffering per meal (Cooney chap. 1). It also may have results that sound, for those unfamiliar with animal ethics, bizarre. For example, effective animal altruists might well focus on wild-animal suffering. Though there is a literature on wild-animal suffering in animal ethics (e.g., Horta, "Debunking"), and though a utilitarian should not distinguish between wild and domesticated animals, talk of interfering in predator-prey relations can be met with incredulous stares.

These debates serve as examples of the questions that contemporary Singer-influenced animal ethicists address. Both are relevant to VS scholars, who reflect upon the impact of their choices (von Mossner 34-5); the underlying tensions of their vegan position (Quinn); and what it means to live a vegan life beyond diet (Quinn and Westwood). No doubt, then, there is much of interest to VS scholars in these conversations, whether or not they are ultimately drawn to Singer's utilitarianism.

Regan's legacy: Abolitionism and the political turn in animal ethics

Animal rights neither begin nor end with Regan. Contemporary strands of animal-rights theory, however, clearly display the influence of his position. Earlier, we saw the strength of Regan's rights view as a vegan theory; it is worth briefly comparing this to major 21st-century approaches to animal rights to ask whether they could provide viable ethical underpinnings to VS.

The abolitionist approach to animal rights – championed by Gary Francione – foregrounds the rights view's rejection of the property status of animals and its abolitionist (in contrast to welfarist, reductionist, or reformist) conclusions (Francione and Charlton). Though explicitly building upon the rights view, it requires sentience (not the subject-of-a-life criterion) for individuals to be counted as full and equal members of society. Most importantly for current purposes, however, is abolitionism's focus on veganism. For abolitionists, veganism is a "moral baseline"; it is what is required of us, with no ifs or buts. Thus, abolitionists have no interest in many of the arguments, puzzles, and exceptions

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surveyed above. And animal activism, for abolitionists, should consist primarily in vegan education: leafleting, cooking demonstrations, conversations with colleagues, and so on. Abolitionism provides a powerful and undeniably *vegan* ethical system – indeed, more vegan than even Regan's rights view.

Before rushing to embrace abolitionism, however, scholars of VS should be aware that it comes with baggage. The objection to the consumption of *any* animal products is consistently grounded on an out-and-out rejection of animal *use*. This means not only that animals cannot be used for food production, or as experimental test subjects, but that they cannot be "used" as animal companions. Abolitionism is an "extinctionist" philosophy. It calls on us to make this generation of domesticated animals the last. Abolitionism means the end of dogs, cats, chickens, cows, pigs, horses, goldfish, and the rest. For VS scholars, this envisioned separation of humans and animals might sound like a dystopia (Wright, *The Vegan Studies Project* chap. 3), rather than a future of respectful human/animal relations. Abolitionism also takes a hard line on the kind of activism to be favored. Abolitionists are not interested in welfare reforms; indeed, they are, as a rule, suspicious of activist organizations generally. They not even keen on vegan education when framed incorrectly. Veganuary, for example – which sees people going vegan for the month of January – would not be well-received by abolitionists, as it focusses on only one month.

There is another branch of animal rights that may be attractive to those worried about abolitionism's implications. Indeed, it is established explicitly *in opposition* to abolitionism. These are the normative frameworks emerging from the "political turn in animal ethics." Proponents of the political turn foreground the rights view's focus on justice, and begin to ask constructive questions about how we could reorder and reimagine our societies and relationships with animals:

> the crucial unifying and distinctive feature of these contributions – and what can properly be said to mark them out as a 'political turn' – is the way in which they imagine how political institutions, structures and processes might be *transformed* so as to secure justice for both human and non-human animals. Put simply, the essential feature of the political turn is this *constructive* focus on justice. (Cochrane, Garner, and O'Sullivan 263-4)

The best-known work in this subfield comes from Sue Donaldson and Will Kymlicka. In their *Zoopolis*, they agree with the abolitionist focus on sentience, and on the rejection of the property status of animals. However, they explicitly set themselves against extinctionism. Instead, they offer exactly the kind of a constructive, justice-based vision mentioned in the quote above. They imagine a future society in which domestic animals are conceived as our co-*citizens*, afforded membership-related rights (and responsibilities!). Donaldson and Kymlicka detail (at a range of scales, from the household to the international arena) a host of ways that we could live with animals *differently*. For example, they point to the practices of sanctuaries for formerly-farmed animals ("Farmed animal sanctuaries"), and envision urban spaces in which animals can negotiate the terms of co-living (*Zoopolis* chap. 5). Other theorists drawing upon Donaldson and Kymlicka's approach look at other kinds of co-relations. For example, Eva Meijer – focusing on human/animal communication – explores human/animal encounters from her very personal negotiation with her dog, to the participation of "problem" geese in conversations about goose-human conflict, to the relationship between worms and the humans who research them.

The place of food in these systems, meanwhile, is up for grabs. While Donaldson and Kymlicka *do* talk approvingly of widespread shifts to vegan diets (*Zoopolis* 202), they also raise questions about whether respectful co-living with animals could be consistent with eating animal products. Zoopolitical rights certainly preclude killing, confining, or torturing animals for food – but they may not preclude eating the eggs of chickens with whom we live as equals (*Zoopolis* 138). And Donaldson and Kymlicka puzzle over the feeding of carnivorous non-human members of mixed societies. If cats cannot be safely fed a plant-based diet, where does this leave the prospect of living with them (*Zoopolis* 152)? The visions of the proponents of the political turn *could* be wholly vegan, but need not be. If VS scholars seek a theory focussing on constructing novel ideas about close and respectful co-relations with animals, however, they could do much worse than start with Donaldson and Kymlicka's zoopolitics.

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Conclusion: Animal ethics and vegan studies

This chapter has reviewed Singer's welfarism and Regan's rights view, with a focus on what use they may have for VS scholars. It has argued that Singer's vision is far from a vegan theory. Nonetheless, an intellectual legacy of Singer's – a focus on the reduction of harm – means that there is much contemporary scholarship on many of the practical questions with which VS grapples. Regan's rights view, meanwhile, is a contender for the ethical underpinning of a VS perspective. As a legacy of Regan's rights view, we have two sets of normative frameworks that may be even more attractive to the VS scholar than Regan's rights view. Abolitionists stress the veganism of Regan's theory, but the natural conclusion of this is a human/animal separation. The "political turn in animal ethics" - epitomised by Donaldson and Kymlicka's zoopolitics – stresses Regan's focus on justice, constructing visions of respectful future co-relations with animals. This comes at the expense, however, of abolitionism's firm line on veganism. Abolitionst or zoopolitical approaches could form the underpinnings for VS scholarship, and for a vegan perspective on the world.

In this chapter, the case has been made that attention to animal ethics will be valuable for VS scholars. In future work, it is worth flipping this question. What is the value of engaging with work in VS for animal ethicists? Consider just one example: perhaps VS can help to develop a society in which failures of imagination are corrected, allowing us collectively to imagine utopias in which humans and animals live in harmony (Cooke). If so, VS will be of considerable value to animal ethicists who – according to Steve Cooke – should be in the business of not only imagining such utopias, but identifying those failures of imagination that hinder respect for animals. Crucially, work in this area could take its lead (and benefit) from literature and the arts – and who is better placed to aid with this than VS scholars? But this is just an example of what VS could add to animal ethics – more work needs to be done.

While we should keep VS and animal ethics separate, there is every reason that they could and should be close cousins – or even siblings.

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