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Development

Manuscript Draft

Manuscript Number: WD-16454R1

Title: Redistributing resilience? Deliberate transformation and political capabilities in post-Haiyan Tacloban

Article Type: Manuscript

Keywords: political capability; disaster risk reduction; equitable resilience; relocation; Asia; Philippines

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Abstract: There are increasing calls for transformation to be considered when resilience is applied in practice as a means to address the effects of social, cultural and political conditions on vulnerability. Yet transformation does not necessarily lead to more equitable social conditions. Here, we draw on the analytical framework of political capabilities to reveal aspects of the underlying politics of transformation. Our focus is on the relocation of communities in Tacloban, Philippines following Typhoon Haiyan, as an example of a deliberate transformation enacted as part of an integrated development and disaster risk reduction plan. A household survey, focus group discussions and individual interviews are applied to rank households in terms of their perception of household resilience four years after the disaster. Analysis of the drivers and consequences of differentiation reveals an uneven distribution of resilience among residents, with many facing difficulties despite a focus on livelihoods embedded in the relocation plan. While some were able to leverage pre-existing human and social capital, others found that the shift from coastal livelihoods left them struggling to find a valued role. Relocation reinforced underlying subjectivities with new layers of meaning, reflecting experiences of success and failure in adjusting to a more commercial culture and cash economy. The plan sought improvement through commercial opportunities, reflecting the authority and worldview of dominant city and international stakeholders. While the deliberate transformation that followed sought to be just in the distribution of risk and opportunity, poorer residents lacked the political capability to influence the relocation narrative, which in turn overlooked histories of marginalization and the lived experience of the poor. The case highlights the significance of engaging political capabilities if transformations are to support those in vulnerable communities to make valued life choices.

*Conflict of Interest Statement

Declarations of interest: none

Acknowledgements

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Table 1 Five disturbance scenarios used in the case study interviews

Disturbance storyline	Scenario a: Small disturbance	Scenario b: Moderate disturbance	Scenario c: Significant disturbance
1) Earthquake	25% of your house was destroyed	50% of your house was destroyed; roads were partially destroyed, and there's very limited access to piped water and electricity; and problematic communication facilities.	100% of your house was destroyed, 75% of the road network was destroyed; electricity, water, communication facilities are down; and fuel is scarce.
2) Disease or accident at the garbage dumpsite	A member of the family got ill and was unable to leave their bed for three weeks, requiring regular doctor's visits and medication for a month.	A member of the family got in an accident and lost the use of their arm. They were unable to leave their bed for eight weeks and will now require regular doctor's visits and medication for the coming year.	A member of the family died.
3) Drought	The village is suffering a month-long drought which reduces its total water supply by 10%.	The village is suffering a month-long drought which reduces its water supply by 25%.	The village is suffering a month-long drought which reduces its water supply by 50%.
4) Reduction of development aid (via	The availability of support to livelihoods	The availability of support to livelihoods	The availability of support to livelihoods has reduced

Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) / Community Based Organizations (CBOs)	has reduced by 25%.	has reduced by 50%.	by 75%.
5) Fluctuation in the market (with respect to the main source of cash income)	The income has dropped by 10%.	The income has dropped by 20%.	The income has dropped by 30%.

Redistributing resilience? Deliberate transformation and political capabilities in post-Haiyan Tacloban

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Declarations of interest: none

Arun Agrawal, PhD
Editor-in-Chief
World Development

Submission Date: April 22, 2020

Dear Dr. Agrawal:

I am writing to submit our manuscript, “Redistributing resilience? Deliberate transformation and political capabilities in post-Haiyan Tacloban,” for consideration as a World Development research article.

In this paper we examine the the case of community relocation in Tacloban, Philippines following Typhoon Haiyan to investigate the underlying politics of transformation. Drawing on fieldwork with relocated residents we were able to identify those who, four years after the disaster, judge themselves to be most and least resilient. By adopting political capabilities as an analytical framework, we found that relocation, as a deliberate transformation, reinforced underlying subjectivities. Many households were unable to find opportunities for valued livelihood activities, and have struggled to adjust to a new development pathway that reflects the worldview of dominant stakeholders.

We believe that the findings presented in our paper are significant for the wide range of actors – governmental and non-governmental – that have adopted resilience to guide policy and practice and are concerned with securing the interests of vulnerable communities. Our findings illustrate the processes that lead to an uneven distribution of resilience outcomes, and identify political capability as an important entry point for understanding and acting on marginalization. As such, we also speak to an outstanding question in the literature: how can deliberate transformations that simultaneously reduce risk and inequality be delivered? This manuscript expands on recent research published in World Development (Carr 2019; Matin et al. 2018) and, we believe, will appeal to the multi-disciplinary readership of the journal.

Each of the authors confirms that the manuscript has not been previously published and is not currently under consideration by any other journal. Additionally, all of the authors have approved the contents of this paper and have agreed to the World Development's submission policies.

Should our manuscript be selected for peer review, we suggest the following potential reviewers based on their publications and expertise to evaluate our findings. To our knowledge, none of the suggested reviewers have any conflict of interest, financial or otherwise.

- Pauline Eadie, University of Nottingham, Pauline.Eadie@nottingham.ac.uk
- Gina Ziervogel, University of Cape Town, Gina.ziervogel@uct.ac.za
- Edward Carr, Clark University- edcarr@clarku.edu

Each named author has substantially contributed to conducting the research and drafting this manuscript. Additionally, to the our knowledge, none of the authors have a conflict of interest, financial or otherwise.

Sincerely,
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Cited literature:

- Carr, E. R. (2019). Properties and projects: Reconciling resilience and transformation for adaptation and development. *World Development*, 122, 70–84. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2019.05.011>
- Matin, N., Forrester, J., & Ensor, J. (2018). What is equitable resilience? *World Development*, 109, 197–205. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2018.04.020>

*Response to Reviewers

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	Reviewer comment	Response
	Journal Editor	
A	One, this is a subject on which there has been some significant research, reported in interdisciplinary development journals. It would be useful for you to engage with available findings in the interests of engaging with the relevant audience to ensure both that your paper is speaking to the literature and demonstrating its additional contributions clearly. World Development is committed to the principle of fair intellectual acknowledgment without bias or discrimination on the basis of gender, ethnicity, race, class, professional standing, or other similar attributes. As such, we encourage all our authors to be vigilant in attribution of intellectual debt and citations, attending in particular to acknowledging authors, scholarship, and literatures often overlooked as a result of above biases.	The revised text now contains a substantially expanded citation list, referred to in the Introduction, Study Context and Discussion sections, that better situates the findings within the existing literature.
B	Two, please provide a set of 3-5 highlights that convey the message and findings of your paper succinctly and clearly to the general reader.	Done
C	Finally, please avoid references to grey literature to the greatest possible extent.	Done
	Reviewer #2	
1	Analytical Framework The author/s said that the analytical framework being used is the framework of political capabilities. However, while it was mentioned in the very brief review of literature, it was not clearly defined and articulated as the framework	The literature review within the introduction has been substantially re-worked and expanded, in particular in paragraphs 4-8, to better locate and articulate the relationship between transformation and political capability, and to present this as a framework for analysis (paragraph 8). The highlights have been adjusted accordingly.

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	<p>of the study. It should be explained carefully so that it can guide the presentation of findings and analysis. What assumptions can be drawn from it that can guide the research and the analysis? Even the Highlights section does not articulate these clearly.</p>	
2	<p>Choice of Case Tacloban of course has been the focus of many studies on Haiyan / Yolanda. For this particular manuscript, the author/s need/s to explain: why Tacloban was still chosen as the case. What is there to learn about Tacloban. Furthermore, the specific focus of the study is the GMA Kapuso Village, a resettlement site. While it was mentioned that the village is the most developed resettlement site in Tacloban, what are the other reasons why it is worth studying? Overall, why choose a very specific single case instead of doing several comparative cases? What is new in this single case study?</p>	<p>This study uses the case of GMA Kapuso in Tacloban to investigate the factors and processes that differentiated those with perceived higher and lower resilience in a relatively successful resettlement setting. As the new Study Context section sets out “By focusing on differentiated resilience outcomes and framing the recovery and resettlement process as a deliberate transformation, our findings contribute into a wider literature concerned whether and how such processes can address the effects of social, cultural and political conditions on vulnerability, thereby expanding on these earlier studies.”</p> <p>The ongoing significance of Tacloban as an area of focus is addressed in particular in the opening paragraph of the new Study Context, while the newly expanded discussion of Tacloban provides further and more detailed context. The reasons for selection of GMA Kapuso as a single study site are addressed and expanded on in the final paragraph - along with a new passage and associated reference to support the use of single case studies in the opening sentence of the Methods section.</p>
3	<p>Methods i)What is the value of using mixed methods (survey, interviews, and FGDs)? Why combine qualitative and quantitative methods? ii)How were the participants in the FGDs selected? iii)What are the value as well as limitations of</p>	<p>(i) The mixed methods approach is now more fully explained and justified (including via new references), in particular in terms of the research questions, in the opening paragraph of the Methods section.</p> <p>(ii) The Methods section now also clarifies that the participants in the FGDs were selected based on the household survey (“...we rely on quantitative analysis of a rapid household survey to inform the selection of research participants, with whom we subsequently undertake detailed qualitative work...” “... the HRG and LRG</p>

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	<p>doing a study several years after 2013 when the super typhoon hit the area?</p>	<p>residents participating in the subsequent FGDs and household interviews were selected, in order, from the upper and lower quintiles, starting at the extremes, ...”). The top and bottom ranked people were contacted in order start from the extremes.</p> <p>(iii) The value and limitations of conducting the study several years after an event is discussed in the Study Context section (first paragraph) and in the opening paragraph of the Methods section.</p>
4	<p>Definition of Concepts The manuscript is peppered with the words "transformation" and "deliberate transformation" and yet, "transformation" has not been clearly defined by the author/s. In the same way, the manuscript talks about "resilience" but how is the concept used in the study?</p>	<p>We have made extensive changes to the Introduction, defining both resilience and transformation and clarifying the relationship between the two, as well as defining “deliberate transformation” in the opening paragraph.</p>
5	<p>Background of Tacloban and TRRP It appears, at least based on the way the manuscript is written, that the author/s is/are unfamiliar with or uncritical of the socioeconomic and political context of the case. While the author/s argue/s about the role of agents and the people in the process of rebuilding and planning, knowledge of the context and the existing structures can help in the analysis of what communities have to contend with. For instance, there is not much analysis of the role of local elites and authorities except to say that they are dominant in the planning of the TRRP. At certain points in the manuscript, the TRRP and the process are described from a very technical style. It would be helpful if the socioeconomic and political characteristics of Tacloban are briefly discussed and while the focus is on the GMA Kapuso</p>	<p>We identified three broad areas to be addressed in response to this comment:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">(i) Brief discussion of socio-economics and politics of Tacloban; The first three paragraphs of the new Study Context section have significantly expanded the level of background detail on Tacloban (e.g., status as economic hub); paragraph three in particular provides more depth, focusing on the significant role played by political affiliation and political elites in the city.(ii) other relocation sites in Tacloban The other relocation sites are now referred to in the Study Context section, and a detailed profile of each is provided in the table in the new Annex.(iii) GMA Kapuso introduction The final paragraph of the Study Context section provides a new introduction to GMA Kapuso.

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	<p>Village, there should have been a brief description of the relocation projects and sites in Tacloban. The GMA Kapuso Village was also not properly introduced to readers. There was no explanation that it was primarily sponsored by a large media group foundation with several partners.</p>	
6	<p>Results and Discussion Are the findings new or similar to findings of other scholars working in the same area or generally studying the post-Haiyan / post-disaster environment? For instance, are differences in coping and rebuilding mechanisms based on gender also noted in other literature? (See last comment on additional literature that author/s can include.) While this is a single case study, it is important to connect the findings to the available literature not only on the specific case but general studies on post-disaster rebuilding, resilience, and community participation. Again, the author/s need to be familiar with pre-Haiyan/Yolanda socioeconomic and political context.</p> <p>For instance, one finding is that power relations exist in the sense that the Board of Directors of the GMA Kapuso Village appear to be very powerful. Is this something unexpected or a replication of existing or pre-Yolanda power relations in Tacloban? Is this the same manifestation of patronage and patron-client relations or a new phenomenon?</p>	<p>The authors appreciate the suggestions for literature. This and other literature are now prefaced in the Introduction or Study Context, and have been added to the Discussion, strengthening it by better locating our case-specific findings in relation to the existing literature on Tacloban or, in particular, the wider feminist political ecology literature. We have also made better (expanded) use of literature already cited in the Discussion.</p> <p>In the particular case of the BoD, more detail on the pre-existing political culture is included in the Study Context, and is now explicitly referred to in the Discussion (“Microcosms of the wider political culture, the Association’s Board of Directors (BoD) in GMA Kapuso were understood as patrons...”).</p>
7	<p>Conclusion This section could be stronger if the analytical</p>	<p>The conclusion has been revised to ensure that the concepts and framework set out in the revised text are now explicitly returned to.</p>

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	framework of political capabilities as well as concepts of resilience and transformation have been clearly articulated from the very beginning of the manuscript.	
8	<p>Additional Literature and References</p> <p>The author/s can benefit from including the works of the following: J.C. Gaillard (on community resilience in disaster risk reduction), Soledad Dalisay (on local culture and coping mechanisms of people), Maria Tanyag (on the gender aspect), Ladylyn Mangada and Yvonne Su (on gender, particularly Haiyan widows), and other works on Haiyan/Yolanda. Some of these include Tacloban as case but others look at other cases as well. I noted the author/s already cited in the manuscript Maria Ela Atienza, Pauline Eadie, and May Tan-Mullins in their 2019 book <i>Urban Poverty in the Wake of Environmental Disaster</i> but the author/s may also cite more recent journal articles of the three scholars that recently appeared in <i>Natural Hazards</i> (2020, on livelihood and vulnerability) and <i>Asia Pacific Viewpoint</i> (2020, social capital and networks in post-disaster rebuilding process). These as well as more general literature on the Philippines can give the author/s a better grasp of the findings and can provide better context in their analysis.</p>	These suggestions have all been helpful and are very much appreciated. See also response to point 6, above.
	Reviewer #3	
9	First, the manuscript might be strengthened by making its central argument both a bit clearer and a bit more substantial. Both in the abstract, and in the text, the article appears to argue that	Our argument is that greater attention to these critical issues bring transformation into the resilience question, but also that transformation needs to be understood in relation to these critical issues. To address this point, we have made extensive

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	<p>a more serious consideration of transformation is needed to overcome the failure of much of the resilience conversation to address social, cultural, and political realities. This gets a bit muddy for the reader:</p> <p>[a] is the argument that more work on transformation will help fix the inattention to these critical issues, or that more attention to these critical issues brings transformation to the fore?</p> <p>[b] Further, do solutions for this inattention, and the inequitable outcomes of resilience interventions that proceed from this inattention, require an attention to transformation? Is there no way to discuss equity and social justice without transformation? If not, why not?</p> <p>In short, the article makes a strong conceptual claim, but doesn't quite support the claim. It may be that the claim needs to be softened, or that the authors could make this argument a bit more direct and clearer and thus support it more easily with their evidence.</p>	<p>changes to the Introduction text, clarifying the meaning and role of transformation in this paper. Specifically, following Manuel-Navarrete and Pelling (2015), we define transformation in terms of how “risks and inequalities unmet by development” can be addressed. We clarify resilience as inclusive of transformation, but that transformation on its own is not sufficient to ensure equitable outcomes. Recognising that deliberate transformations are a response to disasters (as in Tacloban), the central question, which our paper is concerned with, is whose interests are served through transformation. In other words, transformation emerges as necessary but not sufficient to address inequalities that are embedded in the persistence of existing development trajectories.</p>
10	<p>Another issue that limits the article is that it never defines resilience. Given the complexity of this concept and its increasingly contested character, it seems critical that the authors clearly define resilience for the purposes of this paper. The place of agency, power, justice, and even transformation in this conversation depend entirely on the definition of resilience one selects. Certainly, more mainstream, system-focused framings of resilience tend to overlook</p>	<p>The definition of resilience has been addressed through re-worked text and an expansions of references in paragraph 2, plus in the opening to paragraph 4 (“the apparent conflict between the systems ontology of social-ecological resilience and social theory...”), along with clarifications of the relationship to transformation and allied concepts in the substantially expanded introduction (paragraphs 4-8).</p>

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	these important issues, but there are other framings in the contemporary literature that are pushing these issues to the center of the conversation.	
11	Perhaps because it is never clearly defined, the article appears to take an implicitly materialist definition of resilience as its framing and anchor for its methods. The survey administered by the authors asks respondents about their ability to cope with risk storylines, and then attempts to measure the distance of the household from a threshold where the goods and services that support quality of life are lost. This framing erases a critical aspect of resilience that the emerging literature on power, agency, and difference highlights: meaning. People respond not just to loss of material assets, but the ways in which they make meaning in the world, and they seek to avoid both. Therefore, if this paper wants to remain consonant with that literature, it needs to think about how to frame that threshold such that meaning and material assets are considered. Further, such a framing works well with an observation late in the paper: on page 29, the paper discusses fishers who returned to the sea, and a subsistence existence, rather than giving up their lives as they understood them. This is as clear an example of people responding to issues of meaning over issues of material need/well-being as I have seen.	<p>The expanded introduction now explicitly discusses how an understanding of transformation as part of resilience opens space for focus on procedural and recognition justice, embedding meaning alongside materiality (paragraph 5, and remainder of the introduction).</p> <p>In our methods, we recognise that this sense of meaning is not explicit in the resilience ranking questions. However, there are two important caveats to note. First, the questions ask <i>“how likely it is that the scenario would produce a setback that their household would find it very difficult to recover from”</i>: that is, there is no reference to goods and services. We have removed the quote that includes reference to goods and services, as we see now that it is misleading. The questions are in fact explicit in inviting a subjective assessment; as now included in the manuscript text, the response given “relies on the respondent’s understanding of combined social, environmental and/or economic effects of each scenario, their capacity and willingness to adjust or adapt, and the impact of this on their household” (Methods section). There is space here for loss of meaning to form part of the respondent’s assessment, if they feel it significant.</p> <p>Second, the focus of the method - in terms of the data that we rely on - is not the ranking, but the subsequent analysis via FGDs and in-depth interviews. The ranking method is there only to provide a rapid approach to disaggregating the community in terms of their subjective experience. The FGDs and interviews are present precisely to enable a much richer description of individual and shared perceptions of resilience to emerge, including both material and non-material aspects – as the reviewer rightly points out, it is in this second step that the significance of meaning becomes clear. This is now explicitly referred to in the Discussion section, linking back to the revised understanding of resilience and transformation in the Introduction.</p>
12	While the authors frame this piece around the ideas of resilience and transformation, the	This important body of work has now been referenced in the introduction, in relation to how transformation is formulated as a response to concern with the persistence of

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	<p>overall story of the case study is very well-theorized and documented in other settings, particularly in the context of gender and adaptation work - and that work runs deeper than the DRR literature the manuscript references. This work points out that disasters, shocks, and stressors tend to exacerbate existing inequalities, whether shaped around gender or other social cleavages (e.g. Arora-Jonsson, 2011; Carr and Thompson, 2014; Nelson et al., 2002; Sultana, 2010; Tschakert, 2013). How, then, does this case and the attendant discussion build on this conversation?</p>	<p>inequalities and the underlying role of power and authority in the formation of subjects and the generation of vulnerabilities (paragraph 4) and in the potential for reinforcing vulnerability through new interventions (paragraph 7).</p> <p>The final section of the discussion returns to this literature, locating the experiences of the H/LRG in relation to the overlapping social factors that generate risk. The discussion goes on to explore the results in terms of political capabilities, including the significance of subjectivities, thereby drawing these issues to the centre of how, we suggest, deliberate transformation needs to be understood and approached.</p>
13	<p>For readability, the authors might consider separating the description of the research context from the methods. At times, the tacking back and forth between these two content areas was a bit confusing. This, however, is entirely stylistic and I leave that to the authors.</p>	<p>Many thanks for this suggestion. We have revised to provide more extensive background in the Study Context and a separate Methods sections.</p>
14	<p>In the analysis, I greatly appreciated the gender stratification within groups - this is a very good idea. I suggest the authors justify this as the critical intersection - that is, is gender the social factor that most shapes resilience outcomes within LRG or HRG? What other social cleavages matter, and should they have been considered?</p>	<p>We selected gender stratification based on prior literature as well as local expert advice within our consortium that gender was the most relevant social cleavage to our case study. Our qualitative research allowed for recognition of diversity within that category (civil status, education, head of household, and personal narratives etc.). This point is now explained in the final paragraph of the Methods section.</p>
15	<p>The number of interviews is very small, but well-stratified and therefore to my mind justifiable. The authors might consider justifying the small N - this involves clearly tying the goals of the interviews to the size of the sample (i.e. identifying some underlying processes versus</p>	<p>The case for the small number of interviews is made in the Methods section. As the goal of the interviews was to gain a deeper understanding of underlying processes that distinguish between H/LRG and gender, rather than a representative understanding of the community, the smaller N is seen as justified. This is also supported by the literature (Guest et al. 2006; Hagaman and Wutich 2017).</p>

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	<p>gaining a representative understanding). Further, there is a literature on qualitative interviewing that suggests one can get to saturation in data collection with very small Ns (e.g. Coenen et al., 2012; Francis et al., 2010; Guest et al., 2006; Hagaman and Wutich, 2017), though the lit suggests those Ns are larger than what is on display here.</p>	<p>Guest et al. 2006 suggests that twelve interviews can lead to data saturation in the case that the aim is to understand common perceptions and experiences among a group of relatively homogeneous individuals. Hagaman and Wutich 2017 test this claim across various sites (which was not the case in this study) and claimed that more interviews are needed to reach saturation if various sites are in the study. In the case of groups in one site is concerned, then the number could be 16 or less. Furthermore, the interviews are only one method used to collect data in addition to the household survey, FGDs, and 40 key informant interviews.</p>
16	<p>Finally, for the purposes of wider impact, the authors might consider narrowing their claims a bit. On page 2, the article seems to suggest that the conceptual issues in resilience are at the core of persistent failures to bring together development and DRR. If the authors wish to make this claim, it will need to be supported...and this might be hard to support. Often, the problem they describe is not about concepts, but about funding and bureaucratic structures. For example, at USAID the resilience funding comes through one tranche of funding and set of Bureaus that have to operate through country missions, creating a complex process of procurement and politics when designing projects. The DRR funding, on the other hand, is run through a separate Bureau where funds are centrally-controlled and the authority of country missions is diluted - making procurement and politics different than in other Bureaus. Mixing funding from these two parts of the Agency is extraordinarily difficult and at times legally impossible. Thus, even when there is broad agreement on concepts, structures can inhibit the successful design and</p>	<p>We agree that the presentation on p2 could be misleading, and so have deleted the passage that refers to the ‘persistent failures to bring together development and disaster risk’. We have retained the following text, drawing attention to these practical challenges: “At the same time, bureaucratic silos and spatial and temporal scale mismatches continue to challenge the integration of development and disaster risk planning, despite the shared language of resilience (Brand & Jax, 2007; Thomalla et al., 2018).”</p>

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	implementation of interventions.	

Jon Ensor.: Conceptualization, Methodology, Validation, Formal analysis, Writing - Original draft preparation, Writing – Review & Editing; **Heidi**

Tuhkanen: Conceptualization, Methodology, Validation, Formal analysis, Writing- Original draft preparation, Writing – Review & Editing; **Michael Boyland**:

Conceptualization, Methodology, Validation, Investigation, Data curation, Formal analysis, Writing - Original draft preparation, Writing – Review & Editing; **Albert**

Salamanca: Conceptualization, Methodology, Validation, Investigation, Data curation, Formal analysis, Writing – Review & Editing; Supervision, and Project administration;

Karlee Johnson: Conceptualisation, Methodology, Investigation, Data curation, Writing;

Frank Thomalla: Conceptualization, Writing- Original draft preparation, Writing.

Ladylyn Lim Mangada: Investigation, Validation, Writing- Reviewing and Editing;

Abstract

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2
3 ~~A fundamental challenge to resilience lies in the conceptual and practical failure to address~~
4 ~~social, cultural and political realities, rendering it unlikely that resilience interventions will~~
5 ~~achieve equitable outcomes. As a result, there are increasing calls for transformation to be~~
6 considered when resilience is applied in practice as a means to address the effects of social,
7 cultural and political conditions on vulnerability. Yet transformation does not necessarily
8 lead to more equitable social conditions. Here, we draw on the analytical framework of
9 political capabilities to reveal aspects of the underlying politics of transformation. Our focus
10 is on the relocation of communities in Tacloban, Philippines following Typhoon Haiyan, as an
11 example of a deliberate transformation enacted as part of an integrated development and
12 disaster risk reduction plan. A household survey, focus group discussions and individual
13 interviews are applied to rank households in terms of their perception of household
14 resilience four years after the disaster. Analysis of the drivers and consequences of
15 differentiation reveals an uneven distribution of resilience among residents, with many
16 facing difficulties despite a focus on livelihoods embedded in the relocation plan. While
17 some were able to leverage pre-existing human and social capital, others found that the
18 shift from coastal livelihoods left them struggling to find a valued role. Relocation reinforced
19 underlying subjectivities with new layers of meaning, reflecting experiences of success and
20 failure in adjusting to a more commercial culture and cash economy. The plan sought
21 improvement through commercial opportunities, reflecting the authority and worldview of
22 dominant city and international stakeholders. While the deliberate transformation that
23 followed sought to be just in the distribution of risk and opportunity, poorer residents
24 lacked the political capability to influence the relocation narrative, which in turn overlooked
25 histories of marginalization and the lived experience of the poor. The case highlights the
26 significance of engaging political capabilities if transformations are to support those in
27 vulnerable communities to make valued life choices.
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Abstract

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3 There are increasing calls for transformation to be considered when resilience is applied in
4 practice as a means to address the effects of social, cultural and political conditions on
5 vulnerability. Yet transformation does not necessarily lead to more equitable social
6 conditions. Here, we draw on the analytical framework of political capabilities to reveal
7 aspects of the underlying politics of transformation. Our focus is on the relocation of
8 communities in Tacloban, Philippines following Typhoon Haiyan, as an example of a
9 deliberate transformation enacted as part of an integrated development and disaster risk
10 reduction plan. A household survey, focus group discussions and individual interviews are
11 applied to rank households in terms of their perception of household resilience four years
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13 uneven distribution of resilience among residents, with many facing difficulties despite a
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15 pre-existing human and social capital, others found that the shift from coastal livelihoods
16 left them struggling to find a valued role. Relocation reinforced underlying subjectivities
17 with new layers of meaning, reflecting experiences of success and failure in adjusting to a
18 more commercial culture and cash economy. The plan sought improvement through
19 commercial opportunities, reflecting the authority and worldview of dominant city and
20 international stakeholders. While the deliberate transformation that followed sought to be
21 just in the distribution of risk and opportunity, poorer residents lacked the political
22 capability to influence the relocation narrative, which in turn overlooked histories of
23 marginalization and the lived experience of the poor. The case highlights the significance of
24 engaging political capabilities if transformations are to support those in vulnerable
25 communities to make valued life choices.
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- Transformation needs to be considered as part of resilience if issues of equity and social justice are to be addressed
- Tacloban provides an example of a deliberate transformation enacted through an integrated development and disaster risk reduction plan
- ~~Ranking of perceived household resilience revealed an uneven distribution and allowed analysis of the drivers and consequences of outcomes~~Political capabilities places focus on underlying conditions, attending to narrative, voice, authority and subjectivity in planning
- Planning overlooked histories and lived experiences of marginalization, reflecting instead the interests and values of powerful stakeholders
- The case reveals the significance of political capabilities in directing transformation, reinforcing or challenging subjectivities

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Introduction

Disaster recovery settings open a space for rethinking how development and disaster risk reduction (DRR) priorities are addressed, offering hope that lives and livelihoods can be rebuilt in ways that meet the needs and aspirations of affected populations. Yet too often pressures that arise from social, economic and environmental conditions and processes at multiple scales drive recovery and reconstruction into pathways that reproduce pre-existing societal inequities, even when linked to the narratives of resilience and promises to ‘build back better’ (Atienza et al., 2019; Thomalla et al., 2017). While it is recognized that addressing these systemic pressures may require transformation in material and socio-political arrangements (Matin et al., 2018), empirical evidence of where, when and how transformations can be supported through policy and practice remains limited (Blythe et al., 2018; Carr, 2019; ~~F. D.~~ Gibson et al., 2016). A critical question remains: how can deliberate transformations that simultaneously reduce risk and inequality be delivered (Manuel-Navarrete & Pelling, 2015)? In this paper, we understand deliberate transformations to be those “purposefully initiated and carried out by human agents” (Manuel-Navarrete & Pelling, 2015) and use the example of disaster recovery planning in Tacloban, Philippines, to explore the successes and failures of a deliberate transformation an attempt to transform development and disaster risk trajectories by that attempts to reduce vulnerability and promoting equitable development.

Resilience has emerged as a widely adopted goal of policy, capturing a shift in concern towards the dynamic behavior of systems that connect the social, economic and environmental aspects of development (Brown, 2014; Walch, 2018)-. The build back better

1 approach ~~recognizes~~ reflects this, recognizing the a-complex relationship between
2 development and disaster risk, within which development decisions can increase exposure
3 and compound risks, and DRR measures can lock development into unsustainable pathways
4 or fail to address adequately current and future risks (Fernandez & Ahmed, 2019). The
5 systems-orientated view inherent to ecological and social-ecological resilience provides a
6 way to conceptualize the interconnected problems of human and environmental change,
7 drawing attention to cross-scale relationships and the potential for reorganization,
8 recognizing flexibility and change, rather than equilibrium, as a normal system state (Matyas
9 & Pelling, 2015; Nelson et al., 2007). ~~In practice, however, there have been persistent~~
10 ~~failures to bring together development and disaster risk considerations and to recognize~~
11 ~~both as complex problems, interconnected within systems (Bai et al., 2016; Ramalingam,~~
12 ~~2013; Thomalla et al., 2018). In this context, interest in resilience as a potential bridging~~
13 ~~concept or “boundary object” has been understandable (Brand & Jax, 2007, p. 8).~~ When
14 grounded in a social-ecological systems perspective, resilience provides tools to think about
15 development pathways that are sustainable in the face of environmental, social and
16 political-economic shocks, stresses and change, with resilience defined in terms of the
17 amount of disturbance that a system can undergo before losing function-(Folke et al., 2010;
18 ~~B.~~ Walker et al., 2004). Options for utilizing resilience include approaches to enhance or
19 mobilize the potential for persistence, adaptability and transformation, depending on the
20 circumstances and priorities of development and disaster risk planners and decision-makers
21 (Béné et al., 2014; Matyas & Pelling, 2015). However, the promise of resilience has been
22 met with persistent concerns over the neglect of social dynamics in resilience thinking,
23 masking processes at multiple scales, including for example the effects of gender, caste and
24 traditional authority in shaping local practices, and the effects of institutional dynamics or

1 conflicting incentives and interests in shaping and mediating the impacts of policy (Matin et
2 al. 2018; Young 2010; Ensor et al., 2015; Jones and Boyd, 2011; Carr 2019). At the same
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4 time, bureaucratic silos and spatial and temporal scale mismatches continue to challenge
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6 the integration of development and disaster risk planning, despite the shared language of
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8 resilience (Brand & Jax, 2007; Thomalla et al., 2018). Together, these shortcomings have
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10 contributed to conservatism in practice, observed in a focus on persistence and stability
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12 over change; in the tendency to address “avoidable risks” that residing in physical
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14 infrastructure; and ~~on~~ in the prevalence of projects that favor dominant interests, achieved
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16 through methods that are amenable to expert management and replicated across contexts
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18 through checklists or indicators of resilience (Carr, 2019; Cote & Nightingale, 2012; Jon,
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20 2018; Matyas & Pelling, 2015).

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29 ~~Challenging this conservative turn is a~~ A body of critical literature ~~that~~ has raised
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31 concerns about the failure of resilience to address power, politics, equity and social justice
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33 (Carr, 2019; Matin et al., 2018; Stanley, 2017; Tanner et al., 2015). Underpinning this
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35 perspective is a recognition that agency is underexplored in social-ecological resilience and
36
37 that social difference is masked by an analytical focus on systems, leading to a failure to
38
39 attend to the role of power (Brown, 2014). In particular, the interaction of agency and
40
41 structure yields forms of power that sustain system states, securing development
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43 trajectories ~~or shape and enable transformations~~ in the interests of those who are able to
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45 capitalize on their relative strength in social and political processes and institutions (Brown,
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47 2014; Manuel-Navarrete & Pelling, 2015; Matin et al., 2018; ~~M.~~ Pelling & Manuel-Navarrete,
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49 2011). As Carr (2019, p. 72) summarizes, a focus on external disturbances has meant that
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51 resilience has paid too little attention to social dynamics and endogenous forces,
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53 conceptualized as a system property rather than a “project of managing both social and
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1 natural processes to create and maintain particular socio-ecological states that further
2 specific goals of ... those whose authority provides them with privileges” (see also Cote &
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4
5 Nightingale, 2012; Gillard et al., 2016; ~~B.-H.~~ Walker et al., 2006). These findings are widely
6
7 reflected in the inequitable outcomes observed in post-disaster settings following resilience
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9 and build back better initiatives (Atienza et al., 2019; ~~P.~~Eadie, 2017; Field, 2017; Monteil et
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11 al., 2019; Thomalla et al., 2018; Tierney & Oliver-Smith, 2012).
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16 Despite the apparent conflict between the systems ontology of social-ecological
17
18 resilience and social theory (Olsson et al., 2015; Welsh, 2014), Matin et al. (2018) identify
19
20 and review a burgeoning literature in which equity and social justice are integrated into
21
22 social-ecological resilience research and practice. They conclude that driving towards more
23
24 equitable outcomes in ~~resilience~~ interventions means accounting for social vulnerability and
25
26 differentiated access to power, knowledge, and resources. Moreover, “it starts from
27
28 people’s own perception of their position within their human-environmental system, and
29
30 accounts for their realities, and of their need for a change of circumstance to avoid
31
32 imbalances of power into the future” (Matin et al., 2018, p. 198). The focus on systemic
33
34 change in this literature reflects a shift in understanding of social-ecological resilience
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36 towards one that is inclusive of transformation, allowing for the “recombination of evolved
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38 structures and processes, renewal of the system and emergence of new trajectories” (Folke,
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40 2006, p. 259). These insights build on a substantial body of work from within feminist
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42 political ecology that has identified the effects of multiple social characteristics that overlap
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44 in the generation of differentiated and distinct vulnerabilities (Carr & Thompson, 2014; ~~F.~~
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46 Sultana, 2010; ~~Farhana~~ Sultana, 2014), including in recovery and reconstruction processes
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48 (Tanyag, 2018), drawing attention to how “complex subjects are formed, how they are
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50 perpetuated through various layers of inequality and oppression, and how they act in the
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1 context of exercised power” (P. Tschakert, 2012, p. 149). Similar conclusions are found in
2 recent calls for grounding resilience in forms of engagement and participation (Jonathan
3 Ensor et al., 2018; Few et al., 2017; Harris et al., 2017; Ziervogel et al., 2017). Attention to
4 the persistence of inequalities and the underlying role of power and authority have
5 renewed focus on transformations. The crux of these insights lies in the necessity for
6 resilience thinking to encompass transformations that go beyond material or technical
7 change (Few et al., 2017; Jon, 2018; Matyas & Pelling, 2015), located in the circumstances
8 under which marginalized groups are able to be included in decision-making (Few et al.,
9 2017; Jon, 2018; Matyas & Pelling, 2015). The emphasis is on the agency of marginalized,
10 overlooked or excluded groups in a process of change directed at systemic or structural
11 relationships in social-ecological systems. Work in this field has directed attention in
12 particular, towards exposinge and challenginge development narratives that reproduce risk
13 and vulnerability (Eriksen, 2013; Mark Pelling, 2011), and exploration of how marginalized
14 groups can ~~to~~ gain influence in political processes (Blackburn, 2018; Schlosberg et al., 2017;
15 Ziervogel, 2019).

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39 Transformation in this sense is defined by the opening of “new political spaces to
40 address risks and inequalities unmet by development” (Manuel-Navarrete & Pelling, 2015,
41 p. 1), as seen in recent calls for grounding resilience in forms of engagement and
42 participation that enable resilience to be negotiated across divergent interests, values and
43 scales (Jonathan Ensor et al., 2018; Few et al., 2017; Harris et al., 2017; Ziervogel et al.,
44 2017). The focus is on addressing conditions that generate risk and moving beyond
45 dominant voices, imbuing transformation with a normative agenda focused on enabling
46 hitherto marginalized people to gain greater control over decisions and options for change
47 (Gillard et al., 2016). Political space is thus intended to address the potential for procedural
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1 and material injustices otherwise embedded in resilience, shifting the distribution of
2 material resources by providing access to and influence in the spaces where resilience
3 projects and interventions are designed and developed (Dewulf et al., 2019). Where
4 alternative (non-dominant) discourses and identities are recognized, political space can also
5 enable resilience to be defined beyond the realm of solely material considerations, drawing
6 in “the less visible causes of vulnerability that lie in social, cultural, political, and economic
7 relationships and processes”, including the subjectivities that situate people in relation to
8 authority on the basis of social attributes, such as ethnicity or gender, rendering some more
9 powerful than others (Holland, 2017, p. 396; ~~Mark~~ Pelling, 2011). Embedding
10 transformation within resilience thus carries the potential to integrate recognition justice
11 alongside concerns focused on process and distribution (Bulkeley et al., 2014; Schlosberg,
12 2012; Schlosberg et al., 2017). ~~∴~~

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31 ~~While this work has renewed focus on participation, a parallel literature suggests~~
32 ~~that a narrow procedural right is rarely enough to overcome networks of actors and~~
33 ~~institutions that sustain narratives of inequitable resilience (Friend and Moench, 2013; Borie~~
34 ~~et al. 2019) or to challenge the underlying subjectivities that connect history, culture, values~~
35 ~~and institutions to the ways in which groups are socially differentiated and political~~
36 ~~identities maintained (Matin et al., 2018; Manuel Navarette and Pelling, 2015).~~ Seen through
37 this lens, resilience and transformation are implicitly bound up with the agency of
38 vulnerable and at-risk communities and their relationship to patterns of authority and
39 subjectivity. This requires an appropriate form of analysis, focused on the underlying
40 conditions that sustain injustice, that is capable of informing interventions such as efforts to
41 enable resilience to be defined beyond the realm of solely material considerations, drawing
42 in “the less visible causes of vulnerability that lie in social, cultural, political, and economic
43 relationships and processes”, including the subjectivities that situate people in relation to
44 authority on the basis of social attributes, such as ethnicity or gender, rendering some more
45 powerful than others (Holland, 2017, p. 396; ~~Mark~~ Pelling, 2011). Embedding
46 transformation within resilience thus carries the potential to integrate recognition justice
47 alongside concerns focused on process and distribution (Bulkeley et al., 2014; Schlosberg,
48 2012; Schlosberg et al., 2017). ~~∴~~

1 effect changes in resilience through deliberate transformation. Political capabilities offers
2 one such approach, within which procedural and recognition justice are combined
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4 (Schlosberg, 2012) ~~suggests moving beyond participation to consider political capabilities,~~
5 ~~through which procedural and recognition justice are combined. Work on securing~~
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7 Capabilities draws on seminal contributions (Nussbaum, 2000; Sen, 1999), ~~and~~ focuses on
8 agency, empowerment and the conditions under which people lead flourishing lives. It
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10 views the ends of development to be substantive freedom – the ability of people to live lives
11 that they themselves value (Alkire, 2002; Victor et al., 2013). Capabilities capture the
12 mediating effect of pre-existing individual and societal conditions, directing attention
13 toward the context onto which policy and practice interventions are mapped: how, to
14
15 paraphrase Sen, those conditions distribute the substantial opportunities accessible among
16
17 people who are provided with the same means (Sen, 2005). ~~Attempts at deliberate~~
18 ~~transformation~~ Resilience interventions ~~will~~ inevitably engage capabilities, ~~reflected most~~
19 ~~readily revealed~~ in how the “less visible” context of vulnerability and opportunity translate
20 into the different ability of individuals to ~~take advantage of the~~ make valued choices in new
21 circumstances (Holland, 2017, p. 396). ~~The Capabilities analysis highlights the significance~~
22 ~~to select desired outcomes relies on~~ of underlying relationships and processes to an
23 individual’s ability to achieve outcomes, including those that affect an individual’s ability to
24 ~~make valued choices, including processes~~ that are personal (for example, skills, experience,
25 health), social (power, social norms, gender roles) and environmental (institutions, public
26 goods) (Frediani, 2010; Nussbaum, 2000; Robeyns, 2006; Sen, 2005).

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55 Political capability focuses attention on the opportunity to determine which
56 capabilities are secured in political spaces. From ~~this a capabilities~~ perspective, ~~for~~
57 ~~meaningful~~ participation in political space ~~to support transformation~~ requires “attention to
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1 the experiences of the vulnerable and the way that their status is, in part, socially,
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3 politically, and economically constructed” (Schlosberg, 2012, p. 452). Changing their status
4 requires not only aligning decisions with their interests, such as through consultations or
5 focus groups, but providing them with real power to shape those decisions (Holland,
6
7 2017)(Holland 2017). This means not only to recognizing the fact that some social groups
8
9 are routinely dominated, maligned or rendered invisible in their public or social worlds, but
10 converting recognition into processes of participation that enables marginalized people to
11 devise and decide on their own interpretation of a productive and valuable life (Schlosberg,
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13 2012; Sen, 2005)(Schlosberg, 2012; Sen, 2005), institutionalized in forms that respond to the
14
15 particular circumstances of vulnerable communities and the potential for entrenching
16 vulnerability through co-option or elite capture (Arora-Jonsson, 2011; Cote & Nightingale,
17
18 2012). Accordingly, full political capability is achieved when ~~requires~~ hitherto marginalized
19
20 groups ~~to~~ gain full and equal partnership in decision-making processes, recognizing both
21
22 their right to participate and the social and historical roots of their exclusion, providing. ~~The~~
23
24 ~~effect of enhanced political capability is a shift in authority so that marginalized and~~
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26 ~~vulnerable them communities have increased with~~ control over how resilience decisions
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28 change their circumstances and, enabling valued choices to be identified and secured
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30 (Holland, 2017; Shi et al., 2016). Yet to achieve this requires ~~the opening up of resilience~~
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32 narratives and an elevating of alternative voices in ways that challenge established lines of
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34 authority in development and disaster risk, ~~his discussion~~ exposing an underlying politics
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36 of transformation ~~in which the opening up of resilience narratives requires an elevating of~~
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38 ~~alternative voices and challenges to established lines of authority in development and~~
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40 ~~disaster risk~~ (Manuel-Navarrete & Pelling, 2015). Marginalized or vulnerable groups are
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42 faced with networks of actors and institutions that sustain narratives of inequitable
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1 resilience (Friend and Moench, 2013; Borie et al. 2019). Subjectivities, through which
2 individuals position themselves and are positioned in relation to authority, connect history,
3 culture, values and institutions to the ways in which groups are socially differentiated and
4 political identities maintained (Matin et al., 2018). ~~may need to shift and coalesce around~~
5 ~~emancipatory ideas in order for transformation to take hold,~~ While dynamic, evidence from
6 different scales demonstrates how well-established or centrally organized authorities are
7 frequently able to mobilize subjectivities to maintain privilege, securing the wellbeing of
8 dominant groups while justifying the subjugation of others and enabling development
9 pathways to stabilize and persist (Carr, 2019; Mark Pelling et al., 2015). ~~(Carr 2019, 2013;~~
10 ~~Pelling et al., 2014).~~

11 Struggles over the definition of resilience are thus located in relation to development
12 struggles more broadly, in which contested ideas of improvement demand the exercise of
13 authority to discipline political subjects and maintain inequitable development pathways
14 (Manuel-Navarrete & Pelling, 2015) ~~(Manuel-Navarrete and Pelling 2015).~~ A focus on the
15 political circumstances that give rise to transformation exposes resilience as a project that is
16 defined in particular places and times by those able to legitimize and mobilize their
17 authority (Carr, 2019) ~~(Carr 2019).~~ The potential for transformation towards more equitable
18 resilience lies in the relative political capability of established authorities, whose legitimacy
19 may be derived from the promise of persistence or improvement; and of those seeking to
20 mobilize alternative subjectivities, underlining the significance of including representatives
21 of particular ~~support to existing~~ social groups or solidarity movements. For those responding
22 to histories of marginalization, the ability to forge alliances with powerful stakeholders, and
23 to achieve political space to challenge understandings of risk and improvement from outside
24 the bureaucratic mainstream, have been identified as pivotal (Dodman & Mitlin, 2013;

Holland, 2017) ~~(Holland 2017; (e.g. Ensor et al., 2018; Dodman and Mitlin 2013).~~ While this work has renewed focus on participation, a parallel literature suggests that a narrow procedural right is rarely enough to overcome networks of actors and institutions that sustain narratives of inequitable resilience (Friend and Moench, 2013; Boric et al. 2019) or to challenge the underlying subjectivities that connect history, culture, values and institutions to the ways in which groups are socially differentiated and political identities maintained (Matin et al., 2018; Manuel-Navarrete and Pelling, 2015). As Manuel-Navarrete and Pelling (2015, p. 567) suggest, a central question is whether transformative interventions “can add to coalitions of actors and subjectivities that are seeking to disrupt forms of developmental or adaptive authority that increase risk or inequality.” Political capability thus expands on calls for participation and engagement in resilience, directing attention onto how and for whom materiality and meaning are constructed in resilience planning and decision making. Whose voices, values, interests and identities are embedded in experiences of resilience interventions? Which subjectivities are reinforced, and in response to what authority?

This paper examines the case of a large-scale ~~relocation~~ resettlement in post-disaster Tacloban, Philippines, as an example of a ~~an deliberate intended~~ transformation in development and disaster risk for city residents in the aftermath of Typhoon Haiyan (known in the Philippines as Super Typhoon Yolanda), which struck in November 2013. Based on qualitative analysis of extensive fieldwork with residents, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and city government officials, conducted ~~four to six years after the disaster~~ between 2017 and 2019, the experiences of those who judge themselves to have relatively low and high resilience are charted to unpick the genesis of resilience outcomes— This approach asks: who are the winners and losers from this transformation and what drivers and

1 consequences of their experiences differentiate them? What are their contrasting
2 experiences of changes in material standing and subjective sense of identity and wellbeing?
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5 By focusing on the experiences of resettled residents and drawing on the analytical
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7 framework of political capabilities, the aim is to reveal aspects of the underlying politics of
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9 transformation in Tacloban, and thereby contribute to a nascent literature focused on the
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11 empirics of transformation in risk-development contexts (Manuel-Navarrete & Pelling,
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13 2015). While our findings reveal the reproduction of structural relationships and show the
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15 distribution of post-disaster opportunity to be a reflection of pre-existing skills and
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17 resources, they also highlight the significance of identifying windows of opportunity for
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19 investing in political capabilities and democratizing the goals and values of recovery and
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21 redevelopment (Birkmann et al., 2010; Brundiers & Eakin, 2018). Without this, the
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23 transformations that play out reproduce the political and socio-economic interests of
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25 decision-makers, politicians and local elites, sustaining authority, reinforcing subjectivity
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27 and failing to reflect development and disaster risk priorities and trade-offs that are valued
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29 by more marginal groups within the affected communities.
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39 In the following sections, we first describe the case study context and methods
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41 before presenting our findings in terms of the drivers and consequences of
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43 ~~relocation~~resettlement for those who identify as having relatively low or high resilience. A
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45 discussion section identifies how the uneven distribution of resilience outcomes in Tacloban
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47 reflect pre-existing conditions and demonstrates the significance of capabilities as a lens for
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49 unpacking injustices embedded in the Tacloban recovery planning and implementation
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51 processes. We conclude that the mechanisms used to orchestrate transformative moments,
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53 such as ~~relocation~~resettlement, need to respond to the subjectivities that sustain
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marginality, in turn supporting the expansion of political capabilities, the re-defining of resilience narratives, and the reworking of established patterns of authority.

MethodsStudy context

This research took place in the context of the post-Haiyan disaster recovery process in the City of Tacloban, Philippines. Tacloban was selected as the study site for a larger research programme in 2016 due to its status as the regional (Eastern Visayas) political and economic hub; having been the centre of the socio-economic loss and damage from Typhoon Haiyan (Ching et al., 2015; City Government of Tacloban, 2014); and the existence of a planned and well-documented disaster recovery and redevelopment process in a region tackling high rates of poverty soon after the disaster – 41 percent in 2015 (Republic of Philippines NEDA, 2019). Engaging in a long-term research process in Tacloban alongside a local research institution provided an opportunity to explore recovery issues, outcomes and challenges which still persist several years after the disaster. The present study seeks to shed new light on long-term recovery and redevelopment processes and outcomes, once the international assistance has ended and the local governments must transition from recovery to development. As such, this paper contributes to a growing literature on the impacts of Typhoon Haiyan and the responses of different stakeholders, including those focused on the effects of gender norms on young Filipino women informal settlers (Espina & Canoy, 2019) and women widows and survivors (Lim Mangada, 2016; L.L. Mangada & Su, 2019; Su & Mangada, 2020; Tanyag, 2018; Valerio, 2014); and the politics of disaster response (Bankoff & Borrinaga, 2016; Blanco, 2015; Salazar, 2015a) (Bankoff & Borrinaga, 2016; Blanco, 2015; Salazar, 2015; Uson, 2015). By focusing on differentiated resilience outcomes and framing the recovery and resettlement process as a deliberate

1 transformation, our findings contribute into a wider literature concerned with whether and
2 how such processes can address the effects of social, cultural and political conditions on
3 vulnerability, thereby expanding on these earlier studies.
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8 In the six months following Haiyan, a recovery planning process was undertaken by
9 the City government, supported by the United Nations Human Settlements Programme (UN-
10 Habitat) and other international agencies. The result was the adoption of the Tacloban
11 Recovery and Rehabilitation Plan (TRRP), a long-term redevelopment strategy aiming to
12 produce a “resilient, vibrant, and livable” Tacloban. The central pillar of the City’s recovery
13 strategy has been the resettlement of approximately 40 percent of the city’s population
14 from informal coastal settlements in the downtown area to permanent shelter, in the form
15 of 15,000 newly-built homes spread across twenty resettlement sites in the north of the
16 city, some 20km from downtown (Paragas et al., 2016). The wider recovery has sought to
17 promote resilient and equitable development through post-disaster interventions focused
18 on shelter, livelihoods and improved access to social services for the poorest, largely
19 informal communities displaced by the disaster (City Government of Tacloban, 2014).
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40 The planning and enactment of the recovery process inevitably took place against
41 the backdrop of existing social cleavages, political interests and relations of power. Tacloban
42 City, the lone highly urbanized city in Eastern Visayas, is known as a stronghold of the
43 Romualdez - Marcos clan, which has successfully built up and maintained a formidable
44 electoral organization down to the village level. The city is at the epicenter of a regional
45 economic boom, with Eastern Visayas recording the highest growth rate in the Philippines at
46 12.4% in 2016 (Pauline(-Eadie, 2019)(Eadie 2019). However, political relations dominate city
47 affairs: an ally of the powerful clan is believed to be generously rewarded; appointment to
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1 local positions in the city bureaucracy is perceived to be based on connections with the
2 political family; business leaders in the city are perceived to be allies; and many community-
3 based organizations and its leaders are acknowledged to be subservient to the powerful
4 elite (Bankoff & Borrinaga, 2016; ~~L-~~Mangada, 2019; Salazar, 2015b; Wigley, 2015).
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10 Patron-client relations cut through this picture, linking those of different wealth,
11 power and class (Tan-Mullins et al., 2020) ~~(Tan-Mullens et al. 2020)~~. This degree of power
12 among political elites is not uncommon in the Philippines (e.g. Uson, 2017) ~~(e.g. Uson 2015)~~
13 and, as Eadie (2019, p. 96) ~~(2019, p96)~~ suggests, the legitimacy of the dynastic governance of
14 the city of Tacloban is supported through various means including “patronage, monuments,
15 rituals such as fiestas and religious ceremonies, the presence of the family at
16 commemorations, celebrations and the visible sponsorship of civic events.” It is
17 unsurprising, therefore, that In the post-disaster context the TRRP emerged as an important
18 political object for the dominant elite, and that the planning process was enacted with low
19 level of public participation (Maynard et al., 2017; Parker et al., 2017; Tuhkanen et al.,
20 2018). For instance, while public consultations were held, they were largely information
21 sharing exercises and offered limited opportunities for residents to influence or change the
22 plans, compounding a wider sense that “engagement and participation was challenging and
23 insufficient” (Tuhkanen et al., 2018, p. 13) ~~(Tuhkanen et al., 2018 p13)~~. There was
24 particularly limited consultation with the resettled residents about their livelihood needs
25 (Atienza et al., 2019). Simultaneously, pre-existing gender roles were manifest in the
26 exclusion of women from planning processes (Lim-Mangada, 2016) ~~(Lim Mangada 2016)~~, the
27 lack of recognition for womens’ and girls’ societal contributions in the recovery phases
28 (Tanyag, 2018) ~~(Tanyag 2018)~~, and the neglect of widowed women after the disaster ~~(L-~~

1 Mangada & Su, 2019) (~~Mandada and Su 2019~~). It is against this background that our study is
2 situated.
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5 To understand the factors and processes that shaped recovery and redevelopment in
6 Tacloban, our study focuses on one of the 31 official housing projects: GMA Kapuso Village.
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8 GMA Kapuso Village is a 403-unit housing development located in the north of Tacloban,
9 sponsored by the wealthy GMA Kapuso Foundation (an arm of the Filipino broadcast
10 television company, GMA Network). It was selected as the case study site because it was
11 one of the two housing projects that were completed, fully-occupied, and providing all basic
12 services at the time our research commenced. As late as June 2020, GMA Kapuso and the
13 nearby Habitat Village continue to be the only resettlement sites with complete access to
14 basic services or facilities (see ~~Annex~~Supplementary Material Information 1 for a list of all
15 resettlement sites and their access to services or facilities). GMA Kapuso, therefore,
16 provides a case of a relatively successful post-disaster resettlement site, focusing the
17 present research in a location where residents had been living for some time. This allows
18 insight into how they understand their situation as it has evolved through both the recovery
19 and development phases. A member of the research team had previously conducted
20 research in the village and built relationships with the village leadership and residents,
21 providing a background of trust that aided access and offered a familiar starting point for
22 conversations between the research team and respondents.
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Methods

This study explores the complexity of transformation in Tacloban, focusing on livelihood change and resettlement in the context of disaster recovery and redevelopment. We adopt a single retrospective case study strategy, focusing on one subject (the GMA Kapuso resettlement site), as an approach that is appropriate for developing a rich picture of the antecedents and consequences of the transformation that the residents have lived through (Thomas, 2011)(~~Thomas 2011~~). We adopt an explanatory, participant selection, mixed methods model (Creswell et al., 2003)(~~Creswell et al. 2003~~), in which we rely on quantitative analysis of a rapid household survey to inform the selection of research participants, with whom we subsequently undertake detailed qualitative work. This approach responds to two central research questions that directed the study (Doyle et al., 2009)(~~Doyle et al. 2009~~): who assess themselves to be most and least resilient following the resettlement process? And, what factors and processes explain this difference? While potential problems with recall inevitably complicate investigation of long-term processes such as resettlement, triangulation through the use of multiple tools and approaches including key informant interviews, focus groups discussions, surveys, and document analysis help minimise these risks.

The findings are framed by a review of academic and policy literature related to the Tacloban recovery process, and data from 40 semi-structured interviews conducted in 2017-2018 with key informants from city government agencies and departments, barangay leaders and officials, and local and international NGO workers. These interviews explored city- and local-level decision-making in the recovery processes. This background informed the design of a household survey and subsequent focus group discussion (FGDs) in GMA

1 Kapuso Village, conducted in March 2018. Data collection was completed with in-depth
2 follow-up interviews in GMA Kapuso Village in September 2018.
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5 A survey of 160 households was conducted in GMA Kapuso Village in 2018 to
6 ascertain subjective levels of resilience. Following the method set out in (J. Ensor et al.,
7 n.d.), each respondent scores their ability to cope with/respond to five different risk
8 storylines, each developed in consultation with local partners to ensure relevance.
9
10 Storylines are presented as scenarios, describing low, medium and high levels of
11 disturbance, as set out in Table 1. For each scenario, the respondent assesses *how likely it is*
12 *that the scenario would produce a setback that their household would find it very difficult to*
13 *recover from*. Responses are recorded on a Likert scale, from 1 to 6, such that a response of
14 1-3 implies a judgement by the respondent that they will recover (1 – certain to recover, 2 -
15 very likely, 3 – likely to recover) and 4-6 that they will not recover (4 - likely to not recover, 5
16 - very likely, 6 - certain to not recover). The deployed survey was written in Waray (the local
17 language) and administered by Waray-speaking research assistants from the University of
18 the Philippines (UP). The sampling method was to approach alternate housing units along
19 each block in GMA Kapuso Village.
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42 The use of storylines and scenarios, rather than direct reference to the term
43 resilience, recognizes that resilience is in many settings either ambiguous, absent or imbued
44 with politicized meaning (as has been found in Tacloban where the narrative of resilience as
45 “personal or collective strength” has been internalized by many in the resettled
46 communities;(Pauline Eadie, 2019, p. 104)-Eadie 2019, p104). Through the use of scenarios,
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55 the survey results interpret resilience in terms of the distance to a threshold; in this case,
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58 the minimum magnitude of the disturbance that the respondent judges themselves unable
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to recover from. Thus, those judging themselves ‘certain’ to recover are further from a threshold than those judging themselves only ‘likely’ to recover. When a respondent perceives that an increase in disturbance moves them from coping to not coping, this suggests crossing a threshold and moving into a highly undesirable regime. As such, this approach provides an empirical and subjective approach to assessing to Walker et al.’s (2006) understanding of social-ecological resilience, where a crossed threshold occurs when “the goods and services that support our quality of life” are lost (B. H. Walker et al., 2006, p. 37). As a subjective judgment, this may comprise, for example, the participant’s assessment of the effects of changes in ecosystem services, economics and/or social conditions. The method thus relies on the respondent’s understanding of combined social, environmental and/or economic effects of each scenario, their capacity and willingness to adjust or adapt, and the impact of this on their household.

Disturbance storyline	Scenario a: Small disturbance	Scenario b: Moderate disturbance	Scenario c: Significant disturbance

[Insert Table 1]

To capture differences in perceived resilience that account for potential disturbance across the five storylines, each household is assigned a resilience score. This score reflects their subjective assessment of each storyline scenario and allows households to be ranked, capturing differences in perceived resilience. Producing a resilience ranking score (or index) for each household requires accounting for two degrees of freedom: the selected point on the scale for a given storyline, and the number of times each point on the scale is selected for a given household. A resilience ranking score can thus be defined by a simple sum-of-products (J. Ensor et al., n.d.). This allows the survey data to rank households from those

1 who assess themselves 'most resilient' to 'least resilient'; those in the upper half of the data
2 set are referred to as the higher resilience group (HRG) and those in the lower half the lower
3 resilience group (LRG). In accordance with Ensor (~~+~~Ensor et al., n.d.), the HRG and LRG
4 residents participating in the subsequent FGDs and household interviews were selected, in
5 order, from the upper and lower quintiles, starting at the extremes, selected from the upper
6 and lower quintiles, with additional members added from the upper and lower half if
7 sufficient numbers of households were unavailable. Previous work with this method affirms
8 that the ranking approach reflects household and community experiences, and that
9 subsequently working through participatory qualitative methods with the HRG and LRG
10 provide insights into the factors and processes that differentiate those with greater and
11 lesser resilience in a given setting (~~+~~Ensor et al., n.d.).

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The resilience ranking method produces four groups: HRG men, HRG women, LRG men, and LRG women. Separate FGDs were conducted with each group to comprehensively explore ~~understand~~ their recovery experiences, challenges faced, current priorities and the overall gains and losses of the ~~relocation~~ resettlement process (Coenen et al., 2012).

Livelihood challenges emerged in the FGDs as a key area of differentiation between LRG and HRG members. In order to further understand the livelihood challenges, the implementation of livelihood interventions, and to gain a deeper understanding of underlying processes that distinguish the HRG and LRG, individual follow-up interviews were conducted with GMA Kapuso Village residents. In line with the purposive non-probabilistic sampling guidance (Guest et al., 2006; Hagaman & Wutich, 2017), seventeen residents were interviewed (HRG interviews – five men (M1-M5), six women (W1-W6); LRG – two men (M1-M2), four women (W1-W4)). ~~Livelihood challenges emerged in the FGDs as a key area of~~

~~differentiation between LRG and HRG members. Seventeen follow-up one-on-one interviews were conducted with GMA Kapuso Village residents to further understand the livelihood challenges and the implementation of livelihood interventions (HRG interviews— five men (M1–M5), six women (W1–W6); LRG—two men (M1–M2), four women (W1–W4)).~~

The interviews and FGDs were conducted by four of the authors with translation provided by Waray-speaking research assistants from UP. One of the authors, from UP, acted as the fieldwork coordinator and provided links to local stakeholders. The survey questionnaire and list of questions asked during the FGDs and interviews are found in the Supplementary Information.

The research assistants translated the interviews into English and the translated texts were reviewed by the fieldwork coordinator. The transcripts were transformed into coherent narratives with emerging themes relating to consequences and drivers of differentiated resilience as main sections, coded using Dedoose, an online qualitative research analysis software. From there, the interview data were analyzed according to HRG and LRG groups, and further disaggregated by gender. In discussion with local experts within the research consortium, gender was selected as the main secondary attribute for disaggregation based on the gender imbalances in Filipino society and how this manifested in terms of placing women survivors at a disadvantage in the post-Haiyan context (P-Eadie et al., 2020; ~~Lim~~ Mangada, 2016; ~~L. L.~~ Mangada & Su, 2019; Tanyag, 2018). While other social cleavages, such as class, religion, age (F-Sultana, 2010) (~~Sultana 2010~~), ethnicity, disability, gender orientation and the non-binary concept of gender (Gaillard et al., 2017) (~~Gaillard et al. 2017~~) were recognized, they did not reveal themselves in the FGD or in-depth interview data. These became the key structure of the findings discussed below.

Results

This section details the changes experienced by households as a result of ~~relocation~~resettlement. The analysis focuses on the most significant consequences and drivers of change experienced by those expressing higher and lower resilience, further disaggregated by gender.

Consequences of ~~relocation~~resettlement on livelihoods

Changes in livelihood activity

For all of the HRG men, ~~relocation~~resettlement has impacted their livelihood activities. One lost his pedicab driving and rental business as a result of Haiyan but has been able to continue work as a scrap metal collector and has started new businesses, including a store and bakery. One of three ex-fishermen has applied his skills to new work as a mechanic, while all three have started new family businesses with their wives/partners, such as a pig farm and a store. One has done so due to fear of staying at the coast, despite the difficulty of leaving the profession he has known since a child. Most of the HRG men have multiple livelihoods and sources of income. Of the HRG women, most had some livelihood activities pre-Haiyan. Two are able to continue vending, while others continue catering and laundry activities, but to a lesser degree than before. Some tried new activities but reverted to what they knew after mixed successes. Most have husbands/partners who work, but one is widowed and receives financial support from her son who is an accountant in Manila.

1 The two LRG men have continued with their pre-Haiyan livelihoods. One drives a
2 public utility jeep (PUJ), while the other is a fisherman and commutes from GMA Kapuso
3 Village to his old fishing ground in the village he relocated from. Both have wives or partners
4 who have supplemental income-generating activities, in addition to looking after their
5 children. All of the LRG women experienced changes following Haiyan and the subsequent
6 ~~relocation~~resettlement. Some have found new activities, with mixed successes, while others
7 are more reliant on other incomes in the household. For example, one grows vegetables and
8 has a small store but earns little. Another can no longer prepare and vend fish caught by her
9 husband as she once did, but instead sells rice which is not highly profitable. A widowed
10 respondent does laundry and cleaning work in the community, as well as other ad hoc cash-
11 for-work activities. Several of her children financially support the household, including two
12 young children who fetch water for neighbors. Another widow has health issues and cannot
13 work – she and her young children rely on her son’s income from construction labor. Prior
14 to Haiyan, she collected shells that were traded for rice and was reliant on her husband’s
15 pedicab driver income.
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40 *Changes in the household financial situation*

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43 Most of the HRG men speak positively of their current financial situations due to
44 successful businesses, steady incomes, access to loans, and being able to save. This has
45 allowed the expansion of livelihood enterprises and reinvestment of profits into new
46 activities. Some are perceived as being wealthy within the community. One, however,
47 considers himself and his family financially worse-off now: his family has outstanding
48 medical bills and other loans, and is reliant on his income which is modest as he is not yet a
49 fully qualified plumber/technician. The household does, however, receive the deceased
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1 father's pension from the police force. Half of the HRG women have multiple sources of
2 income in the household, but only one speaks of being able to save after accounting for
3 daily expenses. These savings enabled the purchase of a freezer on credit, which in turn
4 enabled an additional income-generating activity of selling ice. For three of the HRG women,
5 a lack of savings means they are unable to cover expenses on days when income is reduced
6 or lacking (e.g. due to husband's sickness) or purchase children's clothes and other non-
7 essential items. Consequently, some take out loans from a microfinance institution or
8 friends. One HRG woman does have savings but has found difficulty in maintaining these
9 savings due to household income instability, stating that "sometimes my husband's income
10 is not enough and to compensate for that, I would use the money that I have saved. This is
11 how we live. So, there's really no legitimate savings" (Interview, HRG W4, 13 Sept 2018).
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28 The majority of LRG men and women spoke of a precarious financial situation due to
29 unstable incomes and a lack of savings – impacts include rationing food, being unable to pay
30 bills, and taking out high-interest loans. Only one felt his household income was sufficient,
31 although they are also supported by remittances from their daughter. Among the LRG
32 women, one has work and income that is seasonal, while for two respondents
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42 ~~relocation~~ resettlement has also brought higher costs such as for transportation to
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Drivers of livelihood intervention outcomes

Implementation of livelihood interventions

Only some of the HRG and LRG men and women received livelihood support after moving to GMA Kapuso Village. Interventions included training and/or supplies related to baking, gardening, fish farming, rice vending, as well as goods for *sari-sari* stores, or local sundry shops, and a collective wholesale grocery store. Only some of the interventions led to viable livelihood activities for residents, while other residents used donations to sustain their households – either by consuming the goods that were supposed to be sold or by paying already accumulated debts. One LRG woman, who’s rice vending business was not sustainable despite participating in three rounds of buying/selling rice, remarked “They [the donor] gave us rice, half a kilo, and a weighing scale. It’s all gone. We consumed it.” (Interview, LRG M2, 14 Sept 2018). Two HRG women also had direct experience of this. For example, one had participated in a food vending related program and received cooking training, a stove, cookware and funds for supplies. She ran a food stall in GMA Kapuso Village until her household consumed the goods. After that, she returned to providing laundry services. Some respondents received multiple types of livelihood support. For example, one received fish cages and other fishing implements as a part of a collective project and had also participated in accounting training. He now runs multiple *sari-sari* stores with his wife, who also received various types of support for her business.

Both HRG and LRG residents reported mixed intervention results, although the reasons for the failures of implementation were predominantly pointed out by HRG residents. Some HRG residents attributed the lack of success due to training’s lack of consideration for the broader requirements of starting and continuing a livelihood. For

1 example, one HRG household received seeds despite lacking the space to plant them, while
2 another, who does not have access to an oven, received training and supplies for baking and
3 pastry production. This HRG woman remarked “[the training would be] useful if they gave
4 capital. But they did not give an oven so how can we use our training?” (Interview, HRG W2,
5 12 Sept 2018). Another HRG man who received accounting training felt it was not useful
6 because it was not suitable for the skill level and livelihood activities of the participants.
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16 Some LRG and HRG residents participated in interventions that required residents to
17 join a cooperative in order to receive livelihood support. For example, one HRG respondent
18 was part of a cooperative grocery store to which an international NGO gave a cash
19 donation. Their wholesale cooperative near the ~~relocated~~ resettled communities removed
20 the need for *sari-sari* store owners to travel downtown to purchase goods. Members
21 participated in meetings and orientations with the NGO and the group worked in shifts,
22 where each person worked one shift a week and earned a set amount. Although there was a
23 daily revenue, the business ended after about a year and a half due to internal conflicts over
24 shift patterns. Another co-operative, focused on fish preparation, dissolved when meeting
25 attendance dropped and members did not pay their dues. Some also stopped attending
26 meetings due to their debts to the cooperative. One HRG respondent reported that
27 members of a fish farming cooperative stole the fish and were uninterested in working: “as
28 a result, performance decreased with each harvest” and the business had to be closed;
29 another suggested the failure of cooperatives was down to the members: “They didn’t want
30 to run a business; they just want to be paid salaries” (Interview, HRG M5, 14 Sept 2018).
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Social relations and power dynamics

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3 Within the ~~relocation~~resettlement site, a Board of Directors (BoD) operates as a
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5 decision-making body in the running of village affairs, including as an intermediary for
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7 organizations looking to distribute resources and support to those who were
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11 ~~relocated~~resettled to the village during the relief and recovery phase. The BoD are officers
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13 of the GMA Kapuso Village homeowners association, originally elected by all homeowners.
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15 At the time of the survey, only those paying to be members of the association were able to
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17 participate in BoD elections. Close connections to the BoD were perceived as influencing
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19 decisions about who should receive support - a perception that was shared by both those
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21 who received support and those who did not. For example, one HRG woman acknowledged
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23 that those close to decision-makers were prioritized, stating that some people did not get
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25 support “because they are not close to, or they do not have a connection with the leaders,
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27 and that those who have the connections would always be listed” (Interview, HRG W5, 13
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29 Sept 2018). The wife of an HRG man attributed her participation in a rice retailing program
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31 to her friendship with the former GMA Kapuso Village president. Another HRG woman
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33 complained to development agencies about the inequitable distribution but was told that it
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35 was an internal village issue.
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45 In addition to leveraging connections with local leaders, HRG men and HRG women
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47 received support from personal and professional connections. Two started working in
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49 businesses that were run by family members; one received a loan for his new bakery from
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51 his nephew’s lending company, while another occasionally borrows from neighbors to allow
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53 them to make ends meet. Seven out of the eleven HRG households interviewed receive
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55 financial support from relatives at least occasionally. Three HRG residents stated that they
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1 were dependent on money regularly coming from children living in Manila and abroad,
2 while others receive money or advice from family members when it is needed or requested;
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4 for one respondent this was in the form of help from their brother-in-law to apply for a loan
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6 for a refrigerator which allows them to sell ice. For one of the HRG men, reliance on
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8 remittances for household income is greater than from his income as a mechanic.
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12 Some of the LRG men and women agree with the HRG residents' views on the
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14 influence of connections with BoD leaders on the distribution of livelihood benefits,
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16 describing the BoD meetings to discuss support as secretive and exclusive. Two of the LRG
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18 women felt that the BoD had withheld support that was meant for them. In one case, a
19
20 female LRG member felt that the BoD was directly responsible for taking items intended for
21
22 her *sari-sari* store donated by United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). "I felt that
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24 it wasn't worth 10,000 pesos. I think they [the BoD] removed some items", she said
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26 (Interview, LRG W1, 12 Sept 2018). Two other LRG women only found out that support was
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28 available after others had already received theirs. Similarly to the HRG, the LRG households
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30 rely on their professional and personal connections, including family, for money and
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32 livelihood opportunities. For example, two receive remittances from family and relatives to
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34 support educational expenses of their children as well as other costs. Personal contacts also
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36 provide access to information, such as where sources of support are available. In the case of
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38 a widow suffering from a long-term illness, personal contacts are relied on to access food
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40 scraps from a neighbor, a trash-collector at the nearby dumpsite. The widow used to work
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42 at the local church as a childminder and after she fell ill, she still received financial or food
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44 donations from the church through a nun. However, once the nun moved away from
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46 Tacloban, this support dried up.
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Individual resources and skills

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3 HRG men accessed finances to reconstitute their livelihoods in various ways,
4 including savings from post-Haiyan support during the time spent in transitional shelters,
5 previous livelihoods, inheritance, and pension of a deceased household member. One
6 received financial support from a religious foundation that he and his partner used to start
7 their *sari-sari* business. He recalls that they received abundant relief goods during the first
8 two years after Haiyan which they used to build a good foundation for their business.
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12 Although household members in half of the six HRG women's households received
13 support, they did not perceive this as having helped them start a successful livelihood. Half
14 of the six HRG women link their household situation to their spouse's livelihoods. For one
15 who is unemployed, the steady income from her husband's livelihood at the Tacloban
16 airport allows them to plan their finances while she awaits the approval for a loan to start
17 her pig farm. In four households, their husbands have continued with their previous
18 occupations and two HRG women have continued with the same line of work. Fishing
19 provides two HRG women with at least fish for the family to eat.
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23 Some HRG men and women referred to the importance of 'soft skills', such as
24 proactive entrepreneurial thinking, which they were able to call on to reconstitute their
25 livelihoods either because they themselves possessed those skills, or because their families
26 did. One experienced fisher now supports his wife's vending business. His wife describes
27 herself as business-minded, having expanded her peanut-selling business after Haiyan and
28 now plans to start a pharmacy because she sees sufficient demand for one. They actively
29 leverage over two generations of skills that the family has in selling peanuts to run the
30 business, to understand its cycles, and how to plan. Another HRG woman previously worked
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1 in a grocery store and now runs a successful *sari-sari* store. Her store has a business permit
2 that enables her to sell additional food items that she acquired by consignment. She also
3 subsidizes her household electricity bill through her store. She considers herself pro-active
4 and entrepreneurial and is proud that she does not have to rely on her husband as the sole
5 income earner. One HRG man runs multiple businesses, including a scrap metal venture and
6 a bakery. He is ambitious, business-oriented, and recognizes the skills and resources
7 required to run each business. When starting his bakery, he leveraged the experience of
8 other bakery owners in his family. Two others temporarily squatted on unused space
9 (without permission), thereby avoiding rent while establishing their business activities.
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24 The LRG women and men, on the other hand, either did not have or were unable to
25 access resources. Some did not receive support after Haiyan, even in cases of poverty and
26 poor health. Access to finances, such as for start-up financing, was also an issue for several
27 LRG members. The LRG men instead report relying on their pre-existing skills to reconstitute
28 their livelihoods, such as a driver or as a fisher. In the latter case, this is despite feeling that
29 his livelihood is at risk each time he returns to GMA Kapuso Village because he must leave
30 his nets hanging at the beach. Someone had recently stolen his crab net, which he cannot
31 afford to replace. According to his wife, his preference to work alone makes it difficult for
32 him to transition to other jobs, despite having received rice and a weighing scale while in
33 the transitional shelter. LRG women's post-Haiyan livelihood activities also link with
34 previous activities. One continues to sell vegetables from her garden and runs a small *sari-*
35 *sari* store, while another sold dried fish prior to Haiyan and now sells rice in addition to
36 caring for their home and children. Two temporarily performed activities based on their life
37 experience as a woman - laundry services, housecleaning and child-minding. The LRG
38 residents do not refer to soft skills, except to point out the lack of them. One, a widow who
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1 carries out a variety of informal work (*barangay tanod* or village guard, laundry,
2 housecleaning for others) and more formal work (in a cash-for-work program) received rice
3 to retail. She had to close her rice vending business because she was “too shy” to collect the
4 payments from those who are indebted to her, recognizing in hindsight that she had not
5 been sufficiently focused on running a profitable business.
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14 Discussion

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Post-disaster planning following Haiyan was explicitly designed to reduce disaster risk and provide more sustained livelihood opportunities, aiming to reduce vulnerability and promote equitable development. ~~Relocation~~Resettlement was combined with livelihood interventions implemented by public and non-profit organizations, and there was a high level of agreement among ~~relocated~~resettled interviewees that one of the TRRP successes was the provision of permanent housing which had decreased their exposure to typhoons (c.f. Piggott-McKellar et al., 2019).

66 Distributing resilience outcomes

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In keeping with the premise of the TRRP, livelihood interventions focused on supporting residents to run businesses and generate cash income, as part of a wider network of retail and other business activities that were planned for the ~~relocation~~resettlement site. Implementation was overlaid on a complex fabric of social, economic, cultural and political dynamics. In particular, social capital and relations of power and influence provided opportunities for some to capitalize on the new resources and opportunities, while the skills and assets that individuals possessed prior to moving were significant in providing different starting points for households as they sought to rebuild

1 their lives and livelihoods. The skills required to survive in the new cash economy in the
2 ~~relocation~~resettlement site meant that some residents were better able to reconfigure their
3 livelihoods than others. While the loss of material assets frequently proved irreversible,
4 those with transferable skills - such as a boat mechanic who became a car mechanic in order
5 to move from a coastal to non-coastal setting - were better able to adapt and were well
6 placed to diversify their livelihood strategies. As one LRG man reported: "... they were
7 businessmen and now, they still are. Same goes with the fishermen, now they're still
8 fishermen. I [was] a driver before, and I'm still a driver now" (Interview, LRG M1, 13 Sept
9 2018). The most financially successful among the respondents referred to business-related
10 soft skills and were able to capitalize on these after the typhoon or collaborate with a
11 spouse or business partner who possessed them. These respondents see their success as
12 tied to their ability to pursue new types of income-earning opportunities in their new
13 environments, where they discovered that an entrepreneurial spirit is rewarded (see Eadie
14 et al., 2020, for similar findings in relation to sari-sari store ownership). Where a business or
15 entrepreneurial mindset was absent, livelihood support interventions were less successful,
16 as in the cases of freeriding and stealing in the fisheries cooperative, business failure after
17 offering credit, and household consumption of goods that were intended to be sold.

18 Those reporting the highest resilience were supported by access to financial
19 resources that allowed for survival in a cash economy (c.f. Béné et al., 2018). In different
20 cases, these resources were pre-existing (such as savings accrued from pre-Haiyan
21 livelihoods); arose from livelihood support or other aid received in the transitional shelter
22 phase (rather than as part of the TRRP related ~~relocation~~resettlement); or from the receipt
23 of inheritance; or from access to a pension. Crucially, financial resources were also accessed

1 through social networks. While most of the ~~relocated~~resettled residents reported more
2 than one source of income for their household, the HRG group was distinguished from the
3 LRG group by their access to financial support in terms of remittances, income from other
4 family members and, in particular, loans. While many in the HRG group are not usually able
5 to save money, the financial support they receive from others is critical to their resilience,
6 demonstrating the importance of these support channels. However, as one LRG woman
7 reported, “no one would let you borrow money or goods if you don’t have a job” (Interview,
8 LRG W2, 12 Sept 2018).
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21 These issues of human and social capital, while critical in their own right, were also
22 overlain on relations of power, ~~and~~ influence and politicization that were central to the
23 distribution of outcomes from the TRRP’s resilience-building interventions. Pre-disaster
24 norms of clientelism and patronage were widespread in post-disaster beneficiary selection
25 processes (L Mangada, 2019) (Mangada 2019) and were reflected. —This was most clearly
26 illustrated by the role played by the in operation of the village Board of Directors
27 (BoD) Homeowners’ Associations. Microcosms of the wider political culture, the
28 Association’s Board of Directors (BoD) in GMA Kapuso were understood as patrons, able to
29 provide access to services for villagers. — Respondents report an accountability gap that
30 enabled relationships with members of the BoD to become associated with learning about
31 opportunities and with being selected as a beneficiary, consistent with reports of the
32 influence of political connections in the selection of recipients for housing benefits in the
33 ~~relocated~~resettled communities. As one HRG man recalls, “The real problem here in our
34 place is the [BoD] officers because we have no idea what they are doing and they can do
35 whatever they desire” (Interview, HRG M5, 13 Sept 2018).
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1 At the same time, gendered livelihood opportunities played a powerful role in
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3 shaping households' ability to adapt or to capitalize on new opportunities (Carr &
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5 Thompson, 2014; ~~F. Sultana, 2010~~) ~~(Carr and Thomson 2014; Sultana 2010)~~. For example,
6
7 the entrepreneurial skills that proved critical to success in the ~~relocation~~ resettlement site
8
9 economy were predominantly the domain of men, with only one of the higher resilience
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11 group women reporting confidence in this regard, and the remainder looking instead to
12
13 sustain smaller-scale versions of their pre-Haiyan livelihoods. Both HRG and LRG women
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15 experienced lower levels of work than men, frequently citing the need to attend to
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17 reproductive activities and domestic work. Rice vending and store ownership - both of
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19 which can be run from the home - thus remained popular with women despite their
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21 awareness of a clear over-supply of these services and, as a consequence, low profitability.
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28 This significance of the overlapping effects of gendered social norms, pre-existing skills and
29 experiences, and unvalued caring or domestic responsibilities is reflected in the findings
30 reported by Eadie et al. (2020) and Tanyag (2018)(2019), who similarly conclude that post-
31 disaster livelihood support in Tacloban frequently bypassed or was inappropriately targeted
32 for the needs of female recipients.
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42 Capabilities for transformative change

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46 Recognition that rising levels of disaster risk and loss are rooted in the choice of
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48 development pathways has focused attention on transformation of development through
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50 DRR-disaster risk reduction (DRR) (~~F. D.~~ Gibson et al., 2016; Thomalla et al., 2018). In
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52 Tacloban, as elsewhere, addressing DRR within existing development pathways had placed
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54 whole communities at risk of inundation and the destructive power of tropical cyclones.
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59 Post-Haiyan, these pathways were judged by national and city planners to be insufficient:
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1 the intense need to address risk was sufficient to demand a transformation in development.
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3 As the guiding mechanism for this change, the TRRP was an attempt to direct a deliberate
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5 transformation in city development in general and DRR in particular; the devastation
6
7 following Haiyan opening a “window of opportunity” for large scale ~~relocation~~resettlements
8
9 and economic restructuring of the urban economic landscape and “hazardscape” (Shah et
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11 al., 2018, p. 252). This transformation was felt most directly by residents in their
12
13 ~~relocation~~resettlement and the designation of no-dwelling zones where their former homes
14
15 had stood and livelihoods had been based. In the face of such significant disaster losses,
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17 DRR plans that challenge established patterns of development are to be welcomed. But
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19 such transformations also imply significant changes and lasting effects, and as such demand
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21 critical engagement to better understand how outcomes emerge and are patterned across
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23 communities (Tierney & Oliver-Smith, 2012).
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32 As the discussion above demonstrates, the consequences of the TRRP were uneven,
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34 with resilience and vulnerability distributed along lines that reflect pre-existing patterns of
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36 structural relationships and human and social capital within the community. ~~-. Taken~~
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38 together, the experiences of the HRG and LRG reveal the combined effect of diverse social
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40 characteristics and relationships in the particular circumstances of deliberate
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42 transformations, reflecting earlier work establishing the significance of complex,
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44 overlapping factors in distributing risk, vulnerability and opportunity (Carr & Thompson,
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46 2014; ~~F.~~ Sultana, 2010) ~~(Carr and Thomson 2014; Sultana 2010)~~. While shortcomings in
47
48 implementation draw attention to the challenges of enacting deliberate transformation and
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50 the need for a detailed understanding of context in order to deliver appropriate support,
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52 implementation is only part of the picture. Where access to housing, training and livelihood
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1 support was successfully provided, the effects were felt very differently among households
2 who judged themselves relatively more and less resilient. The lens of capabilities unpacks
3 these results in terms of the personal, social and environment processes that affect an
4 individual's ability to make valued choices. In the results presented here, the significant
5 structural and individual conditions – skills, experience, power, social norms, gender roles
6 and institutions – reflect these processes and distribute the ability to convert newly
7 available resources into opportunities to live lives that they value and would choose. The
8 provision of resources or support for transformation inevitably meets with the different
9 personal, social and environmental positionality and subjectivities of individuals, limiting or
10 enhancing their freedom to achieve valued outcomes.
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26 Recognizing subjectivities is increasingly identified as significant if the
27 operationalization of resilience is to be equitable, opening the space to deliver
28 transformative pathways that are just in relation histories of marginalization as well as in
29 the distribution of risk and opportunity (Fazey et al., 2017; Harris et al., 2017; Holland, 2017;
30 Manuel-Navarrete & Pelling, 2015; Matin et al., 2018; Schlosberg, 2012; Schlosberg et al.,
31 2017; ~~Petra~~ Tschakert et al., 2016; Ziervogel et al., 2017). In Tacloban, ~~relocated~~resettled
32 residents were presented with a choice of livelihood support opportunities that was tightly
33 bound by a development pathway that had been set in administrative and political spaces to
34 which they had no access (Eadie et al., 2020; Tuhkanen et al., 2018). In terms of livelihoods,
35 the dominant narrative of transformation within the TRRP was focused on integration into a
36 cash economy rooted in the ~~relocation~~resettlement site, thereby overlooking the backdrop
37 of near-subsistence coastal fishery-based livelihoods among many of those who were to be
38 ~~relocated~~resettled (c.f. Tan-Mullins et al., 2020) (~~c.f. Tan-Mullins et al., 2020~~). While some
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1 long standing livelihood practices, such as raising pigs, were not allowed in some
2 resettlement communities around Tacloban and its neighbouring areas (P-Eadie et al.,
3 2020), sSari-sari stores, for example, were heavily supported by international agencies such
4 as USAID as a means to foster entrepreneurial skills and promote the role of consumers in a
5 market economy (Atienza et al., 2019). While the immediately observable effect of this was
6 to favor those with capabilities aligned to the new economy, the failure to recognize the
7 significance of alternative livelihoods frustrated the ability of other actors to make valued
8 choices. While some, such as fisherfolks who had relied on gathering seafood for their
9 households, experienced new challenges and a sense of loss in adapting to life away from
10 the sea, others were forced to make difficult compromises. Many fishers returned to sea
11 despite increased travel costs, time away from families, and a hand-to-mouth existence,
12 preferring (for example) to continue to work alone as a fisher rather than have to adapt to a
13 new life working with others. Many women were left to secure valued domestic or
14 reproductive activities through the means that were available to them - as home-based
15 vendors in marginal activities such as selling rice, as village watchers, or through allowing
16 their children to undertake petty work in the community. Here, the constraints imposed by
17 the TRRP interact with on-the-ground subjectivities to produce differentiated and distinct
18 vulnerabilities among groups whose backgrounds, values and identities were overlooked or
19 undervalued in the planning process (F-Sultana, 2010; P-Tschakert, 2012) (Tschakert 2012;
20 Sultana 2010). Experiences of resilience thus emerge as individuals navigate processes of
21 change, bound up with whether and how they are able secure meaning as much as with the
22 material effects of transformation (c.f. Carr, 2019) (c.f. Carr 2019).

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As ~~Matin et al. (2018) point out,~~ Recognizing these underlying subjectivities through inclusive processes of decision-making can help ~~drives~~ towards more equitable resilience (Matin et al., 2018) ~~(Matin et al. 2018).~~ This ~~But to do so~~ means supporting the political capabilities of marginalized groups, such that they can participate in the political processes that define resilience, shifting from marginal to “full partners in social life – as worthy of equal respect and esteem in decision processes and procedures” (Holland, 2017, p. 395). In Tacloban, the ~~local political~~ authority of the dominant elites became bound up with ~~committed to~~ a development narrative that was defined centrally and in advance via the TRRP drafting and reinforced through ceremonies and commemorations throughout the recovery period (~~Pauline~~ Eadie, 2019) ~~(Eadie 2019).~~ This ~~closed~~ ing down local opportunities for questioning what might constitute an improvement in Tacloban, sustaining existing subjectivities (mother, fisher / entrepreneur, business owner) ~~but~~ while reinforcing them with new layers of meaning (underdeveloped / developed; failure / success in the cash economy) that map onto a lived experience of unequal feelings of resilience and vulnerability. The window of opportunity following Haiyan opened a space in which both livelihoods and disaster risks were transformed, but in the absence of an explicitly transformative narrative – or even consultation with communities – the ‘new’ development pathway *de facto* reflected the dominant commercial and economic worldview of those institutions involved in drafting and implementing the TRRP and the subsequent plans which it informed. Indeed, Tuhkanen et al. (2018) describe a fragmented TRRP drafting process in which livelihood needs were insufficiently explored at the outset and opportunities missed to respond to emerging challenges or reassess livelihood priorities during the implementation phase (see also: Mangada 2019). While this led to dissatisfaction among actors at both the city and community levels, the legitimacy of the new development

1 discourse was maintained due to the authority of the City Government of Tacloban (as
2 authors of the TRRP) in partnership with UN-Habitat and their implementing partners
3 including the village BoD, private sector and the NGO and international donor community.
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7 Tacloban’s political elite, whose reach extended into the villages, community organizations
8 and private sector, were well placed to exercise control of narrative, simultaneously
9 reinforcing their legitimacy and providing an exemplar of their continued authority (Eadie
10 2019; (Bankoff & Borrinaga, 2016; ~~Pauline~~ Eadie, 2019; ~~L.~~ Mangada, 2019; Salazar, 2015b;
11 2019; Wigley, 2015), while the provision of aid resources fitted into pre-existing patterns of
12 patron-client relationships, further reducing the potential for critique or dissent
13 (Tan-Mullins et al., 2020) ~~(Tan Mullens et al. 2020).~~
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26 This exercise of authority enabled control over the narrative of resilience, setting the
27 pathway for development and DRR in the city. It represented a particular expression of the
28 power held by these organizations, manifest as political capability: that is, the ability to
29 shape decision-making and thereby determine the conditions that people were to live under
30 following transformation (Holland, 2017; Schlosberg, 2012). In contrast, the relatively low
31 political capability of ~~relocated~~ resettled residents resulted in a failure to explore and
32 respond to the “experiences of the vulnerable and the way that their status is, in part,
33 socially, politically, and economically constructed” (Schlosberg, 2012, p. 450, see also: Carr,
34 2019; Gibson et al., 2016); consequently, transformation was experienced as a subjugating
35 force on some ~~relocated~~ resettled residents whose marginalization was entrenched in the
36 post-disaster context (P. Eadie et al., 2020) ~~(Eadie et al., 2020).~~
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56 The missed opportunity was for transformation to be predicated on processes that
57 sought to secure political capabilities among marginalized groups. This would mean enabling
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1 those groups to gain full and equal partnership in decision-making by opening up the vision,
2 goals and set of alternatives that frame decision-making, including the trade-offs that must
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5 be negotiated between and within strategies for development and DRR (~~R. B.~~Gibson, 2013;
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7 Morrison-Saunders & Pope, 2013; Tuhkanen et al., 2018). Increasing recognition of
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9 marginalized groups can, in turn, promote movements framed around “emancipatory
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11 subjectivities”, disrupting forms of authority that sustain inequality and promoting
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13 narratives of transformation that question underlying processes of vulnerability creation
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16 (Manuel-Navarrete & Pelling, 2015, p. 561; ~~Petra~~Tschakert et al., 2016). The TRRP process,
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18 by contrast, left political capabilities undisturbed, offering little control to communities over
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20 how resilience decisions changed their circumstances and at the cost of those who perceive
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22 themselves least resilient four years after the typhoon (Holland, 2017; Shi et al., 2016).
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30 Conclusion

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34 This paper contributes to ~~the~~ understandings of transformation by setting out
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36 empirical evidence of successes and failures of a planned attempt to reduce risk and
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38 inequality following a major disaster on a city scale. Tacloban presents a case of a post-
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40 disaster recovery plan that has resulted in material changes on the ground, reducing risk
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42 associated with future typhoon events through extensive ~~relocation~~resettlement. Yet the
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44 sense of resilience among ~~relocated~~resettled residents is uneven, with many struggling
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46 despite a focus on livelihoods embedded in the ~~relocation~~resettlement plan. Pre-existing
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48 human and social capital have played a significant role in distributing resilience in Tacloban,
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52 while elite control over the framing of the resettlement plan limited the opportunity for
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55 some groups to secure or retain livelihoods that they value, reinforcing experiences of
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58 marginalization.
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1 The experience of the resettled residents of Tacloban demonstra~~testing~~ that driving
2 towards equitable outcomes requires engaging ~~more deeply to consider~~with the processes
3 that distribute the ability of individuals to achieve valued outcomes. To achieve this requires
4 mechanisms for orchestrating transformation pathways that respond to subjectivities that
5 sustain marginality, and take seriously the social, political and economic construction of
6 well-being, risk and vulnerability. In this task, political capabilities offers a constructive
7 starting point, applying a procedural and recognition justice framework to question ~~how~~
8 which subjectivities are being reinforced in response to what authority~~authority controls~~
9 planning and decision making, and asking: whose voices, values, interests and identities are
10 being embedded into resilience interventions~~asking what is being valued, by whom, and~~
11 why? In so doing, political capabilities expands on calls for participation and engagement in
12 resilience, directing attention onto how and for whom materiality and meaning are
13 constructed in resilience planning and decision making.
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34 This understanding places a significant burden on those working to effect change in
35 reconstruction or other transformative moments, including national and local authorities,
36 domestic and international NGOs, charitable organizations and donors. As the case of
37 Tacloban suggests, these actors will need, on the one hand, to work to support the
38 emergence of political capabilities among hitherto marginalized groups; on the other, to
39 engender planning processes that are open to narratives of transformation that may
40 challenge established authority.
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Introduction

Disaster recovery settings open a space for rethinking how development and disaster risk reduction (DRR) priorities are addressed, offering hope that lives and livelihoods can be rebuilt in ways that meet the needs and aspirations of affected populations. Yet too often pressures that arise from social, economic and environmental conditions and processes at multiple scales drive recovery and reconstruction into pathways that reproduce pre-existing societal inequities, even when linked to the narratives of resilience and promises to ‘build back better’ (Atienza et al., 2019; Thomalla et al., 2017). While it is recognized that addressing these systemic pressures may require transformation in material and socio-political arrangements (Matin et al., 2018), empirical evidence of where, when and how transformations can be supported through policy and practice remains limited (Blythe et al., 2018; Carr, 2019; Gibson et al., 2016). A critical question remains: how can deliberate transformations that simultaneously reduce risk and inequality be delivered (Manuel-Navarrete & Pelling, 2015)? In this paper, we understand deliberate transformations to be those “purposefully initiated and carried out by human agents” (Manuel-Navarrete & Pelling, 2015) and use the example of disaster recovery planning in Tacloban, Philippines, to explore the successes and failures of a deliberate transformation that attempts to reduce vulnerability and promote equitable development.

Resilience has emerged as a widely adopted goal of policy, capturing a shift in concern towards the dynamic behavior of systems that connect the social, economic and environmental aspects of development (Brown, 2014; Walch, 2018). The build back better approach reflects this, recognizing the complex relationship between development and

1 disaster risk, within which development decisions can increase exposure and compound
2 risks, and DRR measures can lock development into unsustainable pathways or fail to
3 address adequately current and future risks (Fernandez & Ahmed, 2019). The systems-
4 orientated view inherent to ecological and social-ecological resilience provides a way to
5 conceptualize the interconnected problems of human and environmental change, drawing
6 attention to cross-scale relationships and the potential for reorganization, recognizing
7 flexibility and change, rather than equilibrium, as a normal system state (Matyas & Pelling,
8 2015; Nelson et al., 2007). When grounded in a social-ecological systems perspective,
9 resilience provides tools to think about development pathways that are sustainable in the
10 face of environmental, social and political-economic shocks, stresses and change, with
11 resilience defined in terms of the amount of disturbance that a system can undergo before
12 losing function (Folke et al., 2010; Walker et al., 2004). Options for utilizing resilience
13 include approaches to enhance or mobilize the potential for persistence, adaptability and
14 transformation, depending on the circumstances and priorities of development and disaster
15 risk planners and decision-makers (Béné et al., 2014; Matyas & Pelling, 2015). However, the
16 promise of resilience has been met with persistent concerns over the neglect of social
17 dynamics in resilience thinking, masking processes at multiple scales, including for example
18 the effects of gender, caste and traditional authority in shaping local practices, and the
19 effects of institutional dynamics or conflicting incentives and interests in shaping and
20 mediating the impacts of policy (Matin et al. 2018; Young 2010; Ensor et al., 2015; Jones and
21 Boyd, 2011; Carr 2019). At the same time, bureaucratic silos and spatial and temporal scale
22 mismatches continue to challenge the integration of development and disaster risk
23 planning, despite the shared language of resilience (Brand & Jax, 2007; Thomalla et al.,
24 2018). Together, these shortcomings have contributed to conservatism in practice, observed

1 in a focus on persistence and stability over change; in the tendency to address “avoidable
2 risks” that reside in physical infrastructure; and in the prevalence of projects that favor
3 dominant interests, achieved through methods that are amenable to expert management
4 and replicated across contexts through checklists or indicators of resilience (Carr, 2019; Cote
5 & Nightingale, 2012; Jon, 2018; Matyas & Pelling, 2015).
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12 A body of critical literature has raised concerns about the failure of resilience to
13 address power, politics, equity and social justice (Carr, 2019; Matin et al., 2018; Stanley,
14 2017; Tanner et al., 2015). Underpinning this perspective is a recognition that agency is
15 underexplored in social-ecological resilience and that social difference is masked by an
16 analytical focus on systems, leading to a failure to attend to the role of power (Brown,
17 2014). In particular, the interaction of agency and structure yields forms of power that
18 sustain system states, securing development trajectories in the interests of those who are
19 able to capitalize on their relative strength in social and political processes and institutions
20 (Brown, 2014; Manuel-Navarrete & Pelling, 2015; Matin et al., 2018; Pelling & Manuel-
21 Navarrete, 2011). As Carr (2019, p. 72) summarizes, a focus on external disturbances has
22 meant that resilience has paid too little attention to social dynamics and endogenous forces,
23 conceptualized as a system property rather than a “project of managing both social and
24 natural processes to create and maintain particular socio-ecological states that further
25 specific goals of ... those whose authority provides them with privileges” (see also Cote &
26 Nightingale, 2012; Gillard et al., 2016; Walker et al., 2006). These findings are widely
27 reflected in the inequitable outcomes observed in post-disaster settings following resilience
28 and build back better initiatives (Atienza et al., 2019; Eadie, 2017; Field, 2017; Monteil et al.,
29 2019; Thomalla et al., 2018; Tierney & Oliver-Smith, 2012).
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Despite the apparent conflict between the systems ontology of social-ecological resilience and social theory (Olsson et al., 2015; Welsh, 2014), Matin et al. (2018) identify and review a burgeoning literature in which equity and social justice are integrated into social-ecological resilience research and practice. They conclude that driving towards more equitable outcomes in interventions means accounting for social vulnerability and differentiated access to power, knowledge, and resources. Moreover, “it starts from people’s own perception of their position within their human-environmental system, and accounts for their realities, and of their need for a change of circumstance to avoid imbalances of power into the future” (Matin et al., 2018, p. 198). The focus on systemic change in this literature reflects a shift in understanding of social-ecological resilience towards one that is inclusive of transformation, allowing for the “recombination of evolved structures and processes, renewal of the system and emergence of new trajectories” (Folke, 2006, p. 259). These insights build on a substantial body of work from within feminist political ecology that has identified the effects of multiple social characteristics that overlap in the generation of differentiated and distinct vulnerabilities (Carr & Thompson, 2014; Sultana, 2010; Sultana, 2014), including in recovery and reconstruction processes (Tanyag, 2018), drawing attention to how “complex subjects are formed, how they are perpetuated through various layers of inequality and oppression, and how they act in the context of exercised power” (Tschakert, 2012, p. 149). Attention to the persistence of inequalities and the underlying role of power and authority have renewed focus on transformations that go beyond material or technical change, located in the circumstances under which marginalized groups are able to be included in decision-making (Few et al., 2017; Jon, 2018; Matyas & Pelling, 2015). The emphasis is on the agency of marginalized, overlooked or excluded groups in a process of change directed at systemic or structural relationships in

1 social-ecological systems. Work in this field has directed attention in particular towards
2 exposing and challenging development narratives that reproduce risk and vulnerability
3 (Eriksen, 2013; Mark Pelling, 2011), and exploration of how marginalized groups can gain
4 influence in political processes (Blackburn, 2018; Schlosberg et al., 2017; Ziervogel, 2019).
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10 Transformation in this sense is defined by the opening of “new political spaces to
11 address risks and inequalities unmet by development” (Manuel-Navarrete & Pelling, 2015,
12 p. 1), as seen in recent calls for grounding resilience in forms of engagement and
13 participation that enable resilience to be negotiated across divergent interests, values and
14 scales (Ensor et al., 2018; Few et al., 2017; Harris et al., 2017; Ziervogel et al., 2017). The
15 focus is on addressing conditions that generate risk and moving beyond dominant voices,
16 imbuing transformation with a normative agenda focused on enabling hitherto marginalized
17 people to gain greater control over decisions and options for change (Gillard et al., 2016).
18 Political space is thus intended to address the potential for procedural and material
19 injustices otherwise embedded in resilience, shifting the distribution of material resources
20 by providing access to and influence in the spaces where resilience projects and
21 interventions are designed and developed (Dewulf et al., 2019). Where alternative (non-
22 dominant) discourses and identities are recognized, political space can also enable resilience
23 to be defined beyond the realm of solely material considerations, drawing in “the less visible
24 causes of vulnerability that lie in social, cultural, political, and economic relationships and
25 processes”, including the subjectivities that situate people in relation to authority on the
26 basis of social attributes, such as ethnicity or gender, rendering some more powerful than
27 others (Holland, 2017, p. 396; Pelling, 2011). Embedding transformation within resilience
28 thus carries the potential to integrate recognition justice alongside concerns focused on
29 process and distribution (Bulkeley et al., 2014; Schlosberg, 2012; Schlosberg et al., 2017).
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Seen through this lens, resilience and transformation are implicitly bound up with the agency of vulnerable and at-risk communities and their relationship to patterns of authority and subjectivity. This requires an appropriate form of analysis, focused on the underlying conditions that sustain injustice, that is capable of informing interventions such as efforts to effect changes in resilience through deliberate transformation. *Political capabilities* offers one such approach, within which procedural and recognition justice are combined (Schlosberg, 2012). Capabilities draws on seminal contributions (Nussbaum, 2000; Sen, 1999) focused on agency, empowerment and the conditions under which people lead flourishing lives. It views the ends of development to be substantive freedom – the ability of people to live lives that they themselves value (Alkire, 2002; Victor et al., 2013). Capabilities capture the mediating effect of pre-existing individual and societal conditions, directing attention toward the context onto which policy and practice interventions are mapped: how, to paraphrase Sen, those conditions distribute the substantial opportunities accessible among people who are provided with the same means (Sen, 2005). Resilience interventions inevitably engage capabilities, most readily revealed in how the “less visible” context of vulnerability and opportunity translate into the different ability of individuals to make valued choices in new circumstances (Holland, 2017, p. 396). Capabilities analysis highlights the significance of underlying relationships and processes to an individual’s ability to achieve outcomes, including those that are personal (for example, skills, experience, health), social (power, social norms, gender roles) and environmental (institutions, public goods) (Frediani, 2010; Nussbaum, 2000; Robeyns, 2006; Sen, 2005).

Political capability focuses attention on the opportunity to determine which capabilities are secured in political spaces. From a capabilities perspective, participation in political space requires “attention to the experiences of the vulnerable and the way that

1 their status is, in part, socially, politically, and economically constructed” (Schlosberg, 2012,
2 p. 452). Changing their status requires not only aligning decisions with their interests, such
3 as through consultations or focus groups, but providing them with real power to shape
4 those decisions (Holland, 2017). This means not only to recognizing the fact that some social
5 groups are routinely dominated, maligned or rendered invisible in their public or social
6 worlds, but converting recognition into processes of participation that enables marginalized
7 people to devise and decide on their own interpretation of a productive and valuable life
8 (Schlosberg, 2012; Sen, 2005), institutionalized in forms that respond to the particular
9 circumstances of vulnerable communities and the potential for entrenching vulnerability
10 through co-option or elite capture (Arora-Jonsson, 2011; Cote & Nightingale, 2012).
11 Accordingly, full political capability is achieved when hitherto marginalized groups gain full
12 and equal partnership in decision-making processes, recognizing both their right to
13 participate and the social and historical roots of their exclusion, providing them with control
14 over how resilience decisions change their circumstances and enabling valued choices to be
15 identified and secured (Holland, 2017; Shi et al., 2016). Yet to achieve this requires the
16 opening up of resilience narratives and an elevating of alternative voices in ways that
17 challenge established lines of authority in development and disaster risk, exposing an
18 underlying politics of transformation (Manuel-Navarrete & Pelling, 2015). Marginalized or
19 vulnerable groups are faced with networks of actors and institutions that sustain narratives
20 of inequitable resilience (Friend and Moench, 2013; Borie et al. 2019). Subjectivities,
21 through which individuals position themselves and are positioned in relation to authority,
22 connect history, culture, values and institutions to the ways in which groups are socially
23 differentiated and political identities maintained (Matin et al., 2018). While dynamic,
24 evidence from different scales demonstrates how well-established or centrally organized

1 authorities are frequently able to mobilize subjectivities to maintain privilege, securing the
2 wellbeing of dominant groups while justifying the subjugation of others and enabling
3 development pathways to stabilize and persist (Carr, 2019; Pelling et al., 2015).
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8 Struggles over the definition of resilience are thus located in relation to development
9 struggles more broadly, in which contested ideas of improvement demand the exercise of
10 authority to discipline political subjects and maintain inequitable development pathways
11 (Manuel-Navarrete & Pelling, 2015). A focus on the political circumstances that give rise to
12 transformation exposes resilience as a project that is defined in particular places and times
13 by those able to legitimize and mobilize their authority (Carr, 2019). The potential for
14 transformation towards more equitable resilience lies in the relative political capability of
15 established authorities, whose legitimacy may be derived from the promise of persistence
16 or improvement; and of those seeking to mobilize alternative subjectivities, including
17 representatives of particular social groups or solidarity movements. For those responding to
18 histories of marginalization, the ability to forge alliances with powerful stakeholders, and to
19 achieve political space to challenge understandings of risk and improvement from outside
20 the bureaucratic mainstream, have been identified as pivotal (Dodman & Mitlin, 2013;
21 Holland, 2017). As Manuel-Navarrete and Pelling (2015, p. 567) suggest, a central question
22 is whether transformative interventions “can add to coalitions of actors and subjectivities
23 that are seeking to disrupt forms of developmental or adaptive authority that increase risk
24 or inequality.” Political capability thus expands on calls for participation and engagement in
25 resilience, directing attention onto how and for whom materiality and meaning are
26 constructed in resilience planning and decision making. Whose voices, values, interests and
27 identities are embedded in experiences of resilience interventions? Which subjectivities are
28 reinforced, and in response to what authority?
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1 This paper examines the case of a large-scale resettlement in post-disaster Tacloban,
2 Philippines, as an example of a deliberate transformation in development and disaster risk
3 for city residents in the aftermath of Typhoon Haiyan (known in the Philippines as Super
4 Typhoon Yolanda), which struck in November 2013. Based on qualitative analysis of
5 extensive fieldwork with residents, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and city
6 government officials, conducted between 2017 and 2019, the experiences of those who
7 judge themselves to have relatively low and high resilience are charted to unpick the
8 genesis of resilience outcomes. This approach asks: who are the winners and losers from
9 this transformation and what drivers and consequences of their experiences differentiate
10 them? What are their contrasting experiences of changes in material standing and
11 subjective sense of identity and wellbeing? By focusing on the experiences of resettled
12 residents and drawing on the analytical framework of political capabilities, the aim is to
13 reveal aspects of the underlying politics of transformation in Tacloban, and thereby
14 contribute to a nascent literature focused on the empirics of transformation in risk-
15 development contexts (Manuel-Navarrete & Pelling, 2015). While our findings reveal the
16 reproduction of structural relationships and show the distribution of post-disaster
17 opportunity to be a reflection of pre-existing skills and resources, they also highlight the
18 significance of identifying windows of opportunity for investing in political capabilities and
19 democratizing the goals and values of recovery and redevelopment (Birkmann et al., 2010;
20 Brundiers & Eakin, 2018). Without this, the transformations that play out reproduce the
21 political and socio-economic interests of decision-makers, politicians and local elites,
22 sustaining authority, reinforcing subjectivity and failing to reflect development and disaster
23 risk priorities and trade-offs that are valued by more marginal groups within the affected
24 communities.

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3 In the following sections, we first describe the case study context and methods
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5 before presenting our findings in terms of the drivers and consequences of resettlement for
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7 those who identify as having relatively low or high resilience. A discussion section identifies
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9 how the uneven distribution of resilience outcomes in Tacloban reflect pre-existing
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11 conditions and demonstrates the significance of capabilities as a lens for unpacking
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13 injustices embedded in the Tacloban recovery planning and implementation processes. We
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15 conclude that the mechanisms used to orchestrate transformative moments, such as
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17 resettlement, need to respond to the subjectivities that sustain marginality, in turn
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19 supporting the expansion of political capabilities, the re-defining of resilience narratives,
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21 and the reworking of established patterns of authority.
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27 Study context

31 This research took place in the context of the post-Haiyan disaster recovery process
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33 in the City of Tacloban, Philippines. Tacloban was selected as the study site for a larger
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35 research programme in 2016 due to its status as the regional (Eastern Visayas) political and
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37 economic hub; having been the centre of the socio-economic loss and damage from
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39 Typhoon Haiyan (Ching et al., 2015; City Government of Tacloban, 2014); and the existence
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41 of a planned and well-documented disaster recovery and redevelopment process in a region
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43 tackling high rates of poverty soon after the disaster – 41 percent in 2015 (Republic of
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45 Philippines NEDA, 2019). Engaging in a long-term research process in Tacloban alongside a
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47 local research institution provided an opportunity to explore recovery issues, outcomes and
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49 challenges which still persist several years after the disaster. The present study seeks to
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51 shed new light on long-term recovery and redevelopment processes and outcomes, once
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53 the international assistance has ended and the local governments must transition from
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1 recovery to development. As such, this paper contributes to a growing literature on the
2 impacts of Typhoon Haiyan and the responses of different stakeholders, including those
3 focused on the effects of gender norms on young Filipino women informal settlers (Espina &
4 Canoy, 2019) and women widows and survivors (Mangada, 2016; Mangada & Su, 2019; Su
5 & Mangada, 2020; Tanyag, 2018; Valerio, 2014); and the politics of disaster response
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7 (Bankoff & Borrinaga, 2016; Blanco, 2015; Salazar, 2015a). By focusing on differentiated
8 resilience outcomes and framing the recovery and resettlement process as a deliberate
9 transformation, our findings contribute into a wider literature concerned with whether and
10 how such processes can address the effects of social, cultural and political conditions on
11 vulnerability, thereby expanding on these earlier studies.
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26 In the six months following Haiyan, a recovery planning process was undertaken by
27 the City government, supported by the United Nations Human Settlements Programme (UN-
28 Habitat) and other international agencies. The result was the adoption of the Tacloban
29 Recovery and Rehabilitation Plan (TRRP), a long-term redevelopment strategy aiming to
30 produce a “resilient, vibrant, and livable” Tacloban. The central pillar of the City’s recovery
31 strategy has been the resettlement of approximately 40 percent of the city’s population
32 from informal coastal settlements in the downtown area to permanent shelter, in the form
33 of 15,000 newly-built homes spread across twenty resettlement sites in the north of the
34 city, some 20km from downtown (Paragas et al., 2016). The wider recovery has sought to
35 promote resilient and equitable development through post-disaster interventions focused
36 on shelter, livelihoods and improved access to social services for the poorest, largely
37 informal communities displaced by the disaster (City Government of Tacloban, 2014).
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1 The planning and enactment of the recovery process inevitably took place against
2 the backdrop of existing social cleavages, political interests and relations of power. Tacloban
3 City, the lone highly urbanized city in Eastern Visayas, is known as a stronghold of the
4 Romualdez - Marcos clan, which has successfully built up and maintained a formidable
5 electoral organization down to the village level. The city is at the epicenter of a regional
6 economic boom, with Eastern Visayas recording the highest growth rate in the Philippines at
7 12.4% in 2016 (Eadie, 2019). However, political relations dominate city affairs: an ally of the
8 powerful clan is believed to be generously rewarded; appointment to local positions in the
9 city bureaucracy is perceived to be based on connections with the political family; business
10 leaders in the city are perceived to be allies; and many community-based organizations and
11 its leaders are acknowledged to be subservient to the powerful elite (Bankoff & Borrinaga,
12 2016; Mangada, 2019; Salazar, 2015b; Wigley, 2015).

13 Patron-client relations cut through this picture, linking those of different wealth,
14 power and class (Tan-Mullins et al., 2020). This degree of power among political elites is not
15 uncommon in the Philippines (e.g. Uson, 2017) and, as Eadie (2019, p. 96) suggests, the
16 legitimacy of the dynastic governance of the city of Tacloban is supported through various
17 means including “patronage, monuments, rituals such as fiestas and religious ceremonies,
18 the presence of the family at commemorations, celebrations and the visible sponsorship of
19 civic events.” It is unsurprising, therefore, that In the post-disaster context the TRRP
20 emerged as an important political object for the dominant elite, and that the planning
21 process was enacted with low level of public participation (Maynard et al., 2017; Parker et
22 al., 2017; Tuhkanen et al., 2018). For instance, while public consultations were held, they
23 were largely information sharing exercises and offered limited opportunities for residents to
24 influence or change the plans, compounding a wider sense that “engagement and

1 participation was challenging and insufficient” (Tuhkanen et al., 2018, p. 13). There was
2 particularly limited consultation with the resettled residents about their livelihood needs
3 (Atienza et al., 2019). Simultaneously, pre-existing gender roles were manifest in the
4 exclusion of women from planning processes (Mangada, 2016), the lack of recognition for
5 womens’ and girls’ societal contributions in the recovery phases (Tanyag, 2018), and the
6 neglect of widowed women after the disaster (Mangada & Su, 2019). It is against this
7 background that our study is situated.
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18 To understand the factors and processes that shaped recovery and redevelopment in
19 Tacloban, our study focuses on one of the 31 official housing projects: GMA Kapuso Village.
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21 GMA Kapuso Village is a 403-unit housing development located in the north of Tacloban,
22 sponsored by the wealthy GMA Kapuso Foundation (an arm of the Filipino broadcast
23 television company, GMA Network). It was selected as the case study site because it was
24 one of the two housing projects that were completed, fully-occupied, and providing all basic
25 services at the time our research commenced. As late as June 2020, GMA Kapuso and the
26 nearby Habitat Village continue to be the only resettlement sites with complete access to
27 basic services or facilities (see Supplementary Information for a list of all resettlement sites
28 and their access to services or facilities). GMA Kapuso, therefore, provides a case of a
29 relatively successful post-disaster resettlement site, focusing the present research in a
30 location where residents had been living for some time. This allows insight into how they
31 understand their situation as it has evolved through both the recovery and development
32 phases. A member of the research team had previously conducted research in the village
33 and built relationships with the village leadership and residents, providing a background of
34 trust that aided access and offered a familiar starting point for conversations between the
35 research team and respondents.
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Methods

This study explores the complexity of transformation in Tacloban, focusing on livelihood change and resettlement in the context of disaster recovery and redevelopment. We adopt a single retrospective case study strategy, focusing on one subject (the GMA Kapuso resettlement site), as an approach that is appropriate for developing a rich picture of the antecedents and consequences of the transformation that the residents have lived through (Thomas, 2011). We adopt an explanatory, participant selection, mixed methods model (Creswell et al., 2003), in which we rely on quantitative analysis of a rapid household survey to inform the selection of research participants, with whom we subsequently undertake detailed qualitative work. This approach responds to two central research questions that directed the study (Doyle et al., 2009): who assess themselves to be most and least resilient following the resettlement process? And, what factors and processes explain this difference? While potential problems with recall inevitably complicate investigation of long-term processes such as resettlement, triangulation through the use of multiple tools and approaches including key informant interviews, focus groups discussions, surveys, and document analysis help minimise these risks.

The findings are framed by a review of academic and policy literature related to the Tacloban recovery process, and data from 40 semi-structured interviews conducted in 2017-2018 with key informants from city government agencies and departments, barangay leaders and officials, and local and international NGO workers. These interviews explored city- and local-level decision-making in the recovery processes. This background informed

1 the design of a household survey and subsequent focus group discussion (FGDs) in GMA
2 Kapuso Village, conducted in March 2018. Data collection was completed with in-depth
3 follow-up interviews in GMA Kapuso Village in September 2018.
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8 A survey of 160 households was conducted in GMA Kapuso Village in 2018 to
9 ascertain subjective levels of resilience. Following the method set out in (J. Ensor et al.,
10 n.d.), each respondent scores their ability to cope with/respond to five different risk
11 storylines, each developed in consultation with local partners to ensure relevance.
12 Storylines are presented as scenarios, describing low, medium and high levels of
13 disturbance, as set out in Table 1. For each scenario, the respondent assesses *how likely it is*
14 *that the scenario would produce a setback that their household would find it very difficult to*
15 *recover from*. Responses are recorded on a Likert scale, from 1 to 6, such that a response of
16 1-3 implies a judgement by the respondent that they will recover (1 – certain to recover, 2 -
17 very likely, 3 – likely to recover) and 4-6 that they will not recover (4 - likely to not recover, 5
18 - very likely, 6 - certain to not recover). The deployed survey was written in Waray (the local
19 language) and administered by Waray-speaking research assistants from the University of
20 the Philippines (UP). The sampling method was to approach alternate housing units along
21 each block in GMA Kapuso Village.
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45 The use of storylines and scenarios, rather than direct reference to the term
46 resilience, recognizes that resilience is in many settings either ambiguous, absent or imbued
47 with politicized meaning (as has been found in Tacloban where the narrative of resilience as
48 “personal or collective strength” has been internalized by many in the resettled
49 communities;(Eadie, 2019, p. 104). Through the use of scenarios, the survey results
50 interpret resilience in terms of the distance to a threshold; in this case, the minimum
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1 magnitude of the disturbance that the respondent judges themselves unable to recover
 2 from. Thus, those judging themselves ‘certain’ to recover are further from a threshold than
 3 those judging themselves only ‘likely’ to recover. When a respondent perceives that an
 4 increase in disturbance moves them from coping to not coping, this suggests crossing a
 5 threshold and moving into a highly undesirable regime. As such, this approach provides an
 6 empirical and subjective approach to assessing social-ecological resilience. As a subjective
 7 judgment, this may comprise, for example, the participant’s assessment of the effects of
 8 changes in ecosystem services, economics and/or social conditions. The method thus relies
 9 on the respondent’s understanding of combined social, environmental and/or economic
 10 effects of each scenario, their capacity and willingness to adjust or adapt, and the impact of
 11 this on their household.

Disturbance storyline	Scenario a:	Scenario b:	Scenario c:
	Small disturbance	Moderate disturbance	Significant disturbance

36 [Insert Table 1]

37 To capture differences in perceived resilience that account for potential disturbance
 38 across the five storylines, each household is assigned a resilience score. This score reflects
 39 their subjective assessment of each storyline scenario and allows households to be ranked,
 40 capturing differences in perceived resilience. Producing a resilience ranking score (or index)
 41 for each household requires accounting for two degrees of freedom: the selected point on
 42 the scale for a given storyline, and the number of times each point on the scale is selected
 43 for a given household. A resilience ranking score can thus be defined by a simple sum-of-
 44 products (Ensor et al., n.d.). This allows the survey data to rank households from those who
 45 assess themselves ‘most resilient’ to ‘least resilient’; those in the upper half of the data set

1 are referred to as the higher resilience group (HRG) and those in the lower half the lower
2 resilience group (LRG). In accordance with Ensor (Ensor et al., n.d.), the HRG and LRG
3 residents participating in the subsequent FGDs and household interviews were selected, in
4 order, from the upper and lower quintiles, starting at the extremes, with additional
5 members added from the upper and lower half if sufficient numbers of households were
6 unavailable. Previous work with this method affirms that the ranking approach reflects
7 household and community experiences, and that subsequently working through
8 participatory qualitative methods with the HRG and LRG provide insights into the factors
9 and processes that differentiate those with greater and lesser resilience in a given setting
10 (Ensor et al., n.d.).
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26 The resilience ranking method produces four groups: HRG men, HRG women, LRG
27 men, and LRG women. Separate FGDs were conducted with each group to comprehensively
28 explore their recovery experiences, challenges faced, current priorities and the overall gains
29 and losses of the resettlement process (Coenen et al., 2012).
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37 Livelihood challenges emerged in the FGDs as a key area of differentiation between
38 LRG and HRG members. In order to further understand the livelihood challenges, the
39 implementation of livelihood interventions, and to gain a deeper understanding of
40 underlying processes that distinguish the HRG and LRG, individual follow-up interviews were
41 conducted with GMA Kapuso Village residents. In line with the purposive non-probabilistic
42 sampling guidance (Guest et al., 2006; Hagaman & Wutich, 2017), seventeen residents were
43 interviewed (HRG interviews – five men (M1-M5), six women (W1-W6); LRG – two men (M1-
44 M2), four women (W1-W4)). The interviews and FGDs were conducted by four of the
45 authors with translation provided by Waray-speaking research assistants from UP. One of
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1 the authors, from UP, acted as the fieldwork coordinator and provided links to local
2 stakeholders. The survey questionnaire and list of questions asked during the FGDs and
3 interviews are found in the Supplementary Information.
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8 The research assistants translated the interviews into English and the translated
9 texts were reviewed by the fieldwork coordinator. The transcripts were transformed into
10 coherent narratives with emerging themes relating to consequences and drivers of
11 differentiated resilience as main sections, coded using Dedoose, an online qualitative
12 research analysis software. From there, the interview data were analyzed according to HRG
13 and LRG groups, and further disaggregated by gender. In discussion with local experts within
14 the research consortium, gender was selected as the main secondary attribute for
15 disaggregation based on the gender imbalances in Filipino society and how this manifested
16 in terms of placing women survivors at a disadvantage in the post-Haiyan context (Eadie et
17 al., 2020; Mangada, 2016; Mangada & Su, 2019; Tanyag, 2018). While other social
18 cleavages, such as class, religion, age (Sultana, 2010), ethnicity, disability, gender orientation
19 and the non-binary concept of gender (Gaillard et al., 2017) were recognized, they did not
20 reveal themselves in the FGD or in-depth interview data.
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43 Results

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47 This section details the changes experienced by households as a result of
48 resettlement. The analysis focuses on the most significant consequences and drivers of
49 change experienced by those expressing higher and lower resilience, further disaggregated
50 by gender.
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Consequences of resettlement on livelihoods

Changes in livelihood activity

For all of the HRG men, resettlement has impacted their livelihood activities. One lost his pedicab driving and rental business as a result of Haiyan but has been able to continue work as a scrap metal collector and has started new businesses, including a store and bakery. One of three ex-fishermen has applied his skills to new work as a mechanic, while all three have started new family businesses with their wives/partners, such as a pig farm and a store. One has done so due to fear of staying at the coast, despite the difficulty of leaving the profession he has known since a child. Most of the HRG men have multiple livelihoods and sources of income. Of the HRG women, most had some livelihood activities pre-Haiyan. Two are able to continue vending, while others continue catering and laundry activities, but to a lesser degree than before. Some tried new activities but reverted to what they knew after mixed successes. Most have husbands/partners who work, but one is widowed and receives financial support from her son who is an accountant in Manila.

The two LRG men have continued with their pre-Haiyan livelihoods. One drives a public utility jeep (PUJ), while the other is a fisherman and commutes from GMA Kapuso Village to his old fishing ground in the village he relocated from. Both have wives or partners who have supplemental income-generating activities, in addition to looking after their children. All of the LRG women experienced changes following Haiyan and the subsequent resettlement. Some have found new activities, with mixed successes, while others are more reliant on other incomes in the household. For example, one grows vegetables and has a small store but earns little. Another can no longer prepare and vend fish caught by her husband as she once did, but instead sells rice which is not highly profitable. A widowed

1 respondent does laundry and cleaning work in the community, as well as other ad hoc cash-
2 for-work activities. Several of her children financially support the household, including two
3 young children who fetch water for neighbors. Another widow has health issues and cannot
4 work – she and her young children rely on her son’s income from construction labor. Prior
5 to Haiyan, she collected shells that were traded for rice and was reliant on her husband’s
6 pedicab driver income.
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16 *Changes in the household financial situation*
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20 Most of the HRG men speak positively of their current financial situations due to
21 successful businesses, steady incomes, access to loans, and being able to save. This has
22 allowed the expansion of livelihood enterprises and reinvestment of profits into new
23 activities. Some are perceived as being wealthy within the community. One, however,
24 considers himself and his family financially worse-off now: his family has outstanding
25 medical bills and other loans, and is reliant on his income which is modest as he is not yet a
26 fully qualified plumber/technician. The household does, however, receive the deceased
27 father’s pension from the police force. Half of the HRG women have multiple sources of
28 income in the household, but only one speaks of being able to save after accounting for
29 daily expenses. These savings enabled the purchase of a freezer on credit, which in turn
30 enabled an additional income-generating activity of selling ice. For three of the HRG women,
31 a lack of savings means they are unable to cover expenses on days when income is reduced
32 or lacking (e.g. due to husband’s sickness) or purchase children’s clothes and other non-
33 essential items. Consequently, some take out loans from a microfinance institution or
34 friends. One HRG woman does have savings but has found difficulty in maintaining these
35 savings due to household income instability, stating that “sometimes my husband’s income
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1 is not enough and to compensate for that, I would use the money that I have saved. This is
2 how we live. So, there's really no legitimate savings" (Interview, HRG W4, 13 Sept 2018).
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5 The majority of LRG men and women spoke of a precarious financial situation due to
6 unstable incomes and a lack of savings – impacts include rationing food, being unable to pay
7 bills, and taking out high-interest loans. Only one felt his household income was sufficient,
8 although they are also supported by remittances from their daughter. Among the LRG
9 women, one has work and income that is seasonal, while for two respondents resettlement
10 has also brought higher costs such as for transportation to downtown to support their
11 husband's fishing livelihoods. Microcredit loans have been accessed only by two LRG
12 women – but they were reluctant to do so in case they are unable to repay. One LRG
13 woman, the widow, is in a dire situation, as her household cannot afford to put food on the
14 table, pay the electricity bill, or purchase required medication.
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31 Drivers of livelihood intervention outcomes 32 33

34 *Implementation of livelihood interventions* 35 36

37 Only some of the HRG and LRG men and women received livelihood support after moving to
38 GMA Kapuso Village. Interventions included training and/or supplies related to baking,
39 gardening, fish farming, rice vending, as well as goods for *sari-sari* stores, or local sundry
40 shops, and a collective wholesale grocery store. Only some of the interventions led to
41 viable livelihood activities for residents, while other residents used donations to sustain
42 their households – either by consuming the goods that were supposed to be sold or by
43 paying already accumulated debts. One LRG woman, who's rice vending business was not
44 sustainable despite participating in three rounds of buying/selling rice, remarked "They [the
45 donor] gave us rice, half a kilo, and a weighing scale. It's all gone. We consumed it."
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1 (Interview, LRG M2, 14 Sept 2018). Two HRG women also had direct experience of this. For
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3 example, one had participated in a food vending related program and received cooking
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5 training, a stove, cookware and funds for supplies. She ran a food stall in GMA Kapuso
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7 Village until her household consumed the goods. After that, she returned to providing
8
9 laundry services. Some respondents received multiple types of livelihood support. For
10
11 example, one received fish cages and other fishing implements as a part of a collective
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13 project and had also participated in accounting training. He now runs multiple *sari-sari*
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15 stores with his wife, who also received various types of support for her business.
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21 Both HRG and LRG residents reported mixed intervention results, although the
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23 reasons for the failures of implementation were predominantly pointed out by HRG
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25 residents. Some HRG residents attributed the lack of success due to training's lack of
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27 consideration for the broader requirements of starting and continuing a livelihood. For
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29 example, one HRG household received seeds despite lacking the space to plant them, while
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31 another, who does not have access to an oven, received training and supplies for baking and
32
33 pastry production. This HRG woman remarked "[the training would be] useful if they gave
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35 capital. But they did not give an oven so how can we use our training?" (Interview, HRG W2,
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37 12 Sept 2018). Another HRG man who received accounting training felt it was not useful
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39 because it was not suitable for the skill level and livelihood activities of the participants.
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47 Some LRG and HRG residents participated in interventions that required residents to
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49 join a cooperative in order to receive livelihood support. For example, one HRG respondent
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51 was part of a cooperative grocery store to which an international NGO gave a cash
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53 donation. Their wholesale cooperative near the resettled communities removed the need
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55 for *sari-sari* store owners to travel downtown to purchase goods. Members participated in
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1 meetings and orientations with the NGO and the group worked in shifts, where each person
2 worked one shift a week and earned a set amount. Although there was a daily revenue, the
3 business ended after about a year and a half due to internal conflicts over shift patterns.
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5 Another co-operative, focused on fish preparation, dissolved when meeting attendance
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7 dropped and members did not pay their dues. Some also stopped attending meetings due
8
9 to their debts to the cooperative. One HRG respondent reported that members of a fish
10
11 farming cooperative stole the fish and were uninterested in working: “as a result,
12
13 performance decreased with each harvest” and the business had to be closed; another
14
15 suggested the failure of cooperatives was down to the members: “They didn’t want to run a
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17 business; they just want to be paid salaries” (Interview, HRG M5, 14 Sept 2018).
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26 *Social relations and power dynamics*

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29 Within the resettlement site, a Board of Directors (BoD) operates as a decision-
30 making body in the running of village affairs, including as an intermediary for organizations
31 looking to distribute resources and support to those who were resettled to the village
32 during the relief and recovery phase. The BoD are officers of the GMA Kapuso Village
33 homeowners association, originally elected by all homeowners. At the time of the survey,
34 only those paying to be members of the association were able to participate in BoD
35 elections. Close connections to the BoD were perceived as influencing decisions about who
36 should receive support - a perception that was shared by both those who received support
37 and those who did not. For example, one HRG woman acknowledged that those close to
38 decision-makers were prioritized, stating that some people did not get support “because
39 they are not close to, or they do not have a connection with the leaders, and that those who
40 have the connections would always be listed” (Interview, HRG W5, 13 Sept 2018). The wife
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1 of an HRG man attributed her participation in a rice retailing program to her friendship with
2 the former GMA Kapuso Village president. Another HRG woman complained to
3
4 development agencies about the inequitable distribution but was told that it was an internal
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6 village issue.
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10 In addition to leveraging connections with local leaders, HRG men and HRG women
11 received support from personal and professional connections. Two started working in
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13 businesses that were run by family members; one received a loan for his new bakery from
14
15 his nephew's lending company, while another occasionally borrows from neighbors to allow
16
17 them to make ends meet. Seven out of the eleven HRG households interviewed receive
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19 financial support from relatives at least occasionally. Three HRG residents stated that they
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21 were dependent on money regularly coming from children living in Manila and abroad,
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23 while others receive money or advice from family members when it is needed or requested;
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25 for one respondent this was in the form of help from their brother-in-law to apply for a loan
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27 for a refrigerator which allows them to sell ice. For one of the HRG men, reliance on
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29 remittances for household income is greater than from his income as a mechanic.
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40 Some of the LRG men and women agree with the HRG residents' views on the
41 influence of connections with BoD leaders on the distribution of livelihood benefits,
42 describing the BoD meetings to discuss support as secretive and exclusive. Two of the LRG
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44 women felt that the BoD had withheld support that was meant for them. In one case, a
45
46 female LRG member felt that the BoD was directly responsible for taking items intended for
47
48 her *sari-sari* store donated by United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). "I felt that
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50 it wasn't worth 10,000 pesos. I think they [the BoD] removed some items", she said
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57 (Interview, LRG W1, 12 Sept 2018). Two other LRG women only found out that support was
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1 available after others had already received theirs. Similarly to the HRG, the LRG households
2 rely on their professional and personal connections, including family, for money and
3 livelihood opportunities. For example, two receive remittances from family and relatives to
4 support educational expenses of their children as well as other costs. Personal contacts also
5 provide access to information, such as where sources of support are available. In the case of
6 a widow suffering from a long-term illness, personal contacts are relied on to access food
7 scraps from a neighbor, a trash-collector at the nearby dumpsite. The widow used to work
8 at the local church as a childminder and after she fell ill, she still received financial or food
9 donations from the church through a nun. However, once the nun moved away from
10 Tacloban, this support dried up.
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26 *Individual resources and skills*

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29 HRG men accessed finances to reconstitute their livelihoods in various ways,
30 including savings from post-Haiyan support during the time spent in transitional shelters,
31 previous livelihoods, inheritance, and pension of a deceased household member. One
32 received financial support from a religious foundation that he and his partner used to start
33 their *sari-sari* business. He recalls that they received abundant relief goods during the first
34 two years after Haiyan which they used to build a good foundation for their business.
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45 Although household members in half of the six HRG women's households received
46 support, they did not perceive this as having helped them start a successful livelihood. Half
47 of the six HRG women link their household situation to their spouse's livelihoods. For one
48 who is unemployed, the steady income from her husband's livelihood at the Tacloban
49 airport allows them to plan their finances while she awaits the approval for a loan to start
50 her pig farm. In four households, their husbands have continued with their previous
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1 occupations and two HRG women have continued with the same line of work. Fishing
2 provides two HRG women with at least fish for the family to eat.
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5 Some HRG men and women referred to the importance of 'soft skills', such as
6 proactive entrepreneurial thinking, which they were able to call on to reconstitute their
7 livelihoods either because they themselves possessed those skills, or because their families
8 did. One experienced fisher now supports his wife's vending business. His wife describes
9 herself as business-minded, having expanded her peanut-selling business after Haiyan and
10 now plans to start a pharmacy because she sees sufficient demand for one. They actively
11 leverage over two generations of skills that the family has in selling peanuts to run the
12 business, to understand its cycles, and how to plan. Another HRG woman previously worked
13 in a grocery store and now runs a successful *sari-sari* store. Her store has a business permit
14 that enables her to sell additional food items that she acquired by consignment. She also
15 subsidizes her household electricity bill through her store. She considers herself pro-active
16 and entrepreneurial and is proud that she does not have to rely on her husband as the sole
17 income earner. One HRG man runs multiple businesses, including a scrap metal venture and
18 a bakery. He is ambitious, business-oriented, and recognizes the skills and resources
19 required to run each business. When starting his bakery, he leveraged the experience of
20 other bakery owners in his family. Two others temporarily squatted on unused space
21 (without permission), thereby avoiding rent while establishing their business activities.
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49 The LRG women and men, on the other hand, either did not have or were unable to
50 access resources. Some did not receive support after Haiyan, even in cases of poverty and
51 poor health. Access to finances, such as for start-up financing, was also an issue for several
52 LRG members. The LRG men instead report relying on their pre-existing skills to reconstitute
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1 their livelihoods, such as a driver or as a fisher. In the latter case, this is despite feeling that
2 his livelihood is at risk each time he returns to GMA Kapuso Village because he must leave
3 his nets hanging at the beach. Someone had recently stolen his crab net, which he cannot
4 afford to replace. According to his wife, his preference to work alone makes it difficult for
5 him to transition to other jobs, despite having received rice and a weighing scale while in
6 the transitional shelter. LRG women's post-Haiyan livelihood activities also link with
7 previous activities. One continues to sell vegetables from her garden and runs a small *sari-*
8 *sari* store, while another sold dried fish prior to Haiyan and now sells rice in addition to
9 caring for their home and children. Two temporarily performed activities based on their life
10 experience as a woman - laundry services, housecleaning and child-minding. The LRG
11 residents do not refer to soft skills, except to point out the lack of them. One, a widow who
12 carries out a variety of informal work (*barangay tanod* or village guard, laundry,
13 housecleaning for others) and more formal work (in a cash-for-work program) received rice
14 to retail. She had to close her rice vending business because she was "too shy" to collect the
15 payments from those who are indebted to her, recognizing in hindsight that she had not
16 been sufficiently focused on running a profitable business.

42 Discussion

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46 Post-disaster planning following Haiyan was explicitly designed to reduce disaster
47 risk and provide more sustained livelihood opportunities, aiming to reduce vulnerability and
48 promote equitable development. Resettlement was combined with livelihood interventions
49 implemented by public and non-profit organizations, and there was a high level of
50 agreement among resettled interviewees that one of the TRRP successes was the provision
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1 of permanent housing which had decreased their exposure to typhoons (c.f. Piggott-
2 McKellar et al., 2019).
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4 5 6 Distributing resilience outcomes 7

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10 In keeping with the premise of the TRRP, livelihood interventions focused on
11 supporting residents to run businesses and generate cash income, as part of a wider
12 network of retail and other business activities that were planned for the resettlement site.
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14 Implementation was overlaid on a complex fabric of social, economic, cultural and political
15 dynamics. In particular, social capital and relations of power and influence provided
16
17 opportunities for some to capitalize on the new resources and opportunities, while the skills
18 and assets that individuals possessed prior to moving were significant in providing different
19 starting points for households as they sought to rebuild their lives and livelihoods. The skills
20 required to survive in the new cash economy in the resettlement site meant that some
21 residents were better able to reconfigure their livelihoods than others. While the loss of
22 material assets frequently proved irreversible, those with transferable skills - such as a boat
23 mechanic who became a car mechanic in order to move from a coastal to non-coastal
24 setting - were better able to adapt and were well placed to diversify their livelihood
25 strategies. As one LRG man reported: "... they were businessmen and now, they still are.
26 Same goes with the fishermen, now they're still fishermen. I [was] a driver before, and I'm
27 still a driver now" (Interview, LRG M1, 13 Sept 2018). The most financially successful among
28 the respondents referred to business-related soft skills and were able to capitalize on these
29 after the typhoon or collaborate with a spouse or business partner who possessed them.
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31 These respondents see their success as tied to their ability to pursue new types of income-
32 earning opportunities in their new environments, where they discovered that an
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1 entrepreneurial spirit is rewarded (see Eadie et al., 2020, for similar findings in relation to
2 sari-sari store ownership). Where a business or entrepreneurial mindset was absent,
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4 livelihood support interventions were less successful, as in the cases of freeriding and
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6 stealing in the fisheries cooperative, business failure after offering credit, and household
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8 consumption of goods that were intended to be sold.
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13 Those reporting the highest resilience were supported by access to financial
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15 resources that allowed for survival in a cash economy (c.f. Béné et al., 2018). In different
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17 cases, these resources were pre-existing (such as savings accrued from pre-Haiyan
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19 livelihoods); arose from livelihood support or other aid received in the transitional shelter
20
21 phase (rather than as part of the TRRP related resettlement); or from the receipt of
22
23 inheritance; or from access to a pension. Crucially, financial resources were also accessed
24
25 through social networks. While most of the resettled residents reported more than one
26
27 source of income for their household, the HRG group was distinguished from the LRG group
28
29 by their access to financial support in terms of remittances, income from other family
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31 members and, in particular, loans. While many in the HRG group are not usually able to save
32
33 money, the financial support they receive from others is critical to their resilience,
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35 demonstrating the importance of these support channels. However, as one LRG woman
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37 reported, “no one would let you borrow money or goods if you don’t have a job” (Interview,
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39 LRG W2, 12 Sept 2018).
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51 These issues of human and social capital, while critical in their own right, were also
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53 overlain on relations of power, influence and politicization that were central to the
54
55 distribution of outcomes from the TRRP’s resilience-building interventions. Pre-disaster
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57 norms of clientelism and patronage were widespread in post-disaster beneficiary selection
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1 processes (Mangada, 2019) and were reflected in operation of the village Homeowners'
2 Associations. Microcosms of the wider political culture, the Association's Board of Directors
3 (BoD) in GMA Kapuso were understood as patrons, able to provide access to services for
4 villagers. Respondents report an accountability gap that enabled relationships with
5 members of the BoD to become associated with learning about opportunities and with
6 being selected as a beneficiary, consistent with reports of the influence of political
7 connections in the selection of recipients for housing benefits in the resettled communities.
8 As one HRG man recalls, "The real problem here in our place is the [BoD] officers because
9 we have no idea what they are doing and they can do whatever they desire" (Interview,
10 HRG M5, 13 Sept 2018).
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27 At the same time, gendered livelihood opportunities played a powerful role in
28 shaping households' ability to adapt or to capitalize on new opportunities (Carr &
29 Thompson, 2014; Sultana, 2010). For example, the entrepreneurial skills that proved critical
30 to success in the resettlement site economy were predominantly the domain of men, with
31 only one of the higher resilience group women reporting confidence in this regard, and the
32 remainder looking instead to sustain smaller-scale versions of their pre-Haiyan livelihoods.
33 Both HRG and LRG women experienced lower levels of work than men, frequently citing the
34 need to attend to reproductive activities and domestic work. Rice vending and store
35 ownership - both of which can be run from the home - thus remained popular with women
36 despite their awareness of a clear over-supply of these services and, as a consequence, low
37 profitability. This significance of the overlapping effects of gendered social norms, pre-
38 existing skills and experiences, and unvalued caring or domestic responsibilities is reflected
39 in the findings reported by Eadie et al. (2020) and Tanyag (2018), who similarly conclude
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1 that post-disaster livelihood support in Tacloban frequently bypassed or was inappropriately
2 targeted for the needs of female recipients.
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6 Capabilities for transformative change 7

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10 Recognition that rising levels of disaster risk and loss are rooted in the choice of
11 development pathways has focused attention on transformation of development through
12 disaster risk reduction (DRR) (Gibson et al., 2016; Thomalla et al., 2018). In Tacloban, as
13 elsewhere, addressing DRR within existing development pathways had placed whole
14 communities at risk of inundation and the destructive power of tropical cyclones. Post-
15 Haiyan, these pathways were judged by national and city planners to be insufficient: the
16 intense need to address risk was sufficient to demand a transformation in development. As
17 the guiding mechanism for this change, the TRRP was an attempt to direct a deliberate
18 transformation in city development in general and DRR in particular; the devastation
19 following Haiyan opening a “window of opportunity” for large scale resettlements and
20 economic restructuring of the urban economic landscape and “hazardscape” (Shah et al.,
21 2018, p. 252). This transformation was felt most directly by residents in their resettlement
22 and the designation of no-dwelling zones where their former homes had stood and
23 livelihoods had been based. In the face of such significant disaster losses, DRR plans that
24 challenge established patterns of development are to be welcomed. But such
25 transformations also imply significant changes and lasting effects, and as such demand
26 critical engagement to better understand how outcomes emerge and are patterned across
27 communities (Tierney & Oliver-Smith, 2012).
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57 As the discussion above demonstrates, the consequences of the TRRP were uneven,
58 with resilience and vulnerability distributed along lines that reflect pre-existing patterns of
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1 structural relationships and human and social capital within the community. Taken together,
2 the experiences of the HRG and LRG reveal the combined effect of diverse social
3 characteristics and relationships in the particular circumstances of deliberate
4 transformations, reflecting earlier work establishing the significance of complex,
5 overlapping factors in distributing risk, vulnerability and opportunity (Carr & Thompson,
6 2014; Sultana, 2010) . While shortcomings in implementation draw attention to the
7 challenges of enacting deliberate transformation and the need for a detailed understanding
8 of context in order to deliver appropriate support, implementation is only part of the
9 picture. Where access to housing, training and livelihood support was successfully provided,
10 the effects were felt very differently among households who judged themselves relatively
11 more and less resilient. The lens of capabilities unpacks these results in terms of the
12 personal, social and environment processes that affect an individual's ability to make valued
13 choices. In the results presented here, the significant structural and individual conditions –
14 skills, experience, power, social norms, gender roles and institutions – reflect these
15 processes and distribute the ability to convert newly available resources into opportunities
16 to live lives that they value and would choose. The provision of resources or support for
17 transformation inevitably meets with the different personal, social and environmental
18 positionality and subjectivities of individuals, limiting or enhancing their freedom to achieve
19 valued outcomes.

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Recognizing subjectivities is increasingly identified as significant if the
operationalization of resilience is to be equitable, opening the space to deliver
transformative pathways that are just in relation histories of marginalization as well as in
the distribution of risk and opportunity (Fazey et al., 2017; Harris et al., 2017; Holland, 2017;

1 Manuel-Navarrete & Pelling, 2015; Matin et al., 2018; Schlosberg, 2012; Schlosberg et al.,
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3 2017; Tschakert et al., 2016; Ziervogel et al., 2017). In Tacloban, resettled residents were
4
5 presented with a choice of livelihood support opportunities that was tightly bound by a
6
7 development pathway that had been set in administrative and political spaces to which they
8
9 had no access (Eadie et al., 2020; Tuhkanen et al., 2018). In terms of livelihoods, the
10
11 dominant narrative of transformation within the TRRP was focused on integration into a
12
13 cash economy rooted in the resettlement site, thereby overlooking the backdrop of near-
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15 subsistence coastal fishery-based livelihoods among many of those who were to be
16
17 resettled (c.f. Tan-Mullins et al., 2020). While some long standing livelihood practices, such
18
19 as raising pigs, were not allowed in some resettlement communities around Tacloban and
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21 its neighbouring areas (Eadie et al., 2020), *sari-sari* stores, for example, were heavily
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23 supported by international agencies such as USAID as a means to foster entrepreneurial
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25 skills and promote the role of consumers in a market economy (Atienza et al., 2019). While
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27 the immediately observable effect of this was to favor those with capabilities aligned to the
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29 new economy, the failure to recognize the significance of alternative livelihoods frustrated
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31 the ability of other actors to make valued choices. While some, such as fisherfolks who had
32
33 relied on gathering seafood for their households, experienced new challenges and a sense
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35 of loss in adapting to life away from the sea, others were forced to make difficult
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37 compromises. Many fishers returned to sea despite increased travel costs, time away from
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39 families, and a hand-to-mouth existence, preferring (for example) to continue to work alone
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41 as a fisher rather than have to adapt to a new life working with others. Many women were
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43 left to secure valued domestic or reproductive activities through the means that were
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45 available to them - as home-based vendors in marginal activities such as selling rice, as
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47 village watchers, or through allowing their children to undertake petty work in the
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1 community. Here, the constraints imposed by the TRRP interact with on-the-ground
2 subjectivities to produce differentiated and distinct vulnerabilities among groups whose
3 backgrounds, values and identities were overlooked or undervalued in the planning process
4 (Sultana, 2010; Tschakert, 2012). Experiences of resilience thus emerge as individuals
5 navigate processes of change, bound up with whether and how they are able secure
6 meaning as much as with the material effects of transformation (c.f. Carr, 2019).
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16 Recognizing these underlying subjectivities through inclusive processes of decision-
17 making can help drive towards more equitable resilience (Matin et al., 2018). But to do so
18 means supporting the political capabilities of marginalized groups, such that they can
19 participate in the political processes that define resilience, shifting from marginal to “full
20 partners in social life – as worthy of equal respect and esteem in decision processes and
21 procedures” (Holland, 2017, p. 395). In Tacloban, the political authority of the dominant
22 elite became bound up with a development narrative that was defined centrally and in
23 advance via the TRRP drafting and reinforced through ceremonies and commemorations
24 throughout the recovery period (Eadie, 2019). This closed down local opportunities for
25 questioning what might constitute an improvement in Tacloban, sustaining existing
26 subjectivities (mother, fisher / entrepreneur, business owner) while reinforcing them with
27 new layers of meaning (underdeveloped / developed; failure / success in the cash economy)
28 that map onto a lived experience of unequal feelings of resilience and vulnerability. The
29 window of opportunity following Haiyan opened a space in which both livelihoods and
30 disaster risks were transformed, but in the absence of an explicitly transformative narrative
31 – or even consultation with communities – the ‘new’ development pathway *de facto*
32 reflected the dominant commercial and economic worldview of those institutions involved
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1 in drafting and implementing the TRRP and the subsequent plans which it informed. Indeed,
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3 Tuhkanen et al. (2018) describe a fragmented TRRP drafting process in which livelihood
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5 needs were insufficiently explored at the outset and opportunities missed to respond to
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7 emerging challenges or reassess livelihood priorities during the implementation phase (see
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9 also: Mangada 2019). While this led to dissatisfaction among actors at both the city and
10
11 community levels, the legitimacy of the new development discourse was maintained due to
12
13 the authority of the City Government of Tacloban (as authors of the TRRP) in partnership
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15 with UN-Habitat and their implementing partners including the village BoD, private sector
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17 and the NGO and international donor community. Tacloban’s political elite, whose reach
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19 extended into the villages, community organizations and private sector, were well placed to
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21 exercise control of narrative, simultaneously reinforcing their legitimacy and providing an
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23 exemplar of their continued authority (Bankoff & Borrinaga, 2016; Eadie, 2019; Mangada,
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25 2019; Salazar, 2015b; Wigley, 2015), while the provision of aid resources fitted into pre-
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27 existing patterns of patron-client relationships, further reducing the potential for critique or
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29 dissent (Tan-Mullins et al., 2020).
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40 This exercise of authority enabled control over the narrative of resilience, setting the
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42 pathway for development and DRR in the city. It represented a particular expression of the
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44 power held by these organizations, manifest as political capability: that is, the ability to
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46 shape decision-making and thereby determine the conditions that people were to live under
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48 following transformation (Holland, 2017; Schlosberg, 2012). In contrast, the relatively low
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50 political capability of resettled residents resulted in a failure to explore and respond to the
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52 “experiences of the vulnerable and the way that their status is, in part, socially, politically,
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54 and economically constructed” (Schlosberg, 2012, p. 450, see also: Carr, 2019; Gibson et al.,
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1 2016); consequently, transformation was experienced as a subjugating force on some
2 resettled residents whose marginalization was entrenched in the post-disaster context
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5 (Eadie et al., 2020).
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8 The missed opportunity was for transformation to be predicated on processes that
9 sought to secure political capabilities among marginalized groups. This would mean enabling
10 those groups to gain full and equal partnership in decision-making by opening up the vision,
11 goals and set of alternatives that frame decision-making, including the trade-offs that must
12 be negotiated between and within strategies for development and DRR (Gibson, 2013;
13 Morrison-Saunders & Pope, 2013; Tuhkanen et al., 2018). Increasing recognition of
14 marginalized groups can, in turn, promote movements framed around “emancipatory
15 subjectivities”, disrupting forms of authority that sustain inequality and promoting
16 narratives of transformation that question underlying processes of vulnerability creation
17 (Manuel-Navarrete & Pelling, 2015, p. 561; Tschakert et al., 2016). The TRRP process, by
18 contrast, left political capabilities undisturbed, offering little control to communities over
19 how resilience decisions changed their circumstances and at the cost of those who perceive
20 themselves least resilient four years after the typhoon (Holland, 2017; Shi et al., 2016).
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43 Conclusion

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47 This paper contributes to understandings of transformation by setting out empirical
48 evidence of successes and failures of a planned attempt to reduce risk and inequality
49 following a major disaster on a city scale. Tacloban presents a case of a post-disaster
50 recovery plan that has resulted in material changes on the ground, reducing risk associated
51 with future typhoon events through extensive resettlement. Yet the sense of resilience
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1 among resettled residents is uneven, with many struggling despite a focus on livelihoods
2 embedded in the resettlement plan. Pre-existing human and social capital have played a
3 significant role in distributing resilience in Tacloban, while elite control over the framing of
4 the resettlement plan limited the opportunity for some groups to secure or retain
5 livelihoods that they value, reinforcing experiences of marginalization.
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13 The experience of the resettled residents of Tacloban demonstrates that driving
14 towards equitable outcomes requires engaging with the processes that distribute the ability
15 of individuals to achieve valued outcomes. To achieve this requires mechanisms for
16 orchestrating transformation pathways that respond to subjectivities that sustain
17 marginality, and take seriously the social, political and economic construction of well-being,
18 risk and vulnerability. In this task, political capabilities offers a constructive starting point,
19 applying a procedural and recognition justice framework to question which subjectivities are
20 being reinforced in response to what authority, and asking: whose voices, values, interests
21 and identities are being embedded into resilience interventions? In so doing, political
22 capabilities expands on calls for participation and engagement in resilience, directing
23 attention onto how and for whom materiality and meaning are constructed in resilience
24 planning and decision making.
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45 This understanding places a significant burden on those working to effect change in
46 reconstruction or other transformative moments, including national and local authorities,
47 domestic and international NGOs, charitable organizations and donors. As the case of
48 Tacloban suggests, these actors will need, on the one hand, to work to support the
49 emergence of political capabilities among hitherto marginalized groups; on the other, to
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1 engender planning processes that are open to narratives of transformation that may
2 challenge established authority.
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Supplementary Material

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Supplementary information

- List of all resettlement sites in Tacloban as of June 2020 and their access to basic services or facilities (Based on the reports of the City Housing and Community Development Office, City Government of Tacloban)

	Name of Site	Location	Target Units	Raffled/ awarded beneficiaries	Actual Occupants as of 09 June 2020	Street Lights	Water	Electricity	Day Care Centre	School	Multipurpose Building
	National Housing Authority developments										
1	Ridgeview Park 1	Brgy. 97, Cabalawan	1,000	892	761	Lacking	Access to public or communal faucet	Available	Available	Available	Not available
2	Ridgeview Park 2		1,000	791	657	Lacking	Access to public or communal faucet	Available	Not available	Available	Not available
3	Knightsridge Heights	Brgy. 98, Camansihay	1,000	313	33						Currently constructed
4	Salvacion Heights	Brgy. 104, Salvacion	532	231	0						Not available
5	Greendale Residence 1	Brgy. 105, San Isidro	327	325	242	Lacking	Access to public or communal faucet	Available	Not available	Not available	Not available
6	Greendale Residence 2		854	594	246	Lacking	Access to public or communal faucet	Available	Not available	Not available	Not available
7	Greendale Residence 3		459	331	148	Lacking	Access to public or communal faucet	Partial access	Not available	Not available	Not available
8	Guadalupe Heights 1		1,000	946	459	Lacking	Access to public or communal faucet	Available	Not available	Not available	Not available

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9	Guadalupe Heights 2		1,000	987	572	Lacking	Access to public or communal faucet		Not available	Not available	Not available
10	Guadalupe Heights 3		750	565	257	Lacking	Access to public or communal faucet	Available	Not available	Not available	Not available
11	St. Francis Village 1		1,000	983	561	Some	Access to both public or communal faucet and individual connections	Available	Not available	Not available	Available
12	St. Francis Village 2		1,505	142	0	Some	Access to both public or communal faucet and individual connections		Not available	Not available	Available
13	North Hill Arbours 1	Brgy. 106, Santo Niño	1,007	999	809	Lacking	Access to public or communal faucet	Available	Not available	Not available	Available
14	North Hill Arbours 2		1,082	1,076	861	Lacking	Access to public or communal faucet	Available	Not available	Not available	Available
15	Villa Diana	Brgy. 101, New Kawayan	409	409	357	Lacking	Access to public or communal faucet	Available		Available	Not available
16	New Hope Village	Brgy. 107, Santa Elena	1,000	998	822	All has access	Access to public or communal faucet	Available		Available	Not available
17	Villa Sofia	Brgy. 198, Tagpuro	554	554	385	Lacking	Access to public or	Available		Not available	Not available

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							communal faucet				
	TOTAL		14,479	11,136	7,170						
	NGO/INGO Projects										
18	CRS Anibong Resettlement Site	Brgy. 93, Bagacay	883	883	320		Access to public or communal faucet	Available			
19	Lion's Village	Brgy. 97, Cabalawan	100	100	100	Some	Access to public or communal faucet				
20	Pope Francis Village - UPA	Brgy. 99, Diit	566	263	213		Access to public or communal faucet				
21	UNDP Housing Project	Brgy. 97, Cabalawan	55	55	55	All has access	Access to public or communal faucet	Available			
22	Pope Francis Village – SM Cares	Brgy. 101, New Kawayan	415	395	366		Access to public or communal faucet	Available			
23	Community of Hope -OB	Brgy. 103, Palanog	300	92	88						
24	GMA Kapuso Village	Brgy. 106, Santo Niño	402	398	397	All has access	Individual connections	Available	Available	Available	Available
25	Habitat Village (Lot 4428)		547	547	546	All has access	Individual connections	Available	Available	Available	Available
26	Habitat Village (Lot 4466)		50	50	50	All has access	Access to public or communal faucet	Available			
27	Core Housing Project (Lot 4428)		72	72	72	All has access	Individual connections	Available			
28	Global Medic Housing Project		16	16	16	All has access	Individual connections	Available			
29	SOS Housing Project		142	142	141	All has access	Access to public or	Available			

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							communal faucet				
30	PICE Housing Project		22	20	18	All has access	Individual connections	Available			
	TOTAL		3,970	3,033	2,382						
Department of Transportation											
31	Aeroville	Brgy. 106, Santo Niño	498	64	60	Lacking	Access to public or communal faucet	Temporar y			
	TOTAL		498	64	60						

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2. Resilience Ranking Household Survey (English version)

For each of the scenarios below we ask each household's respondent "how likely do you think that the scenario discussed might produce a setback that you and your household would find it very difficult to recover from?"

Each scenario refers to a progressively more severe storyline of disruption. Thus, we are asking each household to self-assess as to how resilient they might be to a) relatively small disturbance; b) moderate disturbance; and c) more significant disturbance.

1) Earthquake

Storyline 1. The community is struck by an earthquake.

Scenario 1a. 25% of your house was destroyed. On a scale of one to six how likely do you think that this might produce a setback that you & your household would find it very difficult to recover from?

1 – Never; 2 – Very unlikely; 3 – Unlikely; 4 – Likely; 5 – Very likely; 6 – Certain

Scenario 1b. 50% of your house was destroyed; roads were partially destroyed, and there's very limited access to piped water and electricity; and problematic communication facilities. On a scale of one to six how likely do you think that this might produce a setback that you & your household would find it very difficult to recover from?

1 – Never; 2 – Very unlikely; 3 – Unlikely; 4 – Likely; 5 – Very likely; 6 – Certain

Scenario 1c. 100% of your house was destroyed, 75% of the road network was destroyed; electricity, water, communication facilities are down; and fuel is scarce. On a scale of one to six how likely do you think that this might produce a setback that you & your household would find it very difficult to recover from?

1 – Never; 2 – Very unlikely; 3 – Unlikely; 4 – Likely; 5 – Very likely; 6 – Certain

2) Drought

Storyline 2. The community is struck by a drought.

Scenario 2a: The community is suffering a month-long drought which reduces its total water supply by 10%. On a scale of zero to six how likely do you think that this might produce a setback that you & your household would find it very difficult to recover from?

1 – Never; 2 – Very unlikely; 3 – Unlikely; 4 – Likely; 5 – Very likely; 6 – Certain

Scenario 2b: The community is suffering a month-long drought which reduces its water supply by 25%. On a scale of zero to six how likely do you think that this might produce a setback that you & your household would find it very difficult to recover from?

1 – Never; 2 – Very unlikely; 3 – Unlikely; 4 – Likely; 5 – Very likely; 6 – Certain

Scenario 2c: The community is suffering a month-long drought which reduces its water supply by 50%. On a scale of one to six how likely do you think that this might produce a setback that you & your household would find it very difficult to recover from?

1 – Never; 2 – Very unlikely; 3 – Unlikely; 4 – Likely; 5 – Very likely; 6 – Certain

3) Disease or accident at the garbage dumpsite

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Storyline 3. The location of the dumpsite is close to GMA Kapuso Village, children and those who do not have sources of income go to the dumpsite to look for scrap items/food.

Scenario 3a: A member of the family got ill and was in unable to leave their bed for three weeks, requiring regular doctors' visits and medication for a month. On a scale of one to six how likely do you think that this might produce a setback that you & your household would find it very difficult to recover from?

1 – Never; 2 – Very unlikely; 3 – Unlikely; 4 – Likely; 5 – Very likely; 6 – Certain

Scenario 3b: A member of the family got in an accident and lost the use of their arm. They were unable to leave their bed for eight weeks, and will now require regular doctors' visits and medication for the coming year. On a scale of one to six how likely do you think that this might produce a setback that you & your household would find it very difficult to recover from?

1 – Never; 2 – Very unlikely; 3 – Unlikely; 4 – Likely; 5 – Very likely; 6 – Certain

Scenario 3c: A member of the family died. On a scale of one to six how likely do you think that this might produce a setback that you & your household would find it very difficult to recover from?

1 – Never; 2 – Very unlikely; 3 – Unlikely; 4 – Likely; 5 – Very likely; 6 – Certain

4) Reduction of government aid

Storyline 4. Imagine that the government has decreased or ceased giving money to support to livelihoods. This means that the government will not be able to offer as much support to livelihoods at the community level. We do not know how long this situation will last but let us assume that this is in its first year.

Scenario 4a: The availability of support to livelihoods has reduced by 25%. On a scale of one to six how likely do you think that this might produce a setback that you & your household would find it very difficult to recover from?

1 – Never; 2 – Very unlikely; 3 – Unlikely; 4 – Likely; 5 – Very likely; 6 – Certain

Scenario 4b: The availability of support to livelihoods has reduced by 50%. On a scale of one to six how likely do you think that this might produce a setback that you & your household would find it very difficult to recover from?

1 – Never; 2 – Very unlikely; 3 – Unlikely; 4 – Likely; 5 – Very likely; 6 – Certain

Scenario 4c: The availability of support to livelihoods has reduced by 75%. On a scale of one to six how likely do you think that this might produce a setback that you & your household would find it very difficult to recover from?

1 – Never; 2 – Very unlikely; 3 – Unlikely; 4 – Likely; 5 – Very likely; 6 – Certain

5) Fluctuation in the market

Storyline 5. Imagine that your main source of cash income suffers a sustained setback that lasts for at least six months.

Scenario 5a: The income has dropped by 10%. On a scale of one to six how likely do you think that this might produce a setback that you & your household would find it very difficult to recover from?

1 – Never; 2 – Very unlikely; 3 – Unlikely; 4 – Likely; 5 – Very likely; 6 – Certain

1 **Scenario 5b: The income has dropped by 20%. On a scale of one to six how likely do you think that**
2 **this might produce a setback that you & your household would find it very difficult to recover**
3 **from?**

4 1 – Never; 2 – Very unlikely; 3 – Unlikely; 4 – Likely; 5 – Very likely; 6 – Certain

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6 **Scenario 5c: The income has dropped by 30%. On a scale of one to six how likely do you think that**
7 **this might produce a setback that you & your household would find it very difficult to recover**
8 **from?**

9 1 – Never; 2 – Very unlikely; 3 – Unlikely; 4 – Likely; 5 – Very likely; 6 – Certain

10 11 3. Focus Group Discussion (FGD) (English version)

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13 Separate FGDs will be held for participants from the High Resilience Group (HRG) and Low Resilience
14 Group (LRG), based on the Resilience Ranking Household Survey results previously conducted.
15 Furthermore, separate FGDs for women and men within each Resilience Group will be conducted,
16 wherever possible. Guiding questions for the FGDs fall under four main categories: a)
17 Implementation, b) Ambition, c) Reaction to the Tacloban Recovery and Rehabilitation Plan (TRRP)
18 and other associated plans, and d) Involvement in planning.

19 20 21 22 **A. Implementation**

23 Positive outcomes:

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27 1. What are the 3 most positive things that you, your household or your community have
28 experienced during pre-GMA and GMA resettlement periods?
29 a. How did these things come about? For example, did they involve any forms of
30 support, or were these actions were taken by households or the community on their
31 own?
32
33 2. What are the most positive or helpful forms of support that have been received?
34 a. Which agencies (NGOs, government, other) have been supportive, or provided
35 useful guidance, resources, training etc.?
36 b. Are these positive outcomes resulting from post-Haiyan/Yolanda plans by
37 government or NGOs?
38 c. Were any of these due to forms of social organization that existed prior to the
39 typhoon (e.g. *church, business groups, political affiliations*)?
40

41 Negative outcomes:

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44 3. What are the 3 most negative things that you, your household or your community have
45 experienced during pre-GMA and GMA resettlement periods?
46 a. How did these things come about? For example, were these things forced on them
47 by other actors, or were these in fact actions that were taken by households or the
48 community on their own?
49 b. If no external actors or agencies [organizations] were involved, were these
50 unsuccessful attempts to achieve something positive, or the deliberate actions of
51 one group undermining another?
52 c. If external agencies were involved, does the group think that this was the intended
53 outcome, or are they suffering the unintended consequences of an otherwise good
54 plan?
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57 **B. Ambition**

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59 1. If you were putting together a plan to support you or your community, what areas would
60 you like to include?
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- a. livelihoods/income generation
 - b. infrastructure investments and services (roads, day-care, housing, water, electricity, schools, public transportation);
 - c. security (police, fire, gangs, drugs);
 - d. natural hazards (floods, landslides, typhoon, earthquake);
 - e. community networks (social relations, networks or organizations; church);
 - f. access to natural resources (land, river, sea);
 - g. politics and representation (community mobilization, access to/ accountability over different levels of government).
2. Can you prioritize 3 of these areas?
 3. How do you intend to achieve these priority areas?
 4. If you were putting together a plan to support you or your community, what areas would you be willing to exclude? Why?

C. Reaction to TRRP/NGO planning trade-offs

1. Do you agree with the expected gains of the TRRP?
 - a. If yes, which among the gains are desirable? Why? If not, why?
2. Which of these gains or benefits have you received/not received?
 - a. List the gains.
 - b. Who made them happen (e.g. direct intervention of outside agency; actions of key individuals; etc.)?
 - c. Would you be willing to wait longer (3-5 years) for these gains to benefit from them?
 - d. If you have to wait longer for the benefits you haven't received, do you consider them as gains?
3. Do you agree with the losses identified?
 - a. Which among the losses are acceptable and unacceptable? Why?
 - b. If a loss is seen as short term, does it change its acceptability?
 - c. What and who caused the losses?

D. Involvement in planning

1. What plans are you aware of [LIST]?
 - a. If no, ask if they are aware of TRRP, TNIDP, CLUP, Annual Investment Plan and CDP.
 - b. If still no, were they consulted in the formulation of any plans? By whom?
2. Which of the abovementioned plans were you involved in?
 - a. How were you involved (e.g. to everyone, via group discussions, just to key community stakeholders)?
 - b. Do feel you were able to discuss your thoughts and have an influence on these plans? If no, why not?
 - c. If not, why or do you know of anyone who participated?
3. Did you participate in the formulation of NGO plans [e.g. the GMA Kapuso Relocation Plan]?
 - a. If yes, were you able to influence the plan?
 - b. If not, did you contact them to offer your voice or ideas?
 - c. Did they listen to you? If not, why?
4. Do you feel any sense of control over the implementation of these plans? If yes, how?

3. Key informant interview questions (English version)

GENERAL INFORMATION	
ID of Interview Questionnaire	Interview with women (IW)..... Interview with men (IM).....
Location	
Consent Form	<input type="checkbox"/> 1. Signed <input type="checkbox"/> 2. Declined
Date of interview (day/month/year)/...../.....
Interviewer name(s)	
Translator name(s)	
Language interview conducted in	

A. BACKGROUND INFORMATION ON THE PARTICIPANT	
A1. Name
A2. Gender	
A3. Age:.....years old	<input type="checkbox"/> Precise <input type="checkbox"/> Approximately
A4. Marital status	<input type="checkbox"/> 1. Never married <input type="checkbox"/> 2. Married/Defacto <input type="checkbox"/> 3. Separated geographically but still in a relationship <input type="checkbox"/> They live in San Jose/downtown Tacloban <input type="checkbox"/> They live in another part of the Philippines/abroad <input type="checkbox"/> 4. Separated/Legally Divorced

	<input type="checkbox"/> 5. Widow/er <input type="checkbox"/> 6. Other.....
A5. Education background	<input type="checkbox"/> 1. Never attended school <input type="checkbox"/> 2. Completed formal education <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <input type="checkbox"/> 2.1 Primary school <input type="checkbox"/> 2.2 Secondary school <input type="checkbox"/> 2.3 Technical/vocational <input type="checkbox"/> 2.4 University <i>Level.....(Bachelors, Masters etc)</i> <input type="checkbox"/> 3. Left school during which level: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <input type="checkbox"/> 3.1 Primary school <input type="checkbox"/> 3.2 Secondary school <input type="checkbox"/> 3.3 Technical/vocational <input type="checkbox"/> 3.4 University <i>Level Year</i> What was the reason for leaving school or university?
A6. Employment/Daily activities	Ask them if they are employed, and if so, to describe their typical work schedule and daily activities. Was this the same before they moved to GMA Kapuso? If not, how has it changed and why?

B. HOUSEHOLD INFORMATION

B1. Before moving to GMA Kapuso, where did you live?	
B2. Were the place, type and quality of dwelling similar or different? Has your housing situation improved?	
B3. How did you or your family member(s) obtain a house in GMA Kapuso? e.g. Were they offered to relocate voluntarily or was it forced? Were they simply allocated a new home or did they have to apply, etc.	
B4. How long have you lived here?	
B5. How many people do you live with now? How about before?	

<p>B6. Who lives in this house with you? <i>Interviewer to check all that apply</i></p>	<p><input type="checkbox"/> 1. Spouse/Partner <input type="checkbox"/> 2. Mother <input type="checkbox"/> 3. Father <input type="checkbox"/> 4. Family (Males) <input type="checkbox"/> 5. Family (Females) <input type="checkbox"/> 6. Child/Children under 18 years old <input type="checkbox"/> 7. Youth (18-25 years old) <input type="checkbox"/> 8. Other people (specify here)</p>

Opening question for discussion:

How do you feel about the changes that have happened to you, your household during the recovery phase after typhoon Yolanda?

<p>C. LIVELIHOOD SUPPORT</p>
<p>C1. Can you tell me about your livelihood before moving to GMA Kapuso? What type of livelihood did you have?</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • How did you come by this livelihood? Was it good, enjoyable, who else was involved? Did it change over time? Was it your intention to stay in this livelihood for long/forever?
<p>C2. What is your livelihood now?</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • If it's the same livelihood, has anything changed about it since you've relocated? • If it's not the same, why did you change livelihoods? <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ How did this happen? How did you feel about leaving your old livelihood? How did you feel about the new opportunity?
<p>C3. What are your household's top three most important sources of income? Is this income stable and regular? Explain.</p>
<p>C4. Since Yolanda have you received any livelihood support (e.g. resources)?</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • What type of support was it? • Was this support provided in the transitional housing? GMA Kapuso? • Which government agencies or organizations (NGOs, humanitarian organizations, private sector) provided it?
<p>C5. Since Yolanda have you received any livelihood trainings or guidance? From who?</p>
<p>C6. How long were you living in the transitional housing or GMA Kapuso before you received livelihood support? How long did the livelihood support last for?</p>
<p>C7. How did you hear about the livelihood support being offered? Were you contacted or did you request the support?</p>
<p>C8. Was there any kind of livelihood support being offered that you were not able to access or take</p>

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advantage of? Why?
C9. Were you consulted about what type of livelihood support you wanted or needed before you received it? <ul style="list-style-type: none">• If so, who were you consulted by?• How were you consulted (e.g. FGD, interview, presentation)?• Do you feel that you were able to influence the type of livelihood support being offered?• Was an explanation provided for why this type of livelihood support was selected?
C10. Was the type of livelihood support you received in line with your needs, desires or skills?
C11. Did anyone else in your household receive livelihood support? If so, please describe what type of support.
C12. Do you think livelihood support was distributed fairly in your community? If not, who do you think benefited the most? The least? Why?
C13. Do you feel that this livelihood support has made your household's income better or worse? Why? <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Has the cost of living increased by living in GMA Kapuso? How?
C14. Overall, is your livelihood situation better or worse since you have resettled in GMA Kapuso? What about your living situation? <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Is your household able to save money? Is this more or less than you were able to save before?• What types of things do you need to save money for?• Is there anything you aren't able to save money for but need to?
C15. How do you think your future financial situation will be? For example, in three years from now?
C16. What support do you think you would need to have a livelihood that would sustain the needs of you and your family? (e.g. what activities or resources would you prioritize and why? Include the question about the perceived importance of community consultation).

D. OVERALL THOUGHTS ON YOLANDA RECOVERY ACTIVITIES (if time allows)

D1. What are the most positive things that you or your household have experienced since resettling in GMA Kapuso?

D2. How did these things come about? (for example, was it the result of any formal support, or was it the result of actions independently taken by you, your households or the community?)

D3. What have been the most helpful forms of livelihood support that you have received, if any, since resettling in GMA Kapuso?

D4. What are the most negative things that you or your household have experienced since resettling in GMA Kapuso?

D5. How did these things come about? (for example, were these things forced on you by other actors?)

1 D6. What have been the least helpful forms of support that you have received, if any, since resettling
2 in GMA Kapuso?

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4 D7. What type of support was absent during the resettlement period in GMA Kapuso? Is this support
5 still absent?
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