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## Types, Tokens, and Talk about Musical Works

Julian Dodd and Philip Letts

### 1. Introduction: the type/token theory

The *categorial question* in the ontology of musical works is the question of which ontological category musical works belong to. A popular answer to this question is *the type/token theory*. This theory says that a work of music is a type whose tokens are its performances and any other sound-events that we want to count as occurrences of it. Sometimes such works are claimed by type/token theorists to be *norm-types* of sound-event: types that can have both properly and improperly formed tokens (Wolterstorff 1980: 58; Dodd 2007: 2). This is the formulation of the type/token theory that we shall presuppose in this paper.<sup>1</sup>

Although competing ontological proposals have proliferated in recent years, the type/token theory still tends to be seen as ‘extremely plausible’ (Walters 2013: 461) and, as a result, continues to command ‘wide acceptance’ (Rohrbaugh 2005: 178). The main reason for this is acknowledged even by those who, in the end, reject the theory: if we treat the distinction between a musical work and its occurrences as just one more example of the general distinction between a type and its tokens, we thereby explain such works’ repeatability – that is, the fact that they can have multiple sound-events as occurrences – in familiar and plausible terms.<sup>2</sup> On this view, in assimilating the relation holding between Sibelius’s Symphony No. 5 and its myriad performances to that obtaining between a type and its tokens, we thereby demystify it.

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<sup>1</sup> While Dodd and Wolterstorff take musical works to be norm-types, other versions of the type/token theory have been adopted by Peter Kivy (1983, 1987), Jerrold Levinson (1980, 1990), and Richard Wollheim (1980, §§35-37).

<sup>2</sup> Dodd (2007: 11), Levinson (1980: 5-6; 1996: 136), and Wollheim (1980: 75-79) are three type/token theorists particularly clear on this point. Guy Rohrbaugh (2003: 177-178) appreciates its force, even though he proposes that we regard repeatable works of art, musical works included, as what he calls ‘historical individuals’.

In deciding whether to adopt the type/token theory, an ontologist of music should conduct detailed cost-benefit analyses. She must see how well the theory meets the key desiderata for ontological theories of musical works, do the same for its rivals, and then opt for whatever theory performs best overall. Significantly, these desiderata extend beyond matters narrowly metaphysical. For one such desideratum on any such ontological proposal is that it be compatible with an acceptable semantic theory of those sentences in which we seem to talk about musical works. Significantly, recent discussion has raised the question of whether the type/token theory can meet this desideratum. Specifically, some philosophers have been tempted to reject the type/token theory as a result of the following line of thought: that the type/token theorist will inevitably adopt the kind of semantic theory proposed by Nicholas Wolterstorff (1980: 58-62) and seconded by Julian Dodd (2007: 83-85); that this semantic theory is unsustainable; and that there are preferable alternative semantic theories that avoid ontological commitment to works of music (*qua* types) altogether, thereby giving us a reason for endorsing eliminativism about them.<sup>3</sup>

The point of this paper is to respond directly to this way of thinking. In our view, the two leading contenders amongst the semantic theories on offer are, respectively, that favoured by Wolterstorff and Dodd, and an alternative proposal made by Stefano Predelli (2011). As we shall explain, the objections to Wolterstorff and Dodd's semantic proposal admit of cogent replies; but even if one is less convinced about this than we are, it is also true that the type/token theorist can adopt Predelli's alternative account. These results prompt us to a methodological observation and a substantial conclusion. The methodological observation is that an ontological proposal is one thing, a semantic theory another; so we should not make the mistake of thinking that the type/token theory, an ontological proposal, includes within itself the semantic theory that two of its most prominent defenders happen to adopt. The substantial conclusion is this: the type/token theorist can help herself to either of the two most viable semantic theories of our talk about

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<sup>3</sup> This kind of objection is suggested by Gary Ostertag (2012: 362-368), and explicitly endorsed by Shieva Kleinschmidt and Jacob Ross (2013: 126-37).

musical works; so it is not true that she cannot come up with an acceptable such theory for this portion of our discourse.

## 2. The target sentences, simple semantics, and simple semantics<sup>+</sup>

Consider the following sentences:

- (1) *Aida* ends pianissimo.
- (2) Bach's *Two Part Invention in C* has an F sharp in its fourth measure.
- (3) *The Turangalila Symphony* lasts for over an hour.

Following Kleinschmidt and Ross, we take sentences such as these to fall into a single class, and we label the members of this class *the target sentences*, since it is the semantics of this kind of sentence that objectors think the type/token theorist cannot get right (Kleinschmidt and Ross 2013: 127).<sup>4</sup>

The target sentences are distinguished by having the following two features. First, they are all examples of *generics*. Like bare plural generics (such as 'Dogs bark', 'Tigers are striped', and 'Mosquitoes carry malaria'), each of (1), (2), and (3) is used to make a generalization about individuals of a certain sort, in this case performances of the said works, without being committed to full generality (Liebesman 2011: 409). (1), for example, is used to make a general claim about performances of *Aida*, but the sentence is true even if a perverse conductor of a performance insists that his orchestra ends its performance of the piece fortissimo.

Significantly, this shunning of full generality in the target sentences tends to have a *normative* character: a fact that the type/token theorist incorporates into her ontological proposal as the thesis that works of music are norm-types. Consider the sentence, 'Cats have fur'. This would still be true even if all cats had been shaved or had come to suffer from alopecia. This is because the sentence is used to make a report about what *properly formed* cats are like. In the same vein, each of (1), (2), and (3) says something about what *correct* performances of a given

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<sup>4</sup> As shall become apparent, we depart from Kleinschmidt and Ross in taking the class of target sentences not to include sentences such as (4), (5), and (6) below. This is because we take the target sentences to be generic sentences, but deny that (4), (5), and (6) are generics.

work of music in question must be like. In asserting (2), for example, we say something about how properly formed performances of the *Two Part Invention* *should* sound.

The second defining feature of the target sentences is this. Although such sentences (for example, (1), (2), and (3)) are generics, their surface form strongly suggests that they are each composed of a singular term referring to a musical work and a predicate attributing a property to the work referred to. That is to say, the target sentences' surface form encourages us to assimilate their semantics to that of sentences like these:

- (4) *Aida* was composed by Verdi.
- (5) *The Moonlight Sonata* is frequently performed.
- (6) Bach's *Two Part Invention in C* is relatively easy to play.

There is widespread – although, as we shall see, not universal – consensus that sentences such as (4), (5), and (6) are composed of a type-referring singular term and a predicate, and that each such sentence is true just in case the type referred to by the sentence's singular term has the property expressed by the sentence's predicate.<sup>5</sup> Let us call (4), (5), and (6) *simple type-predications*.<sup>6</sup> These three sentences are type-predications *without being* generics: each attributes a property – *being composed by Verdi*, *being frequently performed*, and *being relatively easy to play*, respectively – to a type; but they are not used to make generalizations about performances (since the properties expressed by the predicates involved cannot be possessed by performances). Having drawn this contrast, the second distinguishing feature of our target sentences – (1) to (3) – can be reformulated like this: unlike simple type-predications, the target sentences would seem to be *both* type-predications *and* generics. (We might say that they appear to be *generic type-predications*, rather than *simple type-predications*.)

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<sup>5</sup> Ostertag (2012: 363-364) exemplifies this consensus. As we shall see in §6 below, Kleinschmidt and Ross break with it, at considerable cost.

<sup>6</sup> This is a nomenclature derived from Liebesman's 'kind-predication' (2011: 412). Sometimes what we call simple type-predications are called *definite generics*, by contrast with *indefinite generics*, such as (1), (2), and (3). We demur from using this label here, since orthodoxy has it that (4), (5), and (6) are not used to generalise over instances of a type. (See Liebesman 2011: 413.)

Again echoing Kleinschmidt and Ross (2013: 127), let us call this face-value semantic proposal for the target sentences *simple semantics*. According to simple semantics, although the target sentences, *qua* generics, have a generalizing function, they are not themselves generalizations, but type-predications. These sentences come to generalize, not by virtue of containing quantifier-expressions, but by involving singular terms that refer to objects – namely, types – that are themselves generic. Types, so the story goes, are generic entities in the sense that they are things that can be multiply tokened.

An immediate objection to the type/token theory goes like this. The type/token theorist must endorse simple semantics for the target sentences, but in doing so, she must also adopt Nicholas Wolterstorff's doctrine of *analogical predication* for the target sentences' predicates (Wolterstorff 1980: 58-62). However, this latter doctrine, in positing a systematic ambiguity in the predicates applicable to both musical works and their tokens, has unacceptable consequences. Hence, the type/token theory is untenable.<sup>7</sup> Dodd, to be sure, assumes simple semantics and, as a result, adopts the doctrine of analogical predication (Dodd 2007: 83-85), so it would be useful to begin by reviewing what this latter doctrine is and why he endorses it.

Here is what would seem to be a datum about target sentences (1) to (3): they are true. The type/token theorist's problem with these sentences lies in accounting for their truth. More precisely, the problem for the type/token theorist is that of explaining how they can be true, once she takes the target sentences to wear their logical form on their sleeves and thereby adopts simple semantics.

The reason why this problem is so pressing is that musical works, if types, are abstracta, and thereby incapable of possessing the properties standardly expressed by the predicates in (1), (2), and (3). The loudness of a sound-event consists in the amplitude with which the molecules constituting its medium vibrate; so *Aida*, if a type, cannot be truly describable in terms of such properties of

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<sup>7</sup> We interpret Ostertag as committing himself to this line of argument. After making a series of objections to the doctrine of analogical predication he says that he is 'unable to see how the type-token theory can be maintained in its full generality in light of the criticisms advanced above' (Ostertag 2012: 368). The assumption that the type/token theorist must adopt simple semantics and, with it, the doctrine of analogical predication, is also made by David Davies (2011: 52-57). As we shall see in §5, this assumption is false.

loudness. For a performance to contain an F sharp in its fourth measure is for it to contain an *occurrence* of an F sharp in its fourth measure; so, since Bach's *Two Part Invention in C*, if a type, does not consist of occurrences, it cannot possess this property (Wolterstorff 1980: 61). And, finally, for a sound-event to last over an hour is for it to *take* over an hour for its temporal parts to unfold; so, since *The Turangalila Symphony*, if a type, is not something that unfolds in time in this way – since a type, unlike an event, is not something that *takes* time – it cannot have the property that a performance has when we describe the performance as 'lasting' for a certain period of time.<sup>8</sup> Consequently, if each of (1), (2), and (3) attributes the property standardly contributed by the sentence's predicate to the work named by the sentence's singular term, then it is hard to see how the said sentences could be anything other than false: a very counterintuitive result.

How, then can the type/token theorist allow that (1), (2), and (3) are, in fact, true? Dodd's proposed solution, following Wolterstorff, is to preserve simple semantics, but to hold that the predicates in typical uses of the target sentences express properties that are distinct from, but *systematically related to*, the properties expressed by such predicates when they are satisfied by performances (Wolterstorff 1980: 58-62; Dodd 2007: 46-51, 83-85). This is the doctrine of analogical predication, and the most plausible account of its nature is this. Where a predicate, 'is *F*', falls within the doctrine's scope, this predicate, when applied to a work *w*, expresses the following property: *being such that something cannot be a properly formed token of w unless it is F*. Once this doctrine is adopted, (1), (2), and (3) come out as true, despite the fact that their respective names refer to types. While, for example, Bach's *Two Part Invention in C* is categorially disqualified from containing an occurrence of an F sharp in its fourth measure, it *does* possess the property *being such that something cannot be one of its properly formed tokens without having an occurrence of an F sharp in its fourth measure*.

Let us call the semantic theory of the target sentences that couples simple semantics with the doctrine of analogical predication *simple semantics*<sup>+</sup>. The

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<sup>8</sup> Lydia Goehr seems to appreciate this fact when she says that 'performances take place in real time; their parts succeed one another. The temporal dimension of works is different; their parts exist simultaneously' (Goehr 2007: 3). Dodd puts things a little differently, arguing that works, *qua* types, have no proper parts, temporal or otherwise (Dodd 2007: 48-53).

elegance of simple semantics<sup>+</sup> lies in the fact that it explains how (1), (2), and (3) can be true at the same time as doing justice to the two features of the target sentences with which we started. Simple semantics – what would seem to be the face-value account of the logical form of the target sentences – is preserved; and yet, since the property expressed by a target sentence’s predicate is in this way analogically related to a property that something must have to be one of the work’s properly formed tokens, we can nicely explain how these sentences fulfil their function of saying something about what performances should be like. In short, attributing the analogically related property to the work *just is* to say something about what is required of its properly formed tokens. We say that *w*’s performances should be *F* by saying of *w* that it is such that something cannot be one of its properly formed tokens unless it is *F*. As such, the application of the doctrine of analogical predication to the target sentences – the move from simple semantics to simple semantics<sup>+</sup> – looks well motivated and plausible.

As we explained at the end of §1, this paper defends two theses: that simple semantics<sup>+</sup> provides an adequate semantic theory of the target sentences for the type/token theorist to adopt; and that, even if this were not true, the type/token theorist would still be free to adopt what we shall argue to be simple semantics<sup>+</sup>’s most convincing competitor theory. In order to establish the first of these claims, we shall defend simple semantics<sup>+</sup> against two very different kinds of objection.

### **3. Worries with analogical predication I: ambiguity**

The first objection to simple semantics<sup>+</sup>, as pressed by Predelli (2011: 274-278), Ostertag (2012: 366-367), and Kleinschmidt and Ross (2013: 135-137), is this: the doctrine of analogical predication proliferates ambiguities implausibly. On the basis of this objection, these authors all go on to recommend alternative analyses which avoid the postulation of such ambiguities. However, while it is true that the doctrine of analogical predication commits its proponent to the existence of systematic ambiguities among predicates shared between a musical work and its performances, it is altogether less obvious that this positing of systematic ambiguities is really so implausible.

Predelli, Ostertag, and Kleinschmidt and Ross all independently argue in the following way for the claim that the systematic ambiguities posited by simple semantics<sup>+</sup> are unacceptable. If, they suggest, the doctrine of analogical predication were correct, sentences like (7) would seem zeugmatic (i.e. startling to the hearer):

- (7) Bach's *Two Part Invention in C* has an F sharp in its seventh measure, and so did the performance I heard last night.

And yet, as they point out, such sentences do not seem startling to ordinary hearers. Hence, they conclude, we have convincing evidence that the predicate 'has an F sharp in its fourth measure' is *univocal* in its application to the work and to the performance (Predelli 2011: 276; Ostertag 2012: 366).

In our view, though, this diagnostic is too blunt to be decisive. As Adam Sennett has noted, such tests are fallible (Sennett 2011). There might be ambiguities that are so subtle that the folk miss them; in which case, non-zeugmatic parallelism between pairs of predications might nonetheless involve ambiguity. To see this, consider the following example. Those who believe, for philosophical reasons, that 'exist' must have different senses – one applicable to concrete objects, the other to *abstracta* – will not be cowed into retracting this claim by the fact that

- (8) Bicycles exist, and so do numbers

'goes down smoothly' with ordinary speakers. On the contrary, they will regard this phenomenon as explicable in terms of the folk's lacking the philosophical sensitivity to detect what is a very subtle ambiguity. In this case, such philosophers will say, the convincingness of a philosophical theory trumps the deliverances of linguistic theory. The type/token theorist who adopts simple semantics<sup>+</sup> will say the same about cases such as (7). Indeed, since, according to simple semantics<sup>+</sup>, the standard and analogical meanings of the systematically related predicates are so intimately connected, it will be no surprise at all that the folk tend not to register the differences between them.

Ostertag attempts to defend the reliability of the diagnostic against such a response. He proposes that a successful philosophical challenge to the results of the diagnostic would require us to identify an uncontroversial ambiguity that comes out as unambiguous according to the test: a condition that he claims philosophical theories, due to their contested nature, cannot meet (Ostertag 2012: n. 47). But it is important to realise that this form of appeal to the diagnostic embodies a theoretical claim that is itself controversial: namely, that until we have evidence that the discipline of linguistics would *itself* regard as showing otherwise, then the results of the linguist's diagnostic test cannot be challenged. We take Ostertag's refusal to contemplate the possibility that philosophical inquiry could uncover ambiguities not uncovered by this test as tantamount to *linguistic deferentialism*: an attitude crystallized in the belief that linguistics makes claims that have a decisive bearing on philosophical disputes, and which are more epistemically justified than any philosophical considerations, *just because* these claims are made by linguistics.<sup>9</sup>

Contrast this rigid deferentialism with our position. We maintain an attitude of respect for the tests advocated by linguistics: we accept that the absence of zeugma from sentences such as (7) provides some evidence against the doctrine of analogical predication. However, we also believe that it would be myopic to ignore conflicting, philosophical, evidence: specifically, the way in which the doctrine of analogical predication enables us to hold in place the explanatorily successful type/token theory, preserve the face-value logical form proposal for the target sentences, and yet account for how target sentences such as (1), (2) and (3) can be true. Perhaps positing some systematic ambiguities that escape the folk's notice is a price worth paying for such explanatory virtue. Furthermore, as we shall argue in §§5 and 6, alternative semantic theories that do not postulate the analogical ambiguities posited by simple semantics<sup>+</sup> are, on balance, more problematic than simple semantics<sup>+</sup> itself. If we are right about this latter fact, and if we work with the assumption that one semantic theory amongst the pool of

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<sup>9</sup> Chris Daly and David Liggins coined the phrase 'deferentialism'. They subject deferentialism towards linguistics to a convincing critique in their 2011.

extant such theories is the correct one, this provides additional grounds for doubting the reliability of the diagnostic.

This, it seems to us, is sufficient to draw much of the sting of this initial objection to the doctrine of analogical predication. So even if, as Dodd thinks, a type/token theorist should endorse this doctrine in adopting simple semantics<sup>+</sup>, the resulting position remains defensible.

#### **4. Worries with analogical predication II: categorical types**

As Ostertag helpfully points out, musical works are not the only musical types that a type/token theorist will admit into her ontology of music. There are also types such as The String Quartet, The Symphony, and The Fugue. Let us call such types *categorical types*. Ostertag believes that categorical types are best construed as *meta-types*: that is, types that are tokened by further musical types (such as Ravel's String Quartet in F, The Turangalila Symphony, and Beethoven's *Grosse Fuge*, respectively), and not by sound-events (Ostertag 2012: 364). However, Ostertag contends that once categorical types are construed in this way, they present insurmountable difficulties for the doctrine of analogical predication as applied to the target sentences. Indeed, he thinks that a type/token theorist who adopts simple semantics<sup>+</sup> has no choice but to deny that there are such types as The String Quartet, The Symphony, and the rest (Ostertag 2012: 368). In this section we shall explain why he is wrong about this.

Ostertag seems to present two objections to analogical predication on this score. One is interesting and profound; the other is misconceived. We shall get the latter out of the way first.

The first objection is this. According to Ostertag, applying the doctrine to certain target sentences concerning categorical types misconstrues their truth conditions radically. Consider, for example,

- (9) The Fugue was popular among Baroque audiences.

If we endorse simple semantics<sup>+</sup> for (9), treating ‘The Fugue’ as a singular term and applying the doctrine of analogical predication to its predicate, we will take its truth conditions to be supplied by

- (9a) The Fugue is such that nothing can be a correctly formed token of it unless it was popular among Baroque audiences.

But as Ostertag observes, (9a) is ‘disastrously wrong’. It does not follow from the fact that The Fugue was popular amongst Baroque audiences that every – or even *any* – properly formed individual fugue was (Ostertag 2012: 365-366).

True enough, analysing (9) as (9a) would be a mistake. But this is because (9) is not, strictly speaking, a *target sentence*, as we have defined this class of sentences. Our reason for thinking this is that (9) does not possess the first feature definitive of the target sentences: that is, it is not a generic sentence at all. Rather than being used to generalise about The Fugue’s tokens, it is a simple (i.e. non-generic) type-predication of the non-generic sort: in other words, a sentence akin to (4), (5), and (6). The claim being made by (9) is that a certain musical form – The Fugue – has the property of being popular amongst Baroque audiences. What is being said is just that Baroque audiences tended to like that musical form (where such a form is a type that is instantiable by works of music and/or performances).<sup>10</sup> The sentence says or implies nothing about how the things that instantiate this form either tend, or ought, to be. Consequently, since this sentence is not a target sentence, the type/token theorist who adopts simple semantics<sup>+</sup> for the target sentences is free to regard (9)’s predicate as having its customary meaning.<sup>11</sup>

So much for this misjudged reason for thinking that the application of the doctrine of analogy to the target sentences is undermined by the existence of

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<sup>10</sup> Such straightforward ascriptions of properties to musical forms are common in our talk about music. A composer, for example, may claim sonata form to be uninteresting, outdated, or constricting.

<sup>11</sup> Ostertag (2012: 365) makes another objection premised upon the claim that the type/token theorist must apply the doctrine of analogical predication to causal attributions to types. However, we deny this premise, since we believe that, as with attributions of popularity to works, such attributions need not be analogical. The proposal that types can be involved in causal relations is defended by both Dodd (2007: 11-16) and Lee Walters (2013: 470-471).

categorical types. Altogether more interesting is another objection that can be distilled from Ostertag's discussion of categorical types.<sup>12</sup> Here is how this second objection goes (Ostertag 2012: 368).

Consider the following truth:

(10) The Fugue begins with a statement of its subject.

Evidently, (10) is true, yet the categorical type, The Fugue, since it is a type, cannot possess the property that the predicate, 'begins with a statement of its subject', standardly expresses when applied to a performance. For a performance of a fugue to begin with a statement of its subject is for the performance to start its process of unfolding in time with an occurrence in which the fugue's subject is stated. But, as we noted in §2, types, unlike sound-events, can neither have *occurrences* as constituents nor unfold in time. (Types last *through* time, not by *taking* time, as David Wiggins would put it (2001: 31).) Consequently, a type/token theorist who wishes to endorse simple semantics cannot, it seems, account for the truth of (10) by taking 'begins with a statement of its subject' to express the property it normally expresses when applied to performances.

But if we follow Ostertag in assuming that categorical types are meta-types, then we cannot straightforwardly apply the doctrine of analogical predication to (10), either. A simple application of the said doctrine to (10) yields

(10a) The Fugue is such that nothing can be a correctly formed token of it unless it begins with a statement of its subject.

But once it is granted that categorical types are meta-types – once it is granted, for example, that The Fugue's tokens are themselves types – then the analysis of (10) as (10a) appears to be a dismal failure. For if the *Grosse Fuge* is a token of The Fugue then, according to the proposed analysis, the *Grosse Fuge* should itself

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<sup>12</sup> We say 'distilled from Ostertag's discussion of categorical types' because his own presentation of this problem differs somewhat from our own (Ostertag 2012: 367-368; n. 37).

satisfy 'begins with a statement of its subject' in the standard sense. However, strictly speaking, beginning with a statement of its subject is something that only a fugue's concrete performances (or other token sound-events) can do. Consequently, while (10) is true, (10a), its putative *analysans*, is false.

Unlike the previous objection, this one does not trade on an illegitimate conception of the scope of the doctrine of analogical predication: (10) is, indeed, used to say something about what is required of its properly formed tokens. Hence, any type/token theorist who adopts simple semantics<sup>+</sup> for the target sentences appears committed to analysing (10) incorrectly, namely, as (10a). What we shall now argue, however, is that this objection is not decisive, since the type/token theorist who adopts simple semantics has two possible means of escape.

Ironically enough, the first escape route is suggested by Ostertag himself (2012: 365). The idea is this. Let us introduce the ancestral of the *token-of* relation: the *token\*-of* relation. According to this idea, if a type *K* has further types *L*, *M*, and *N* as tokens, then the tokens of *L*, *M*, and *N* are thereby tokens\* of *K*. Let us say, further, that when this obtains, *L*, *M*, and *N* are *immediate* tokens\* of *K*, while the immediate tokens\* of *L*, *M*, and *N* are *mediate* tokens\* of *K*. Finally, let us say that a token\* of a type *K* is *terminal* if and only if it cannot itself have tokens. On this view, then, while The Fugue's *immediate* tokens\* are types (*i.e.* those works of music that are fugues), its *mediate* tokens\* – that is, performances of fugues – are its terminal tokens\*.

Having laid all this out, our first response to the objection is simple: we can amend (10a), *using the token\*-of* relation, so that it comes out as true. Specifically, the proposal is that the doctrine of analogical predication is revised so that, whenever this doctrine applies to a predicate 'is *F*' ascribed to a type *K*, '*F*' expresses the property *being such that something cannot be a properly formed terminal token\* of K unless it is F*. Applied to the case in hand, (10) would be analysed as

(10b) The Fugue is such that nothing can be a properly formed terminal token\* of it unless it begins with a statement of its subject;

and (10b) is true, since The Fugue's terminal tokens\* are performances and playings of individual fugues, and nothing can be a properly formed performance of a fugue unless it begins by stating its subject.

However, those who think that a type's properly formed tokens must *resemble* each other might be puzzled by the idea that The Fugue has both types (*i.e.* musical works) and events (*i.e.* performances and playings of those works) as tokens\*. (Philosophers of the latter persuasion will be apt to press the question of *how exactly* an abstract object and a concrete event could resemble each other.<sup>13</sup>) Philosophers of such a persuasion might prefer the following response: categorical types, such as The Fugue, are not meta-types. The Fugue does not have the *Grosse Fuge* among its tokens, only those sound-events that are the tokens of those works of music that are fugues. The defender of simple semantics+, if he takes this line, does not, as Ostertag thinks he must, deny the existence of categorical types; he just denies the metaphysical claim that these things are meta-types.

Ostertag does not consider this response, but once it is denied that categorical types are meta-types – once, that is, it is denied that The Fugue has other musical types among its tokens – (10)'s truth follows straightforwardly from simple semantics+. If The Fugue can only be tokened by performances and playings of musical works that are fugues, and not by these works themselves, then it will be true that any properly formed token of The Fugue must begin by stating its subject, just as (10a) says. Furthermore, the present suggestion allows for the fact that all of the *Grosse Fuge's* tokens are tokens of The Fugue, and yet it does this without positing a hierarchy of types. The *Grosse Fuge's* tokens are thereby tokens of The Fugue, not because The *Grosse Fuge* is itself a token\* of The Fugue (and because a type inherits the tokens\* of its immediate tokens\*), but simply because The *Grosse Fuge* is a fugue. This fact, it is claimed, does not have to be explained by treating The Fugue as *itself* tokened by *The Grosse Fuge*. On the contrary, it is something to be explained by the fact that the conditions laid down by The Fugue

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<sup>13</sup> Words are physically embodied by both inscriptions and utterances. David Kaplan is sceptical about the thesis that words are types on the grounds that it is hard to render intelligible the claim that an inscription resembles an utterance. (See his 1990: 104.) He attributes this point to Arthur Danto.

are properly included in those laid down by The *Grosse Fuge*, i.e., to meet the latter's condition is to meet the former's, but not *vice versa*.

Perhaps this latter claim will strike some critics as *ad hoc*. But whether this charge is merited will to a large extent depend upon what the *purpose* of the type/token theory is assumed to be. If, for example, its purpose is taken to be that of explaining how certain kinds of abstract generic entities (such as words and repeatable artworks) can come to have physical embodiments, or else that of explaining what similarity and difference between such physical embodiments consists in, then denying that categorical types have both abstract instantiables *and* concrete particulars as tokens will seem a good deal less arbitrary. Naturally, we acknowledge that this avenue of reply, like the previous one, might turn out to be subject to refutation by a fully worked out theory of types. But unless and until such a refutation is established, we remain justified in maintaining, despite Ostertag's insistence to the contrary, that the existence of categorical types does not undermine a type/token theorist who, like Dodd, adopts simple semantics<sup>+</sup> for the target sentences.

## 5. The target sentences and generic quantification

What alternatives are there to endorsing simple semantics<sup>+</sup> for the target sentences? One suggestion, relatively popular in the literature, is that the target sentences have a disguised generic quantificational form. The most well worked out version of this approach is Predelli's (2011: 276-278). But as Predelli himself makes abundantly clear, his proposal is not hostile to the type/token theory but an alternative to simple semantics that the type/token theorist can freely to adopt. We shall now explain why.

According to Predelli,

(1) *Aida* ends pianissimo

is 'roughly paraphraseable' as

(1a) Generically, exemplars of *Aida* end pianissimo,

its logical form being represented by

(1b)  $\text{GEN}(x) [R(\textit{Aida}, x), \textit{ends pianissimo}(x)]$ .

In (1b) '*Aida*' is interpreted as a singular term designating what Predelli calls a 'kind' and '*R*' is interpreted as the relation of *exemplification*: roughly, in the case of (1b), the relation of being-a-performance-of (Predelli 2011: 276-277). Significantly, this enables Predelli to avoid commitment to the kinds of systematic predicate ambiguities that characterise simple semantics<sup>+</sup>. While Dodd and Wolterstorff must say that the predicate in (1) expresses the property *being such that something cannot be a properly formed performance of Aida unless it ends pianissimo*, Predelli is able to say that it ascribes the property it customarily ascribes to performances.

At this point, though, two questions must be answered. Is Predelli's proposal for the target sentences preferable to simple semantics<sup>+</sup>? And is it a proposal that, if true, might give us pause to rethink the type/token theory? Our answer to the first question is a guarded 'No'. Despite the clear attractions of Predelli's analysis, we think that there are powerful, albeit probably inconclusive, reasons to prefer simple semantics<sup>+</sup>.

First, and as Liebesman explains (2011: 414-416), there is a powerful, albeit non-decisive, reason for thinking that English does not contain the generic quantifier, GEN. Of course, a defender of a generic quantificational approach to the target sentences will agree that GEN does not show up in the surface structure of English sentences; she will regard this quantifier as unpronounced. But positing such an unpronounced quantifier is inconsistent with a compelling principle: namely, that it is reasonable to suppose that English contains an unpronounced semantically significant operator only if other natural languages contain a synonymous operator that is, or at least could be, pronounced.<sup>14</sup> Since there exists

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<sup>14</sup> This principle is compelling for the following reasons (Liebesman 2011: 415): for the most part, natural languages have similar expressive power; there is no prohibition on pronouncing operators that can occur unpronounced in other languages; and if a language could contain a pronunciation of GEN, there would exist some language that does actually. (This latter thesis is made plausible by the multitude of diverse natural languages that there are.)

no known language that contains a GEN operator, we should avoid taking English to contain such a hidden quantifier.

Even for those who have faith in the existence of the GEN operator within English, a second consideration favouring simple semantics<sup>+</sup> is that it gives a more informative account of the truth conditions of the target sentences. The systematic connection between what is standardly expressed by a predicate falling within the scope of the doctrine of analogical predication (such as ‘has an F sharp in its fourth measure’) and what it expresses when correctly applied to a type gives a clear explication of how the truth conditions for structural predications are determined. By contrast, the truth conditional contribution made by GEN, should there be such an operator, is a somewhat controversial and murky matter.<sup>15</sup> This, we believe, makes simple semantics<sup>+</sup> more informative than a generic quantificational analysis.

The third such reason for preferring simple semantics<sup>+</sup> is that, unlike Predelli’s analysis, it enables us to maintain our pre-theoretic assumption that (2) and (6) have the same (*i.e.* bipartite) logical form. Significantly, both (2) and (6) present themselves to the innocent eye as being composed of a name and a predicate: something that simple semantics<sup>+</sup> reinforces. By contrast, while Predelli acknowledges that ‘Bach’s *Two Part Invention in C*’ functions in (6) as a name in a simple name-predicate sentence, he can only regard such an occurrence as atypical: that is, as an outlier from the standard sort of case, such as (2), in which the name lies within the scope of the generic quantifier. The fact that he is in this way forced

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<sup>15</sup> This concern is pressed by Liebesman (2011: 416-417), but also acknowledged by both Ostertag (2012: 367) and Predelli (2011: 277).

In response to this kind of concern, an anonymous referee has, suggested that GEN be treated as a universal quantifier that applies to properly formed tokens; an approach that would analyse (1b), for example, as:

(1c)  $\forall x (x \text{ is a properly formed performance of } Aida \rightarrow x \text{ ends pianissimo}).$

This style of analysis is unsatisfactory for two reasons, however. First, it overgenerates truths. Any universal quantification of the form ‘ $\forall x (Fx \rightarrow Gx)$ ’ is vacuously true if there are no *Fs*. Hence, according to this proposal, in a world in which there are no properly formed performances of *Aida*, it would be true that *Aida* ends fortissimo. This looks wrong. Second, there are generic sentences that do not fit this ‘all normal’ profile, as Sarah-Jane Leslie has pointed out (2008: 7-8). For example, we count the generic sentence, ‘Mosquitoes carry the West Nile virus’, as true even though less than one per cent of mosquitoes actually carry the virus.

into saying that (2) and (6), despite their apparent similarity, differ in point of logical form, must be taken as a cost.

Finally, the appeal to generic quantification faces a recalcitrant problem concerning works that are never performed. Common sense tells us that attributions of predicates such as ‘ends pianissimo’, ‘has an F sharp in its fourth measure’, and ‘lasts for over an hour’ to musical works have their truth-value independently of the existence of any performances of the works concerned. The analogical predication thesis makes sense of this fact by explicating the truth conditions of such attributions in terms of what is required for a token to be properly formed; and these truth conditions obtain or not independently of the existence of any such tokens.

Things are different when it comes to Predelli’s generic quantificational analysis. According to Predelli, the truth conditions of the target sentences are token-involving. The truth conditions of (1), for example, are said by him to be supplied by ‘a sentence that attributes physical traits to unproblematically concrete individuals, the tokens of [*Aida*]: its performances, in other words (Predelli 2011: 277). On this view, then, (1) is true by virtue how things stand physically with just these performances. But (1) would still be even if the work remained untokened in perpetuity. Someone who insists that (1) is true in virtue of facts about its performances faces an obvious difficulty in accounting for this.

The most obvious response to this difficulty is to prop up a generic quantificational analysis by appealing to merely possible performances of actually unperformed works. On such a view, works that happen to be unperformed do not lack concrete exemplars; it is just that their concrete exemplars comprise merely possible performances.<sup>16</sup> This is not the place to mount a sustained attack on such a commitment. We merely note that it is controversial to accept the existence of concrete possibilia and a substantial task to show how they fit into a plausible metaphysical worldview.<sup>17</sup> Simple semantics<sup>+</sup>, by contrast, has no need to appeal

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<sup>16</sup> This move is made by Predelli when he says that the truth conditions of a representation of logical form such as (1b) are ‘sensitive to how things happen to be in circumstances related to the actual state of affairs by a relationship of accessibility reflecting the pretheoretic idea of ... “musical normativity”’ (Predelli 2011: 278).

<sup>17</sup> In §6, we’ll see that the same problem besets Kleinschmidt and Ross’s multi-operator view.

to such a controversial ontology, and this is surely a point in its favour over Predelli's approach.

We think that the foregoing considerations put simple semantics<sup>+</sup> ahead of the analysis offered by Predelli, but we accept that not everyone will follow us in this.<sup>18</sup> Nevertheless, even if correct, Predelli's account would not undermine the type/token theory. For in taking expressions such as '*Aida*', '*Bach's Two Part Invention in C*', '*The Turangalila Symphony*' and the rest to uniformly function as names of musical works, Predelli leaves the door open for a type/token theorist to adopt his semantic proposal. Indeed, Predelli's own description of the referent of '*Aida*' in (1b) as a 'kind' (2011: 276-277) is an explicit recognition of just this possibility, since 'kind' is a mere notational variant of 'type'.<sup>19</sup> For this reason, Predelli's generic quantificational account of the target sentences, far from being hostile to the type/token theory, is, in fact, an additional semantic theory compatible with it. Rather than *having to* adopt simple semantics<sup>+</sup>, a type/token theorist can, in fact, consider the merits and demerits of the *two* semantic theories available to her, and make a reasoned, defensible choice between them.

## 6. Target sentences without a commitment to musical works?

So far, so good for the type/token theorist. She is free to adopt either of the two semantic theories for the target sentences that we have considered thus far. But is there available an alternative semantic analysis of these sentences that genuinely avoids ontological commitment to works of music? If there is, then this would push us towards eliminating such things from our ontology and, as a result, apply pressure to the type/token theorist to abandon her ontological proposal for some version or other of nominalism. In this, the final, section of this paper, we discuss the most fully worked out such proposal and explain why it should be resisted.

In common with simple semantics<sup>+</sup>, and by contrast with Predelli's generic quantificational analysis, Kleinschmidt and Ross's *multi-operator view* takes the

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<sup>18</sup> We accept that those less sanguine about the systematic ambiguities posited by simple semantics<sup>+</sup>, and more drawn towards linguistic deferentialism, than we are, may well prefer to adopt Predelli's proposal.

<sup>19</sup> Wolterstorff suggests that both 'types' and 'kinds' serve equally well as names for the things that he takes musical works to be (Wolterstorff 1980: 194). This is seconded by Dodd (2007: 32, n. 19).

target sentences to have a bipartite subject/predicate structure (Kleinschmidt and Ross 2013: 147-156). The distinctive feature of their proposal is that it treats musical works' titles as terms that refer plurally to performances, rather than singly to repeatable types. It is because they take this stand on the sentences' subject terms that they claim that these sentences, while ontologically committed to performances, make no such commitment to musical works (i.e. to types of performance), entities whose existence they deem to be controversial (Kleinschmidt and Ross 2013: 155).

According to the multi-operator view, the logical form of

(1) *Aida* ends pianissimo

is represented as

(1d) <sup>G</sup>Ends pianissimo  $((\iota X)(\forall y)[X(y) \leftrightarrow \text{Is-an-}Aida\text{-performance}(y)])$ .

Two features of (1d) are worthy of note. First, it makes the point that (1)'s subject term, '*Aida*', is actually claimed to function as a predicate, its semantics represented by the expression enclosed within the outer brackets in (1d). This expression is glossed as 'the things such that, for all  $y$ ,  $y$  is one of them if and only if  $y$  is a performance of *Aida*', or, more colloquially, as 'the *Aida* performances'. Second, the superscript '<sup>G</sup>' in (1d) marks the presence of a *generic operator*, which registers that the predicate applies *generically* and distributively (although, perhaps non-universally) across individual *Aida* performances, rather than *collectively* to the *Aida* performances as a whole (Kleinschmidt and Ross 2013: 150).<sup>20</sup> Kleinschmidt and Ross (2013: 150) suggest that this operator's contribution may be elucidated using the GEN operator as follows,

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<sup>20</sup> Compare the generic sentence, 'The *Aida* performances end pianissimo', with a sentence used to say that *together* the *Fs* (are) *G*, such as 'The British people eat three tons of bacon per day'. Kleinschmidt and Ross would represent the logical form of the latter sentence using a collective operator, thus: '<sup>c</sup>Eat three tons of bacon per day  $((\iota X)(\forall y)[X(y) \leftrightarrow \text{Is-a-British-person}(y)])$ '. Hence, the name of their proposal, 'the *multi-operator view*'.

(1e)  $\text{GEN}(x)[\text{Is-an-Aida-performance}(x), \text{Ends pianissimo}(x)]$ .

Hence, according to Kleinschmidt and Ross, to say that *Aida* ends pianissimo is just to say that the *Aida* performances typically end pianissimo.

In order to provide a unified account of our musical work-talk, and thereby side-step a drawback with Predelli's account, Kleinschmidt and Ross seek to extend this analysis of the target sentences to sentences that, up to now, we have been presuming to be simple type-predications; that is, sentences such as the following:

(4) *Aida* was composed by Verdi.

(5) *The Moonlight Sonata* is frequently performed.

(6) Bach's *Two Part Invention in C* is relatively easy to play.

Treating the subject terms in the above sentences as referring to types would both generate awkward syntactic ambiguities in such subject-terms and force ontological commitment to works of music. So, rather than going down this road, Kleinschmidt and Ross reject the idea that (4), (5), and (6) are simple type-predications, preferring to extend their multi-operator view of the target sentences by offering the following analyses of (4), (5), and (6), respectively:

(4a) **Composed by Verdi**  $((\iota X)(\forall y)[X(y) \leftrightarrow \text{Is-an-Aida-performance}(y)])$ ;

(5a) **Frequently performed**  $((\iota X)(\forall y)[X(y) \leftrightarrow \text{Is-a-Moonlight-Sonata-performance}(y)])$ ;

(6a) **Relatively easy to play**  $((\iota X)(\forall y)[X(y) \leftrightarrow \text{Is-a-Bach's-Two-Part-Invention-in-C-performance}(y)])$ .

Although these analyses are syntactically uniform with those they offer for the target sentences, it is notable that the predicates contained in (4a), (5a), and (6a) are emboldened. This orthographic feature signifies that, unlike the predicates in the target sentences, the predicates in these sentences do not distribute, even non-

universally, across individual performances. It is absurd to think that any particular performance could satisfy 'is frequently performed', 'is relatively easy to play', or 'was composed by Verdi'. Thus, in an attempt to avoid such absurdity, Kleinschmidt and Ross treat these predicates as non-distributive, higher-order predicates that cannot be true of any individual performances, but only of performances collectively (Kleinschmidt and Ross 2013: 144-145, 151).

Undoubtedly, this unified approach to the semantics of the target sentences and apparent simple type-predications avoids some of the problems afflicting the generic quantificational approach, notably the concern that GEN might not exist in English and the difficulties that Predelli faces in taking target sentences (such as (1), (2), and (3)) and apparent simple type-predications (such as (4), (5), (6)) to have divergent logical forms. Equally, it avoids positing the kinds of ambiguities at the level of predication posited by simple semantics<sup>+</sup>. Nonetheless, we believe that there are three reasons why Kleinschmidt and Ross's proposal is unsustainable.

First, although the multi-operator view is not committed to the existence of the GEN operator in English, it nonetheless explicitly uses GEN to explain the truth conditions of those sentences it analyses using the generic operator marked by the superscript '<sup>G</sup>'. As a result, the worries expressed about the murkiness of GEN's truth conditional contribution transfer directly across to the multi-operator view itself. In short, since the multi-operator view uses GEN to characterise the truth conditions of the target sentences, and since GEN's truth conditional contribution is obscure, the multi-operator view ultimately fails in its ambition to give pellucid truth conditions for such sentences.

Second, the thesis that a subject term in an apparent type-specification, such as (4), (5), or (6), refers plurally to performances, rather than singly to a type, is very hard to maintain. We can begin to see why this is so by noticing that *being composed by Verdi*, *being frequently performed*, and *being easy to play*, are not properties that can be possessed collectively by the performances of a certain kind, any more than they are properties that can be possessed by a single performance. They are properties that can be had only by a *type* of performance: a work. To claim, for example, that the *Moonlight Sonata* performances collectively are frequently performed is not to say something true; it is to make a category mistake.

Performances, *neither* singly *nor* collectively, can be performed; this is a privilege reserved for works alone. The same goes for being relatively easy to play and being composed by Verdi. A performer cannot play the *Two Part Invention in C* performances, while Verdi could only be said to have composed the performances of *Aida* if we had first of all changed the meaning of the word ‘composed’.

No doubt, Kleinschmidt and Ross would respond to this worry by making the following claim: the predicates figuring in (4), (5) and (6) are not the first-level predicates that express the properties of being relatively easy to play, being frequently performed, and being composed by Verdi, respectively; rather, they are higher-level collective predicates which, though systematically related to their first-level brethren, can only be true of groups of performances collectively. They will insist, for example, that while the *Aida* performances cannot possess the first-order property *being composed by Verdi*, they do possess the higher-level collective property ***being composed by Verdi***.

But for this response to be cogent, we must know *what it is* for the *Aida* performances to possess this higher-order, collective property, and it is at this point that the terrain becomes muddy once again. Presumably, the higher-order, collective predicates in (4a), (5a), and (6a) will be elucidated in terms of first-order predicates that *can* be satisfied by individual performances (Kleinschmidt and Ross 2012: 145). For certain such higher-order, collective predicates, it is relatively easy to see how such an elucidation would go. Consider, for instance,

(12) The Dodo is extinct.

Presumably, Kleinschmidt and Ross would analyse (12) as

(12a) **Extinct**  $((\exists X)(\forall y)[X(y) \leftrightarrow \text{Is-a-dodo}(y)])$ .

With this analysis in place, the natural thing to say is that the predicate ‘**extinct**’ is true of the *Xs* if and only if *Xs* used to exist, but no longer do so. In other words,

- (13) **Extinct**  $((\exists X)(\forall y)[X(y) \leftrightarrow \text{Is-a-dodo}(y)]) \leftrightarrow \text{PAST} [(\exists x) (\text{Is-a-dodo}(x))]$   
 & **PRESENT**  $[(\neg \exists x) (\text{Is-a-dodo}(x))]$ . (Koslicki 1999: 457)

Unfortunately, however, Kleinschmidt and Ross give us no indication as to how analogous elucidation of the predicates in (4a), (5a), and (6a) is to proceed. This immediately leaves them vulnerable the charge that the multi-operator view is little more than a promissory note concerning the truth conditions of what we have hitherto assumed to be simple type-predications. Certainly, when compared with what simple semantics<sup>+</sup> has to say about such sentences, it is significantly impoverished in theoretical content and this is a vice that substantially counts against it.

But, in fact, the problem is worse than this, since Kleinschmidt and Ross's assumption that there are satisfactory first-order elucidations of the predicates in (4a), (5a) and (6a) is unjustified. Consider '**composed by Verdi**' again. Perhaps it could be said that Verdi **composes** the *Aida* performances by virtue of each of these performances standing in the right kind of causal-intentional relation to a certain holograph manuscript produced by Verdi. Crucially, though, such a proposal differs in a fundamental way from that concerning '**extinct**' proposed in (13). Whereas the right-hand side of (13) will strike an English speaker as accurately glossing the English predicate 'extinct', the same is not true of our proposed elucidation of '**composed by Verdi**'. For, as it is used in English, 'composed by Verdi' applies, not to performances, but to things that performances can be *of*: works, in other words. The brick wall we are coming up against here is one of categorial unintelligibility: putting it bluntly, performances of works, whether individually or as a group, are not the sorts of things that composers compose. In ignoring this basic fact, the proposed elucidation of how the totality of *Aida* performances *could* be composed by Verdi is, in effect, a recommendation that we replace our concept of composition with another concept altogether.

Categorial incomprehensibility is not the only reason to be sceptical about the prospect of formulating convincing first-order elucidations of the higher-order, collective predicates appearing in (4a), (5a), and (6a). For at this point, a problem that bedevilled the generic quantificational approach to the target sentences – that

of accounting for how certain predicates can be true of unperformed works – resurfaces. Although the truth of (5) requires that there are performances of The Moonlight Sonata, many apparent simple type-predications, such as (4) and (6), do not. Verdi, for example, would still have composed *Aida* even if it had never been subsequently performed. Clearly, in such a situation, ‘composed by Verdi’ would have been true of something other than its performances: the work itself. So, since it is unreasonable to think that this predicate would apply to the work itself when *Aida* is unperformed but to the *Aida* performances otherwise, it cannot be the case that ‘composed by Verdi’ is actually collectively true of the *Aida* performances.

More worryingly, and this is the third reason why we should not adopt the multi-operator view, the problem of true predications of unperformed works carries over to the target sentences themselves. Consider once more a target sentence such as,

(1) *Aida* ends pianissimo.

This would still be true even if the work had never been performed. But now take another look at Kleinschmidt and Ross’s proposed analysis of (1):

(1d)  $\text{Ends pianissimo } ((\exists X)(\forall y)[X(y) \leftrightarrow \text{Is-an-}Aida\text{-performance}(y)])$ .

(1d) says that the *Aida* performances generically end pianissimo. The problem here is that whereas (1) would still be true if the work had never been performed, the same cannot be said of (1d). For sentences of the form ‘The *F*s are *G*’ are true only if there are some *F*s.<sup>21</sup> Consequently, (1d) is true only if there are some *Aida* performances, while (1) would be true even if there had been none.

Kleinschmidt and Ross seem to have some awareness of this problem, since they fleetingly suggest availing themselves of what is by now a familiar strategy for

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<sup>21</sup> John Hawthorne and David Manley (2012: 178) offer the following plausible account of the truth conditions of ‘The *F*s are *G*’, which they have borrowed from Alex Oliver and Timothy Smiley: ‘The *F*s are *G*’ is true if and only if there are some *X*s such that they are *F* and for all *Y*s, if the *Y*s are *F* then the *Y*s are the *X*s, and those *X*s are *G*. This analysis enshrines the uncontroversial claim that ‘The *F*s are *G*’ can only be true if there are some *F*s.

dealing with it. For at the very end of their paper they explain that, according to the multi-operator view, in order ‘to account for the truth of sentences about e.g. *The Moonlight Sonata*, we need merely posit some (at least possible) *Moonlight Sonata* performances’ (Kleinschmidt and Ross 2013: 155; see also 137, n.13). Presumably, the words in brackets here are an acknowledgement that they, like Predelli, must admit merely possible performances into their ontology, if they are to do justice to the fact that a sentence such as (1) can be true even if there are no actual performances for its subject term to refer to. But this feature of the multi-operator view is a considerable demerit and, what is more, one that reveals it to fail to make good on its promise to involve ‘no steep ontological commitments’ (Kleinschmidt and Ross 2013: 155). Although we accept that types are to some extent controversial, we maintain that they are somewhat less so than (concrete) mere possibilia. Ontological commitment to actual types is preferable to a commitment to merely possible performances.

In summary, then, the multi-operator view’s reliance on the GEN operator to gloss its account of the truth conditions of the target sentences renders this account irretrievably murky. And when this worry is combined with its failure to elucidate satisfactorily the higher-order predicates it takes to feature in simple type-predications, one is compelled to think that the proposal’s lack of theoretical content outweighs any advantage over simple semantics+ accrued by its avoidance of predicate ambiguities. Finally, the multi-operator view fails to deliver on its claimed benefit of avoiding ontological commitment to controversial entities. Indeed, in requiring the existence of mere possibilia to account for the truth of certain predications of unperformed works, it seems less ontologically hygienic than simple semantics+, which is thoroughly actualist in character.<sup>22</sup>

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<sup>22</sup> Ostertag defends a version of the generic quantificational approach which, unlike Predelli’s, appears to harbour the same eliminativist ambitions as the theory we discuss in §6. According to Ostertag, a target sentence, such as (1) is to be analysed as

(1f) GEN(*x*) [*Aida*(*x*), ends pianissimo(*x*)] (Ostertag 2012: 366);

and he motivates such an approach, at least in part, by saying that it avoids ontological commitment to types, at least ‘in a wide range of cases’ (Ostertag 2012: 367).

However, the following three considerations constitute a compelling case against Ostertag’s proposal. First, (1f) only avoids ontological commitment to types by virtue of adopting the highly implausible thesis that ‘*Aida*’ in (1) functions as a predicate, rather than a name. We

## 7. Conclusion

As we noted in §1, it is tempting to argue against the type/token theory in the following style. First, the type/token theorist will inevitably adopt simple semantics<sup>+</sup> for the target sentences; but, second, this semantic theory cannot be maintained; and, third, there are preferable alternative analyses that dispense with the need to posit types, and which thereby give us a reason for eliminating works of music, *qua* types, from our ontology.

This paper acts as a corrective to such thinking, since it shows that all three claims are false. In fact, simple semantics is a plausible semantic proposal, and the addition of the doctrine of analogical predication – which yields simple semantics<sup>+</sup> – is well motivated and defensible. However, even if this reply were deemed less convincing than we have argued it to be, this would not of itself undermine the type/token theory, since a type/token theorist, if convinced by such criticisms of analogical predication, can adopt Predelli’s version of the generic quantificational approach. This option opens up once we take care to separate in thought the type/token theory from the semantic theory of the target sentences that prominent type/token theorists happen to have adopted in its defence.

True enough, there exist semantic theories of the target sentences that promise – or seem to promise<sup>23</sup> – that we can account for the truth of target sentences without admitting works of music into our ontology. A correct such theory, would apply pressure to the type/token theory by suggesting that we need

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think that Predelli’s version of the generic quantificational approach is preferable to Ostertag’s, in part, because it accords with our pre-theoretic semantic innocence on this issue. Second, Ostertag treats apparent simple type-predications, such as (4)-(6), at face-value: that is, as comprising a name of a type and a predicate. Thus, Ostertag’s overall theory does not, in fact, succeed in avoiding ontological commitment to types. Finally, given Ostertag’s disjunctive approach to the target sentences and to apparent simple type-predications, it turns out that he is committed to more surprising ambiguities than is the adherent to simple semantics<sup>+</sup>. For example, if Ostertag is right, then ‘*Aida*’ functions as *both* a name *and* as a predicate in

(11) *Aida*, which was composed by Verdi, ends pianissimo.

This result is much more far-fetched than the pattern of systematic ambiguities posited by simple semantics<sup>+</sup>, since it takes ‘*Aida*’ to be ambiguous with respect to its very semantic function, and within the same sentence.

<sup>23</sup> Ostertag’s theory merely flatters to deceive when it comes to eliminating musical works (*qua*) types from our ontology. See n. 23 above.

not posit items of the kind that the type/token theory is a theory of. But the most fully developed semantic theory with this ambition, Kleinschmidt and Ross's multi-operator view, falls short of both simple semantics<sup>+</sup> and, we believe, Predelli's account, on any plausible cost-benefit analysis. The multi-operator view comes in a distant third because, while it inherits from the generic quantificational approach a failure to give clear truth conditions to the target sentences, and also shares with that approach an ontological commitment to merely possible performances, it also introduces murky higher-level predicates.

So our conclusion is this. The type/token theorist is free to adopt either of the two most plausible accounts of the semantics of the target sentences. While she may well face challenging objections to her ontological proposal, she is by no means beggared for an acceptable semantic theory of our talk about musical works.<sup>24</sup>

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