

You still don't understand: why troubled engagements continue between feminists and (critical) IPE

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Introduction

Relatively early in the attempts to gender the discipline of International Relations (IR), it was argued by some feminist scholars that it was easier to raise feminist concerns in International Political Economy (IPE) than in IR.¹ However, it has subsequently proved very difficult to articulate these concerns within mainstream IPE, as 'the neo-realist and neo-liberal frameworks, with their common focus on state-centric issues of co-operation and conflict and their positivist and rationalistic methodologies, do not lend themselves to investigating gendered structures of inequality ...'.² In contrast, more overlap has been discerned between feminist perspectives and methodologies and the less influential 'globalist' (also known as critical/transdisciplinary or heterodox) approaches to IPE than with the dominant statist approaches. This article takes this position as its starting point and will focus on the relationship between gendered analyses and critical IPE (as it will be known here). It therefore does not engage with the undoubtedly important question of how far it is possible or desirable to have a gendered analysis that is not linked to feminism, as within both feminist and critical approaches to IPE an emancipatory agenda is entirely legitimate and even an integral part of those approaches.³

This article will argue that, despite some similarities in their ontologies and epistemologies, and a commitment to pluralism, most critical IPE does not mention gender except in passing or engage with any of the gendered political economy debates and research, despite feminists' attempts to engage in dialogue.⁴ At the moment only an occasional token article or a few references to women are included within critical IPE. Most analyses therefore remain gender-blind and over-simplistic, oblivious to the complexity of the situations they analyse. Therefore, contrary to

* This title borrows from J. Ann Tickner's article, 'You Just Don't Understand: Troubled Engagements Between Feminists and IR Theorists', *International Studies Quarterly*, 41 (1997), pp. 611–632.

¹ Sandra Whitworth, 'Gender in the Inter-Paradigm Debate', *Millennium*, 18:2 (1989), pp. 265–72.

² J. Ann Tickner, *Gendering World Politics: Issues and Approaches in the Post-Cold War Era* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001), p. 66.

³ R. C. Carpenter, 'Gender Theory in World Politics: Contributions of a Nonfeminist Standpoint?', *International Studies Review*, 4:3 (2002), pp. 153–65.

⁴ Marianne Marchand and Ann Sissons Runyan: see their edited collection *Gender and Global Restructuring: Sightings, Sites and Resistances* (London: Routledge, 2000) as attempting to foster dialogue between critical IPE and feminist IPE. J. Ann Tickner (see fn. 2 above) also argues that feminist IR should maintain its connections to mainstream IR despite its lack of receptivity.

some assertions, critical IPE has not yet taken on gender as an analytical category in any serious way.⁵ This situation continues despite the possibilities for gendered analyses that exist within critical IPE as it is envisaged by many of its best-known advocates. After examining these possibilities, this article explores, through an analysis of the literature on globalisation, how and why this situation can exist, if, in comparison to other variants of IPE (such as liberal or realist), critical IPE contains the greatest possibilities for taking gender on board as an analytical category. It then explores what has already been achieved by feminist scholars working in this area, before outlining what more needs to be done to create a gendered IPE.

There is now a large body of work, sometimes identified as post-positivist or post-rationalist, that sees itself as lying outside mainstream IPE. It has been influenced by a range of different perspectives including Foucauldian, post-structural and post-colonial thought.⁶ Because of its heterogeneity, this article will concentrate primarily on the 'neo-Gramscian' variant as the most influential strand within critical IPE. Defined in this way, critical IPE and a developing gendered political economy share a number of characteristics in terms of their approach and subject matter that should mean that many of their analyses and approaches are compatible.⁷ In contrast to the mainstream, critical IPE is based on ontologies that give primacy to the construction of social relations and its epistemologies are sceptical of empiricism and positivism. For example Robert Cox, one of the key figures in the development of critical IPE, argued early on that one important task of IPE is to understand how social structures, particularly structures of inequality, come into being and are transformed.⁸ The emphasis is therefore on the importance of *historically* constituted frameworks. It sees economic activity, markets and states as socially constructed.

The normative concerns of critical IPE are also very different to those of the mainstream. Stemming in part from an emphasis on structures of inequality is a desire to understand how to transform those structures. As Cox famously argued, critical IPE theorists believe that social theorising is 'always *for* someone and *for* some purpose'.⁹ It is, according to Murphy and Nelson, for those excluded from decision-making in the world economy.¹⁰ Critical IPE is therefore oppositional and particularly seeks to challenge 'hyperliberalism'.¹¹ In contrast to much mainstream

⁵ Craig Murphy and Dennis Nelson claim several times in 'International Political Economy: A Tale of Two Heterodoxies', *British Journal of Politics and International Relations*, 3:3 (2001), pp. 393–412, that 'British' (critical) IPE has focused more on the 'contentious politics of gender' (as well as race and the environment) than has the American school of IPE. They cite (p. 400) as evidence, the inclusion of feminist contributions as standard fare in 'British' School collections such as Craig Murphy and Roger Tooze (eds.), *The New International Political Economy* (Boulder, CO: Lynn Rienner, 2001); and Stephen Gill and James Mittelman (eds.), *Innovation and Transformation in International Studies* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997).

⁶ See Lily Ling, *Post Colonial International Relations* (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2002) and Ash Amin and Ronen Palan, 'Towards a Non-Rationalist International Political Economy', *Review of International Political Economy*, 8:4 (2002), pp. 559–77.

⁷ Birgit Locher and Elisabeth Prugl have argued something similar for feminist IR and constructivism, see 'Feminism and Constructivism: Worlds Apart or Sharing the Middle Ground?', *International Studies Quarterly*, 45 (2001), pp. 111–28.

⁸ Robert Cox, 'Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory', *Millennium*, 10:2 (1981), pp. 126–55.

⁹ Robert Cox, 'Critical Political Economy', in Bjorn Hettne (ed.), *International Political Economy: Understanding Global Disorder* (London: Zed Press, 1995), p. 31.

¹⁰ Murphy and Nelson, 'IPE', p. 400.

¹¹ Robert Cox, 'The Way Ahead: Toward a New Ontology of World Order', in Robert Wyn Jones (ed.), *Critical Theory and World Politics* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 2001), p. 48.

IPE, although it emphasises structures, critical IPE also aims to be non-state centred, moving away from the state/market frame of reference and giving greater prominence to agency.¹² It aims to highlight the roles played by non-state actors, including the oppositional role played by social movements in resisting dominant structures.¹³ Critical IPE aims therefore to place a greater emphasis than mainstream IPE on the role of ideas, ideology and identities.¹⁴ According to its proponents, critical IPE as a result has to be multi-disciplinary if not trans/interdisciplinary, moving away from just politics and economics to embrace a range of disciplines, methods and approaches. One suggestion is that it should bring together the IPE that has emerged from international relations with institutional economics and development studies to form a 'pluralism of heterodoxies' that breaks away from the dominance of IPE by the discipline of international relations.¹⁵

In recent years we have seen the growth of a gendered political economy that shares a number of these traits with critical IPE.¹⁶ It, too, gives primacy to the construction of social relations. Gender as a social construct is as ontologically central to gendered political economy as it is to feminism. Indeed the majority of those engaged in gendering all forms of political economy see themselves as feminists, attempting not only to understand women's subordination but also to change it, even if the analyses and solutions advocated vary.¹⁷ All feminists recognise inequalities, particularly gender inequalities, sharing a normative belief that the purpose of social theorising is to help to challenge and transform those inequalities. In common with other analyses informed by feminism, gendered political economy is also concerned with asking what possibilities there are for change in the dominant gender order. Many feminist analyses have therefore looked at the actions of non-state actors in civil society, focusing particularly on the oppositional roles played by women's movements in their efforts to change their situation. Therefore gendered political economy is not state-centred like a lot of mainstream IPE, but also focuses on a variety of women's movements and their interactions with the state and governance structures.

Gendered political economy, like critical IPE, is also concerned with historically constituted frameworks or structures within which political and economic activity take place, as well as with the nature of different individuals and their actions. Until quite recently much gendered political economy has concentrated on providing gendered analyses at the micro-level, but calls have been made to integrate gender issues into macroeconomics.¹⁸ Echoing some of the IPE work which uses Polanyi's notion of markets as embedded in wider social and cultural frameworks, 'feminist economic analyses of the macro-economy point to the gender biases of micro and meso-level institutions, such as households, government agencies, firms and even

¹² Ronen Palan, 'New Trends in Global Political Economy', in Ronen Palan (ed.), *Global Political Economy: Contemporary Theories* (London: Routledge, 2000). pp. 1–18.

¹³ Robert O'Brien, 'Labour and IPE: Rediscovering Human Agency', in Palan, *Global Political Economy*, pp. 89–99.

¹⁴ Amin and Palan, 'Towards Non-Rationalist IPE'.

¹⁵ A. Amin, R. Palan and P. Taylor. 'Forum for Heterodox International Political Economy', *Review of International Political Economy*, 1 (1994), pp. 1–12.

¹⁶ Joanne Cook, Jennifer Roberts and Georgina Waylen (eds.), *Towards a Gendered Political Economy* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2000).

¹⁷ G. Waylen, 'Gender, Feminism and Political Economy', *New Political Economy*, 2:2 (1997), pp. 205–20.

¹⁸ L. Beneria, in 'Towards Non-Rationalist IPE'.

markets, from which macroeconomic outcomes emerge'.¹⁹ The economy is a gendered structure, as is the state, which can act both to uphold and refashion existing patterns of gender relations, for example by intervening in the market to determine who can have rights over property and other economic assets. Markets, too, as social institutions that embody social norms and practices, are imbued with structural power relations that include a gender dimension.²⁰ Gendered political economy therefore also attempts to find ways around the old structure/agency dichotomy that has characterised so much recent social science.

Many of those working within gendered political economy are also active in the promotion and development of a feminist economics that has roots in economics but also forms part of a critical political economy. Epistemologically it, too, is heterodox, rejecting many of the key assumptions of neo-classical economics such as the rational actor model and the public/private distinction, arguing for the need to analyse the household and reproductive economy and for a more humane economics.²¹ In common with other feminist analyses, gendered political economy therefore displays a heterogeneity of approach and methodology, advocating interdisciplinarity and pluralism in its analyses.²²

These shared characteristics should mean that it is relatively easy for critical IPE to fulfil its stated aims and incorporate gender into its frameworks. However, despite some obvious commonalities in ontologies and epistemologies and a commitment to using a wide variety of tools and methodologies (and a belief that this is achieved), it is very rare to find critical IPE analyses that show much evidence of awareness of gender as an important analytical category. Although it emphasises the importance of social construction broadly defined, critical IPE has continued to focus on class as the main axis of differentiation and inequality, while other axes such as gender and race are still largely ignored. Therefore its analyses of the socially constructed nature of institutions, markets and economic processes lack a gendered dimension. It focuses primarily on abstract formal processes to the exclusion of the reproductive economy, household and private sphere and the links between the two. Although there has been some recognition from Cox and others that gender is missing from their analyses, little has been done to rectify this omission.

This article will examine how and why this occurs. It will argue that, in part, this omission stems from a misunderstanding of what using gender as an analytical category means. As a result most critical IPE scholars cannot and do not do it. Instead they appear to believe that it is enough to make some mention of women as a group in a few contexts, often as activists in women's movements or in terms of the impact of a process on women. This is no more than a limited 'adding women in' to existing analyses without changing any underlying categories and frameworks. It is not to see gender as fundamentally constitutive of important processes. Indeed even when women are mentioned, many studies see women as an often entirely homogenous group, without recognising that other groups are gendered. For

¹⁹ N. Cagatay, D. Elson and C. Grown, 'Introduction to Special Issue on Gender Adjustment and Macroeconomics', *World Development*, 23:11 (1995), p. 8929.

²⁰ L. Beneria, 'Globalization, Gender and Davos Man', *Feminist Economics*, 5:3 (1999), pp. 61–83.

²¹ L. Beneria, 'Toward a Greater Integration of Gender in Economics', *World Development*, 23:11 (1995), pp. 1834–41.

²² G. Waylen, 'Introduction to Special Section: Towards a Gendered Political Economy', *New Political Economy*, 3:2 (1998), pp. 181–9.

example in an analysis of the agency of labour, O'Brien sees workers as gender-free individuals with homogeneous interests and identities, rarely acknowledging in that discussion that workers are differentially positioned according to a number of factors including gender, race and sexuality as well as class.²³ In short, it is not enough to acknowledge that some women have played a role as activists, ignoring the gendered nature of other groups, or just to examine the impact of certain processes on women, seen as a homogenous group. A gendered analysis constitutes much more than this. Critical IPE will not fulfil its own stated aims until it gains a more sophisticated understanding of what a gendered approach means and then utilises it routinely in its analyses.

For a more concrete examination of the causes, consequences and solutions to this problem, we now turn to the analysis of globalisation. As one of the predominant themes in the critical IPE research and publishing agenda in recent years, analyses of globalisation that incorporate gender as an analytical category should be central to a critical IPE. Furthermore it has been claimed that globalisation has increased the need to go beyond established IPE orthodoxies to develop a new more heterodox IPE.²⁴ However the majority of critical writings on globalisation also share the causes and consequences of the gender-blindness outlined above. Globalisation therefore provides an ideal example with which to illustrate the more abstract arguments about the form that a gendered IPE, that goes beyond 'simply adding women in', could take within a reformulated critical IPE. Some of the necessary work has already been done, as globalisation is also now a key theme in a heterogeneous body of feminist scholarship. This article will explore the diverse writings on globalisation emerging from two influential feminist perspectives: feminist economics/gendered political economy and feminist IR. It will demonstrate that both have a key role to play in gendering IPE. Engagement with these analyses within critical IPE would help it to acknowledge the ways in which gender is fundamentally constitutive of processes of globalisation.

The study of globalisation

Over the last decade, a great deal of research in a range of disciplines has focused on understanding, defining and theorising globalisation. IPE, and within that critical IPE in particular, has been no exception to this pattern. But within the large and diverse body of work on globalisation there is little consensus. The term has been used in numerous different ways with different meanings and there is often unacknowledged slippage between them that adds to the overall confusion. In some contexts, globalisation is conceptualised as a process, in others as an outcome. Some initially argued that globalisation is a new process that had proceeded apace since the 1970s (the hyper-globalisers) while others claimed that nothing we have witnessed is really new or qualitatively different (the sceptics) as internationalisation has long

²³ Robert O'Brien, 'The Agency of Labour in a Changing Global Order', in Richard Stubbs and Geoffrey Underhill (eds.), *Political Economy and the Changing Global Order*, 2nd edn. (Ontario: Oxford University Press, 2001), pp. 38–47.

²⁴ Amin et al., 'Forum for Heterodox IPE'.

been a feature of capitalism.²⁵ Analysts also divide into those who take a narrow, predominantly economic definition of globalisation and those who want a wider definition, often more focused on culture.²⁶ Indeed this division has sometimes been rather crudely characterised as a dichotomy between social science and humanities approaches to globalisation with all the attendant differences in methodology and epistemology that result. Analysts also differ over the extent that they are for or against the processes associated with globalisation. Some use globalisation simply as a description, but for others – particularly those who are in favour of it – it is often an explanation, even a rationale and something inevitable, irresistible and beneficial.

Not unsurprisingly IPE analyses of globalisation have tended to concentrate on the economic processes identified with it, although of late growing attention has been paid to the associated political processes. Numerous studies have looked at the restructuring of production, trade, finance, and migration, through changes in the global movement of goods, capital and people as well as the impact of technological innovation particularly information and communications technology (ICT). In addition, attention has focused on changing structures of international governance, examining the role of actors at the international, regional and national levels as well as non-state actors such as TNCs and global civil society. The relative power of international institutions such as the IMF, World Bank and WTO, TNCs and the nation state has been hotly debated.

Critical IPE has made significant contributions to many of these debates. In keeping with its commitment to pluralism, 'narrow circumscribing views of globalisation are rejected' and different analytical traditions (more broadly defined than politics and economics) are brought together that problematise social relations, discourse and practice and place globalisation in its broad historical and intellectual context.²⁷ Scholars identified with a critical IPE perspective are predominantly anti-globalisation, arguing that it brings increasing inequality and polarisation. Indeed globalisation is frequently associated with the spread of neoliberal ideology and the implementation of neoliberal policies, epitomised for example by the structural adjustment programmes advocated by the World Bank and IMF).²⁸ Critical IPE has also highlighted the negative impact of globalisation on democracy and accountability citing the increased power of actors such as TNCs and financial institutions such as international banks in combination with the reduced power of nation states as their sovereignty is undermined.²⁹ The challenges and resistances to globalisation have also been explored most thoroughly by those identified with this perspective.³⁰

Yet one characteristic which all these differing perspectives, including the majority of critical IPE analyses, share is gender blindness, with little acknowledgement within

²⁵ Paul Hirst, Paul and Graham Thompson, *Globalization in Question* (Cambridge: Polity, 1996).

²⁶ Marchand and Runyan, *Gender and Global Restructuring*.

²⁷ Introduction to Randall Germain (ed.), *Globalization and Its Critics: Perspectives from Political Economy* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2000), pp. xiii–xx.

²⁸ S. Gill, 'Globalisation, market civilisation and disciplinary neo-liberalism', *Millennium*, 24:3 (1995), pp. 399–423.

²⁹ Gill, *Globalisation*.

³⁰ Barry Gills (ed.), *Globalization and the Politics of Resistance* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2000); Robert O'Brien, Anne Marie Goetz, Jan Arte Scholte, and Mark Williams, *Contesting Global Governance: Multilateral Economic Institutions and Global Social Movements* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000).

this macro-level picture of globalisation that gender is a constitutive force in either the processes of globalisation or their consequences. The few analyses that go so far as to mention women, do it in one of two ways that constitute attempting to 'add women in'. First, a few analyses make some reference to the impact of processes of globalisation on women – predominantly seen as a homogeneous category and frequently as passive victims of the processes of globalisation. Secondly, when women are considered as agents it is in one particular, narrowly defined, context: the roles played by women's movements and feminism. Therefore a few critical analyses do acknowledge that women's movements and women's activism have played a part in constituting the emerging 'global civil society' when it is deemed to exist, but even this is not commonplace.³¹

As a result, women's agency, if recognised, is predominantly seen as important in resisting globalisation. Therefore even those critical analysts who think that they are using gender as an analytical category, are actually only talking about the role of women actors in this one context. What is more, this very restricted usage allows them to argue mistakenly that gender analysis is primarily counter-hegemonic.³² Although highlighting the roles played by different women is important, it is not enough. The larger point is that few, if any, studies take on the much more difficult task of examining how the processes and structures associated with globalisation are gendered. Gender is rarely incorporated into any of the analytical frameworks used by IPE scholars to analyse globalisation.

These claims can be illustrated fairly easily. It is not possible to examine all of the now large literature on globalisation here. However, a more systematic analysis of a number of the influential edited collections whose titles would indicate that they might consider gender as an important theme confirms these trends. They were selected on the following criteria. First, the chapter authors and/or editors are identified with critical IPE; second, these volumes figure prominently on student reading lists and in library collections; and third, they are widely cited by other scholars in the field. *The Political Economy of Globalization*, for example, has only four mentions of women and they are all in the chapter on global civil society by Jan Arte Scholte.³³ In *Globalization: Critical Reflections*, despite the largest of the three substantive sections of the book being entitled 'The counter-thrust to globalization: political and cultural resistance', there is only one article that mentions women.³⁴ *Globalization and Its Critics: Perspectives from Political Economy* does not include any mention of gender (except a couple of cursory references in an article on philosophy in which the author says, for example, that lecturers may treat male and female students differently and that no women are generally listed among great IR thinkers), and the volume as a whole does not cite any feminist critiques of globalisation.³⁵ *Globalization and Politics of Resistance* has no chapter on women, no reference to gender and only four references to women in the index.³⁶

³¹ John Mittelman (ed.), *Globalization: Critical Reflections* (Boulder, CO: Lynn Rienner, 1997); Gills, *Globalization and Resistance*; Ngaire Woods (ed.), *The Political Economy of Globalization* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2000).

³² B. Gills, 'Re-orientating the New (International) Political Economy', *New Political Economy*, 6:2 (2001).

³³ J. A. Scholte, 'Global Civil Society', in Ngaire Woods, *Political Economy*'.

³⁴ Mittelman, *Globalization: Critical Reflection*.

³⁵ Germain, *Globalization and its Critics*.

³⁶ Gills, *Globalization and Resistance*.

The content of two important texts on the globalisation reinforces these findings. The first, *Global Transformations: Politics, Economics and Culture* is fairly typical of the genre (it explicitly lists culture as one of its concerns thereby signalling that it is taking a wider sweep than simply politics and economics).³⁷ Yet, gender as an analytical category is entirely absent from the volume both in the analytical framework, and from the more empirically based discussions, such as migration. Gender is also absent from the index – although this did include a reference to the Spice Girls – and from the bibliography – the authors’ reading appears not to have been informed by any of the debates relevant to the gendered analysis of globalisation. There are two mentions of women’s movements: the first in the chapter on the impact of cultural globalisation (p. 371) as an example of a new social movement in the West that is a transnational or ‘third cultural network’, and again as contesting globalisation in the conclusion (p. 452). There is also one mention of women’s rights (CEDAW) in a section on the human rights regime (p. 67). The companion reader to that volume, *Global Transformations: An Introduction to the Globalization Debate*, displays many of the same characteristics. Gender is absent from the analytical framework laid out by the editors in the introductory chapter.³⁸ However, included in its 480 pages are eight pages on ‘the gender dimension’ by Jill Steans; some of the other contributors recognise gender as a category – for example in labour costs or internet use (see the contributions by Fred Halliday, UNDP report, Manuel Castells, Chris Brown) – and others recognise the importance of feminism as a social movement (Chris Brown, Michael Mann).³⁹

As a consequence, many of the categories used in this literature are not deconstructed and the complexity of the processes involved in globalisation is missed. Even when considering globalisation from the perspective of people rather than abstract processes (which by the admission of many critical writers on globalisation should be done more frequently) again they are often seen as gender-free individuals. For example studies of migration often fail to analyse who migrants are in gender terms, ignoring the different reasons for male and female migration, different levels of skill and the different sorts of employment men and women take on, whether for example it is in the informal sector such as domestic service or the provision of sexual services.⁴⁰ In discussions of actors’ resistance to globalisation, after the passing reference to women’s resistance, all other actors continue to be seen as gender-free individuals with little sense, for example, that men and women have different interests and identities. As a partial exception to this pattern, O’Brien does recognise that, as a result of the changes brought about by globalisation, women now form a large proportion of unprotected workers and that partly as a consequence of women’s activism in new social movements, trade unions now feel compelled to take on new issues in their campaigns because they need to form broader coalitions and to recruit women members.⁴¹

³⁷ David Held, Anthony McGrew, David Goldblatt and Jonathan Perraton, *Global Transformations: Politics, Economics and Culture* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1999).

³⁸ David Held and Anthony McGrew (eds.), *Global Transformations: An Introduction to the Globalization Debate* (Cambridge: Polity, 2000).

³⁹ One notable exception to this gender blindness is the collection edited by Eleonore Kofman and Gillian Youngs, *Globalization: Theory and Practice* (London: Pinter, 1996), but this is not surprising as both the editors are feminists who undertake gendered analyses.

⁴⁰ Held and McGrew, *Global Transformations*.

⁴¹ O’Brien, ‘Agency’.

The analyses of the processes associated with globalisation are even more devoid of gender as a category. For example, both mainstream and critical IPE analyses of trade liberalisation and the restructuring of production rarely acknowledge the extent to which these processes are highly gendered – such as the ways in which women’s labour has been central to much export production both in the industrial and agricultural sectors. Also ignored are the ways in which changes in the organisation of global finance structures, and the impact of the financial instability that has resulted from the deregulation of capital movements, impact differently on men and women. Those examining the effects of policies associated with neoliberal ideology, such as structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) and welfare restructuring, often fail to acknowledge that, despite their overt gender neutrality, SAPs have a very different impact on men and women. Indeed, studies of the polarisation and inequalities that accompany globalisation rarely examine the full extent to which these inequalities are racialised and sexualised.

Why has this been the case? Despite the stated commitment of many critical scholars to methodological pluralism, to the analysis of markets and states as socially constructed institutions and to a move away from a focus on structures, that together would make their frameworks more open to gender, they do not often use concepts that would allow their analyses of globalisation to incorporate gender. As we have seen, any consideration of the significance of the unpaid economy and the costs of social reproduction is rarely included in their analyses. They focus almost entirely on the formal/public sphere without looking at the household and the private sphere and the connections between the productive and reproductive economies. The importance of the nature of the sexual division of labour, for example in the production decisions of TNCs, is rarely acknowledged. In addition the starting points of critical scholars (in common with mainstream ones) and feminist scholars can be very different. For example feminist critiques often begin at the micro-level while IPE is primarily focused on the macro-level.⁴² The language and discourse used by both are often dissimilar. As a consequence of these factors, the trends and processes involved in globalisation are still talked about even in the majority of the critical IPE literature in top-down and abstract terms. They are therefore conceptualised in such a way that makes many of the dominant discourses of IPE and globalisation difficult to penetrate, either to simply ‘add women in’ or more ambitiously to attempt to reformulate IPE as a discipline.⁴³ Therefore despite the claims of the critical scholars that their approach is different, they, too, have not got away from the perspectives that they see as characterising other types of IPE.

Overall there are few examples of analyses of globalisation that do incorporate gender in any meaningful way. The work of Saskia Sassen provides an exception, going beyond simply ‘adding women in’. Many of her analyses focus primarily on one aspect of globalisation, the nature of the global city and the ways in which the changes associated with globalisation have contributed to the emergence of global cities. As well as examining abstract processes such as changes to production, the state and sovereignty involved in globalisation in gendered terms, Sassen starts from the perspective of people, seeing them not as abstract individuals but as workers and

⁴² O’Brien et al., *Contesting Global Governance*.

⁴³ Isabella Bakker, ‘Who built the Pyramids? Engendering the new international economic and financial architecture’, ISA paper, Chicago 2001.

migrants fundamentally affected by their gender, class and racial identities. Sassen can provide gendered analyses: firstly because her analytical framework is open to utilising the necessary concepts, but also because she uses the gendered analyses that have already been undertaken by feminist scholars. It is to this body of work that we now turn, since critical IPE will have to engage with this literature in order to produce gendered analyses that come closer to reflecting the complexity of the processes involved in globalisation.⁴⁴

Towards a gendered IPE of globalisation

Much of the work needed to create a gendered IPE has already been undertaken. There is now a large body of literature that describes the impact of globalisation on women and the role played by women actors in resisting globalisation, as well as some work that uses gender as an analytical category to analyse the processes of globalisation. Crudely it can be divided into that which emanates from gendered political economy perspective (and within that feminist economics), as it has been defined above and that which emanates from feminist IR. This distinction oversimplifies and over-polarises what are often heterogeneous and overlapping categories, but it is a useful device with which to set up the terms of the discussion. Although gendered political economy and feminist IR share a commitment to feminism, pluralism and interdisciplinary scholarship, there are differences between them in terms of their intellectual origins and the methodologies and epistemologies that they use. Both perspectives are still, perhaps inevitably, tied into their intellectual and disciplinary origins and the battles they have fought or are still fighting within those disciplines. These factors influence the kinds of analyses that have been produced and where they have been developed. The gender and feminist theory section of ISA has been very influential in the emergence of feminist IR and in recent years, IAFFE and its journal *Feminist Economics* has played an important role in the development of a gendered political economy. Before elaborating the kinds of work that have already been done, it is useful to outline the major characteristics of these two approaches to see how they can come together to produce gendered analyses of globalisation.

Gendered political economy/feminist economics approaches to globalisation

In comparison to feminist IR, until quite recently there has been a less clearly identifiable body of work within gendered political economy/feminist economics focusing directly or explicitly on globalisation. But the term is now being used more frequently. This is not to say that a large amount of research relevant to the analysis of gender and globalisation has not already been published.⁴⁵ As feminist economics

⁴⁴ See, for example, Saskia Sassen, *Globalization and its Discontents* (New York: The New Publisher, 1998).

⁴⁵ Feminist economists have shown some reluctance to use the term globalisation. The Special Issue of *Feminist Economics* on 'Gender and Globalization', 6:3 (2000) is the first major academic feminist economics publication to engage with the term globalisation, and, although covering much of the same ground, the *World Development* Special Issue on 'Growth, Trade Finance and Gender

tends to use a narrower definition of globalisation than feminist IR, globalisation has been seen as a predominantly economic phenomenon. Much of the work carried out to date has focused on economic restructuring, is still mainly about the 'third world' and can be identified with a 'development agenda'. However, it has now been recognised that more consideration should be given to the relationship between globalisation and 'first world' women, examining, for example, the relationship between trade liberalisation and women's employment in both the first and third worlds.⁴⁶

It is possible to trace the intellectual origins of much of the gendered political economy/feminist economics work on globalisation, in terms of subject matter, underlying approach and personnel, back to the Gender and Development (GAD) work that emerged in the late 1970s and 1980s.⁴⁷ GAD grew out of the socialist feminist ideas of the 1970s. It developed through critiques of mainstream liberal development theory and its feminist offshoot 'Women in Development' (WID), as well as underdevelopment theory (highlighting its gender-blindness). GAD always placed great emphasis on analysing the wider global processes of accumulation involved in the spread of capitalist social relations.⁴⁸ We can argue that part of what we are currently seeing is a reformulation of those longstanding concerns of GAD scholars and the incorporation of their work into the gender and globalisation literature from a gendered political economy/feminist economics perspective. This has been reinforced by the insistence of many feminist economists that gender issues must be integrated into macroeconomics. Therefore what used to be described as GAD work is now seen as part of feminist economics and the gender and globalisation literature.

It is partly because of the intellectual origins of much of the feminist economists' work on globalisation, that it does give more emphasis to structures and the 'material' than much of the feminist IR. It is also more quantitative and empiricist than feminist IR. Even though it is seen as very 'unscientific' within economics, its methodologies are often closer to mainstream social science than feminist IR, and debates within feminist economics about the range of appropriate methods and approaches have some links to debates within economics about the nature of the discipline. In contrast to feminist IR, many feminist economists working in this area have not tended to utilise with the gender and globalisation work undertaken by feminist IR scholars. Feminist economists are also interested in policy outcomes, in intervening into policy debates and affecting policymaking processes. They therefore interact both with the governments of nation-states and international institutions such as the UN as advisers and paid personnel. As a result the work of

Inequality' (2000), edited by some prominent feminist economists, does not use the term until the last page of the Introduction. However, globalisation is prominent in the UNDAW 1999 World Survey on the *Role of Women in Development: Globalization, Gender and Work* (New York: UNDAW, 1999), which itself is very influenced by the work of feminist economists.

⁴⁶ Although the editorial of the *Feminist Economics* Special Issue on globalisation talks about this, the articles are on flexible labour in Mexico, the Asian financial crisis, India's new economic policy of 1991 and export growth in Taiwan.

⁴⁷ Ester Boserup's book, *Women's Role in Economic Development* (New York: St Martin's Press, 1970) is a pioneering work in this field.

⁴⁸ Kate Young, Carol Wolkowitz and Roisin McCullagh (eds.), *Of Marriage and the Market: Women's Subordination in International Perspective* (London: CSE Books, 1981); D. Elson and R. Pearson, 'Nimble Fingers Make Cheap Workers: An Analysis of Women's Employment in Third World Export Manufacturing', *Feminist Review*, 7 (Spring 1981), pp. 87–107.

feminist economists has had some impact on policy debates, for example with gender mainstreaming, gender budgets and efforts to gender macroeconomic policy.

Feminist IR approaches to globalisation

The feminist IR literature on globalisation has grown out of the now quite large field of feminist IR and as such has played a role in the debates within IR about epistemology and approach. Although part of social science, IR has been very influenced by many of the humanities debates about postmodernism, language and identity, and feminist IR has often been positioned as post-positivist within the 'paradigm' debate in IR. In the past much of the feminist IR writing on IPE has said more about IR than IPE and, although this tendency has diminished, it has not quite disappeared.⁴⁹ Feminist IR tends to use a much broader definition of globalisation than feminist economics. It is critical of the gender blindness and economism of the majority of the mainstream literature that sees globalisation as a predominantly economic process that states and people are powerless to resist, arguing that it is necessary to look at cultural and ideational aspects as well.⁵⁰ Indeed using Hooper's work on hegemonic masculinity, Marianne Marchand argues that utilising this concept can help to illuminate the connections between 'gendered representations of globalisation and its dynamics of power' as part of an approach that gives greater prominence to cultural and ideational factors.⁵¹

But the feminist IR literature on globalisation is also quite heterogeneous, probably more so than the gendered political economy/feminist economics one. Locher and Prugl identify two positions on power within feminist IR that in some ways mirror different feminist IR positions on globalisation.⁵² The first sees gender constructions as part of a larger system of subordination (such as capitalism or patriarchy), and within this framework power is seen as an ideology (echoing Marchand's arguments about hegemonic masculinity).⁵³ This approach has more in common with structuralist approaches and as such with feminist economics. The second sees power as located within the formation of identities and subjectivity and

⁴⁹ Much early feminist IR work consisted of programmatic statements laying out what should be done to gender IPE without actually doing it: see Christine Sylvester, 'The Emperor's Theories and Transformations: Looking at the Field Through Feminist Lenses', in David Pirages and Christine Sylvester (eds.), *Transformations in Global Political Economy* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1990); J. Ann Tickner, 'On the Fringes of the World Economy: A Feminist Perspective', in Murphy and Tooze (eds.), *The New International Political Economy*; Sandra Whitworth, 'Theory as Exclusion: Gender and International Political Economy', in Richard Stubbs and Geoffrey Underhill (eds.), *Political Economy and the Changing Global Order* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1994). Then followed a phase in which gender and IR texts began to include a rather brief chapter on IPE (for example, Jill Steans, *Gender and International Relations: An Introduction* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1998). Many of these chapters are not about IPE. Even Sandra Whitworth's updated chapter 'Theory and Exclusion: Gender, Masculinity and International Political Economy' in the second edition of Stubbs and Underhill's *Political Economy*, published in 2001, is still primarily about feminist IR.

⁵⁰ Marchand and Runyan, *Gender and Global Restructuring*.

⁵¹ Marianne Marchand, 'Gendered Representations of the "Global": Reading/Writing Globalization', in Stubbs and Underhill, *Political Economy*, 2nd edn., p. 221; Charlotte Hooper, 'Masculinities in Transition: The Case of Globalization', in Marchand and Runyan, *Gender and Global Restructuring*.

⁵² Locher and Prugl, 'Feminism and Constructivism'.

⁵³ Gillian Youngs, 'Breaking Patriarchal Bonds: Demythologizing the Public/Private', in Marchand and Runyan, *Gender and Global Restructuring*.

is perhaps less compatible with feminist economics.⁵⁴ In comparison to feminist economics, approaches to globalisation, feminist IR (particularly the second variant) puts more emphasis on identity and subjectivity and therefore on human agency, but agency rather narrowly defined as counterposed to structure rather than interacting with it. As a result feminist IR has been less concerned to address the economic issues that are often associated with structural and 'material' conditions and that are central to feminist economics.

This focus on the agency of women activists, frequently seen in terms of their resistance to globalisation, also coincides with a relative lack of interest within this perspective in influencing the policy agendas of states and international institutions. Indeed, working with states and international institutions is sometimes seen as colluding with globalisation. But despite their different approach, the feminist IR scholars have used a lot of feminist economics work in their own analyses, for example in discussions of the ways in which different forms of women's labour have been central to globalisation. However, they have also been critical of gendered political economy/feminist economics work as variously over-emphasising structures, being too quantitative in methodological terms, too ready to deal with the state and too top-down in its focus.⁵⁵

*A gendered analysis of globalisation*⁵⁶

Both within feminist IR and gendered political economy/feminist economics, scholars are agreed that it is not enough to simply 'add women' in to critical IPE analyses of globalisation. One solution advocated by Marchand and Runyan is to go beyond what they see as the narrow materialist understandings of critical IPE and address the ideational and cultural aspects as well.⁵⁷ As we will see below, they believe that feminist IR is in an ideal position to bridge the gap between the materialist and ideational to produce a more inclusive analysis of globalisation (or global restructuring as they prefer to call it). However, although necessary, the addition of cultural and material factors into the analysis is not enough. It is also imperative to gender the analysis of the 'material' and fully demonstrate that gender is fundamentally constitutive of processes of globalisation. Gendered political economy/feminist economics has an important contribution to make to these tasks. It is now possible

⁵⁴ In an important recent book Spike Peterson has outlined what a gendered global political economy would look like from their perspective. See V. Spike Peterson, *A Critical Rewriting of Global Political Economy: Integrating Reproductive, Productive and Virtual Economies* (New York: Routledge, 2003).

⁵⁵ Susan Bergeron, 'Political Economy Discourses of Globalization and Feminist Politics', *Signs*, 26:4 (2001), pp. 983–1006. Some scholars have tried to bring together the different strands of the gender and globalisation work. But often this privileges feminist IR approaches that emphasise culture, identity and power at the expense of gendered political economy/feminist economics approaches which are characterised as displaying 'mono-disciplinary, productivist and masculinist biases that generate "thin" and ideologically constrained analyses': V. S. Peterson, 'Rewriting (Global) Political Economy as Reproductive, Productive and Virtual (Foucauldian) Economies', *International Feminist Journal of Politics*, 4:1 (2002), pp. 1–30; Peterson, *Critical Rewriting*.

⁵⁶ For a more detailed discussion see Georgina Waylen, 'Putting Governance into the Gendered Political Economy of Globalization', *International Journal of Feminist Politics*, 6:4 (2004).

⁵⁷ Marchand and Runyan, *Gender and Global Restructuring*.

to outline the gendered analyses of globalisation that encompass insights from both gendered political economy/feminist economics and feminist IR.

The work that has been produced so far can be divided into four interrelated layers. None of these on their own is enough to produce a gendered analysis of globalisation. The first examines the ideologies, discourses and narratives of globalisation and emanates primarily from a feminist IR perspective. The second and third categories cover the impact of the processes of globalisation on women and the roles played by some women in response to globalisation, filling in the gaps left in the majority of mainstream and critical scholarship which has focused primarily on men. This work comes from both feminist IR and gendered political economy/feminist economics scholars. The minimal consideration of women already undertaken by a few critical IPE scholars also fits into these categories. The final layer, work that shows how gender is constitutive of processes of globalisation, derives from all the other categories but also results from the deployment of concepts and analytical frameworks used by gendered political economy/feminist economics. Although the first three layers provide the essential building blocks for a gendered analysis of globalisation that incorporates both the ideational and the material, without the kind of overarching framework provided by the fourth layer, it cannot be complete.

Discourses, narratives and ideologies of globalisation

When considering cultural and ideational aspects, feminist IR writings have emphasised the necessity of deconstructing the narratives, discourses and ideologies surrounding globalisation (the so-called 'myths of globalisation') to demonstrate the ways in which, although apparently neutral, they are highly gendered whether they come from the left or the right.⁵⁸ Based on Robert O'Connell's notion of hegemonic masculinity, Hooper argues that discourses of Anglo-American hegemonic masculinity that underlie gendered power struggles are undergoing change as part of globalisation and that these changes need to be analysed and understood.⁵⁹ She illustrates her arguments with an analysis of *The Economist* as a magazine that is read by business elites supportive of globalisation and that is helping to construct the new dominant symbolic imagery of the globalised political economy. Although not without its contradictions and disruptions, she argues that *The Economist* puts forward images of an aggressive 'frontier' masculinity of risk-taking entrepreneurialism that is associated with the activities of the new global executive and the new technocracy. Within many of these narratives on both the right and the left, globalisation is seen as an irresistible masculine force. Indeed Freeman has argued that there is a tendency for masculinist theories of globalisation to examine macro-global processes, ignoring gender as an analytical lens, while local empirical studies put gender at centre stage and as a result the local becomes seen as somehow feminine and fundamentally defined by the global.⁶⁰

⁵⁸ Ibid., p. 12.

⁵⁹ Hooper, 'Masculinities'.

⁶⁰ C. Freeman, 'Is Local: Global as Feminine: Masculine? Rethinking the Gender of Globalization', *Signs*, 26:4 (2001), pp. 1007–39, p. 1013.

The impact of processes of globalisation

Much of the work on gender and globalisation examines the second layer: the differential impact of processes of globalisation on both men and women and on different groups of women. It therefore aims to improve our knowledge and analysis of the role of women in these processes. It moves beyond the consideration of women as a homogeneous group and a crude tendency to see women as victims of globalisation, enabling analyses to appreciate the complex and contradictory outcomes that globalisation has produced. The bulk of this research has been undertaken by feminist economists and addresses themes pertinent to critical IPE. It has focused primarily on changes in women's labour in the workplace and the household that have resulted from the changing patterns of trade and production, with some attention also paid to the impact of policies associated with globalisation such as SAPs and welfare restructuring.

Overall the changes accompanying globalisation such as increased trade liberalisation, flexibilisation of employment, the growth of the service sector, explicit and implicit deregulation and the relocation of manufacturing from the first world have resulted in an overall increase in women's participation in the paid labour force and a decline in men's participation in most of the world, leading some to argue that we were witnessing a global feminisation of labour.⁶¹ However, studies have shown that these overall trends must be deconstructed as different groups of women are participating in very different ways and these processes are not taking place evenly or straightforwardly. Overturning the old consensus that industrialisation marginalised women, Elson and Pearson argued that much of the new export-led manufacturing (often owned by TNCs in Export Processing Zones (EPZs)) established in parts of the third world actually depended on female labour, often provided by young single women.⁶² However, later analyses demonstrate the complexity of the situation: for example, studies from Mexico show that employers sometimes favour married women and that the numbers of women in the *maquiladora* workforce can also fall in the face of changing conditions.⁶³ Studies of the role of women's labour in the development of non-traditional agricultural exports such as flowers, fruit and luxury vegetables like *mange-touts* have also shown its centrality in this sector but often in low-paid temporary work.⁶⁴ Women's employment has also increased in service sector occupations such as retailing and financial services. Employment prospects have improved particularly for highly educated middle-class women who have entered well-paid jobs in the service sector and the professions. In contrast, poorer women are frequently forced to take insecure badly-paid, low-skilled jobs in the service sector, often providing the domestic services within the household that enable the professional women to participate in the labour market. In the first world, many of these positions are taken by (often deskilled) migrant women, who often end up in

⁶¹ G. Standing, 'Global Feminization Through Flexible Labour', *World Development*, 17:7 (1989), pp. 1077–95.

⁶² Elson and Pearson 'Nimble Fingers'.

⁶³ Ruth Pearson, 'Nimble Fingers Revisited: Reflections on Women and Third World Industrialization in the Late Twentieth Century', in Cecile Jackson and Ruth Pearson (eds.), *Feminist Visions of Development: Gender Analysis and Policy* (London: Routledge, 1998).

⁶⁴ Stephanie Barrientos, Anna Bee, Ann Matear and Isobel Vogel, *Women in Agribusiness: Working Miracles in the Chilean Fruit Export Sector* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1999).

the most precarious and insecure employment such as in subcontracted garment manufacturing workshops.⁶⁵

A number of studies have also looked at the impact of the neoliberal economic reform that has accompanied the restructuring that forms part of processes of globalisation.⁶⁶ Short-term adjustment policies, such as SAPs for example, have particular, often contradictory, implications for different groups of women. Cuts in welfare services have an impact on women as providers and consumers of health and social services resulting in a loss of employment for some women and the expenditure of more time and effort to replace lost provision by, often poor, women in their roles within the household. At the same time they may have to adopt survival strategies in order to 'make ends meet' as well as undertake additional income-generating activities. At the same time, as we have seen, employment opportunities in some sectors of the restructured economy have increased. The longer-term restructuring of the state and economies also has differential impact on men and women. Social sector reform often entails a move from ostensibly 'gender neutral' to 'gender differentiated' schemes. The move towards marketised schemes for pensions and health care result in only better off women having coverage and then on less favourable terms than men earning the same salaries.⁶⁷ The complex and often contradictory nature of these gendered processes of globalisation have therefore been highlighted.

Women's organising

The third layer moves away from the impact of processes of globalisation on different women and focuses on women's agency in the form of women's collective organising. Although the research on women's organising on local, regional and international levels has been undertaken by a variety of feminist scholars, there has been a tendency for some (sometimes from a feminist IR perspective) to interpret a broad spectrum of activities in blanket terms as women's resistance to globalisation.⁶⁸ A more sophisticated analysis that differentiates between the variety of activities undertaken by different women is necessary. At the local level, in addition to the studies of different feminist movements, there are a number of analyses of women's economic organising in the workplace – such as the factory – showing the ways in

⁶⁵ Patricia Fernandez Kelly and Saskia Sassen, 'Recasting Women in the Global Economy: Internationalization and Changing Definitions of Gender', in Christine Bose and Ellen Acosta-Belen (eds.), *Women in the Latin American Development Process* (Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press, 1995); Eleonore Kofman, 'Beyond a Reductionist Analysis of Female Migrants in Global European Cities: The Unskilled, Deskilled, and Professional', in Marchand and Runyan, *Gender and Global Restructuring*.

⁶⁶ Haleh Afshar and Carolynne Dennis (eds.), *Women and Adjustment Policies in the Third World* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1992); Isabella Bakker, 'Introduction: Engendering Macro-economic Policy Reform in the Era of Global Restructuring and Adjustment', in Isabella Bakker (ed.), *The Strategic Silence: Gender and Economic Policy* (London: Zed Books, 1994), pp. 1–9; Pamela Sparr (ed.), *Mortgaging Women's Lives: Feminist Critiques of Structural Adjustment* (London: Zed Books, 1994).

⁶⁷ A. Arenas de Montecinos and V. Montecinos, 'The Privatization of Social Security and Women's Welfare: Gender Effects of the Chilean Reform', *Latin American Research Review*, 34:3 (1999), pp. 7–38.

⁶⁸ Sheila Rowbotham and Stephanie Linkogle Rowbotham, *Women Resist Globalization: Mobilizing for Livelihood and Rights* (London: Zed Books, 2001).

which women can resist employers' demands, helping to dispel myths about the passivity of women workers in the face of economic restructuring more generally.⁶⁹ These are complemented by studies of poor women's organising at the community level in the face of the economic hardship often resulting from SAPs.⁷⁰ For example, studies of collective survival strategies in poor neighbourhoods in Chile and Peru have looked at communal kitchens and the provision of food and milk for young children, together with income-generating activities such as bakeries and other artisanal workshops.⁷¹

Few analyses have been focused on the regional level until recently. But more attention is now being paid to some of the organising that has accompanied the 'new regionalism' of the 1990s and development of regional women's organisations. Regional trading blocs such as NAFTA and longer standing regional integration projects such as the EU have gained some attention. A number of feminist IR scholars have looked at the cross-border organising between women in Canada, USA and Mexico round issues of workers rights across borders in the context of the regional trade agreement.⁷² Latin America has seen, for example, women's organisations from a number of different countries joining together around issues such as human rights, domestic violence and reproductive rights to form regional networks on these subjects. This process has been facilitated by developments at the international level.

Women's organising has increasingly been taking place at the international level. Facilitated by the development of new technologies such as ICT, scholars have pointed to the development of transnational advocacy networks of professionalised and 'NGOised' women's organisations that are often avowedly feminist and attempt to reframe issues for elites at the international level.⁷³ Specialised groups such as Women's Eyes on the Bank (many of whom were feminist economists) have also lobbied international organisations such as the World Bank.⁷⁴ A number of the UN conferences, such as the 1992 Rio Earth Summit, the 1993 Vienna Conference on Human Rights and the 1994 Cairo Population Conference as well as the 1995 Beijing

⁶⁹ Aiwa Ong, *Spirits of Resistance and Capitalist Discipline: Factory Women in Malaysia* (Buffalo, NY: State University of New York, 1987); Linda Lim, 'Women's Work in Export Factories: the Politics of a Cause', in Irene Tinker (ed.), *Persistent Inequalities: Women and World Development* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990); Sheila Rowbotham and Swasti Mitter (eds.), *Dignity and Daily Bread: New Forms of Economic Organizing among Poor Women in the Third World and the First* (London: Routledge, 1994); Amrita Basu (ed.), *The Challenge of Local Feminisms: Women's Movements in Global Perspective* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1995).

⁷⁰ Amy Lind, 'Negotiating Boundaries: Women's Organizations and the Politics of Restructuring in Ecuador', in Marchand and Runyan, *Gender and Global Restructuring*.

⁷¹ Maruja Barrig, 'Women, Collective Kitchens and the Crisis of the State in Peru', in John Friedman, Rachel Abers and Lisa Autler (eds.), *Emergences: Women's Struggles for Liveliness in Latin America* (Los Angeles: Center for Latin American Studies, UCLA, 1996).

⁷² Laura Macdonald, 'Globalization and Social Movements: Comparing Women's Movement Responses to NAFTA in Mexico, the USA and Canada', *International Feminist Journal of Politics*, 4:2 (2002), pp. 151-72; Ann Sisson Runyan, 'The Places of Women in Trading Places: Gendered Global/Regional Regimes and Internationalised Feminist Resistance', in Kofman and Youngs, *Globalization: Theory and Practice*.

⁷³ Margaret Keck and Katherine Sikkink, *Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics* (Cornell, NY: Cornell University Press, 1998); Sonia Alvarez, 'Latin American Feminisms "Go Global": Trends for the 1990s and Challenges for the New Millennium', in Sonia Alvarez, Arturo Escobar, and Evelino Dagnino (eds.), *Politics of Culture/Cultures of Politics* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1998).

⁷⁴ O'Brien et al., *Contesting Global Governance*.

Women's conference, have also acted as an important spur to the development of transnational organising. After preparatory organising at the national and regional level, different groups have come together in women's caucuses and the NGO forum at the Beijing conference to press for change.⁷⁵ International organising therefore has also fed back down to activities at the regional and local level.⁷⁶ But women's organising, although important, can only be seen as one aspect of a gendered analysis of globalisation.

Framework and concepts

This wealth of research discussed above provides some of the essential constituents of a gendered analysis of globalisation. The majority of it goes beyond simply 'adding women in' as either 'victims' or 'resisters' of globalisation as they have often been portrayed in critical IPE. It has demonstrated the variety of women's organising at different levels and the complexity of the impact of processes of globalisation on different groups of women, showing for example that changes in employment opportunities have not affected all women in the same ways. However, although it supplies valuable data and analysis, it does not amount to a gendered analysis of globalisation on its own. For example, many studies have tended to separate the analysis of women's agency (often in the form of women's organising) and the role of processes and institutions (in the category of the impact of globalisation on different women) without considering how the two impact upon each other. The more challenging task is to develop a more overarching analysis that can bring these separate categories together and examine the interaction of actors, both men and women, with structures that are understood as fundamentally gendered. In order to have analyses that show how gender is constitutive of processes of globalisation, our previous discussion has demonstrated that several things are necessary.

First, rather than seeing the global and the local as separate categories, with one identified as masculine and the other as feminine, their analysis must be brought together. Freeman argues that that there should be a feminist reconceptualisation of the global in which local forms of global are not just seen as effects but as constitutive ingredients of the global, thereby decoupling the link that has fused gender with the local.⁷⁷ She uses the example of Jamaican higglers (women traders), arguing that they should be seen as agents of globalisation, involved not only in responding to the demands of global capitalism but also in crafting the multiple modes of global capitalism. This approach also posits a different view of women's agency, allowing it to be seen in the context of different structures. In her study of different forms of

⁷⁵ Deborah Stienstra, 'Dancing Resistance from Rio to Beijing: Transnational Women's Organizing and United Nations Conferences 1992-6', in Marchand and Runyan, *Gender and Global Restructuring*; Alice Clark, Elisabeth Friedman and Katheryn Hochstetler, 'The Sovereign Limits of Global Civil Society: A Comparison of NGO participation in UN World Conferences on the Environment, Human Rights and Women', *World Politics*, 51:1 (1998), pp. 1-35.

⁷⁶ Jacqui True and Michael Mintrom, 'Transnational Networks and Policy Diffusion: The Case of Gender Mainstreaming', *International Studies Quarterly*, 45 (2001), pp. 27-57. Valerie Sperling, Myra Marx Ferree and Barbara Risman, 'Constructing Global Feminism: Transnational Advocacy Networks and Russian Women's Activism', *Signs*, 26:4 (2001), pp. 1155-86.

⁷⁷ Freeman, 'Is Local', p. 1013.

transnational production in the borderlands of Mexico, Leslie Salzinger shows how the construction of gender varies contextually as a result of the interaction between actors (both female and male workers and managers) and the economic processes associated with globalisation.⁷⁸ Rather than seeing agency primarily in the context of resisting globalisation, both these works highlight the importance of understanding the ways in which women's decisions interact with particular structures and institutions at all levels and thereby helping to constitute those processes.

Second, analyses must bring together the analysis of the productive and reproductive economies demonstrating how the two are inexorably linked, and that the boundaries between them are not fixed but shifting, as is the related analytical distinction between the public and the private. The ways in which these relationships are being reconfigured is fundamental to globalisation. These interconnections have led Chang and Ling to argue that globalisation has a dual nature in which global restructuring (G1), associated with processes such as deregulation and privatisation, rests on another kind of globalisation (G2) that depends on the provision of low skilled menial intimate household services by low wage, highly sexualised and racialised labour.⁷⁹ It mirrors Young's analysis of the contrasting roles played by often highly paid professional women in hyper-mobile 'money society' and those women in the territorially bounded 'work society' whose labour benefits those better-off women through the 'outsourcing of domestic production' (the (re-)emergence of the 'mistress' and the 'maid' in the first world).⁸⁰ The restructuring of the state and welfare systems that are seen as part of globalisation also have to be analysed in terms of a reconfiguration of the productive and reproductive spheres, in which tasks that were undertaken by the Keynesian welfare state are now the responsibility of the household or the individual with hugely gendered implications. It is clear therefore that the implicit gender assumptions of these ostensibly gender-blind policies need also to be disentangled in these terms. As we have seen, SAPs, despite their overt gender neutrality, have had very different impacts on different groups of men and women. More profoundly than this, the models ignore the sexual division of labour and the reproductive economy at the same time as implicit within them is an assumption that women's unpaid labour in the household is infinitely elastic.⁸¹ This blindness has resulted in 'inefficient' policy outcomes as SAPs have not had the consequences policymakers intended, as for example women producers have been unable to respond to market signals as intended.⁸²

Although attempts to incorporate the analysis of reproduction and the private sphere into IPE analyses that have not been undertaken by feminist scholars are rare, it is possible to cite one non-feminist attempt to incorporate gender as an analytical

⁷⁸ Leslie Salzinger, *Genders in Production: Making Workers in Mexico's Global Factories* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2003).

⁷⁹ K. Chang and Lily Ling, 'Globalization and Its Intimate Other: Filipina Domestic Workers in Hong Kong', in Marchand, and Runyan, *Gender and Global Restructuring*.

⁸⁰ Brigitte Young, 'Gender and Globalization: A European Perspective', in Rita Mae Kelly et al. (eds.), *Gender, Globalization and Democratization* (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield); B. Young, 'The "Mistress" and the "Maid" in the Globalized Economy', *Socialist Register* (2001), pp. 315–27.

⁸¹ Diane Elson, 'Male Bias in Macro Economics: The Case of Structural Adjustment', in Diane Elson (ed.), *Male Bias in the Development Process*, 2nd edn. (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1995).

⁸² Ingrid Palmer, 'Gender Equity and Economic Efficiency in Adjustment Programmes', in Afshar and Dennis, *Women and Adjustment Policies*, pp. 69–83.

category within comparative political economy. Esping Andersen has tried to integrate the reproductive economy and its relationship to changes in the productive economy into his analysis of post-industrial economies, as an important part of the explanation of the problems that now beset welfare states in the national context.⁸³ He argues that his earlier work had failed to recognise the importance of gender differences, the role of the family and within that the role of women's unpaid labour in social reproduction, and as a result his analyses had serious flaws and made satisfactory solutions difficult to find. However, the solutions he then advocates are not ones intended to promote women's emancipation and gender equality (for example by getting men to undertake more childcare) but to solve what he sees as pressing problems within certain post-industrial economies.⁸⁴

Conclusions

To return to Tickner's famous phrase, troubled engagements still continue between feminist and critical IPE. Part of the explanation lies in the power differentials between the two that mean that the majority of critical IPE scholars can and do ignore feminist writings with impunity.⁸⁵ But this is not the whole story. Even those who do attempt to deal with gender, misunderstand what it means to use it as an analytical category. However, as the analysis of the IPE literature of globalisation has shown, although critical IPE has not yet taken gender on board as an analytical category, this would not be an impossible task. Critical IPE shares enough common ontological and epistemological ground with some feminist approaches to make this possible. However, in order to achieve this aim, critical IPE needs to broaden its horizons and do a number of things. First, it needs to engage with the large, already existing, gender literature that explores the complex nature of many aspects of these processes, such as their contradictory impact on different groups of women, their ideational aspects and the variety and nature of women's organising. At the moment this wealth of research is almost completely ignored in all the IPE literature. Second, critical IPE needs a much more sophisticated understanding of what a gendered analysis entails. It is not enough to simply mention women in passing, for example seeing women solely in the context of their resistance to globalisation or to 'add women in' to existing categories as occasionally happens at the moment. Third, as an extension of this, IPE needs to begin to utilise concepts that would enable it to use gender as an analytical category. It is too narrowly focused on certain, often formal, structures and processes to the exclusion of other informal ones, and too little consideration is given to the construction of norms, rules, institutions and identities and the ways in which they are gendered. The adoption of analytical frameworks that incorporate gendered notions of interaction between the productive and reproductive economies would contribute to this process, and facilitate more comprehensive understandings of the complex processes of globalisation.

⁸³ Goran Esping Andersen, *The Social Foundations of Postindustrial Economies* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999).

⁸⁴ This use of Esping Andersen's work is not support for Charli Carpenter's position (fn. 4).

⁸⁵ Tickner has argued this for mainstream IR, 'You Just Don't Understand', p. 629.