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Another challenge is to explain away a tension between extended blame and Mason's detached/ordinary contrast. The tension emerges as follows: if the blameless can aptly take responsibility by engaging in conversation, then so, presumably, can the culpable. After all, intimate relationships are not the only valuable relationships that demand responses to our mistakes, and the relational stakes of culpably wronging others seem at least as high as the relational stakes of, for example, forgetting the milk.

This supports the view that it is apt for those who Mason thinks warrant detached blame—deeply ignorant wrongdoers—to take responsibility, that is, to enable blaming conversations where the normal grounds for communicative blame are absent. Mason seems open to that conclusion (144). However, here is the problem in accepting it: if it is apt for the deeply ignorant to take responsibility and enable conversation, it also seems apt for others to encourage them to do so through conversation. At first glance at least, compared to shunning the deeply ignorant, it seems no less apt to encourage them to do something that is apt for them to do, through the very process that it is apt for them to engage in. This gives another reason to question Mason's idea that communicating blame to the deeply ignorant is pointless.

As we have seen, that idea elegantly ties together the main theses in the book. To further develop the overall vision of our blaming practices that it underpins, we might compare the costs of taking a slightly more inclusive approach. On this approach, shunning the deeply ignorant from our moral community might sometimes be apt, but communicating with them is never wholly inapt. Communication recognizes our shared agency and encourages reflection in those agents who most urgently need to take responsibility: to respond to having flouted values they should grasp but cannot yet grasp. There remain plenty of avenues to explore on this issue, however, and for that, normative and responsibility theorists alike have Mason's arguments loudly to thank.

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Moran, Richard. *The Exchange of Words: Speech, Testimony, and Intersubjectivity.* Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018. Pp. 254. $105.00 (cloth).

Many of us can recall a moment when we realized—perhaps with some level of perplexity, or even disturbance—that the vast majority of our knowledge of the world has its foundations in the testimony of other people, rather than in our own personal experiences. The fact that testimony plays such a privileged role in knowledge formation places it at the center of epistemological inquiry, along with, for example, perception. In order to feel secure about the status of beliefs formed on the basis of testimony, we must understand how this speech act can provide legitimate reasons for belief, thus paving the way to knowledge. Testimony also has a range of other philosophically perplexing features. Unlike perception, for instance, testimony is a distinctively social and relational affair; it not only provides reasons for belief but also changes normative relationships between agents. In relying on the testimony of others, we count on speakers themselves—not just their

words—in forging our own epistemological commitments, and we are justified in holding them accountable for leading us astray. The testifier, in turn, counts on her audience in myriad ways; she cannot succeed in passing on her knowledge of the world via testimonial exchange unless she obtains a certain level of cooperation from her audience and their recognition of what she is trying to do. In *The Exchange of Words*, Richard Moran explores the link between this social/relational aspect of testimony and its peculiar and distinctive power to provide reasons for belief. The very fact that testimony involves such dependence on others might cause us to question its strength and legitimacy as a source of such reasons; however, Moran argues that it is this very feature which endows testimony with its epistemic significance.

The book is divided into seven chapters. Chapters 1 and 2 delineate the topic and focus of the book, as an exploration of the social/relational nature of testimony, with an eye to its distinctive epistemic significance. Though the details of the positive proposal are not introduced until later chapters, here Moran provides an initial sketch of his *assurance* account by tracing its philosophical ancestry and introducing its core commitments. In particular, this account can be seen as a development of Thomas Reid's picture of testimony as an act of mind which is essentially social in that it must necessarily be expressed and that this expression is directed to another intelligent being who plays a role in its completion. The account also follows a broader tradition (associated with Aristotle and Hobbes) of identifying the capacity for speech as a precondition for political life; testimony is understood as a manifestation of the authority of the speaker made possible by her participation in a broader institution and dependent on the recognition and cooperation of others. The rest of the book is an elaboration on this picture of testimony as an essentially social/relational phenomenon.

Moran thinks that the social/relational aspect of testimony provides the key to understanding its distinctive epistemic significance. His explication of testimony's power to provide epistemic reasons relies heavily on setting up a foil which fails to account for it: a picture which he calls the "evidential" view, according to which a speaker's testimony functions as evidence for the truth of the content of this speech act, thus providing the audience a reason to believe it. An evidential view can take many forms, but since Moran's discussion focuses largely on the influential Gricean account, it is worth briefly outlining that view here. Grice's account has undergone many iterations and developments, but here is a rough synopsis of one version Moran considers:

> In uttering u, S testifies to A that p just in case S intends
> 1. A to believe that S believes p;
> 2. A to recognize her intention that (1); and
> 3. that (2) provide A with a reason for (1).

On this picture, the immediate goal of the utterance is to provide evidence of the speaker's mental states, which in turn will provide evidence for the truth of the asserted proposition (given additional assumptions about the reliability and trustworthiness of the speaker). So, the speaker's testimony provides a reason for the audience to believe the content of her utterance by providing (indirect) evidence of its truth.

Moran claims that, by treating the speaker as a mere source of evidence, the Gricean picture obscures the social relationship that is so fundamental to testimonial exchange and the distinctive kinds of epistemic reasons it provides. In relying on another's testimony, we are not merely relying on a piece of evidence that assumes an objective epistemic status upon completion of the speaker's utterance; rather, we are relying on the speaker herself, and she is accountable to us if her assertion turns out to be false. Moreover, Moran claims that this picture cannot explain why it is the case that in order for testimony to serve its epistemic function, the speaker must understand what she is doing and do it intentionally. Not only would this condition be irrelevant if her testimony were merely serving as evidence—as any reliable connection between her assertion and the truth of its content would do, regardless of its relation to the speaker's mental states—but it would also seem to downgrade the status of testimony as a reason for belief. Any evidence which is produced intentionally carries the risk of being doctored, increasing its likelihood of inaccuracy. Not only does the Gricean view fail to explain the privileged status of the speaker's intentions in providing a reason for belief, but it also fails to explain why recognition of these intentions should provide a reason for belief at all, according to Moran, who asks, "Why cooperate with [the speaker's] designs on me, however benign?" (57).

Identifying the weakness of the evidential approach allows Moran to start to sketch out a picture of what a successful account of testimony should look like—a picture whose details are filled in throughout the remainder of the book, with continuous use of the evidential approach (for which the Gricean account serves as a paradigm) as a contrastive foil. In order to account for the way in which the speaker's intentions and understanding of her actions can serve to provide the audience with a reason for belief, we need a theory which brings out the social/relational aspect of testimony. Moran claims that his assurance account can do just that: the audience's reason for belief comes from the speaker's assurance—that is, her public assumption of responsibility for the truth of her statement. Assurance is by nature an intentional act; this very feature provides the audience with a reason to believe the testified content, because she knows that the speaker has intentionally taken on responsibility for its truth and is willing to be held accountable for it.

Chapters 3 and 4 argue against an old picture of the value and significance of sincerity in testimony—associated with the evidential view—and demonstrate how a more explanatory picture follows from the assurance account. The fact to be explained is what Moran calls testimony's *Sincerity condition*: "The Sincerity condition tells us that the speaker's utterance must be presumed to be sincere, as reflecting her actual beliefs (or intentions, etc.), if it is to fulfill the function of an act of telling, which is to provide a reason to believe what is said" (113). According to the evidential view, sincerity is epistemically valuable because it provides otherwise inaccessible access to speaker's beliefs/mental states, which in turn provide evidence about the world. But Moran complains that if testimony were merely a matter of a speaker's presenting evidence and leaving others to draw their own conclusions, this would leave out the responsibility that she assumes in testifying; it would not be her concern if the audience assigned the wrong evidential value to her words and formed false beliefs as a consequence. The evidential picture obscures the fact that in taking testimony as a reason for belief, the audience relies

on the speaker herself—rather than relying merely on the assumption that the speaker's beliefs correspond to her words. In contrast, the assurance picture takes a more relational approach to explaining the epistemic significance of sincerity. If the speaker is sincere, then her belief in what she says has survived her reflection, and she has taken up responsibility for its truth by presenting it as belief-worthy—not only for herself but also for others. Moreover, the assurance view provides an explanation of why testimony is successful only if the speaker understands what she is doing. A lack of understanding of the significance of her action undermines the key components of reflection and responsibility which provide the audience with a reason for belief in the testified content.

Chapters 5–7 elaborate on the distinctively interpersonal nature of testimony with a discussion of the nature of second-personal reasons. Second-personal reasons are those whose status as reasons essentially relates two people to each other as complainant and complainee; they can be contrasted with monadic reasons, which lack this feature. Moran claims that testimonial exchange provides distinctively second-personal reasons for belief. When a speaker gives her testimony, she transforms the relationship between herself and her audience into that of potential complainant and complainee, respectively. Should the speaker's testimony turn out to be false, the audience has a right to hold her accountable. The evidential view cannot account for this feature of testimony, because evidence—according to Moran—can only give monadic reasons; while one agent might be responsible for the act of producing evidence, once she has done so, this evidence becomes an impersonal feature of the world. Another agent's decision to assign it evidential weight is something which that agent herself ultimately bears responsibility for, and she alone is to blame if she gets it wrong.

The assurance view, in contrast, reveals the second-personal nature of testimony by treating it as a power to delimit one's claims and responsibilities—a power which lies at the heart of second-personal reasons. By taking on such responsibilities, the speaker forges a relationship between herself and her audience as potential complainant and complainee. Moreover, this picture of testimony brings out another relational feature which bears on its epistemic significance: the importance of reciprocity in establishing a distinctively testimonial reason for belief. While it is up to the speaker to determine the illocutionary force of her utterance (i.e., as an assertion rather than a question), the success of her speech act relies on the recognition of the audience. The speaker's testimony does not count as a reason for belief unless the audience recognizes the speaker to have presented it as such. In contrast to the evidential view, which treats the speaker as source and the audience as object, the assurance view shows how testimonial exchange involves two parties in a relation as interlocutors.

The Exchange of Words successfully highlights both the need to account for the social/relational aspect of testimony and the failure of much of the literature to give it due attention. Moran convincingly argues that approaching the topic of testimony from a purely epistemological standpoint invites a methodology which masks its essentially social and communicative character—treating speaker as a source and audience as a consumer, rather than as interlocutors with shared dependencies and responsibilities. However, while certain approaches—in particular, the evidential approach which Moran uses as a foil throughout the book—may

underplay certain social/relational aspects of testimony, it is far less clear that they ultimately lack the tools to account for them. In particular, his discussion of the Gricean approach glosses over a tool that is not only available to but also essential to that project—namely, an appeal to general norms of social behavior.

For instance, while it is true that second-personal normativity is not constitutive of the speech act of testifying on standard Gricean accounts, we can expect it to be derived from these accounts taken together with general norms of social behavior. The Gricean account defines the speech act of testimony in terms of speakers' intentional actions, which are plausibly subject to various kinds of norms—some of them interpersonal in nature. For instance, we might expect a second-personal norm prohibiting a speaker's intentional presentation of misleading evidence; if her audience is rational, such evidence will alter their credences in decreased alignment with the truth. Such an epistemic alteration will be disadvantageous in its own right on the assumption that there is intrinsic value in representing the world accurately, and it will carry risk of being instrumentally disadvantageous given that they may act on those credences to their detriment. An audience member would certainly have grounds for complaint if a speaker intentionally placed her in such a position; thus, appealing to general social norms provides the Gricean account with an explanation for speakers' responsibility to their audiences to testify sincerely. Detractors, of course, have room to push back against this explanation, and Moran touches on interesting potential weak spots in the Gricean approach. However, by glossing over a range of tools that are fundamental to the broader Gricean picture of communication, he fails to convincingly establish that it is unable to account for the second-personal normativity of testimony.

Moran's focused critique of his evidentialist foil also seemed to come at the cost of addressing some of the deeper explanatory questions invited by the positive proposal. In particular, why should one's assurance provide another with a reason to believe? This is an interesting question, and providing a satisfactory answer to it is crucial to Moran's project—yet he seems to take it for granted that assurance serves this function, without spelling out the details. For something to be a purely epistemic reason for belief, it must serve the goal of that action (perhaps knowledge, understanding, or maximizing true and significant beliefs while minimizing others). It is not clear how assurance—and its accompanying right of complaint—could advance this kind of goal for the audience. Complaining, after all, does not tend to improve one's epistemic state, and an audience member will only act on her right to complain after she has realized that the speaker's testimony was false and adjusted her credences accordingly. One idea might be that the speaker has an interest in avoiding such complaints and so will avoid testifying unless she believes her words to be true. But this sort of explanation lands us squarely in evidential territory—such facts about the interests of the speaker provide evidence for her sincerity which, together with assumptions about her credentials as an epistemic agent, will suggest that there is a reliable connection between her testimony and the truth. An alternative possibility is that assurance gives practical reasons for belief—but again, it is not clear how relying on a speaker's assurance in forming beliefs will serve an audience's practical interests, as a stable or general rule. Or perhaps testimony gives the audience a moral reason to believe, though this seems to get things the wrong way

around; on the assurance view, testimony introduces obligations for the speaker, rather than the audience. There is doubtless much to be said here on the part of the assurance view, and the topic is fascinating, but in order to be fully convincing, it would need a substantive account of reasons for belief and a deeper explanation of how assurance functions as a source of such reasons, without secretly slipping in evidentialist commitments.

Stylistically, the book is engaging and refreshingly readable; however, its easy conversational tone may come at the cost of structure. The same core set of dialectical points are revisited in each chapter, though from varying angles and perspectives; while this is helpful in reinforcing the major commitments of the book, it could be disorienting for a reader looking to find a streamlined argument for a particular thesis. However, one advantage to this approach is that it ties together a great deal of seemingly independent threads of literature in the philosophy of language, revealing common methodologies and commitments with regard to the social/relational features of language and testimony. Thus, it offers a novel and helpful birds-eye perspective on a large swath of literature and would make an excellent core text for an introductory class on speech acts or testimony, if supplemented by additional readings. Though many of the issues taken up in *The Exchange of Words* are not new, Moran distills them in a fresh and illuminating way by closely examining them against a common backdrop of social/relational considerations. Researchers approaching the topic of testimony from a variety of different backgrounds—including epistemology, speech act theory, and interpersonal normativity, to name just a few—will stand to learn much from this philosophically rich book and will come away challenged to reexamine their ideas about the epistemic significance of speech.

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Orend, Brian. *War and Political Theory.*
Medford: Polity, 2019. Pp. 240. $64.95 (cloth); $22.95 (paper).

This book aims to provide an interdisciplinary overview of war—focusing on three questions, what is war, what is to be done about it, and how will it develop in the future—that will be both accessible to beginners and profitable to experts. The book begins with a chapter on the ontology of war (addressing the first question), followed by one chapter each on realism and pacifism and three chapters on just war theory, one each on *jus ad bellum*, *jus in bello*, and *jus post bellum* (these five chapters together address the second question), and concludes with a chapter on the future of warfare (addressing the third question).

I presume that the primary intended audience of this book is students in classes on the morality, law, or politics of war, and I think that it could indeed serve as a useful textbook in such classes. It is well researched and sourced (although unfortunately it includes neither a bibliography nor an index), neatly organized, and stocked with examples, some quite detailed, that could serve to motivate and inform class discussions. I can, then, recommend this book to teachers of such classes, or to the proverbial "intelligent general reader" interested in a good