Talking About Youth: The Depoliticization of Young People in the Public Domain

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Abstract

In this paper we employ data from a comparative claims analysis of five major newspapers in nine European countries between 2010 and 2016 to examine discourse around youth. We look at the ways in which collective actors frame youth in the public domain and how this may provide discursive opportunities understood in terms of the extent to which public discourse portrays young people as agents of social change. More specifically, we argue that young people are depoliticized in the public domain. We find that public statements and more generally public discourse about youth tend to depict them as actors who do not have political aims or to focus on other, non-political characteristics. Our exploratory analysis shows that, while youth are fairly present as actors in the public domain, they are only rarely addressed or discussed in political terms. Moreover, where they are addressed politically it is in negative terms, with few political claims. At the same time, we observe important cross-national variations, whereby the depoliticization process looks to be further matured in some countries relative to others. This process of depoliticization of youth in the public domain, in turn, has important implications on their potential for acting as political agents and for their political activism.

Keywords: Youth, public discourse, depoliticization, political claims analysis

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Introduction

Public discourse on young people suffers from a fundamental ambivalence. On the one hand, scholars and pundits of various political orientations often note how youth are central to contemporary democracies. Such a discourse is present both at the national and, perhaps even more so, at the European level. Accordingly, states as well as the European Union are investing money to promote social and political investments, including through the financing of research programs. On the other hand, young people are often depicted in an apolitical or nonpolitical fashion. By that we mean that public statements and more generally public discourse about youth tend to depict them as actors who do not have political aims or, perhaps more precisely, they tend to focus on other characteristics and categories rather than political ones, such as for example in terms of age or generation, educational belonging, or otherwise in general terms as "youth," young people," "young adult," and so forth.

In this paper, we show the extent to which such a depoliticization occurs in the public domain and how this varies across countries. We do so by analyzing data from a random sample of political claims made by actors in the public domain between 2010 and 2016 in nine European countries: France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Poland, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. By public domain we mean an arena that "contains a large plurality of actors – including powerful policy makers and political elites as well as corporate actors, pressure groups, and civil society organizations and movements – who thus have at their disposal a common arena for making public their positions, mutual conflicts, shared agreements, and so forth" (Cinalli and Giugni 2016: 390). While not accessible to the same extent by all kinds of actors given some

have easier access than others due to their power, resources, reputation, or media attractiveness, and so forth, the public domain is nonetheless open to different actors and, most importantly for our present purpose, is relatively transparent in the context of liberal democracies with free media. Our focus in this paper is on what different kinds of actors say about youth in this arena.

Exploring whether we can find evidence for the depoliticization of youth in discourse in the public sphere has important implications for understanding the possible avenues for the politicization and political activism of young people. Their being framed in apolitical and or negative terms would suggest that larger than average barriers are present for their politicization in the public sphere so that young people would need to overcome these to become subjective political actors shaping their own destiny. This thus problematizes their politicization further and suggests a paradox at the heart of liberal democracies in that while governments and political bodies of many sorts emphasize youth participation and its importance, they in fact discourage it through the very construction of discourse and their framing of young people in the public domain (Grasso and Bessant 2018). We hope that analyzing these processes and examining extant evidence can bring further attention to these issues in contemporary societies and contribute to the development of more inclusive discourses that do not exclude young people from the political arena and decision-making contexts.

Theoretical background

The literature on political participation has shown that young people tend to be more disengaged from institutional participation relative to older people, for example in terms of voting (Blais et al. 2004). However, while studies show that young people participate in institutional activities less than older people, they are also often found to be more involved in extra-institutional

repertoires such as protest activism (Dalton 2008). With respect to the findings on youth disengagement, the context of socialization is often understood to play a role. For example, Franklin's (2004) study of turnout decline in Western Europe points to various factors including the rules under which elections are conducted, the party system structure, and the features of elections.

While Franklin's (2004) argument for the depoliticization of younger citizens focuses on elections, we can see that, along with the other works on young people's disengagement, there are various aspects of context which are cited as possible explanations. As Franklin (2004) suggests, it might be more fruitful to ask what it is about the context that means young people do not engage rather than asking why young people do not participate themselves. Many studies have noted how the more depoliticized context of socialization of generations since the 1960-70s has meant that subsequent generations have been less politicized and thus less politically engaged than the baby-boomer "protest generation" (Grasso 2014, 2016; Jennings 1987).

In this paper we develop this view by looking at a linked aspect: young people's representation in the public domain as conveyed by actors' public statements (but also through nonverbal actions) about youth. By depicting youth in depoliticized terms, discourse can be seen to serve to undermine their subjectivity as agents of political change. Indeed, recent work has also shown that while many governments tend to say that they support and encourage youth activism, that they also problematize and criminalize many forms of youthful political action (Grasso and Bessant 2018). In this way, taking away the political from young people deprives them of their subjectivity as actors shaping their own destiny and rather constructs them as helpless and needing support from state and various agencies.

In her work on the role of discourse for European social reform projects, Schmidt (2005) further notes how discourse matters for both gaining the relevant political support for initiating change but also to maintain it. Discourse on reform and social change is particularly relevant given political inertia and the need to push against the barriers of existing arrangements, including "against entrenched interests and in particular majorities resistant to change" (Schmidt 2005: 1). According to Schmidt (2005: 6) discourse is "first of all about 'what you say,' or the substance of ideas, which speaks to their cognitive and normative content, and about 'how you say it,' which relates to the 'truthfulness,' relevance, and applicability of its cognitive arguments, the resonance of its normative arguments, and the coherence and consistency of both cognitive and normative arguments." Moreover, all these factors are related to the extent to which discourse can influence public opinion (Schmidt 2005). Additionally, discourse is also linked to political communication and policy construction in the public sphere as well as the institutional context (Schmidt 2002).

Inspired by this perspective as well as by related work, we suggest that young people undergo a process of depoliticization in the public domain. By that we mean that the public representation of youth given by other groups, organizations and institutions – including and perhaps above all by the state – tends to focus on other aspects than politics and their role as political actors. Such a process of depoliticization may be seen in various aspects of the public discourse about youth: for example, in the fact that, when speaking about youth, both state and non-state actors refer to them using categories other than political ones; or in the fact that, in those rare occasions when political categories are used to refer to youth, public discourse tends to be negative towards them; or still in the fact that only a small part of the public statements about

youth refer to political issues; or more generally in the frames used when talking about young people.

We can only speculate about the reasons of this state of affairs. From a neo-Marxist point of view, it would be a sign of the domination exerted over young people, in particular by other age cohorts or generations. This would point to an existing generational conflict, which has often been stressed at least since 1968 (Goertzel 1972). Or it could simply indicate the challenges facing youth not only in terms of gaining access to politics – especially institutional politics – but also with respect to receiving the full recognition that they deserve as political actors. However, the purpose of the present study is not so much to explain why young people are depoliticized in the public domain, but rather, to firstly explore whether this process is reflected in discourse on youth.

While the causes of the depoliticization of youth in the public domain are unclear, and as we have seen above, a wide array of explanations have been suggested in the literature, the former has important consequences. As previous research has shown, the way in which a given group, especially if it is a vulnerable group, is represented in the public domain may influence to a large extent their opportunities for political mobilization and participation. This has been shown for example for the case of migrants and ethnic minorities (Cinalli and Giugni 2011, 2013; Giugni and Passy 2004; Koopmans et al. 2005). A similar effect has been suggested in the case of unemployed people (Giugni 2008). These works suggest that an overall negative public framing of these social groups and categories provides more closed discursive opportunities for their political mobilization.

The theoretical perspective adopted in this paper stresses the role of so-called discursive opportunities, which link political opportunities and framing perspectives on collective action

(Koopmans and Olzak 2004), as opposed to institutional opportunities, as providing a favorable or unfavorable context for political mobilization. The underlying idea behind this approach is that prevailing discourses – as they manifest themselves through political claims-making in the public domain – have different degrees of public visibility, resonance and legitimacy (Koopmans and Olzak 2004; Koopmans et al. 2005), and this, in turn, has an impact on the ways certain social groups – whether migrants, unemployed, or other specific groups such as young people – see themselves as well as their place in society. In a way, in this approach, what actors say is as important, if not more, than what they do. This is what has emerged, for example, in a study of the impact of political opportunity structures on migrants' propensity to participate politically (Cinalli and Giugni 2011). We expect a similar process to be at play with respect to youth and, more specifically, to be the objects of a process of depoliticization in the public domain due to what other actors say – or do not say – and in what terms they do so.

Data and methods

The data used in this paper stems from a systematic content analysis of five newspapers in each of the countries under study, following the method of political claims analysis (Koopmans and Statham 1999). The source selection aimed to include newspapers of different political orientation so as to avoid getting a biased picture of claims-making, while at the same time having high circulation and continuous coverage of the period under study. A comparative dataset was created by selecting and coding about 500 claims in each country (for a total sample of 4524 claims) covering the period from 2010 to 2016. The claims were generated by random-sampling newspaper articles based on a list of relevant keywords. All articles containing any of the three words "young," "student teenager," or "youth" (or their equivalents in each country's

language) have been selected and coded. Quotas by newspaper were applied (100 claims per newspaper).[2]

While most of the claims have youth as their object – that is, the group whose rights, interests, or identity is either positively or negatively affected by the realization of the claim – some of them have other objects. This is because we also coded all claims made by youth actors, regardless of their thematic focus. For this paper, however, we excluded these claims in order to allow for comparisons across types of actors. In other words, we only analyze claims dealing with youth as objects. We also excluded a small amount of claims that were not made in one of the nine countries of the study. In contrast, we include both verbal and nonverbal claims. When we speak of public statements or discourse, therefore, we mean interventions in the public domain that can take the form of speech acts of other forms such as protest actions for example. When the state is the claimants, furthermore, claims also include repressive measures and political decisions.

The analyses shown below focus on a number of specific features of claims. More specifically, we look at who makes the claims (state actors, political parties, civil society actors, including young people, etc.), the thematic focus of claims (confronting in particular political issues to other issues), the object of claims (specific categories or groups of youth), the position of claims towards those objects (positive, negative, or neutral/ambivalent), and three "framing" variables (the way in which the claimant evaluates the inequalities in their claim, the type of causes of the evaluated inequalities, and the proposed solution of the particular aspect of the assessed inequalities). Additionally, we examine variations across countries. The analyses in the first part are descriptive; we also run a multilevel model to test for various predictors in the

second part. Our findings, at this stage are mainly aimed at an exploratory investigation of the evidence for youth depoliticization in the public domain as described above.

The depoliticization of young people in the public domain

The first step in our analysis consists in examining to what extent young people are present as claimants – as actors of claims – in the public domain. Table 1 shows that for all nine countries. While our analysis focuses on general trends beyond country differences, for this particular aspect we provide a comparative look. As in the following tables, we emphasize in italics the most relevant information in relation to our main argument within the table rows.

Table 1

Overall, young people are far from being invisible and make it to the news relatively frequently as they contribute to about 15 percent of all the claims. The share of claims by youth actors, however, varies quite considerably across the nine countries covered by our study. The highest share is in France, where one quarter of the claims have been made by youth actors, while the UK displays the lowest share with only 5 percent of the claims. This difference, furthermore, becomes even larger if we focus on nonverbal forms of action. Amongst the other countries, Italy, Greece and Spain belong to the top of the ranking, while the remaining countries are closer to the lowest level. Perhaps the larger share of youth claims in the three southern European countries are linked at least in part to the severity of the economic crisis there. As we know, young people have contributed to the anti-austerity protests in recent years in these countries (Grasso and Giugni 2016). A more detailed longitudinal analysis of our data to suggest that this is the case for Greece and Spain, less so for Italy.

One of the key pieces of evidence for our argument that young people undergo a process of depoliticization in the public domain lies in the analysis of the objects of claims. The object is the actor whose rights, interests or identity are – positively or negatively – affected by the realization of the claims. While they all deal with youth, claims may vary in their more specific object. Table 2 shows the objects of claims broken down by type of actor. As we can see, only a small part of the claims deal with political youth groups and youth associations, and this regardless of the claimants. Most often than not, claims refer to youth as teenagers and school students, university students, or group-specific youth, with the relative weight of these three categories varying depending on the actor making the claim. Alternatively, claims also often refers to youth in general or other categories. Finally, for some of the actors – most notably, the state, other civil society organizations and groups, and other actors – disadvantaged or marginalized youth are also a relatively often mentioned object.

Table 2

To be sure, political parties and groups frames their claims more often than other actors in terms of political youth objects. Yet, even they do so only rarely, while the share of claims by actors other than youth themselves and having political youth groups or youth associations as their objects never exceeds 4 percent, which is the amount displayed by state actors. Interestingly, even youth pay themselves little attention to political youth objects. In this way, it seems that young people also follow the social norm that leads to their depoliticization by talking about youth in nonpolitical terms most of the time. It is likely thus that at least those youth who express themselves in the public domain – or at least who make it to the news – have internalized the fact that youth are generally understood societally as largely a nonpolitical or apolitical. Here, however, we should be wary of overstating this interpretation, as it could also emerge through a

selection process by the media with nonpolitical statements more likely to be reported in the newspapers that we are using as a source for our analysis. However, it would seem that this should be evenly spread so that this is less of a concern.

Objects of claims may be referred to either positively or negatively. In other words, the position of claims towards the object may be positive or negative. The former means that, if realized, the claims would benefit the rights, interests or identity of the object, while the latter refers to a deterioration of such rights, interests, or identity. The results shown in Table 3 are clear and straightforward: when talking about political youth, public discourse is on average more negative than when referring to any other group category. In other words, when claims by actors other than young people themselves – which we excluded from this analysis – have political groups and youth associations as their objects, such claims tend to be negative, whereas when they deal with other objects they are much more positive. For example, teenagers and school students have an average position of 0.58, while political youth objects score -0.06. A similar difference can also be seen for youth general or other youth as well as group-specific youth. This, we maintain, is strong evidence that young people tend to be depoliticized by other actors in the public domain.[3]

Table 3

As a further indication of such a depoliticization we can look at the thematic foci of claims dealing with youth, reported in Table 4. The first row of the table is the most important one for our present purpose as it refers to political issues. Overall, the latter amount to about 7 percent of all claims. This is by far not the most sizeable share of claims. The most important issues in public discourse about youth are by and large those dealing with education, with more than one third of all claims. Clearly, when debating about youth, most actors focus on educational

issues. Socioeconomic and employment issues as well as those pertaining to welfare, social benefits and social well-being – in brief, everything that has to do with the exclusion of young people from the labor market as well as others forms of marginalization – are also important.

Table 4

At the same time, we observe however strong differences across types of actors. As we saw earlier when discussing the objects of claims, political parties and groups as well as youth themselves refer to political issues more often than other actors. In contrast, the state largely contributes to the depoliticization of young people in the public domain as only a small share of its claims deal with political issues. The same can be said of other actors, but in this case priority is reasonably given to issues relating to the specific sector of activity, such as socioeconomic and employment issues for labor organizations and economy-related groups or, even more so, educational issues for education-related actors. Additionally, we also observe variations in other issue categories across actors, which can once again be explained at least in part by the specific field in which the claimants are active.

A final aspect where we can find signs of the depoliticization process has to do with the frames of claims. Unlike the issues or thematic foci, which refer to the topic addressed by a given claims, frames refer to the ways in which the claims are defined, evaluated, and interpreted by the actors. Table 5 compares youth and non-youth actors on three kinds of frames: inequality, diagnostic, and prognostic frames. They refer, respectively, to the way in which the claimants evaluate the inequalities in their claim, to the type of causes of the evaluated inequalities, and to the proposed solution of the particular aspect of the assessed inequalities. The latter two have received much attention in the literature on social movements and are seen as important strategic devices for mobilization (Snow 2004). As we can see, claims that are framed in terms of

inequalities in political participation form only a small part of all claims that have an inequality frame, both for youth and non-youth actors. Much more frequent are frames pointing to educational or economic inequalities. Similarly, claims that link existing inequalities affecting youth with political participation causes play only a minor role. Finally, political participation receives some more attention when it comes to evaluating the possible solutions to inequalities. In this case, while they are not the most frequent ones – just as for inequality and diagnostic frames, the largest share of claims refers to educational prognostic frames – political participation frames receive more attention, especially by youth actors.

Table 5

Apart from the small share of claims dealing with political participation frames – except perhaps when it comes to prognostic frames – the fact that youth actors activate frames – in terms of inequality, diagnosis, or prognosis – relating to political participation more often than other actors points once again to the process of depoliticization that we have identified above. Thus, all in all, the analysis of the frames of claims provides further evidence that youth are suffering from a depoliticization in public discourse. Such evidence adds to that previously discussed.

The impact of depoliticization on youth's claims-making

To conclude our exploratory analysis, we would like to investigate whether public discourse has an impact on the presence of youth in the public domain and on the modalities of such a presence. To do so, we regressed, on the one hand, a variable capturing the fact a claim was made by youth (dummy whereby 1 stands for youth actors and 0 for all other actors) and, on the other hand, a variable capturing the fact that a claims took the form of a protest action (dummy whereby 1 stands for protest actions and 0 for all other forms of claims) on a measure of the position of

claims towards youth objects.[4] The latter was created using the average position of claims by actors other than youth themselves towards youth objects in each country. This way of proceeding is inspired by previous research on the role of discursive opportunities for the claims-making and the political mobilization of certain social groups such as migrants and ethnic minorities or unemployed (Cinalli and Giugni 2011, 2013; Giugni 2008; Giugni and Passy 2004; Koopmans et al. 2005). In addition to the measure of discursive opportunities, we included in the models a variable pertaining to the youth unemployment rate (in percentage of the labor force)[5] and another one referring to the degree of disproportionality of the political system (the Gallagher index of disproportionality)[6] as a way to control for respectively, "grievances" and institutional opportunities. Since our dependent variables here are two dummies, we apply logistic regression. Country variations are taken into account by estimating random-intercept models.

Table 6

The results of the regression analysis, shown in Table 6, suggest that the ways young people are represented in the public domain profoundly impinges upon both the presence of youth actors in claims-making and on the use of protest actions by youth actors. As we can see, the measure of discursive opportunities has a strong multiplicative effect as the odds of having a claim made by youth are more than 15 times higher and those of having young people doing a protest action are more than 16 times with each increase of a unit in the discursive opportunities variables. The significance level is only at the 10 percent level ($p=0.056$, respectively $p=0.059$), but the size of the effects is very large. In other words, the more positive the public discourse on youth, the more likely that a claim is made by youth and the more likely that such a claim takes the form of a protest action. The impact of discursive opportunities, moreover, is net of the effect of youth unemployment rate and of disproportionality. This thus shows the importance of

discourse and the opportunities it provides for participation of various groups and as such that the depoliticization of young people in the public sphere which we have shown with evidence in this paper is likely to have an important pernicious effect on their ability to express themselves politically further increasing their political exclusion through inequalities in representation, discursive representation in the public domain specifically, in this case.

Conclusion

In this paper we examined available evidence to ascertain whether we observe a process of depoliticization of youth in the public domain. Our analysis, based on a random sample of political claims in nine European countries between 2010 and 2016 as a way to capture public discourse about youth (but also including nonverbal actions), provides evidence of the existence of such a process. To do so, we have addressed four specific aspects of public discourse on youth: the extent to which political youth groups and youth associations are the object of claims by other actors, the average degree of positivity or negativity of such claims, the share of claims about political issues, and the framing of claims in terms of political inequalities, causes, and solutions. We should stress that our analyses abstracted the role of the context. Yet, country variations in the ways youth are framed in the public discourse may be observed. However, here we were mostly interested in documenting a more general process of depoliticization of youth in the public domain, regardless of cross-national differences.

Our exploratory analysis shows that, while youth are relatively present as actors in the public domain, they are only rarely dealt with as political objects and even when so, in rather negative terms; they make few political claims, and are seldom framed in political terms. This process of depoliticization of youth in the public domain is likely to have important implications

on their potential for acting as political agents and for their political activism. Our multilevel modelling results show that, net of the levels of youth unemployment and of the degree of disproportionality of the political system, when youth are positively represented in public discourse they are more likely to intervene in claims-making and also to do so through protest activities. We interpreted these effects as an opening up of discursive opportunities for political mobilization by young people in the public domain.

Our findings have important implications not only for the political engagement of young people, but also more broadly for the ways in which they are to be included – or rather excluded – from policy programs at both the national and the European level. If youth, are mainly considered as an object and largely deprived from their agency as protagonists of social and political change, including by political elites, this is likely to lead to policy platforms which leave little room for them to be an active part in reshaping the society, for example in European social reform projects. If, as political rhetoric often says, young people are to be the carriers of the society of the future, they need to have a proactive place in political and public discourses, and should not simply be referred to as passive objects deprived of their capacity as political actors.

To conclude, we would like to note how our study has a number of limitations and our findings should not be overstated. First, the size of the sample of political claims is relatively small, especially when it comes to breaking down the data into more specific categories. This has restricted our possibilities to conduct further analyses on the political categories. Second, our multilevel analysis should be understood as an indication of the potential impact of discursive opportunities on the presence of youth actors and protest actions by youth actors. Third, it is hard to disentangle our argument about public discourse being selective in some regards towards youth from a media selection effect on the part of newspapers. Employing, as here, more than a

single source as well as newspapers of different political orientations avoids this potential bias to some extent but does not exclude the possibility altogether. Still, our analysis only captures part of the public discourse about youth, namely that which becomes visible through political claims-making in mainstream newspapers. The latter is only a subset of public discourses on a given topic. Other ways of representing youth are therefore not included in our analysis, as are both claims and other ways of representing youth that go through other channels, such as for example, social media. Yet, newspapers still capture a large and important slice of public discourse and therefore provide a good picture of public discourse about youth.

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Table 1: Actors of claims by country (percentages)

	FR	DE	GR	IT	PL	ES	SE	CH	UK
State actors and judiciary	29.63	25.18	40.50	30.67	29.15	31.26	35.00	27.06	35.46
Political parties and groups	9.03	15.06	4.98	8.89	12.33	12.63	15.65	14.29	6.77
Professional organizations and groups	9.03	7.53	3.62	7.56	16.59	6.83	15.00	10.39	17.13
Labor organizations and economy-related groups	4.40	5.65	7.47	2.89	4.26	3.52	4.13	2.60	1.99
Education-related actors	10.19	21.41	16.06	10.89	12.56	16.98	8.48	20.56	10.76
Youth actors	*24.54*	*10.12*	*18.55*	*19.11*	*11.21*	*16.98*	*7.39*	*9.96*	*4.98*
Other civil society organizations and groups	10.19	12.00	7.92	17.78	13.00	9.32	13.26	12.77	18.33
Other actors	3.01	3.06	0.90	2.22	0.90	2.48	1.09	2.38	4.58
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
N	432	425	442	450	446	483	460	462	502

Pearson chi2 = 405.891, Pr = 0.000, Cramer's V = 0.119

Table 2: Objects of claims by type of actor (percentages)

	State actors	Political parties and groups	Professional organizations and groups	Labor organizations and economy-related groups	Education-related actors	Youth actors	Other civil society organizations and groups	Other actors
Teenagers and school students	33.44	30.24	25.06	37.35	38.73	22.74	31.87	43.16
University students	21.26	20.97	27.61	17.47	39.24	37.00	8.59	9.47
Group-specific youth	17.41	20.53	20.65	27.71	10.15	17.15	25.00	16.84
Disadvantaged or marginalized youth	10.17	4.19	7.89	5.42	3.10	4.69	12.40	12.63
Political youth groups and youth associations	*3.78*	*7.95*	*2.55*	*1.81*	*1.03*	*5.23*	*2.10*	*3.16*
Youth general or other	13.94	16.11	16.24	10.24	7.75	13.18	20.04	14.74
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
N	1298	453	431	166	581	554	524	95

Pearson chi2 = 382.660, Pr = 0.000, Cramer's V = 0.137

Table 3: Position of claims towards youth objects (means)

	Mean	N
Teenagers and school students	0.58	1174
University students	0.42	801
Group-specific youth	0.54	660
Disadvantaged or marginalized youth	0.35	289
Political youth groups and youth associations	*-0.06*	*119*
Youth general or other	0.59	505
Total	0.50	3548

Notes: Claims made by youth actors are excluded.

Table 4: Thematic foci of claims by type of actor (percentages)

	State actors	Political parties and groups	Professional organizations and groups	Labor organizations and economy-related groups	Education-related actors	Youth actors	Other civil society organizations and groups	Other actors
Political issues	*4.47*	*15.89*	*3.94*	*10.24*	*5.68*	*13.54*	*4.95*	*1.05*
Education	37.29	30.91	21.11	39.16	66.27	35.56	16.00	16.84
Socioeconomic and employment	11.86	20.75	24.13	33.73	4.30	12.45	6.67	6.32
ICT, media, and Innovation	1.39	1.10	3.48	0.60	2.41	1.26	2.48	1.05
Welfare, social benefits, and social well-being	14.64	9.05	22.04	6.63	3.79	12.82	23.62	15.79
Creativity and culture	5.86	3.97	7.89	2.41	2.58	7.22	14.10	8.42
Religion and spiritual-related issues	1.23	2.21	0.70	1.81	2.24	2.53	6.10	0.00
Extremism	2.16	3.09	1.39	1.20	0.69	1.99	1.90	3.16
Violence and abuse	8.09	3.97	6.50	0.60	4.82	4.33	10.67	13.68
Law and order, crime	9.40	5.30	3.48	2.41	3.27	3.43	4.19	14.74
Military issues	0.69	1.32	0.70	0.00	0.17	0.72	0.38	0.00
Other issues	2.93	2.43	4.64	1.20	3.79	4.15	8.95	18.95
TotalN	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
N	1298	453	431	166	581	554	525	95

Pearson chi2 = 987.303, Pr = 0.000, Cramer's V = 0.185

Table 5: Frames of youth and non-youth actors (percentages)

Inequality frames	Other	Youth	Diagnostic frames	Other	Youth	Prognostic frames	Other	Youth
Generational	16.58	12.09	Generational	9.33	9.09	Generational	3.13	2.80
Political participation	*2.97*	*6.04*	*Political participation*	*3.85*	*8.26*	*Political participation*	*12.50*	*20.56*
Policy	9.28	13.19	Welfare-related	11.36	9.92	Welfare-related	19.79	14.95
Economic	18.32	15.38	Economic	19.27	21.49	Economic	11.25	9.35
Educational	25.50	25.27	Educational	26.77	25.62	Educational	38.33	29.91
Spatial/regional	5.82	4.40	Gender	4.06	6.61	Gender	2.71	6.54
Gender	5.69	7.69	Race/ethnicity/migrant	4.87	3.31	Race/ethnicity/migrant	3.33	0.93
Race/ethnicity/migrant	6.19	4.95	Spatial/regional	3.25	5.79	Spatial/regional	0.63	1.87
Religious	2.35	3.85	Religious/ethnicity	1.22	1.65	Religious/cultural	1.88	5.61
Cultural	2.10	1.10	Digital/technological.	1.01	0.83	Digital/technological	1.04	0.93
Digital	0.25	0.55	Individual/psychological	7.51	1.65	Individual/psychological	5.00	6.54
Other inequalities	4.95	5.49	Demographic/population	2.64	0.83	Demographic/population	0.42	0.00
			Other diagnostic frames	4.87	4.96			
Total	100%	100%		100%	100%		100%	100%
N	808	182		493	121		480	107

Pearson chi2 = 13.345, Pr = 0.271, Cramer's V = 0.116 (inequality frames)
Pearson chi2 = 14.878, Pr = 0.248, Cramer's V = 0.156 (diagnostic frames)
Pearson chi2 = 19.884, Pr = 0.047, Cramer's V = 0.184 (prognostic frames)

Table 6: Effect of discursive opportunities on the presence of youth actors and protest actions by youth actors (odds ratios)

	Youth actors	Protest actions
Discursive opportunities	15.73*	16.64
	(18.01)	(26.51)
Youth unemployment	1.02	1.05***
	(0.01)	(0.01)
Disproportionality	1.03	1.08***
	(0.02)	(0.02)
Constant	.02***	.01***
	(.01)	(0.01)
Log likelihood	-1570.697	-276.176
N	4102	538

*** p<0.001, ** p<0.05, * p<0.01

Notes: Binary logistic random-intercept models. Standard errors between parentheses.

Notes

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[2] For more details on the selection and coding procedure WP2 Report on Political Claims Analysis, see the integrated report on political claims analysis available at https://www.unige.ch/sciences-societe/euryka/files/4515/3854/9194/WP2Report-1.pdf.

[3] For the analysis of the position of claims towards the object, we cannot breakdown the data according to the type of actor due to the small number of observations in each country.

[4] Ideally, we would have created a measure of the position of claims towards the more specific object represented by political youth groups and youth associations. However, due to the low number of observations, we had to use a broader indicators referring to all youth objects.

[5] Source : https://data.oecd.org/unemp/unemployment-rate.htm.

[6]Source: http://christophergandrud.github.io/Disproportionality_Data.