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Violent Political Action during the European Economic Crisis: An Empirical Investigation of Four Theoretical Paradigms from Social Movement Research

Abstract

The recent economic crisis has witnessed a surge in demonstrations and other protest actions all over Europe, while in the most affected countries – such as Greece – the use of personal violence and damage of property became an everyday phenomenon. What are the drivers of violent political action in times of crisis? How do these drivers interact? And to what extent does context matter? These questions are examined in light of a new and original survey dataset carried out across nine European countries, all affected to different degrees by the financial crisis. Four theoretical paradigms from social movement research that account for violent political action are examined. This study looks beyond the staple explanations of relative deprivation and resource mobilisation, expands the analysis to include a relational approach – namely, conflictual irrelevance – and explores the soundness of an integrative approach that attempts to reconcile the traditional divide between grievance and resource-based models. By measuring actual behaviour rather than merely intention, the article furthermore contributes to the discussion over the participation of individuals in violent activism and gives empirical support to the dual pathways model of collective action for the understanding of violent political action during times of crisis.

Keywords: violent political action, relative deprivation, resource mobilisation, conflictual irrelevance, dual pathways model

Introduction

The literature on social movements and collective action has often associated the emergence of radical action repertoires with periods of social and economic turmoil (Buechler, 2004). According to this line of reasoning, the grievances that people develop when faced with deprivation and hardship fuel non-normative mobilisation and protest[1] (Wright *et* al, 1990). Recently, grievances have resurfaced as central elements in the study of popular contention due to the economic crisis that began in 2007/08 (Giugni and Grasso, 2015; Kern *et al*, 2015; Grasso and Giugni, 2016; Grasso *et al*, 2017). High levels of protest activity have been observed, particularly in those countries worst hit by the crisis. In some countries such as Greece, an escalation of violence – against both persons and objects – has been noted (Rüdig and Karyotis, 2013; Karampampas, 2018). These observations suggest a seemingly straightforward theoretical link connecting the rising tide of protest and violence with popular, economic and political, grievances.

However, a number of accounts have disputed the direct link between grievances and political action and pointed instead to different factors explaining the emergence of mobilisation and violence (Van Stekelenburg and Klandermans, 2013). In this paper we build on this previous work in order to disentangle the reasons that drive people to violent political action[2] during times of politico-

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[1] Wright *et al* (1990) distinguished between normative and non-normative participation; the former includes all political actions that conform to the norms (e.g. laws and regulations) of a given society (e.g. voting, trade unions, peaceful protest) while the latter violates the dominant rules of the society (e.g. violence, property destruction, terrorism).

[2] We understand violent political action as the episodic social interaction that immediately inflicts physical damage (light or severe) on objects, includes the threat and use of physical violence against persons and occurs as a by-product and/or in conjunction with non-violent protest (Diani, 2012; Seferiades and Johnston, 2002).

economic distress. In this way, the paper presents a comprehensive empirical test of the major theoretical approaches from the field of social movement research. Our analysis – following Tilly's (2003) distinction between behavioural, ideational and relational theories – examines the explanatory power of relative deprivation theory, resource mobilisation theory and conflictual irrelevance theory, respectively. Additionally, through the consideration of an integrative perspective, which attempts to reconcile the split between those emphasising the importance of grievances and those that highlight the role of resources for the rise of non-normative political action, this study further examines empirical evidence in support of the quotidian disruption, the "movements of crisis" and the dual pathways models.

To shed light on the micro and macro-level dynamics of this radical political phenomenon, we measure the actual participation of individuals in non-normative collective action using the data from an original survey dataset from nine European countries (France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Poland, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the UK) collected in the context of a collaborative research project in 2015 (N = 18,000). [PROJECT DETAILS REMOVED FOR PEER REVIEW]. The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows: first we review the existing literature and develop our theoretical hypotheses and we then discuss our data and methods in detail. Next, we present our results and finally we reflect on their implications with respect to wider theorising on political action.

Protest and Violent Political Action: Theories and Hypotheses

The question is still open with respect to what factors lead to the adoption of violent tactics and a consensus has not yet been reached. Violent protest used to be classified into the same category with other forms of deviant and anomic behaviour such as crime and mental illness (Oberschall, 1980). The rise of political process theories (McAdam, 1982), along with the normalisation of protest in the 1970s and 1980s (Van Aelst and Walgrave, 2001; Grasso, 2016), facilitated the demise of this perception and the development of an understanding of violence as a calculated and rational option (Tarrow, 1998). Later on, the profound influence of the contentious politics approach (McAdam *et al*, 2001) in the study of social movements led to the de-exceptionalisation of political violence as a *sui generis* phenomenon and to its reconceptualisation as an extension of protest tactics.

In this paper, we start by testing three theories of collective action that represent different theoretical traditions for making sense of violent protest participation. Tilly (2003) distinguished between three different strands of understanding on collective violence. According to this, there are the *behaviour people,* who highlight the significance of emotions, impulses and passions; the *idea people,* who stress strategy, ideology and costs as the basis for mobilisation; and the *relation people*, who elevate the interactions between different actors, institutional and non-institutional, to the centre of the study of political violence. Three theories epitomise the above taxonomy: relative deprivation theory (behavioural/grievance-based theories), resource mobilisation theory (ideational/resource-based theories) and conflictual irrelevance theory (relational theories). We turn to each of these below.

Grievance-based theories: Relative deprivation

According to the first account, grievances[3] that are "triggered by some breakdown, strain, or disruption in normal social routines" (Buechler, 2004, p. 49) are the instigating cause of collective protest and violence. The most important variant of this theoretical tradition has been relative deprivation theory (Gurr, 1970), which still has considerable impact in scientific research in social sciences (Smith and Pettigrew, 2015; Grasso *et al,* 2017).

A central tenet of relative deprivation theory is the assertion that individuals who perceive that there is a gap between what they think they are entitled to and what they get or end up getting from a polity, tend to engage in political action to either reduce or eliminate this acknowledged gap. Particularly, as Gurr (1968) explains "one innate response to perceived deprivation is discontent or anger", which eventually acts as a catalyst for protest (p. 1104). This is the frustration-aggression mechanism, which condenses the theory's position towards the emergence of civil strife and violence and can be summarised into a "more grievance breeds more protest" perception (Muller, 1985). As such, we expect that:

Hypothesis 1 (H1): *Greater anger is associated with an increased likelihood of violent political action*; and

Hypotheses 2 (H2): *Higher levels of life satisfaction are associated with a decreased likelihood of violent political action.*

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[3] Grievances are the material and ideational constituted claims of unfair treatment that may motivate individuals and groups to protest action (Simmons, 2014).

Resource-based theories: Resource mobilisation

Resource-based or political process theories developed as a criticism of the dominance of the deprivation perspective during the 1960s. Political process scholars not only rejected the notion of protest as an emotional reaction to grievances, but fundamentally recognised grievances as a relatively constant feature of modern societies (Jenkins, 1983). What is more, they identified violent tactics as purposeful collective actions that claimants employ to defend or obtain collective goods (Oberschall, 1978). Variants of political process theories such as political opportunity theory (McAdam, 1982) as well as resource mobilisation theory (McCarthy and Zald, 1977) can today be seen as part of the most dominant strand of theories for protest emergence.

In particular, the resource mobilisation approach of social movement theory emphasises the importance of resources, organisational structures and political opportunities as necessary for individual and group mobilisation (McAdam *et al*, 1996). According to this perspective, political action is a result of the availability of resources, rather than the absence of them – as deprivation theorists argued. However, it is the interaction of resources with a state's political opportunity structure that fuels or constrains mobilisation, as groups take advantage of political opportunities and respond to political threats in their attempt to advance and secure their interests (Della Porta, 1995). Hence, the theory regards the use of a violence as a strategic choice, a tactic that is pursued when the benefits of participation seem to outweigh its costs (Muller and Opp, 1986). Other factors that decrease the cost of political action are solidarity incentives, social networks and group identification

(Kitts 2000). Based on these key insights from the resource mobilisation approach of social movement theory, we expect that:

Hypothesis 3 (H3): *Group membership is associated with an increased likelihood of violent political action*; and

Hypothesis 4 (H4): *Higher political interest is associated with an increased likelihood of violent political action.*

Relational theories: Conflictual irrelevance

Grievance and resource-based approaches have been found wanting though, particularly with respect to those cases where either violence did not erupt despite the presence of root causes, or where violence remained low despite the existence of facilitating factors (Alimi *et al*, 2015). Inspired by the path-breaking analysis of McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly (2001), a new theoretical tradition developed, emphasising the dynamics by which the root causes exert their effect. This perspective underlines the importance of *how and when* the shift to violence occurs, by studying how different causal mechanisms interact to trigger the use of violent tactics (Bosi *et al,* 2014). Hence, a relational analysis pays attention to the "interpersonal processes that promote, inhibit, or channel collective violence and connect it with nonviolent politics" (Tilly, 2003, p. 20).

More specifically, Seferiades and Johnston's (2012) conflictual irrelevance theory focuses on the interaction between claimants and the state to analyse the rise of violent political action. The two authors argue that the outbreak of violence is critically intertwined with the notion of conflict. Hence, while conflict is recognised as the interactive relationship between challengers and the state that entails the

making of interest-entailing claims, violence is seen as the exhaustion of this relationship. Conflictual irrelevance theory identifies two patterns for the rise of violent political action in present-day democracies. First, as a response to the disruptive deficit, when individuals that feel unrepresented by traditional challenging actors (e.g. trade unions, left-wing parties) join the ranks of transgressive organisations[4] in order to make their claims heard (Diani, 2012). Second, as a retribution to the reform deficit characterising the contemporary neoliberal democracies, as claimants react to the reluctance of the state to respond to their demands (Goldstone, 2012). Consequently, when the two deficits – reform and disruptive – coincide, they produce a political vacuum "that tends to precipitate violent action" (Seferiades and Johnston, 2012: 6). As such, we expect that:

Hypothesis 5 (H5): *Transgressive group membership is associated with an increased likelihood of violent political action*; and

Hypothesis 6 (H6): *Increased blame for government for the crisis is associated with an increased likelihood of violent political action.*

Reconciling paradigms: Quotidian disruption, "movements of crisis" and dual pathways model

The long-lasting divergence between grievance and resource-based theories has produced a wide array of competing explanations for violent political action

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[4] Transgressive organisations are those that employ an innovative repertoire of collective action, as they employ claims and tactics that are unprecedented, confrontational and even unauthorised within a political regime (Tilly, 2000; Gillham and Noakes, 2007). In contrast, constrained movements use an institutionalised or routinised tactical repertoire that respects the dominant norms of a given regime.

through the years. Nonetheless, a number of researchers have not only challenged this perceived dichotomy, but also proposed perspectives *combining* the two approaches. Snow *et al* (1998) theorised quotidian disruption as the sudden breakdown of everyday life occurring when "routinised patterns of action are rendered problematic and the natural attitude is fractured" (p. 5). However, solidarity and social ties are also seen as central to the mobilisation process in addition to the suddenly imposed grievances given that despite the breakdown of routines, they remain strong and facilitate protest (Snow *et al*, 2005). Applying this scheme to the recent crisis, during which resources kept decreasing and claims increased, we can expect that when economic hardship disrupts everyday routines it becomes a quotidian disruption. Then, in line with the quotidian disruption thesis, we would expect that a combination of grievances and resources would act as a stimulus for the rise of protest and violence in times of crisis. Following this theory, we thus hypothesise:

Hypothesis 7 (H7): *The effect of grievance indicators on violent political action will be greater when people also hold political resources.*

Moreover, the "movements of crisis" perspective also combines different approaches. Kerbo (1982) differentiated between "movements of crisis" and "movements of affluence" and in her recent book Della Porta (2015) drew a clear line between anti-austerity/Occupy movements (movements of crisis) and the post-materialist "new social movements" (movements of affluence). Fuelled by anger and grievances, then, anti-austerity movements are expected to be more violent than their post-materialist counterparts. According to this line of reasoning, then, we anticipate that:

Hypothesis 8 (H8): *The countries most affected by the crisis will show the highest levels of violent political action relative to those less affected.*

Finally, the dual pathways model integrates the notions of grievances and resources. Based on the work of Lazarus (1991), who recognised collective action as a form of coping with collective disadvantage, Van Zomeren *et al* (2004) identified two pathways to protest: an emotion-focused pathway fuelled by anger and a sentiment of unfairness; and a problem-focused pathway stimulated by a cost-benefit analysis and the belief that issues can be solved collectively. Hence, while the former is recognised as an emotional reaction of individuals towards a perceived illegitimate collective disadvantage, the latter is seen as a calculated deed that people undertake when they believe they have access to enough resources to successfully stand up for their claims (Tausch *et al*, 2011). By this logic then, people are drawn to protest as a result of either grievances or due to their resource-based confidence that they can resolve their troubles. We thus hypothesise:

Hypothesis 9 (H9): *The effect of grievance and resource indicators on violent political action will be similar across the countries under examination.*

Data and Methods

In order to test our hypotheses, we rely on data from an original cross-national survey conducted in 2015 in the context of the [PROJECT NAME REMOVED FOR PEER REVIEW] project funded by the European Commission under the auspices of their 7th Framework Programme (grant agreement number REMOVED FOR PEER REVIEW). The survey was conducted in nine European countries (France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Poland, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the UK)

by a specialised polling agency (YouGov) with samples matched by quotas to national population statistics in terms of region, gender, age, and education level[5].

As noted above, we are interested in analysing which factors impact on violent political action. More specifically, we employ an indicator which asks respondents whether they had engaged in two forms of violent political action, by using personal violence (e.g. against the police) or by damaging property. We focus on those individuals who said that they had engaged in either or both of these acts in the last five years (i.e. during the recent economic crisis); thus, measuring directly actual protest behaviour rather than intention to protest (Van Zomeren *et al*, 2008). These questions represent a "step-up" from normative collective action to more violent forms of political engagement, which would often require breaking of the law. We combine the two indicators as only very small numbers of respondents carry out such violent political acts across the countries (between less than 1% to around 5.5%), which is in line with Della Porta's (1999) assertion that "the normalisation of some forms of protest goes along with the stigmatisation" (p. 91) of the more violent forms. We use Poisson models to try and better account for the small number of cases[6].

In order to capture each of the first three explanatory models discussed in our theoretical section, we employ two key independent variables per model, alongside interaction effects between the grievance and the resource indicators to detect their combined framework and check for the integrative perspective. Our first

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[5] The survey included a total N of approximately 18,000 respondents with approximately 2,000 N per country.
[6] For each country the percent engaging in one or more of these activities is as follows; France (4.66%), Germany (4.43%), Greece (4.58%), Italy (7.49%), Poland (7.20%), Spain (4.13%), Sweden (2.14%), Switzerland (5.07%) and the UK (1.07%).

independent variable for measuring relative deprivation (H1-H2) is anger (H1). Respondents were given a choice of emotions related to their current economic situation and asked to judge them on a scale of $0 - 10$ (0 feeling them not at all, 10 feeling them very strongly). Secondly, we use a measure of life satisfaction that asked individuals how satisfied they were during the time of the survey with their life on a scale from 0-10 (0 feeling completely dissatisfied, 10 feeling completely satisfied) (H2). To capture the resource mobilisation approach (H3-H4) due to the significance that the theory attributes to organisational resources and social networks, we include a binary measure of whether the respondent claims to be an active member of at least one political organisation (H3). The choice of groups included human rights, civil rights, environmental, feminist, LGBTQ, peace/anti-war, anti-racist/migrant solidarity and social solidarity groups/networks. To capture the notion of mobilisation and collective behaviour, active members were those who claimed to both belong to and also contribute towards an organisation (through volunteering or other unpaid work). Those who claimed only to belong to an organisation without any active contribution were deemed passive and coded along with non-members. Moreover, we measure political interest as a binary measure for those who are 'very' and 'quite' interested (H4). On the other hand, to test for conflictual irrelevance theory (H5-H6), we firstly use a measure of active membership in *transgressive* groups (H5). This was based on the distinction between normative constrained and non-normative transgressive organisations (Tilly, 2000; Gillham and Noakes, 2007). The transgressive group variable is a binary measure that accounts for active membership of respondents in Occupy or anti-cuts, anti-austerity-type movements and/or anti-capitalist and global justice

groups. In addition, we look at blaming the government for the crisis (H6) (0/1). To test for the quotidian disruption thesis (H7) we include an interaction between the relative deprivation and resource mobilisation variables. Finally, to test for the "movements of crisis" (H8) and dual pathways (H9) theses we check for country differences.

Across all the models we controlled for standard controls in political participation research (Grasso and Giugni, 2016) including: age, education, occupation, whether the individual is unemployed, interest in politics, political efficacy and left-right values (see Table 1 for details on all variables).

Table 1 here

Results

In this section we examine the evidence for and against our theoretically-driven hypotheses for making sense of violent political action during the economic crisis. Table 2 presents the results from six models: (1) a baseline model; (2) a model examining hypotheses H1-H6; (3)-(6) interaction models examining the multiple possible combinations of interest between grievance and mobilisation variables (H7). Our baseline model 1 presents two findings that remain robust across all the models. Those who have undertaken violent political action are more likely to be male (0.54, $p<0.01$), a pattern well-established in the literature (Schlozman *et al*, 1999). They are also more likely to consider themselves on the political right (0.004, $p<0.05$). On the other hand, we do not find evidence for any influence from age, occupation, education and unemployment.

We then move to examining the evidence for and against H1 and H2 and test for grievance effects by looking at the effect of anger and life satisfaction on violent political action in Model 2. Results show that when it comes to the anger variable, those who report higher levels of anger are significantly more likely to have committed violent political acts (0.04, $p<0.01$). However, with respect to satisfaction with life we do not find an effect. Therefore, when it comes to relative deprivation, our results support the notion that anger an important driver for violent political behaviour.

Table 2 and 3 here

To test resource mobilisation theory, we examine H3 and H4 that hypothesise that those with an active group participation and those with higher levels of political interest are more likely to be involved in violent political action. Results show support for the effect of political interest – those with higher levels of interest are more likely to act in this way in comparison to those with lower levels. Being a member of a political organisation also has a positive effect; hence, those who are active members are more likely than their non-member counterparts to have been involved in violent political action. Resource mobilisation is an important driver of participation in political violence. Therefore, evidence at this stage supports both grievance and resource mobilisation approaches. Whilst individuals have to be angry to carry out political violence, there is also evidence that this is not the only trigger. There is also clear evidence that active involvement in political groups also matters, providing initial support for the idea that this behaviour is not carried out

by individuals in isolation, but by individuals who are members of political organisations.

In terms of H5-H6 and the conflictual irrelevance approach, results are more mixed. As hypothesised, membership in a transgressive group boosts the likelihood of these violent political acts (0.93, p<0.01), supporting the idea that transgressive organisations do matter. However, our hypothesis is not supported with respect to blaming the government.

To explore H7 and the quotidian disruption thesis we interact the variables associated with relative deprivation and resource mobilisation in Models 3-6, including one interaction term only in each model. Evidence shows only one significant result but not in the direction hypothesised: a negative interaction between both anger and active group membership. This negative interaction suggests that higher levels of anger increase the likelihood of carrying out violent political acts for respondents who are not members of political groups; for those who are members, the relationship is, weakly, in the other direction. These results disprove the quotidian disruption thesis in this sense and show grievances are more relevant for those who are outside of organisations when it comes to mobilisation to violent political action. Despite the fact that the crisis disrupted the everyday life in the most affected countries, grievances and resources do not in this case combine to propel violence.

The "movements of crisis" (H8) and dual pathways approaches (H9) are examined by looking at the country differences. In the case of the "movements of crisis," we turn to examining country differences in violent political action as outlined in reference to Greece in Table 2. Here we can see that protest patterns do

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not match the severity of the crisis, as it would be expected by the "movement of the crisis" thesis. Hence, while some countries – such as Greece – experienced deep crisis, they faced lower levels of violent protest than those with much weaker crisis like Poland. Actually, there are no differences between the likelihood for participation in violent political action for respondents in Greece, Germany and Spain – countries with very different experiences of the crisis. At the same time, countries such as the UK have consistently lower levels in comparison to Greece, whilst Italy, Poland and France have consistently higher. A fact that challenges the clear-cut categorisation of movements in resource-rich and resource-poor and highlights the importance of the protest culture and the accepted repertoires of action for the manifestation of violent political action in each country.

To examine the evidence for H9 we turn to Table 3 and examine the country-specific models. Here we can see that on the whole the effects of grievance and resource indicators are similar across the nine countries of the survey. The above results also support those voices claiming that there is not a single universal pathway to protest participation, as citizens participating in collective action are not a homogenous entity but a heterogeneous mass with different characteristics (Vráblíková, 2015).

The most important findings to emerge out of our analysis is the negative interaction between grievance and resource indicators, which thus supports the idea of the existence of two independent pathways to violent political action: an emotion-focused pathway stirred up from anger and a feeling of unfairness and a problem-focused pathway stimulated by the abundance of organisational and other

resources in the hands of claimants; providing therefore clear empirical evidence for the validity of the dual pathways thesis (H9) (Van Zomeren *et al*, 2012).

Discussion and Conclusions

This paper was the first attempt to investigate the relation between the recent economic crisis and the emergence of violent political action that was observed in some European countries. The nature and intensity of the protest during the crisis era gave prominence to a recurring debate in the study of collective action: the place of grievances and relative deprivation as an analytical tool for the analysis of violent political action. Next to relative deprivation, we examined two alternative theories that try to account for violent protest, the conflictual irrelevance and resource mobilisation approaches, as well as three different models of the integrative paradigm on collective action: quotidian disruption, "movements of crisis" and dual pathways models. For that, we used an original cross-national survey conducted in 2015 in the context of the [PROJECT NAME REMOVED FOR PEER REVIEW], which was carried out in nine European countries – all of them affected to a different extent by the crisis.

Our findings confirm previous studies over the role of grievances in collective action, as individual-level feelings of relative deprivation have an impact on both normative (Kern *et al*, 2015; Giugni and Grasso, 2016) and non-normative mobilisation (Della Porta and Mattoni, 2014). The impact of grievances in motivating violent political action seems to intensify even further under negative economic circumstances, such as during the recent economic crisis. At the same time, the results corroborate previous studies over the consequence of pre-existing

networks and groups for non-normative and violent political participation (Nepstad and Smith, 1999). The strong effect of both grievance and resource indicators throughout the nine countries – regardless of the level of the crisis – on violent political action substantiates previous research over the closing of the protest gap between resource-poor and resource-rich individuals in negative economic contexts (Grasso *et al*, 2017). More importantly, this study provides clear empirical evidence for the validity of the dual pathways thesis and the co-existence of two distinct, an emotion-focused and a problem-focused, pathways to violent political action, further demonstrating a positive relation of non-normative forms of political action with both grievance (e.g. anger) and resource (e.g. group membership, political interest) indicators (Van Zomeren *et al*, 2004; Van Zomeren *et al*, 2012). The existence of two independent pathways to violent political action also challenges this literature that treats demonstrators as a homogenous entity driven through a single universal pathway to protest.

Finally, the small number of cases suggests that the results and further analysis should be treated with caution. Further research is necessary in order to ascertain if the prominence of the dual pathways thesis in the study of violent political action is valid, as well as to investigate whether it can be generalised to other comparable settings.

Acknowledgements

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Table 1: Variable Descriptive Statistics

Variable	Mean	Std.Dev.	Min	Max
Demographics				
Age	45.6	14.76	18	88
Gender (Male)	0.49	0.50	0	1
Education (Less than upper secondary)	0.23	0.42	0	1
Occupation (Manual)	0.23	0.42	0	1
Unemployed	0.12	032	0	1
Left-Right Scale (Left 0-10 Right)	4.90	2.65	0	10
Grievance				
Anger (0-10 more anger.)	5.76	3.28	0	10
Life satisfaction (0-10 more sat.)	6.00	2.34	0	10
Resource Mobilisation				
Organisation member (Active member)	0.19	0.39	0	1
Political Interest (More interested)	0.70	0.46	0	1
Conflictual irrelevance				
Trans. group members (Active member)	0.03	0.18	0	1
Blame Government (Blame)	0.21	0.41	0	1
n	13,531			

Table 2: Poisson Regression Models and Interaction Tests

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Age	-0.02	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(0.020)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.019)
Age.Sq	-0.00	-0.00**	-0.00**	-0.00**	-0.00**	-0.00**
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Male	-0.54***	-0.44***	-0.43***	-0.44***	-0.44***	-0.44***
	(0.077)	(0.072)	(0.072)	(0.072)	(0.072)	(0.072)
Education (low)	0.14	0.09	0.09	0.10	0.09	0.09
	(0.092)	(0.084)	(0.084)	(0.084)	(0.084)	(0.084)
Occupation (manual)	-0.10	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
	(0.088)	(0.081)	(0.081)	(0.081)	(0.081)	(0.081)
Unemployed	-0.14	-0.11	-0.10	-0.11	-0.11	-0.11
	(0.112)	(0.110)	(0.109)	(0.109)	(0.110)	(0.110)
Left-Right (0-10)	0.04**	0.07***	0.08***	0.07***	0.07***	0.07***
	(0.014)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)
Anger (0-10)		0.11**	0.18***	0.01	0.11**	0.11**
		(0.046)	(0.067)	(0.083)	(0.047)	(0.046)
Life Sat. (0-10)		-0.00	-0.00	-0.00	0.00	-0.02
		(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.022)	(0.031)
Org. Member		1.54***	1.72***	1.53***	1.61***	1.53***
		(0.076)	(0.134)	(0.076)	(0.180)	(0.076)
High Pol. Interest		0.17**	0.17**	0.01	0.17**	0.09
		(0.085)	(0.085)	(0.144)	(0.085)	(0.208)
Transg. Org. Member		0.61***	0.62***	0.61***	0.61***	0.62***
		(0.076)	(0.076)	(0.076)	(0.076)	(0.076)
Blame Government		0.03	0.03	0.04	0.03	0.03
		(0.083)	(0.083)	(0.083)	(0.083)	(0.083)
Country (ref=Greece)						
Germany	-0.05	0.12	0.13	0.12	0.12	0.12
	(0.159)	(0.162)	(0.163)	(0.162)	(0.163)	(0.162)
France	0.34**	0.53***	0.53***	0.53***	0.53***	0.53***
	(0.156)	(0.148)	(0.148)	(0.148)	(0.148)	(0.148)
Italy	0.63***	0.61***	0.62***	0.61***	0.61***	0.61***
	(0.131)	(0.124)	(0.124)	(0.124)	(0.124)	(0.124)
Poland	0.45***	0.65***	0.66***	0.65***	0.65***	0.65***
	(0.136)	(0.132)	(0.132)	(0.132)	(0.132)	(0.132)
Spain	-0.07	-0.17	-0.15	-0.17	-0.17	-0.17
	(0.153)	(0.152)	(0.152)	(0.152)	(0.152)	(0.152)
Sweden	-0.48**	-0.21	-0.20	-0.21	-0.21	-0.21
	(0.208)	(0.203)	(0.203)	(0.203)	(0.203)	(0.203)
Switzerland	0.14	0.42***	0.44***	0.42***	0.42***	0.42***
	(0.152)	(0.158)	(0.159)	(0.158)	(0.158)	(0.159)
UK	-1.05***	-0.68**	-0.66**	-0.68**	-0.68**	-0.68**
	(0.278)	(0.269)	(0.269)	(0.269)	(0.269)	(0.269)
Interactions						
Org. Member*Anger			-0.14*			
			(0.078)			
Pol.Interest*Anger				0.12		
				(0.090)		
Org. Member *Life Sat.					-0.01	
					(0.027)	
Pol.Interest*Life.Sat						0.01
						(0.034)
Constant	-1.53***	-3.36***	-3.49***	-3.24***	-3.40***	-3.30***
	(0.393)	(0.409)	(0.423)	(0.419)	(0.424)	(0.432)
Pseudo R-squared	0.09	0.19	0.19	0.19	0.19	0.19
N	13,531	13,531	13,531	13,531	13,531	13,531

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10

Table 3: Country-specific Models

	(Greece)	(Germany)	(France)	(Italy)	(Poland)	(Spain)	(Sweden)	(Switz.)	(UK)
Age	-0.05	0.07	0.08	-0.00	0.04	-0.03	-0.21**	0.02	0.17
	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.05)	(0.15)
Age.Sq	0.00	-0.00	-0.00*	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00	0.00**	-0.00	-0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Male	-0.84***	-0.46	-0.37	-0.09	-0.39*	-0.48	-0.30	-0.48*	-1.09
	(0.23)	(0.26)	(0.25)	(0.17)	(0.19)	(0.24)	(0.40)	(0.24)	(0.61)
Education (low)	-0.12	0.35	-0.20	-0.13	0.24	0.07	0.53	0.31	0.36
	(0.34)	(0.30)	(0.33)	(0.21)	(0.23)	(0.26)	(0.47)	(0.27)	(0.81)
Occupation (manual)	0.19	-0.10	-0.26	0.02	0.11	0.40	0.43	-0.20	-15.61
	(0.25)	(0.31)	(0.32)	(0.21)	(0.20)	(0.26)	(0.40)	(0.26)	(1312.10)
Unemployed	-0.53	0.16	0.35	-0.41	-0.21	0.04	1.85***	0.71*	-16.23
	(0.29)	(0.53)	(0.33)	(0.26)	(0.31)	(0.31)	(0.52)	(0.34)	(4374.45)
Left-Right (0-10)	-0.07	0.13*	0.05	0.06*	0.07*	0.08	0.15*	0.09	0.23*
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.07)	(0.05)	(0.12)
Anger (0-10)	-0.05	0.62***	0.11	-0.24*	0.07	-0.27	0.15	0.50***	0.11
	(0.16)	(0.14)	(0.15)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.14)	(0.21)	(0.12)	(0.34)
Life Sat. (0-10)	0.06	-0.00	0.02	0.00	-0.03	-0.05	-0.04	-0.01	-0.04
	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.09)	(0.05)	(0.12)
Org. Member	1.33***	1.21***	1.59***	2.25***	1.81***	1.09***	1.53***	0.92***	1.38
	(0.22)	(0.26)	(0.29)	(0.22)	(0.23)	(0.25)	(0.43)	(0.27)	(0.70)
High Pol. Interest	0.32	-0.05	0.06	0.04	-0.03	0.73*	0.21	0.61*	-0.34
	(0.26)	(0.31)	(0.27)	(0.19)	(0.24)	(0.30)	(0.48)	(0.28)	(0.67)
Transg. Org. Member	0.40	0.42	0.69*	0.52**	0.58*	0.10	1.17**	0.33	1.84*
	(0.25)	(0.26)	(0.30)	(0.19)	(0.23)	(0.26)	(0.45)	(0.27)	(0.73)
Blame Government	0.34	-0.02	-0.14	-0.07	-0.09	0.21	0.41	0.47	0.03
	(0.24)	(0.35)	(0.30)	(0.20)	(0.21)	(0.27)	(0.52)	(0.31)	(0.62)
Constant	-1.78	-4.76***	-3.88**	-2.88***	-3.17**	-1.85	-0.52	-3.82***	-7.66*
	(1.14)	(1.35)	(1.21)	(0.83)	(0.99)	(1.30)	(1.63)	(1.16)	(3.62)
N	1683	1551	1435	1621	1478	1720	1237	1474	1332
Pseudo R-squared	0.13	0.19	0.26	0.27	0.22	0.14	0.23	0.15	0.30
Log lik.	-296.74	-232.76	-218.38	-358.97	-330.53	-273.28	-112.60	-279.58	-57.48

Standard errors in parentheses
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$