**Theorising Rightist Anti-Consumption**

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**Abstract**

Although a large number of conceptual and empirical works on anti-consumption can be found in the marketing literature, the majority of these studies describe progressive reasons against consumption and pay little attention to rightist[[1]](#footnote-1) arguments. Building on multidisciplinary literatures, this paper identifies three rightist ideological groups that are likely to engage in anti-consumption: traditional conservatives, the radical right, and welfare chauvinists. We theorise rightist anti-consumption in relation to three tensions (global-national, novel-traditional, individual-communitarian), discuss the implications for marketing theory and identify possible avenues for further research. Consumer research should investigate political ideology as a dimension of anti-consumption, with particular attention paid to rightist reasons against consumption.

**Keywords**

Anti-consumption; political ideology; conservatives; radical right; undemocratic political consumption; welfare chauvinist; rightist ideology

**Introduction**

Starbucks is one of the most frequently studied examples of antagonistic consumer-brand relationship (e.g. Izberk-Bilgin, 2008; Thompson and Arsel, 2004). For instance in 2016, a feminist group picketed French Starbucks stores to protest against the refusal to allow women into their coffee shop in Saudi Arabia (BBC Trending, 2016). In 2018, the Open Wing Alliance launched a petition against the company over their use of eggs from battery farming (Change.org, 2018). In 2012, Starbucks also faced a boycott from Christian groups because its CEO announced that the company supported same-sex marriage (CNN Business, 2013). Since February 2019, the platform “i-boycott” targets the company because of its tax evasion practices (I-boycott.org, 2019).

This non-exhaustive list of examples illustrates the diversity of reasons for consumer opposition to a brand. More specifically, it resonates with the recent discussion of “problematic” boycotts generating confusion for the companies, but also moral dilemmas for the activists (Micheletti and Oral, 2019).

Special issues in the Journal of Business Research (2009), Consumption Markets & Culture (2010) and European Journal of Marketing (2011) highlight academic interest in anti-consumption. Over the last decade, consumer research has provided a detailed perspective of anti-consumption as the study of the “reasons against” consumption[[2]](#footnote-2) (Lee et al., 2009a; Chatzidakis and Lee, 2013). Arguably, most reasons against consumption that have been addressed in consumer research literature relate to progressive demands such as increasing equality or human dignity and protecting the environment. Conservative or reactionary demands receive less attention, mostly from research looking at the interplay of nationalism or religion, and anti-consumption (Castelló and Mihelj, 2017; Stolle and Huissoud, 2019).

In the context of re-emerging sociocultural conservatism (Geiselberger, 2017), several cases of anti-consumption originating from right-wing groups have been reported by the media (see Stolle and Huissoud, 2019 and Lekakis, 2019 or online appendix 1 for examples). Researchers describe the claims of these groups as *neoconservative* (Kozinets and Handelman, 2004), *parochial* (Castelló and Mihelj, 2017), *reactionary* *and patriotic* (Izberk-Bilgin, 2010), *nationalist and ethnocentric* (Lekakis 2017; 2018), or even *undemocratic[[3]](#footnote-3)* (Stolle and Huissoud, 2019). They unanimously call for further research on the matter, particularly in terms of the motivation behind these claims.

The present paper answers this call, and approaches the phenomenon through political ideology. It suggests that it is possible to distinguish between left- and right-wing anti-consumption. This paper focuses on theorising rightist anti-consumption. Although our theory focuses solely on anti-consumption in western countries over the last decade, the analysis includes a wider consideration of global current events and historical context. We consider rightist anti-consumption to be based on reasons against consumption that aim to protect or reinforce hierarchies, values that are considered traditional, and sources of authority that are defined as natural. This theory of rightist anti-consumption contributes to anti-consumption research in two ways: 1) It explains why rightist groups and their members could engage in anti-consumption; 2) It suggests that political ideology (rather than religion or nationalism) could be considered as a dimension of anti-consumption.

The paper has three sections. The first section defines anti-consumption and reviews existing research on parochial, nationalist, reactionary and conservative reasons against consumption. The second section clarifies our understanding of the nuances among right-wing ideologies, combining a historical analysis with an analysis of the current situation. The third section details the contributions this paper makes to existing research. Firstly, it theories three tensions between right-wing ideologies and consumption. Secondly, this paper encourages consumer researchers to take political ideology into account for a better understanding of what motivates anti-consumption.

# Anti-consumption and political ideology

## Targets and purposes of anti-consumption

Anti-consumption encompasses three non-exclusive phenomena: rejection, restriction and reclamation (Lee et al., 2011). Rejection results in stopping consumption of certain types of goods for functional, ethical or symbolic reasons. Restriction refers to the reduction of consumption when rejection is not possible. Through reclamation, consumers express their ideological opposition to consumption. Anti-consumption sometimes overlaps with consumer resistance, boycotts or avoidance, as well as green activism (Chatzidakis and Lee, 2013). However, these approaches are different from anti-consumption, which focuses on the *reasons* *against* consumption (Chatzidakis and Lee, 2013; Lee et al., 2009a). This paper therefore focuses on identifying those reasons against consumption that are related to right-wing ideologies. It does not look at how such ideologies promote themselves (Moufahim and Humphreys, 2015), or how ideological preferences lead to the consumption of certain products (Miller Idriss, 2018; Ordabayeva and Fernandes, 2018).

The literature on anti-consumption considers all actions against consumption in two specific dimensions (Iyer and Muncy, 2008). Targets (or objects) are the first dimension of anti-consumption. They can be specific (e.g., a particular product, brand, company or practice) or general (e.g., consumerist ideology, materialism[[4]](#footnote-4) or globalization). Purpose is the second dimension of anti-consumption: consumers may be driven by societal issues (e.g., environmentalism) or by personal issues (e.g., simple living).

Iyers and Muncy (2008) draw a typology of anti-consumers from these two dimensions and identify four categories in which consumers share the same reasons against consumption. First, global consumers (general/societal) want to reduce the general level of consumption for the benefit of society or the planet. Second, simplifiers (general/personal) aim to reduce their consumption and to build a “simpler and less consumer-oriented lifestyle” (Iyer and Muncy, 2008, p. 2). Third, market activists (specific/societal) avoid using a specific product or brand because it causes a societal problem. The last category is composed of anti-loyal consumers (specific/personal) who do not purchase a specific target because of its perceived inferiority or a previous negative experience with the brand or the product. This framework has proved very useful in helping to categorise manifestations of anti-consumption. However, it has limitations when analyzing undemocratic, nationalistic or xenophobic motivations for anti-consumption, or contrasting them with progressive motivations. For the Starbucks example cited earlier, this framework does not easily distinguish between the demands of the feminist group expressing their rejection of a decision inspired by patriarchal values; and the Christian group opposed to a LGBT-friendly declaration. In both cases, the company is clearly the target, and the purpose of their action is most likely societal. This would place both organizations in the “market activist” category. We posit that this framework leads to an oversimplification of the actual situation if we consider that these two actors are responding to different motivations and have different intentions that are worth studying in more detail. The first seems focused on attaining equality (between men and women) whereas the second aims to maintain inequalities (between LGBT and heterosexual people). We propose that this limitation can be addressed by considering political ideology in addition to the target.

## Ideology in consumer research

Ideology is a disputed concept in politics that has long been used in different pejorative ways (see Freeden, 2006; Maynard and Mildenberger, 2016 for detailed analysis of this concept and its evolution over time). Although debates continue, scholars converge towards a definition of ideology as a “non-pejorative and broad concept that refers to a diverse range of idea systems that influence political and social thought and behaviour” (Maynard and Mildenberger, 2016, p. 578). This study builds its argument on this non-pejorative definition.

Marketing scholars have examined the interplay between an individual’s consumption practices and their political ideology (Crockett and Wallendorf, 2004; Stolle et al., 2005). Consumption practices appear as a political act (Fontenelle, 2013), reflecting personal ideology (Crockett and Wallendorf, 2004). This line of reasoning is based on Bourdieu’s analysis of consumption as the expression of a socially constructed taste, which creates and maintains social relationships and hierarchies (Bourdieu, 1979). What is considered a legitimate form of consumption in a given context is usually the expression of the taste and ideology of the dominant class (Bourdieu, 1979). Objects not only reflect their users’ ideology, they also work as frameworks that guide interpretation by consumers, and can be ideologically invested (Miller, 2010). For instance, Anonymous have invested a commodity (Guy Fawkes mask) with anti-capitalist ideology (Kaulingfreks and Kaulingfreks, 2013). In sum, there is strong evidence that political ideology influences consumer behaviour, but does not necessarily make consumers adopt progressive, environmental, or inclusive purposes. Indeed, political consumerism is distinct from ethical consumerism, as unlike ethical concerns, political ideology can lead to supporting far-right organizations (Parsons et al., 2017). This raises the question of the motivations behind their behaviour.

In addition to looking at the influence of political ideology in consumption practices, a second stream of thought concerns the delineation of consumerism as an ideology (Binkley and Littler, 2008; Gilbert, 2008; Rumbo, 2002). Some researchers focus on the ideology of marketing as a capitalist and neoliberal discipline that aims to maximise the use of consumers’ resources for the benefit of corporations and shareholders (Fitchett et al., 2014; O’Reilly, 2006), and is “based on notions of a free market economy, consumerism and individualism.” (Lee et al., 2009b, p.7). Historians associate consumerist ideology with freedom of choice, the abundance of goods, the expression of social values through material possessions, upsetting traditional hierarchies and a desire for novelty (Stearns, 1997). In this politicization of consumption, consumerist ideology is considered to be the value system that holds global capitalism together (Sklair, 2002). Given the importance of political ideology in consumer behaviour, it seems logical to expect that political ideology drives some of the reasons against consumption.

## Rightist reasons against consumption and political ideology

Anti-consumption can be the expression of consumers’ ideological opposition to consumption (Lee et al., 2011). In 2018, Edelman reported an increase in the share of the population that considered the political position of brands when shopping. This number rose from 51% in 2017 to 64% of the population in 2018 (Edelman, 2018). Research on political consumers shows that both right- and left-leaning voters are likely to boycott (Baek, 2010; Copeland, 2014). As Stolle and Huissoud (2019) noted, consumer actions are not always “used to achieve more equality, enhance human and animal rights and protect the environment, but also to discriminate, spread hatred, pit groups against each other, and practice exclusion” (p. 625). Yet marketing research tends to focus on progressive groups and individuals (Cambefort and Pecot, 2017; Castelló and Mihelj, 2017; Stolle and Huissoud, 2019). There are different possible explanations for this. Stolle and Huissoud (2019) mention a conceptual and methodological apparatus that is designed to facilitate research on ethical and environmental anti-consumption. Like in sociology, marketing academics also tend to be socially closer to progressive groups and have easier access to them than to right-wing groups (Blee and Creasap, 2010). As explained above, consumerist ideology is strongly associated with neoliberalism. The hegemony of neoliberalism over the right wing may also have made it harder for scholars to consider the reactionary critique of liberalism and globalization (Geiselberger, 2017; Hawley, 2016) and its impact on consumerist ideology.

While we do subscribe to this progressive bias, existing research on reactionary, nationalist, bigoted or conservative forms of anti-consumption should also be acknowledged and are indeed visible in the media (see examples in online appendix 1).

Historical analysis of 18th and 19th century rejection of consumption shows that early opposition to consumerist ideology usually stemmed from an attachment to religious or traditional values (e.g., rejection of worldly pleasures, a desire to maintain an established hierarchy, or suspicion towards anything new and/or foreign) (Stearns, 2006). Extant research has looked at anti-Jewish boycotts over time (cf. review in Stolle and Huissoud, 2019), or the boycotts by the Ku Klux Klan (KKK) in America (Blee, 1991). Pioneering work on anti-globalization mentioned attacks on global neoliberalism by right-wing promoters of a white, masculine and Christian America (Rupert, 2000). Recent qualitative research at the interface of politics and marketing discusses several cases such as the boycotts of Halal products in England, of Catalan products in Spain, and of German products in Greece (Lekakis, 2019); or the boycotts of Disney by conservatives in different countries (Micheletti and Oral, 2019). Authors look at the phenomenon through the lens of religion, nationalism, racism, and/or attachment to traditions. Table 1 is a reduced version of a more detailed table that integrates existing work in consumer research and political science (see online appendix 2). The categories can sometimes overlap (for example, consumer racism also concerns the protection of established hierarchies, Ouellet, 2007). We have tried to acknowledge these overlaps in our description of the reasons against consumerism, and have ultimately organised them based on the conceptual lens chosen by the aforementioned authors.

**Table 1 - Anti-consumption driven by religious, nationalist and traditional criticism**

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Authors** | **Countries** | **Purpose** | **Target** | **Reason against consumption/anti-consumption behaviour** |
| **Example of Religious criticism** | | | | |
| Izberk-Bilgin (2012) | Turkey | Personal | Specific | Brand avoidance and anti-brand actions against those considered as “infidel”. |
| Sandıkcı and Ekici (2009) | Emergent countries | Personal | Specific | Rejection of brands driven by conservative ideas (“chauvinistic nationalism” and “religious fundamentalism”), and by a reaction to American cultural domination (“predatory globalization”). |
| Shamir and Ben Porat (2007) | Israel; United Kingdom | Societal | General | Religious groups use their purchasing power to reshape the public sphere in a secular-religious struggle, for instance over appropriate rest days in Israel and in the UK. |
| Steger (2013) | Global | Societal | General | Resistance to market globalism building around the community of believers, and is ready to use violence (i.e. Al-Qaeda, fundamentalist Christian groups, Sikh movements, Falun Gong, Aum Shinrikyo). |
| **Examples of Nationalist / Ethnocentric criticism** | | | | |
| Lekakis (2017) | Greece | Societal | General | Ethnocentric consumption as an answer to austerity and crisis. It is related to economic nationalism and could lead to very different outcomes: create a civic consciousness or create polarisation between insiders and outsiders. |
| Varman and Belk (2009) | India | Personal | Specific | Nationalist ideology at the origin of anti-consumption of a Western symbol (Coca Cola). |
| **Examples of Traditional / Authoritarian criticism** | | | | |
| Johnson and Grier (2017) | Western countries | Societal | Specific | Perceive as disrupting an established privilege can lead to anti-consumption reaction from the privileged groups (eg. Reaction against Quick burgers over Halal meat in France). |
| Ostberg (2006) | Sweden | Societal | General | Traditional masculine elite reaffirms a traditional masculinity in reaction to a perceived feminized consumption ethos. |

The aggregation and cross-analysis of these different papers show that Iyer and Muncy (2008) bi-dimensional framework permits the classification of these anti-consumption cases. Similar targets (specific or general) and similar purposes (societal or personal) can be identified. However, we would end up using the same category for “women who self-identify as lovers of the natural world” (Dobscha, 1998), the Mormons (Belk,1994), and the ethnocentric consumer campaign (Lekakis, 2017). The reasons against listed in Table 1 show motivations that are radically different from those usually considered in anti-consumption research: consumers are against the homogenization of values, against foreign influence, against the secularization of society, but also seek to protect traditions and privileges or maintain inequalities. Some authors point out this entanglement, although no theoretical solution has emerged (Kozinets and Handelman ,2004[[5]](#footnote-5)). Research on religiously inspired anti-consumption shows that it combines emancipatory claims against a Western cultural imperialism, as well as the conservative rejection of a secular society (Izberk-Bilgin, 2012; Sandikci and Ekici, 2009; Shamir and Ben Porat, 2007). Research into nationalism yields similar conclusions: the same campaign can be built on a progressive narrative aiming to build civic consciousness, or a regressive narrative that aims to achieve the exclusion of foreign goods (Lekakis 2017; 2018; 2019). Similarly, ethnocentric consumers can reject foreign products out of xenophobia or to protect the environment (Castelló and Mihelj, 2017). Finally, racialised consumerism (i.e. political consumerism based on race) can be both an emancipatory tool for minorities and a way to further divide populations (Park, 2019). In short, these examples show the need to further distinguish between the motivations driving these forms of anti-consumption.

Our integration of existing work shows a wide range of unexplored reasons against consumption, but also reveals that religion, nationalism and traditionalism all make similar critiques of consumption. We suggest that the use of political ideology rather than other variables facilitates the categorisation of these reasons against, and permits their differentiation from more progressive or emancipatory manifestations of anti-consumption. Such ideological distinction has proved useful in sociology to distinguish between social movements (Blee and Creasap, 2010). Prior work in this discipline differentiates conservative right-wing from progressive left-wing social movements based on the position they take on equality and participation. While conservatives aim to maintain their privilege or to increase inequalities based on traditions or status, progressive movements seek greater equality (Dietrich, 2014; Lo, 1982). We therefore argue that political ideologies could be a variable that allows distinguishing among the motivations behind anti-consumption, more than other individual variables such as religion. The following section looks more closely at the diversity of ideologies on the right wing of the political spectrum.


# Clarifying rightist ideologies

Marketing scholars interested in anti-consumption have paid little attention to the distinction between the right, conservatives, capitalists and neoliberals. This is not surprising as for the last 50 years, neoliberalism has largely shaped our understanding of the right wing (Steger, 2013). This study clarifies this question by using the political science literature to examine the long-term evolution of conservatism and its different nuances. We then focus on the current situation in Western countries, using theoretical frameworks and empirical studies of the electorate.

## At the origin of rightist ideologies: a reaction against the Enlightenment

Although we use *rightist* as a generic category, we must go back to the very notion of conservatism in which most current rightist ideologies find their origin, and from which they have evolved – namely the reaction to the Enlightenment. The following discussion of conservatism builds on two thorough analyses of conservatism and its evolution (Heywood, 2007; O’Sullivan, 2013). As a political ideology, conservatism expresses both the desire to preserve and doubts about change. Political scientists are able to list the central tenets of conservatism (Figure 1). However, they acknowledge the existence of different tendencies among conservatives that adhere to each of these central tenets to various degrees (Heywood, 2007).

**Figure 1 - The tenets of conservatism**




In a reaction against collectivism, some conservatives joined forces with economic libertarians in the second half of the 20th century in an attempt to combine the free market with traditional morality (Gamble, 2013). This neoliberalism, or liberal new right, has gained hegemony over the right wing since the 1980s (Steger, 2013), thus weakening certain core values of conservatism such as the respect for traditional institutions, or the submission of the individual to organic society (Heywood, 2007). However, this does not mean that all conservatives share similar views. One branch of conservatives remain opposed to both social and economic liberalism (Levinson et al., 2016; Meyer, 1964). There are even dissensions among neoliberals. A group may give priority to the free market (e.g., liberal conservatives like Hayek). This group will face opposition from further groups who prioritise organic society (e.g., Scruton) in reaction to the evolution of Western societies in the 1960s and 1970s, which they consider to be too permissive and too fragmented (Hawley, 2016; Heywood, 2007; O’Sullivan, 2013).

The tacit assumption that consumers sharing rightist values are unlikely to engage in anti-consumption underestimates the diversity of rightist thoughts, and particularly the current right-wing criticism of neoliberalism, materialism and globalization in Europe and in the United States (Gilbert, 2008; Hawley, 2016). This brief overview is important because it shows that categories are not static. Recent analyses of the situation in the US, the UK, Continental Europe, and even India, tend to show that after decades of neoliberalism domination of the right, a more traditional conservatism is re-emerging (Geiselberger, 2017; Hawley, 2016). In the following section, we look at the current situation in more detail and suggest focusing on three ideological groups.

## Seizing the phenomenon of rightist anti-consumption: three ideological groups

Existing ideologies are represented using spatial and non-spatial approaches. The dominant spatial approach consists mostly of unidimensional or bi-dimensional maps (Maynard and Mildenberger, 2016). Given that our objective is primarily to identify right-wing ideological groups, we rely on a spatial representation developed by Herbert Kitschelt, a renowned expert on the right wing. At the end of the 1990s, he designed a bi-dimensional representation of the European political panorama to illustrate three ideal types of positions that new radical right parties could adopt in the future. He combines an economic dimension relating to debates around the allocation of resources (reliance on the state or market) with a sociocultural dimension relating to debates about what makes a community (liberal – authoritarian). He adds that the sociocultural dimension - has gained salience and recent analysis tends to confirm this, with the increasing electoral weight of an authoritarian right (Oesch and Rennwald, 2018). In this framework, he presents several examples of ideal types of positions for right-wing parties: moderate conservatives, radical right, welfare chauvinists, and anti-statist populists (Figure 2). For the purpose of this paper, we have excluded the populist anti-statists (the fourth group) from our analysis, as their main characteristic is to embrace the market in opposition to the state. This makes them unlikely to engage in actions against actors of the market (Kitschelt, 1997).

**Figure 2 - Ideal type positions for right-wing ideological families (sources: Kitschelt, 1997, for the positions; Harteveld, 2016, for electoral scores[[6]](#footnote-6)).**

## The Moderate Conservatives

The first ideological group is composed of moderate conservatives. The individuals and groups that identify with this position are likely to share pro-market views about the economy (Gross et al., 2011). Their belief that a free market can also serve as an instrument of discipline (Heywood, 2007) generally leads them to reject collectivism and socialism (Blee and Creasap, 2010). From a sociocultural perspective, they tend to be patriotic and to show little enthusiasm for supranational institutions such as the United Nations or the European Union. They are traditionalists, a trait that is sometimes combined with religion. They generally want to preserve institutions and minimise social reforms (Heywood, 2007). There are at least two obvious tensions within this group. The first occurs between freedom and traditions, affected by the belief that individual freedom must be associated with faith to avoid “disorderly” lifestyles such as rampant materialism or adultery (Femia, 2012). A second opposition occurs between the now global free market and the protection of national economies (Heywood, 2007; O’Sullivan, 2013). From a political and organizational perspective, the collectives representing this ideology are respectful of democracy and of constitutions. They would not be automatically classified as “undemocratic” in their actions, although their motivations could lead to reinforcing existing inequalities. The political parties representing this ideology tend to have vertical structures with democratic decision processes. In sum, this first ideological group gathers individuals that have accepted economic liberalism but remain conservative on sociocultural issues. They are very unlikely to express anti-consumption behaviour against the foundational aspects of the capitalist consumer society (e.g., reasons against capitalism, globalization, liberalism, individualism, etc.). However, they could engage in anti-consumption against specific targets (companies, brands, products, practices, etc.). This group is more likely to prioritise sociocultural issues in relation to authoritarianism, such as refusing to buy a brand that is blasphemous, makes fun of national symbols (or threatens the nation, as shown by Lekakis (2019) in her analysis of the Spanish boycott of Catalan products), challenges traditional values (e.g., gender-neutral toys for children, dating apps for married couples), is openly specific to a population that is considered to be outsiders by this group (e.g., a restaurant serving Halal meat, see Johnson et al., 2017), or more broadly challenges the established ethnic, gender or social class hierarchies (Varul, 2013).

## The Radical right

The second ideological group is the radical right. The individuals and groups associated with this position have a mixed position on the economy that can even be contradictory to a certain extent. They can promote capitalism inside the national borders, and at the same time advocate protectionism outside the national borders (Rydgren, 2007). Haider’s policies in Carinthia (Austria) provide examples of radical right-wing interventionism in the economy: lowering rents and the cost of access to energy, supporting small businesses and providing allowances for having children (Minkenberg, 2001). People in this group also tend to oppose multinational corporations while supporting “autochthonous” enterprises (Zaslove, 2008). They are supporters of the welfare state but limit this support to the ethnic group that they consider to be legitimate members of their society (Griffin, 2000; Rydgren, 2007), and are definitely more statist than traditional conservatives. From a sociocultural perspective, they share an ethno-nationalist view, based on a mythical national past (Rydgren, 2007). Their nation is not necessarily a country, but can be a region in the case of Vlaams Blok. They oppose patriots to globalists in a dualistic vision of society, and claim the right to protect national cultural purity from external influences (Rydgren, 2007; Zaslove, 2008). They justify the exclusion of others by a so-called “right to difference”. In this system, different cultures are perceived as incommensurable, so exclusion and segregation are the only way to protect the purity of individual identity (Betz and Johnson, 2004). They tend to oppose liberal values (Eatwell, 2000: 443; Mudde, 2013), although in the most secular countries, they can combine strong anti-immigration stances with more progressive views on gender equality and homosexuality (Daenekindt et al., 2017). Those focused on authoritarianism strongly support the rehabilitation of law, order, family and traditional values in reaction to postmodernity (Ignazi, 2003). They aim to undo the social changes associated with modernity, and more particularly the emphasis on the individual rather than the nation (Minkenberg, 2003, p. 151). Individual rights are secondary compared to the national community (Minkenberg, 2003). They are also anti-materialist. For the radical right, materialism promotes private interest at the expense of national solidarity and homogeneity (Fennema, 2005). An important aspect of the collective bodies representing this ideology is that they clearly engage in a cultural battle against liberal values that makes them more likely to act against consumption as part of this fight. This originates from the intellectual French New Right’s appropriation of the Gramscian concept of cultural hegemony in the late 1960s (Rydgren, 2007). They pursue the objective of “filling terms of public debate with a right-wing definition of a homogeneous nation, a strong state and discrimination against all things ‘foreign’” (Minkenberg, 2000: 180). From a political and organizational perspective, they tend to favor plebiscitary organizations more than participative ones (Della Porta, 2017). They prefer strong leadership and clear decisions over compromise (Eatwell, 2004). However, their political parties engage in democratic processes, respect the constitution and officially reject violence as a modus operandi (Mudde, 2013). In sum, this second ideological group gathers individuals and groups that are likely to express reasons against consumption in general, against globalization and liberalism, in the same way as the global consumers or simplifiers described by Iyer and Muncy (2008). However they differ insofar that the radical right are more likely to express these behaviours for different reasons, such as the protection of the national ethos and community traditions or the maintenance of established hierarchies (racial, gendered, etc.). They can also show anti-consumption behaviour against specific targets for reasons similar to moderate conservatives, with a stronger emphasis on nationalism, and the more statist individuals will display a weaker commitment to the market and to capitalism. Unlike those of the first ideal type, these groups are more likely to put forward “undemocratic” reasons against (Stolle and Huissoud, 2019).

## The Welfare Chauvinists

The third ideological group is the welfare chauvinists. They draw their ideological background from the most radical conservatives of the New Right and from fascism (Hawley, 2016; Ignazi, 1992; Eatwell, 2013). In terms of the economy, the individuals and groups close to this position reject both communism and liberalism (Varga, 2014). They particularly oppose neoliberalism, which they accuse of increasing poverty in their respective nations, and promote the restriction of the welfare state to indigenous people (Varga, 2014; Ellinas, 2015). On the rare occasions in which such parties have seized power, they have exerted more control over business but have never really launched a systematic attack on private property (Eatwell, 2013). From a sociocultural perspective, they share most of the characteristics of the radical right, such as authoritarianism and nationalism, but in a more extremist way (Rydgren, 2007). They are strongly against individualism, which they say fragments the homogeneity of the nation (Fennema, 2005). Unlike the left, they do not organise the collective according to class but rather according to an ethos of being native from the nation (Minkenberg, 2001). They believe in an ethnic and cultural collective that is usually defined within national borders, even if some groups are more focused on race and promote supranational structures (Griffin, 2000). Their more extremist followers see the necessity for a new order (Griffin, 2000; Mudde, 2009). These individuals tend to be obsessed with the theme of decadence and aspire to the establishment of a heroic elite to regenerate society (Griffin, 2000). They openly engage in cultural activities to influence public debate through activities such as blogging, publishing books, the music industry, or by making interventions in schools (Felix, 2015; Shekhovtsov and Jackson, 2012). From a political and organizational perspective, they differ from the radical right groups insofar that they take part in elections but consider parliamentary democracy as a rule of cowardice in which leaders do not take responsibility (Fennema, 2005). The members of this group are extremely hierarchical (Felix, 2015) and they maintain close relationships with paramilitary organizations (Ellinas, 2015; Varga, 2014). Far-right American groups such as the white supremacists have been involved in numerous terrorist plots in the last decades (Blejwas et al., 2005). According to Kitschelt (1997), this third group is unlikely to emerge in Western Europe unless there is a major economic crisis, but Harteveldt’s analysis of the European electorate shows an increasing demand for authoritarian and statist political solutions. This demand is particularly strong in Eastern Europe, as well as in Greece, where the experience of the 2008 crisis and subsequent events tends to confirm Kitschelt’s prediction. In sum, this third ideological group gathers individuals that have many reasons to oppose consumption, and militate against general and specific targets. Their consumption is ethnocentric, as illustrated by the labeling of “True Hungarian” shops by Jobbik, or the organization of food charities for “Greeks only” by Golden Dawn (Felix, 2015). This group can also be racialised in a similar way to the KKK boycotts and encouragements to shop at “100 percent” [white] shops (Blee, 1991). Beyond their preference for certain products or certain consumers, they are also likely to reject fundamental aspects of consumerist ideology, which is seen as part of the culture of decadence. They can link environmental topics with the right to difference and the protection of the race (Bhatia, 2004; Olsen, 2000). Varul (2013) reminds us how the Nazi theorist Carl Schmidt rejected liberal and consumerist values of diversity, opportunity and possibility, because they would lead to an “alienation from folk, from soil, from destiny” (Varul, 2013, p. 299). Their anti-consumption can extend beyond the protection of the nation, it can be driven by the protection of the race, with the rejection of products or practices that are considered impure (e.g., a former candidate in the French presidential election proposed a ban on black music because its inherent sexuality would be a civilization regression for France; see L’Express, 2016). Their actions against entities can be a lot more violent than those of the two previous groups, as they accept violence as a legitimate means to resist. This group definitely classify as undemocratic and morally questionable entities.

We have now delineated the phenomenon and explained why individuals and groups could find themselves at odds with consumption. In the next section, we discuss the implications of our inquiries for consumer research.

# Discussion: implications for consumer research


Having clarified the nuances among right-wing ideologies, this last section discusses the implications for consumer research. This paper first theorises three tensions between right-wing ideologies and consumerist ideology that could explain rightist anti-consumption. We also argue that political ideology should be considered as a new dimension of anti-consumption. Finally, possible avenues for future research are described.

The present study is based on and extends existing literature on political brand rejection (e.g. Sandikci and Ekici, 2009), nationalist anti-consumption (e.g. Castelló and Mihelj, 2017), religious anti-consumption (e.g. Izberk-Bilgin, 2012), undemocratic political consumerism (e.g. Stolle and Huissoud, 2019), and anti-consumption for the defense of privileges (e.g. Johnson et al., 2017). We propose a political understanding of the phenomenon, with a distinction between the left and the right.

## A theory of rightist anti-consumption

Based on our literature review, we define rightist anti-consumption as reasons against consumption that aim to protect or reinforce hierarchies, values that are considered traditional, and sources of authority defined as natural. The three rightist ideological groups cited – moderate conservatives, the radical right and welfare chauvinists – all have reasons to engage in anti-consumption behaviours. The relation these groups have with economic liberalism and violence suggests that the purpose and the forms of their anti-consumption may vary in several ways. However, three tensions can be highlighted between right-wing ideologies and consumerist ideology, as defined by Stearns (1997), Lee et al. (2009b) or Sklair (2002). Keeping the differences between the three groups in mind, we see potential conflicts between rightist beliefs and consumerist ideology around these three tensions (Figure 3).

**Figure 3 - Tensions between rightist beliefs and consumerist ideology**



First, right-wing groups tend to be patriotic whereas the market tends to be global. For conservatives, the nation provides individuals with an identity and a way of seeing the world (Femia, 2012; Heywood, 2007). Nationalism leads to racism and xenophobia for the radical right and the welfare chauvinist group. Conversely, consumerist ideology inherently promotes a global market (Sklair, 2002), and consumer culture promotes a shared consumption ethos (Varul, 2013). The boycotting of Virgin group over its opposition to Brexit, or the campaign against Catalan products over independentism (Lekakis, 2019) illustrate right-wing attachment to the nation and to patriotism as a legitimate limit to the freedom of private businesses. Although not all expressions of consumer nationalism would classify as right wing (Castelló and Mihelj, 2017; Lekakis, 2019), nationalism can be a driver for anti-consumption among right-wing individuals and groups. Based on our literature review, we would classify consumer nationalism as right-wing when it is exclusively associated with a binary opposition between patriots and traitors, and/or if it involves defined hierarchies between the national community and others, or within the national community (in terms of ethnic origin or gender, for example). We believe this distinction can facilitate further research on problematic political consumerism (Micheletti and Oral, 2019).

Second, right-wing groups favor traditions while consumerist ideology builds on novelty. A central characteristic of conservatism is skepticism towards modernity and progress (Femia, 2012). Conservative ideology believes in an inherent order of things, which is expressed in traditions (Heywood, 2007; O’Sullivan, 2013), and in unequal societies based on privilege (Dietrich, 2014). Contrary to these positions, consumerist ideology promotes “the consumption of disposable products, short-lived fashions, and ephemeral sensations” (Cherrier, 2010: 260). The past and its traditions have a limited place in consumer culture (Marion, 2006; Stearns, 1997;), which also challenges the authority of parents and teachers over children (Behr, 2010). Consumer action against Lidl and Nestlé over novel religiously neutral packaging show that this tension is another limit to the freedom of private businesses. These companies try to acknowledge and adapt to what they perceive to be major sociocultural changes in their markets. Although this could be interpreted as part of a strategy aiming to capture more customers, the groups taking stands against Lidl or Nestle believe these actions are unacceptable because they undermine religious traditions.

Finally, rightists tend to put community before the individual, while consumerist ideology promotes individual freedom (Lee et al., 2009b). This third point is particularly relevant for the radical right and welfare chauvinists, but less so for conservatives, who adopt capitalist and liberal principles. More radical individuals or groups acknowledge the pre-existence of social order over any individual right and maintain that human beings should submit themselves to the authority of the social order and its traditions rather than attempting to change them (Fennema, 2005; Heywood, 2007). Rightists believe in the existence of evil in people (Femia, 2012) and consider that institutions aim to prevent them from hurting themselves and their fellow humans (O’Sullivan, 2013). Conversely, consumer culture emphasises individualism (Behr, 2010; Fitchett et al., 2014; Marion, 2006). The example of Walgreens being criticised over trans-inclusive bathrooms illustrates this tension. This company implements a change to be more inclusive of gender diversity. Because the extreme right-wing consumers do not recognise an individual’s right to define their gender, they perceive it at best as an unnecessary adaptation, or at worst a dangerous challenge to established hierarchies and norms. Usually, this attitude also expresses a moral judgement. This emphasis on morality has led to legal constraints on advertising in countries like Russia, forbidding so-called “gay propaganda” in an attempt to discourage “unorthodox” behaviours (Laruelle, 2015).

In short, several aspects of rightist ideology seem to be incompatible with consumption as it stands today in the West. They do not reject consumption as an exchange system, but oppose the socioeconomic order that gives consumption practices a central role in society.

This theory has some limitations. As with all integrations resulting in a framework, we build on definitions that simplify reality. First, we rely on a non-problematic definition of ideology, which from certain perspectives, can be considered an endorsement of the dominant ideology in itself (Žižek, 2008). We also use definitions of consumerist ideology, individualism, and materialism that have often been challenged (e.g. Miller, 2010, 2012). Any theoretical framework involves a trade-off between exhaustivity and parsimony. We believe that our selected level of complexity allows the understanding of our proposal, but also points to more complex situations if used to focus on one concept. For instance, the tension between the rightist ideologies and materialism could be explored in more detail, taking the complexity of the concept into consideration. Second, we base our rationale on the existence of three ideal type positions in the right wing. These categories serve a purpose in relation to one another (e.g. explaining their different positions concerning the economy or the use of violence) that is a reliable tool to explain the reasons against consumption that are described in empirical research. We certainly do not want to imply that all ideological groups on the right, and all individuals identifying themselves in these groups have reasons against consumption, or indeed that all right-wing political parties are now against the free market or globalization. On the contrary, our categorization emphasises the nuances not only between the three groups (moderate conservatives, radical right and welfare chauvinists), but also within each of them (e.g., tensions arising from the emphasis on anti-immigration and/or authoritarianism among the radical right). Ultimately, we seek to put forward three ideal type positions that will need discussion, amendments, or validation with empirical data. Further research could, and should, investigate each of these categories in more detail, or work on borderline cases to show more complexity. We are not suggesting that companies cannot accommodate or co-opt this anti-consumption as seen for their management of left-wing anti-consumption (Holt, 2002), as recent sociology work investigates (Miller Idriss, 2018). For instance, further research could look more closely at the way companies signal their authenticity (Beverland, 2006) or their heritage (Pecot et al., 2018) as a strategy to co-opt part of this opposition. The consideration of rightist social movements has appreciably enriched the theoretical frameworks developed on progressive resistance (Blee and Creasap, 2010; Warnick, 1982). We discuss hereafter how rightist consumption arguments add to the established paradigms at different levels.

## Political ideology: a dimension of anti-consumption?

Current literature defines anti-consumption as reasons against consumption, but fails to consider the underlying ideological purpose. The literature puts forward numerous examples highlighting our limited understanding of the motivations and intentions of anti-consumption or political consumerist movements, leading to confusion for analysts, activists and companies (e.g. Micheletti and Oral, 2019). This paper suggests that adding political ideology to the existing dimensions of anti-consumption provides a better understanding of what motivates anti-consumption. This approach relating ideology and motivations does not aim to replace existing approaches focusing on religion or nationalism, but rather to complement them. Our argument underlines that consumption practices reflect and maintain ideologies (Crockett and Wallendorf, 2004), and that anti-consumption is ideological by definition (Kozinets et al., 2010; Lee et al., 2009b). This argument is not new, but it might have been overlooked because of the underlying assumption that anti-consumption was the expression of a left-wing ideology. Consumer research may have suffered from progressive bias caused by academic proximity to progressive groups and easy access to empirical data for these groups (Blee and Creasap, 2010; Stolle and Huissoud, 2019). The contribution of our paper is to show that tensions can also be expected between several aspects of the right-wing ideologies and the consumerist ideology or certain actors of the market. We suggest that anti-consumption does not simply overlap with left-wing ideology, this dimension therefore deserves to be questioned further.

Our framework distinguishes between two different militant actions opposing their views about equality.. This aforementioned Starbucks example illustrates the tension between tradition and adaptation to a new context. Starbucks follows traditions in Saudi Arabia and is attacked for not showing sufficient support for equality. In the United States, the company challenges the tradition and is attacked for not protecting an established inequality. By studying political ideology, we can distinguish between the two different cases of anti-consumption. Two other examples further illustrate this need to consider political ideology.

The same company can also be targeted by different groups, over the same misconduct, but for different reasons. In June 2018, Benetton advertised a photograph of the rescue of Aquarius migrants by a non-governmental organization[[7]](#footnote-7). The NGO condemned Benetton for using a human tragedy for commercial purposes. Italy’s far-right Minister of the Interior at that time (Matteo Salvini)–qualifyed the advertising as “squalid” (The Telegraph, 2018). Although an NGO committed to rescue migrants and a far-right minister strongly opposed to immigration expressed their discontent in the same way, it is reasonable to assume that they do not share the same reasons for objecting to the brand. Our framework distinguishes the NGO, motivated by ethical reasons and human dignity, from the far right leader, aiming to make a point against immigration and against a company that does not stand for his own definition of the ‘national interest’. His reaction exemplifies the national / global tension.

Finally, within the same cause or claim, different individuals or small groups may seem to engage in a similar anti-consumption behaviour, but actually rely on different political ideologies. Marketing literature examines voluntary simplifiers who downsize their consumption to reduce their environmental impact (e.g., Etzioni, 1998; Shaw and Newholm, 2002) and to express their opposition to consumerist ideology (Etzioni, 1998). However, failing to question the ideological intentions of simplifiers can lead to confusions. Research in politics shows how far-right groups invest in environmental themes. They articulate ecology and the protection of species to anti-immigration stances and to the incommensurability of cultures (Bhatia, 2004; Olsen, 2000). As Peter Staudenmaier notes: “Environmental themes can be mobilised from the left or from the right, indeed they require an explicit social context if they are to have any political valence whatsoever” (in Bhatia, 2004, p. 213).

Again, close attention to ideological motivations can provide greater detail in our analysis of the phenomenon. Beyond the theorizing of rightist anti-consumption, this paper encourages researchers to consider left- and right-wing ideologies when elaborating their research designs, and their methodologies to capture the underlying ideological dimension of anti-consumption. We subscribe to Stolle and Huissoud’s (2019) analysis of the methodological limitations of the current tools (e.g. scales, interview guides…). Based on our analysis of the literature, we confirm the need to revise existing scales for anti-consumption so their items can capture the right-wing reasons against that we have identified.It would also be important to pay attention to the informants’ ideological background when preparing interview guides, for instance by integrating a section on how each individual perceives hierarchies and their origins (natural or constructed), the limitations of individual autonomy, and other themes composing conservative and fascist ideologies.

## Research agenda

Many right-wing movements (e.g., the Christian Right, the Tea Party, the Identitarians, the Alt-Right…) explicitly engage in cultural battles to infuse their political ideas within society (Blee and Creasap, 2010; Laurelle, 2016; Minkenberg, 2000; Rozell and Wilcox, 1996). Given the role consumption plays in shaping culture, consumer research can make an important contribution to the social sciences here. The consideration of political ideology as a dimension of anti-consumption facilitates much-needed interdisciplinary work to shed light on these strategies. Our work sets three main avenues for further research.

A first avenue invites marketing researchers to historicise anti-consumption. Historians show that anti-consumption was primarily driven by traditions and resistance to change in the 18th and early 19th century, sometimes tainted with xenophobia, anti-Semitism and sexism (Stearns, 2006). The majority of recent empirical work in consumer research indicates that anti-consumption has primarily been driven by environmental or humanitarian objections to capitalism over the last 40 years. Our work invites consumer researchers to take a longer-term approach. Marketing scholars could engage with research on the KKK (e.g. Blee, 1991) and focus on their anti-consumption actions. Researchers could also look at times when far-right parties were in power (e.g. Nazi Germany, fascist Spain, or South-Africa during the Apartheid). We argue that both left-wing and right-wing anti-consumption tend to coexist over time, with one usually being dominant.

A second avenue for future research would build on and test our propositions. We identify three tensions and three ideological groups in the current context. Empirical work on existing groups identified as right-wing (e.g., the English Defense League, Sens Commun or Golden Dawn) could help amend, refute or validate our propositions. This empirical work can take the form of ethnographic or even netnographic research to avoid the risks involved for the researcher in studying extreme groups that are usually very suspicious of academics (Blee and Creasap, 2010). We expect this research to provide new insights into known forms of anti-consumption. First on the organization of anti-consumption, right-wing groups tend to favor vertical structures (Della Porta, 2017), but could also make use of the resources of dominant groups (e.g. social connections) to protest in a more discrete but not less effective way. This research could extend the range of potential targets of anti-consumption, and include firms that promote gender equality or target minorities, specific products or practices (e.g. alcohol, pornography, or gambling). It would also be interesting to look at the sociology of these particular groups and extend the work of Baek (2010) with an emphasis on the right-wing. At a micro-level, it would be good to question the compromises that right-wing individuals make between their ideals and the reality of the market offers, and consider how they would imagine ideal consumption in their society.

Finally, another avenue for further research would need to investigate how far this rightist anti-consumption phenomenon affects business practices and political debates. The influence of these movements on consumer habits could be limited. Marketing researchers can investigate this effect through secondary data analysis of companies targeted by rightist groups. As some radical groups openly engage in a cultural battle, we think that social scientists should also pay attention to the effect of these boycotts on the public debate. Indeed, we cannot rule out the possibility that rightist groups do not seek leverage on consumption to damage the target company’s reputation, but rather to use it as a platform to promote their ideology.

# Concluding remarks

This paper makes a case for further consideration of rightist anti-consumption. According to Stolle and Huissoud, “scholars have focused on somewhat “politically correct” forms of political consumerism” (p. 625). In line with these authors, we posit that marketing scholars tend to neglect political ideology in the study of reasons against consumption, and overlook phenomena happening on the right wing of the ideological spectrum.

Building on existing literature, we identify three groups within the rightist political spectrum: moderate conservatives, the radical right and welfare chauvinists. We show that their anti-consumption activities can reflect three main tensions: nationalism vs. globalism, traditions vs. novelties, and social order vs. individual freedom. We also suggest considering political ideology as a dimension of anti-consumption to obtain a detailed picture of motivations behind the phenomenon.

This work has led us to identify new lines of inquiry. Above all, our paper make a valuable contribution to social science research on the influence of the New Right in Western societies. Social science scholars acknowledge that rightist groups focus on cultural influence (Hawley, 2016; Rozell and Wilcox, 1996). Given the importance role of consumption in shaping Western cultural norms, consumer researchers have a major part to play in documenting not only anti-consumption practices, but also rightist efforts to influence consumption.

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Online appendix 1 - Recent examples of rightist anti-consumption

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| **Example** | **Sources** |
| **Motivation:** Anti-LGBTG (Lesbian Gay Bisexual Transgender Queer)  In 2018, Walgreen was boycotted in the United-States because it adopted a transgender-inclusive bathroom policy (The Huffington Post, 2018). The American Family Association launched a petition claiming that the ‘*Walgreens’ store policy endangers women and children by allowing men to frequent women’s restrooms’* (Pink News, 2018). Target stores were also targeted by this anti-LGBT group in 2016 for the same motive. | Pinknews (2018) Walgreens faces right-wing boycott over trans-inclusive bathroom policy. Available at: <https://www.pinknews.co.uk/2018/02/11/walgreens-faces-right-wing-boycott-over-trans-inclusive-bathroom-policy/>  The Huffington Post (2018) Walgreens has adopted a transgender-inclusive bathroom policy. Available at: <https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/walgreens-transgender-bathroom> policy\_us\_5a7c6cb8e4b044b3821a3cfc |
| **Religious motivation**  In 2017, leaders of Greek Orthodox Church called for a boycott of Lidl and Nestlé in Europe because these companies removed crosses from pictures of churches on their packaging in attempt to be “religiously neutral” (The Times, 2017). Consumers expressed their anger on Facebook, posting their complaints on the social network. The companies apologised to offended customers. Lidl’s spokesperson stated that the company was “extremely sorry for any offence” and would ensure that “all feedback is taken into consideration when redesigning future packaging” (The Independent, 2017). | The Independent (2017) Lidl removes crosses from Greek church on food packaging in attempt to be “religiously neutral”. Available at: <https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/lidl-greek-church-cross-remove-food-packaging-design-religious-neutral-santorini-anastasis-a7929286.html>  The Times (2017) Orthodox leaders call for boycott of Lidl and Nestlé. Available at: <https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/orthodox-leaders-call-for-boycott-of-lidl-and-nestle-758cl0m9k> (accessed 9 November 2018). |
| **Xenophobic motivation**  In 2019, Decathlon triggered negative consumer reactions after announcing the launch of a “running” hijab in France (The Independent, 2019). The customer service team received more than 500 calls and emails in just half a day. Some consumers insulted and threatened (sometimes physically) staff in Decathlon stores. French politicians from Les Républicains (a centre-right party) and La République En Marche (a centrist party) also expressed their disagreement with this product on Twitter, accusing the company of giving in to Islam and breaking away from national values. The company consequently decided against marketing their “running” hijab in France. | The Independent (2019) Decathlon scraps plans for 'running hijab' in France after public backlash. Available at: <https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/decathlon-hijab-running-france-muslim-women-a8798936.html> |

Online appendix 2 - Anti-consumption driven by religious, nationalist and traditional criticism (full version)

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| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Authors** | **Countries** | **Purpose** | **Target** | **Reason against consumption/anti-consumption behaviour** |
| **Religious criticism** | | | | |
| Belk (1994) | United-States | Societal | General | The struggle between spirituality and materialism in Mormon Utah parallels what is observed in emerging countries, in post-communists countries, and in the reactionary sentiments against globalization. |
| Izberk-Bilgin (2012) | Turkey | Personal | Specific | Brand avoidance and anti-brand actions against those considered as “infidel”. |
| Sandıkcı and Ekici (2009) | Emergent countries | Personal | Specific | Rejection of brands driven by conservative ideas (“chauvinistic nationalism” and “religious fundamentalism”), and by a reaction to American cultural domination (“predatory globalization”). |
| Shamir and Ben Porat (2007) | Israel; United Kingdom | Societal | General | Religious groups use their purchasing power to reshape the public sphere in a secular-religious struggle, for instance over appropriate rest days in Israel and in the UK. |
| Steger (2013) | Global | Societal | General | Resistance to market globalism building around the community of believers, and is ready to use violence (i.e. Al-Qaeda, fundamentalist Christian groups, Sikh movements, Falun Gong, Aum Shinrikyo). |
| Swimberghe (2011) | United States | Personal | Specific | American consumers are likely to engage in boycotts for religious motives, particularly if they sympathize with conservative Christian ideas. |
| Webb (2005) | Iran | Societal | General | Khomeneism (Iranian regime ideology) opposes western style consumerism, and more specifically individualism, trans-national companies, although it accepts private property and the accumulation of wealth. |
| Micheletti and Oral (2019) | United States | Societal | Specific | Christian right groups have attacked Disney over the last 30 years, claiming that the company encouraged perversions, destroyed Christian family values, and supported gay rights. |
| **Nationalist / Ethnocentric criticism** | | | | |
| Lekakis (2017) | Greece | Societal | General | Ethnocentric consumption as an answer to austerity and crisis. It is related to economic nationalism and could lead to very different outcomes: create a civic consciousness or create polarisation between insiders and outsiders. |
| Lekakis (2019) | Spain | Societal | Specific | The boycott of Catalan products over the self-declared independence process intends to punish the region and the companies endorsing the separatist process. |
| England | Societal | Specific | The boycott of companies selling Halal meat mixes animal rights with nationalist and anti-Muslim claims. The latter is based on an ethnic and religious definition of the nation. |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Varman and Belk (2009) | India | Personal | Specific | Nationalist ideology at the origin of anti-consumption of a Western symbol (Coca Cola). |
| Lee et al. (2009b) | Not specified | Societal | Specific | Consumers feel a patriotic connection with local brands and express their financial patriotism buying locally to resist global homogenization, preserve cultural diversity, and ensure that the financial profits of their purchases will remain in their own country. |
| **Traditional / Authoritarian criticism** | | | | |
| Ger and Belk (1996); Izberg-Bilgin (2008); Varman and Belk (2009) | Emerging countries | Personal | Specific | Global brands (e.g., Coca-Cola, Starbucks) are rejected in the name of traditions and perceived hegemony. |
| Johnson and Grier (2017) | Western countries | Societal | Specific | Perceive as disrupting an established privilege can lead to anti-consumption reaction from the privileged groups (eg. Reaction against Quick burgers over Halal meat in France). |
| Ostberg (2006) | Sweden | Societal | General | Traditional masculine elite reaffirms a traditional masculinity in reaction to a perceived feminized consumption ethos. |
| Varul (2013) | N/A (conceptual paper) | Societal | General | Conservatives reject consumerism altogether because it is associated with working-class excesses, it tends to homogenize values and it challenges traditional inequalities. |

1. We use “rightist” as an overall term for the different forms of right-wing ideologies, as already used in social movement research by authors such as Blee and Creasap (2010). [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. Consumption can refer to the act of consuming, as well as to the social and economic order that makes these acts a central aspect of society (Graeber, 2011). As a socioeconomic order, consumption is often referred to as consumerism (Rumbo, 2002). This same term has also been frequently used to refer to social movements that protect the interests of consumers (Straver, 1977). To avoid confusions throughout this paper, the socioeconomic order will be referred to as “consumerist ideology”, and the social movement will be described in the context of “political consumerism”. [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. Stolle and Huissoud (2019) define undemocratic as aiming "to discriminate, spread hatred, pit groups against each other, and practice exclusion" (p.625). [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. We define materialism here as the importance of being attached to material possessions (Richins and Dawson, 1992). Miller (2010) challenges this opposition between people and objects, showing that people who have extent relationships with other people also have more control over their material environment. [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. These authors say in their pioneering work: “With its religious, moral, and self-disciplinary orientation, this consumer movement assumes a neoconservative orientation and not the more sexy revolutionary position that Gabriel and Lang (1995) use to portray it.” (p. 703) [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
6. The scores represent the distribution of respondents in the European Election Studies of 1999, 2004 and 2009. [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
7. The NGO SOS Méditerranée gives assistance to anybody in distress on the sea (including migrants and refugees). [↑](#footnote-ref-7)