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# Indirect Communication, Authority, and Proclamation as a Normative Power: Løgstrup's Critique of Kierkegaard

Christopher Bennett, Paul Faulkner, and Robert Stern

## 1. Introduction

On the face of it, the paper “The Category and the Office of Proclamation, with Particular Reference to Luther and Kierkegaard” by the nearly forgotten Danish philosopher and theologian K.E. Løgstrup (1905–1981) may seem to hold little interest for the contemporary reader. Its central focus, which is on religious proclamation and its relation to the authority and office of the preacher or pastor, hardly appears to promise much philosophical excitement, as it relates to a debate in the theology of Løgstrup's time concerning the nature of religious proclamation that largely centered around the work of the theologian Rudolf Bultmann and his doctrine of “kerygma.”<sup>1</sup> Moreover, while the paper deals with Kierkegaard at some length, it does so by contrasting his views with Martin Luther's, who is rarely seen as a philosophically productive conversation partner. Thus, while the issues raised in this paper had some resonance in the theology of Løgstrup's time, it seems unlikely to have much to say to philosophy today.

Appearances, however, can be deceptive. At the heart of Løgstrup's paper, it turns out, is a crucial question raised by Kierkegaard, namely how does one address a person on a matter of decisive importance without exercising undue authority over them? Neither Kierkegaard nor Løgstrup thinks that this problem is insurmountable. Kierkegaard's solution is that we can express views about matters of fundamental personal significance but only in a way that at the same time undercuts the authority we appear to be claiming—this is his idea of indirect communication.<sup>2</sup> Løgstrup rejects this solution. In doing so, he argues that

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<sup>1</sup> See Rudolf Bultmann, “The Kerygma of the Earliest Church,” and “The Kerygma of the Hellenistic Church Aside from Paul,” chaps. 2 and 3 respectively of *Theology of the New Testament*, trans. Kendrick Grobel (Waco: Baylor University Press, 2007), pp. 33–185.

<sup>2</sup> For examples of clear articulations of the notion of indirect communication, see Søren Kierkegaard, *Concluding Unscientific Postscript to Philosophical Fragments*, trans. Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong, vol. 12.1 of *Kierkegaard's Writings*, trans. Howard V. Hong et al., ed. Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992), pp. 242, 325; henceforth CUP followed by page number; *Afsluttende Uvidenskabelig Efterskrift*, vol. 7 of *Søren Kierkegaards Skrifter*, ed. Niels Jørgen Cappelørn et al. (Copenhagen: Gads, 2002), pp. 220–1, 296–7; henceforth references to the Cappelørn et al. This paper is a companion piece to the translation of Løgstrup's article “The Category and the Office of Proclamation, with Particular Reference to Luther and Kierkegaard” by Christopher Bennett and Robert Stern, which is also included in this issue of the journal.

Kierkegaard's failure to allow for authority stems from his nihilism, using Luther to offer a provocative alternative approach. He also identifies proclamation as a distinctive speech act (though without using this terminology) in a way that is of philosophical interest in its own right.

To understand Løgstrup's strategy, we first have to know more about Løgstrup, the context in which this paper was written, and in particular what lies behind the connection he draws in this text between proclamation, Kierkegaard, and Luther (§2). We will then look at the paper itself in some detail (§3) before moving on to evaluate the debate between Løgstrup and Kierkegaard (§4). The final section (§5) considers what makes proclamation distinctive as a speech act and the role of authority in it, relating these questions to the issue of normative powers.

## 2. Background

The paper that concerns us here was published in 1949 in German rather than in Løgstrup's native Danish;<sup>3</sup> it therefore appeared seven years before Løgstrup's most celebrated work, *The Ethical Demand* [*Den etiske fordring*], which was published in 1956.<sup>4</sup> However, there is an important connection between the two pieces, as *The Ethical Demand* also makes the issue of proclamation central. The latter work begins with the proclamation of Jesus to love thy neighbor as thyself (ED 2–3/EF 10–11) and ends in chapter 12 with a discussion of the authority underlying this proclamation (ED 207–17/EF 232–43).<sup>5</sup>

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edition will appear as SKS, followed by volume in Roman numerals and page number in Arabic numerals. References to the works of Kierkegaard refer to the translations by Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong and then to *Søren Kierkegaards Skrifter*.

<sup>3</sup> For the German original version, see K.E. Løgstrup, "Die Kategorie und das Amt der Verkündigung, im Hinblick auf Luther und Kierkegaard," *Evangelische Theologie* 9:1–6 (1949), pp. 249–69; henceforth KAV, followed by page number. A version in Danish appeared the following year as "Forkyndelsens Kategori og Embede med særligt Henblik paa Problemstillingen hos Luther og Kierkegaard," *Tidehverv*, 24:2–3 (1950), pp. 14–26. The Danish version includes a small amount of material not found in the German version, which we have added to our translation in curly brackets.

<sup>4</sup> In this essay we will cite *Den Etiske Fordring* (Copenhagen: Gyldendale, 1956; new edition ed. David Bugge, Aarhus: Klim, 2014); *The Ethical Demand*, translated by Theodor I. Jensen and Gary Puckering; revised with an introduction by Hans Fink and Alasdair MacIntyre (Notre Dame: Notre Dame University Press, 1997). A new translation of *The Ethical Demand* by Bjørn Rabjerg and Robert Stern is forthcoming from Oxford University Press. The abbreviations ED refer to the NDUP translation, and EF to the Klim edition.

<sup>5</sup> Chapter 12 is the last chapter of the main part of the text, followed by a "polemical epilogue" on Kierkegaard and then-contemporary Kierkegaardianism, in which some of the criticisms of Kierkegaard discussed below are also raised.

In focusing on the issue of proclamation, both in the article and in *The Ethical Demand*,<sup>6</sup> Løgstrup was engaging in a debate that had been raised by the theology of Rudolf Bultmann, who had made the category of proclamation—or in his terminology, “kerygma”—central. Bultmann had distinguished between hearing the Word of God as a neutral or objective report—thus as a standard form of communication—on the one hand, and on the other hand, as a call addressed to the individual directly, based on some authority; this thus represents a form of faith that goes beyond any grounding it could be given in philosophy or history and that is transformative of the individual in a profound way, if they respond appropriately to the call it represents.<sup>7</sup> Thus, Bultmann’s position raised deep questions

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<sup>6</sup> Løgstrup also discusses the issue of proclamation in reference to Kierkegaard in his 1950 text *Kierkegaard’s and Heidegger’s Analysis of Existence and Its Relation to Proclamation*, which is mentioned below (K.E. Løgstrup, *Kierkegaards und Heideggers Existenzanalyse und ihr Verhältnis zur Verkündigung* [Berlin: Erich Bläschker, 1950]; henceforth KHE, followed by page number). We also refer to the Klim edition, *Kierkegaards og Heideggers Eksistensanalyse og dens forhold til forkyndelsen*, ed. Svend Andersen (Aarhus: Klim, 2013); henceforth KE, followed by page number. The text takes a similar approach to the problem of authority that Løgstrup later develops in *The Ethical Demand*: he argues in both texts that “faith without understanding is not faith, but coercion” (KHE 108; KE 98; see also ED 2/EF 10). Unlike in the article we are discussing, and unlike in *The Ethical Demand*, in *Kierkegaard’s and Heidegger’s Analysis of Existence*, Løgstrup argues that Kierkegaard and Heidegger can be used to provide a kind of “test” of any proclamation and whether it should be accepted. In this respect, he raises the following kinds of question: Does the proclamation leave the individual at the mercy of the crowd or not? Does it enable them to remain true to their existence as becoming and possibility or not? Does it offer an absolute certainty or instead leave room for the individual to assume their own responsibility? And does it subordinate existence to thought or vice versa? (see KHE 116; KE 105).

<sup>7</sup> In this respect, consider the following reflection from Bultmann: “Is it enough to say that faith grows out of the encounter with the Holy Scriptures as the Word of God, that faith is nothing but simple hearing? The answer is yes. But this answer is valid only if the Scriptures are understood neither as a manual of doctrine nor as a record of witnesses to a faith which I interpret by sympathy and empathy. On the contrary, to hear the Scriptures as the Word of God means to hear them as a word which is addressed to me, as *kerygma*, as a proclamation. Then my understanding is not a neutral one, but rather my response to a call. The fact that the word of the Scriptures is God’s Word cannot be demonstrated objectively; it is an event which happens here and now. God’s Word is hidden in the Scriptures as each action of God is hidden everywhere” (Rudolph Bultmann, *Jesus Christ and Mythology* (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1958), p. 71). For a helpful summary of Bultmann’s position, see Gerhard Ebeling, *Theology and Proclamation: A Discussion with Rudolf Bultmann*, trans. John Riches (London: Collins, 1966). Consider, in particular, the following remark from Ebeling: “According to Bultmann we are concerned in the kerygma, not in the first place with the imparting of information, but with a challenge which demands from us obedience and decision, and which is addressed to the will or, to be more precise, to the conscience. The kerygma, thus seen as a challenge, qualifies anew the situation of the man to whom it is addressed. That is to say, that the kerygma considered as Word is an event which overtakes

concerning the tension between theology and philosophy, faith and reason, acceptance of God's Word and making that Word intelligible.

In *The Ethical Demand*, Løgstrup begins by considering Jesus' commandment to love one's neighbor as a proclamation and argues forcefully that if this is not to be a coercive form of obscurantism, the proclamation must be something that we do not just accept on authority but rather connects to some fundamental feature of our existence (ED 1–2/EF 9–10). This fundamental feature, Løgstrup claims, is our dependence on one another, a dependence that he thinks makes perfect sense of Jesus' proclamation to us to love your neighbor<sup>8</sup> in purely human terms out of which the ethical demand to care for the other person arises (ED 3/EF 11). There is thus an important difference between us and Jesus' contemporaries when it comes to his proclamation to love one's neighbor: when Jesus proclaimed it, the love commandment may have struck his audience as puzzling in a way that meant they had to accept it on the authority of revelation, as the idea of loving all, including the neighbor and the stranger, would have seemed fundamentally alien to the ethical outlook of the times. However, for us (Løgstrup suggests), this is no longer the case, as we can now understand what makes it valid in a way that no longer makes it a matter of revelation or authority—and if we did now accept it on those latter terms, we would be loving our neighbor in the wrong way, as we would then love them based on this authority rather than their own ethical standing (ED 208–9/EF 234).

At the same time, however, as a thinker who was equally deeply interested in theological issues, Løgstrup also recognized that this approach to the proclamation still left him with a theological puzzle: namely that if the love commandment can be made sense of in purely human terms, what happens to the authority of Jesus? Does this make him no more than a profound moral teacher, the first to make clear to us that our relations of love should go beyond partner, family, or community, but also include the stranger and even the enemy in a way we can all now understand—even if we still find it a difficult (or impossible) ideal to live up to? Yet, of course, to see Jesus as just a moral teacher is to no longer see Jesus as the son of God. But, on the other hand, if to see Jesus as the son of God we need to view him as speaking with divine authority, how can he exercise authority over us on this matter without reducing the love commandment to an order we blindly follow rather than something we understand, generating the problems outlined above?

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the man who hears it and forces him to a decision between faith and unfaith, and consequently to a decision about his own understanding of himself" (p. 41).

<sup>8</sup> Mark 12:31 Revised Standard Version.

In *The Ethical Demand*, Løgstrup's solution to this problem is a rather ingenious one: he argues that Jesus' authority in relation to the proclamation lies not as the source for our *acceptance* of the love commandment (which instead can come from seeing why it matters to love the other and how this relates to our human interdependence), but rather lies in his declaration that we will be forgiven by God for failing to love the other in the way that is required, so that the authority Jesus is exercising here is that of divine *forgiveness*, not of command (ED 212/EF 237–8). Moreover, Løgstrup argues, it is *only* a divine judge such as God, or Jesus acting on his behalf, who can offer such forgiveness to us; no other human being can do so, as we are all as equally prone to failure as everyone else and so lack the requisite standing to give us the authority required to forgive other people in this manner (ED 207/EF 232).

As this brief sketch suggests, therefore, in his main work Løgstrup showed how the issue of proclamation, which may appear to be a theological matter with few philosophical implications, in fact has widespread ramifications for how one thinks of a number of fundamental issues, such as the relation between philosophy and theology, the role of authority in ethics, how far authority is exercised in different forms of interaction, what different kinds of authority there might be and how they can be legitimated. In this paper, we will go on to discuss similar themes that also come up in the article—in particular, the issue of the authority of proclamation for the apostles, preachers, or pastors who speak of forgiveness.

Moreover, as we shall see, in this article Løgstrup also uses this issue to mount a critique of Kierkegaard and his doctrine of indirect communication. Critiquing Kierkegaard is an important feature of Løgstrup's wider scholarship, including the “polemical epilogue” in *The Ethical Demand, Kierkegaard's and Heidegger's Analysis of Existence and Its Relation to Proclamation* [*Kierkegaards und Heideggers Existenzanalyse und ihr Verhältnis zur Verkündigung*] from 1950, and *Controverting Kierkegaard* [*Opgør med Kierkegaard*] from 1968.<sup>9</sup> Løgstrup's relation to Kierkegaard is in fact rather complex, for while his attitude to Kierkegaard certainly became highly negative, in his earlier period he was involved with the Tidehverv movement in Denmark, which was closely associated with the Kierkegaard revival

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<sup>9</sup> K.E. Løgstrup, *Opgør med Kierkegaard* (Copenhagen: Gyldendal, 1968); *Controverting Kierkegaard*, trans. Kristian-Alberto Lykke Cobos and Kees van Kooten Niekerk (Oxford: Oxford University Press, forthcoming).

led by Kierkegaardians such as K. Olesen Larsen.<sup>10</sup> However, he increasingly came to have misgivings about their approach, and they in turn increasingly criticized him from their radical Kierkegaardian perspective<sup>11</sup>—and in these debates Løgstrup largely took their reading of Kierkegaard to be accurate in a way that might be disputed today, as we shall see.

At the heart of these disputes was the issue of nihilism, or more precisely nihilism about our earthly, human, finite existence. For, of course, while no one could dispute that Kierkegaard saw value in the transcendent, divine, and infinite, the question was how far any such value could be found here on earth. To Kierkegaard's radical post-war followers, such as Olesen Larsen, it was clear that Kierkegaard in the end believed that while we must live in the finite, we must retain a kind of ironic distance from it, seeing through it as merely relative rather than absolute and looking for the latter elsewhere—which, given the horrors of the war time experience, represents a kind of pessimism about the human that can surely be understood given the historical context.<sup>12</sup> However, Løgstrup found he could not endorse this pessimism, as he thought it took us too far from any proper ethical engagement with others around us, replacing it with a relation to the divine and so supplanting the ethical relation by directing us toward the religious (God) rather than the ethical (the neighbor).<sup>13</sup> One response to Løgstrup (which readers might take today) would be to argue that Løgstrup here exaggerates the dualism of the Kierkegaardian position and that in fact a kind of “return” to the finite can be found within it, such that it is a mistake to see Kierkegaard as “negating” the value of the worldly in the manner that concerns Løgstrup. However, the response of Larsen and other Kierkegaardians of Løgstrup's time was not to take this concessive route;<sup>14</sup> instead they hardened their dualistic reading of Kierkegaard and used it to criticize Løgstrup for his

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<sup>10</sup> For a brief discussion of *Tidehverv* and Løgstrup's relation to it, see Kees van Kooten Niekerk, “The Genesis of K.E. Løgstrup's View of Morality as a Substitute,” in *Concern for the Other: Perspectives on the Ethics of K.E. Løgstrup*, ed. Svend Andersen and Kees van Kooten Niekerk (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2007), pp. 55–84, esp. 62–3.

<sup>11</sup> See *ibid.*, pp. 62–3.

<sup>12</sup> See, for example, K. Olesen Larsen, “Nogle Bemærkninger om Forholdet mellem Humanisme og Kristendom,” *Tidehverv* 31 (1957), pp. 77–84; “Some Remarks on the Relation between Humanism and Christianity,” trans. Kees van Kooten Niekerk and Robert Stern, Løgstrup's Ethical Demand, <https://ethicaldemand.files.wordpress.com/2016/01/larsen-humanism-and-christianity-translation-final1.pdf> (accessed February 18, 2019).

<sup>13</sup> As Løgstrup puts it in the “polemical epilogue” to *The Ethical Demand*, for Kierkegaard “the relationship to God is meant to serve as a way of liberating people from having anything to do with others” (ED 232).

<sup>14</sup> For an introduction to Olesen Larsen's Kierkegaardian theology, see Bjørn Rabjerg, *Løgstrup og Kierkegaard* (Aarhus: Klim, 2018), pp. 159–63.

“humanism,”<sup>15</sup> for seeing absolute value in finite, human existence. This persuaded Løgstrup that Kierkegaard was a figure ultimately to be rejected, which explains his increasingly negative view of the latter’s work. The article we are discussing is the first clear step in this process, where Løgstrup seeks to distance himself from what he takes to be the Kierkegaardian view, as we will discuss further in the next section.

Finally, as the third piece of background information needed to understand this article, it is important to say something about Løgstrup’s view of Luther—for it is Luther (perhaps unexpectedly) that Løgstrup uses as a foil with which to criticize the Kierkegaardian nihilism outlined above. Leaning on the Lutheran conception of creation, and in particular the Lutheran doctrine of “ordinances” (*Ordnungen*),<sup>16</sup> Løgstrup suggests that, on this account, Luther in fact gives value to the finite world insofar as it is brought into being by God and structured in accordance with his purposes, including at the level of its social structures (KAV 253–4). Thus, in seeing these social structures as “orders” built around the household (which consists of family and working life), the state, and the church, on Luther’s account each of us can be given a meaningful and valuable vocation or calling, while within these structures there are authority relations we have over others in a manner that is ordained by God, such as parents over their children, or ruler over subjects.<sup>17</sup> In this way, then, Løgstrup thought he could use Luther to build a case against Kierkegaard, by bringing out the significant differences between them and using the former to dispute the degradation of the finite that he found in the latter. Ultimately, Løgstrup did not want to use Luther’s own approach to these matters in an uncritical way, or to accept the details of his position, including his view of the ordinances<sup>18</sup>—but he did clearly find it a useful conception with

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<sup>15</sup> See Olesen Larsen, “Nogle Bemærkninger.”

<sup>16</sup> See, for example, Luther’s lectures on Genesis, where he writes that “This life is profitably divided into three orders: (1) life in the home; (2) life in the state; (3) life in the Church” (in *Martin Luthers Werke: Kritische Gesamtausgabe* 65 vols in 127 (Weimar: Hermann Böhlau, 1883–1993), vol. 43, p. 30 [hereafter WA, cited by volume and page number]; *Luther’s Works* 55 vols (St. Louis and Philadelphia: Concordia and Fortress Press, 1958–86), vol. 3, p. 217 [hereafter LW, cited by volume and page number]).

<sup>17</sup> See for example Martin Luther, *Confession Concerning Christ’s Supper*, WA 26: 504/LW 37: 364): “But the holy orders and true religious institutions established by God are these three: the office of the priest, the estate of marriage, the civil government . . . For these three religious institutions or orders are found in God’s Word and commandment . . .”

<sup>18</sup> For further discussion of Løgstrup’s view of Luther on ordinances, and how it developed, see Kees van Kooten Niekerk, “Løgstrup’s Road to *The Ethical Demand*,” trans. Kees van Kooten Niekerk, [https://ethicaldemand.files.wordpress.com/2016/11/niekerk-lc3b8gstrup\\_s-road-final.pdf](https://ethicaldemand.files.wordpress.com/2016/11/niekerk-lc3b8gstrup_s-road-final.pdf) (accessed January 28, 2019). Also see Niekerk’s translator’s introduction to K.E. Løgstrup, “The Anthropology of Kant’s Ethics,” trans. Kees van Kooten Niekerk, in

which to think through what an alternative to Kierkegaard's position (as he understood it) might look like and thus as an impetus in developing his own views, as we shall now see by looking at the article itself.

### 3. The Paper

At the center of Løgstrup's paper, we will suggest, is a challenge to Kierkegaard's method of indirect communication: that is, Kierkegaard's authorial strategy of not speaking in his own voice, by writing in such a way that it leaves it up to his readers to determine for themselves what is being said and on what basis it should be accepted—for example, by using pseudonyms, multiple retellings, irony, and paradoxical expressions. Løgstrup focuses on what he takes to be one central rationale for this approach, which is Kierkegaard's concern over authorial authority.<sup>19</sup> This concern arises for Kierkegaard because when it comes to the communication of significant existential matters such as how to live ethically or how to relate oneself to God, there is a danger that the authority of the speaker will take away from the audience's ability to think and decide for themselves, thereby compromising their proper relation to questions of such decisive importance to the individual and submerging them in the crowd.<sup>20</sup> Løgstrup holds that Kierkegaard adopts the strategy of communicating in a way that attempts to avoid any such exercise of authorial authority and so takes an indirect approach instead, which leaves it open to the reader how to respond to his writings. Kierkegaard thus takes Socrates as his model, whose maieutic approach is not to impose

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*What is Ethically Demanded?: K.E. Løgstrup's Philosophy of Moral Life*, ed. Hans Fink and Robert Stern (Notre Dame: Notre Dame University Press, 2017), pp. 19–23.

<sup>19</sup> Løgstrup presents Heidegger and Kierkegaard as sharing this concern: “Heidegger further makes clear that the consequence of this must be that the words and deeds that result from life with others must thereby be determined in such a way that the others—each for themselves—also has the task to live their life as their own responsibility. The same consequence plays an extraordinary role in the thought of Kierkegaard. To dwell on this further would take us too far afield; but it is this consequence that leads him to put such an emphasis on the dialectic of communication or indirect communication” (KHE 71–2; KH 64–5).

<sup>20</sup> For example, Kierkegaard writes the following: “To stop a man on the street and to stand still in order to speak with him is not as difficult as having to say something to a passerby in passing, without standing still oneself or delaying the other, without wanting to induce him to go the same way, but just urging him to go his own way—and such is the relation between an existing person and an existing person when the communication pertains to the truth as existence-inwardness” (*Concluding Unscientific Postscript*, p. 277/SKS VII: 251).

himself on his audience but to bring out what is already latent within them in a way that does not overrule their capacity to think for themselves.<sup>21</sup>

Now, Løgstrup's challenge to Kierkegaard in this paper can be put as follows: Kierkegaard confuses communication with proclamation and as a result sees a need for indirect communication when in fact there is none. Løgstrup's argument can be put in the form of a dilemma. On the one hand, in the case of communication, there is in fact no exercise of authority, so no indirect communication is required. On the other hand, in the case of proclamation, there is an exercise of authority, but to accept a proclamation on the basis of legitimate authority is unproblematic, so, again, no indirectness is required. Either way, therefore, Kierkegaard's grounds for adopting his strategy of indirect communication are based on the mistaken assumption that as he does indeed lack the requisite authority to proclaim, then all he can do is communicate indirectly instead, which he believes involves no exercise of authority—but if (as Løgstrup claims) direct communication involves no authority anyway, then no such indirectness is needed. We will now consider in more detail how Løgstrup develops this argument.

Løgstrup's paper begins in §1 by distinguishing between proclamation and communication (see, in particular, KAV 249).<sup>22</sup> In proclamation, Løgstrup argues, one “brings something into force”<sup>23</sup> in relation to the other person and impacts them through a linguistic act much like a performative, such as a promise or command, which depends on some sort of recognitive response from the recipient (*ibid.*). This, indeed, does involve an exercise of some authority or normative power. However, Løgstrup claims, the case of communication is different because in communicating something to a person (even if what is said is of fundamental importance), one simply states what one takes to be the case,

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<sup>21</sup> For example, Kierkegaard writes as follows: “[A]t most [Socrates] was capable of artistically, maieutically helping another person negatively to the same view. Everything subjective, which on account of its dialectical inwardness evades the direct form of expression, is an essential secret” (*Concluding Unscientific Postscript*, p. 80/SKS VII: 80). For a thorough discussion of Kierkegaard's view of Socrates, see Jacob Howland, *Kierkegaard and Socrates: A Study in Philosophy and Faith* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006).

<sup>22</sup> In the Danish version of this paper, Løgstrup introduces a third category here that he contrasts with the other two, namely that of a *message* (“Forkyndelsens Kategori og Embede,” pp. 15–6). As he characterizes it, a message is more fateful than a communication and so involves the message-giver more in the life of the recipient, but this involvement still lacks the element of authority that is crucial to the proclamation.

<sup>23</sup> The German is “tritt für ihn in Kraft,” where “in Kraft” suggests not just that the proclamation is in force for the person in the sense of having validity or authority for them, but also has an impact on them.

ultimately leaving it up to the audience whether to accept it or not so that the relation does not rest on the authority of the communicator, and no authority is exercised in communication (ibid.). Thus, as Løgstrup puts it, in the case of communication “the relation between the informant and the recipient is exhausted in the message, as it were” (ibid.), as I pass over the propositional content of what I say to you, and you decide whether to take it up or not, leaving no space for the exercise of authority.<sup>24</sup> As we shall see, this initial distinction between communication and proclamation is crucial to the argument against Kierkegaard that Løgstrup develops later in the article.

Having suggested that proclamation involves authority while communication does not, Løgstrup now turns in §2 to consider the nature of this authority, which is when he brings Luther into the discussion. For, he argues, the authority involved here is that of holding a particular office, and he uses Luther to explain how that might be conceived (KAV 251–2). When it comes to religious proclamation, Luther took himself to be following St. Paul in distinguishing between the apostle, who is directly called to their office by God, and the proclaimer within the Church, who has their authority bestowed on them by the human community and is only indirectly related to God—, but nonetheless this gives the proclaimer a legitimacy that does not belong to a private individual and as such their authority is more than mere power.<sup>25</sup> Likewise, Løgstrup argues, Luther held that non-religious proclamation and authority within worldly offices also ultimately stems from God’s ordering of our lives together in these terms, so that “authority in the other offices is given so that it can be exercised in the name of God; and therefore a person must have a calling in worldly activity as much as in spiritual activity” (KAV 253).

Having explained how authority connects to proclamation, in §3 of his paper, Løgstrup turns to consider Kierkegaard’s account of authority in communication. Løgstrup begins with Kierkegaard’s distinction between an objective, factual truth and subjective,

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<sup>24</sup> See also K.E. Løgstrup, “Fænomenologi og psykologi,” in *Solidaritet og kærlighed og andre essays* (Copenhagen: Gyldendal, 1987), pp. 116–40; “Phenomenology and Psychology,” trans. Hans Fink and Robert Stern, Løgstrup’s *Ethical Demand: Resources and Links*, <https://ethicaldemand.files.wordpress.com/2016/11/logstrup-phenomenology-and-psychology-translation-final1.pdf> (accessed January 28, 2019), pp. 1–19. In this essay, Løgstrup writes the following: “It is not, as Kierkegaard thought, communication’s indirectness, but on the contrary its openness, that makes the other free. With sincerity a person gives us security and freedom, for with sincerity they deplete their own possibilities for exerting power and authority” (“Phenomenology and Psychology,” p. 14; “Fænomenologi og psykologi,” p. 133).

<sup>25</sup> See the references given by Løgstrup in his paper, to Luther’s 1535 commentary on St. Paul’s Epistle to the Galatians (WA 40.1: 59/LW 26: 17).

decisive truth.<sup>26</sup> Objective truth is not decisive in shaping the individual into who they are, so it can be communicated directly. However, decisive truth does impact the individual, and they are therefore not able to relate to it objectively. When such a truth is communicated, there is a danger of either one individual imposing their own self-conception on another or reducing what is communicated into an objective matter. Thus, Løgstrup explains that for Kierkegaard, “Direct communication, if it concerns a decisive truth, is a contradictory undertaking” (KAV 255). Moreover, as the decisive truth for Kierkegaard concerns the individual’s relation of dependence on God, if one were to try to communicate this directly, one would make the other person dependent on oneself instead of God, thus precisely undermining what one is trying to communicate (ibid.).

Løgstrup argues that this then leads Kierkegaard to set up the difficulty for which indirect communication is the answer (KAV 256). The issue is this: when it comes to communicating objective matters, Kierkegaard sees that the relation between communicator and recipient is impersonal, does not involve an intention to interfere with the self-conception of the recipient, and still counts as communication regardless of how the recipient responds, so it does not involve any problematic authority relation. But he takes each of these relations to be different when the content is an essential and decisive truth, as it is in the case of Christianity, and it is this difference that generates the problem of authority. Løgstrup thus treats Kierkegaard’s strategy of indirect communication as an answer to this problem—for example, by offering two contradictory possibilities that the recipient must choose between or by making sure the recipient has no grounds on which to admire the communicator and so to take their assertion seriously. The problem is particularly acute when it comes to Christianity, which does at one level have what looks like an objective doctrinal content: if this is all that is communicated, Christianity becomes cut off from our subjective existence, but attempts to connect its message to our existence will fail if communicated directly. Løgstrup suggests that Kierkegaard treats the paradoxical nature of Christianity as crucial in resolving this difficulty, as this again cannot be communicated without leaving the individual free to decide how to respond to the paradox of “God become man” (KAV 258), as each of us has to struggle resolve it for ourselves. Likewise, Løgstrup argues, Kierkegaard understood being faced with this paradox as a way of liberating the individual from “life in the crowd” insofar as “the paradox confronts the individual with the choice between faith and offense that they

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<sup>26</sup> See, for example, Kierkegaard, *Concluding Unscientific Postscript*, pp. 21–2/SKS 7: 29–30.

can only meet alone” (KAV 260). Løgstrup thus locates Kierkegaard’s work in a certain “polemical situation” (ibid.), as he sought to replace Christendom with a more genuine form of Christianity and turned to the paradox and hence indirect communication as a means to do so.

Having outlined what he takes to be Kierkegaard’s argument in favor of indirect communication, Løgstrup then notes an important exception to this argument that is emphasized by Kierkegaard himself: the apostle. Kierkegaard allows this exception, Løgstrup suggests, because while the apostle communicates a matter of decisive significance, Kierkegaard holds that they are not communicating on their own behalf but on behalf of God, and so they do not bring their audience under their own personal authority but exercise this authority based on a calling that has come to them through the paradox of divine revelation (KAV 261). Løgstrup suggests that this allows Kierkegaard to treat the apostle as engaging in direct communication, for here the authority he sees as involved in communication does not undermine God’s authority; he is therefore happy to treat their preaching as a special form of direct communication, which means he fails to distinguish this preaching from communication in the way that Løgstrup takes to be crucial (KAV 262).

This then means, Løgstrup argues, that there is a fundamental difference between Luther and Kierkegaard on these matters (ibid.). Luther just focuses on the category of proclamation and does not confuse proclamation with communication as Kierkegaard does; moreover, Luther is also happy to extend the authority involved in the latter beyond the apostles. By contrast, Kierkegaard does not really distinguish between the authority involved in communication of a decisive matter and proclamation. The important distinction for Kierkegaard is rather between direct and indirect communication, and he thinks that only Jesus and the apostles have authority to communicate directly on matters of decisive importance to the individual. (And since a direct communication of decisive importance is what he understands proclamation to be, proclamation thus falls under the category of communication in a way that it does not for Luther.) Løgstrup’s argument against Kierkegaard is, then, that communication even concerning a decisive matter such as Christianity need not involve the exercise of authority, and hence the Kierkegaardian requirement for indirect communication is undermined. On the other hand, proclamation and hence the exercise of authority within the Church is unproblematic because it can be justified (KAV 263).

In §4 of his essay, Løgstrup turns to consider why Luther was content to extend the authority involved in proclamation beyond the apostles, in a way that Kierkegaard was

unwilling to do, and what this divergence tells us about their respective views of God's relation to the world and thus of the value and meaning that resides in it. The crucial difference between them, Løgstrup argues, is as follows: Luther was prepared to see God as ordaining structures even within the human world and thus within the "worldly government [*Regiment*]" so that those with offices within these structures could derive their authority from God, whereas Kierkegaard was not prepared to make this move, as he sought a greater degree of separation between the "sphere of immanence" and the "sphere of transcendence," and so between the relative value of the finite and the absolute value of the infinite (KAV 264). This means that he could only recognize the apostle as having an immediate vocation from God but not the kind of mediated vocation that Luther was prepared to allow, which then makes it possible to extend the authority of proclamation beyond the apostolate.

However, Løgstrup argues, if we follow Luther and extend authority to other religious offices, such as that of the pastor, where that authority is now traced back to God rather than residing in the individual, we can see how there is no problem of indirect communication for those in such offices (KAV 266). For, while the pastor may be proclaiming rather than just communicating, and so is exercising authority as a result, the proclamation is now no longer a matter of one individual exercising their individual authority over another in a way that would interfere with the latter's relation to God, precisely because they are speaking *for* God (say, in conveying to their audience that they have divine forgiveness). Thus, if we accept a position more like Luther's than like Kierkegaard's (Løgstrup argues), there is no need to think that indirect communication is required with respect to proclamation, even though here the exercise of authority is involved, since on the Lutheran account, "God is the source of all authority, so that here the single and only bearer of authority [i.e. God], by performing what is proclaimed, brings it into force for those to whom it is proclaimed [by forgiving them]" (KAV 267).

Finally, Løgstrup then relates this difference between Luther and Kierkegaard to wider aspects of their positions. First, he notes that Luther's "polemical situation" differs from Kierkegaard's: whereas the latter was fighting against the reduction of Christianity to Christendom and so sought to make the religious relation a matter of "inwardness" and decisive existential importance to the individual, Luther was trying to make Christianity less a matter of individual works and so he emphasizes its social dimension (*ibid.*). As a result, the tendencies in their respective conceptions pull in opposite directions. But secondly, and more broadly, Løgstrup argues that Luther is happier than Kierkegaard to see life in the finite world as structured by God into ethical relationships. For Kierkegaard, "finitude is levelled

out to nothing but relative ends and nothing but immanence” (KAV 268), with a corresponding loss of significance to our social relations in which he can therefore see no place for divine authority but only an inauthentic “life in the crowd.” By contrast, for Luther, “In finitude, God places his demand on the individual, God contradicts the egoism of the individual through the neighbor that he forces on the individual by ordering life in finitude into a life in offices” (ibid.). It is this issue that Løgstrup carries forward into his later work, where he continues to contrast Luther’s position with Kierkegaard’s (and Kant’s).<sup>27</sup> Løgstrup suggests that in distinguishing between absolute and relative goals or ends and rejecting any mediation between them, Kierkegaard denudes the finite world of human needs and relations of any genuine value and significance in its own right by reducing it to a Platonic “realm of shadows,”<sup>28</sup> thereby preventing it from containing the kind of normative structures that Luther recognized (KAV 268–9). Thus, even when Løgstrup moves away from Luther’s specific conception of social orders as providing us with these structures and instead takes our ethical relations to arise out of our more basic interdependence that is then refracted in social norms, he still sees this as fundamentally closer to Luther’s conception of the finite world than that of Kierkegaard,<sup>29</sup> which he thinks is always in danger of becoming a kind of ethical nihilism and other-worldliness. At the heart of this article, therefore, lies a

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<sup>27</sup> For further discussion of how Løgstrup’s critique of Kierkegaard relates to his parallel critique of Kant, and of his critique of Kierkegaard more generally, see Robert Stern, “Confronting Kant and Kierkegaard,” chap. 8 of *The Radical Demand in Løgstrup’s Ethics* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019), pp. 202–46.

<sup>28</sup> Løgstrup, *Opgør med Kierkegaard*, p. 159; our trans. Løgstrup writes the following: “Platonism’s speculative devaluing of this world, that it lacks reality, that it is a realm of shadows [*skyggerige*], recurs in Kierkegaard’s understanding of Christianity as an implicit claim that the empirical is not first rendered mediocre by the mediocrity of human beings, but is made so already by the hand of the creator” (ibid.). For further comments on Kierkegaard’s relation to Plato, see also pp. 133–9, where Løgstrup makes clear that he does not share Kierkegaard’s interpretation. In particular, consider the following remark: “Hegel makes the absolute immanent, while the transcendent [*hinsidigheden*] in Socrates and Plato remains transcendent—on Kierkegaard’s interpretation of them” (p. 133).

<sup>29</sup> For example, Løgstrup claims that “the ethical demand receives its content from the fundamental condition that we live under and that we are not in a position to change, namely that the life of one person is entangled with that of the other person, and so it consists in taking care of the part of the other person’s life which as a result of this entanglement is at our mercy. ‘Nature (understood as the immutable fundamental conditions) teaches what love does’ (Luther). The ethical demand is refracted as through prisms of all the different and particular relationships in which we stand to one another as spouses, parents and children, teachers and students, employers and workers, as they are all forms of the fundamental condition whereby the ethical demand receives its content” (K.E. Løgstrup, *Ethiske begreber og problemer* [Aarhus: Klim, 2014], p. 12; our trans.).

fundamental disagreement between Løgstrup and Kierkegaard that was to be developed through the engagement with Kierkegaard that was still to come, as Løgstrup continued to distance himself from Kierkegaard and contemporary Kierkegaardians on these central issues in elaborating his own position.

#### 4. Løgstrup *contra* Kierkegaard

We have now seen how Løgstrup's paper raises two fundamental objections to Kierkegaard. First, Løgstrup claims that Kierkegaard's strategy of indirect communication is in fact uncalled for, as it attempts to address a problem that does not really arise. Second, Løgstrup offers a diagnostic suggestion, arguing that Kierkegaard fails to see this due to wider difficulties in his outlook, stemming from his "levelling out" of the finite and the underlying nihilism about the finite that this implies. In this section, we will consider how Kierkegaard might respond to these objections.

On the first issue, there can be little doubt that the question of authority does concern Kierkegaard. In particular, his *own* authority as an author creates difficulties for him in his attempt to communicate significant subjective truths to his readership.<sup>30</sup> Moreover, Kierkegaard explicitly relates this issue to his lack of authority as a preacher, claiming that he cannot communicate directly to his audience as one who issues a proclamation might.<sup>31</sup> In this respect, Løgstrup clearly has a legitimate target for his criticism.

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<sup>30</sup> Consider, for example, Kierkegaard's remark that "'Without authority' to make aware of the religious, the essentially Christian, is the category for my whole work as an author regarded as a totality. From the very beginning I have enjoined and repeated unchanged that I was 'without authority.' I regard myself rather as a *reader* of the books, not as the *author*" (Søren Kierkegaard, "The Accounting," in *The Point of View*, trans. Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong, vol. 22 of *Kierkegaard's Writings*, trans. Howard V. Hong et al., ed. Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong [Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998], p. 12; *Om min Forfatter-Virksomhed*, SKS: XIII 19). See also the preface to *For Self-Examination*, where Kierkegaard recommends the book be read aloud, saying that "By reading aloud you will gain the strongest impression that you have only yourself to consider, not me, who, after all, am 'without authority'" (*For Self-Examination/Judge for Yourself!*, trans. and ed. Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong, vol. 21 of *Kierkegaard's Writings*, trans. Howard V. Hong et al., ed. Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong [Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990], p. 3/*Til Selvprøvelse*, SKS XIII: 33; see also pp. 17 and 21–2/SKS XIII: 46 and 50–51). This point is made frequently in the prefaces to Kierkegaard's works: for some further references, see the Hongs' note to *For Self-Examination* (p. 271n. 3).

<sup>31</sup> In the preface to *Two Upbuilding Discourses*, Kierkegaard notes that this "little book . . . is called 'discourses,' not sermons, because its author does not have authority to *preach*" (Søren Kierkegaard, preface to *Two Upbuilding Discourses*, in *Eighteen Upbuilding Discourses*, trans. and ed. Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong, vol. 5 of *Kierkegaard's Writings*, trans.

However, in fairness to Kierkegaard, it could be argued that while this is undoubtedly *one* source of his concern, and thus *one* source of his argument for indirect communication, it is not the *only* one, and perhaps not even the most important, which would mean that Løgstrup has failed to properly address the issue as a whole. Kierkegaard's emphasis on the need for such communication has other grounds on which it can be defended that Løgstrup does not deal with at all. For example, in the rather extensive literature on Kierkegaard's view of indirect communication, based primarily on Kierkegaard's comments in his work *The Point of View for My Work as an Author*, it is argued that an important rationale for indirect communication comes not from any concern about authority but rather from a concern about how to enable people to escape from the "enormous" [*uhyre*] or "dreadful illusion" [*fryteligt Sandsebedrag*] of Christendom—that people are Christian simply by being born in a Christian country—, which inspires Kierkegaard to write that "an illusion can never be removed directly, and basically only indirectly. If it is an illusion that all are Christians, and if something is to be done, it must be done indirectly."<sup>32</sup> He continues:

On the assumption, then, that a religious author has from the ground up become aware of this illusion, Christendom, and to the limit of his ability with, note well, the help of God, wants to stamp it out—what is he to do then? Well, first and foremost, no impatience. If he becomes impatient, then he makes a direct assault and accomplishes—nothing. By a direct attack he only strengthens a person in the illusion and also infuriates him.<sup>33</sup>

Instead, Kierkegaard argues, an indirect approach is required, involving the use of deception as a "corrosive" so that the audience will not be aware of what is occurring and so will not be able to shut out what is being said.<sup>34</sup> This indirectness is a deception because, instead of saying what one thinks—that one is a Christian and the other is not—, one begins by pretending that one believes the opposite.<sup>35</sup>

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Howard V. Hong et al., ed. Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong [Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990], p. 5/*To opbyggelige Taler*, SKS V: 183).

<sup>32</sup> Søren Kierkegaard, *The Point of View for My Work as an Author*, in *The Point of View*, p. 43; *Synspunktet for min Forfatter-Virksomhed*, SKS XVI: 25.

<sup>33</sup> *Ibid*/SKS XVI: 25–6.

<sup>34</sup> *Ibid*, pp. 53–4/SKS XVI: 35.

<sup>35</sup> For further discussion of this approach, see Genia Schönbaumsfeld, *A Confusion of the Spheres: Kierkegaard and Wittgenstein on Philosophy and Religion* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), pp. 40–1; and Antony Aumann, "Kierkegaard on Indirect Communication, the Crowd, and a Monstrous Illusion," in *International Kierkegaard Commentary: Point of View*, ed. Robert L. Perkins (Macon, GA: Mercer University Press,

Now, it would be fair to say that this set of issues does raise questions distinct from those addressed by Løgstrup and that the latter's criticisms of Kierkegaard's authority-based argument for indirect communication may not apply to this argument from "enormous illusion." Moreover, it would appear that Løgstrup nowhere tackles this second argument for indirectness. But, of course, that does not in itself undermine Løgstrup's criticisms of the authority-based argument or show that he needs to deal with this second argument, since for him this second argument would not appear to connect to the deeper issues that really concern him with the authority-based argument, namely what this tells us about Kierkegaard's underlying nihilism. It is thus to this second issue that we can now briefly turn.

Here, Løgstrup's criticism of Kierkegaard is likely to irritate the contemporary Kierkegaardian<sup>36</sup>—although, as we have seen, in the context of the Kierkegaardianism of his own day, Løgstrup's reading of Kierkegaard as a nihilist was generally accepted as the right one by readers in the Tidehverv circle such as Olesen Larsen and others, so to this extent it would seem unfair to condemn Løgstrup for his approach. Nonetheless, it might seem to make Løgstrup's criticism less relevant within current debates.

However, there are two possible responses to this concern. First, while Løgstrup's criticism of Kierkegaard is certainly polemical, and therefore often unsubtle and at times uncharitable, it may be harder to dismiss than some Kierkegaardians have claimed—though it is not possible to go into the details of this here.<sup>37</sup> Second, even if Løgstrup's claim concerning Kierkegaard's nihilism in the end proves unfounded, this claim was developed (as we have seen) as a diagnostic point concerning Kierkegaard's commitment to the argument from authority and why Kierkegaard felt compelled to make it and found it so compelling. Even if this diagnostic point were to be overturned, therefore, it would still leave Løgstrup's criticism of that argument intact—and as this is an original criticism of that argument (as far as we can tell), interest in Løgstrup's position still remains fully warranted.

Finally, it could be argued against Løgstrup that these two Kierkegaardian arguments for indirect communication—the argument from authority and the argument from removing

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2010), pp. 295–324. Aumann's article contains many references to the secondary literature on Kierkegaard and indirect communication.

<sup>36</sup> Indeed, it has done so: see, for example, Jamie M. Ferreira, *Love's Grateful Striving: A Commentary on Kierkegaard's Works of Love* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), pp. 76–82; and Robert Zachary Manis, "Kierkegaard," in *The Cambridge History of Moral Philosophy*, ed. Sacha Golob and Jens Timmermann (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017), pp. 459–71, esp. 469.

<sup>37</sup> For further discussion, see Stern, "Confronting Kant and Kierkegaard"; and also Rabjerg, *Løgstrup og Kierkegaard*.

illusion—are more closely connected than Løgstrup sees, as the second can be used to reinforce the first. For example, in *For Self-Examination*, Kierkegaard argues that the illusion will only be removed if we are forced to see ourselves for what we are in the “mirror” of God’s Word to us, which will only work in this way as a mirror if we take that Word to be addressed to each of us as individuals rather than as some objective truth,<sup>38</sup> so that, for example, we think of *ourselves* as being in the situation of the Priest, the Levite, or the Good Samaritan when the parable is recounted to us.<sup>39</sup> Thus, Kierkegaard could argue against Løgstrup as follows: either the audience needs to see the parable as addressed to them individually in a second-personal manner that does involve some sort of authority; or (if we lack the requisite authority, as Kierkegaard does, for who is he to hold up this mirror to the audience in this way and judge them?) indirect communication is required in order to prevent what is being discussed from becoming a merely objective matter that fails to engage the audience as individuals at all.<sup>40</sup> The claim here is therefore that in order for the mirror to work in dispelling our illusions, it must draw us to see our own faces in the glass, which requires authority; if such authority is lacking, indirect communication would then remain as the only available option to a writer like Kierkegaard.<sup>41</sup>

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<sup>38</sup> For example, Kierkegaard claims, “When you read God’s Word, in everything you read, continually to say to yourself: It is I to whom it is speaking, it is I about whom it is speaking—this is earnestness, precisely this is earnestness. Not a single one of those to whom the cause of Christianity in the higher sense has been entrusted forgot to urge this again and again as most crucial, as unconditionally the condition if you are to come to see yourself in the mirror. Consequently, this is what you have to do; while you are reading you must incessantly say to yourself: It is I to whom it is speaking, it is I about whom it is speaking” (*For Self-Examination*, pp. 36–7/SKS XIII: 63).

<sup>39</sup> See *ibid.*, pp. 40–41/SKS XIII: 66–7.

<sup>40</sup> For example, he writes, “Oh, what depth of cunning! One makes God’s Word into something impersonal, objective, a doctrine—instead of its being the voice of God that you shall hear. This is the way the fathers heard it, this terrifying voice of God; now it sounds as objective as calico! And one relates impersonally (objectively) to this impersonal thing” (*ibid.*, p. 39/SKS XIII: 66).

<sup>41</sup> This point has been noted by Jamie Lorentzen, *Kierkegaard’s Metaphors* (Macon, GA: Mercer University Press, 2001), pp. 111–2, and further developed in relation to Kierkegaard’s conception of the mirror by Patrick Stokes in his *Kierkegaard’s Mirrors: Interest, Self, and Moral Vision* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), pp. 129–30. Lorentzen writes: “Throughout his authorship, Kierkegaard continually intimates to the reader that the content of his work is for the reader because the subject of his thought is the reader. . . . And although a direct communicative approach by the author may let readers more easily know in what respect they are being addressed, Kierkegaard seldom break from his Socratic fidelity with the reader by assuming such an authorial or dogmatic stance evoked by direct communication. Instead, he continually seeks out new ways to prompt the reader into self-awareness . . . More often than not, metaphor plays a significant role, not only in

Interestingly, then, what this debate with Løgstrup reveals is that the key issue regarding indirect communication may turn out not to be the Socratic problem of how one communicates a decisive truth to a person while leaving them to think for themselves (which is how it is often portrayed, not least by Kierkegaard himself), but how, without some exercise of authority, one gets them to feel that communication in a second-personal manner, as an address to them as individuals, for it is only when taken up at this level that the illusion under which they are operating can be dispelled. If one has the authority to proclaim to a person, this can be achieved directly, as in the case of proclaiming the Gospel;<sup>42</sup> but if (like Kierkegaard) one does not have authority to speak to others in this manner, then in order for the subject of the address to recognize that they are indeed being addressed individually in this way, a more indirect approach is required.<sup>43</sup>

### 5. Proclamation as Normative Power

Having reviewed the debate between Løgstrup and Kierkegaard, we now turn to relating Løgstrup's concerns to developments in contemporary philosophy and try to gain a better understanding of his position on the nature and status of proclamation. In his article, Løgstrup does not give us an explicit and comprehensive account of what this nature and status is or the kind of authority that it involves. He identifies it as a kind of speech act and puts it in the category of address alongside “the question, the command, the request, the promise, and so on” (KAV 250)—but beyond this, does not specify in any detail what kind of speech act it is. In the remainder of this paper we take up this question and consider the normative power of

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communicating assertions but also in upholding his art of indirect communication” (*Kierkegaard's Metaphors*, p. 111).

<sup>42</sup> In *Works of Love*, Kierkegaard writes the following: “The Gospel does not need to add what the prophet Nathan added to his parable, ‘You are the man,’ since it is already contained in the form of the statement and in its being a word of the Gospel. The divine authority of the Gospel does not speak to one person about another, does not speak to you, my listener, about me, or to me about you—no, when the Gospel speaks, it speaks to the single individual. It does not speak *about* us human beings, you and me, but speaks *to us* human beings, to you and me” (Søren Kierkegaard, *Works of Love: Some Christian Deliberations in the Form of Discourses*, trans. Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong, vol. 16 of *Kierkegaard's Writings*, trans. Howard V. Hong et al., ed. Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong [Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993], p. 14/*Kjerlighedens Gjerninger*, SKS IX: 22).

<sup>43</sup> For an amusing example of how this indirectness might work, see Hugh Pyper's Kierkegaardian use of one of Neil Munro's stories “The Malingerer” (in *Para Handy and Other Tales* [Edinburgh: William Blackwood and Sons, 1948], pp. 10–3) in Hugh Pyper, *The Joy of Kierkegaard: Essays on Kierkegaard as a Biblical Reader* (Chesham: Acumen, 2011), pp. 41–2.

proclamation *qua* performative. Our suggestion will be that this power varies depending on what is proclaimed, and we will illustrate this with three key examples that differ in how the relation between the speaker and the audience plays out.<sup>44</sup> These three examples are: proclamations about the objective facts; proclamations that issue demands for subjective reflection; and proclamations that bring about forgiveness. We start with a brief account of normative power before turning to look at each of these three types in more detail.

First of all, let us look at how performatives, like orders or promises, operate to change the normative situation or relation between two or more agents and how they require authority or standing.<sup>45</sup> Take the case of an order. If valid, an order brings about a *normative change*, since in issuing the order the bearer of authority creates a new obligation for the subject. The normative change is brought about by *performance* insofar as it is an expression of will (or an expression of intention) that creates the obligation. Furthermore, it creates a specific kind of obligation that we can call *directed* or *bipolar*. It is not simply that it is a good idea for the subject to behave in a certain way but rather that there is now an obligation that the subject owes to the bearer of authority. The subject X owes it to bearer of authority Y to do some action A; and by the same token, Y has a right, as a result of the order, that X should do A. However, as well as creating a new obligation, a valid order also has an effect on the reasons that would have applied to the subject had the order not been given. Let's say the order is "Attack from the right." There may be various reasons in favor of actions other than attacking from the right—there might be something to be said for not attacking at all, or attacking from the left, or splitting up and attacking in pincer formation, etc.—but the effect of the order is to take away the subject's right to act on those considerations. The practical force of the reasons that conflict with the order is *excluded* or *silenced*. This silencing of competing considerations is not absolute, since if the order is sufficiently misguided it can no longer be binding. But if orders can be valid then at least sometimes they must be successful in replacing the subject's decision-making with the decision made by the superior. In those cases, the order is binding because the subject no longer has the right to make the decision for

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<sup>44</sup> Another obvious example which we will not consider is a proclamation that issues in a command. This is not so relevant to our discussion here, given that (as we have seen) Løgstrup has concerns over the sort of divine command theory that this would entail.

<sup>45</sup> For more on normative powers, see Joseph Raz, *Practical Reason and Norms* (London: Hutchinson, 1975); Gary Watson, "Promises, Reasons and Normative Powers" in *Reasons for Action*, ed. David J. Sobel and Steven Wall (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), pp. 155–78; and David Owens, *Shaping the Normative Landscape* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012). For more on the question of authority see Joseph Raz, *Practical Reason and Norms* and *The Morality of Freedom* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986).

themselves. The reason for which a valid order is binding is therefore not that the action A is the most sensible option of the available alternatives. Although it must not be too misguided, a valid order can be binding independently of being optimal. Therefore, an important part of explaining its force must refer not to the content of the order, and how sensible it is, but rather its source or the *position* or *authority* of the person to make it: it has to refer to the right of that person to make such decisions and to their having a certain jurisdiction.

To show that Løgstrup thinks of proclamation as the exercise of a normative power, return to Løgstrup's distinction between proclamation and communication, which he draws along four axes. First, *proclamation is second-personally addressed*. It is "a category of address. That means: what is proclaimed to a human being comes into force for them"; whereas what is communicated "simply as communicated—leaves the life of human being completely untouched" (KAV 249). Second, and as observed above, *proclamation is a performative speech act*. It is like "the command, the request, the promise and so on . . . [in] that the content does not exist as something given outside the corresponding category [of address]" (KAV 250). By contrast, with respect to communication, "one disregards the category, in order to stress explicitly that one comes to know something; this is what the objectivity of the category consists in" (KAV 251). Third, *proclamation presupposes authority*. It "presupposes some authority that establishes the validity of that which is proclaimed" (KAV 249). On the other hand, "Communication is not grounded or supported through something else that stands behind it; rather the relation between the informant and recipient is exhausted in the message" (KAV 249). Fourth, *proclamation changes the second-personal communicative relation*. For example,

If what is proclaimed is something good for the recipient, then the authority relation can be further characterized as either one of trust or mistrust, depending on how what is proclaimed is accepted. If the proclamation has threatening content, then the manner of its reception gives the relationship of authority the further characteristic of either obedience or rebellion. (KAV 249–50)

By contrast, communication "does not change anything in the relationship between the informant and the recipient as such" (KAV 250).

### 5.1 Proclamation as Testimony

Having outlined the basic conception of normative powers and shown how it can be related to Løgstrup's position, we now consider what form of such power is deployed in the case of

proclamation. We will suggest that the answer to this depends on what is being proclaimed. Let us start by looking at proclamation about facts, as a form of testimony.

To see how testimony might count as a form of proclamation, by involving the kind of authority the latter requires, recall that the distinction between proclamation and communication with which Løgstrup began is a distinction between two different ways of *receiving* the Word of God. In communication, the audience is given evidence for belief, but in proclamation the speaker's authority is in some way crucial. As such, the distinction between proclamation and communication could be understood as an *epistemological distinction*. Conceived epistemologically, the set of contrasts Løgstrup maps out above lines up with two different contemporary epistemologies of testimony. When a speaker performs the speech act of telling an audience something, on one account this speech act operates as an *assurance*, where the speaker's authority is crucial; and on the other account, this speech act is treated as a piece of *evidence*, and the audience maintains their autonomy. This distinction between assurance and evidentialist approaches to the speech act of telling then generates the same set of contrasts that Løgstrup describes.

First, conceived as assurance, *telling is second-personally addressed*. The speech act of telling is one where a speaker S addresses an audience A; and in telling A that p, the speaker S thereby purports to give A unique reason to believe that p, namely the reason that comes from seeing S's intention that A believe that p as an assumption of responsibility for A believing truly that p. Thus, Richard Moran argues that telling is like promising because it offers the speaker's assurance that what is told is true.<sup>46</sup> By contrast, conceived as evidence, a telling is just one more piece of behavior and no more second-personally addressed than the speaker's wearing certain clothes or having a certain accent. Second, *telling is a performative speech act*, again at least when conceived as assurance. Performatives are speech acts whose very utterance does something, and one signal that such an act has occurred is the applicability of "hereby." For example, when promising, it is appropriate to use "hereby" as in, "I (hereby) promise you to . . . ." And the same is true of the speech act of telling: it is appropriate to say, "I (hereby) tell you that . . . ." Remove the category of address—suppose, for example, that the promise or telling were mere words uttered while asleep—and, as

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<sup>46</sup> Richard Moran, "Getting Told and Being Believed," *Philosophers' Imprint* 5:5 (2005), pp. 1–29. See also Benjamin McMyler, *Testimony, Trust and Authority* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011); Edward Hinchman, "Telling as Inviting to Trust," *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 70:3 (2005), pp. 562–87; and Paul Faulkner, "On Telling and Trusting," *Mind* 116:464 (2007), pp. 875–902.

Løgstrup observes, there is no promise made and nothing is told (KAV 249). By contrast, conceived as evidence, there is no difference between a speech act that is intentionally made and words uttered in sleep; both are evidence for something. Third, *telling presupposes authority*, again at least when conceived as assurance. We can make promises we are not in a position to keep and tell people things we do not know. But these speech acts are false or *infelicitous*, in Austin's term.<sup>47</sup> In telling A that p, S purports to assume responsibility for A believing truly, and S can properly assume this responsibility if and only if S has grounds for thinking that p is true—ideally grounds that allow S to know that p. Thus, in telling A that p, S purports to have these grounds, and S's telling presupposes this authority. By contrast, telling is evidence for something if and only if it is combined with further belief that indicates what it is evidence for and why it is evidence for this thing. The authority then lies with this further background. Remove this background and the telling is, as Løgstrup says, no more than message (*ibid.*). Fourth, *telling changes the second-personal communicative relation* when conceived as assurance because viewed this way, it is an invitation to trust.<sup>48</sup> So if the telling is not received with trust, it is liable to provoke resentment in the speaker. Equally, if the audience responds to the telling with trust and is then misled, either intentionally or through some failure to assume responsibility adequately, the audience is liable to resentment. The telling thereby changes the speaker-audience relation. By contrast, conceived as evidence, nothing is demanded of the speaker, and nothing is risked by the audience.

The distinction between proclamation and communication thus maps onto the distinction between conceiving of testimony as assurance and conceiving of it as evidence. Having made this distinction and focusing on proclamation—or a speech act of telling that is conceived as assurance—Løgstrup then draws a very natural distinction. There are cases in which the speaker is the *original authority* and cases in which the speaker has *derived authority* (KAV 263). For example, suppose that you ask me what the weather is like outside. I get up, look, and tell you. In this case, my authority is original: I know what the weather is like by looking, and you know by my telling you. Or suppose you have proved a theorem that I am struggling with. You indicate a certain point in my workings where I go wrong and tell

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<sup>47</sup> J. L. Austin, *How To Do Things With Words* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1962).

<sup>48</sup> The importance of trust is a central theme in Løgstrup's work: see for example "Mediation," chap. 2 of *The Ethical Demand*, pp. 29–42. For further discussion, see Paul Faulkner, "Trust and the Radical Ethical Demand," in *What is Ethically Demanded?*, pp. 237–54; and Robert Stern, "'Trust is Basic': Løgstrup on the Priority of Trust," in *The Philosophy of Trust*, ed. Paul Faulkner and Thomas Simpson (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), pp. 272–94.

me to do something else. In this case, your authority is original: you know through possessing and understanding the proof; and I know, at this point, only by your telling me. In many testimonial exchanges, we tell people things that we know first-hand, when we are the original authorities. But we also tell people things that we only know by testimony ourselves. This is then one way in which a speaker can be a derived authority, and Løgstrup suggests there are two cases here. There are cases in which the speaker is a derived authority because *authority is inherited*; and there are cases in which the speaker is a derived authority because the speaker is *merely a spokesperson for authority*. The first of the cases is when the speaker tells an audience something that is not known first-hand but itself known through testimony. From the epistemological perspective this difference between original and inherited authority changes little: if testimony can transmit knowledge across one communicative link, this can be iterated. Provided that a speaker can assume responsibility for the truth of what they know, it does not matter whether this knowledge is first-hand or testimonial.

The interesting case is when the speaker's authority is derived because the speaker is merely a spokesperson for authority. This is the case in which the apostles proclaim the Word of God or when the proclaimer is within the Church. In both cases, the authority of the speaker comes with the "possession of an office" (KAV 251). Thus, Løgstrup observes, "The category of proclamation therefore cannot in any way be analyzed without *the office* of the proclamation being brought into the picture" (ibid.). This idea that authority might be grounded in office is, we suggest, the idea that the authority that grounds a felicitous act of telling might be neither original nor inherited—it might not be an authority that the speaker possesses, but might come from the speaker being an official spokesperson of an authority.

A contemporary example of this can be found in the case of collective knowledge. Some things we can only know collectively. This is because the evidence required to know some things first-hand can only be assembled through collective endeavor. Much contemporary scientific work is like this because experiments are often too complex to be done individually. For example, John Hardwig cites an early experiment to measure the life-span of Charm particles where 280 person-years were required to build the experimental equipment, gather, and analyze the data.<sup>49</sup> The resulting paper stating the experimental results in the *Physical Review Letters* cited ninety-nine authors.<sup>50</sup> Or consider Lackey's case of a report charting the progress of populations in forty-seven states, commissioned by and

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<sup>49</sup> John Hardwig, "Epistemic Dependence," *Journal of Philosophy* 82:7 (1985), pp. 335–49.

<sup>50</sup> K. Abe et al., "Charm Photoproduction Cross Section at 20 GeV," *Physical Review Letters* 51:3 (1983), pp. 156–60.

presented to the United Nations Population Commission.<sup>51</sup> The vast amount of data and statistical analysis needed to identify population level trends in forty-seven countries again makes this report the product of collective endeavor. As Lackey imagines the case, the report is presented to the United Nations Population Commission by a *spokesperson*, Sam, who “interprets and compiles all of the data contributed . . . into the published report.”<sup>52</sup> This would be a substantial contribution, and for this reason, Sam could be regarded as an original authority—one who knows the various strands the report pulls together on the basis of testimony. However, the kind of spokesperson we should imagine is not one who plays any contributory role but rather one who is *merely a spokesperson*. Were Sam merely a spokesperson, when she tells the assembled United Nations Population Commission that p—say that the birth-rate of Latinos is on the rise in the United States—she would be merely vocalizing what has been written in the report. As such, while Sam’s testimony allows the assembled members of the Commission to know that p, this is not because Sam is an original authority—nor is it because she is an inherited authority, though she is this—, but it is because her testimonial authority derives from that fact that she speaks for, and so with the authority of, the United Nations Population Commission.

Consider now the audience’s perspective. On the assurance view, the speech act of telling invites trust and so belief. Belief will then be rational to the extent that trust is rational, or to the extent that the audience otherwise believes that the speaker is in a position to discharge the responsibility that they assume (i.e., to the extent that the audience believes the speaker to have the requisite authority). Given that testimonial authority can be grounded in these ways, this means that a speaker has authority to the extent that either the audience believes that the speaker is an authority (original or inherited), or the audience believes that the speaker has the authority of an office that has authority. In the contemporary case just given, this judgment is straightforward, so there need be no issue with the rationality of trust. That is, it would be simple to conclude both that Sam speaks for the United Nations Population Commission and that she has the authority of the United Nations Population Commission. In the case of religious proclamation, the parallel of this last judgment is far from straightforward.

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<sup>51</sup> Jennifer Lackey, “A Deflationary Account of Group Testimony,” in *Essay in Collective Epistemology*, ed. Jennifer Lackey (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), pp. 64–96.

<sup>52</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 78.

Indeed, there is something of a puzzle to religious proclamation when it comes to considering proclamation as a vehicle for conversion.<sup>53</sup> To outline this, suppose that the audience already believes in the Word of God. Then the audience will recognize both the office of the proclaimer and the authority behind it. It follows that it will be rational for this audience to believe the proclamation. But the concern here is proclamation to the unconverted. Suppose, then, that the audience is a non-believer. In this case, irrespective of whether the audience recognizes the office of the proclaimer, the audience will not recognize any authority behind this office. It follows that there is no rational path to believe the proclamation that starts from the audience's belief alone. Thus, there remains the question of whether trust in the proclamation is possible and can be rational. The debate here is rather complex, but in order for this avenue to be open, it needs to be argued that the rationality of trust does not reduce to that of belief and that trust can be rational in its own terms.<sup>54</sup> But even if this is accepted, any trust-based uptake of the proclamation still involves presuming that the speaker has the authority that they purport to have. This presumption would be rejected if non-belief amounts to a rejection of the Word of God. It follows that there can be no rationality in trusting the proclamation when non-belief amounts to such rejection. But then, short of a miracle, there can be no rational conversion for atheists and others who start from a rejection of the Word of God. The puzzle is then that proclamation only really speaks to those who already converted.

## 5.2 Proclamation as Appeal

In the previous sub-section, we explained how proclamation might be understood as a kind of testimony that involves authority because it purports to offer some kind of personal assurance. On the assurance account, telling should be understood as a performative like ordering or promising. In focusing on proclamation as testimony, we have argued that the normative power for both is that of giving an audience a reason for belief. However, not all proclamations are about facts; proclamation can also be a practical normative power, a power

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<sup>53</sup> See Paul Faulkner, "The Nature and Rationality of Conversion" (unpublished manuscript, 2019).

<sup>54</sup> For the claim that the rationality of trust is that of belief see Pamela Hieronymi, "The Reasons of Trust," *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* 86:2 (2008), pp. 213–36. For an outline of the debate the contrary view, see Paul Faulkner, "Testimony and Trust," in *The Routledge Handbook on Trust and Philosophy*, ed. Judith Simon (London: Routledge, forthcoming 2019).

to create reasons for doing something. For example, proclamation can be the normative power of *appeal*.

To see how appeals might relate to proclamation, take the parallel case of a *request*.<sup>55</sup> If I request that you lend me your book for half an hour to help with the writing of my essay, I do not put you under an obligation to lend me your book. Requests differ from orders in that they leave the person free, normatively speaking, to decide whether or not to accede to the request. However, this is not to say that the request does not place the recipient under any obligation at all. The recipient is under an obligation, simply by being requested, to *respond in some way*. The person making the request has a certain authority or standing to make a request. That standing has to be recognized or acknowledged by giving the request some response, even if the response is only a negative one. Simply to ignore the request would be to wrong the requester because it denigrates them: it would treat them as if they had no right to make the request in the first place. Thus, the request places the recipient under an obligation to respond, and the requester can do this because they have the authority or standing to make a request of someone. Furthermore, this obligation to respond is one that is directed—meaning that the response is owed to the requester by the recipient—, and it is silencing and authoritative in that it stems from the right of the person to make the request rather than the weighing of pre-existing reasons for or against doing the action requested. So, there is reason to think of request as a normative power (as Løgstrup suggests by including it with promise and order in his list of speech acts requiring authority [see KAV 250]).

What is the recipient of a request under an obligation to do? Minimally, they are under an obligation to give *some* recognitive response. However, it might be that a person would rightly feel that they had been treated contemptuously if their request was dismissed without any consideration. A better understanding would be that in issuing a request a person puts the recipient under an obligation to give the request the *appropriate* recognitive response. And what seems appropriate in this situation seems to be due consideration. (What due consideration involves will depend on various things such as the nature of the thing or action requested, how much is at stake in acceding or refusing, how burdensome complying with the request would be, what relationship one has or wants to have with the person

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<sup>55</sup> For discussions of requests, see David Enoch, “Giving Practical Reasons,” *Philosophers’ Imprint* 11:4 (2011), pp. 1–22; and James H.P. Lewis, “The Discretionary Normativity of Requests,” *Philosophers’ Imprint* 18:20 (2018), pp. 1–16. Note that both Enoch and Lewis attempt to explain not just what requests are but also their normative force.

involved,<sup>56</sup> how strong one's rights are to the thing requested, the alternative ways for the person to get what they have requested, and so on.)

Now we can understand an *appeal* as related to a request in that, when valid, it puts a person under an obligation to give a matter *serious consideration*. Sometimes we are under obligations to give matters serious consideration. Take, for instance, the case of assessing a PhD thesis or reviewing a paper for a journal. There is a professional or role-obligation in these cases to give one's assessment serious thought and to engage with the piece of work one is dealing with. It might also be argued that those who have the authority to order their subjects to do or refrain from certain actions are also under a role-obligation to give their orders serious consideration before they issue them. But if there is such a thing as an appeal, in this sense, then one person can put another under an obligation to give some matter serious consideration *performatively*, that is, by *making an appeal*. For instance, if a student appeals a mark or a defendant appeals a conviction, then, assuming that the appeal is valid and the person has the right to make it, those reviewing the decision have been placed under an obligation to give their appeal serious consideration by reviewing the circumstances of the original assessment, whether the correct procedures were followed, whether the matter was given proper consideration at that time, and so on. What is necessary here is that the appeal should be reviewed in a spirit of openness rather than with a preferred conclusion already in mind. Another kind of appeal might be where one person issues an appeal for help. Of course, one might also issue a request for help, but the use of "appeal" indicates that we are dealing with a matter that is weightier or perhaps more urgent than mere request. Again, reviewing the appeal in a spirit of openness seems to be what is required by the appeal. An appeal is like a request in that one is within one's rights not to comply, but non-compliance is required to be preceded by serious consideration in which one thinks through the possibility of compliance, imaginatively confronting the consequences both of compliance and refusal.

We are now in a position to see the possibility of interpreting proclamation as a normative power. Like request and appeal, proclamation leaves the recipient free to refuse what it presents. This is important because proclamation usually concerns matters of decisive importance (not always, but mostly), and if we accept Løgstrup's concerns about authority then we can say that it would be wrong for one person to claim the right to dictate to another what their fundamental orientation should be. However, like request and appeal and other exercises of authority, proclamation does place recipients under an obligation to open

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<sup>56</sup> See Lewis, "The Discretionary Normativity of Requests," p. 12.

themselves to serious consideration of what it presents. Unlike request and appeal, however, the personal characteristics of the person doing the proclaiming drop out as irrelevant. The obligation to give serious consideration does not depend on the urgency of the situation, or the nature of what is requested, the available alternatives, and so on. Rather, what gives one an obligation to respond to proclamation would be the *office* occupied by the proclaimer. Thus, the obligation is owed to the person doing the proclaiming not because of their personal characteristics but because they occupy the office of proclamation and because they thereby have an authority, inherited from the divine, to speak about matters of fundamental significance and have us pay open-hearted attention to them.

Picking up on the point raised at the end of the previous subsection, this dimension of proclamation shows why preaching to the already converted can make sense if the point of proclamation is not so much to alter recipients' belief in the content of what is proclaimed but rather to alter their normative situation by placing recipients under an obligation to reflect appropriately. This makes sense because faith can be fragile and needs to be refreshed by renewed reflection on one's fundamental orientation. Such reflection can be occasioned by the proclaimer putting one under an obligation to do so. Furthermore, proclaiming to the non-converted makes sense because it is precisely through responding to an obligation to open-hearted reflection on matters of decisive significance for the individual that, it is hoped, conversion might come about.

### 5.3 Proclamation as Forgiveness

Finally, we can turn to a third form of proclamation, which links up with our earlier reading of Løgstrup's account of the authority of Jesus—namely proclamation of divine forgiveness. As we saw earlier (in §2 above), in resisting the concern that proclamation might be seen as a kind of coercion, Løgstrup argued that proclamation does not involve the authority of command but could involve the authority of forgiveness. This provides us with a further way of interpreting proclamation as a normative power, since it is arguably plausible to see forgiveness as a normative power.<sup>57</sup> After all, it is a common thought that forgiveness

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<sup>57</sup> See, for example, Christopher Bennett, "The Alteration Thesis: Forgiveness as a Normative Power," *Philosophy and Public Affairs* 46:2 (2018), pp. 207–33. See also, Brandon Warmke, "The Normative Significance of Forgiveness," *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* 94:4 (2015), pp. 687–703. Not all accounts of forgiveness take it to be a normative power. For an example of an account that doesn't treat forgiveness as a normative power, see Lucy Allais, "Wiping the Slate Clean: The Heart of Forgiveness," *Philosophy and Public Affairs* 36:1 (2008), pp. 33–68.

involves restoring relations between victim and offender and that it is something that only the victim can do. Furthermore, it is unsatisfying to think of the change characteristic of forgiveness in solely psychological terms—say, as a change of heart. While forgiveness often involves a change of heart, it also involves a change in the rights and obligations of the parties affected by wrongdoing. When we think, for instance, of forgiveness as something that can be given or bestowed, it looks as though the victim, in forgiving, has discretionary authority to make some normative change in the situation. This normative change might be one that somehow allows the parties involved to put the act behind them. But forgiveness also commits the victim to putting the act behind them, since forgiveness is something a victim cannot, except in special circumstances, take back.

For these reasons, it is attractive to think of forgiveness as a power held by the victim of an offense to restore a relation with an offender by altering the obligations that arise as a result of the offense. For instance, forgiveness might involve the victim waiving their right to apology or compensation and undertaking a commitment to leave the matter in the past. On this view, forgiveness is a power to alter bipolar obligations that arise from the situation of wrongdoing. This power is exercised by a performative speech act, and it involves the victim, in virtue of their status as victim, having a certain kind of authority to decide whether or not to alter those obligations.

In the case of divine forgiveness, it is God who is conceived of as the (ultimate) victim of our wrongdoing. This might make it problematic to see how, if I wrong someone, there can be two victims: both the human person whom I wrong, who therefore has a power to forgive, but also God, who must be conceived as a victim in a different sense. One way of thinking about this is that God is the victim of every wrong because he is the source of moral laws, and because in doing wrong (even when we wrong identifiable human victims) we violate his authority. However, this might take us into the problematic territory of a divine command interpretation of morality. But if we reject the idea that God creates morality from his own authority, in what sense can we still think of him as the victim of all our wrongdoing, who therefore has the power to forgive us?

Løgstrup himself offers an interesting response to this question—which he is required to do, as his rejection of a divine command theory means he cannot take the option canvassed above. Instead, in the introduction to *The Ethical Demand*, he follows the theologian Friedrich Gogarten and argues that it is in our relation to our neighbor that our relation to God is also decided so that in failing to love our neighbor, our relation to God is likewise

damaged (see ED 4–5/EF 12–14). This explains why this failure calls for divine forgiveness and thus generates the authority we have been discussing.

Now it is worth noting that on this “proclamation as forgiveness” interpretation, what is done in proclamation is not just testifying that the recipient has been forgiven (by someone else). This would amount to a proclamation about a fact, with the proclaimer offering assurance to the recipient that they, the proclaimer, know that the recipient has been forgiven by God. By contrast, the idea here is that proclamation *is* the giving of forgiveness and that proclamation involves an exercise of normative authority because forgiveness involves such authority. On this view, therefore, in proclaiming the Word of God, Jesus *bestows* forgiveness on his audience. If only the victim of some wrong can have the authority to forgive that wrong, and if God is the victim of the wrongs that Jesus forgives, then Jesus can do this only because he *is* God. This is precisely why, for Løgstrup, it is Jesus’ proclamation that he is bestowing God’s forgiveness on us that raises the real question of his divine nature, which is not raised in the same way if he is testifying or appealing because he might do either of these on behalf of God without at the same time *being* God (see ED 211–2/EF 236–8).<sup>58</sup>

However, if proclamation is thought of as an act of forgiveness, there is an important question of whether anyone other than Jesus can proclaim in this sense. Løgstrup argues that divine authority can be inherited through the office of proclamation. But does that mean that those who have that office within the Church can forgive on Jesus’ behalf? If so, this must be because of Jesus (or God) having explicitly invested that office with this power, since the requirement that only the victim holds the power to forgive means that it is not usually permissible, or even possible, to forgive on behalf of another person. Otherwise, all that those who proclaim could do in relation to forgiveness is to testify their knowledge that we are, or will be, forgiven by God. Because, as we have seen, Løgstrup just focuses on the broad distinction between communication and proclamation in his article, he does not analyze the distinction between the types of proclamation that we have been considering or deal with this issue in “The Category and the Office of Proclamation,” but it may well be one of the matters of “great theological interest” that he sets aside at the beginning of his paper (KAV 250). Moreover, the distinction between proclamation as testimony and proclamation as appeal allows Løgstrup a response to a Kierkegaardian criticism that if it is only God who has the authority to forgive and officers in the Church do not, then proclamations by officers in the

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<sup>58</sup> For further discussion of this issue, see Stern, “The Unfulfillability of the Demand and the Proclamation of Jesus,” §1 of “Forgiveness and the Limits of Ethics,” chap. 6 of *The Radical Demand in Løgstrup’s Ethics*, pp. 145–59.

Church become testimonial or objective in form. Once the distinction between proclamation as testimony and proclamation as appeal has been made, this problem does not follow because Løgstrup can now construe the proclamations of officers in the Church as appeals that involve their audience in the kind of subjective engagement that is suitable to the religious case.

## 6. Conclusion

From our discussion above, it is thus to be hoped that what may appear to be a rather abstruse article by a somewhat obscure Danish philosopher has in fact been shown to be of considerable interest and significance at two main levels: first, as a critique of Kierkegaard and his commitment to the method of indirect communication; and second, in the questions Løgstrup raises concerning the speech act of proclamation and the form of authority it might be said to involve. The article is also important for the way in which it prefigures some of Løgstrup's key concerns that were developed in more detail in his later works, both as this relates to his continuing critique of Kierkegaard and to how his own positive position unfolded, partly as a result of that critique.

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