# Side-Channel Protected MPSoC through Secure Real-Time Networks-on-Chip

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**Abstract**

The integration of Multi-Processors System-on-Chip (MPSoCs) into the Internet -of -Things (IoT) context brings new opportunities, but also represent risks. Tight real-time constraints and security requirements should be considered simultaneously when designing MPSoCs. Network-on-Chip (NoCs) are specially critical when meeting these two conflicting characteristics. For instance the NoC design has a huge influence in the security of the system. A vital threat to system security are so-called side-channel attacks based on the NoC communication observations. To this end, we propose a NoC security mechanism suitable for hard real-time systems, in which schedulability is a vital design requirement. We present three contributions. First, we show the impact of the NoC routing in the security of the system. Second, we propose a packet route randomisation mechanism to increase NoC resilience against side-channel attacks. Third, using an evolutionary optimisation approach, we effectively apply route randomisation while controlling its impact on hard real-time performance guarantees. Extensive experimental evidence based on analytical and simulation models supports our findings.

*Keywords:* Side Channel, MPSoC, NoC, Routing

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## 1. Introduction

The comprehensive use of Internet-of-Things (IoT) will be the driver of digitization in all domains, e.g. industry automation, automotive, avionics, and healthcare. Increasingly complex and powerful Multi-processor Systems-on-Chips (MSoCs) connected through a 5G network, form the basis of the IoT. The semiconductor industry has been challenged to meet the tight and demanding requirements of such applications. These requirements include low power, tight latencies and high throughput. When developing systems for these hyper-connected environments, real-time constraints and security are necessary considerations.

Network-on-Chips (NoCs) are the heart of the MPSoC. NoCs are shared by different communication flows characterized by a wide set of requirements, which include performance, reliability or security. Their key role in the MPSoCoperation turns the NoC design into a critical task. Over the past decades, a significant amount of work has addressed the trade-offs between performance and other secondary objectives such as energy [1], fault-tolerance [2], and chip area [3]. Less work has addressed such trade-offs in NoCs with hard real-time constraints, with some inroads towards improving energy [4] and area efficiency (by optimising buffering in virtual channels [5]) while meeting deadlines of all packets even in the worst-case scenario. While hard real-time applications impose strict latency requirements on the NoC, the impact on security has been not addressed before. Hard real-time mechanisms may impact the MPSoC security.

MPSoCs operating in the context of IoT usually integrate cryptographic hardware cores for confidentiality and authentication security services. However, these components are prone to implementation attacks. During the operation of a cryptographic core, the secret key may passively be revealed through so-called side-channels. Classical side-channels include the measurement of the execution time, power-consumption and electromagnetic (EM) radiation of the cryptographic IP core [6]. The interconnection of MPSoCs operating in the Internet-of-Things permits possible timing side-channel attacks that emerge from sharing resources on the MPSoC.

Cache hierarchies and NoC are a common target in timing side-channel attacks. In general, NoC communication can be exploited to optimize cache attacks, as demonstrated in [7] and [8]. By detecting the communication patterns of the sensitive traffic (e.g., volume and communication rate) an attacker is able to trigger cache attacks in the most vulnerable point of the

encryption process. Thus the NoC communication collision of malicious and sensitive traffic can potentially compromise the security of the complete embedded system. Many mechanisms have been proposed to improve NoC security and many more will certainly be developed in the coming years. However, most of such mechanisms impose performance overheads, and therefore can potentially jeopardise the ability of the NoC to provide real-time guarantees. In this paper, security is used as a driver to optimise hard real-time NoC design. The hard real-time NoCs constraints must be always guaranteed. Our approach is based on the randomisation of packet routes. By randomly changing the route of every packet injected into the NoC, we can introduce random effects to all side-channels of interest, such as packet timing, energy dissipation, temperature and electromagnetic emissions. In this paper, we concentrate on a threat model based on packet timing.

This paper extends our earlier conference paper work upon security through routing randomisation in NoCs [9]. In summary, the contributions of our total work upon this idea are:

- Provide a realistic motivation for our work by specifying case studies; a side-channel attack on AES encryption and how it may arise in an IoT context due to the interaction between secure and malicious downloaded code communicating over a shared NoC. A novel case study involving an autonomous vehicle is added in this paper, over that presented in [9].

- Present an experiment performed on a NoC hardware platform in order to motivate route randomisation as a viable approach for improving security - the current publication adds this upon the earlier work in [9]

- Define a schedulability analysis for determining the worst-case end-to-end latency in the case of randomised routing

- Present a GA optimisation process which uses task mapping to maintain schedulability assessed by this analysis, while permitting improving security by allowing flows to use randomised routing

- Assess via simulation the impact of randomised routing strategies upon empirically measured latency in a real application case study

The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the description of the MPSoC and the security requirements. It includes the NoC

timing attack and the threat model. Section 3 presents the most relevant NoC security mechanisms and the types of security mechanisms to prevent the MPSoC attacks. Performance overheads and resource usage are discussed, highlighting the need for the contributions of this paper. Section 4 we identify techniques that support NoC designers in improving NoC resilience against side-channel attacks while still maintaining full system schedulability. The paper is closed with extensive experimental work based on schedulability analysis and simulation in Section 5, and with a summary of our findings.

## 2. Multi-Processor System-on-Chip and security requirements

MPSoCs are prone to attacks. In this section the MPSoC architecture and operation are described. These concepts will be used to understand the threat model for the NoC-based communication side-channel vulnerability.

### *2.1. MPSoC / NoC Architectural Description*

While the contribution of this paper can be applied to a large variety of NoC architectures, we believe it is easier to explain it with the help of a concrete architecture. We assume a NoC architecture with a 2D-mesh topology and wormhole switching protocol, because such features are commonly used in embedded systems for their simplicity and moderate resource overheads.

- In a 2D-mesh topology, every core is connected to a NoC switch via a network interface (NI), which is responsible for packetising and depacketising data, and controlling the injection of packets into the network. The regularity of such a topology is attractive because it simplifies packet routing, and facilitates chip floorplanning, placement and routing.

- The use of wormhole switching protocols allows packets to be gradually sent over the NoC in smaller units called flits. Once a flit is received by a switch, it can be forwarded to the next switch down the packet route as long as that switch has sufficient buffering to hold it. This means that at any given time a packet could have its flits temporarily stored by multiple switches, so each of them are not required to hold a complete packet, thus reducing the overall buffering requirements of the NoC.

- There is a downside to this choice of topology and switching protocol, which is the difficulty in predicting packet latencies. Since a packet can be simultaneously occupying multiple NoC buffers and links, there is a significant amount of competition for resources throughout the NoC at all times. The wide variety of interference patterns makes it hard to predict how long it takes for a packet to reach its destination. Different resource arbitration policies can make such predictions more or less difficult, especially in the case of hard real-time NoCs when an upper-bound worst-case latency is needed.

- Previous work has considered NoC arbitration based on packet priority [10], time multiplexing [11] and round robin [12], and has devised analytical models that can be used to find latency upper-bounds for packet flows transmitted over such NoCs [13]. Any of those approaches could be used in this paper, and we chose a priority-arbitrated NoC because of its ability to provide upper-bound latency guarantees that are customisable to different levels of packet urgency while allowing for high NoC link utilisation [14].

- The general architecture of the network on chip described in previous bullet points explains the data communications. However, when considering security implications it is important to describe the enclosing context of the MPSoC in which the NoC exists. MPSoCs are tile-based structures which are flexible enough to meet a variety of application requirements. Each tile is either composed of a single IP core or a cluster of IP cores. Data is exchanged over a NoC between tiles. In order to increase the performance, current MPSoCs employ two main strategies: i) memory hierarchies, where several levels of cache (e.g. L1 to L3) and a set of DRAMs are integrated; and ii) resource sharing, where different applications are split and mapped onto the MPSoC resources.

### *2.2. Threat Model and Timing Side Channel Attacks*

In this paper, we assume that the NoC and its interfaces to the cores are secure. We also assume that secure tasks execute in secure cores (i.e. cores that do not allow the execution of unsecured tasks). For this threat model, we assume that the NoC communicates sensitive information between two secure tasks, which we refer as the sensitive communication. We then assume an adversary that has knowledge about the NoC architecture, about

the mapping of secure tasks to (secure) NoC cores, and is able to gain control of at most two non-secure NoC cores.

A successful attack happens when the adversary, which has taken control of two non-secured processors, is able to obtain information about the sensitive traffic. In such attack, the adversary injects packets to the NoC in order to collide with the sensitive traffic. These two types of traffic (malicious and sensitive) collide inside the router, that is, they compete for the same output port resource. As a consequence of the malicious traffic, delays in the communication are caused and thus the malicious packets transmission is also delayed. At an endpoint at the other non-secured core, the adversary is able to measure the latency of their malicious traffic and infer how many collisions with the sensitive traffic occured. The resulting collisions leak information regarding sensitive communication flows. Note that the router is not necessarily malicious and that no any information embedded into the sensitive packet is required to perform the attack. The latency interference imposed by the sensitive communication over the malicious low priority traffic can provide the attacker with valuable information about the timing, frequency and volume of the secure communication.

This threat model is not new, and its variations have also been used in best-effort NoC-based systems by [15], [16], [7]. The timing nature of the threat is also the same used in hard real-time uniprocessor systems by [17].

### *2.3. Security of MPSoCs Case Studies*

In order to motivate the work and provide a concrete example of the security consequences of a timing attack, we now present two illustrative interrelated case studies. In both of them, timing attacks focused upon NoC communication can lead to negative consequences for a trusted application, even if the endpoint cores are fully secured against intrustion. The first focuses upon an AES encryption scenario, and the second focuses upon an autonomous vehicle. Note that these case studies are illustrative and apply to an example system; while expected to be representative of real security concerns in a system, they are not strictly based upon a particular hardware implementation or the simulation case study evaluated later in the paper.

#### *2.3.1. AES NoC Timing Attack Case Study*

MPSoCs operating in the context of IoT usually integrate security features such as cryptographic hardware cores for providing security services

(confidentiality, authentication and integrity). The symmetric key encryption algorithm Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) is widely used to implement security functions in several MPSoCs. AES encrypts 128 bits of data with key lengths of 128 bits using 10 rounds. AES operates iteratively data organized as a 4x4 state matrix. Each round is composed of four round operations: AddRoundKey (XORing the state with the current round key), SubByte (byte substitution), ShiftRow (byte transposition) and MixColumn (matrix multiplication). In order to speedup the execution of AES, transformation tables (T-tables) are used. T-table AES reduces the SubByte, ShiftRow and MixColumn operations to four lookup tables whose entries are simply XOR'ed [7]. The AES functionality is integrated in the MPSoC through a security co-processor, an IP core with a private L1 cache. In such scenario T-tables are stored along the different cache hierarchies of the MPSoC. The vulnerability exploited by attackers is that T-tables are accessed depending on the secret key. Such attacks are know as cache attacks. A deeper description of the access-based cache attacks for MPSoCs is given in [7] and [6]. The weakest point of the AES operation is at the end of the first round. The NoC timing attack detects the end of the first round of the AES, thus allowing an attacker to trigger in the cache attack in the best moment, when noise generated from other cache accesses performed during the encryption are avoided.

Fig. 1 presents the NoC-based MPSoC architecture. It integrates 16 IP cores ($IP_0$ to $IP_{15}$) which exchange communication through a mesh-based NoC. The integration of MPSoCs into an IoT context may permit remote applications downloaded from the Internet to be stored into external memories and mapped into the MPSoCs. These applications are vulnerable to attacks and can be tampered with by an attacker. When mapped into the system resources, attackers are able to control packet injection into the NoC. In Fig. 1, the attacker has infected the $IP_1$ and controls the traffic injection. $IP_3$ represents the AES cryptoprocessor, where the T-Tables are stored in the shared cache $IP0$.

The goal of the NoC timing attack is to identify the end of the first AES round. The attacks is performed in 7 steps, as shown in Fig. 1. In step (1) and (2), the attacker triggers first an AES encryption, then continues to frequently inject packets into the NoC. The throughput of the infected core is monitored by the attacker. Step (3) shows the execution of the AES encryption by the $IP_{13}$. During the AES encryption, the value stored in the T-tables should be retrieved, thus a read request to $IP_0$ is performed in step




Figure 1: Description of the NoC timing attack to NoC-based MPSoCs

(4). As a result, a big packet is retrieved in step (5). The communication collision in $R_1$ between the infected traffic and the sensitive traffic causes a degradation in the throughput of the attacker. This is illustrated in Figure 2 which illustrates the timing behaviour at the router $R_1$, for an attacker injecting a packet coincident with $IP_0$ responding. The attacker can measure the time taken between injecting its malicious packets and its completion. Since it knows its basic latency; the time taken to deliver this packet without load, it can determine the excess latency by subtraction. This provides an estimate of the response size.

This triggers a cache attack, where the attacker perform a read request to the shared memory in $IP_0$ in step (6). As is [7] and [6], by reading the shared cache in step (7), the attacker can identify the memory sets accessed due the

AES encryption. As a result a key candidate is obtained. This process is performed multiple times until the key is found.




Figure 2: Timing diagram demonstrating the attacker measuring the latency

### *2.3.2. Autonomous Vehicle Case Study*

A similar attack case study may apply in the case of an autonomous vehicle. The integration of heterogeneous software and MPSoCs for an autonomous vehicle could incorporate components derived independantly by different manufacturers. As mechanical systems and engine control units (ECUs) become more complex and integrated, the timing of messages for tasks such as engine control and emissions control becomes more critical [18]. Simple attacks on timing in an AV system could include using malicious cores to inject additional traffic that delays sensor readings from reaching external buses such as CAN at the expected times [18]. If the MPSoCs in the AV uses AES encryption, then this would be vulnerable to the attack described in the previous section 2.3.1.

However, it is possible to imagine a more subtle attack. Take for example the requirement in autonomous vehicles for computer vision algorithms to analyse camera data and identify particular targets. It is possible that manufacturers of these systems would not wish to reveal their algorithm operation, either from competitors, or to not reveal what targets their system is scanning for. In the case of a potential detection of an object requiring additional processing, the secured tasks may need to transmit more data amongsts themselves, or send requests for additional data from sensors. The

potential motivation of an attacker would be to detect these communications occuring, and thus infer information about the AV system's goal or techniques of operation.

If the computer vision tasks were located upon secured cores, then the attacker would not be able to access these tasks directly. However, by injecting low priority traffic into the onboard NoC and observing the delays these low priority communications experience, the attacker would be able to infer increased communication lengths or frequencies by the secured tasks, leading to potential leakage of the AV system purpose or operation.

## 3. Related Work

Multiprocessor embedded systems are target of attacks by means of malicious hardware or software [19]. Hardware-based attacks depend on design-time access to the system, which is then modified in a way that can be exploited during operation (e.g. by adding hardware able to leak information by changing chip temperature [20]). Software-based attacks are the most common cause of security incidents in such types of systems [21], and are carried out by malicious software installed at design time or after deployment.

NoC-based systems have been shown to be vulnerable to a variety of attacks, both hardware and software-based. Active NoC attacks, such as code injection [22], malware [23] and control hijacking [24], or passive NoC attacks, such as side-channel exploitation, can be used to read sensitive communications, modify the system behaviour or prevent correct NoC operation. NoCs are especially vulnerable to side-channel attacks that exploit traffic interference as timing channels [15] [25]. The shared nature of NoCs can be exploited by an attacker to obtain sensitive information. By forcing traffic collision with sensitive packet flows, an attacker can observe the throughput variations and infer sensitive data, as shown in [15] [25] [26].

Security-enhancing mechanisms have been added to NoC platforms to provide authentication [27], access control [23], integrity [28], and confidentiality services [29]. By monitoring and controlling the data exchange inside the chip, NoCs can detect and avoid attacks.

Firewall-based and crypto-based techniques integrated at the network interface are the most commonly used approaches against active NoC attacks over the past decade [23] [30]. Firewalls implement authentication, access control and integrity services by means of traffic matching with a security

table. Authorized transactions are allowed and injected to the NoC, otherwise they are denied and thus dropped. Crypto-based NoCs implement the confidentiality service by creating a shared secret among the sensitive cores and perform the encoded data exchange. While achieving desirable security enhancements, such approaches have an unpredictable impact upon the performance of the NoC and thus the overall system.

PhaseNoC [31] focuses upon traffic isolation, which provides separation of traffic in adjacent domains and therefore potential reductions in the attack surface for timing attacks. However, such TDM (time-division multiplexing) static techniques reduce performance in the case of dynamic traffic arrival, so the authors provide a scheme which can opportunistically steal bandwidth between traffic classes. This scheme does permit potential timing attacks via leakage between the traffic classes.

Firewalls and crypto-based NoCs are the state-of-the-art in NoC security, but they are not able to protect the system against passive NoC attacks. Randomised arbitration [25], virtual channel allocation [16] and routing [26] have been investigated and evaluated as countermeasures against timing attacks. By randomising the characteristics of sensitive packet flows, it is possible to break the correlation between the traffic characteristics (e.g. volume and access patterns) and the sensitive data thus avoiding information leakage. Among those mechanisms, random routing has achieved the best levels of security enhancement with the lowest energy and area overhead [26]. By spreading sensitive traffic over the NoC, the spatial distribution makes it harder for compromised cores or external attackers to gather sufficient side-channel information to infer correlations with sensitive data.

Similarly to firewalls and crypto-based approaches, the focus of randomisation approaches is to increase security and none of the works in the state-of-the-art consider the performance requirements of the applications. In this paper, we argue that NoCs supporting real-time applications require a careful balance of a trade-off between security and performance. In most cases, we envisage that the level of security will be constrained by the NoC's ability to support attack countermeasures while at the same time ensuring performance guarantees to the application. By providing a test to evaluate whether performance guarantees can hold under a specific side-channel attack countermeasure (namely route randomisation) we aim for a better balance of performance guarantees, resource usage and security trade-offs.

### *3.1. System Model*

To increase NoC resilience against side-channel attacks while providing hard real-time guarantees to the application tasks running on it, we must make assumptions about the application behaviour such as upper-bounds on resource usage by every application task and packet. In this paper, we follow the well-known and widely used sporadic task model, which makes assumptions about the worst-case execution time (WCET) of all tasks and their shortest inter-arrival interval (i.e. their period). Since we are concerned about NoC communications, we follow an extension of the sporadic task model that considers that tasks inject packets to the NoC only after their execution completes, and that the maximum packet size is known [14].

Thus, a hard real-time application $\Gamma$ comprises $n$ real-time tasks such as $\Gamma = \{\tau_1, \tau_2, \ldots, \tau_n\}$. Each task $\tau_i$ is a 6-tuple $\tau_i = (C_i,\ T_i,\ D_i,\ J_i,\ P_i,\ \{\phi_i\})$ indicating respectively its worst case computation time, period, deadline, release jitter and priority. The sixth element of the tuple is an extension to the sporadic task model proposed by [14], and represents the communication packets sent by $\tau_i$ at the end of its execution. Each packet $\phi_i$ is defined as a 3-tuple $\phi_i = (\tau_d, Z_i, K_i)$ representing its destination task, size and maximum release jitter. In this paper, we assume for simplicity that a single packet is released at the end of each execution of each task, but the contributions presented here can be generalised for any number of released packets.

Such applications are executed over a NoC platform like the one described in subsection 2.1 above. We model such a platform as a set of cores $\Pi = \{\pi_a, \pi_b, \ldots, \pi_z\}$, a set of switches $\Xi = \{\xi_1, \xi_2, \ldots, \xi_m\}$, and a set of unidirectional links $\Lambda = \{\lambda_{a1}, \lambda_{1a}, \lambda_{12}, \lambda_{21}, \ldots, \lambda_{zm}, \lambda_{mz}\}$. We also model the mapping of tasks to cores with the function $map(\tau_i) = \pi_a$.

The routing of packets over the NoC can be modelled by the function $route(\pi_a, \pi_b) = \{\lambda_{a1}, \lambda_{12}, \ldots, \lambda_{mb}\}$, denoting the subset of $\Lambda$ used to transfer packets from core $\pi_a$ to core $\pi_b$. We can then extend the function $map$ to also model the mapping of a packet to its route: $map(\phi_i) = route(map(\tau_i), map(\tau_d))$.

With the knowledge of the NoC architectural characteristics such as the latency to cross a link or to route a packet header, and with the knowledge of the length of a packet's route (i.e. its hop count, or $|route(\pi_a, \pi_b)|$ as expressed in [14]), it is possible to calculate the no-load latency $L_i$ of every packet $\phi_i$: the time it takes to completely cross the NoC from its source to destination without any interference or contention from other packets. For the NoC described in subsection 2.1, and for most commercial and academic

NoCs, the no-load latency of a packet can be deterministically obtained, and will not change if its route and the NoC operation frequency do not change.

## 4. NoC Routing Randomisation

### *4.1. Overview Of Route Randomisation*

By using a route randomisation approach, it is possible to prevent the adversary from obtaining accurate information about the sensitive communication. Because not every packet of the secure communication will interfere on the malicious flows injected by the attacker, the information about timing, frequency and volume they can obtain will be less accurate, which as a consequence increases the resilience of the NoC against the threat. There are many ways to introduce route randomisation in NoCs, and we will discuss our design decisions in subsection 4.3.

Figure 1 and Fig. 3 show examples of the described threat model in Section 2.2. Fig. 3 shows an adversary controlling cores F and G, and using a malicious packet flow (shown as a purple dashed line) to infer data about a sensitive communication between secure cores C and E (shown as a red dotted line, representing the case of a NoC with deterministic XY routing). In the case of a NoC with randomised routing, all routes between C and E will be used (red dashed and dotted lines), preventing the adversary from inspecting the complete sensitive communication.

### *4.2. Motivation Experiment*

Different NoC parameters impact the security of the system. Routing may have a huge impact on the success of the attack. In order to show this statement, we performed an experiment on a FPGA-based prototype of an MPSoC as shown in [8]. It is composed of 16 NIOS II IP cores, each with a 32 kB private L1 cache. The shared L2 cache is of 256 kB size and it is inclusive of L1. All of them have a cache line size of 16 bytes. The MPSoC structure is similar to Fig. 1. However the position of the AES, shared caches and attackers are modified. In the experiment the infected IP could be placed in six location of the MPSoC: i) linked to the east port of the router 1 (R1 E); ii) linked to the north port of the router 1 (R1 N); iii) linked to the east port of the router 4 (R4 E); iv) linked to the north port of the router 4 (R4 N); v) linked to the north port of the router 6 (R6 N); and vi) linked to the east port of the router 9 (R9 E).




Figure 3: Threat model, and examples of route randomisation with pseudo-adaptive XY (from A to B) and west-first (from C to D and C to E) algorithms

The sensitive path is defined by the communication channel between the IP 0 and IP 10. Three different dimension ordered routing strategies were used to commute packets in the NoC: i) XY, which limits all turns to y-dimension until the x-dimension is reached; ii) XY-YX, which alternates randomly the XY and YX routing algorithms; and iii) West First (WF), which restricts turns to the west. The detection rate of the sensitive packets for each configuration was evaluated. The observation points were the output ports shared with the sensitive traffic. Results are shown in Fig. 4). For the deterministic XY, the attackers that intersected the sensitive path were able to detect all the packets. However, when XY and YX were used randomly, the effectiveness of the attacker varies according to the amount of traffic that collides with the attacker traffic. Since only two paths were possible, an attacker was not able to detect all sensitive traffic. The best results were achieve for attacks on the east port of the router 9 (R9 E) and the north port of the router 4 (R4 N). However, such results are highly dependent on the routing algorithm. In the last scenario, the West-first algorithm has six route possibilities. Hence, the efficiency of the attack was very low, since the messages became spread in the NoC through different routes. This motivates work on improving the security of the MPSoC via route randomisation. However, in viable real-time systems, security must be considered alongside

end-to-end latency constraints.




Figure 4: The detection rate of sensitive packets under different attacker IP locations and routing strategies

### *4.3. Design Choices and Constraints*

There are many design choices related to packet routing in different NoC architectures [32]. As expected, those choices also define whether and how route randomisation can be achieved. For example, some NoC architectures use deterministic routing [33], meaning that there is only one possible route between a source and a destination, effectively preventing the approach proposed here. Among NoCs supporting dynamic or adaptive routing, which are the ones we target, there is a key design choice affecting the randomisation approach: source or distributed routing.

In source-routed NoCs, the routing decision is done by the source core or its respective NI. This is usually implemented as multiple packet header flits that contain the next-hop information for each of the switches along the packet's route. Once a switch routes one of the packet headers by assigning its output port, it discards that header flit and forwards the rest of the packet through that port. The next switch will route the subsequent header flit, discard it, forward the rest of the packet, and this is repeated all the way towards the packet destination. By following this approach, it is possible to program the source core or its NI to perform full route randomisation before every packet release.

In NoCs with distributed routing, the next-hop decision is made by each switch individually. Typically, they have far less resources than the cores (and

often than the NIs), so the routing decisions are based on simple rules related to the relative position of the destination core with regards to the switch holding the packet header (e.g. pseudo-adaptive XY [34], turn model [35]). In those cases, it is only possible to randomly choose from a predefined subset of all possible routes. For instance, pseudo-adaptive XY switches can only randomly choose between two routes between a source and a destination (e.g. routes between cores A and B in Figure 3). Switches implementing turn model routing may have a larger number of alternative routes to randomly choose from in most cases, but must behave deterministically for some specific cases. Figure 3 shows two routes created by a west-first turn model: packets between core C and D have only one possible route, as the destination is located on the west of the source, while packets from core C to E can take a variety of possible routes.

In both source and distributed routing, the NoC component making random decisions must have access to a source of random data, such as a pseudo-random number generator (PRNG, generated by a deterministic algorithm) or a true random number generator (TRNG, often generated out of low level noise signals). Such sources can have significant hardware overhead, thus favouring source routing because of the low area constraints for NoC switches. For the route randomisation approaches reviewed above, however, overheads should be minimal in either case as they only require random sources with one-bit output.

Additional issues when randomising packet routes include the potential increase of the packet route, the possibility of deadlocks, and the potential increase of packet latency (and therefore the potential violation of real-time constraints). Let us now address each of them.

All the routing approaches reviewed above are minimal: the route they choose has the smallest possible hop count between source and destination. This is because of their obvious advantages in terms of latency, network contention and energy dissipation. However, from the point of view of side-channel attack resilience, it may be interesting to exploit non-minimal randomised routing in order to decorrelate the side channels with the functional properties of the packet communication (e.g. short packet transmission between neighbouring cores would not necessarily have the shortest latency and lowest energy dissipation if they are forced to take a long route across the chip).

Deadlock-free packet communication is a critical characteristic for NoCs. This can be achieved at the link arbitration layer, e.g. with priority-preemptive

virtual channels [14], or at the network layer by restricting the possible turns of the routing algorithm (either in source or in distributed routing). In NoCs that ensure deadlock-freeness at the network layer, special care must be taken by the route randomisation approach to avoid introducing turns that can lead to deadlocks.

Finally, route randomisation is likely to change the latencies of packets, both because for every release their routes may have different hop counts (leading to different no-load latencies) and because different routes may trigger different contention scenarios (leading to different blocking times). In our approach, such variability is actually desirable because it is a key aspect to increasing the NoC's resilience against side channel attacks. In the case of hard real-time systems, however, it is critical that such variability is bounded and that the worst-case latencies of all packets are always less than their deadlines. In the next subsection, we propose an extension to existing schedulability analysis to evaluate if that is the case for a given application mapped to a given NoC architecture. The proposed approach is simple, yet general enough to analyse randomised routing approaches following any of the design choices reviewed above: source or distributed, minimal or non-minimal, and with deadline-freeness ensured at the link or network layer.

### *4.4. Schedulability Analysis*

Schedulability analysis for a set of sporadic packets transferred over a priority-preemptive wormhole switching NoC was presented in [36]. A set of packets is deemed schedulable if the worst-case latency of each packet is less than their deadline. By coupling that analysis with classical response time analysis for uniprocessor fixed-priority scheduling, an end-to-end schedulability analysis for that type of NoC was proposed in [14], considering the worst-case response times of tasks and the worst-case latency of the packets they generate. Both the original analysis from [36] and the end-to-end extension from [14] assume static routing, so a different formulation is needed before it can be used for the purpose of this paper. First, we review those formulations, but using the notation described in subsection 3.1.

According to [36], the worst-case latency $S_i$ of a packet $\phi_i$ can be obtained from Equation 1. This equation is defined recursively and iterated until a stable fixed point is discovered.

$$S_i \;=\; L_i \;+\; \sum_{\phi_j \in \mathbf{interf}(i)} \left\lceil \frac{S_i + K_j + K_j^I}{T_j} \right\rceil L_j, \tag{1}$$

The set **interf**$(i)$ is the set of higher priority packets $\phi_j$ whose route shares at least one link with the route of $\phi_i$ and therefore can interfere with it. Precisely, **interf**$(i) = \{\phi_j \in \phi : map(\phi_i) \cap map(\phi_j) \neq \emptyset\}$. The two terms $K_j$ and $K_j^I$ denote respectively the maximum release jitter of the interfering packet $\phi_j$ and its maximum indirect interference jitter. As shown in [14], $K_j$ is equal to the worst case response time $R_j$ of task $\tau_j$ which produces $\phi_j$, assuming that $\phi_j$ will be released immediately after the end of $\tau_j$'s execution. $R_j$ can be calculated using uniprocessor response time analysis, considering the type of task scheduling by the operating system at each core (e.g. priority-preemptive). And as shown in [36], the indirect interference jitter $K_j^I$ can be bound by $S_j - L_j$.

It can be seen in Equation 1 that the route of a packet affects its worst-case latency because it defines the set of packets that can add to the interference term of the equation (i.e. sum operator). Route randomisation would change the set **interf**$(i)$ at each packet release, since different routes would produce different interference patterns. An intuitive way to find the worst-case latency of a packet with a randomised route would be to calculate the worst-case latency of each of its possible routes with Equation 1, and pick the highest value. However, that approach works only if there is a single packet with randomised route, and all others following deterministic routes.

A general analysis where all packets could potentially have randomised routes is more complex: all possible routes of a packet would have to be tested with all possible routes of all other packets before the worst case could be found. Furthermore, if one cannot make probabilistic assumptions on the randomisation approach, pathological cases must also be taken into account (e.g. the same route could be chosen again and again for a single packet over a long period of time, even though that is very unlikely).

In this paper we assume that, in the worst case, if there is a way for a high-priority packet to interfere with a low priority packet, it would interfere with it in every possible release. This means that even though there may be routes when packets do not interfere with each other, we assume that in the worst case the random choice of route would always pick the ones where there is interference. This is perfectly reasonable when packets have similar periods, but it gets more and more pessimistic as we reduce the periods of higher priority packets. In that case, high priority packets would have a larger number of releases within a single release of a low priority packet, thus interfering more often with it, even though the larger number of releases would make less likely that an interfering route would be chosen every time.

To calculate worst-case latencies for the general problem where all packets could have randomised routes, we define the set $\mathbf{interf_r}(i)$ as the set of higher priority packets $\phi_j$ who could, with any of their possible routes, interfere with any of the possible routes of the packet of interest $\phi_i$. To precisely define that set, we must first define a new function $route_r(\pi_a, \pi_b) = \{\lambda_{a1}, \lambda_{12}, \lambda_{13}, \lambda_{14}, \ldots, \lambda_{mb}\}$, denoting the subset of $\Lambda$ that contains all the links that could be part of any of the routes that could be randomly chosen to transfer packets from core $\pi_a$ to core $\pi_b$, and a new function $map_r(\phi_i) = route_r(map(\tau_i), map(\tau_d))$. Then, $\mathbf{interf_r}(i) = \{\phi_j \in \phi : map_r(\phi_i) \cap map_r(\phi_j) \neq \emptyset\}$.

By applying Equation 1 with the summation over the set $\mathbf{interf_r}(i)$ instead of the original $\mathbf{interf}(i)$, we can then find an upper bound to the packet latencies over a NoC with randomised routing.

### *4.5. Optimising the Performance-Security Trade-off*

The schedulability analysis proposed in the previous subsection can only be used to test whether a particular randomised NoC configuration can meet the hard real-time constraints of an application. It offers no alternatives in case of negative results, i.e. when performance constraints are not met. In this subsection we show how the schedulability test can be exploited as a fitness function in a design space exploration process. Similarly to [4] and [14], we follow an evolutionary approach to navigate over a key part of the design space: task-core mapping. By changing that mapping, it is possible to achieve fine-grained improvements on schedulability of tasks over cores and packet flows over NoC infrastructure (e.g. tasks that are barely unschedulable can become schedulable by a simple remapping of one of the higher priority tasks that interfere with their computation or communication, thus changing the set **interf** in Equation 1). The same can happen in the case of route randomisation, since changes on mapping can determine which randomised routes interfere with each other and in turn affect schedulability through changes in the $\mathbf{interf_r}$ set.

Figure 5 shows the evolutionary pipeline proposed here, which starts with an arbitrary population of task mappings using a given route randomisation approach and a given level of security. It then uses evolutionary operators such as mutation and crossover to improve the mapping population with regards to the percentage of schedulable tasks and packets calculated using the proposed modification of Equation 1. For every generation of the population, those with the larger number of schedulable tasks and packets are selected

to the next generation, where they will be again mutated, crossed-over, evaluated and selected to the subsequent generation. The pipeline stops after a fully schedulable mapping is found, or a predefined maximum number of generations is reached.

Unlike many constructive task mapping approaches, the evolutionary pipeline proposed here does not necessarily try to map communicating tasks to the same or neighbouring cores. Its fitness function can be tuned, for instance, to keep communicating tasks as far apart as possible while keeping their communication packets schedulable over a variety of randomly-chosen routes.




Figure 5: Evolutionary pipeline to optimise performance-security trade-off

In this paper, we consider two types of route randomisation which can be implemented either as source or distributed routing, namely random XY/YX and random west-first. Random XY/YX is a randomised version of pseudo-adaptive XY routing used in [34], so the route of the packet to its destination is randomly chosen between the XY or the YX route prior to the injection of the packet header into the network. In random west-first, we randomise one of the turn model routing approaches [35] so that whenever a packet is

allowed more than one route it randomly chooses one of them (i.e. uniform probability among all alternatives).

We then allow for multiple levels of security by changing how many packet flows are allowed to have their routes randomised. A baseline with no randomisation should have the best results regarding schedulability, given that packets suffer less interference and therefore are more likely to be schedulable. Then, increased levels of security can be achieved by randomised larger percentages of packet flows, up to a fully randomised configuration where all packets follow randomised routes on every release. In the next section, we show experimentally that the proposed schedulability test and evolutionary optimisation pipeline can produce NoC configurations able to hold hard real-time guarantees with maximised security potential.

## 5. Experimental Work

We evaluate the proposed approach in two distinct experimental setups. The first uses the proposed schedulability test and evolutionary pipeline to balance the trade-off between performance guarantees and security over a large set of synthetically generated applications. The second uses a cycle-accurate NoC simulator to show the effects of route randomisation upon latency with a realistic application.

### *5.1. Schedulability-driven optimisation of route randomisation*

This section presents the workflow for analytic schedulability evaluation, and evolution with an evolutionary pipeline based on a genetic algorithm (GA). It follows the pipeline presented in Figure 5. To evaluate the challenge of optimising different applications with different levels of load, we synthetically generate thousands of applications, each of them composed of tasks that communicate with each other with different numbers of packet flows. We then apply the evolutionary pipeline to each one of those applications, aiming to optimise the mappings of tasks in such a way that the whole set of tasks and flows is schedulable at different levels of security. We then plot the percentage of schedulable applications we could achieve for each level of security and each level of load. For the sake of reproducibility, we provide below more details on the whole process.

For a single experiment upon a given NoC and set of parameters (e.g. topology, operating frequency, switch and link latencies), a range of packet flow counts are identified, each of which represents a level of communication

within the application, and therefore a utilisation load upon the NoC. For each flow count chosen for experimental evaluation, a set of tasksets and packet flowsets are generated, each containing the chosen number of flows. The number of tasks is kept roughly constant, and all of them are either source or destination of at least one packet flow. Therefore, flowsets with higher flow counts represent increasing packet contention between the same endpoints. Flows are assigned to particular source and destination tasks with uniform random probability. This implies that the average number of flows transmitted is even across all tasks, although as a result of the random assignment there may be unique hotspots.

Following this, an experiment is initialised by defining a population of initial mappings, and a setting for the target level of security case setting. The levels of security settings are defined as either unsecured, or 25%, 50%, 75% and 100% secured flows. The secured flows are those that will use randomised routing, providing increased potential protection against side-channel attacks. In case of a partial provision of security e.g. 50%, security is assigned to the flows in their order of priority, with the highest priority flows being randomised. The rationale is to enforce overall random interference patterns, since higher priority packets are the ones causing interference.

A population of chromosomes (each representing of a mapping of tasks to cores upon the NoC, as shown in the upper-left corner of Figure 5) is specified for each level of load (i.e. synthetically generated taskset and flowset with a specific flow count). A genetic algorithm is then used to evolve these chromosomes, performing mutation, crossover and evaluation of the population according to a fitness function based on the modified Equation 1. This is done separately for each level of security, each of them generating a different $\mathbf{interf_r}(i)$ set representing the randomised routes of different packet flows.

By applying the modified Equation 1 for every packet flow of the application, it is possible to check whether each of them is schedulable, i.e. their end-to-end latency is less than the respective deadline. The overall fitness of an application is then assumed to be the number of schedulable packet flows. Following the fitness function evaluation, the population is culled to retain only the chromosomes that are at the top of the fitness ranking. If the fitness function indicates that the top-ranked chromosome represents a mapping where all flows are schedulable, then the GA terminates early. Otherwise, following the completion of the chromosome improvement process at a fixed number of generations, the best chromosome (output mapping) and schedulability obtained (both aggregate flows and flowsets) is output for dis-

| NoC/Packet flowset parameters | Value |
|---|---|
| Maximum packet flow no-load latency | 100 ms |
| Maximum period | 500 ms |
| Priority assignment | Deadline monotonic |
| Route randomisation | Random XY/YX |
| Standard NoC topology | 4x4 |
| Enlarged NoC topology | 8x8 |
| Flowsets per data point | 100 |
| GA parameters | |
| Population size | 100 |
| Mutation individual task moving probability | 0.3 |
| Maximum generations | 50 |

Table 1: Evaluation parameters

play.

To show the impact of the level of security on performance guarantees and resource usage, we have produced several experimental series:

**No security (NS)** Deterministic routing, fitness function incorporates schedulability calculated using Equation 1 with the original $\mathbf{interf}(i)$ set.

**Percentage security (PS(%))** A given percentage of the packet flows use randomised routing, fitness function evaluated using Equation 1 with the proposed $\mathbf{interf_r}(i)$ set reflecting that percentage.

**Application of security a posteriori (SAP)** Evolution is performed using a fitness function that tests the schedulability without any security mechanisms (only deterministic routing), aiming to find a schedulable mapping without security considerations. Following the completion of this evolutionary process, the evolved best application mapping has 100% of its packet routes randomised, and is then evaluated with Equation 1 with the proposed $\mathbf{interf_r}(i)$ set. This experiment therefore aims to show that the optimisation of the mapping should take into account route randomisation, and that poor results can be expected from applying randomisation to a mapping that was optimised for deterministic routing.

### *5.1.1. Results*

Figure 6a shows the aggregate schedulability of flows after improvement with the GA, as a mean proportion across all flowsets generated for that data point. It is clear that the ordering of the results series in the illustrated plot follows the proportion of security provided, with an increasing number of flows in the flowsets (and therefore an increasing load upon the NoC) providing a slight reduction in schedulability of the evolved cases. This is as anticipated, in that the worst-case schedulability analysis would be affected by the increased interference present from the optional random routes. However, since each GA run is an independent evolutionary process, the ordering of the series does not always follow the anticipated order. In the SAP series (security a posteriori), evolution is performed using a fitness function that tested schedulability under the no security case (XY routing). However, following the completion of the GA the evolved mapping schedulability was evaluated with all flows using randomised routing. As anticipated, the schedulability of SAP is considerably worse than the NS or PS series, since the evolution was performed using a routing strategy that assumes lower interference than the final evaluation case. Figure 6b shows the schedulability of flowsets. A flowset is only considered schedulable if every flow within it is schedulable. The results follow the same general trend as in Figure 6a, although they reach zero earlier since flowset schedulability requires every component flow to be schedulable.




(a) Flow schedulability (b) Flowset schedulability

Figure 6: Schedulability under various security models in the 4x4 case




(a) Flow schedulability (b) Flowset schedulability

Figure 7: Schedulability under various security models in the 8x8 case

For the 8x8 example evaluation case, the results are presented in Figures 7a and 7b. The results show a greater separation between the NS and PS series after NoC evolution, due to the increased NoC size and number of flows allowing a greater complexity of interference graphs when randomised routing is enabled. The SAP case also has significantly lower schedulability, since its evolved mapping was obtained without routing randomisation and imposing randomisation later affects schedulability. In the schedulability of flowsets in Figure 7b, it is clear there is a wider difference in schedulability between the PS(100) secured case and NS (no security) particularly in flowsets with 70 to 85 flows. This illustrates that as the interference graph becomes more complex it is harder for the GA to find schedulable mappings.

### *5.2. Cycle-accurate simulation of route randomisation*

One of the key concerns in altering network routing is the impact that it will have upon latency for packet transmission, particularly in latency-sensitive real time applications. This section considers via simulation the impact of randomising of the routing protocol on the latency of a previously published real-time application case, the autonomous vehicle application [14].

The simulation framework used for this section is a cycle-accurate NoC model with support for priority preemption and virtual channels. This simulator has been extensively validated in our previous work, frequently being used as a baseline for results in latency and power analysis [37] [38].

### *5.2.1. Application Structure*

The application used in this application is an autonomous vehicle (AV) application [14]. This application consists of 38 communicating flows between a set of tasks that represent video processing, system monitoring and control for a robotic vehicle. As is the convention throughout this paper, priorities are defined such that lower priority index values represent the highest priority transmissions. The priorities, data transmission rates, frequencies and deadlines of these application transmissions are as defined in [14], although a different mapping has been used in order to show the impact of routing protocols on a randomly selected mapping without artificial tuning to favour a particular routing protocol. The application has been mapped onto a 4x3 NoC, and the video resolution of the AV application video streams is 640x480. Since the application mapping is static and a single priority level is used per packet, a packet always travels between a fixed source-destination pair during the simulation.

### *5.2.2. Routing Alternatives*

In this simulation evaluation, two routing alternatives incorporating randomisation are used, in addition to the baseline comparison of XY routing. The first routing alternative uses the XY/YX approach. In this approach, traffic producers determine uniformly randomly on injection whether a data packet will use XY or YX routing, and following this decision a flag is set in the data packet to control the routing behaviour. As a result, the chosen routing algorithm (either XY or YX) is used throughout packet transmission.

In addition, an alternative routing structure known as random west first (RWF) routing is also implemented, which allows randomised routing decisions to be taken by individual arbiters during data transmission. RWF requires the packet always be forwarded towards the west when the destination node is west of the current arbiter. However, any other destination port can be chosen uniformly randomly (east, north or south) as long as the direction taken is towards the destination. Therefore, the RWF approach permits a more diverse range of transmission paths than the XY/YX selection approach, providing more potential protection against side channel attacks.

### *5.2.3. Evaluation Results*

The results are presented in Figures 8 and 9, illustrating the max-min-mean latencies and normalised latencies for the randomised routing cases

(XY/YX and RWF) versus the baseline. Normalised latency is calculated by dividing the end-to-end latency of the packets by the packet size, which provides a metric of latency per flit. This metric is therefore more sensitive to delays in the transmission of short packets.

The latency results presented in Figure 8 illustrate that routing randomisation typically increases the communication latencies for the majority of packets compared to fixed XY routing. This is particularly evident in the case of the packets with priority 8 under RWF routing, which experience an increased latency due to contention with other higher priority flows on some of the randomly chosen routes. In the XY/YX routing case, increased latency is also observed for the packets with priorities 21 and 26 in some cases. Interestingly, for some of the packet transmissions with priority 10 and 13, the use of randomised routing is also to reduce latency in the best case, either by routing a higher priority packet so that it no longer causes interference, or routing the current packet around the interferer.

Considering the normalised latency results in Figure 9, it is clear that the relative impact of route randomisation is most significant upon packets with priorities 13, 15, 18 and 26. These transmissions represent some of the shortest packets in the system, which are therefore more greatly impacted on a relative basis by contention with other packets. As depicted in the previous figure, some priority 13 packets encounter a large reduction in latency during some transmissions as a result of avoiding interference.

## 6. Conclusions and Future Work

This paper has addressed the trade-off between security and hard real-time performance guarantees in Networks-on-Chip. It has proposed route randomisation as a way to increase NoC resilience against side-channel attacks, and has discussed a number of design alternatives for the randomisation approach. It then has proposed a schedulability test for applications running over a secure priority-preemptive NoCs using route randomisation. Finally, the paper identifies an optimisation pipeline which can be guided by the proposed schedulability test towards configurations that can achieve full schedulability while maximising the provided level of security. Extensive experimental work using 4x4 and 8x8 NoCs with random XY/YX routing running thousands of synthetically generated applications show the performance guarantees that can be achieved by the proposed approach at four different levels of security, compared against two baselines (no security, and




Figure 8: Communication latency results for the randomised routing case on the AV application




Figure 9: Communication latency results (normalised) for the randomised routing case on the AV application

full security applied a posteriori). Additional experiments with a realistic application running over 4x3 NoCs with random XY/YX and random west-first routing were performed with a cycle-accurate simulator, aiming to show

the impact of route randomisation on latency variability, which in turn shows the increased resilience against side-channel attacks.

Since this is the first paper addressing the trade-off between security and hard real-time performance in NoCs, it had to make several assumptions to be able to attack the problem. Lifting some of those assumptions will certainly open new avenues of research, such as using different NoC arbitration mechanisms (e.g. TDM) or different route randomisation techniques (e.g. if randomised routes of subsequent releases of packets are never the same, a less pessimistic schedulability test can be used). Addressing those cases will require new schedulability tests, but could still reuse the proposed optimisation pipeline.

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