

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Types of connotative meaning, and their significance for translation

James Dickins

Abstract

This chapter defines connotative meaning (connotation) as all meaning which is not denotative meaning (denotation) – this latter involving the overall range of reference, in a particular sense, of an expression. It considers connotative meaning in relation to the Peircean distinction between symbol, index and icon. It identifies four kinds of connotation: (i) reference-focusing, (ii) parenthetical, (iii) secondary-referential, and (iv) pseudo-referential. It also investigates the fuzzy boundary between connotation and affect/effect. The following types of connotative meaning and their translation significance are investigated: 1. Associative meaning; 2. Attitudinal meaning; 3. Affective meaning; 4. Allusive meaning; 5. Reflected meaning; 6. Selectional restriction-related meaning; 7. Collocative meaning; 8. Geographical dialect-related meaning; 9. Temporal dialect-related meaning; 10. Sociolect-related meaning; 11. Social register-related meaning; 12. Emphasis (emphatic meaning); 13. Thematic meaning (theme-rheme meaning); 14. Grounding meaning; and 15. Locution-overriding illocutionary meaning.

Denotative vs connotative meaning

This chapter operates with a basic distinction between denotative and connotative meaning. Denotative meaning involves the overall range, in a particular sense, of an expression – word, multi-word unit, or syntactic structure. A 'syntactic structure' is defined to include the words involved in that structure, not just the abstracted structural relations. Thus in relation to a 'parse-tree' approach, a syntactic structure under this definition goes beyond the nodes (terminal and non-terminal) to include the vocabulary items which are attached to terminal nodes. Two expressions in a particular sense which 'pick out' the same extensional range of entities in the world – or better, in all possible worlds, real and imaginable – have the same denotative meaning.

Denotative meaning is also known by other terms, e.g. denotational meaning, denotation, propositional meaning and cognitive meaning (Cruse 1986: 45, 271–277). Connotative meaning, or connotation, is defined here negatively as all kinds of meaning which

are not denotative meaning. The denotative meaning of an expression in a particular sense is that kind of meaning which, in the context of a proposition, contributes to the truth-conditions of that proposition (for an extension of these principles to questions and other non-propositions, see Dickins 2010: 1079). There is thus an intimate connection between denotative meaning and truth-conditional semantics.

Connotative meaning, as noted, covers all kinds of meaning which are not denotative meaning: meanings which do not involve the extensional range of an expression in a particular sense, minus denotative meaning. There are many types of connotative meaning (perhaps an endless number), but in this chapter, fifteen are identified as particularly important for their significance for translation. In doing so, the following basic notions are used here to analyze connotative meaning.

Reference: referent vs ascription

Referent and ascription are two aspects of reference. A referent is what an expression in a particular sense refers to in a particular 'speech/writing event'. An ascription is the category to which this referent is related. Thus, in using the expression 'the baker' in the sense 'the one who bakes' (OED Online) with the referent on a particular occasion of a particular individual, I have ascribed the individual to the category 'baker(s)'. This person (referent) could, however, also be referred to in any number of other ways ('your dad', 'her husband', etc.) – these other ways being different ascriptions of the same referent (cf. Dickins 2014: 2016). In 'That man's a fool', 'that man' and 'a fool' are co-referential, but not co-ascriptive. In 'He's a fool, but he's alright' (where the two 'he's refer to different people), the two 'he's are co-ascriptive (they assign the two people concerned to the same category of 'he'), but not co-referential (they don't refer to the same person).

Peirce: symbol vs index vs icon

In his semiotics, Peirce made a distinction between three kinds of signs: symbol, index and icon (e.g. Peirce 1868). Hervey (1982: 30–31) provides clear definitions:

> (1) If the sign denotes its object *by virtue of* a real similarity that holds between physical properties…of the sign and physical properties of its object, Peirce designates that sign as an *icon*;
>
> (2) If the sign denotes its object *by virtue of* a real cause-and-effect link…that holds between sign and object, Peirce designates that sign as an *index*;

(3) If the sign denotes its object by virtue of a general association of ideas that is in the nature of a habit or a convention…Peirce designates that sign as a *symbol.*

Symbols, indexes (or indices) and icons are sometimes regarded as wholly discrete. For current purposes, however, we can view them as potentially overlapping categories. Thus, the stylised figures representing 'man' and 'woman' on toilet doors are iconic in that they look somewhat like a man and a woman. They are also, however, symbolic, in that it would be impossible to know what precisely they refer to unless one knew the convention that these signs are used on toilet doors to refer to male and female toilets. Their stylised nature is also indicative that they are not purely iconic; the vaguely skirt-like shape around the 'woman's' legs and the vaguely trouser-like shape around the 'man's' legs are only generally indicative that what is intended is a man and a woman; think also of a woman wearing trousers, or a man wearing a kilt.

Other signs involve a combination of symbol and index. The fundamental mechanism of a Torricellian (mercury) barometer is indexical; changes in air pressure cause the mercury in the barometer to go up or down. However, barometers are calibrated using numbers (and other signs) for air pressure; this is a symbolic aspect.

In fact, symbolicity dominates both indexicality and iconicity: we could not know that the 'man' and 'woman' signs indicate men's and women's toilets if we had not learnt the convention that this is so. Similarly, we could not interpret a Torricellian barometer if we did not know the conventions for numbers and other symbols marking air pressure.

The fuzzy connotative meaning vs effect/affect boundary

Consider the difference between a sign on a placard in the street reading 'Stop!' which is 20 centimetres by 20 centimetres, and one which is 2 metres by 2 metres. The latter is likely to have more effect on the passer-by (even if that effect is only to attract their attention). We would be inclined, however, to say that the two placards have the same meaning, even though the latter might be said to emphasize the message more. As discussed later in this chapter, there are some features relatable to connotation where it is not clear whether what is more prominent is meaning or effect/affect. Connotative meaning can therefore be divided into two kinds:

(purely) *meaningful*, and *meaningful/affective* (i.e. where meaning and effect/affect are both prominent).

Modes of connotative meaning: reference-focusing, parenthetical, secondary-referential, pseudo-referential

I suggest that there are at least four 'modes' of operation of connotative meaning: i. reference-narrowing (narrowing down the overall ascription of a particular expression in a particular sense in a given context); ii. parenthetical (commenting, in much the same way as does a parenthetical element, on the entity referred to); iii. secondary-referential (producing a reference additional to, and existing alongside, the reference involved in the denotative meaning); and iv. pseudo-referential (producing what looks like a reference, but is not, in fact, one).

Forms of connotative meaning

We can, on the basis of Hervey and Higgins (2002; also Dickins, Hervey and Higgins 2016: 95–107; based on Leech 1981 and Lyons 1977), and Baker (2011; 11–13; based on Cruse 1986), initially recognize the following forms of connotative meaning:

1. Associative meaning
2. Attitudinal meaning
3. Affective meaning
4. Allusive meaning
5. Reflected meaning
6. Selectional restriction-related meaning
7. Collocative meaning
8. Geographical dialect-related meaning
9. Temporal dialect-related meaning
10. Sociolect-related meaning
11. Social-register-related meaning
12. Emphasis (emphatic meaning)
13. Thematic meaning (theme-rheme meaning)

14. Grounding meaning

15. Locution-overriding illocutionary meaning

Figure 1 presents these types of meaning, with alternative terms, as in Dickins, Hervey and Higgins (2016: 95–107), and Baker (2011: 11–13).

<table>
<tr><th colspan="3">Dickins, Hervey and Higgins (2016)</th><th colspan="2">Baker (2011)</th></tr>
<tr><td colspan="3">Denotative meaning</td><td colspan="2">Propositional/cognitive meaning</td></tr>
<tr><td rowspan="16">Connotative meaning</td><td colspan="2">Associative meaning</td><td colspan="2" rowspan="5">Expressive meaning</td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="2">Attitudinal meaning</td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="2">Affective meaning</td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="2">Allusive meaning</td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="2">Reflected meaning</td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="2">No category</td><td>Selectional restriction-related meaning</td><td rowspan="2">Presupposed meaning</td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="2">Collocative meaning</td><td>Collocation restriction-related meaning</td></tr>
<tr><td rowspan="5">Language-variety-related meaning</td><td>Geographical dialect-related meaning</td><td>Geographical dialect-related meaning</td><td rowspan="4">Evoked meaning</td></tr>
<tr><td>Temporal dialect-related meaning</td><td>Temporal dialect-related meaning</td></tr>
<tr><td>Sociolect-related meaning</td><td rowspan="2">Register-related meaning</td></tr>
<tr><td>Social register-related meaning</td></tr>
<tr><td></td><td></td><td></td></tr>
<tr><td rowspan="3">Information prominence-related meaning</td><td>Emphasis (emphatic meaning)</td><td colspan="2">No category</td></tr>
<tr><td>Thematic meaning (theme-rheme meaning)</td><td colspan="2">Theme and information structure</td></tr>
<tr><td>Grounding meaning</td><td colspan="2">No precise category, but cf. Theme and information structure</td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="2">Locution-overriding illocutionary meaning</td><td colspan="2">Pragmatic meaning (esp. implicature)</td></tr>
</table>

Figure 1. A typology of meaning according to Dickins, Hervey and Higgins, and Baker.

As seen in Figure 1, it is possible to group certain kinds of connotative meaning into larger categories. Thus, geographical dialect-related meaning, temporal dialect-related meaning, sociolect-related meaning, and social register-related meaning can all be grouped under the category of language-variety-related meaning, while emphasis (emphatic meaning), thematic meaning (theme-rheme meaning) and grounding meaning can all be grouped under the category of information prominence-related meaning.

In the following sections, I will discuss these types of meaning in turn, considering how each relates to denotative meaning. I will consider first associative meaning (Section 4.1), attitudinal meaning (Section 4.2), affective meaning (Section 4.3), allusive meaning (Section 4.4), and reflected meaning (Section 4.5), all of which fall under what Baker terms 'expressive meaning' (Baker 2011: 11–12).

Associative meaning

Associative meaning is:

> that part of the overall meaning of an expression which consists of expectations that are – rightly or wrongly – *associated with the referent* of the expression. The word 'nurse' is a good example. Most people automatically associate 'nurse' with the idea of female gender, as if 'nurse' were synonymous with 'female who looks after the sick' – on the basis that in the real world (at least in Britain and other English-speaking countries at the start of the twenty-first century) nurses are typically female. This unconscious association is so widespread that the term 'male nurse' has had to be coined to counteract its effect: 'he is a nurse' still sounds semantically odd, even today. (Dickins, Hervey and Higgins 2016: 97)

A similar, though less extreme, example is provided by 'engineer'. Engineers in British culture are in the great majority men. Thus, in a statement like, 'An engineer has been assessing the structural faults', one is likely to interpret the reference as being to a man, rather than a woman.

Associative meaning specifies a narrower typical 'denotative range' than that of the (full) denotative meaning of an expression in a particular sense: there is a narrowing of the ascription from that of the expression in its overall particular sense, giving a 'sub-ascription' as compared to the overall ascription in the particular sense. In terms of the modes of connotative meaning established in Section 3.4, associative meaning is thus reference-narrowing.

In the cases of 'nurse' and 'engineer', associative meaning is extralinguistic (real-world) based; in British culture, nurses are typically female and engineers typically male. There are, however, at least two other types of associative meaning: linguistic-based and communicative-efficiency-based.

Linguistic-based associative meaning is illustrated by إثم *iṯm* and ذنب *ḏanb* (Elewa 2004) in classical Arabic. These both mean 'sin, wrong, offence', and seem to have had the same range of meaning: anything which could be called an إثم *iṯm* could be called a ذنب *ḏanb*, and vice

versa. They were thus synonyms (i.e. they had the same denotative meaning). On the basis of the usages of these two words in a corpus of classical Arabic texts, however, Elewa concludes that they tended to be associated with different types of activity. إثم *iṯm* was typically used for sins that are personal or do not entail a punishment in this world (e.g. failing to perform obligatory acts of worship, or doing a bad deed which is liable to have a bad effect on oneself, such as drinking or gambling). ذنب *ḏanb*, on the other hand, was typically used for sins that involve punishment in this world or the next, such as killing, theft or adultery (Elewa 2004: 123–4; cf. also Dickins 2014; Dickins, Hervey and Higgins 2016: 99).

Finally, communicative-efficiency-based associative meaning is illustrated by the fact that 'some' in English, although its denotative range includes 'all', is typically used to mean 'some but not all', i.e. the normal ascription of 'some' is not 'some including the possibility of all' but 'some excluding the possibility of all'. This can be seen from the fact that if I say 'He spent some of the money', this will typically be interpreted to mean that he did not spend all of it. The fact that the denotative range of 'some' includes all, however, is shown by the possibility of utterances such as 'He spent some, but not all, of the money' and 'He spent some, in fact all, of the money'. These kinds of utterances reflect a hyperonymy–hyponymy-type relationship; cf. 'It's a vehicle, but not a lorry', and 'It's a vehicle, in fact a lorry'. (This is a simplification of the actual situation, ignoring some of the problems in analyzing 'some' as a hyperonym of 'all'; for a more developed analysis of 'some', and related issues of scalar implicature, see Dickins 2014.) It seems clear that it is much more communicatively useful to have a language in which 'some' typically excludes 'all' than to have one in which 'some' is typically interpreted in its full 'some including all' ascription. In a language in which 'some' typically has the ascription 'some excluding all', communication is more succinct and likely to be more successful than it would be in one in which 'some' typically had the ascription covering its full meaning range 'some including all'. Accordingly, the 'some excluding all' associative meaning of 'some' seems to be a general feature of natural languages.

In Peircean terms, extralinguistic-based associative meaning is indexical. There is a natural – causal-type – relationship between the facts of the real world, and the linguistic expressions which denote these facts. Extralinguistic-based associative meaning is, however, indexical within symbolic, the overall denotative range of the expression being defined by linguistic convention. Extralinguistic-based associative meaning can thus be more fully characterized as *indexical (within symbolic)*, where the '*(within symbolic)*' element makes plain that the connotative *indexical* element of meaning further restricts the overall

symbolically defined denotative element of meaning.

Linguistic-based associative meaning, by contrast, is purely symbolic; both the overall denotative ranges of إثم *iṯm* and ذنب *ḏanb* are symbolic, and it is part of the conventions of classical Arabic that إثم *iṯm* was typically used for sins that are personal or do not entail a punishment in this world, while ذنب *ḏanb* was typically used for sins that involve punishment in this world or the next. Linguistic-based associative meaning can thus be more fully characterized as *symbolic (within symbolic).*

Communicative-efficiency-based associative meaning is more interesting. On the one hand, it is conventional (symbolic); languages would not, in principle, need to be organized such that words for 'some' typically mean 'some excluding all'. On the other hand, this convention has a quasi-indexical underpinning; given that languages operate better in terms of communicative-efficiency if word(s) for 'some' typically mean 'some excluding all', the demand for communicative-efficiency quasi-causally impels the associative meaning 'some excluding all'. Like extralinguistic-based, communicative-efficiency-based associative meaning occurs within the more symbolic context of the expression's overall denotative range. Communicative-efficiency-based associative meaning can thus be characterized as *quasi-indexical (within symbolic)*. All associative meaning is clearly *meaningful*, rather than *meaningful/affective*.

Translation problems involving associative meaning areillustrated by the translation into English of the Arabic word مقهى *maqhā*, for which:

> a denotative near-equivalent might be 'tea-house', 'tea-garden', 'coffee-house', or possibly 'cafe'. However, in terms of the cultural status of the مقهى as the centre of informal male social life, the nearest equivalent in British culture might be the pub. Given the Islamic prohibition on the drinking of alcohol, however, such a translation would in most cases be obviously ruled out. (Dickins, Hervey and Higgins 2016: 98)

For further discussion of translation issues relating to associative meaning for Arabic, see Dickins, Hervey and Higgins (2016: 97–99); for French, Hervey and Higgins (2002: 150–151); for German, Hervey and Higgins (2006: 90–91); for Italian, Cragie, Higgins and Gambarotta (2005: 96); and for Spanish, Haywood, Thompson and Hervey (2009: 172–173).

Attitudinal meaning

Attitudinal meaning is 'that part of the overall meaning of an expression which consists of

some widespread *attitude to the referent*. The expression does not merely denote the referent in a neutral way, but also hints at some attitude to it' (Dickins, Hervey and Higgins 2016: 95). An example is 'pigs' in the sense 'police'. 'Pigs' (= police) and 'police' are denotatively identical, covering the same range of referents (real and imaginary). However, while 'police' is a neutral expression, 'pigs' has pejorative overtones.

While associative meaning specifies a narrower typical 'denotative range' than that of the (full) denotative meaning of an expression in a particular sense (Section 4.1), attitudinal meaning does not. Thus, while 'nurses' may typically be female, 'pigs' (= police) are not typically police whom one does not like. Rather, 'pigs' suggests that the speaker/writer does not like police in general, as does even the use of a singular form 'the pig' referring to one specific policeman.

A comparison can be drawn between attitudinal meaning and the meaning relayed by parenthetical elements in sentences, such as non-restrictive relative clauses. In a standard restrictive relative clause, the meaning of the relative clause plus its noun-phrase head is described by the intersection of the denotative meaning of the two elements. In 'Drivers who break the law will be prosecuted', the denotative meaning of 'drivers who break the law' is the intersection of the set of *drivers* (in a given discourse context) and the set of *[those] who break the law* (in that same discourse context). Contrast this with 'Drivers, who break the law, will be prosecuted', in which 'who break the law is a non-restrictive' (parenthetical) relative clause. Here the denotative meaning of 'drivers, who break the law' is not the intersection of the denotative meaning of 'drivers' and 'who break the law'. Rather, no denotative narrowing of 'drivers' is introduced by 'who break the law': **all** drivers (in the discourse context) will be prosecuted, and another fact about them is that these drivers break the law.

Just as parenthetical elements introduce additional – 'off-stage' – information which does not involve any restriction on the denotative meaning of the element to which they relate (in the case of non-restrictive clauses the head-noun), so attitudinal meaning can be regarded as an additional 'off-stage' element of meaning which does not involve any restriction of the denotative meaning of the expression (in a particular sense) which has this attitudinal meaning. Attitudinal meanings are typically marked in dictionaries by terms such as 'derogatory', 'pejorative', etc.

In Peircean terms, attitudinal meaning is symbolic; it is a matter of the conventions of English, for example, that 'police' has a neutral attitudinal meaning, while 'pigs' (= police) has

a negative one. As a parenthetical-type element, the connotative derogatoriness conveyed by a word such as 'pigs' (= police) functions independently of the 'police' denotation. While associative meaning is *indexical (within symbolic)*, *symbolic (within symbolic)*, or *quasi-indexical (within symbolic)* (Section 4.1), attitudinal meaning might be characterized as *symbolic (plus symbolic)*, in that it adds an additional non-defining (parenthetical) meaning to the basic denotative meaning. Given, however, that attitudinal meaning is simply additional to the basic denotative meaning, I will subsequently (in Figure 4) refer to it simply as *symbolic*.

Translation problems involving attitudinal meaning are illustrated by the translation into English of the pejorative French word for 'police' *flicaille*. "Translating 'la flicaille' as 'the police' accurately renders the literal meaning of the ST, but fails to render the hostile attitude connoted by 'la flicaille' ('the filth', 'the pigs')" (Hervey and Higgins 2002: 149).

For discussion of translation issues relating to attitudinal meaning for Arabic, see Dickins, Hervey and Higgins (2016: 95–97); for French, Hervey and Higgins (2002: 149–50); for German, Hervey and Higgins (2006: 90); for Italian, Cragie, Higgins and Gambarotta (2005: 94–95); and for Spanish, Haywood, Thompson and Hervey (2009: 172).

Affective meaning

Affective meaning is that kind of meaning conveyed by tonal register, i.e. '*the tone that the speaker takes* – vulgar, familiar, polite, formal, etc.' (Dickins, Hervey and Higgins 2016: 212; cf. Figure 3, below). With affective meaning, 'the expression does not merely denote its referent, but also hints at some attitude of the speaker or writer to the addressee' (Dickins, Hervey and Higgins 2016: 212). An example of two words with the same denotative, but different affective, meaning are 'toilet', with no or neutral affective meaning, and 'bog' with impolite/disrepectful affective meaning.

Affective meaning can be regarded as functioning via a two-stage process: (i) the belonging of an expression to a particular tonal-register category, such as vulgar, familiar, polite or formal; and (ii) the meaning which this tonal-register category has for the addressee in the context in which the expression is used. As an example we can take the expression 'Would you like…?' in English, regarded as belonging to the tonal-register category 'polite'; i.e. 'Would you like…?' is a polite way of making a request in English. (There are, in fact, significant academic disagreements about what politeness is; cf. Dimitrova-Galaczi 2002. These do not concern us here.)

The belonging of the expression 'Would you mind…?' to the tonal-register category

‘polite’ represents stage (i) of affective meaning. Stage (ii) is what meaning this polite form has for the addressee in the specific context in which it is used. In general, we may consider politeness to involve behaviour which, by convention or otherwise, suggests respect for one’s interactant(s) (the person or people with whom one is interacting). The greater the respect due to an interactant, the more politeness one is expected to demonstrate. Thus, the standard affective meaning of ‘Would you mind…?’ can be regarded as respect for the addressee.

Politeness itself is therefore not meaning, but carries meaning. Thus, in British culture, it is traditionally considered impolite to put one’s elbows on the table while eating. Behaviour, such as putting one’s elbows on the table during a meal, may just *be* polite or impolite, it does not *mean* polite/politeness or impolite/impoliteness. The impoliteness of putting one’s elbows on the table during a meal does, however, carry affective meaning – this meaning typically being something like disrespect for the other people at the table.

The most important, though not perhaps the most obvious, area in which affective meaning operates is formality vs informality. Formality and informality are features of expressions – more precisely, features of expressions in particular senses. Thus, ‘channel’ in the sense of ‘bed or course of a river, stream or canal’ (Collins English Dictionary) is a standard word with no particular formality. ‘Channel’ in the sense of ‘course into which something can be directed or moved’ (Collins English Dictionary; as in ‘through official channels’), by contrast, is a somewhat formal usage. Formality and informality can be thought of as being on a cline from very informal to very formal, as in Figure 2:

Figure 2. The cline of formality.

Thus, formality is not an all-or-nothing matter. We may reasonably describe a word or phrase as being relatively informal, slightly formal, etc.

Although it is expressions in particular senses which are formal or informal, just like politeness, formality and informality imply affective meaning. This is because they suggest a relationship between the speaker/writer and the listener/reader. In informal writing/speech, this connoted relationship is one of emotional closeness and normally rough equality of status. In formal writing/speech, the relationship is one of emotional distance and normally of non-

equality of status. Expletives such as ‘bloody’ in ‘a bloody good thing too’ arguably have only affective meaning (plus reflected meaning; Section 4.5), without denotative meaning (cf. Ljung 2010: 86–87).

In Peircean terms, affective meaning is *symbolic*: it is a matter of linguistic convention that ‘toilet’ is fairly polite, but ‘bog’ impolite. In terms of meaning vs effect/affect, affective meaning can be regarded as *meaningful/affective*. This is most clearly seen in the two-stage analysis of politeness (above), where politeness is not itself meaning, but carries meaning.

Unlike associative meaning, affective meaning does not involve narrowing of the overall denotative range of an expression: ‘bog’ is not typically used to refer to only one kind of toilet. Rather, like attitudinal meaning, affective meaning involves an ‘off-stage’ assessment, and can thus be classified as *parenthetical*. In the case of attitudinal meaning, this is an assessment of the referent. In the case of affective meaning, it is an assessment (in terms of respect, relative social status), etc. of the addressee. Where the addressee is also the referent, e.g. in ‘Pigs, I hate you’ (where ‘pigs’ = policeman), attitudinal meaning and affective meaning coincide.

Translation problems involving affective meaning are illustrated by the following:

> in French, you might lend a book to a friend and say ‘Tu me le rendras mardi’. A literal translation of this would sound rude in English: ‘You’ll give it me back on Tuesday’, although the ST does not have that affective meaning at all. A better TT would avoid such brutal assertiveness: ‘(So) you’ll give it me back on Tuesday, then?’ (Hervey and Higgins 2002: 154)

For translation issues relating to affective meaning for Arabic, see Dickins, Hervey and Higgins (2016: 99–100); for French, Hervey and Higgins (2002: 154); for German, Hervey and Higgins (2006: 91); for Italian, Cragie, Higgins and Gambarotta (2005: 99); and for Spanish, Haywood, Thompson and Hervey (2009: 173–174).

Allusive meaning

Allusive meaning ‘occurs when an expression evokes an associated saying or quotation in such a way that the meaning of that saying or quotation becomes part of the overall meaning of the expression’ (Dickins, Hervey and Higgins, 2016: 101). Discussing the example of the novel مدينة البغي *madīnat al-bağy* (*The City of Oppression*), by the Palestinian novelist عيسى بشارة *ʕīsā bišāra*, Dickins, Hervey and Higgins say:

the city in question is clearly Jerusalem (or a fictional equivalent). The term مدينة البغي [*madīnat al-bağy*], which is used as the name of the city, alludes to the fact that Jerusalem is sometimes referred to as مدينة السلام [*madīnat al-salām*] 'City of Peace'. It also perhaps recalls St Augustine's 'City of God' (عيسى بشارة [*ʕīsā bišāra*] is a Christian, and makes widespread use of Christian symbolism in this work). For Arabic readers, a further possible allusive meaning is مدينة النبي [*madīnat al-nabī*], i.e. the term from which is derived the name for the city 'Medina' المدينة [*al-madīna*] (in pre-Islamic times known as يثرب [*yaṯrib*]). For English-speaking readers, particularly those of a Protestant background, the TT 'City of Oppression' might also carry echoes of John Bunyan's 'City of Destruction' in *A Pilgrim's Progress*, although it is extremely doubtful that these would have been intended in the ST. (Dickins, Hervey and Higgins 2016: 101)

Allusive meaning is a form of pseudo-reference. This can be illustrated by the title of a book on the fall of Soviet Communism: *The Future That Failed* (Arnason 1993). This title involves an allusion to the name of the series in which the book was published: 'Social Futures'. It also contains two further allusions – the first to 'I've seen the future and it works', found on the title page of the book *Red Virtue* by the American writer, and communist, Ella Winter, and the second to a book written by a group of disillusioned ex-communists in 1949, entitled *The God That Failed* (the 'God' in the title being communism itself).

The real reference in the title 'The future that failed' is to the Soviet Union – this is the denotative meaning of the book title. The denotative meanings of 'I've seen the future and it works' and 'the God that failed' are recalled by the use of the phrase 'The future that failed'. However, these are merely 'echoes' of the phrase 'The future that failed', i.e. allusive meaning is *pseudo-referential*. Given that these pseudo-denotations, are, however, meaningful, we can classify allusive meaning as *meaningful* (rather than *meaningful/affective*).

In Peircean terms, allusive meaning is both *iconic* and *symbolic*. Thus, the relationship between the phrase 'The future that failed' and the phrase (sentence) 'I've seen the future and it works', for example, is one of similarity; the first phrase recalls the second because the second is similar to the first. However, the relationship between 'I have seen the future and it works' and what it refers to is symbolic (albeit that this is a pseudo-reference in the context of this allusion): the meaning of 'I have seen the future and it works' is determined by the conventions of English (as interpreted in the particular context in which this particular utterance was made).

Translation problems involving allusive meaning are illustrated by the following example between French and English:

> [A] book title using allusive meaning is Julien Green's *Mille chemins ouverts [Literally 'A thousand open roads']*, his memoir of the Great War. The allusion is to Act 1 Scene 2 of Racine's *Phèdre*, in which Oenone, the loyal, misguided servant, says to her mistress: 'Mon âme chez les morts descendra la première. / Mille chemins ouverts y conduisent toujours.' *[Literally, 'My soul will descend to the dead the first one. / A thousand open roads lead there always'.]* The allusive meaning is 'how easy it is to die', an appropriate way of referring to the trenches of the First World War. It is tempting to translate with something like '*Roads to Hell*'. The danger here is to avoid *unwanted* allusions, in this case the proverb 'The road to hell is paved with good intentions' (cf. 'L'enfer est pavé de bonnes intentions'), which would place intentions, rather than hell, at the centre of the allusion. If this is unsuitable, a quite different title will have to be found; this is actually common with book titles, which are often built round intertextual allusions. (Hervey and Higgins 2002: 148)

For translation issues relating to allusive meaning for Arabic, see Dickins, Hervey and Higgins (2016: 101); for French, Hervey and Higgins (2002: 148–149); for German, Hervey, Higgins and Loughridge (2006: 93–95); for Italian, Cragie, Higgins and Gambarotta (2005: 96–97); and for Spanish, Haywood, Thompson and Hervey (2009: 176–178).

Reflected meaning

Reflected meaning is:

> the meaning given to an expression over and above the denotative meaning which it has in that context by the fact that it also calls to mind another meaning of the same word or phrase. Thus, if someone says, 'Richard Nixon was a rat', using 'rat' in the sense of 'a person who deserts his friends or associates' (Collins English Dictionary), the word 'rat' not only carries this particular denotative meaning, but also conjures up the more basic denotative meaning of the animal 'rat'. (Note also the standard collocation 'dirty rat'.)
>
> Reflected meaning is normally a function of polysemy, i.e. the existence of two or more denotative meanings for a single word…. The simplest forms of reflected meaning are when a single word has two or more senses, and its use in a particular

> context in one of its senses conjures up at least one of its other senses, as in the example 'rat' above. A similar example in Arabic is calling someone حِمار [*ḥimār*]. In colloquial Arabic, حمار [*ḥimār*] applied to a person means 'stupid'. However, this metaphorical meaning also very strongly calls to mind the more basic sense of حمار [*ḥimār*] 'donkey'. (Dickins, Hervey and Higgins 2016: 103)

Like allusive meaning, reflected meaning is *pseudo-referential*. When we call someone حمار *ḥimār*, we are not saying they are a donkey – we are not ascribing them to the set (class) of donkeys. We are, rather, ascribing them to the set of stupid people. However, the use of حمار *ḥimār* in this secondary sense recalls the primary 'donkey' sense – i.e. it is *as if* we are ascribing the person to the set of donkeys. There is in this respect, however, a distinction between lexicalized cases and non-lexicalized cases of reflected meaning. In حمار *ḥimār* 'donkey'/'stupid person', the secondary sense 'stupid person' is fixed – i.e. lexicalized – by the conventions of Arabic. In the case of 'tree' in an utterance, 'Tom is a tree', by contrast, the sense of 'tree' (which, as in the case of حمار *ḥimār* meaning 'stupid', is also metaphorical) is not fixed; i.e. in 'Tom is a tree', '[a] tree' is non-lexicalized, such that it is impossible to deduce from the general conventions of English, what 'Tom is a tree' means in a given context.

I have argued (Dickins 2005: 2018) that with non-lexicalized metaphors, the overall ascription is along the lines 'like in some non-basic respect to …'. Thus, in 'A man is a tree' the overall ascription is 'like in some non-basic respect to a tree', and the specific meaning in a particular context is determined by a 'sub-ascription' narrowing down this overall ascription. Thus, if 'A man is a tree' was uttered in a context where the focus was on the distinction between the relatively small amount which is apparent or conscious about human personality and the relatively large amount which is hidden or unconscious, the reader might conclude that 'A man is a tree' is roughly equivalent to saying 'A man is like a tree in that only a certain proportion is apparent (in the case of the tree the trunk, branches and leaves; in the case of a man some psychological features), while much remains hidden (in the case of the tree the extensive root system; in the case of a man most psychological features)'. Here, the meaning element 'like a tree in that only a certain proportion is apparent (in the case of the tree the trunk, branches and leaves; in the case of a man some psychological features), while much remains hidden (in the case of the tree the extensive root system; in the case of a man most psychological features)' constitutes the sub-ascription. In terms of traditional metaphor analysis, the element 'in that only a certain proportion is apparent (in the case of the tree the trunk, branches and leaves; in the case of a man some psychological features), while much remains hidden (in the

case of the tree the extensive root system; in the case of a man some psychological features)', i.e. the core of the sub-ascription, is known as the grounds (e.g. Dickins 2005).

Reflected meaning in lexicalized cases is, in Peircean terms, fundamentally symbolic. The fact that حمار *ḥimār* in colloquial Arabic means both 'donkey' and 'stupid' is part of the conventions of the language. There is, however, a strong indexical – or quasi-indexical – element in reflected meaning. The fact that we perceive the sense 'stupid' as strongly reflecting the sense 'donkey', but we do not perceive the sense 'donkey' as reflecting the sense 'stupid' (or only weakly so) is a function of the fact that the 'donkey' sense of حمار *ḥimār* is more psychologically basic than the 'stupid' sense (e.g. Dickins 2005: 228). This psychological basicness is not a function of the conventions of language – or of any other conventions, but of basic psychological mechanisms, i.e. how we perceive things in the world as more basic or less basic, physical objects (and animate entities in particular) being perceived as more basic than mental traits, such as stupidity. This relationship causes us to understand there to be a reflected meaning relationship between حمار *ḥimār* = 'stupid' and حمار *ḥimār* = 'donkey'. If we were to include sameness within the category of similarity, we might also argue that reflected meaning in حمار *ḥimār* = 'stupid' and حمار *ḥimār* = 'donkey' also involves iconicity – since the two *ḥimār*'s sound exactly the same. Since identity is, however, only rather dubiously included under similarity, it seems best to characterize lexicalized reflected meaning as *symbolic (plus quasi-indexical).*

In non-lexicalized cases, reflected meaning is fundamentally symbolic, but not in the same way as with lexicalized reflected meaning. Thus, it is not part of the conventions of English that 'tree' means both 'perennial plant having a self-supporting woody main stem or trunk' (*Oxford English Dictionary Online*) and 'like a tree in that only a certain proportion is apparent [etc.], while much remains hidden [etc.]'. However, it is part of the conventions of English (and perhaps of all natural languages) that non-lexicalized metaphors can be generated from words in a more basic sense. In addition, just as there is a (quasi-)indexical element in our perception of حمار *ḥimār* in the sense 'stupid' as strongly reflecting حمار *ḥimār* in the sense 'donkey', so there is also a (quasi-)indexical element in our perception of 'tree' in the sense 'like a tree in that only a certain proportion is apparent [etc.], while much remains hidden [etc.]' as strongly reflecting 'tree' in the sense 'perennial plant having a self-supporting woody main stem or trunk'. Like lexicalized reflected meaning, non-lexicalized reflected meaning is analyzed in Peircean terms as *symbolic (plus quasi-indexical).*

An example of the problems involved in the translation of reflected meaning is provided

by the following fairly literal translation of ثم شد الغطاء على جسمها الهرم as ‘then pulling the covers over her old body’ (from the book مدينة البغي *madīnat al-baǧy*, *The City of Oppression*, by the Palestinian novelist عيسى بشارة *ʕīsā bišāra*):

> The reader has, in fact, learnt earlier in the book that the mother of the central character صابر *[ṣābir]* is old. The statement that her body is old, therefore, does not provide any information in this context. In order to extract some meaning, […] the reader therefore looks for another interpretation of ‘old’ in this context. One possible interpretation which presents itself is that based on another sense of ‘old’, viz ‘former’. That is to say, ‘old’ is polysemous, having senses ‘not new’ and ‘former’, amongst other senses […]. Thus, the interpretation ‘former body’ (i.e. not the one which the lady is incarnated in now) momentarily presents itself as a possibility. This is, of course, rejected in the context. However, this reflected meaning of ‘old’ has enough of an influence here, in combination with the oddity of ‘old’ in the sense of ‘not new’ […], to make the reader feel that ‘old’ is odd in this context.

For further translation issues relating to reflected meaning for Arabic, see Dickins, Hervey and Higgins (2016: 103–104; and for metaphor, see Dickins 2005; Dickins, Hervey and Higgins 2016: 194–210); for French, Hervey and Higgins (2002: 153); for German, Hervey, Higgins and Loughridge (2006: 91–92); for Italian, Cragie, Higgins and Gambarotta (2005: 98–99); and for Spanish, Haywood, Thompson and Hervey (2009: 174–175).

Selectional restriction-related meaning

Some expressions (in particular senses) are sometimes described as having selectional restrictions. Thus, ‘rancid’ only occurs in certain combinations, e.g. ‘rancid butter’, while ‘addled’ occurs in others, e.g. ‘addled eggs’ (cf. Cruse 1986: 289). One way of looking at this is to regard such selectional restrictions as a form of connotation. However, it makes better sense to analyze very strict selectional restrictions of this type as reflecting denotative differences. Thus, if we consider the set of all ‘rancid [things]’ (both real and imaginary) it will include instances of butter, but none of eggs. By contrast, if we consider the set of all ‘addled [things]’, it will include instances of eggs, but none of butter. According to this analysis, therefore, ‘rancid’ and ‘addled’ are denotatively different (they have different ranges of referents), and we do not need to invoke connotative meaning to describe the semantic differences between them.

Where selectional restrictions are looser, such as the expectation that 'geometrical' should go with an inanimate noun (Baker 2011: 12–13), we can analyze the restriction in terms of associative meaning; 'geometrical' has the associative meaning' of 'inanimate geometrical entity'. Thus an expression such as 'geometrical rodent', which collocates 'geometrical' with an animate noun 'rodent' may be difficult to interpret, but is not impossible, even where 'geometrical' and 'rodent' are both used in their standard non-metaphorical sense. A 'geometrical rodent' could, for example, be a rodent which builds geometrical structures, or which delimits its territory according to a mathematically regular pattern.

Although I have included selectional restricted-related meaning as a type of connotative meaning in Figure 1, I have argued in this section that it is, depending on the degree of restriction, either a case of denotative meaning (i.e. the restriction of the denotation), or associative meaning (Section 4.1). It should therefore properly speaking not appear as a separate category in Figure 1. Selectional restriction-related meaning is not dealt with as a separate category in the *Thinking Translation* series.

Collocative meaning

Dickins, Hervey and Higgins (2016) define collocative meaning as the meaning given to an expression over and above its denotative meaning by the meaning of some other expression with which it typically collocates (co-occurs) to form a commonly used phrase. They give the example of the word 'intercourse', which they note has largely dropped out of usage in modern English, because of its connotative sexual associations, derived from the common collocation 'sexual intercourse' (Dickins, Hervey and Higgins 2016: 102). Like reflected meaning, collocative meaning can be regarded as *pseudo-referential*. If I use the phrase 'social intercourse', I am referring to social interaction, rather than sexual activity. There is no real reference to sexual intercourse, regardless of the psychological 'echo' of 'sexual intercourse' which the phrase 'social intercourse' may engender.

Collocative meaning is in Peircean terms essentially symbolic. The meaning of 'intercourse' (in its general sense) and of 'sexual intercourse' are both determined by the conventions of English. Like reflected meaning, however, collocative meaning also has an indexical-type aspect, at least in origin. Thus, it is the 'sensitive' nature of the reference 'sexual intercourse' which has caused the term 'intercourse' to become associated with sex, and thus to acquire the same sensitivity as 'sexual intercourse' itself. Collocative meaning can thus be characterized as *symbolic (plus quasi-indexical)*. In referential terms, collocative meaning is

clearly *meaningful*, rather than *meaningful/affective*.

An example of the operation of collocative meaning in translation is provided by the following from the Syrian poet نزار قباني *nizār qabbānī*):

أحمل الزمن المحترق في عيني

This has been translated (Rolph 1995: 10) as:

I carry this scorched era in my eyes

> Here, ‘scorched era’ sounds more acceptable than other more literal alternatives because of the existence of the phrase ‘scorched earth’. The denotative meaning of ‘scorched earth’ gives ‘scorched era’ a collocative meaning which is strongly suggestive of the devastation wrought by war. (Dickins, Hervey and Higgins 2016: 102)

For further translation issues relating to collocative meaning for Arabic, see Dickins, Hervey and Higgins (2016: 101–102); for French, Hervey and Higgins (2002: 151–153); for German, Hervey, Higgins and Loughridge (2006: 92–93); for Italian, Cragie, Higgins and Gambarotta (2005: 98–99); and for Spanish, Haywood, Thompson and Hervey (2009: 175–176).

Language-variety related meaning

Baker (2011: 13–15) talks about ‘evoked meaning’, under which may be included: geographical dialect-related meaning, temporal dialect-related meaning, sociolect-related meaning and social register-related meaning. Dickins, Hervey and Higgins (2016: 211–217) similarly identify five aspects of the way a message is formulated that reveal information about the speaker/writer: tonal register, social register, sociolect, dialect and temporal variety. They relate these to each other as in Figure 3.

x **SUB-LANGUAGE**	
(geographical) dialect	
temporal variety (‘temporal dialect’)	
sociolect (‘social dialect’)	social register
	tonal register
	REGISTER

Figure 3. Language-variety related meaning.

Under the category of register, Dickins, Hervey and Higgins distinguish tonal register and social register. Tonal register is the feature of linguistic expression that carries affective meaning, as discussed above, but (geographical) dialect-related meaning, temporal dialect-related meaning, sociolect and register are discussed below.

(Geographical) dialect-related meaning

A dialect is a speech variety defined in terms of its geographical spread. (Geographical) dialect-related meaning may be of two types: primary and secondary. Primary (geographical) dialect-related related meaning is exemplified by the fact that we can, if we know what a Yorkshire accent sounds like, derive the information that a particular person who speaks with a Yorkshire accent is from Yorkshire (a county in northern England). Secondary (geographical) dialect-related meaning involves any further inferences – frequently of a stereotypical kind – which we derive from this. Thus, for many in Britain, people from Yorkshire are traditionally regarded as direct and honest in what they say. When such people hear someone speaking in a Yorkshire dialect, this evokes for them a sense of directness and honesty. Other people may have different views about Yorkshire people, of course, resulting in different evoked meanings for them.

In Peircean terms, primary (geographical) dialect-related meaning is *symbolic*; there is a conventional relationship between the form of language used (the dialect) and a geographical region. People in a particular region happen to talk the way they do; they are not constrained to talk this way by virtue of the local topography or the minerals in the local water. Secondary dialect-related meaning is *indexical*; it involves what we take to be a real association between

regional identity (as marked by dialect) and behaviour (Yorkshiremen are, we believe, direct and honest, for example). (Geographical) dialect-related meaning is *meaningful* (rather than *meaningful/affective*), and it is *parenthetical*, providing 'off-stage' information about the speaker, rather than, for instance, further narrowing the denotative meaning of an expression used by the speaker.

The analysis of (geographical) dialect-related meaning as *symbolic* (in its primary mode) and *indexical* (in its secondary mode), *meaningful*, and *parenthetical* applies also to the other types of language-variety meaning: temporal dialect-related meaning, sociolect-related meaning and social register-related meaning.

For translation issues relating to (geographical) dialect-related meaning for Arabic, see Dickins, Hervey and Higgins (2016: 215); for French, Hervey and Higgins (2002: 166–169); for German, Hervey, Higgins and Loughridge (2006: 33); for Italian, Cragie, Higgins and Gambarotta (2005: 108–110); and for Spanish, Haywood, Thompson and Hervey (2009: 185–186, 197–202).

Temporal dialect-related meaning

A temporal dialect is a language-variety which is used by a certain social group at a particular time. The discussion of evoked meaning in relation to dialect also applies to temporal dialect. Thus we may get both primary information (e.g. that the speaker/writer is from the nineteenth century) and secondary information (e.g. that they will therefore have specific attitudes towards religion or politics). As noted in Section 4.8.1, temporal dialect-related meaning is *symbolic* (in its primary mode) and *indexical* (in its secondary mode), *meaningful*, and *parenthetical*.

For translation issues relating to temporal dialect-related meaning for Arabic, see Dickins, Hervey and Higgins (2016: 216–217). The topic is not covered in other books in the *Thinking Translation* series.

Sociolect-related meaning

A sociolect (also sometimes termed 'social dialect') is a language-variety defined in terms of sociological class, or another broad social category. Together with (geographical) dialect and temporal dialect, sociolects constitute 'sub-languages', as ways of speaking/writing which may constitute the totality of the speech/writing behaviour of some speakers/writers. Thus we may get both primary information (e.g. that the speaker/writer is working class) and secondary information (e.g. that they will therefore probably like football) from this fact. As noted earlier, sociolect-related meaning is *symbolic* (in its primary mode) and *indexical* (in its secondary

mode), *meaningful*, and *parenthetical*.

For translation issues relating to sociolect-related meaning for Arabic, see Dickins, Hervey and Higgins (2016: 214–215); for French, Hervey and Higgins (2002: 165–166); for Italian, Cragie, Higgins and Gambarotta (2005: 107–108); and for Spanish, Haywood, Thompson and Hervey (2009: 185–186, 197–198, 202–204). The topic is not included in *Thinking German Translation* (Hervey, Higgins and Loughridge 2005).

Social register-related meaning

A social register is:

> a particular style from which the listener confidently infers what social stereotype the speaker belongs to. Of course, a stereotype by definition excludes individual idiosyncrasies of people belonging to the stereotype; but, however unfortunate this may be, we do tend to organize our interactions with other people on the basis of social stereotypes. These stereotypes cover the whole spectrum of social experience. They range from broad value-judgemental labels, such as 'pompous', 'down-to-earth', 'boring', etc. to increasingly specific stereotypical personality-types, such as 'the henpecked husband', 'the macho football fan', 'the middle-aged *Guardian*-reading academic', etc. In so far as each of these stereotypes has a characteristic style of language-use, this style is what we mean by social register. … Social register carries information about such things as the speaker's educational background, social persona (i.e. a social role the person is used to fulfilling), occupation and professional standing, and so on. (Dickins, Hervey and Higgins 2016: 213)

While a sociolect covers the whole range of speech/writing situations possible for a member of a sociologically defined group, a social register is much more restricted, covering 'a style that is conventionally seen as appropriate to both a type of person and a type of situation' (Dickins, Hervey and Higgins 2016: 213). The boundary between what is sociolectal and what is social-register-related is fuzzy – hence their placement side by side in Figure 3.

We may get both primary information (e.g. that the speaker/writer is an Islamist intellectual) and secondary information (e.g. that they are probably hostile to left-wing views) from this fact. Social register-related meaning is *symbolic* (in its primary mode) and *indexical* (in its secondary mode), *meaningful*, and *parenthetical*.

For translation issues relating to social register-related meaning for Arabic, see Dickins,

Hervey and Higgins (2016: 213–214); for French, Hervey and Higgins (2002: 162–165); for German, Hervey, Higgins and Loughridge (2006: 127); for Italian, Cragie, Higgins and Gambarotta (2005: 104–107); and for Spanish, Haywood, Thompson and Hervey (2009: 185–186, 197–198, 202–204).

Information prominence-related meaning

I turn now to three types of meaning which are related to the prominence of the information which they convey: emphatic meaning, thematic meaning (theme-rheme meaning), and grounding meaning.

Emphatic meaning

'Emphasis' is a broad and vague term in linguistics, covering, amongst other things:

1. Semantic repetition: repetition of the same meaning, using synonyms or near-synonyms; e.g. 'protect and preserve' in 'May God preserve and protect him'.

2. Parallelism: repetition of the same semantic structure; e.g. 'He has plundered our seas, ravaged our coasts, burnt our towns' (from the American Declaration of Independence).

3. Alliteration, assonance and rhyme: repetition of the same and/or similar sounds; e.g. 'pr' in 'preserve and protect'.

4. The use of emphatic intonation in speech, or an exclamation mark in writing.

5. Rhetorical anaphora: repetition of a word or words at the start of successive or closely associated clauses or phrases; e.g. '…we shall fight on the beaches, we shall fight on the landing grounds, we shall fight in the fields…; we shall never surrender…' (from a speech by Winston Churchill during World War II).

6. Metaphor (metaphorical effect).

7. Emphatic particles: for example, English 'so' (as in 'That was so amusing!').

It might be felt that emphatic meaning is not really meaning, but rather *effect/affect*. Emphasis (even when interpreted in terms of effect) can, however, be easily converted into one of meaning, i.e. *this element of the text is particularly important* – or similar. Given the tendency for emphatic meaning to be associated with extended sections of text (e.g. in cases of parallelism), emphatic meaning is not typically labelled in dictionaries. A major exception is emphatic particles, such as Arabic إِنَّ *inna*, which may be labelled (e.g. 'emphatic particle') in

addition to, or instead of, being glossed.

In Peircean terms, at least some kinds of emphasis are indexical. A good example is the fact that a placard bearing the message 'Stop!' which is 2 metres by 2 metres is more emphatic than one which is 20 centimetres by 20 centimetres (as discussed above). While the message 'Stop!' is symbolic, being expressed through the conventions of natural language, the difference in prominence given to this message between the two-metres-by-two-metres placard and the 20-centimetres-by-20-centimetres placard is indexical; it is caused by the fact that things which are bigger are more perceptually prominent. The same is true in spoken language in respect of a whispered utterance 'Stop!' compared to one which is bellowed: the greater prominence (emphasis) of the latter is purely indexical.

It might appear that at least some of the types of emphasis in 1–7 above are also to be analyzed as indexical. Thus, in the case of no. 6, rhetorical anaphora, we might imagine that the repetition of lexical items (e.g. 'we shall fight on the beaches, we shall fight on the landing grounds, we shall fight in the fields') gives rise to emphasis via purely natural (non-conventional) psychological processes. It seems to be true that repeating things gives them more prominence – as acknowledged by the use of phrases such as 'I cannot repeat this enough' in the context of a repeated instruction, for example. However, contrastive linguistic analysis shows that repetition of lexical items is not used to the same extent in different languages, or for the same purposes. Thus, Arabic typically makes greater use of lexical repetition than English (e.g. Dickins Hervey and Higgins 2016: 141–143; Baker 2011: 216–218). Lexical repetition in Arabic, unlike in English, is also typically used to enhance textual cohesion (e.g. Dickins, Hervey and Higgins 2016: 175–178; Hatim 2015). Thus, indexical aspects notwithstanding, there is a symbolic (conventional) aspect in the interpretation (meaning/effect) of lexical repetition in different languages – symbolicity, as noted above, dominating indexicality.

Corresponding arguments apply to all the other forms of emphasis listed in this section, with the exception of no. 7, emphatic particles, such as 'so' (as in 'That was so amusing'). These particles are purely symbolic. Emphatic meaning can thus be variously *indexical* (e.g. the shouted nature of a particular utterance), *symbolic (plus indexical)* (e.g. lexical repetition), or purely *symbolic* (e.g. English 'so', Arabic إنَّ *inna*).

The question of whether forms of emphasis are referential is more interesting. While words and phrases have references (and have them separately each time they are repeated), the

emphasis which emerges from repetition (whether of words or phrases, or meanings) is not an additional element of reference on a par with these other references. Rather, like attitudinal and affective meaning, emphatic meaning provides an 'off-stage' *parenthetical* assessment of the information provided by these words and phrases.

For a discussion of translation issues relating to emphatic meaning for Arabic, see Dickins, Hervey and Higgins (2016: 104–105); for French, Hervey and Higgins (2002: 115–117); for German, Hervey, Higgins and Loughridge (2006: 170–187); for Italian, Cragie, Higgins and Gambarotta (2005: 190–192); and for Spanish, Haywood, Thompson and Hervey (2009: 123, 127, 133).

Thematic meaning (theme-rheme meaning)

Thematic meaning is the meaning of old/given/relatively predictable information ('theme') as compared to that of new/relatively unpredictable information ('rheme') in a clause or sentence (for recent discussions consonant with the approach taken here, see Dickins 2010, Alharthi 2010).

Like emphatic meaning (Section 4.9.1), thematic meaning can be thought of in terms of effect or meaning. The effect of a theme, for example, is for the hearer/reader to assign the information in it less interest. This can, however, be easily converted into the meaning 'this element is being presented as old/given/relatively predictable information'. Thematic meaning is typically treated as a form of meaning in linguistics (in Hallidayan systemic-functional grammar, it is central to one of three basic types of meaning: 'textual meaning'; e.g. Halliday and Matthiesson 2004). Given its strongly affective element, we will here classify thematic meaning as *meaningful/affective*. Like emphatic meaning, thematic meaning is best thought of as *parenthetical*, i.e. an 'off-stage' assessment of the status of the denotative meaning in the relevant stretch of language.

In Peircean terms, thematic meaning has an indexical and even iconic aspect. In many (perhaps all) languages, themes (old/given/relatively predictable information) tend to occur at the start of utterances, and rhemes (new/relatively unpredictable information) at the end. This reflects the fact that in developing new ideas (i.e. new information) we start with what is already understood and then proceed to what is not yet understood. Typical theme-rheme order thus mirrors communicative demands both indexically (in terms of cognitive processes) and iconically (in terms of the order in which we process bits of information) (cf. also Dickins 2009: 494 – where I have used the term 'topic', rather than 'theme'). Thematic meaning is,

however, also symbolic. This can be seen in the fact that theme-rheme placement of the (apparently) same items in the same position in an utterance in different languages does not necessarily have the same meaning/effect. Thus, in English, for example, thematised (utterance-initial) temporal adverbials are unmarked (i.e. only weakly emphatic), and occur frequently as linking elements in past tense narratives (e.g. '**On 11th March** the merchant bank Kleinwort Benson announced…. **Three hours later** a junior official of the DTI sent a note…. **In ten** days, the unknown Fayeds gained permission…'; Baker 2011: 144). In Dutch, by contrast, thematised temporal adverbials are strongly emphatic and contrastive, and thus do not occur in this function (Baker 2011: 144). In overall terms we can classify thematic meaning as *symbolic (plus indexical, plus iconic).*

For translation issues relating to thematic (theme-rheme) meaning for Arabic, see Dickins, Hervey and Higgins (2016: 163–171). The topic is not covered in other books in the Thinking Translation series. Baker (2011: 131–189) provides an extended general discussion with reference to numerous languages.

Grounding meaning

Grounding meaning is the meaning of information within the sentence (or clause) as foregrounded or backgrounded, i.e. as a likely candidate for further discussion in subsequent sections of the text or not. (For recent discussions consonant with the approach taken here, see Dickins 2010; Alharthi 2010).

Like emphatic meaning and thematic meaning, grounding can be thought of either in terms of effect or of meaning. The effect of a backgrounded element, for example, is for the hearer/reader to assign the information in it only temporary interest. This can, however, be easily converted into the meaning 'this element is being presented as not a likely candidate for further discussion in subsequent text'. Here, we will classify grounding as *meaningful/affective*.

In English, main clauses are almost always foregrounded while subordinate clauses are backgrounded (for some limitations, see Dickins, Hervey and Higgins 2016: 166–171; Sekine 1996: 78). In Arabic, by contrast, main clauses, while normally foregrounded, may be backgrounded, and subordinate clauses may, under some circumstances, be foregrounded (Dickins 2010; Dickins, Hervey and Higgins 2016: 166–171). In Peircean terms, grounding meaning is *symbolic*; it is meaning which is conventionally associated with the main–subordinate structuring of languages, and, as seen from this comparison between English and Arabic, varies from language to language. Like emphatic and thematic meaning, grounding

meaning is best thought of as *parenthetical*, i.e. as an 'off-stage' assessment of the status of the denotative meaning in the relevant stretch of language.

For translation issues relating to grounding meaning for Arabic, see Dickins, Hervey and Higgins (2016: 163–171). The topic not covered in other books in the Thinking Translation series or by Baker (2011).

Locution-overriding illocutionary meaning

For brevity I have referred here to this type of meaning as *locution-overriding illocutionary meaning*. A less concise though more easily comprehensible term would be *illocutionary meaning which overrides locutionary meaning*. The terms 'locutionary meaning' and 'illocutionary meaning' are adapted here from Austin's (1975) 'locutionary act' and 'illocutionary act/force'. Various attempts have been made to analyze the distinction between 'locutionary meaning' and 'illocutionary meaning' in general pragmatic terms (e.g. Levinson 1983: 270–275). For current purposes, we can take locutionary meaning to mean the 'linguistic meaning' of an utterance. Accordingly, statements have locutionary meaning, but so do non-statements such as questions and commands. The locutionary meaning of 'The cat sat on the mat' is thus different from that of 'Did the cat sit on the mat?', and different from 'Sit on the mat, cat!' – though the meanings of all three are similar by virtue of their shared 'underlying' propositional content. Similarly, locutionary meaning includes figurative meaning which is 'lexicalized' (i.e. semantically fixed by the conventions of the language). Thus, the locutionary meaning of 'hit the roof' in 'When he heard the news, John hit the roof – and didn't calm down again for hours', is 'got very angry' (not the literal meaning 'collided against the house-top partition').

Illocutionary meaning is defined for current purposes as meaning which goes beyond locutionary meaning, but does not annul or amend it. An example is provided by the English, 'Do you want to do the washing up?' In many contexts, this is used as a polite request, along the lines 'Please do the washing up'. This polite request meaning does not annul or amend the 'desire' ('want') meaning, but operates alongside it (albeit that it can be said to override it). This can be seen from the fact that an interlocuter who didn't really want to do the washing up could coherently reply to 'Do you want to do the washing up?' by saying, 'No, I don't want to do it. But if you really want me to, I will do it'. The meaning 'Do you want to do the washing up' (i.e. 'Do you desire…') is thus the locutionary meaning of this utterance, while the meaning 'Please do the washing up' (or similar) is its illocutionary meaning. Many phenomena of this

type are not universal. In some Arabic dialects the Arabic equivalent of 'Do you want to do the washing up?', for example, does not have the illocutionary meaning of 'Please do the washing up' (though in others, it apparently does).

As seen from the fact that depending on dialect the Arabic equivalent of 'Do you want to do the washing up?' may or may not have the illocutionary meaning of 'Please do the washing up', locutionary meaning-overriding illocutionary meaning is *symbolic*. It is also clearly *meaningful* (rather than *meaningful/affective*). By virtue of the fact that it does not annual or amend the basic (primary) reference, locution-overriding illocutionary meaning can be analyzed as *secondary-referential*, i.e. providing a secondary reference in addition to the primary one.

For a brief discussion of translation issues relating to locution-overriding illocutionary meaning for Arabic, see Dickins, Hervey and Higgins (2016: 105). The topic is not covered in other books in the Thinking Translation series or in Baker (2011), although she does provide an extended discussion of pragmatic equivalence (2011: 230–273).

A revised typology of meaning

Figure 4 below revises Figure 1 in a number of ways. Firstly, it removes selectional restriction-related meaning as a category of connotative meaning, incorporating strict selectional restriction-related meaning under denotative meaning, and loose selectional restriction-related meaning under associative meaning. Secondly, it moves affective meaning from immediately after attitudinal meaning, to the sub-category 'language-variety-related meaning', where it more coherently belongs (see Figure 3), adding as an alternative term for this type of meaning 'tonal register-related meaning' in brackets. In Figure 1, affective meaning was placed after attitudinal meaning, because it has some analytical similarities to attitudinal meaning, and because this roughly reflects the order of discussion in the Thinking Translation books.

Thirdly, Figure 4 characterizes each of the forms of connotative meaning discussed in this chapter in terms of three categories: 1. Whether the meaning is, in Peircean terms, *symbolic*, *indexical* (plus *quasi*-indexical), or *iconic*; 2. Whether what is involved is purely *meaningful*, or whether it can be thought of as being *meaningful/affective*; 3. Whether the phenomena are: *reference-focusing*, *parenthetical*, *secondary-referential*, or *pseudo-referential*. In Figure 4, I have also analyzed denotative meaning, as symbolic, meaningful and referential.

<table>
<tr><th colspan="3">Dickins, Hervey and Higgins (2016)</th><th colspan="2">Baker (2011)</th></tr>
<tr><td colspan="3">Denotative meaning
(including strict selectional restriction-related meaning)
1. Symbolic
2. Meaningful
3. Referential</td><td colspan="2">Propositional/cognitive meaning</td></tr>
<tr><td rowspan="6">Connotative meaning</td><td colspan="2">Associative meaning
(including loose selectional restriction-related meaning)
1. (a) Extralinguistic-based: Indexical (within symbolic); (b) Linguistic-based: Symbolic; (c) Communicative-efficiency based: quasi-indexical (within symbolic)
2. Meaningful
3. Reference-narrowing</td><td colspan="2" rowspan="4">Expressive meaning</td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="2">Attitudinal meaning
1. Symbolic
2. Meaningful
3. Parenthetical</td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="2">Allusive meaning
1. Symbolic (plus iconic)
2. Meaningful
3. Pseudo-referential</td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="2">Reflected meaning
1. Symbolic (plus quasi-indexical)
2. Meaningful
3. Pseudo-referential</td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="2">Collocative meaning
1. Symbolic (plus quasi-indexical)
2. Meaningful
3. Pseudo-referential</td><td>Collocation restriction-related meaning</td><td>Presupposed meaning</td></tr>
<tr><td>Language-variety-related meaning</td><td>(Geographical) dialect-related meaning
1. (a) Primary: Symbolic
(b) Secondary: Indexical
2. Meaningful
3. Parenthetical</td><td>Geographical dialect-related meaning</td><td>Evoked meaning</td></tr>
</table>

		Temporal dialect-related meaning 1. (a) Primary: *Symbolic* (b) Secondary: *Indexical* 2. *Meaningful* 3. *Parenthetical*	Temporal dialect-related meaning	
		Sociolect-related meaning 1. (a) Primary: *Symbolic* (b) Secondary: *Indexical* 2. *Meaningful* 3. *Parenthetical*	Register-related meaning	
		Social register-related meaning 1. (a) Primary: *Symbolic* (b) Secondary: *Indexical* 2. *Meaningful* 3. *Parenthetical*		
		Affective meaning (tonal register-related meaning) 1. *Symbolic* 2. *Meaningful/affective* 3. *Parenthetical*	Expressive meaning	
	Information prominence-related meaning	Emphasis (emphatic meaning) 1. (a) *Indexical* (b) *Symbolic (plus indexical)* 2. *Meaningful/affective* 3. *Parenthetical*	*No category*	
		Thematic meaning (theme-rheme meaning) 1. *Symbolic (plus indexical, plus iconic)* 2. *Meaningful/affective* 3. *Parenthetical*	Theme and information structure	

		Grounding meaning 1. *Symbolic (plus indexical)* 2. *Meaningful/affective* 3. *Parenthetical*	*No precise category, but cf.* Theme and information structure
	Locution-overriding illocutionary meaning 1. *Symbolic* 2. *Meaning* 3. *Secondary-referential*		Pragmatic meaning (esp. implicature)

Figure 4. A revised typology of meaning.

Conclusions and prospects

In this chapter, I have considered various forms of connotative meaning particularly in terms of: 1. whether the meaning relayed is, in Peircean terms, *symbolic*, *indexical* (also *quasi-indexical*) or *iconic*; 2. whether what is involved is purely *meaningful*, or on the *meaningful/affective* fuzzy boundary; and 3. whether the phenomena involved are: *reference-focusing*, *parenthetical*, *secondary-referential*, or *pseudo-referential*. I have also considered how these phenomena are treated in the Thinking Translation books, as well as Baker (2011). I have not, however, considered the specific relevance for translation of the analytical categories established in this chapter (*symbolic*, *indexical*, *quasi-indexical*, *iconic*; *meaningful*, *meaningful/affective; reference-focusing*, *parenthetical*, *secondary-referential*, and *pseudo-referential*), whether viewed singly or in combination. The exploration of these issues is a task for future research.

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