Good International Citizenship and Cosmopolitan Responsibilities to Protect: Balancing Responsibilities and Dirty Hands[1]

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Introduction

How can states become more reliable bearers of cosmopolitan responsibility? Many theorists have observed that states' particular responsibility to give some priority to the interests of their own citizens creates a strong tension with states' cosmopolitan responsibility to respect the equal moral standing and basic rights of all human beings.[2] In the absence of any radical refashioning of the state's basic structure, it is highly unlikely that any state will become *purely* cosmopolitan in character. As cosmopolitan commitments become established alongside states' more particularistic duties, we can expect conflicts between these different sets of values to emerge. For instance, attempts by states to discharge their responsibility to protect (or 'R2P') – a cosmopolitan commitment made by all states in 2005 to protect populations from atrocity crimes – through military intervention may involve sacrificing citizens' lives, create conflict with their electorates' wishes, undermine the international order which they are committed to maintaining, and involve civilian deaths. In consequence, states that assume cosmopolitan responsibilities, such as R2P, need to find a place for these responsibilities among their more particularistic duties, as it were, and to develop procedures for addressing conflicts between them. While recent work has explored how particularistic commitments among citizens can potentially motivate cosmopolitan action, and how cosmopolitan ideals can thereby acquire political agency within state structures (e.g. Benhabib 2006; Glenn 2013; Ypi 2011), a key question facing advocates of the cosmopolitan state remains: how can states best realise their cosmopolitan

[2] This tension has been characterised by many theorists by way of various, overlapping distinctions, such as particularism and universalism (e.g. Scheffler 2001), communitarianism and cosmopolitanism (e.g. Erskine 2008), and partiality and impartiality (e.g. Nagel 1991).

responsibility to protect alongside their other responsibilities in cases where they conflict?

In this chapter, we articulate a distinctive framework for understanding and addressing the conflicting responsibilities that emerging cosmopolitan states face. In so doing, we seek to demonstrate the enduring value of political theory in a context in which, as we shall see, there can be a tendency towards scepticism about its ability to address such conflicts. We develop this account by taking as our starting point a modest vision of the cosmopolitan state: the notion of good international citizenship. The idea of good international citizenship has been developed by theorists within the English School of International Relations (IR) to depict a state which acts in accordance with the responsibilities that flow from its membership of an international society of states. While many cosmopolitan theorists have neglected the questions of what a cosmopolitan state might look like, and how such a state might navigate conflicts of value generated by its cosmopolitan commitments – instead tending to view cosmopolitanism as entailing the supersession of the state (see G.W. Brown 2011, 54) – the framework of good international citizenship is instructive in this context, given its explicit recognition of states' need to *balance* their potentially conflicting particularistic and cosmopolitan responsibilities. [3] Although discussions of good international citizenship have focused largely on the foreign policy of liberal-democratic states (Souter 2016), good international citizenship itself can be seen as a relatively conservative version of the cosmopolitan state, or as an intermediate point on the path towards full cosmopolitan statehood (Lawler 2013, 21; Shapcott 2013).

In order to interrogate the notion that good international citizens can successfully balance and simultaneously fulfil their potentially conflicting cosmopolitan and particularistic responsibilities, this chapter is structured in the following way. In the first part, we briefly outline ways in which good international citizens may balance their divergent responsibilities and thereby internalise their cosmopolitan responsibilities to protect more fully, such as contextual political decision, and pragmatic action which aims to prevent conflicts of value from developing in the first place. In the second part,

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[3] While we focus on moral conflicts arising *between* states' cosmopolitan and particularistic responsibilities, we also recognise the existence of moral conflicts *within* cosmopolitan responsibility, such as the potential clash between cosmopolitan means and ends in the case of military intervention under R2P.

we draw on theorists of 'value pluralism' – such as Isaiah Berlin, Stuart Hampshire and Bernard Williams – to argue that good international citizens and emerging cosmopolitan states are at times faced with conflicts between responsibilities that are ineliminable.[4] While the framework of good international citizenship is implicitly pluralist – in that it does not posit any overarching value which can be used to resolve conflicts between responsibilities – we show how the political philosophy of value pluralism suggests that some of these conflicts involving R2P will be simply unamenable to either contextual political judgement or pragmatic action. In such hard cases, we propose, the notion of 'dirty hands' – famously discussed by Michael Walzer (1973) – becomes a more apt way of characterising the moral choices of good international citizens and nascent cosmopolitan states. On this view, good international citizens are at times faced with unavoidable dilemmas created by their cosmopolitan responsibilities to protect that cannot be satisfactorily resolved, and in which all available courses of action involve some wrongdoing, or even tragedy. Dirty hands, we argue, should be seen as an ever-present possibility for even the best-intentioned good international citizen.

Nevertheless, we contend that this conclusion should not necessarily lead us to a counsel of despair at the prospects of the state becoming a more reliable vehicle for cosmopolitan responsibilities to protect non-citizens, for there are productive ways in which states can address the moral conflicts with which they will inevitably be faced. Political theorists, we suggest, can make a constructive contribution to understanding these dilemmas, by attending to the character and dispositions of both individual politicians and the institutions in which they act. While individual politicians and decision-makers can better respond to these dilemmas by cultivating dispositions of caution and reluctance, institutional processes of adversarial public deliberation, as well as offers of reparation to those harmed in the course of these moral conflicts, can help states to embed cosmopolitan values such as R2P within their constitutions and policies even in the face of apparently intractable moral conflict.

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[4] Use of the term 'pluralism' in a chapter partly addressing good international citizenship may be liable to cause confusion. The political philosophy of value pluralism – the view that there is no ultimate value that can resolve all apparent moral conflicts – should be clearly distinguished from the position within English School IR theory which denotes a commitment to the sovereignty of a plurality of states within international society (see Jackson 2000: 178-179).

Balancing the responsibilities of good international citizenship

Significantly for those concerned with the state as a potential site of cosmopolitan responsibility, theorists of good international citizenship argue that membership of an international society of states carries with it plural, and potentially conflicting, cosmopolitan and non-cosmopolitan responsibilities. In keeping with English School theory more broadly, theorists have viewed the good international citizen as bearing a 'national responsibility' to protect and advance the interests of their own citizens; an 'international responsibility' towards other states and to maintain international order; and a 'humanitarian responsibility' (see Gilmore 2015; Ralph 2007, 78–79), which embodies a cosmopolitan concern for the basic rights of human beings as such, or 'harm principle' (Linklater 2011), which has found expression in the R2P principle. The concept of good international citizenship has been strongly associated with 'solidarist' English School theory which, by stressing principles of justice and human rights rather than only international order and state sovereignty, not only recognises cosmopolitan duties to outsiders (Shapcott 2013, 140), but may even be seen as being cosmopolitan itself, albeit by another name (G.W. Brown 2011, 64).[5] These theorists recognise this range of responsibilities without ranking them, and without presenting any one of them as being overarching.

If good international citizens have plural responsibilities, then this raises the question of how they should act when these responsibilities conflict. Theorists of good international citizenship have hardly been blind to this kind of scenario. For instance, solidarist theorists such as Dunne and Wheeler (2001, 170) have recognised that 'the devil is in deciding what to do when the national interest and the norms of international society are in tension', and have recognised the strong conflict between international and cosmopolitan responsibilities to protect when a humanitarian emergency requires intervention to uphold human rights, but international consensus to authorise it cannot be secured (Linklater 2000). Nevertheless, such theorists have emphasised that a balance can be achieved between these potentially conflicting responsibilities. As Jason Ralph (2007, 79) has put it, '[a]ny claim to be a good citizen of international society

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[5] For the sake of brevity, in this chapter we engage only with English School theory that engages explicitly with the concept of good international citizenship. For broader discussions of conflicting responsibilities from an international society perspective, see Bull (1977: ch. 4) and Jackson (2000: 169-182).

should seek to *balance* each of the responsibilities' with which it is faced (emphasis added; see also Jackson 2000, 169). This, in turn, raises the questions of what constitutes such a balance of responsibilities, and how states may simultaneously fulfil them.

This metaphor of balance is at once comfortingly familiar and yet also troublingly opaque. Jeremy Waldron notes the deep ambiguity of the appeal to balance in politics, which is sometimes meant simply to imply 'that there are things to be said on both sides of an issue', whilst at other times it takes on a much more elaborate meaning, with 'connotations of quantity and precision' (Waldron 2003, 192-193). It is in this latter sense that we might observe a 'shifting balance', and we might speak of trying to 'strike a balance' or of trying to 'adjust a balance' in one direction or another. Waldron also observes that sometimes this ambiguity is made to do ideological work in political discourse. For instance, against the background of a rising threat of terrorism in Western democracies, the moderate-sounding language of 'striking a balance' has sometimes been deployed to excuse the violation of the liberties of certain minorities in the cause of enhancing the security of the rest (Waldron 2003, 202).

Nevertheless, the notion of a 'balance' can be given some tolerably clear definition that appears to accord with the way the term is generally used in political and academic discourse. The concept of a balance of responsibilities can be understood in terms of both *procedures* and *outcomes*. Procedurally, a balance can, broadly speaking, be said to consist in the hearing and consideration of all moral considerations that bear on a particular political decision. In terms of outcomes, in contrast, a balance of responsibilities consists in the fulfilment of each of the responsibilities in question to the greatest extent that is compatible with the like fulfilment of the others. This may mean that each responsibility will be fulfilled to a lesser degree than if it had been realised single-mindedly, and that the outcome will be sub-optimal by the lights of any one of the responsibilities at play. It is, however, the best outcome overall when the importance of each responsibility is recognised.

Without, to our knowledge, offering any precise definition of what constitutes a balance between responsibilities, discussions of good international citizenship nevertheless suggest some broad means through which this kind of balancing act might be achieved

by states. First, it may be claimed that conflicts of responsibilities are often more apparent than real, and that good international citizenship *itself* offers a way of balancing states' responsibilities. In this vein, Wheeler and Dunne have presented good international citizenship as a framework which posits the 'mutual interdependence' of states' national, international and humanitarian responsibilities, and between order and justice (Wheeler and Dunne 1998, 852; Dunne and Wheeler 2001, 169), mirroring the liberal internationalist view that 'values and interests merge' (Blair 1999). The process of balancing responsibilities may be achieved by determining what constitutes the *vital* national interest: while 'good international citizens are not required to sacrifice their vital security interests out of fidelity to the rules of international society', they are required to 'place order before the pursuit of narrow commercial and political advantage...where they conflict with human rights' (Wheeler and Dunne 1998, 855).

Second, it may be claimed that, while these conflicts of responsibility may be real and serious, a balance between them may be achieved through contextual political judgement. On this view, while it is not the role of the theorist to state in advance how politicians and policy-makers can balance their conflicting duties, theorists *can* offer the framework of good international citizenship to better inform this decision, by effectively clarifying the duties that politicians must then strive to fulfil in each concrete situation they face (Gilmore 2015, 107; see Jackson 2000, 178). Contextual decision may not only involve judgement once a conflict of responsibilities has already arisen or an attempt to determine what constitutes the vital national interest, but may also entail a series of pragmatic judgements designed to reduce the likelihood of these conflicts arising in the first place. This may require an attempt to attend to the framings and understandings of a particular problem in an attempt to identify ways in which these framings might be limiting political possibilities, and to creatively and imaginatively develop alternatives (see Ralph 2016; see chapter by Brown in this volume).[6] These imaginative alternatives can be brought about by the exercise of 'critical intelligence', a pragmatist concept,

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[6] This process has some reflection in recent work on the state as a potential bearer of cosmopolitan responsibility. For instance, Lea Ypi (2011: 45) has examined how cosmopolitan values may become embedded within state structures through a 'dialectical' process which involves 'the elimination of some interpretations which progressively lose their relevance in addressing the issues with which they were initially confronted...and the possibility of anticipating potential future challenges', while Seyla Benhabib's concept of 'jurisgenerative politics' presents 'a model that permits us to think of creative interventions that mediate between universal norms and the will of democratic majorities' (Benhabib 2006: 49).

which Daniel Bray (2013, 467) describes as 'a method of reaching practical judgements about problematic situations in which connections are found between old habits, beliefs and new conditions'. For instance, one way of navigating the conflict between international and cosmopolitan responsibility which arises when international consensus to support a necessary military intervention in response to atrocities cannot be secured is a heightened commitment to providing asylum to refugees fleeing those atrocities (Souter 2016).

Conflict, Character and Institutions

The discourse of good international citizenship, then, suggests that one should not be too hasty to infer from the fact of competing state responsibilities that the values involved must be incommensurable and the conflict ineliminable. A balance between the good international citizen's cosmopolitan and non-cosmopolitan responsibilities can, this discourse suggests, at times be achieved through either contextual political judgement or pragmatic action. Yet all this is consistent with what can be described as the *thin* version of value pluralism to which theorists of good international citizenship might be seen as implicitly subscribing: a version which recognises both a plurality of values and the possibility of conflict between them, but which ultimately asserts that these responsibilities can be harmonised, and that cosmopolitan responsibilities to protect non-citizens can be successfully internalised by states alongside their other responsibilities. On this view, it is possible to balance rival responsibilities in such a way as to leave no moral remainder. By setting out a *thicker*, and more disconcerting vision of value pluralism, in contrast, philosophers such as Berlin operated without any assurance that this kind of harmony of responsibilities can be achieved.[7] In his famous essay on Machiavelli, Berlin highlighted an '*erschreckend*', or terrifying possibility that

> ends equally ultimate, equally sacred, may contradict each other, that entire systems of value may come into collision without possibility of rational arbitration, and that not merely in exceptional circumstances, as a result of abnormality or accident or error … but … as part of the normal human situation' (Berlin 1997, 74-5).

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[7] For an account of international society that draws on Berlin's pluralism, see Jackson (2000: 179-183).

While a philosophical defence of value pluralism lies well beyond the scope of this chapter, this thicker version of value pluralism raises the important possibility that any attempt to embed cosmopolitan values, such as R2P, within existing state structures may create irresolvable moral conflicts, which do not present merely 'hard choices', but rather fully-fledged *dilemmas*, in which every available course of action involves some wrongdoing (Lu 2012). In the following section of this chapter, we take up this possibility, and seek to show how the resources of political theory may help to illuminate even these apparently desperate cases of conflict, and discuss the ways in which politicians' character and the workings of political institutions can help to navigate such cases.

Conflict

Stuart Hampshire (1983, 159) endorses a version of Berlin's value pluralism, but explains that his is 'a stronger thesis and differently grounded'. It is worth briefly considering Hampshire's view in order to clarify the 'terrifying' possibility before us. On Hampshire's account, conflicts of values are not simply an inevitable feature of human life; they are an *essential* and *necessary* feature. Hampshire is impressed by the creative potential of conflict, which he describes as 'the engine of history' (1993, 46), noting that most influential conceptions of the good have defined themselves in and through conflict, 'as rejections of their rivals' (Hampshire 1999, 41). And this is not just contingent happenstance. This kind of self-definition through conflict is essential, so much so that Hampshire (1999, 34) elevates it to the status of a logical principle as applied to human life: *omnis determinatio est negatio*; all determination is negation.

Now of course this is a controversial thesis, but if it is true, then conflicts of values are a permanent and necessary feature of human existence as we know it, and only good fortune stands between the good international citizen and ineliminable moral conflict. And when such conflicts arise, it will be impossible for the state actor simply to fulfil its cosmopolitan responsibilities to protect with no remainder. Whatever it does in seeking to fulfil these responsibilities, it will do wrong by the lights of some entirely reasonable set of moral standards, and the victims of its choices will accordingly have entirely reasonable grounds for complaint.

One response to this problem is to reject moral and political theory and resort to a form of political decisionism: at times the good international citizen is simply 'doomed to choose' (Berlin 2003, 14) between R2P and its more particularistic duties, and must not look back. But this kind of despairing lurch may be too quick. In the years since Berlin's essay on Machiavelli, there has developed an important body of literature in political theory dedicated to the consideration of these kinds of dilemmas. It is acknowledged as a basic premise of this literature that 'it is a predictable and probable hazard of public life that there will be … situations in which something morally disagreeable is clearly required' (Williams 1978, 61). This has come to be known as the problem of 'dirty hands': doing the right thing in politics, and even clearly the right thing, will sometimes involve incurring a moral cost that lingers, and that is not cancelled even by the favourable outcome of the decision made. The conflicts are typically presented as those between the claims of a 'public' consequentialist ethic on one hand and those of a 'private' deontological ethic on the other – where the pursuit of what is seen to be for the 'greater good' of the polity is thought to be at odds with personal scruples concerning the proper treatment of persons. But, on the value pluralist model of conflict we have outlined, there is no reason to insist that the conflicts involved must be framed in this limited way. Certainly the conflict may be that between public and private morality, but it may equally be a conflict *within* a public morality, between two systems of political value, such as the national, international and cosmopolitan responsibilities facing good international citizens or more fully cosmopolitan states. We might also think here of cases in which the pursuit of the stability and security of the polity seems to be at odds with claims of social justice and fairness – it is of course the sense of a tension of this kind that animates the public debates we mentioned earlier surrounding the correct 'balance' to be struck between liberty and security (see Waldron 2003).[8]

The notion of dirty hands has some important implications for our understanding of good international citizenship and other versions of statist cosmopolitanism, as well as for their efforts to uphold cosmopolitan values such as R2P. First, it appears to

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[8] The notion of 'dirty hands' seems in one respect to bear some resemblance to the concept of tragedy, which has received greater attention within recent IR theory (see Erskine and Lebow 2012), given that tragedy often revolves around severe conflicts of values. While recognising that tragedy and dirty hands are not synonymous, Chris Brown has observed that '"dirty hands" shares with the tragic the central ethical understanding that sometimes to act is to do wrong and, crucially, that this is a fact about the world that must not be denied or glossed over' (C. Brown 2012, 80).

complicate the view that good international citizenship entails fidelity to a cosmopolitan 'harm principle' which, in the work of scholars such as Linklater (2011), is defined primarily as a duty of non-maleficence, to 'do no harm' to human beings across national borders. In dirty hands cases, however, by definition there is no course of action that is harmless or free of wrongdoing. This suggests that in situations of acute moral conflict involving cosmopolitan responsibilities to protect, the harm principle needs to be tailored so it is understood as a duty to *minimise* harm (Shapcott 2008, 195, 196), rather than entirely eliminate it. As we discuss at the end of this section, it also involves a willingness to offer reparation to those harmed.

Second, the idea of dirty hands can illuminate one of the practices strongly associated with R2P and good international citizenship in its solidarist form: forcible humanitarian intervention. While, as noted earlier, discussions of this citizenship recognise the potential moral conflict involved in unauthorised humanitarian intervention (e.g. Linklater 2000), a case can be made that any such intervention will at best involve dirty hands, even in the absence of this particular dilemma. Critiquing the binary categorisation of wars as either just or unjust within just war theory, Michael Neu (2013, 461) observes how 'justified wars are tragic' in the 'sense of inescapably involving moral wronging'. Given the fact that all military intervention involves civilian casualties and often accelerates the violence it is designed to curb, leaders of good international citizen states may face the stark choice between acting to halt atrocities but with an inevitable human price, or not intervening, while allowing atrocities to continue unabated. Any 'cosmopolitan politics of the lesser violence' (Beardsworth 2011, 219) will involve a choice that must often be made in conditions of significant uncertainty about the likely effects of the intervention, particularly where this involves regime change, which may spark communal tensions and violent sectarian conflict. In acting justifiably in order to uphold cosmopolitan values of human rights and R2P, a moral remainder is arguably left that is not cancelled out by the justice of the cause, or by any pragmatic attempts to diminish this remainder.

Now, to be sure, the dirty hands literature offers no clear or principled means of negotiating the dilemmas upon which it focuses. Indeed, it generally supposes, as a matter of principle, that moral and political theorising must necessarily fall short of

providing satisfying answers in such situations of deep moral difficulty. As Hampshire has it:

> A philosopher in his study is in no position to lay down rules for justified murders and reasonable treachery. Nor can one determine a priori what degree of achievement outweighs what degrees of inhumanity in the means employed. Once again the philosophical point to be recorded is that there is no completeness and no perfection to be found in morality. (1989, 177)

But crucially that does not mean that there is nothing constructive to be said about such dilemmas. The idea here is that, while the 'philosopher in his study' may not have much, or indeed anything, to say about what the political actor ought to do in circumstances of ineliminable moral conflict, he may yet have something to say about the kind of person the political actor ought to be. He may, that is, have something constructive to say about the moral character of politicians tasked with discharging cosmopolitan responsibilities to protect within state structures.

Character

This is an important strand of Michael Walzer's seminal work on the problem of dirty hands in which he proposes a sketch of the 'moral politician': 'It is by his dirty hands that we know him. If he were a moral man and nothing else, his hands would not be dirty; if he were a politician and nothing else, he would pretend that they were clean' (1973, 168). In other words, the kinds of politicians we should want are those who are willing and able to do what is wrong by one scheme of value in the course of doing what is right by another. They must not be 'moral men and nothing else', obsessed with the purity of their souls and the cleanliness of their hands above all else. But equally we should want politicians who do recognise the wrongs they do, and even, on Walzer's 'Catholic' account (1973, 178-80), we should want those disposed to *confess* of their sins and submit themselves to punishment for the wrongs they have done.

In a similar, though somewhat less Catholic, vein, Bernard Williams (1978, 65) suggests that what we must particularly seek in our politicians is the habit of 'reluctance'. On Williams's pluralist account, reluctance should be grounded in the actor's acknowledgement that her intended conduct is morally disagreeable, that she will violate legitimate moral claims even in the course of serving other, equally legitimate, moral claims. Reluctance of this kind is a valuable political habit not because 'it is

edifying to have politicians who, while as ruthless in action as others, are unhappy about it. Sackcloth is not suitable dress for politicians, least of all successful ones' (Williams, 1978, 64). The point, rather, is that 'only those who are reluctant or disinclined to do the morally disagreeable when it is really necessary have much chance of not doing it when it is not necessary' (Williams 1978, 64). Thus, while Walzer appeals to our intuition that we know the moral politician by his dirty hands, Williams explains why that intuition could be well-founded. It is well-founded, first, because the reluctance it entails is a useful habit to possess – 'an essential obstacle against the happy acceptance of the intolerable' – and, secondly, because it is the 'correct reaction' to circumstances of ineliminable moral conflict (Williams 1978, 65).

There are some striking implications here. Berlin's Machiavellian model, canvassed above, identifies political integrity with the integrity of the physician:

> Once you embark on a plan for the transformation of a society you must carry it through no matter at what cost: to fumble, to retreat, to be overcome by scruples is to betray your chosen cause. To be a physician is to be a professional, ready to burn, to cauterize, to amputate; if that is what the disease requires, then to stop halfway because of personal qualms, or some rule unrelated to your art and its technique, is a sign of muddle and weakness, and will always give you the worst of both worlds (Berlin 1997, 59).

Williams's model demands almost the opposite. Here, integrity is not to be found in the single-minded, frictionless pursuit of a goal without looking back. On the contrary, the politician of integrity is a curiously divided creature, beset by moral qualms and a shadow of uncertainty in action (Williams 1995, 198-99).

This is not at all to say that we should want politicians disposed to paralysis in the face of difficult decisions. There is clearly such a thing in politics of all domains as too much uncertainty, too much reluctance. But it would be to misunderstand Williams's point to suppose that he is advocating a specific mode of conduct: one that prefers inaction in the face of deep conflict. The appropriately reluctant agent will be as reluctant about pursuing a policy of inaction as she will be about pursuing any particular course of action. The crucial point here is one that returns us to our reflections on Hampshire's view of conflict. Since all determination is negation, rational determination demands the acknowledgement of negation – rational action presupposes the acknowledgement of moral conflict, the acknowledgement of what is lost, a kind of two-sidedness in moral

reflection. The inner life of the politician of moral character is and should be a scene of enduring conflict and disquiet.

While the theorists of dirty hands offer no solutions to the ineliminable moral conflicts that politicians face, they do have something to say about the sorts of politicians who should face them, the sorts of politicians most likely to choose well. But our concern in this chapter is not primarily with individual politicians; our concern is with the collective state actors – good international citizens – who move and act on the international stage, at times in pursuit of cosmopolitan goals such as R2P. Finally, then, we need to consider the institutional analogues of the desirable dispositions and traits we have identified, which emerging cosmopolitan states may cultivate.

Institutions

There is a pervasive connection in our thought and language between the appropriate functioning of individuals and the appropriate functioning of collectives. For better or for worse, Plato's analogy between the city and soul has established our idioms of both public and private morality (Hampshire 1999). It now seems natural to invoke public metaphors – of hearing, balancing and judging – to characterise the hidden operations of the mind. Thus, it is easy enough to infer from the account of the good politician outlined above, the picture of the good polity it inevitably reflects. Indeed, the discourse of 'good international citizenship' explicitly presupposes a parallel of this kind. While the individual politician is a citizen whose public role entails a frequent confrontation with conflicting values, the practice of good international citizenship on the state level also often involves this kind of situation.

Schmuel Nili (2016, 156) reminds us that we often speak of states as bearers of moral identities, and that 'we can meaningfully speak of a liberal polity as an agent that has integrity in a way that parallels the integrity of an individual person'.[9] So doing can help to illuminate the sense of moral uneasiness that often attends the entanglement of a purportedly good international citizen in the affairs of illiberal regimes. We may think of such entanglement as a stain on its integrity, even though it might be unavoidable or necessary in the circumstances. Nili follows Williams in regarding integrity as a kind of

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[9] While Nili speaks of the 'liberal polity', his argument is, by extension, applicable to the good international citizen or emerging cosmopolitan state.

harmony between identity and action (Nili, 2016, 149-50). Just as the integrity of an individual consists in her acting in a manner consonant with her identity-grounding commitments, so too the integrity of a good international citizen consists in the harmonisation of its actions and identity. For Nili, the identity of the liberal polity is centrally bound up with the realization of its citizens' equal rights (2016, 150-2).

Nili briefly alludes to the manner in which his model might capture the kinds of problems of dirty hands that have occupied us here: where the good international citizen is 'permitted or even obliged to do things that conflict with its constitutive, identity-grounding moral struggles' (2016, 157). But the account of conflict we have elaborated suggests a more troubling possibility that Nili does not consider. Nili's account implies that the liberal polity or good international citizen, faced with the prospect of dirtying its hands, would be able to preserve its integrity by not acting. Although that might sometimes be true, it is unlikely to be true all of the time. Take Nili's own example (2016, 157) of a polity struggling to combat centuries of racism that finds itself morally obligated, all things considered, to do business with a racist regime. Suppose that it is necessary to do business with the regime in order to defuse local tensions and thereby mitigate regional instability, war and suffering. It does not seem plausible here simply to say that what integrity demands is that the good international citizen refuses to do business with the racist regime. The struggle against racism is clearly constitutive of its identity, but so too presumably is the struggle against war and avoidable suffering. So described, this is not a case in which the demands of the good international citizen's identity-grounding commitments are at odds with the demands of (all things considered) morality, but rather a case in which the fulfilment of one identity-grounding commitment entails the betrayal of another.

Similarly, to return to the example of military intervention under R2P, a democratic decision *not* to intervene may potentially leave just as much of a moral remainder as intervention would. The decision of the United States (US) and United Kingdom (UK) not to take military action against the Syrian regime in response to its alleged use of chemical weapons in 2013, following a vote in the British House of Commons, may have allowed the two states to discharge their responsibility not to directly cause further harm by avoiding the risk of stoking Syria's civil war but, at the same time, the omission carried with it the moral cost of creating a vacuum into which the regime's principal

backers – Russia and Iran – could move and perpetrate widespread atrocities against civilians with impunity in the following years. This is the difficulty: the good international citizen will normally recognise a plurality of identity-grounding commitments, whether cosmopolitan in character or not, and their claims will not always fit neatly together. What does integrity demand when the polity finds itself subject to the conflicting imperatives of its identity-grounding commitments?

If integrity is to be more than an impossible aspiration, then it must consist in something like the model we have described. The politician of integrity is not she who avoids conflict, but she who acknowledges it. In both the soul and the city, integrity consists not in the pursuit of unattainable harmony, but rather, and as Hampshire suggests, in the 'intelligent recognition and acceptance of conflicting and ambivalent elements' (1989, 189). Just as the soul of the good politician will be a scene of enduring conflict and disquiet, so too will the public conscience of the good international citizen state. This conscience is revealed in significant part by the structure of its public institutions and the procedures they employ. Those procedures must be capable of acknowledging, containing, and communicating conflict and disquiet. In order to achieve this, the decision-making institutions of the developing cosmopolitan state must possess an adversarial quality in which all sides are granted a public hearing. The institutional analogue of the kind of two-sided thought we seek in the politician of character is the kind of two-sided, adversarial process we see in law courts and parliaments (see Hampshire 1999).[10]

Writing of the moral infamies of the US' intervention in Vietnam, Hampshire stresses that the fault lay not in the reliance on consequentialist calculation in the effort to resist Communist expansion, but rather in the systematic failure of policymakers and institutions to recognise the moral costs of the choices they made. The fault lay in 'the

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[10] In describing this two-sided adversarial process, it is striking that Hampshire invokes the metaphor of balance. He suggests that procedural justice reflects the habit of 'balanced adversary thinking' and requires 'the fair weighting and balancing of contrary arguments bearing on an unavoidable and disputable issue' (1999: 22 and 21). This exemplifies the ambiguity we have noted of the balancing metaphor. Here the appeal to balance is meant to signify the importance of hearing and considering all of the major claims and counter-claims, but it is not meant to signify the importance of achieving a harmony or a '*concordia ordinum*' between them (Hampshire 1989: 109). 'Balance' here is intended as a feature of a deliberative procedure, and not as a feature of the outcome of that procedure as per the definition we sketched earlier. Once weighed in the balance, some claims must be rejected, some costs must be incurred.

extreme crudity, the insensitiveness and lack of perception, the false definiteness, and false clarity of the calculations' (Hampshire 1983, 123). At times of war and emergency, there is a real danger that adversarial procedures designed to recognise conflict will be overridden, and that the institutional embodiments of reluctance and conscience will be overwhelmed in the rush to action.[11] It is for this reason that Hampshire emphasizes the practical and symbolic significance of the development of protest around the idea of a moratorium. The Moratorium to End the War in Vietnam reflected the strongly felt need to suspend the rush to action, and to signal 'a period of confusion and arrest and redefinition, before it is too late' (Hampshire 1970, 5).

At its best, the ritual of parliamentary debate may also serve the function of acknowledging, containing and communicating conflict. We have seen something of this in UK parliamentary debates on whether to launch airstrikes in Syria in 2013 and 2015, in which arguably a cosmopolitan responsibility to protect Syrians vulnerable to the atrocities of the Syrian regime and the so-called Islamic State was at stake just as much as concerns regarding domestic factors such as national security and terrorism on UK soil. The ritual here, of rival perspectives passionately voiced across the aisle (and on either side of it) in lengthy debate leading to a vote is of tremendous symbolic importance. But its significance is not purely symbolic. Just as Williams says of the reluctant individual, the adversarial institutional framework serves both as 'an essential obstacle against the happy acceptance of the intolerable', and as the 'correct reaction' to cases of deep, and possibly ineliminable, conflict.[12]

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[11] More recently, this may have been visible in the decision of the UK Prime Minister, Theresa May, to join the US and France in air strikes in response to a further suspected chemical attack by the Syrian regime in 2018 without parliamentary approval, despite what James Strong (2015, 604) has identified as 'a new parliamentary prerogative', previously established through votes on intervention in Iraq and Libya, 'that MPs must vote before military action can legitimately be launched'.

[12] This emphasis on the importance of adversarial institutional frameworks also has some reflection in recent work on the state as a bearer of cosmopolitan responsibility. Within these frameworks may occur what Seyla Benhabib (2004: 19) has dubbed 'democratic iterations', which she defines as 'complex processes of public argument, deliberation, and learning through which universalist rights claims are contested and contextualized, invoked and revoked, throughout legal and political institutions as well as in the public sphere of liberal democracies'. These processes of contestation and contextualisation will, for Benhabib (2004: 2), involve negotiation of what she describes as the 'constitutive dilemma' within the liberal-democratic state, between national self-determination and cosmopolitan values of human rights. Similarly, if – as Ypi (2008: 50) has argued – '[p]opular sovereignty…allows cosmopolitan obligations to enter a collective deliberative process enabling the transformation of political institutions in accordance with cosmopolitan goals', then these institutions need to include fora in which conflicts involving these goals can be acknowledged, negotiated and mediated.

And it is worth noting that these kinds of moral conflicts, and the corresponding demand for adversarial institutional frameworks to accommodate them, are liable to recur at the next level up: as states bind together in coalitions of various kinds in order to discharge their responsibilities to protect. In this regard, our argument suggests a note of caution about informal 'coalitions of the willing' of the kind discussed by Toni Erskine in her contribution to this volume. Their lack of formal deliberative structures (Erskine, 11-12) make it very difficult for such associations to communicate the kind of conflict and disquiet that we have argued is the hallmark of responsible political action, leaving this to the variable initiative of individual leaders. In the absence of those institutional embodiments of reluctance, 'coalitions of the willing' are liable to be only too willing to proceed in morally disreputable ways. Of course, that was the verdict of many on the 'preventive war' in Iraq launched by George W. Bush's US-led coalition of the willing in 2003.

In addition to ensuring opportunities for public deliberation, one potentially important means through which good international citizens or emerging cosmopolitan states may respond to the moral remainders left by their actions is by offering reparation to those harmed as a result of them. Although this potential appears to have been curiously overlooked in the literature on dirty hands,[13] reparation is a clear means through which the moral costs of a justified action can be forthrightly recognised, especially where an otherwise purely symbolic apology is substantiated with material measures, in order 'to uphold the inviolability of certain central and cherished moral values' (de Wijze 2013: 891). For instance, in the aftermath of necessary military intervention under R2P, this may take the form of compensation for civilians wounded, and families bereaved. It may

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[13] A few authors have merely asserted that reparation is owed to those harmed in dirty hands cases. For instance, Stephen de Wijze (2005: 460) includes 'the desire to do reparations' in his conception of 'tragic-remorse', which he sees as an appropriate response to 'the anguish of dirty hands'. For similar assertions, see Digeser (1998) and Nussbaum (2000). The claim that reparation is owed by those with dirty hands raises moral questions which stretch beyond the confines of this chapter. For instance, as de Wijze (2013: 891) has observed, '[i]n dirty hands scenarios reparation is complicated by the fact that the violation of another person's rights and the material harm inflicted were the right thing to do in order to bring about the lesser evil'. Any apology to victims, for instance, may have to be tempered by recognition of the necessity of the harmful action. It is also debatable whether the offering of reparation will be capable of eliminating a moral remainder and restoring a prior moral balance, or whether every offer of reparation should be made in awareness that the dirt on politicians' hands can, so to speak, become deeply ingrained (at least in cases which inflict severe costs on some individuals).

also take the form of some degree of post-conflict reconstruction, of the sort that has been conspicuously absent in Libya since NATO's intervention in 2011, and an acceptance by intervening states of their 'responsibility to rebuild', which was articulated in the first expression of R2P by the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS 2001), but not codified in the R2P agreement at the United Nations World Summit in 2005.[14]

Instead of attending to the potential of reparations as a response to dirty hands, debate on how dirty hands cases should be addressed has focused upon the question of whether the dirty-handed politician should be punished for his or her actions (e.g. de Wijze 2013; Walzer 1973). The questions of reparation and punishment are not entirely unrelated for, although reparation may be offered voluntarily, part of the punishment imposed on the dirty-handed politician may be the duty to make reparation, through material compensation, apology, or both. However, it can be argued that, because politicians often dirty their hands as a result of their public roles which, by their nature, involve negotiating conflicting responsibilities, citizens who rely on politicians to occupy such roles may owe these politicians *forgiveness* rather than punishment (Nieuwenberg 2014). In other words, it may be unfair on the part of the citizenry to demand that the costs of a particular value conflict fall on individual politicians, instead of being dispersed across political institutions as a whole. For instance, if a war of aggression were pursued by an individual leader without democratic approval, it would seem appropriate that that leader assumed all or some of the costs of reparation for the unjust destruction caused, wherever feasible. On the other hand, if a military intervention constitutes a case of dirty hands, it would be appropriate for the costs to be

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[14] It can, however, be argued that, in cases of necessary or justified humanitarian intervention under R2P, it would be unfair to expect the intervening states to go on to offer reparation to those harmed in the course of the intervention by way of post-conflict reconstruction (Blake 2013: 118; Pattison 2015: 638). However, given that dirty hands cases are those in which to act rightly is also to act wrongly, viewing forcible humanitarian intervention as a case of dirty hands opens the possibility that reparation may be owed to those harmed by an intervention even if that intervention was necessary or justified.

dispersed across the entire citizen body, who can reasonably be expected to finance reparations through taxation.[15]

Conclusion

In this chapter, we have suggested that value pluralism provides a rigorous, though also disconcerting, philosophical framework for considering the conflicting moral responsibilities that good international citizens and emerging cosmopolitan states may face. While accepting that some moral conflicts are more apparent than real, and may in fact be satisfyingly resolved, we have identified ways in which the resources of political theory can be deployed in order to address the more intransigent forms of conflict that international actors are likely to encounter when seeking to fulfil their cosmopolitan responsibilities to protect. In particular, we have appealed to the notion of dirty hands to capture the idea that, even where principled solutions to moral conflicts are unavailable, there may still be constructive things to say about the kinds of individual and collective agents best situated to face such conflicts. Specifically, we have suggested that the integrity of the good international citizen and its commitment to cosmopolitan ideals such as R2P is preserved by habits of reluctance and caution, its unwavering commitment to adversarial institutional frameworks, as well as by practices of reparation. So doing offers to drive a wedge, albeit a fragile one, between moral conflict and tragedy.

And note one final implication. The account we have presented here is one that reaffirms the importance of the discourse of good international citizenship. If it were possible to resolve all cases of apparent conflict by the calculation of consequences or by the application of principle, then the good international citizen is reduced to a cipher. 'Good international citizenship' in this context would consist in nothing more than the careful implementation of whatever the theory happened to instruct. On the account we have elaborated there can be no such easy answers: responsibility remains with each good international citizen and, with it, the need for perception, judgement and

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[15] For discussion of whether individual leaders or the citizenry should be liable for the costs of unjustified wars, see Kalmanovitz (2011).

sensitivity. It is these qualities that are required if putative good international citizens are to navigate the moral conflicts created by their cosmopolitan commitments to protect vulnerable non-citizens, and thereby to become more thoroughgoing cosmopolitan states.

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