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Understanding the Effectiveness and Desirability of De-Radicalisation: how de-radicalisation is framed in The Daily Mail

Research on de-radicalisation has been primarily concerned with the efficacy of de-radicalisation programmes and their negative consequences. However, there has been little research on how the public perceives de-radicalisation programmes and whether they are viewed as effective or desirable. It is important to understand public attitudes to de-radicalisation programmes because public opinion can affect the capacity to deliver the programmes. The following paper takes a first step toward understanding these issues by examining how The Daily Mail has framed de-radicalisation in terms of whether or not the programmes are effective or desirable. We argue that an assumption of potential efficacy exists throughout *newspaper's* framing of de-radicalisation which presents the policy as desirable, despite also framing de-radicalisation as ineffective. While practitioners are reluctant to promote de-radicalisation programmes, The Daily Mail's *framing of de-radicalisation* as natural, logical and desirable reflects the concept's ideological flexibility as both a rehabilitative and normative endeavour.

The interest in de-radicalisation programmes has continued to grow as a means to counter terrorism among states across the world since 2009 (Horgan, 2009), with the UK government recently piloting its own de-radicalisation programme to assist in re-integrating and managing returning foreign fighters associated with Islamic State (Pettinger, 2017, Powell, 2016). While the content of de-radicalisation programmes vary, programmes typically target the post-criminal space and seek to facilitate a substantial cognitive shift away from extremist views through various interventions (Weeks, 2017). The term captures a wider debate on whether counter-terrorism policy should prioritise challenging radical ideas based on the assumption that holding radical ideas causally relates to an increased risk of (re)engaging in terrorism (Richards, 2015) or challenging extremism as a normative end in itself. This radicalisation debate permeates much of the discussion on de-radicalisation itself. There has been extensive interest from academia on de-radicalisation programmes, which has predominantly focused on whether de-radicalisation is necessary (Horgan and Altier, 2012, Horgan and Braddock, 2010), how to measure the success of such programmes (Koehler, 2016, Webber et al., 2017) or as part of a broader critical response to government criminalisation and

securitisation of the ideational space (Elshimi, 2017, Heath-Kelly, 2013, Powell, 2016). A significant proportion of this literature is sceptical of whether de-radicalisation programmes are effective, especially those programmes prioritising ideological change, which has prompted calls to prioritise behavioural change over ideological change in order to reduce the risk of re-offending (Horgan and Altier, 2012; Marsden, 2016). Thus, the effectiveness and desirability of de-radicalisation programmes has been challenged in academic research.

However there has been little research on wider perceptions of de-radicalisation programmes (Ambrozik, 2018, Msall, 2017), the manner in which these programmes are conveyed to the public, or what de-radicalisation is understood to mean more broadly. This is an increasingly important area of enquiry for a number of reasons. Firstly, the capacity and willingness of governments to implement and fully support de-radicalisation programmes can be influenced by the perceived sensitivity among the public to what may be seen as preferential treatment or too soft an approach: a potential public backlash against de-radicalisation programmes can have consequences for the success of the programme as they are often a ‘time-intensive endeavour’ which may not overlap with the political life-cycle (Schuurman and Bakker, 2016, Neumann, 2010). Furthermore, the public reputation of a de-radicalisation programme is important to facilitate inter-agency co-operation, for example where judicial decisions are required to allow offenders to attend a de-radicalisation programme (Schuurman and Bakker, 2016). Thus, public attitudes toward de-radicalisation, whether these are supportive or hostile, can shape the effectiveness of the programme’s delivery. Secondly, public responses to de-radicalisation programmes are important because the fundamental objective of the programme is to (eventually) re-integrate the programme participants into society. Familial and social networks can facilitate successful re-integration (Kaplan and Nussio, 2015) and de-radicalisation programmes can help former combatants to reintegrate, (Barrelle, 2015) potentially amplifying pull factors within society and providing greater agency to ensure re-integration and desistance (Altier et al., 2017, Marsden, 2015). However, this does not take into consideration the agency of communities to resist re-integration and de-radicalisation, especially if the latter has been publically discredited. For example, the public backlash against re-integrating former combatants poses challenges to the Nigerian de-radicalisation programme, where former combatants have been killed or pushed away (Anyadike, 2017). Public support is an important factor in de-radicalisation programmes being successful due to their fundamental community-based constitution, especially where they fit within a broader family of counter violent extremist (CVE) initiatives which are becoming

increasingly community oriented (Ambrozik, 2018, Msall, 2017), thus shifting responsibility for CVE to various sectors in society (Thomas, 2017, Spalek, 2013). While there has been a wide range of studies on de-radicalisation programmes and whether they are effective, there has been very little research conducted on how these programmes are relayed to the public despite the importance it can have on the core debates on efficacy and the implementation of policy.

Thus far, literature which has looked at public attitudes on de-radicalisation has been scarce. An evaluation of a Dutch de-radicalisation programme pilot makes a number of references to the impact of public attitudes upon the delivery of the programme (Schuurman and Bakker, 2016) and another evaluation of de-radicalisation programmes claims that de-radicalisation programmes are likely to be less popular publically in Western countries than non-Western countries (Neumann, 2003). In the first extensive study on the subject, Ambrozik (2018) draws upon data from an experimental survey which tests the differential effect of the term ‘counter violent extremism’ on support for such initiatives, as opposed to the more neutral community-oriented term ‘community resilience initiative’. The research shows high public support in the US for policies under both labels (63 and 67 per cent respectively) with no significant statistical difference between framings. However, the term de-radicalisation is merged within the broader term and policies of CVE which only provides some speculative indication of support for de-radicalisation programmes as it is reasonable to assume attitudes may vary regarding de-radicalisation since such programmes are qualitatively different from more preventative measures and is conceptually distinct (and more controversial) too (Horgan and Taylor, 2011, Sedgwick, 2010, Neumann, 2003, Kundnani, 2012, Baker-Beall et al., 2014). The only study to look specifically at attitudes of de-radicalisation programmes was conducted among university students in Yemen, where the most dominant theme was the perception that de-radicalisation programmes can be effective but only if the participant wanted to change, if the environment was right, and if the programme had the correct support (Msall, 2017). Scepticism of de-radicalisation programmes (the second theme) revolved around the perception that de-radicalisation programme participants had been brainwashed and there was little chance of redemption, or scepticism that the environment was conducive for re-integration. A third theme revolved around the belief that participants had a right to a second chance (providing they did not kill anybody), which was framed as a human rights issue (Msall, 2017). Msall’s study is important in providing the groundwork for further research on public attitudes to de-radicalisation programmes, although as Msall (2017) notes there are limitations to drawing

upon student perceptions and the survey method does not capture how de-radicalisation is discursively operationalised and neither does the study capture the weight of attitudes over time. The following study builds upon this emerging and important literature which seeks to understand broader attitudes to de-radicalisation programmes through a case study examination of how The Daily Mail frames de-radicalisation, as a term and as a policy.

While an examination of media frames does not provide an indication of public attitudes to de-radicalisation, it provides a rich understanding of the dominant discourse surrounding de-radicalisation that has the potential to influence and shape public opinion and elite responses. In particular, the media “is stunningly successful in telling its readers what to think about” (Cohen 1963, 13), which can be seen to influence “how [they] think about the attitude objects described in the news” (Melkote 2009, 548). This in turn affects the actions of political elites as they “monitor public attitudes because they want people to behave in ways that favour or passively acquiesce in elite choices” (Entman 2010, 392). The role of the media in influencing public perception has been expounded upon at great length (Entman 2006, Entman 2003, Entman & Rojecki 1993, Yarchi et al. 2013, Melkote 2009, Goddard Et al 2008, Aday 2010) and underlines the potential for media shaping how the public perceive de-radicalisation. There has been extensive research on how the media frames terrorism and more generally on counter-terrorism discourse (Heath-Kelly, 2013, Hatton and Nielsen, 2016, Hoskins et al., 2011, Brinson and Stohl, 2012), yet to date there has been no research on how the term de-radicalisation is operationalised and whether the media frames de-radicalisation (programmes) in a positive or negative manner.

De-radicalisation programmes present an interesting case in terms of media framing insofar as, contrary to other areas of governance, some governments have been reluctant to promote or release information on de-radicalisation programmes (See Schuurman and Bakker, 2016, Weeks, 2017, Thornton and Bouhana, 2017), which may be out of a concern that publicity will negatively impact upon the programme’s operations or due to privacy laws, ethics, and security concerns to name a few. Another factor is what constitutes an actual de-radicalisation programme is contested (Pettinger, 2017) – therefore the media may refer to a programme as de-radicalisation-oriented where said programmes may be better described as pre-criminal interventions which seek to prevent radicalisation. In addition, some governments do run a de-facto de-radicalisation programme however they prefer to not refer to it as a ‘de-radicalisation programme’ because the term mischaracterises the sum of its activities and its objectives. For example, while the UK government has developed a range of programmes that

have been erroneously labelled as de-radicalisation programmes, most notably the Prevent and Channel programmes (Thornton and Bouhana, 2017), the government rarely uses the term de-radicalisation to frame its approach.¹ In fact, the government's recently launched 'Desistance and Disengagement Programme' – the closest to an actual de-radicalisation programme – eschews the term de-radicalisation. Thus, the contested nature of de-radicalisation, alongside the potential controversy of programmes, means there is a disconnect between how the government and the media frame de-radicalisation, which has consequences for how the media discusses the term de-radicalisation in relation to its effectiveness and desirability.

Building on the media framing literature which emphasises how media reproduces government framings for certain policies, thereby generating public support (Brinson and Stohl, 2012), by extension the lack of government framing of de-radicalisation would also potentially be counter-productive to policy ends, especially where media frames CVE activities as discriminatory and ineffective (Ambrozik, 2018, Thomas, 2017). In particular if the political elite are not seen to have a unified position on, or are not actively producing a consistent frame of, an issue “the public will reframe media coverage through the prism of their political predispositions” (Aday 2010, 447). Thus, given the potential relationship between the media's framing of de-radicalisation and the efficacy of programmes, in the context of a government and practitioner reluctance to publically frame it, the issue merits a deeper study of how de-radicalisation is discursively constructed. The following paper provides a case study analysis of The Daily Mail to identify the dominant themes in the presentation of de-radicalisation, whether these are broadly positive or negative, and the sub-frames present within these value judgements. The following section outlines the methods deployed in the study.

Methods

The paper explores the manner in which The Daily Mail frames de-radicalisation, highlighting the potential for these representations to influence judgements as to the usefulness of de-radicalisation programmes. This publication was selected because it provided a broad coverage of de-radicalisation within the UK², it is widely read and attended to³, and because it should offer, in theory, a sympathetic platform for the current Government's policies which allows us to explore the significance of framing⁴. There are two significant areas of debate regarding research on de-radicalisation in both academic and policy circles: the first concerns whether the programmes are effective and how success can be measured; the second concerns

the problematic nature of the term and the deleterious effects de-radicalisation policies have in securitising sections of society. Therefore, the paper sets out to examine how the media frames the efficacy and the (social) desirability of de-radicalisation programmes through an exploratory deconstruction of The Daily Mail's frames. Broadly, and unsurprisingly, the discussions of de-radicalisation fall into two camps, positive frames and negative frames. By 'positive' and 'negative' we refer to statements which make claims on the in/efficacy, success/failures of initiatives associated with the term de-radicalisation, and advocating or opposing its implementation. Of course, calling into question whether de-radicalisation programmes are effective does not necessarily preclude advocating that they should be implemented. Nevertheless, the distinction provides a basic organising framework to identify and analyse the key themes present in the media in relation to those in academic research and to ascertain whether certain themes are underrepresented or emphasised in the media.

The paper contends that media outlets are situated in "privileged discursive position" (Tomlinson, 1991:28) and as such they have the ability "to construct the topic in a certain way..." while limiting "the other ways in which the topic can be constructed" (Hall, 1996: 291). From this position of privilege the representations of de-radicalisation provided by media outlets have the potential to influence public perception of the programs being instituted in the U.K. and as a result of this affect their success or failure. As such it is important to understand both the broader discursive trends surrounding de-radicalisation in media outlets and also the process by which these representations are constructed. In order to begin elucidating the process by which UK media outlets (re)interpret and (re)display academic and policy debates for public consumption we have employed a content analysis case study of The Daily Mail that will be outlined below.

We hold that media outlets are integral in the presentation of information to the public and as such the way they package information has the potential to shape public perception on any given issue. The representations depicted within these sites of production can come to be "a socially shared organizing principle through [their] transmission" (Resse & Lewis 2009, 778). How any given issue is presented and subsequently transmitted to the public, how it is framed, is "critical to the stories' ultimate acceptance or rejection" (Ryan 2004, 364). We follow from Entman's (1993, 52) definition of framing that:

To frame is to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a

particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation for the item described.

Further to this, we accept Hansen's (2006) appraisal that the media is an influential discursive producer with the power to shape the construction of policy representations.

In attempting to catalogue how de-radicalisation is framed by The Daily Mail this paper utilised a Lexis Nexis archival search. The search terms used to identify references to de-radicalisation were "de-radical!" OR "deradical!", which allowed us to capture different iterations of the term. We excluded duplications of a highly similar nature through Lexis Nexis but coded the remaining duplication as this allowed us to identify articles which were repeated over a few days and to identify shifts in framing between edits. Importantly, we decided to only code uses of the term de-radicalisation and not synonyms or official policy names, such as Channel, unless they were mentioned alongside de-radicalisation. The decision to exclude references to Channel limits the article's ability to speak to framing of policies and to compare the differential effect of using the term de-radicalisation has on attitudes to policies. However, this decision was made because it is firstly necessary to provide a foundation by exploring in depth how the term de-radicalisation itself is framed and secondly it is contentious to what extent Channel constitutes a de-radicalisation programme (Thornton and Bouhana, 2017), therefore its relevance to the project is through its explicit ascription as a de-radicalisation programme.

Having limited our search terms to the use of de-radicalisation, we determined a timeframe of discursive viability for de-radicalisation commencing from 2008 until the point that research was undertaken, 7 June, 2018. The starting point was chosen to coincide with the increasing focus on de-radicalisation programmes, particularly within academia, but within The Daily Mail the first use of the term is in 2009. We limited the Lexis Nexis search options to MailOnline and The Daily Mail and Sunday Mail (London), both of which were merged as they constitute the same paper but are separated by Lexis Nexis. By importing all of The Daily Mail's articles discussing de-radicalisation into NVIVO we were able to determine the general tone, major themes, and trends regarding the representation of de-radicalisation within this publication. Once catalogued, we utilized quantitative and qualitative content analysis elaborated upon below to deconstruct the framing of these representations.

Once highly similar results were excluded by Lexis Nexis, we had a sample size of 302 articles with 420 mentions of de-radicalisation. In order to effectively catalogue the different representational trends within this body of text we approached the collection with a mix of inductive and deductive approaches. As defined by Semetko and Valkenburg the inductive approach involves analysing a news story “with an open view to attempt to reveal the array of possible frames, beginning with very loosely defined preconceptions of these frames”; while the deductive approach “involves predefining certain frames as content analytic variables to verify the extent to which these frames occur in the news” (2000, 94). Accordingly, our initial readings were informed by our understanding of the broad framings of de-radicalization bound to be present within the articles, thus the initial focus was on the positive and negative framing of the efficacy and desirability of de-radicalisation which has underpinned academic approaches. These preconceived themes formed the basis for our code book which was subsequently updated after preliminary readings to account for any unexpected framings. For example, we found a small number of articles framed de-radicalisation as creating suspect communities, which we subsequently included in the code book. The data was coded in three stages, each stage providing a different analytical insight and deploying quantitative and qualitative content analysis. Our unit of analysis for these articles was the paragraph, as de-radicalisation was often discussed in conjunction with unrelated topics there was a need to isolate it from irrelevant information. Another advantage of coding per paragraph is it allows us to capture frequency of framings within articles and the overall trends were similar if the article was coded as the unit, therefore the limitations of paragraph coding was minimal. Coders were tasked with determining whether paragraphs discussing de-radicalisation fell firstly into negative or positive frames, and then within the following emergent themes: in/efficacy; advocacy; and general negative.

For the efficacy theme, coders were asked if a paragraph had claimed or demonstrated de-radicalisation (programmes) ‘working’ or being successful. Ineffective frames were considered to be clear statements of de-radicalisation being ineffective or not being successful and included stories of failed referral processes. For the advocacy theme, coders were asked if a paragraph stated a need for de-radicalisation (programmes), make a claim that an object should be de-radicalised, or state problems if de-radicalisation programmes are not implemented. For the general negative theme, coders were asked if a paragraph a) used negative adverbs and adjectives to describe de-radicalisation, b) showed the negative social consequences of de-radicalisation such as alienating Muslim communities or creating problems

for social service providers, or c) framing those referred to de-radicalisation programmes as being innocent or being critical of referral processes? The remaining samples were coded as 'neutral'. Mentions coded 'neutral' are included in the analysis as they are relevant to the topic but different methods are applied: they are not included in the quantitative analysis of the main themes outlined above, however the 'neutral' articles are included in the qualitative content analysis. Below we discuss how the neutral descriptions of de-radicalisation present a normalising context which buttresses the positive framings.

Firstly, a sample of articles was coded and both authors discussed the sample to ensure accurate replication, then both authors independently coded 302 Daily Mail sources. The discrepancy between how articles were assigned to nodes (i.e. effective/ineffective framing) was relatively low for four out of five frames (.98-.93 inter-coder reliability). The ineffective frame had a slightly higher discrepancy between coders (.87 inter-coder reliability) however this can be accounted for in the uneven familiarity with the suspect community literature between coders, spelling mistakes in The Daily Mail which changed the meaning of sentences, and different interpretations of what constituted the unit of analysis. A reconciliation process was conducted to account for disparities in coding to an agreed baseline. It is worth noting that the general themes and trends remained consistent for both coders prior and following the reconciliation of coding.

By coding positive and negative sentiments through inductive and deductive approaches, we are able to present a thorough account of how The Daily Mail framed de-radicalisation over several years. The codification of themes allows us to present the longitudinal trends in how de-radicalisation is represented in The Daily Mail, indicating whether framing tends to be more positive or negative. While the themes provide more depth to the content of positive and negative framings, we further deepen the examination of the framings by exploring and further breaking down the themes to illustrate how, for example, The Daily Mail frames de-radicalisation as ineffective. Through this three-staged approach, we can, for example: a) identify the broader trend that The Daily Mail's framing becomes significantly more negative in 2017; b) that it is framed negatively more due to efficacy rather than its negative social consequences; and c) through qualitative content analysis of all references to de-radicalisation in the newspaper, we show that the inefficacy of de-radicalisation programmes is located in its implementation rather than its overall desirability or potential success.


Additionally, the majority of these articles have framed de-radicalisation in a neutral manner, and have been coded as such, which in turn has limited the severity of some of the framing trends. While the manner in which they are written does not allow for us to definitively code these instances as positive advocating/efficacy, that de-radicalisation is not actively questioned entrenches these programmes as a matter of routine that should be adhered to. In essence there is an implicit assumption of efficacy within these frames, the result of this would be a surge in the positive advocacy/efficacy frames. But as we cannot definitively account for the intent nor the individual's interpretation, they have been coded as neutral. Nevertheless, the benefit of having a mixed quantitative and qualitative analysis is the qualitative analysis allows us to identify the significance of articles that would not be captured by a quantitative approach.

Results

We firstly coded Daily Mail articles on whether they represented de-radicalisation positively or negatively. Out of 420 coded references to de-radicalisation, 84 were coded as positive, 91 as negative, and 245 were coded as neutral/unassigned. 'Positive' referred to articles which demonstrated de-radicalisation being successful, including claims of success without evidence, or advocating the use of de-radicalisation. One of the clearer examples of what we considered positive framing is 'Islamic Council of Victoria pulled out of successful de-radicalisation program [emphasis added]' (White, 2016). Another example illustrates advocacy of de-radicalisation which we also coded as positive: "Labour leader Ed Miliband has suggested a mandatory programme of de-radicalisation for people involved on the fringes of radical groups such as the Islamic State" (Duell, 2014). 'Negative' refers to articles which demonstrate de-radicalisation being ineffective, experiencing problems such as recidivism, and being criticised for its wider social consequences. A number of negative articles were clear-cut: "I was sent on Government's deradicalisation scheme but just spent the whole time playing pool says convicted extremist preacher" (Charlton, 2015). The ineffectiveness of de-radicalisation was also framed frequently in terms of failure of the programmes to stop participants engaging in terrorism (Drury et al, 2017) or where there was little uptake in de-radicalisation initiatives (Morgan, 2017), often due to their voluntary nature (Taylor, 2016). Several mentions are more unequivocal in the failing of de-radicalisation, especially where it is claimed that the programmes cause radicalisation (Margan, 2017; Matthews, 2016). Other mentions were classified as negative where they linked to a wider critique of Prevent and the

Prevent Duty: “A nursery tried to send a four-year-old boy on a deradicalisation programme because staff thought he mispronounced 'cucumber' like 'cooker bomb', it has been claimed” (Willgress, 2016). The majority of neutral mentions of de-radicalisation were a) descriptions of policies (Doyle, 2016), b) description of individuals being referred to a ‘de-radicalisation programme’ or description of referral numbers (Slack, 2014), or c) reference to ‘de-radicalisation experts’ (Robinson, 2016). As the examples show, the use of de-radicalisation is not explicitly positive or negative however they normalise the practice of de-radicalisation by uncritically using the term and there is an inherent assumption of potential efficacy and necessity. We explore this point more in the discussion.


Figure 1: Positive and Negative Framing by Mentions



Overall use of the term de-radicalisation increases from 2013 onwards, peaking in 2017 and subsiding significantly in 2018. While initial academic interest in de-radicalisation emerged between 2008-2010 in relation to a wide variety of international cases, we see de-radicalisation entering public consciousness from 2013 onwards in relation to the rise of Islamic State and the (returning) foreign fighter phenomenon. The number of positive and negative framings of de-radicalisation run concurrently, although we see more positive reporting in 2015 shifting to more negative reporting in 2017.

Following coding the mentions of de-radicalisation as positive or negative, we separated these into sub-themes to identify how often de-radicalisation is framed in terms of efficacy and how this compares to framing in terms of desirability. The breakdown of the sub-themes as percentages was as follows: advocacy (33 per cent); effective (14 per cent); ineffective (41 per cent); and negative general (11 per cent). Framing de-radicalisation as successful and effective play a relatively low part in how it is represented. De-radicalisation is largely framed as unsuccessful and ineffective, yet these framings run concurrently alongside the advocacy for de-radicalisation across the newspaper's reporting. Mandatory de-radicalisation programmes were advocated (Spillett, 2014), de-radicalisation is presented as a 'glimmer of hope [to] break the cycle of violence' (Pemberton, 2015), and de-radicalisation is an important component in a proposed policy of internment (Ghaffur, 2017). As shown in Figure 2, mentions which advocate de-radicalisation without showing it to be effective constitute the majority of positive framings of de-radicalisation, even increasing alongside articles framing it as ineffective in 2017.

Figure 2. Efficacy Framing by Mentions



We separated 'negative general' to code the extent to which de-radicalisation is framed negatively through pejorative adjectives and its negative social consequences, namely that they create suspect communities (Richards, 2017; Thomas, 2017). However de-radicalisation

framed in relation to the suspect communities narrative is often within a context of discrediting those who claim de-radicalisation creates suspect communities (Mohamed, 2015; Johnson, 2017), therefore the representation of de-radicalisation in this way can be construed as a defensive riposte against the suspect communities critique. The Daily Mail reports on several controversial stories surrounding the Prevent Duty and the inappropriate referral of children by schools. However, these are only descriptively labelled as de-radicalisation programmes rather than forming a larger critique of the programme (Willgress, 2016) and are within the context of framing the threat of terrorism (Beckford, 2015). The Daily Mail reported several times on the criticisms of Prevent however this was not linked to de-radicalisation therefore was not included.

The article has sought to identify the main trends in how The Daily Mail has framed de-radicalisation to understand whether or not it presents de-radicalisation as successful and desirable. As shown above, negative reporting runs concurrently alongside the advocacy of de-radicalisation within the newspaper, and while these are not necessarily contradictory it does reveal that the appeal of de-radicalisation is not dependent upon it being viewed as effective. This parallel framing may be viewed to reflect an acceptance that efficacy can be rarely measured or that it reflects an attitude that it is ‘better to do something than doing nothing’. However as discussed below we argue that it reflects the ideological elasticity of the term de-radicalisation which, at least in The Daily Mail, means that the framing of de-radicalisation is positive despite its ineffectiveness. Indeed, as negative framing of de-radicalisation partly concerns the failed implementation of policies, or that such policies need to be mandatory, we find an overarching narrative that frames de-radicalisation as desirable despite its failings. This frame is reinforced by how de-radicalisation is not heavily associated with criticisms levelled at Prevent. The following section discusses these points in greater detail, concluding with several areas for future research stemming from the findings and their limitations.

Discussion

The paper primarily set out to examine how The Daily Mail framed de-radicalisation and whether it was framed as successful. However, given the contested nature of the meaning of de-radicalisation within academic and policy circles, it is also worthwhile discussing how de-radicalisation is understood in The Daily Mail’s framing of the term. The majority of references to de-radicalisation are not accompanied by a definition, with one exception

discussing new entries to the dictionary (Charlton, 2015), or more significantly, they define de-radicalisation in relation to policies such as Prevent (Boyle, 2017; Lawson, 2017; Duell 2016; Slack, Drury, & Groves 2015). In linking de-radicalisation to Prevent, The Daily Mail shifts the focus of de-radicalisation away from concerning the post-criminal space toward also including the pre-criminal space. While to an extent this mirrors the contestation of de-radicalisation within academia, this formulation of de-radicalisation builds upon and reinforces the problematisation of being radical and that de-radicalisation is a worthy end in itself. In regard to the assumption of a causal link between ideas and behaviour, which underpins the concept of de-radicalisation, only one article explicitly referenced this issue relating to the relationship between the de-radicalisation programmes and recidivism rates in Saudi Arabia (Goodman, 2017). References to the inefficacy of de-radicalisation naturally imply the absence of a causal link. However, in The Daily Mail's framing, rarely was the inefficacy of de-radicalisation linked to a challenge of the fundamental assumptions underpinning de-radicalisation. Thus, The Daily Mail's framing of de-radicalisation does not mirror existing mainstream academic and policy positions on the concept. The newspaper's framing produces an understanding of de-radicalisation which uncritically reproduces the causal mechanisms that derive from being de-radicalised and places de-radicalisation firmly within a pre-criminal space which subsequently presents de-radicalisation as a positive end in itself in addition to a counter-terrorism instrument.

Returning to the issue of efficacy and desirability, there has been no research on how the media frames de-radicalisation, despite its significance for academic study and policy, yet several comments in existing literature would indicate that a newspaper such as The Daily Mail would frame de-radicalisation negatively (Neumann, 2010, Schuurman and Bakker, 2016). Given the potentially controversial nature of de-radicalisation programmes, which are typically seen as soft approaches to counter-terrorism (Dugas and Kruglanski, 2014, Dechesne, 2011), The Daily Mail would be expected to frame de-radicalisation negatively given its previous reporting on social spending, government intervention, terrorism, rehabilitation and Muslim communities (Nickels et al, 2012, Poole 2018, Philo et al 2013). Indeed, there are some examples where de-radicalisation is framed within a right-wing framework: one article refers negatively to an ex Jihadi bride's taxpayer funded de-radicalisation (Taher and Craven, 2018). This paper's extensive examination of The Daily Mail's usage of de-radicalisation shows that this hypothesis is partially accurate. Mentions of de-radicalisation which make an explicit judgement tend to frame de-radicalisation as less successful and few mentions frame de-

radicalisation as a success. The negative reporting of de-radicalisation reaches a peak in 2017, where de-radicalisation becomes conflated less with Prevent and becomes more associated with returning Islamic State fighters (Taher and Beckford, 2017). However, it is not clear-cut to say that The Daily Mail (and possibly by extension, right wing press) is opposed to de-radicalisation. This assumption has played a part in why practitioners have sought to downplay de-radicalisation activities, to an extent true with the UK government which does not use the term de-radicalisation. The argument presented in this paper is that, rather than framing de-radicalisation negatively, The Daily Mail's reporting is in fact more conflicted and sympathetic to the idea de-radicalisation which can be attributed to the specific flexibility of the concept of de-radicalisation and the lack of overt government framing of the issue. We argue that The Daily Mail normalises the desirability of de-radicalisation even within its presentation of the initiatives being ineffective. De-radicalisation is framed as desirable largely regardless of efficacy because the concept's fused rehabilitative and normative dimension transcends divisions within the political mainstream. The lack of an overt framing of de-radicalisation by political elites represents a missed opportunity (for themselves) to utilise the terminology to mobilise media support for de-radicalisation.

An assumption of potential efficacy can be found across all framings of de-radicalisation: positive, negative and neutral. By this we mean that de-radicalisation is presented as an initiative which can potentially work in the indeterminate future. Thus regardless of current evidence to the contrary, de-radicalisation is a policy which should be continually strived toward. This assumption of efficacy is naturally most obvious in those articles which framed it as effective. De-radicalisation is presented as an almost inevitable outcome of having been radicalised if there are interventions ready to capitalise on agential realisation. HRH The Prince of Wales states how he has asked his charity, Mosaic, which was designed to help Muslims in deprived areas to help build self-esteem, 'to do more towards de-radicalisation' because there are 'interesting examples of how people can be de-radicalised once they become radicalised because they find they are horrified by what it leads to' (HRH The Prince of Wales, 2015). Another story reports how in a French prison there was no attempt to de-radicalise 'the fundamentalists' and one of the Charlie Hebdo attackers emerged from prison more radical and 'festering with even more anger' (Jones, 2015). De-radicalisation programmes are thus a logical and desirable space for 'fanatics' and 'barbarians' to be sent to. The Daily Mail quotes one unnamed sources as saying: 'The law protects people like Ahmed but how can we ever be safe if people like him go unpunished? It's ridiculous - at the very least

he should be made to attend the Government's deradicalisation programme [emphasis added]' (Narain, 2015). We see this assumption of potential efficacy fed into a wider framing of de-radicalisation programmes as socially desirable, crucially within neutral references to de-radicalisation. This is important considering neutral references to de-radicalisation significantly outweigh articles which frame it negatively. The extensive number of 'neutral' descriptions of referral rates to de-radicalisation programmes leaves open to interpretation their effectiveness by not providing deeper context on the differences between the high number of referrals and those actually enrolled in the programmes. Interestingly, negative and positive framings on the efficacy of de-radicalisation programmes build upon this larger 'neutral' representation of de-radicalisation. For example, one article makes similar reference to referral numbers however is distinguished by framing 777 out of 3,934 potential extremists as being 'such a danger' (Drury, 2015). Thus, the wide-ranging usage of 'de-radicalisation' in a descriptive and 'neutral' manner provides the architecture for the presentation of de-radicalisation as natural, logical and desirable.

Even where The Daily Mail frames de-radicalisation negatively it, on occasion, contributes to a wider sense of desirability. The concept of de-radicalisation does not share the same fate of Prevent as a toxic brand, which has been widely critiqued in the media. As mentioned, in the few cases where de-radicalisation is associated with the suspect community narrative, this is situated within the context of discrediting critical voices. In several cases, de-radicalisation is often framed as ineffective due to its failed implementation as opposed to its failed success rate. The Parsons Green Bomber incident is framed as the officials having missed a chance to de-radicalise the attacker (Camber, 2018) and other cases link the refusal to participate in voluntary de-radicalisation initiatives as potentially leading to violent extremism (Beckford, 2015; White and Noble, 2017). Sixteen out of 66 cases where de-radicalisation is framed as ineffective also suggest that de-radicalisation could have been successful. Of course, this is not to deny that The Daily Mail does largely frame de-radicalisation as negative – it does – however contained within this negative reporting is an assumption that de-radicalisation could work, which links to a broader framing of de-radicalisation as desirable.

To conclude, this paper does not find that The Daily Mail frames de-radicalisation in a predominantly negative manner, and while this is certainly a major feature in its reporting it has to be contextualised in a more extensive framing of de-radicalisation as desirable. As a concept and a policy, de-radicalisation challenges expectations of media framing as demonstrated through our analysis of The Daily Mail – the UK government does not aim to

use the term or actively frame a distinct ‘de-radicalisation policy’. Thus the policy of de-radicalisation raises tensions in terms of how right-wing press would traditionally report on a policy. The constituent parts of de-radicalisation - ‘soft’ rehabilitation, pragmatic management of risk, and normative social/ideological engineering, alongside its malleable but vague definition – make it a policy which can be framed across mainstream ideological lines in public opinion. The result of this is an assumption of potential efficacy existing throughout The Daily Mail’s framing of de-radicalisation which presents the policy as desirable, even in cases where it is shown to have not been effective. De-radicalisation programmes are framed as potential transformative social spaces which provide physical and ideational security – their in/efficacy is secondary to their desirability.

Conclusion: Limitations and Future Directions for Research

De-radicalisation has been primarily studied and implemented through consideration of what types of programmes are more effective at reducing the risk of recidivism – therefore debates have revolved around measures of success and the negative social consequences of such programmes. Governments and programme practitioners have been reluctant to promote their activities to the public out of fear of a backlash or have not used the label ‘de-radicalisation’ due to the problematic nature of the term for programme delivery. However this paper has contended that public support is important if de-radicalisation programmes are to be effective and that the problematic nature of the term for programme delivery is distinct from how the term de-radicalisation is operationalised publically, particularly in its capacity for generating support. While de-radicalisation programmes may be concerned with effectiveness, this study of how one newspaper, The Daily Mail, frames de-radicalisation would suggest that in/effectiveness is not the only factor in shaping the paper’s attitude to de-radicalisation (and by extension its readers). The desirability of de-radicalisation extends beyond whether a programme can challenge violent extremism to facilitate their re-integration and reduce the risk of recidivism. The power of de-radicalisation conceptually, as framed by The Daily Mail, is its inescapable social desirability in the face of either no evidence of success or an abundant evidence of failure and negative social consequences. De-radicalisation is framed as a good to be achieved in itself and crosses typical political positions, which creates a logic of perpetually striving for better implementation deeper, broader, more community oriented and so on. Underlying these frames is the assumption that de-radicalisation is an inherent good for society

and that its failures are based in the implementation of specific policies but not de-radicalisation itself. The findings of this paper would suggest greater optimism for practitioners in being more open with the public about de-radicalisation programmes and that the term de-radicalisation has a distinct potential in mobilising support, in contrast to ‘damaged brands’ such as Prevent. As such, practitioners should seek to establish frames based around the term de-radicalisation instead of policy specific ‘brands’ as this would potentially, at least initially, engender media outlets to discuss the programs in the practitioners’ terms.

The article was the first to explore media framing of de-radicalisation but it reflects a need to better understand how the public perceive such initiatives, especially where public support impacts upon their delivery. One area for future research in this vein would be to compare media framing of de-radicalisation between ‘Western’ and ‘non-Western’ countries. Neumann (2003) hypothesises that support for de-radicalisation would vary between Western and non-Western countries and there are grounds to hypothesise that de-radicalisation is framed positively more in some contexts over others. The Daily Mail contains Australian and Indian international sections; as they are part of the same newspaper we had considered them collectively and it was out of the scope of the paper to provide sufficient context to merit analysing them separately in depth. However, we found a substantial difference in the framing of de-radicalisation in India-related stories where there are no negative framings of de-radicalisation and it is framed as effective in the majority of uses (67 per cent). The fact that Australian and UK-related stories in The Daily Mail broadly followed the same trend (reflected in the article) while India-related stories diverge significantly indicates scope for future research to examine Neumann’s hypothesis.

A limitation of the paper (and an opportunity for further research) is we do not take into account how de-radicalisation policies by other names are framed and therefore references to Channel programme are not included in the data despite this being referred to as the UK’s de-radicalisation programme. While it is accepted that Prevent and Channel are viewed negatively, a future study could replicate Ambrozik’s (2018) research to analyse whether interventions framed using the term ‘de-radicalisation’ generates greater support over other terms. Finally, our results focused on explicit references to de-radicalisation yet as mentioned the articles coded as ‘neutral’ cannot be causally separated from how readers perceive the subject, especially insofar as neutral references to de-radicalisation programmes contribute to providing meaning to de-radicalisation. We sought to capture this through a qualitative content analysis however to ensure consistency with the quantitative content analysis we restricted analysis of

'neutral' articles to the unit (i.e. the paragraph). The benefit of this approach was we could provide a more extensive and longitudinal account of framing. Sentiment analysis or discourse analysis would capture the context of articles as the unit of analysis referring to de-radicalisation and provide a thick description, which would complement our findings on the framing de-radicalisation. Thus while in one sense our research is limited by not exploring these areas, the results presented here demonstrate the opportunity to understand de-radicalisation by examining how it is framed publically.

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NOTES

¹ Hansard was used to search the use of de-radicalisation and the term was used twice in government written statements and 41 times in spoken references in both houses. Government documents and policy statements were also searched and corroborated that the term is not used significantly to describe policies. While not the focus of the current paper, we found that not one of the references to de-radicalisation by Labour and Conservative MPs framed it negatively.

² The Daily Mail & the Mailonline had the most results for deradicalization, 463, in the UK according to Lexis Nexis, compared to the Guardian's 281 results which had the second highest number in the UK. While the number of articles was reduced as we excluded irrelevant articles and merged duplications with a high similarity, The Daily Mail still made the most references to de-radicalisation.

³ Daily Mail / dailymail.co.uk has a monthly readership of 31.1 million according to the NRS, making it the most widely read UK publication

⁴ The latter of these three rationales is of particular interest for this research; as publications of a similar political ilk to the political elite tend to provide favourable coverage of their policy prescriptions. As such deradicalization, as will be discussed later, offers a unique point of departure from this overriding trend.