**Dynamic Sublimes, Changing Plans, and the Legacy of a Megaproject: The Case of the 1966 Soccer World Cup**

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**ABSTRACT**

Global sporting events such as FIFA World Cups have been described as megaprojects. The motives of decision-makers for undertaking megaprojects are summarized by Flyvbjerg’s (2012; 2014a) “four sublimes”, which lack a temporal dimension. We utilize a case study of the 1966 FIFA World Cup in England applying the three levels of project management identified by Morris & Geraldi (2011) refined through Flyvbjerg’s four sublimes to analyze the shifting nature of stakeholders’ motives. We evidence that Flyvbjerg’s sublimes are dynamic in response to change during the project timeline, creating new insights into project development and opportunities for research into historic projects.

**INTRODUCTION**

Large-scale sport tournaments such as the Olympic Games and FIFA World Cups have been described as megaprojects (e.g. Flyvbjerg & Stewart, 2012; Grün, 2004). The motives of decision-makers for undertaking megaprojects are summarized by Flyvbjerg’s (2012; 2014a) “four sublimes”, which influence their objectives: Technological, Political, Economic and Aesthetic. To mobilize sports megaprojects requires the formation of a temporary project organization to plan and execute a large-scale and complex fixed-duration event, and increasingly this also involves overseeing its ‘legacy’ for a broad range of stakeholders in the post-event period. These temporary organizations require the application of knowledge and capabilities from the past as well as anticipating the future (Grabher and Thiel, 2015). Such temporary project organizations are therefore complex to manage, but can be conceptualized quite simply as comprising three levels: the technical, the strategic, and the wider institutional context within which the project occurs (Morris and Geraldi, 2011).

 The 1966 FIFA World Cup held in England provides an interesting case study in contrast to existing megaproject literature because the project and its sublimes changed over the duration of the project. The sublimes were therefore dynamic – the motives and objectives of the stakeholders shifted as the project progressed. The realized project and subsequent legacy are different to the original conception. Due to changes in the project plan, existing stadiums were developed rather than new stadiums built, and the works to these existing facilities appears to have been undertaken by local contractors. The 1966 FIFA World Cup did not involve a global construction project and its tangible built legacy is less visible than is the case for some subsequent World Cups, but its intangible and symbolic legacy is significant.

We apply the three levels of project management identified by Morris & Geraldi (2011) together with Flyvbjerg’s (2012; 2014a) four sublimes to analyze stakeholders’ reasons for involvement in the 1966 World Cup project, and their decision-making. We demonstrate these frameworks are compatible in the study of project management history, highlighting the particular importance of Morris and Geraldi’s understanding of the institutional level in this project, and develop Flyvbjerg’s sublimes by evidencing that they are dynamic in response to changing opportunities during the project’s duration.

**PROJECT MANAGEMENT AND SPORTS MEGA-EVENTS**

We begin with a critical review of sports mega-event literature, demonstrating that such events can be viewed as a form of megaproject. Next, we introduce our theoretical lenses, the three levels of project management identified by Morris & Geraldi (2011) and Flyvbjerg’s (2012; 2014a) four sublimes.

Major sport events often include significant stadiums building and related infrastructure developments. These sports mega-events, such as the Olympic Games and FIFA World Cups, have been described as megaprojects within the Project Management literature (e.g. Flyvbjerg & Stewart, 2012; Grün, 2004) although with some exceptions (e.g. Brady & Davies, 2014) the explicit applicability of project management theories to the organization of sports mega-events is less studied.

Outside of Project Management journals, research on major sports events can be found in literatures from different disciplines and different theoretical lenses have been applied. The project nature of sports mega-events is also evident within sports economics, leisure, tourism, and regional studies. This diverse literature contains contrasting viewpoints – perhaps because of the temporal and spatial nature of mega-events and the extent to which they can be compared, and perhaps because of the differences in disciplines and theoretical lenses. However, there are similarities and we summarize literatures converge to explain:

* The reasons for hosting major sports events including their intended outcomes
* Planning and delivery of the events
* Realized outcomes and legacies

**Reasons for hosting major sports events**

Mega-events are best understood as “large-scale cultural (including commercial and sporting) events, which have a dramatic character, mass popular appeal and international significance” (Roche, 2000, p.1). Sports mega-events are scarce, so demand is often high (Andranovich, Burbank & Heying, 2001) although that is not always the case due to the associated cost and risk of hosting them (Dyreson & Llewellyn, 2008). Motives for hosting sports ‘megas’ include perceived short- and long-term economic and social benefits, some of which can be viewed as an end in themselves, whilst others are a means to an end. The wider, increasingly global, broadcasting of these events amplifies the symbolism attached to them.

One attractive aspect of sports mega-events is that they are understood as social occasions and contribute to community spirit and feel-good factor (Wann, Melnick, Russel & Pease, 2001; Madrigal, Bee & LaBarge, 2005; Preuss & Solberg, 2006; Molloy & Chetty, 2015; Solberg & Ulvnes, 2017). It is therefore possible to understand why local communities might be supportive (Andersson, Rustad & Solberg, 2004; Preuss & Solberg, 2006; Atkinson, Mourato, Szymanski & Ozdemirogly, 2008) although that is not always true, as evidenced by news reports highlighting residents’ reactions and resistance to global sports events such as the 2016 Olympic Games in Rio.

More tangibly, it is often claimed sports mega-events will lead to financial and economic benefits for locality and investors, increasing employment and alleviating poverty (Andranovich et al., 2001; Preuss, 2007; Kellett, Hede & Chalip., 2008; Pillay & Bass, 2008; Dyreson & Llewellyn, 2008; Poynter, 2009; Kaplanidou & Karadakis, 2010; Grabher & Thiel, 2015; Molloy & Chetty, 2015; Kaplanidou, Al Emadi, Sagas, Diop & Fritz., 2016). It is hypothesized that investments in the built environment and sporting infrastructure will result in increased productivity and discretionary effort during the lead-up to the event (Molloy & Chetty, 2015) and new or enhanced sports facilities and participation in local areas thereafter (Hogan & Norton, 2000; Coalter 2004; Preuss, 2007; Kellett et al., 2008; Veal, Toohey & Frawley, 2012; Kaplanidou et al., 2016; Solberg & Ulvnes, 2017). Furthermore, advocates for hosting suggest that sports mega-events might act as a catalyst for public sector investment in local economies and improved national non-sporting infrastructure, i.e. transport, and an opportunity to extend the returns on investment by hosting more mega-events in future, because of the long-term lifespan of such developments (Molloy & Chetty, 2015).

Furthermore, sports mega-events can be seen as promotional opportunities for cities and countries, showcasing their attractions to global audiences, helping to attract tourism and outside investment (Løwendahl, 1995; Andranovich, et al., 2001; Horne, 2007; Dyerson & Llewellyn, 2008; Molloy & Chetty, 2015; Kaplanidou et al., 2016). This relates to a further dimension: the political.

Sport mega-events have been used as propaganda, for example to legitimize ideologies, such as the fascism of Italy and Germany in the 1930s (Archetti, 2006; Gordon & London, 2006; Guttmann, 2006) or to showcase and hopefully catalyze economic and societal development (e.g. Molloy & Chetty, 2015; Zimbalist, 2015). Motives focus on long and short-term potential benefits and legacies, which can be tangible/measurable, or in-tangible/difficult to measure (Preuss, 2007). Projected benefits are not guaranteed to materialize and as such, sports mega-events carry risks, and yet they continue to receive public subsidy. The literature points to the rationale for continued investment as partly being the intangible nature of legacy (i.e. that megaprojects become in some way symbolic) as well as the more tangible outcomes from economic “boosterism” (Baade & Matheson, 2004; Kuper & Syzmanski, 2012; Zimbalist, 2015). To illustrate, the UK’s bid for hosting the Olympics and Paralympics in 2012 focused on measurable economic and built environment legacy as well as intangible outcomes from volunteering such as community spirit (HM Government & Mayor of London, 2013).

**Planning and delivery of the events**

In comparison to literature about the motives for hosting sports mega-events, or the extent to which these motives are realized (i.e. their legacies), there is less published work focusing on the actual planning and delivery of sports mega-events. The sports history and economics literature place particular focus on considerations before and after mega-events, although project management literature does offer more insight into the management and operational aspects.

National governments often pay a substantial proportion of infrastructure investments (Solberg & Ulvnes, 2017). As an important stakeholder, government is often involved in the main stages of the mega-event project lifecycle (bidding, organizing, and delivery) (Andranovich, et al., 2001). The FIFA World Cup requires the host government to create an appropriate business climate and environment for the mega-event and this might involve working across national and state boundaries, and making political reforms realized through governance overhauls (Preuss, 2007; Kellett et al., 2008; Kaplanidou et al., 2016). Whilst such development could have positive effects, there is a risk of collusion and corruption (Molloy & Chetty, 2015). Sports mega-event projects require “a tremendous investment of human, financial and physical resources from the communities that stage them” (Kidd, 1992, p.154). The risks to the public purse and to the wider economy are significant, given that these projects can involve multi-billion dollar budgets (Flyvbjerg, et al., 2003; Andreff, 2012; Baade & Matheson, 2004; Zimbalist; 2015).

Problems might arise in projects because of project task uncertainty and the extent to which project management is embedded within a parent organization (Løwendahl, 1995). Because of uncertainties, sports mega-events can be ambiguous in their nature (Horne, 2007), although this can often be by design. Flyvbjerg, et al. (2003) and De Bruijn & Leijten (2007) identify that promoters of megaprojects frequently mislead stakeholders and funders in order to have their projects approved, and that this can be a particular feature of events which are also symbolic in their nature. Project drift such as the over-engineering of stadiums can occur from the lure of ‘free money’ and tensions between national and local level organizers stemming from the different priorities given to different drivers (e.g. should development efforts focus on achieving national exposure via television, or on local infrastructure needs) (Molloy & Chetty, 2015).

**Realized legacy**

Mega-events deserve public debate, accountability, and critical reflection as to what they achieve beyond the field of play (De Bruijn & Leijten, 2007). Extant literature covers both multi-sport events such as the Olympics and Commonwealth Games, and single sport events like the Football and Rugby World Cups. There is relatively little consensus as to whether the proposed legacies of mega-events are actually achieved and in many cases the literature concludes that it is very difficult to prove causality for many of the outcomes (Preuss, 2007; Frawley, 2013). Whilst studies have tended to be critical it is important to note that others have demonstrated positive outcomes (e.g. Løwendahl, 1995; Grabher and Thiel, 2014; 2015).

 Part of the difficulty in assessing how effectively mega-events achieve their proposed objectives is the lack of a single theory, definition or law about what constitutes ‘legacy’, ‘impacts’, and so on, although ‘legacy’ is a term used broadly to encompass economic, social, political, cultural, and sporting achievements inherited from one generation, person or organization to another. Legacies can include additional activity generated after the event, such as increased tourism in subsequent years (Holt and Ruta, 2015).

Following Holt and Ruta we interpret the term ‘legacy’ broadly, to include short, medium and long-term achievements, economic and non-economic, of varying degrees of impact, tangible and intangible, ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ (including ‘symbolic’), which we consider formative to how the event is perceived in the long-run. Consistent with the theme of this Special Issue our interpretation of legacy emphasizes the symbolic.

Preuss (2007) defines legacy very broadly in terms of event structures, encompassing ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ structures: Soft structures relate to knowledge (organizational, security, technological), networks (political, sport federations, security), cultural goods (cultural identity, cultural ideas, common memory). Contrastingly, ‘hard’ structures refers to tangible legacy and divides into primary structures (sports infrastructure and training sites), secondary structures (villages for athletes, technical officials and media), and tertiary structures (security, power plants, telecommunication networks, cultural attractions). This analysis was expanded by Kaplanidou et al. (2016) who view business networks as being important soft structures.

Preuss (2007) and Kaplanidou et al. (2016) show that the term legacy is not just used in relation to the planned and positive. This is consistent with studies such as that of Molloy & Chetty (2015) whose research of the 2010 FIFA World Cup demonstrated wide divergence among their interviewees as to the expected and realized benefits.

***The Economic benefits and costs***

A common claim is that hosting a sports mega-event leads to increased economic activity (Stevens & Bevan, 1999; Spilling, 2000; Lee & Taylor, 2004; Kasimati & Dawson, 2009; Maennig & du Plessis, 2009; Rose & Spiegel, 2011; Tien, Lo & Lin, 2011; Feddersen & Maennig, 2013). Holt & Ruta (2015, p.3) identify that some economists use the terminology of “impacts” (the amount of money that will flow in or out of a geographic area exclusively through hosting an event, either directly or via a multiplier effect) and “legacy” (the additional economic activity generated after the event, such as increased tourism in subsequent years).

It is though difficult to isolate the hosting of a sports mega-event as the causal variable behind an increase in economic activity because other factors including those from the macro-environment might have an influence (as might the methodology of the researchers, such as their measure of economic activity, sample size and geography). Furthermore, results can depend upon when the study was conducted (ex-poste or ex-ante studies). Nevertheless it does seem that there can be some direct economic benefits even if these are somewhat short-term. Economic benefit might occur as a result of temporary injections of external funding for new sporting facilities (Holt & Ruta, 2015; Solberg & Ulvnes, 2017). Multiplier effects might then occur such as from a temporary increase in employment to cope with demand before and during an event, such as building contractors (Miguelez & Carrasquer, 1995; Brunet, 1995). The achievement of any such economic benefits is though subject to participation and seasonality effects (Teigland, 1999; Spilling, 2000; Fourie & Santana-Galleo, 2011; Tien, et al., 2011). Benefits may also occur as a result of knowledge development in the human resources of the host country (Preuss, 2007; Kellett et al., 2008; Kaplanidou et al., 2016).

 As well as evidence for the benefits of sports ‘megas’, there is a substantial body of literature highlighting the risks, assessing their economic costs, under-performance and failures, particularly for the host cities and countries (Senn, 1999; Preuss, 2004; Baade & Matheson, 2004; Kim, Gursoy & Lee, 2006; De Bruijn & Leijten, 2007; Pillay & Bass, 2008; Baloyi & Becker, 2011; Baumann, Engelhardt & Matheson, 2011; Flyvbjerg & Stewart, 2012; Andreff, 2012; Müller, 2014; Alm, 2012; Kuper & Szymanski, 2012; Preuss, Solberg & Alm, 2014; Müller, 2014; Zimbalist, 2015; Molloy & Chetty, 2015). For example, the Olympic Games have frequently been subject to cost overruns (e.g. Flyvbjerg & Stewart, 2012;Zimbalist, 2015).

 We have already mentioned that mega-events are hosted in the belief they will attract tourism and inward investment. There is some evidence to suggest hosting a sport mega-event can have a positive country-of-origin effect, improving the image of the host in the minds of visitors as prospective consumers (Donaldson & Ferreira, 2009; Sun & Paswan, 2012; Kim & Morssion, 2005).

However, there is also literature to demonstrate that regardless of image-boosting and changes to consumer attitudes, hosting sport mega-events might not necessarily result in economic gains (Pyo et al., 1988; Kang & Perdue, 1994). Jakobsen, Solberg, Halvorsen, & Jakobsen (2012) and Flyvbjerg & Stewart (2012) suggest sport mega-events do not necessarily achieve the FDI inflows governments sometimes predict. Baade & Matheson (2004) explain visitors and residents may decide not to shop locally because they are concerned about congestion and price gauging for the duration of the tournament. Secondly, errors made in estimating direct spending are compounded when calculating multiplier analysis - the indirect spending from the circulation of tourists’ money in the local economy. Leakages can be significant if the host economy has high employment, because the event will be staffed by people from other localities, in which unemployment or a labor surplus exists. A further point not stated by Baade & Matheson (2004) is that many of the staff could be working on a purely voluntary basis.

***The non-Economic benefits and costs***

There is much debate as to the wider effects of sporting mega-events, beyond those which can be classified as strictly/directly ‘economic’. For example, there is little consensus as to whether hosting mega-events can lead to increased interest and participation in sport (Ritchie, 1984; Truno, 1995; Frawley & Cush, 2011; Veal et al., 2012; Pope, 2016) or not (or at least not to the extent that is proposed when making the case to host a mega-event) (Hogan & Norton, 2000; Weed et al., 2009). Some writers suggest the global exposure of a city or country can make the expense of hosting an event worthwhile (Ritchie & Smith, 1991; Oldenboom, 2006; Varrel & Kennedy, 2011) while others discern little or no impact on international awareness and image improvement (Mossberg & Hallberg, 1999; Rivenburgh, Louw, Loo & Mersham, 2003; Chalip, Green & Hill, 2003; Gripsrud, Nes & Olsson, 2010). For example, while not an economic success in the short term, South Africa 2010 arguably helped elevate the country’s image as a growing competitive economy, promoted national unity and national identity (Varrel & Kennedy, 2011). In England, the success of the 1996 UEFA European Championship Finals reinforced an optimistic attitude towards the idea of bidding to host the 2012 Summer Olympiad (Fairclough, 2000). However, as Grabher & Thiel (2014) identify, mega-events can result in a risky “self-induced shocks” (massive disruptions due to expectations for stunning and overwhelming spectacles) and a further and related criticism is that sports mega-events can lead to protests and bad publicity resulting from the displacement of local populations (Beatty, 1999; Andranovich, Burbank & Heying, 2001). Whether successful or not, hosting mega-events can be politically sensitive for host countries (Solberg & Ulvnes, 2017) therefore there is an impact on reputation. To help reduce the risk of mistakes being repeated, the London 2012 Olympics plan for legacy formally attempted to capture managerial experience and best practice from the project by implementing an open access internet platform accompanied by several lecture and publication series’ (Grabher & Thiel, 2015).

 The *symbolic* legacy effects over the long term are also important but may be intangible and even impossible to quantify – the implication being that the legacy of sports mega-events must look beyond the immediate cost: benefit analysis (Horne, 2007; De Bruijn & Leijten, 2007; Flyvbjerg & Stewart, 2012). Cynics may however argue that claims of non-economic and intangible benefits are an attempt to cover-up for the aspects of the Games that did not achieve their proposed financial or tangible benefits. Critics of sports mega-events and boosterism, such as Zimbalist (2015) argue there are few positive spillover effects associated with sports events and the building of new sports venues, which often constitute the built legacy.

**Theoretical lenses**

We have shown that actual realized outputs and outcomes from hosting sports mega-events may differ from those that are proposed when prospective hosts bid for the rights to hold a mega-event, and also that there are contrasting findings within academic studies.

Capturing the network of organizing and delivering the 1966 FIFA World Cup event, Tennent & Gillett’s (2016) swarm model interprets the scope of stakeholders, portraying them as if bees swarming to establish a new colony or nest. In this analogy, following Gloor (2006), the participant organizations simultaneously cooperate to organize, manage and deliver the project, apparently without a high degree of deliberate central coordination. The swarm has limited explanatory power however in that it is an empirical rather than a theoretical construct. It is limited in its depth as to the locus of decision-making. Neither does it fully contextualize the reasons for the stakeholders wanting to host the event, or explain its legacy (Porter, 2016).

<Insert Figure 1 here>

Tools exist which can address these limitations. Firstly, Flyvbjerg’s (2012; 2014a) “four sublimes” that drive megaproject development, explains what makes megaprojects attractive to decision-makers. Flyvbjerg extends the “technological sublime” - a term he attributes to Miller (1965) and Marx (1967) to explain “the excitement engineers and technologists get in pushing the envelope for what is possible in “longest-tallest-fastest” type of projects” (Flyvbjerg, 2014a: 8) - with three additional sublimes that make megaprojects attractive to decision-makers, namely:

* Political: “The rapture politicians get from building monuments to themselves and for their causes, and from the visibility this generates with the public and media”
* Economic: “The delight business people and trade unions get from making lots of money and jobs off megaprojects”
* Aesthetic: “The pleasure designers and people who love good design get from building and using something very large that is also iconic and beautiful”

Another useful Project Management framework is Morris & Geraldi’s (2011) identification of project management levels in temporary organizations. Similar to the conceptual disaggregation of strategy in the strategic management literature between the operational, business unit, and corporate levels (Johnson, Scholes & Whittington, 2013), Morris & Geraldi see project organizations as being manageable at three levels: Level 1, the technical, consisting of the operational and delivery orientation; Level 2, the strategic, taking a more holistic view of the project process, and; Level 3, the wider institutional context within which the project occurs. Level 2 is relevant to this study because it emphasizes the project as an organizational entity to be managed within its business and social context (Morris, 1994). This has congruence because while a sporting mega-event is short in duration, lasting a month at most, the preparation process usually takes place over years, and may necessitate the creation of special project organizations within the host sporting bodies. Level 3 is also particularly relevant to sport mega-events because the sporting bodies are usually not capable of managing the project preparation process on their own, due to the broad nature of the events involving diverse social and economic variables beyond the playing of sports.

Succinctly described by Morris & Geraldi (2011, p. 23) level 3 involves “the institutional context: management here is concerned with ensuring the long-term project management health of the organization. Work will be in the ‘parent’ organization and/or in the environment that the project is operating.” In practice this concerns the interaction of the sporting event megaproject with the wider environment comprising various levels of government and other stakeholder organizations. This complex interface involves a range of scenarios and requires further research for increased explication, a point raised by Morris & Geraldi (2011).

**RESEARCH APPROACH**

**The Case**

Megaprojects are expensive in terms of time as well as finance and thus carry considerable reputational as well as economic risk. Time, together with political reputation and international diplomacy were prominent drivers in the case of the 1966 World Cup. Unlike contemporary sports mega-events or the FIFA World Cups of the 1930s, the 1966 FIFA World Cup was not initially conceived or engineered as a symbolic megaproject, but as we identify, it evolved into one.

We were first interested in studying the 1966 FIFA World Cup because of another project we were involved in, concerning the use of public finance to fund sports clubs and their built assets such as stadiums and sports halls. We discovered that the 1966 FIFA World Cup received an unprecedented sum of public money in the UK context, with the majority of this money directed towards stadium improvements although no new stadiums were constructed. However the legacy of these investments in the built environment were largely forgotten over the decades following the tournament, as English football suffered an decline in support (Walvin 1985). Stadiums were neglected until reforms following several fatal disasters spurred investment in new all-seater stadiums which ushered in or at least corresponded with soccer’s revitalization in England, and which in turn has corresponded with its global expansion and financialization (Taylor, 1990; Conn, 2004).

Thus, the 1966 edition represents a pivotal moment in the history of soccer’s world cup, which subsequently amplified - the 1966 event was at the vanguard of the global expansion of the soccer ‘industry’ through subsequent World Cups, broadcast media, and sponsorship. Despite the lack of tangible built reminders to1966 (even Wembley Stadium has been demolished and rebuilt – a megaproject in its own right) tourism and economic opportunities have arisen since, due to the symbolic nature of the project.

**Methods**

We used inductively based archival research, drawing upon project documents together with periodicals and secondary sources to triangulate and compensate for the problems of archival silence and selection (Decker, 2013; Kipping, Wadhwani & Bucheli, 2013). We believed that returning to the documents generated in the 1960s by the original stakeholders was the optimal way of avoiding the danger of ahistoricism, enabling our understanding of the how the World Cup was contextualized within the economic and social setting of the 1960s rather than applying our present-day understanding of the tournament to the past. This historical survey of the topic allowed us to examine planning and organization, and the extent to which phenomena such as stadium boosterism existed in the 1960s and how far the FIFA World Cup of that period was captured by social and economic concerns. We offer a management and organizational history of a global sporting event, focusing on the institutional context and the organizations involved in delivering the event.

Within the project management history literature Söderlund & Lenfle (2013) offer five categories of research. We position ourselves within the framework in Type 2 (Landmark projects and project narratives) and Type 3 (Corporate project history) because we are concerned with a single project, within which we study the project organization at ‘firm level’, studying the P-form links between a number of organizations that manifest themselves in temporary form.

A wide sweep of archives was consulted, including documents belonging to the following stakeholders identified from Tennent & Gillett’s (2016) World Cup 1966 Swarm Model:

* English Football Association (FA): minute books of the main organizing committee, council minutes, the plans for the 1966 tournament, and subsequent publications such as Mayes (1966) official World Cup report.
* FIFA: Records of the FIFA Bureau, correspondence and plans detailing early planning and regulations which divided responsibility between FIFA and the FA.
* UK Government and Civil Service: At the national level, memos and correspondence principally originating from the Foreign Office and Ministry of Education, as well as the Prime Minister’s Office and Ministry of Transport were used to establish their roles in planning the tournament. At the local level, local authority minutes and local newspaper accounts of the local hosting arrangements were then added by visiting local archives and libraries, and local organizing committee files were accessed.

Using historical methods to study project history is valuable because a temporal perspective allowed us to see the longitudinal scope of a project while avoiding concerns about the presentism of much project management research (Biesenthal, Sankaran, Pitsis, & Clegg, 2015). Maylor, Brady, Cooke-Davies & Hodgson (2006) argue that where a task stretches over many years a project is not a temporary organization. However, our project is by definition a temporary organization, as there was a fixed end in 1966 and a fixed maximum span of six years for project delivery. A further benefit of a historical study is that we were able to observe long-term legacy, such as fiftieth anniversary celebrations and how ‘1966’ has become symbolic. By focusing on a single case study we aimed to draw out the *deep structure* of the case drawing richer and more detailed insights than possible from multiple case studies (Platt, 1988; Dyer & Wilkins, 1991). We use these insights to evaluate the case study, highlighting the general in the particular in order to uncover the ‘dynamics of phenomena’ (Maclean, Harvey and Clegg, 2016, pp. 612-613). In doing this we follow the lead of Eisenhardt (1989) in highlighting the extent to which historical specificity matters, in this case creating opportunities for future researchers to exploit the differences between this and other global sporting events.

Following Yin’s (2003) matrix of relevant situations for different situations strategies, our study exists within the overlap of archival analysis, history, and case study. We were mainly concerned with the *how?* and the *why?* of our case in relation to motives and decision-making, and ultimately to the legacy of the event. We were mostly concerned with the past although we also had interest in contemporary manifestations of ‘legacy’ such as events to commemorate the 50th anniversary of the 1966 World Cup tournament. With reference to Yin’s taxonomy, it was not necessary to control behavioural events because most had already occurred, whilst on-going legacy could be observed.

Initially, we undertook a literature review. This analysis revealed different disciplines converge to suggest reasons for hosting events, the ways in which they are planned and executed, and resulting outputs and legacies. The emergent and intangible nature of projects was an interesting finding because motives for hosting can become subverted or forgotten. We found no academic literature to satisfactorily capture the dynamic, intangible, or symbolic nature of the 1966 event. We considered this a gap worthy of exploration and an opportunity to develop understanding of a significant historic project.

Our archival analysis comprised three main phases. Eisenhardt (1989) refers to the usefulness of writing up a narrative account of the case as a suitable early step in the case study process. So, we firstly produced a chronological narrative understanding of the project from an initial reading of the data to identify what compared and contrasted with existing literature and what was novel. By evaluating key points and identifying the dates when important decisions about financing, locations, and so on were made, and by whom, we created a timeline to provide a snapshot of our case that helped us to keep things in chronological order. We identified clues as to the reasons for hosting the tournament, how it was organized, and also some indication as to legacy, although additional research was required to address ‘what happened next?’ We visited commemorative events such as the National Football Museum’s exhibition marking the 50th anniversary of the 1966 tournament. Identifying events and producing a chronology provided the building blocks of our case, but to go beyond descriptive case history to produce a case study, we observed patterns within the data (Pettigrew, 1997, p. 338).

Secondly, to address the question ‘why were the stakeholders interested in hosting the event?’ we examined the original proposals for the tournament, the ‘new’ plan, and what actually happened. We noticed that motives of different stakeholders changed over time. We distilled our findings into two main themes, 1) How the 1966 World Cup was organized and delivered (this included who was involved, when and why?), 2) What the project delivered (including positive and negative, short, medium and long-term legacies). We researched theory for an explanatory framework following Eisenhardt’s (1989) recommendation to ask ourselves ‘what theory is this similar to? What does it contradict and why?’ Eisenhardt claims linking to existing theory in this way enhances the internal validity, generalizability and general level of theory building from case research. We identified two frameworks from the project management literature as being the best fit for our data: Flyvbjerg’s (2012; 2014a) four sublimes of megaprojects to determine what decision-makers’ motivations/drivers for the project were, and Morris & Geraldi’s (2011) three levels of project management, to show where and in what way decision-making occurred. We were also to assess the extent to which this contemporary framework might apply to a fifty-year-old example.

 Our third phase of data analysis involved examining the project network of the temporary organization, to determine the spaces within which decision-making took place, and by whom. We found the headings provided by the frameworks of Flyvbjerg (2012; 2014a) and Morris and Geraldi (2011) were suitable for coding and sorting our data, although some expansion of definition was required. We applied these frameworks to data to see what fits and how, and what the frameworks don’t explain. The latter were our unique features. We found a more dynamic understanding of the existing theory was necessary, which we shall explain later in this paper.

 Our theoretical choices were therefore made after data collection, and our research approach was exploratory and inductive. There is some comparison with the work of Molloy & Chetty (2015) whose study of the 2010 FIFA World Cup used grounded theory (Glaser & Strauss, 1967). Their study of a contemporary mega-event was based on interview data, which was not possible for our study because the organizers were dead, although autobiographies were used to triangulate some of the archival data relating to Sir Stanley Rous (FA, FIFA) and Denis Howell (UK Sports Minister).

**FINDINGS**

**The Original Plan and Intended benefits of hosting**

1966 involved no ‘new build’ stadiums and the improvements that were made to the existing stadiums were procured and overseen by the football clubs themselves. As such, the tournament is dissimilar to many other FIFA World Cups where the building of new stadiums was an integral part of the plan (e.g. Molloy & Chetty, 2015). To understand the reasons for hosting the 1966 event we must analyze the intended benefits, which requires looking beyond the plan used in the delivery of the project, to the Football Association’s original plan document (FA, 1961). We now outline our findings from this document using Flyvbjerg’s ‘four sublimes’ to evidence the English Football Association’s (FA’s) intentions for hosting. The FA, as host was contractually responsible for the tournament’s delivery within FIFA’s specifications; the FA were essentially franchisees of FIFA. The FA Secretary (effectively a Chief Executive), Sir Stanley Rous and the England team manager, Walter Winterbottom, wrote the first detailed plan for the hosting of the tournament in 1961 (Rous, 1978; FA, 1961). This vision for the tournament, included details of the financial plan, possible host grounds, and speculation about the possible status of broadcasting for the competition. Possible hotels and training grounds for visiting sides were also listed, and even ideas as to possible souvenir products both for the public and for visiting teams were detailed.

With reference to Flyvbjerg’s Four Sublimes, we found that these sublimes were less evident at the time of the initial bid to host the tournament in England, which was driven by the FA without government backing (Table 1). Contextually, the FA would celebrate its centenary in 1963 so perhaps this was a catalyst, although there is no documentary evidence to prove so. It is apparent from the plan that opportunities existed relating to technology and economics which were certainly attractive, although it might be stretching the data to claim much significance for the ‘Technological’ or ‘Economic’ sublimes when compared to some previous World Cups (for instance, sixteen years prior to our case, the 1950 edition held in Brazil involved constructing the largest stadium in the world, the Maracanã). An example which demonstrates the inter-linking nature of these opportunities was the noted possibility to film all of the games and broadcast them globally, the USA and Canada are mentioned explicitly, although it was stated that any deals for film rights should not be made until 1966; because of the pace of technology the technological capabilities would be more advanced by then (FA, 1961). The plan identified economic opportunities or ticket sales and merchandising such as badges and scarves. The plan gives no consideration to the potential for product licensing, although this would be the dominant approach when the tournament actually happened (FA, 1961).

It is possible to infer that the ‘Political’ sublime was present at the time of the original 1961 plan, but more in relation to the ‘politics’ of football, than to party politics. Specifically, the fact the report’s authors, Stanley Rous and Walter Winterbottom, were senior figures in the English FA indicates that the possibility of hosting the 1966 tournament was considered important and prestigious, as well as an opportunity to leverage income from souvenirs and ticket sales, and spread the sport into new territories or leverage technological advancements in film and television.

**<Insert Table 1 here>**

**Table 1: Four Sublimes of the 1966 FIFA World Cup (at the time of the FA’s original plan, 1961)**

Broadcast media aside, other technological developments were clearly important as to how the event would be experienced, and contributed to its lasting legacy in terms of the built environment and symbolically. The FAs original plan, provides a slightly different narrative to the established story of which grounds were selected – for instance that Ayresome Park was only considered at the very last minute, while the north-east group was originally conceived to include three stadiums.

Table 2 shows the original vision was for the tournament to be held at fourteen grounds (FA, 1961). Assumptions of likely gate receipt revenues were based upon data from the 1958 FIFA World Cup which indicated attendances of 50,000. The plan also estimated some operating costs of the World Cup, but no capital expenditure plans were outlined. It envisaged stadiums would have to be improved with regard to the amount of covered seating and standing accommodation available, including some improvements to the seating at Wembley, as the English weather could not be relied upon. It was also noted that restaurant, bar and toilet facilities at all stadiums required a “100% increase” (p. 14) and that television facilities needed to be installed, as well as facilities for up to 500 journalists with 100 telephone lines. Support services would also have to be improved such as accommodation for police, first aid posts, catering services, souvenir sellers, and information kiosks.

 Also envisaged was the introduction of electronic scoreboards, which already existed in some European grounds, as well as improved dressing room facilities – and even places for pre-match entertainers to change. Security measures, and access for teams and officials would also need to improve. A feeling emerges that Rous and Winterbottom had a vision of what was required to modernize England’s traditional football grounds, which had been built with locally living standing spectators in mind, and which had not envisaged the use of the grounds in internationally televised tournaments. The plans were mostly an adaptation of existing grounds – the one exception being Sheffield Wednesday where the club’s board proposed a new ground. Further, the projections were still largely based on standing accommodation being the norm. Wembley was the only venue where additional seating was proposed, including temporary form benches to be placed on the greyhound-racing track.

**<Insert Table 2 here>**

**Table 2: Original Rous and Winterbottom Plan: Proposed Stadium Capacities**

Source: Adapted from FA, 1961, p. 14

\*Planned by the Sheffield Wednesday board, not specifically for the tournament.

**A new plan**

The death of the FIFA President Arthur Drewry led to the election of Sir Stanley Rous in his place (FIFA, 1960; Rous, 1978, pp. 138-144), but with Rous unable to carry on as FA Secretary this meant that he moved from franchisee to franchisor. As a result the strategic thread was lost, and Rous’ successor as FA Secretary, Denis Follows started the process again from scratch after a gap of around a year, convening the first meeting of the FA’s World Cup Organizing Committee (WCOC) in November 1962 (FA, 1962).

Our archival data shows the decisions and behaviors of the main stakeholders involved in the planning and delivery of the 1966 FIFA World Cup. By relating our findings to the three levels identified by Morris and Geraldi (2011), we provide a more detailed and effective understanding of the project management of the tournament than has previously been published. Table 3 summarizes our analysis.

< Insert Table 3 Here>

**Table 3: Morris & Geraldi’s (2011) Three Levels of Project Management and the 1966 FIFA World Cup**

Our findings indicated the particular significance of public sector involvement in the project, which we now explain.

After the death of Drewry, Dennis Follows was essentially left on his own to re-plan the tournament, although government support was not forthcoming at this stage; Follows’ approach to the Conservative government led only to an assurance that police escorts would be provided for visiting team vehicles (FA, 1965). Follows was forced to economize by narrowing the eighteen possible hosting grounds down to eight. Each of the four groups would now have two constituent grounds; Everton and Manchester United remained hosting matches in the North West, Newcastle and Sunderland in the North East, while Sheffield Wednesday was grouped with Aston Villa in the ‘Midland’ group and London matches were to be held at Arsenal and Wembley.

Crucially, the committee decided that the hosting clubs themselves would be responsible for funding any new facilities or improvements deemed necessary. Their reward for taking this risk was to receive 15% of the gate receipts (FA, 1962); the rest of the takings after expenses paid to teams and officials would be paid to the qualifying nations, the FA and FIFA. Clubs were still expected to stage matches simply for the honor of doing so with no consideration of legacy. Indeed, in their first draft of the World Cup Regulations, FIFA only allowed 10% of the receipts for ‘ground hire’, clearly stipulating that all usual privileges, such as club season tickets and complementary tickets, were suspended for World Cup finals matches (FIFA, 1963). In May 1963, after negotiations with the FA, FIFA agreed to allow the host clubs 15% of the gate receipts, although FIFA would not contribute towards the cost of ground alterations (FA, 1963a). The FA committee started to plan the tournament within the limited envelope allowed for them by FIFA, although it would be as late as 1965 before the definite final host grounds, shown in Table 4, were decided.

**<Insert Table 4 here>**

**Table 4: Eventual Host Grounds, 1965**

Source: Adapted from FIFA (1964, p. 14).

**\*** This number of seats was available for allocation on any given day to the tournament organizers. The capacity available depended on the allocation of matches to grounds. This was a decision for the organizers who were influenced by stadium capacity as well the desire to spread matches around the country as equally as possible.

***The Influence of Stakeholders***

Our archival research has revealed the original 1961 plan by Walter Winterbottom and Sir Stanley Rous for the 1966 FIFA World Cup, which focused on the tournament as being for the benefit of football and the sport’s governing bodies, was gradually subverted towards the benefit of national and local government. The national government sought to benefit from an improved image for Britain in order to improve foreign relations and boost exports. The local governments sought to boost local industry and improve tourism. This led to considerable investment of public funds into the project, and co-option of local industry into its implementation. The influence of stakeholders, power, and politics can also be considered from the perspectives of international diplomacy between governments and sports governing bodies, with each other and one another. Cold war concerns, wider geopolitics, and domestic industrial policy in a period of national planning evolving around the world (everywhere from the UK to North Korea) also led the politicians to desire a more permanent legacy than was initially envisaged, as we now explain.

***A New Government***

The election of Harold Wilson’s Labour government in the Autumn of 1964 caused an abrupt change in the political landscape. Importantly to our narrative is the change of ethos towards centralized planning which was fundamental to the Wilson view of the economy. In the British context Wilson’s National Plan of 1965 meant stimulus and corrective intervention in the economy through control of public investment, nationalized industries and encouragement of technological change (Tomlinson, 2004), rather than the outright command and control approach favored by the Communist nations. An important element of the Labour government’s policy was to invest heavily in Science and Education. Unlike today, where sport and leisure have their own distinct government department, the Department of Culture, Media and Sport (DCMS), in the 1960s sport was under the purview of the Department of Education and Science (DES). As we shall now explain the government’s role in funding the World Cup was part of this expansion of Education and Science funding, and sport formed only part of a broader portfolio in which education and science were the main responsibilities (Howell, 1990).

Denis Howell, the undersecretary with responsibility for sport, and also a football referee, saw the potential of the tournament for national prestige and wanting to generate a lasting legacy, approached Wilson for funding. Wilson agreed to set aside the sum of £500,000, partly backed by the Board of Trade who saw the opportunity to boost British exports (Howell, 1990, p. 142-143; *The Times*, 1965a, p. 5). The World Cup was seen by the government as an opportunity to create a lasting legacy; it was symbolic of progress under the government’s national plan. This was the first time the UK government had funded a football event, but it had previously the supported the 1948 London Olympics, and this invited comparisons with that event in the Civil Service (HM Treasury, 1965).

The chosen stadiums were substantially unimproved since around 1900 – attendances had been large but the gate receipts had mostly been spent on transfer fees. Despite this it would be prohibitive to build new stadiums and the Treasury admitted that “we have to make do with what we have” (HM Treasury, 1965). The issue of power and rivalry between different parts of government became important as Howell and his team prepared their plans to enhance the tournament in the Spring of 1965. In terms of creating a lasting legacy Howell persuaded the FA to go beyond the original plan by installing new areas of seating together with improved hospitality and media facilities to make the stadiums more welcoming to the overseas media and visiting dignitaries (HM Treasury, 1965). There were concerns about how good an investment this would be for the public sector because of the prolificacy of football clubs with increasing transfer fees and player wages at a time when they were unwilling to invest in the updating of their stadiums, their main capital asset (The Times, 1965b, 7). There was also concern in the Treasury that investing in the World Cup could be the thin end of a very large wedge; there could potentially be as many tournaments to spend money on, as there were types of sport (HM Treasury, 1965).

 There was further concern in the Foreign Office about the inclusion of the team representing the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK). It was feared their presence in England and symbolic display of national symbols such as flags and national anthems would legitimize a state considered non-existent at best and an enemy at worst, this being the height of the Cold War and within recent memory of the Korean War. It was also feared that recognition of North Korea would implicitly legitimize the German Democratic Republic (GDR), which was backed by the USSR. Due to a boycott by most African and Asian states the DPRK ended up being sole qualifier from outside of Europe and the Americas. The Foreign Office were initially unwilling to grant the DPRK team a visa to visit the UK, and this threatened their ability to appear in the World Cup finals at all. After considerable negotiations between DES and the Foreign Office a compromise was reached in which the DPRK team would agree to be known as North Korea and the usual World Cup customs of displaying flags and playing national anthems before matches were suspended for most of the tournament (Polley, 1998, p. 4). This was an example of a conflict between government organizations, as well as between countries, because DES had already invested public money in flagpoles for the host stadiums (HM Treasury, 1965).

 Although part of the original plan, Middlesbrough might not have been included in the actual project had it not been for local politics in Newcastle-Upon-Tyne. An important name associated with the National Plan in the North East was the ambitious council leader T. Dan Smith who had grand designs for the city and was at loggerheads with the local soccer team, Newcastle United FC, who leased the St. James’ Park stadium from the council. Smith wanted to upgrade the stadium to a municipal multi-sport arena which could be used seven days a week, rather than the sole domain of the club (Joannu, 2000, p. 270; Foote Wood, 2010). This dispute caused significant delays to starting any of the required work for the World Cup, and meant that the club, responsible for the day-to-day operations at the stadium, was unable to guarantee to the FA that they would still be occupying St. James Park by the time of the tournament. This presented such a significant risk to the World Cup Organizing Committee (WCOC) in terms of the FA contract with FIFA that it was decided to relocate the matches to Middlesbrough (FA, 1964a; 1964b).

**Intended and achieved benefits of hosting: Legacy and Symbolism**

A key finding of our study was that as the 1966 FIFA World Cup project evolved, the sublimes became more significant as opportunities were identified and public money invested. There is some evidence to suggest Flyvbjerg’s sublimes can explain the motives for this evolution, and the same typology can be used to categorize the actual outputs and outcomes of the project, which were tangible as well as intangible. An important finding was how the 1966 FIFA World Cup has become increasingly symbolic over time, in ways that were not envisaged by its organizers.

Table 5 summarizes our findings in relation to Flyvbjerg’s four sublimes (Technological, Political, Economic, Aesthetic). We found the Political and Economic sublimes emerged as government and public sector became increasingly involved. Similar to the findings of Molloy & Chetty (2015) who studied the 2010 FIFA World Cup, there is evidence to show how the Technological sublime become more relevant in the 1960s as public money became available. Although there was no major aesthetic *built* legacy, there is evidence to support the Aesthetic sublime, as the WCOC (World Cup Organizing Committee) realized the potential for symbolism and branding.

<Insert Table 5 here>

**Table 5: The Four ‘Sublimes’ of the 1966 FIFA World Cup**

***Technological***

There is evidence that clubs brought forward investment plans to benefit from the opportunity of public money. Football clubs seized upon the expectation for higher specification technical conditions encouraged by FIFA to access grant funding so that they could create stadiums that were technically advanced and worthy of a never seen before event. Even in the initial plan there were proposed technical improvements to stadiums though mostly of a temporary nature (FA, 1961). In contrast the subsequent plan proposed by Denis Howell sought a longer lasting legacy with the intention of improving English stadiums to be comparable with those found overseas. Proposals included installing new steel cantilever stands (the latest technology), new seating, permanent facilities for television broadcasters for the first time and new hospitality facilities including women’s toilets for the first time at many stadiums. Sheffield Wednesday did not build a new stadium, but developed a gymnasium and a whole new stand seating 5,000 at its existing Hillsborough stadium (HM Treasury, 1965). Middlesbrough FC, whose Ayresome Park ground had the lowest capacity of the host stadiums made significant improvements, proposing an additional 8,520 seats to replace dated terracing, as well as improving its hospitality areas and covered its terraces (Middlesbrough FC 1965a; 1965b; HM Treasury, 1965); Everton FC demolished housing to lengthen their pitch and increase stadium capacity (Mayes, 1966, p. 88), and Manchester United widened a road bridge and developed a ‘modern’ technologically advanced cantilever stand (Financial Times, 1966, p. 15). By the end of the process all six provincial host grounds had at least 18,000 seats installed, a high number in English football grounds at this time (HM Treasury, 1965).

***Political***

There is a clear overlap between the Political and the technological sublimes – UK government as well as FIFA intervention was the driver for technological improvement after the 1964 general election, creating a world class sporting spectacle to showcase the country as we now explain.

Despite satire (e.g. Private Eye, 1966) the World Cup 1966 is remembered as successful: the host nation’s team won, people were happy, and diplomatic embarrassments were avoided. However, British soft power was impacted (Foreign Office, 1966a; 1966b). This was partly due to the poor performance of South American teams - World Champions Brazil exited in the group stages followed by Argentina in the Quarter-Finals. There were claims the English had used their influence within FIFA to choose referees favorable to themselves, which escalated into a diplomatic row with British embassies in South America expressing concern of the risk to British exports and FDI links (Foreign Office, 1966a; 1966b).

The World Cup seduced national and local politicians who thought it would create an opportunity to generate much needed foreign currency and drive the National Plan for industrial renewal, itself a seductive megaproject. This was consistent with the wider failure of 1960s economic and social planning. In a reflection of the way that a small detail can upset a larger plan, the FA appointed the travel agency Thomas Cook, which mismanaged the allocation of visiting supporter accommodation (see below). With reference to organizational theory this was a warning from the 1960s (a decade characterized in Anglo-Saxon economies by M-form organizations) that the Druckerian policy of outsourcing could compromise project delivery (Wilson & Thomson, 2006, p. 108-133). The idea that the World Cup would provide an opportunity to push British industrial exports to football fans might have been far-fetched: there is no evidence to suggest Brazilian fans placed orders for Sheffield steel or Sunderland glass as a direct result of attending the World Cup! This practical disconnect evidences the seduction explicit in sporting mega-events.

 More broadly the tournament improved British relations with DPRK, on a local scale at least, which we explain later in this paper in relation to the symbolic legacy of the 1966 World Cup.

***Economic***

Economic factors had significance at the time of the FA’s first plan for the tournament and became more important as the project progressed.

As hoped, the profile and image of football benefitted from global TV exposure, in this tournament the greatest yet. Advances in marketing and licensing of World Cup branded products, for example the ‘World Cup Willie’ range (Mayes, 1966, p. 44) innovated the first ever world cup mascot. Unlike previous World Cups, the English approach demonstrated that hosting the tournament did not require the construction of new stadiums.

As the tournament grew closer there were hopes it would encourage tourism and promote local industry. However, the expected influx of tourists to the regions did not materialize. Many overseas visitors opted to stay and visit London instead of Sunderland or Liverpool. The provincial cities were relatively unknown to overseas visitors yet were also keen to put themselves in the shop window, and like the tournament overall the regional matches were exploited for local economic purposes. Tours of factories and workplaces were organized, including the Vauxhall Motors factory near Liverpool and the offices of the Littlewoods football pools company (Liverpool Echo, 1966). In Sunderland the local authority organized tours of factories and shipyards (Northern Echo, 1966a). In Middlesbrough, an ‘Industrial Eisteddfod’ event was held on the ICI chemical company’s showgrounds, planned separately from the World Cup but tied into the tournament (Northern Echo, 1966b).

The FA’s Official Travel Agents, Thomas Cook, sold the tournament to overseas visitors in the form of three week ‘packages’ on the assumption that a fan would spend the whole tournament around a fifty-mile radius of a single match center. There were ambitions that floating hotels might be needed to alleviate accommodation shortages in provincial cities but these proved optimistic (FA, 1964c; 1964d; British Railways Board, 1966; Evening Gazette, 1965, p. 11). This approach, which did not match the pattern of matches played, nor take account of London’s allure to overseas visitors, was flawed. Accommodation bookings were not tied to overseas ticket sales and inevitably with a range of attractions the London package proved most popular.

***Aesthetic***

We found little evidence of the aesthetic sublime in Flyvbjerg’s meaning of the term. Construction was temporary or for technical compliance and economic reasons, such as future income. The built legacy of the tournament was one of neglect. With few exceptions, football clubs did not renew their assets until forced to do so by the Taylor Report of 1990, a direct response to the Hillsborough disaster of 1989. Fans also died at another World Cup stadium, Ayresome Park, and elsewhere in the country a fire at Bradford in 1985 showed the dangers of England’s stadiums, which were in need of improvement (Conn, 2004). After Bradford the memory of the World Cup became a symbol of hope when the 1966 World Cup Final was recreated in an exhibition match between England and West Germany teams comprising 1966 alumni (Wray, 1985).

There was an aesthetic dimension to the World Cup 1966 project in terms of the World Cup Willie merchandising, developed for economic purposes but which has become iconic and symbolic of the tournament demonstrating the power of sports mega-event aesthetics. A better way to explain this is in terms its symbolic legacy.

**A Symbolic Legacy**

The 1966 FIFA World Cup has taken on symbolic meaning, for several reasons, including the culmination of sublimes and other factors. It remains the only time the tournament was both hosted and won by England, and this victory took place in the setting of the iconic Wembley stadium, since replaced. At the time of writing there has been a fashion for football nostalgia and 2016 marked the 50th anniversary of these events.

The 1966 World Cup was a symbolic project for unintended reasons – the legacy of the tournament was almost entirely intangible and social rather than built and economic. This partly supports Warrack’s (1993, p. 2) proclamation that megaprojects have “powerful economic, social and symbolic roles in the society”. The final, in which England won 4-2 against West Germany, became iconic – the main reason for this being the technological advances made in the broadcast media which enabled viewers across Europe, the USA and Mexico to watch live. This catalyzed the formation of the North American Soccer League (Cairns, 2016). England’s victory was a landmark moment in English popular memory, likened by some to the assassination of President Kennedy in 1963 (Critcher, 1994, Wray, 1985, Porter, 2009, Hughson, 2016).

Public appetite for televised football in the UK increased after the tournament, raising the profile of the FA’s domestic cup competition and match attendances also enjoyed a short-term revival (European Football Statistics, 2016). To illustrate, the extent to which the BBC commentator Kenneth Wolstenholme’s “Some people are on the pitch, they think it’s all over—it is now!” at the final whistle slipped into the English language, inspiring the title of the BBC’s panel game show *They Think it’s All Over* thirty years later (Porter, 2009). England’s subsequent failure to win the tournament inspired a popular song *Three Lions* which included lyrics reflecting on England’s “thirty years of hurt” since 1966 (Baddiel & Skinner, 1996). The tournament was also instrumental in broadening the appeal of football amongst females as supporters (Pope, 2016) and players (Lopez, cited by BBC 2016).

 There was a more successful cultural and commercial legacy related to another symbol of the tournament, the mascot World Cup Willie, conceived as a marketing device within England only, and at the time commercially unsuccessful. Subsequent World Cups have had their own mascot, and the Olympic Games followed suit a few years later, as well as the UEFA European Championship in 1980 (McGuiness, 2011). English football clubs also introduced mascots in the wake of 1966 (Football League Review, 1967). The legacy lives on – London 2012 was notable for two mascots, Wenlock and Mandeville, although it remains to be seen whether they have the longevity of World Cup Willie. Simultaneously the British Olympic Committee launched Pride the Lion, a mascot resembling World Cup Willie (Gibson, 2011)! Even today, World Cup Willie memorabilia is for sale, on the collector market for original items and also as contemporary souvenirs. An opportunity for this has been provided by the football nostalgia market, symbolized by the National Football Museum’s dual site ‘World Cup ’66’ exhibition in 2016-17 in Manchester and Wembley Stadium. Anniversary exhibitions were also organized locally at other 1966 host cities.

The fiftieth anniversary was also commemorated by the media, including documentaries, dramatizations, and newspaper articles. Book publishers also capitalized with a plethora of new titles. An academic symposium was held in London during June 2016, attended by some of the authors and academic experts. Another way in which 1966 has been commemorated was the launch of the Sporting Memories Network, a social research project to record written and oral memories of the tournament. This project was extended to establish a network of sporting memories groups for people over 50 and demonstrates how the unforeseen legacy of a sporting event can be used for social good decades later. It exists ‘to reignite connections between generations and combat the effects of dementia, depression and loneliness’. This is fitting because some members of England’s 1966 team have been diagnosed with Alzheimer’s Disease (Sporting Memories, 2017).

At a local level a symbolic relationship between Middlesbrough and the DPRK has persisted. The Ayresome Park stadium was demolished in 1997 to make way for a housing estate incorporating memorials to the club and tournament, but a bronze sculpture marks the location of an important goal scored by North Korea (Wood & Gabie, 2011). The North Korea players revisited Ayresome Park in 2002 (Middlesbrough FC, 2002) and the Middlesbrough Ladies Team visited North Korea in 2010 (Kelly, 2010).

**The Temporary Organization – a missed opportunity?**

We have outlined the outcomes and legacies of the tournament in relation to technological, political, economic, aesthetic and symbolic perspectives. Also important is the missed opportunity to sustain the successful relationships within the project organization. The delivery of the project entailed a series of temporary organizations oriented around each city by the Local Liaison Committees, stretching the scope of the project far off the pitch (FA, 1963b).

These organizations brought football’s institutions – including the FA, and the clubs, together with the media, local authorities, police and utility companies such as the General Post Office and British Rail. This enabled the creation of an integrated communications system to manage the unusual demands of the tournament. Press centers were established at stadiums and city centers with new telephone links to allow international media to dispatch reports (Mayes, 1966). Special rail services were arranged to correspond with games, and British Rail also set up a Transport Information Unit to relay information to the BBC (British Railways Board, 1966). Information kiosks were provided for foreign visitors (British Railways Board, 1966; HM Treasury, 1965; Northern Echo, 1966a) and a corps of language students from universities recruited as translators (FA, 1965). Universities and colleges provided premises and team accommodation (FA, 1964d; Foreign Office 1966a; Manchester Evening News, 1966). The temporary organizations engendered a great sense of camaraderie. Workers in Manchester remarked it was a shame there wasn’t another project after the tournament (Shiel, 2006). This network evidences the existence of soft structures, as discussed in our literature review. However, we broaden Kaplanidou et al.’s (2016) concept of business networks to place greater emphasis on state run organizations. But in the case of 1966 this was a missed opportunity – an example of inter-agency cooperation to deliver a large-scale project, with no further projects planned.

**DISCUSSION**

Scranton (2014, p. 354) raises the question “is it possible projects serve as a useful category for historical analysis?” We examine this proposition by looking at one such historical project, the 1966 FIFA World Cup in England. We analyzed the 1966 World Cup as a megaproject worthy of analysis informed by project management and organizational theory, in relation to contexts of its time. Doing so has allowed us to extend the work of Flyvberg (2012, 2014a) by demonstrating that the four sublimes of megaprojects can interact and change over the course of a project. We also identify what goes on in a sport mega-event project and how it was managed.

Our findings provide an alternative view of the factors that need to be taken into account when evaluating such events as success or failure over time, including its symbolic impact on national identity and status, international relations and so on. We also explain the temporal nature of project implementation, demonstrating that the strategic and institutional context itself is not static over the lifetime of a project, and thus the contribution of historical analysis is to provide the opportunity to evaluate how these challenges were managed. We argue that this requires an understanding of the dynamic nature of megaproject management.

Megaprojects are expensive in terms of time as well as finance and thus carry considerable reputational as well as economic risk. Time, together with political reputation and international diplomacy were prominent drivers in the case of the 1966 World Cup. Unlike contemporary sports mega-events or the FIFA World Cups of the 1930s, the 1966 FIFA World Cup was not initially conceived or engineered as a symbolic megaproject. The tournament did not require the construction of huge new stadiums. The 1966 edition represents an interesting pivot in the history of soccer’s world cup, which subsequently amplified and the 1966 event was at the vanguard of the global expansion of the soccer ‘industry’. Despite the lack of tangible built reminders to1966 (even Wembley Stadium has been demolished and rebuilt – a megaproject in its own right) tourism and economic opportunities have arisen since, due to the symbolic nature of the project.

We therefore argue that the World Cup 1966 was a “vanguard project” (Brady & Davies, 2004, p. 1607) and should be viewed as the pivot between the ‘Stanley Rous era’ of FIFA and the approach taken to hosting mega-events in Britain, and the coming of Rous’ successor at FIFA, João Havelange, who ushered in a new commercial era of football.

We view this project as one which emerged within a particular spatial temporal context, with unique features (Maylor, Brady, Cooke-Davies & Hodgson, 2006) that arose because of the nature of the temporary organization wrought around it and one where there was a great danger of knowledge being forgotten (Foucault, 1971) as the FIFA World Cup circus moved on elsewhere. By viewing the World Cup project in such a way we also seek to show it is possible to answer Söderlund & Lenfle’s (2013, p. 654) call for more variety to enhance our knowledge of projects in countries such as England and away from the railway, canal, military and space projects. We add further methodological sophistication by breaking away from the quasi-Chandlerian norm (Söderlund & Lenfle, 2013), not only challenging the hegemony of corporate histories but directly engaging with them while using their archives to find traces, sometimes merely transient and ephemeral on their own but when converged together prove synergistic in the creation of the narrative of a transient multifaceted organization (p. 656).

The argument that sport is a relevant topic for social science has been made by Bourdieu (1991) who postulated that sport is a form of production intended to meet a social rather than economic demand. Within the study of sport, global mega-events such as World Cups which require associated infrastructure work and off the pitch intervention are a type of megaproject. Their size and significance is evidenced by the fact that their organizer FIFA has more members than the United Nations and because of their ubiquity and the use of large sums of money, including public investment makes them worthy of critical analysis (De Bruijn & Leijten, 2007).

The study of World Cups and their legacy therefore requires researchers to look not just at tangible economic legacy but also at intangible and non-economic legacy. The 1966 project is particularly interesting because the tournament which took place differed significantly from the original conception. Developments were done mainly to a) meet FIFA required standards and b) improve hospitality and press/media facilities. As such the 1966 World Cup became an important event in the evolution of the tournament towards its contemporary scope and scale and also symbolic in English national identity - partly because of an injection of public money which contributed to its success.

The organization of the 1966 World Cup Finals was a project shaped by Morris & Geraldi’s (2011, pg. 23) “Level 3” environment, but one in which the parent organization, FIFA (Fédération Internationale de Football Association), franchised out the implementation to a wide range of institutional actors such as the English Football Association (FA), the UK government, local authorities and national utilities. These actors came together to deliver the tournament with a finite deadline, but the team was dissolved and moved on to very different projects despite the feeling that the project organization had developed real capacity.

This case emphasizes that politics in the megaproject sense is not limited to relations with government but also to the wider “institutional” context (Morris & Geraldi, 2011, p. 20). Therefore Flyvbjerg’s (2014a, pp. 8-9) definition of the “political sublime” should be expanded to include institutions as well as governments. International NGOs such as FIFA and the English FA provide the institutional framework for the operation of sporting megaprojects. Indeed, FIFA’s entire economic survival at this time was contingent on the World Cup, and this remains true to a large extent today even though the main income streams are now from sponsorship and broadcasting rights rather than ticket sales.

**CONCLUSION AND SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH**

The central contribution of this paper is to illustrate the dynamic nature of Flyvbjerg’s sublimes framework. With government intervention the 1966 FIFA World Cup evolved from just a football event into an increasingly important political, social and economic megaproject. We have found that the main benefits of the project were actually unintended or perhaps accidental and the intended benefits either did not materialize or melted away. Government intervention in megaprojects is always a risky activity but in this case the government’s involvement changed the nature of the project, which had already shifted from the original plan, and served to increase the visibility of the project and thus ironically enhanced its cultural significance. We have reached these conclusions by analyzing what happened during the project and how it was managed.

Our study has resonance for contemporary megaprojects, potentially beyond sport, where the political sublime is an important driver. As sports mega-events become bigger in scale and scope the lead-time expands. Therefore the need to understand the implementation phase has increased. Historical sports mega-events provide an opportunity to evaluate an entire implementation process, including the change implicit within this process.

 We recommend further research should be undertaken to evaluate the pressures of continuity and change during the lives of megaprojects. We have demonstrated the usefulness of contemporary project management theory (i.e. Flyvbjerg’s sublimes, and Morris and Geraldi’s three levels) in analyzing an historic megaproject. In particular, we have found that these frameworks were useful for explaining continuity in a project, but less so change. We have also found that the main benefits of the 1966 World Cup project were actually unintended or perhaps accidental. Government intervention in megaprojects is always a risky activity but in this case the government’s involvement changed the nature of the project, which had already shifted from the original plan, and served to increase the visibility of the project and thus ironically enhanced its cultural significance. With government intervention the 1966 FIFA World Cup was more than just a football event but an important political, social and economic megaproject.

 Areas for further research should therefore focus on the dynamic nature of sublimes and of decision-making within the levels of a project. Specifically research should aim to explain more recent and more complex megaprojects where legacy was planned and engineered into the projects from the early phases. An obvious comparative study would be to research another World Cup or Olympiad, but other case studies beyond sports could be similarly rich, such as transport or military, in instances where the institutional and political contexts have been particularly dynamic – such as regime change. We shall now explain how further research could apply additional theory to develop and refine the ideas presented in this paper.

In our paper we have drawn mainly upon Flyvberg’s sublimes and Morris and Geraldi’s three levels of project management. Used together, these frameworks were most suitable because a) their scope is consistent with the most significant stakeholders identified from our data, and b) we have been concerned with changes over the lifetime of the project and its longitudinal legacy, including the way in which the project has resulted in, or even shaped, symbolic value. But there are other perspectives – for example a corpus of work on large-scale projects exists that is underpinned by a sociological perspective of institutional theory (see for example, Javernick – Will & Scott, 2010; Ainamo et al., 2010; Scott, Levitt & Orr, 2011). Here, conception of institutional theory, which “attends to the deeper and more resilient aspects of social structure” (Scott, 2005, p. 460) has adapted Scott’s (1995) pillars framework which emphasises three main elements of institutions – they are regulative, normative and cultural-cognitive. Put simply, “institutions lead to regularized or homogenous behaviour within a group” (Mahalingam & Levitt, 2007 p. 523) as “a dominant institutional form will overcome a weaker one” (Mahalingam & Levitt, 2007 p. 526).

The Institutional conception of an organization’s context appears broader than the frameworks of Flyvberg and Morris & Geraldi. Scott (2011, p. 8) proposes institutional perspectives can help to inform and guide decision-making by important project stakeholders including “governments, oversight bodies, consumers of services, community members, and interest groups”. This broader sociological institutional perspective has been applied to global projects concerning engineering projects focussing on built environment and infrastructure development and does not appear to fully reflect or explain the findings which emerged from our data relating to the 1966 FIFA World Cup. There is however potential for applying institutional theory to other historic cases, and also to recent sports mega-events such as the London 2012 Olympics, or contemporary or future FIFA World Cups, which from the bidding stage onwards explicitly placed more emphasis on legacy for a wider scope of stakeholders than was evident from our findings of the 1966 tournament. This legacy has often involved investment in new infrastructure and the built-environment. For instance, Germany which hosted the 2006 World Cup already had sufficient stadiums to host the tournament, but public funding was lavished upon infrastructure, including a new central railway station in Berlin. The 2010 World Cup in South Africa and 2014 edition in Brazil also involved considerable investment in stadiums and public infrastructure, and for the 2022 tournament, hosts Qatar have promised 9-12 stadiums with at least $65m investment in transport and hotel infrastructure (Tennent & Gillett, 2016). Indeed, the 2022 FIFA World Cup project is sufficiently globalized for the project to act as an opportunity to import procurement accreditations from overseas (Kaplanidou et al., 2016). Specifically, we identify the following future research directions:

• How do national or organizational cultures affect sports governing bodies such as FIFA and other global sporting bodies (i.e., IOC), continental confederations (i.e. UEFA, CAF, CONMEBOL), and national associations (i.e. English Football Association, United States Soccer Federation)?

• How do national or organizational cultures affect the way that these bodies work with each other and with external stakeholders such as governments, sponsors, construction firms, the media, and other stakeholders?

• How does institutional perspective affect the project sublimes for hosting sports megaprojects?

• How do the institutional factors affect the perceived legacy of hosting sporting events? Is legacy perceived differently by different stakeholder groups depending upon their cultural attitudes, beliefs and so on?

Hofstede’s (1993) cultural beliefs include the most deep-set and “slow moving” of the institutional elements. They connect to deeper “background” assumptions taken for granted by their adherents, including expectations of power distance, uncertainly avoidance, masculinity and long term orientation (Campbell 2004, ch. 4). So institutional theory helps us understand how and why things work the way they do. For example, conflicting timing norms can lead to temporal misfits on global projects (Dille and Soderlund, 2011; 2013), institutional theory could help us to more easily coordinate norms within sporting megaproject teams to fit the requirements of the sporting calendar, TV broadcasts, and so on. Orr et al. (2011a, p.48-49) identify leadership, teamwork, and risk management as areas for future research but perhaps most interesting in terms of the symbolic legacy for sport megaprojects might be trust and shared project culture. The creation of new group identities, symbols and collective practices specific to the project team in sports mega-event projects raises certain questions. For example:

• To what extent does a shared culture develop within a project organization, especially in relation to Morris and Geraldi’s (2011) three levels of project management?

• How long does this take to achieve good performance and how can it be accelerated?

• How can the quality of output be optimised?

Project management and institutional theory has tended to take a snapshot approach– this is where historic studies are potentially useful; whereas longitudinal studies require the researcher to wait for something to happen, historic studies such as the case presented in this paper allow us to look at a temporal run of data to analyse the evolution and legacy of a project over the medium to long term, in our case over six decades. For example, a process research approach could be applied to chart events, activities and choices, and the involvement of individuals and organizations within the project organization to shed more light on the sequence of events and dynamics between the various actors as they interpret and react to events in world cup projects (Langley, 1999).

This research agenda has the potential to help further integrate sport, history, and project management research into mainstream international management theory areas. Following Engwall’s (2003) postulation that projects are nested within their historical and organizational contexts we propose further research to identify the evolution and linkages between global sporting mega-event projects. Preuss’ (2007) Matrix of Event Comparison case studies suggests there would be value in studying other events in the United Kingdom such as the UEFA European Championships 1996, or any of the Olympic or Commonwealth games. Alternatively we could explore cases in geographies other than the United Kingdom, for example World Cups or other global sporting megaprojects including multi-sport events such as the Olympic Games, or world championships in a single global sport.

To illustrate, an interesting comparison to our study but beyond the contexts of the World Cup and the UK could be the 2020 Olympic Games, due to be hosted in Japan. Following IOC Agenda 2020 reforms which suggest using existing facilities if it makes financial and practical sense, and with its costs escalating, Japanese government has tried to find savings with new proposals to either move the location of some venues further away from the main Tokyo hub, or even to make more use of some of its existing facilities including the built legacy of the 1964 Olympics (Zimbalist, 2015; The Guardian, 2016).

In summary, the study of sports megaprojects using historic and contemporary data offers potential for rich insight as to the ways in which plans and motives change as megaprojects (and sometimes also the network of organizations involved in and around the temporary organization) become more high-profile and more political. Applying dynamic sublimes, levels of decision making in project organizations, and institutional theory would surely help to develop and refine the conclusions presented in this paper.

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**Figure 1**

**Figure 1:** The 1966 World Cup Swarm (adapted from Tennent and Gillett, 2016)

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**Table 1:** Four Sublimes of the 1966 FIFA World Cup (original plan, 1961)

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Type of Sublime** | **Characteristic** | **Degree of applicability** | **Explanation** |
| **Technological** | The excitement engineers and technologists get in pushing the envelope for what is possible in “longest-tallest-fastest” types of projects | No evidence |  N/A |
| **Political** | The rapture politicians get from building monuments to themselves and for their causes, and form the visibility this generates with the public and media | Some  | * Prestige for English FA as hosts
 |
| **Economic** | The delight business people and trade unions get from making lots of money and jobs off megaprojects, including money made for contractors, workers in construction and transportation, consultants, bankers, investors, landowners, lawyers and developers | Some | * FIFA to ensure organizational continuity
* Government aim to attract foreign currency,
* Local economies from incoming tourism
* Host football clubs from available funding and gate receipts from match attendance

  |
| **Aesthetic** | The pleasure designers and people who love good design get from building and using something very large that is also iconic and beautiful, such as the Golden Gate Bridge | No evidence |   N/A |

**Table 2: Original Rous and Winterbottom Plan: Proposed Stadium Capacities**

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| **Group** | **Stadium** | **Anticipated Capacity** |
| London | Wembley Stadium | 97,165 |
| Highbury | 67,000 |
| White Hart Lane | 62,000 |
| Stamford Bridge | 71,000 |
| Birmingham | Villa Park | 70,500 |
| St. Andrews | 55,000 |
| Wolverhampton | Molineux | 53,500 |
| Liverpool | Goodison Park | 72,000 |
| Manchester | Maine Road | 75,200 |
| Old Trafford | 65,600 |
| Sheffield | Proposed new stadium\* | 58,500 |
| Sunderland | Roker Park | 60,800 |
| Newcastle | St. James’ Park | 59,500 |
| Middlesbrough | Ayresome Park | 55,500 |
| Total | 923,265 |

Source: Adapted from FA, 1961, p. 14

\*Planned by the Sheffield Wednesday board, not specifically for the tournament.

**Table 3:** Morris & Geraldi’s (2011) Three Levels of Project Management and the 1966 FIFA World Cup

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Level** | **Focus of Management** | **FIFA** | **English FA** | **Word Cup Organisation** | **UK Public Sector Institutions** | **Host Football Clubs and liaison committees** |
| **1 Technical** | **Operational and Delivery Orientated** | **Stipulated stadia specification and assessed delivery standards****Appointed match referees****Travel to the tournament for teams and officials from outside of England** | **Travel for teams and officials within England** | **Awarding licensing agreements for use of brands and logos****Print and sell tickets, brochures and programmes** | **Reduce usage of national symbols****Grant visas to visiting teams****Travel agency execution****Public transport provision****Provide policing****Provide utilities and post services****Provide university accommodation and press centres** | **Construction work to improve stadia and facilities****Sell tickets and programmes at hosted fixtures****Provide public information literature and hospitality** **Local PR and press** |
| **2 Strategic** | **Managing Projects as holistic entities including front-end development and definition. Concern for value and effectiveness.** | **Negotiate gate receipt apportionment with English FA** | **Negotiate gate receipt apportionment with FIFA****Front-end development and definition – the World Cup Plan – including financial planning, proposed stadia at each stage of the tournament – speculate about broadcasting, and suggest hotels, training grounds and possible souvenir products****Emphasis on developing existing stadia - no complete new builds – decide that clubs to self-fund permanent improvements** | **Develop brands and logos****Design tournament literature** | **Persuades host football clubs to use allocated public funds to improve hospitality and media facilities****Travel agency planning****Public transport planning****Planned policing****Planned utilities and post services****Planned university accommodation and press centres** |  |
| **3 Institutional**  | **Creating the context and support for projects to flourish and for their management to prosper** | **Set the format, timing, qualification and host****Negotiated broadcasting rights** |  |  | **Set foreign and economic policy outcomes****Allocate public funds to stadium improvement and hospitality** |  |

**Table 4:** Eventual Host Grounds, 1965

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **City** | **Stadium** | **Anticipated Stadium Capacity (per game)** | **No. of Games Hosted** | **Total Capacity (all games)** | **Actual Crowds (all games)** | **Utilization %** |
| London | Empire Stadium, Wembley | 97,000 | 9 | 873000 | 760,795 | 87.1 |
| London | White City Stadium | 60,000 | 1 | 60000 | 44,574 | 74.3 |
| Middlesbrough | Ayresome Park | 46,000 | 3 | 138000 | 54,307 | 39.4 |
| Sunderland  | Roker Park | 63,000 | 4 | 252000 | 107,236 | 42.6 |
| Manchester | Old Trafford | 64,000 | 3 | 192000 | 101,876 | 53.1 |
| Liverpool | Goodison Park | 66,000 | 5 | 330000 | 263,065 | 79.7 |
| Sheffield | Hillsborough | 65,000 | 4 | 260000 | 130,836 | 50.3 |
| Birmingham | Villa Park | 72,000 | 3 | 216000 | 149,580 | 69.3 |
| **Totals** | 533,000\* | 32 | 2321000 | 1,612,269 | 69.5 |

Source: Adapted from FIFA (1964, p. 14).

**\*** This number of seats was available for allocation on any given day to the tournament organisers. The capacity available depended on the allocation of matches to grounds. This was a decision for the organisers who were influenced by stadium capacity as well the desire to spread matches around the country as equally as possible.

**Table 5: The Four ‘Sublimes’ of the 1966 FIFA World Cup**

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Type of Sublime | Characteristic | Degree of applicability | Explanation |
| Technological | The excitement engineers and technologists get in pushing the envelope for what is possible in “longest-tallest-fastest” types of projects | Low  | * Wembley Ltd – “Plexi” roof
* Host football clubs – e.g. steel cantilever stand at Sheffield
* Advances in broadcasting technology, e.g. satellite, replays etc.
* However, World Cup driven by technology, not technology driven by World Cup.
 |
| Political | The rapture politicians get from building monuments to themselves and for their causes, and form the visibility this generates with the public and media | High  | * Seen as consistent with national plan – World Cup as shop window for England
* Prestige for English FA as hosts
 |
| Economic | The delight business people and trade unions get from making lots of money and jobs off megaprojects, including money made for contractors, workers in construction and transportation, consultants, bankers, investors, landowners, lawyers and developers | High  | * FIFA to ensure organizational continuity
* Government aim to attract foreign currency,
* Local economies from incoming tourism
* Host football clubs from government funding and gate receipts from match attendance
* World Cup Organising committee from licensed products
 |
| Aesthetic | The pleasure designers and people who love good design get from building and using something very large that is also iconic and beautiful, such as the Golden Gate Bridge | Low | * WCOC and English FA - Symbolism and branding of the tournament – e.g. the World Cup Willie mascot
* No major aesthetic build legacy
 |

Source: Adapted fromFlyvbjerg (2014, p.8)