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THE ORATORY OF BARRY GOLDWATER

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Introduction

Any discussion of Barry Goldwater's rhetoric must address a paradox. In 1964 Goldwater experienced one of the biggest defeats in American electoral history. Lyndon Johnson won 61 percent of the popular vote, Goldwater 38.4 percent; Johnson won 486 electoral college votes, Goldwater just 52, winning only Arizona (his home state) and five Southern states (Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, and South Carolina). Given that Goldwater stood on an unequivocally conservative platform his defeat was almost universally interpreted as the electorate's rejection of conservatism. Rhetorically Goldwater is best remembered for thirty words in his 1964 speech accepting his party's presidential nomination. Notwithstanding, Goldwater's ideas and supporters remained influential and these ideas achieved dominance amongst Republicans culminating in the nomination of Ronald Reagan. Goldwater's ideas remained central to GOP ideology Goldwater's rhetoric was clearly an electoral failure but extremely successful in helping forging a conservative constituency.

Goldwater's rhetoric failed as electoral persuasion but succeeded as political mobilisation (Taylor 2016, 242-260). How can we explain the same rhetoric producing different outcomes? Two factors seem particularly relevant: time and speaker's character. In 1964 Goldwater was before his time and the long-term influence of his ideas rested on the passage of time and emerging phenomena including anti-war protests, economic problems, and growing dissatisfaction with America's political institutions that rendered Goldwater's ideas infinitely more acceptable to more voters. Second, Goldwater's character – frequently described as rugged individualism -- was seen by many conservatives as appropriate to his message but not so by voters (Hammerback 1972, 175-183). Ronald Reagan, articulating Goldwater's ideas and benefitting from events, proved a far more convincing advocate of Goldwaterism. The chapter examines, first, the nature and content of

Goldwater's ideas; second,it considers Goldwater's rhetorical strategy; and third, it explores the politics of Goldwater's rhetoric. The paper concludes that irrespective of his rhetorical and political shortcomings Barry Goldwater is one of the most effective rhetoricians in American political history.

Goldwater's rhetoric: content

Goldwater rhetoric was, and is, criticised as a divisive, polarising figure which is precisely what he intended. Karl Hess saw winning elections as secondary to establishing a clear choice between political philosophies (1967, 23-4). Covering some 13 states and 10,000 miles a month on behalf of the Senate Republican Committee giving more-or-less the same speech, allied to his syndicated *Los Angeles Times* column and his 1960 book *The Conscience of a Conservative* made Goldwater the most visible and influential conservative politicians. He could be a remarkably effective speaker. Shadegg reported he 'had seen Goldwater tame a hostile audience with his reasonable, friendly responses to antagonistic questions. I had watched him develop a consistent, and to my mind, appealing conservative political philosophy. He possessed ... that quality of charisma which enables a speaker to rouse a crowd to wild enthusiasm' (Shadegg 1965, 5). He was seen by many as offering 'a new rhetoric, new tactics, new emphases' (Bozell 1960, 74) but the critical words are 'to my mind' and Goldwater's problem was the transition from the GOP's rubber-chicken circuit to electioneering. Goldwater spoke to Republicans and ordinary voters *via* the same intellectual prism and using the same language and one of the reasons he was transformative in grassroots Republican politics was that his message was constantly and consistently reiterated before sympathetic audiences. However, what was a largely unmediated message in Republican politics was filtered by the media in the election and this transformed Goldwater's strengths into serious weaknesses (Perlstein 2009, 456).

Whatever his technical weaknesses as an orator and candidate he did evoke an enthusiatic response from audiences attuned to his ideas. Central to his style was a determination to tell voters what Goldwater was convinced they needed to know even if they did not like it. This was coupled to a

willingness to answer any questions put to him by journalists with little thought given to the consequences. Goldwater hoped this style reflected the seriousness of the Republic's plight and that voters would draw the correct conclusions. His determination not to be ensnared by the compromises of electioneering and make 1964 a clear choice between competing political philosophies sometimes led to a failure to 'read' an event and resulted in a public relations disaster. His tendency to 'shoot from the hip' which evoked widly differing responses (his proposal to sell the TVA for $1 evoked both derision and enthusiasm) and about which he was warned. Advisers (for example, in the New Hampshire primary that Goldwater lost) argued for greater message discipline, which Goldwater largely ignored (There were also amateur mistakes. For example, an official portrait has him with his spectacles askew). Goldwater's advisers recognised his oratory generated powerful reactions, 'Throughout his political life, and particularly during the 1964 presidential campaign, politicians attached to Goldwater winced at his blunt speech, his willingness to take a stand on any issue, his doing the unnecessary, his saying things that need not have been said' (Shadegg 1967, 26).[1] Middendorf conceded Goldwater 'was often an inept campaigner, irritable and impatient. But he so much wanted to get his message across in an unvarnished way, "shooting from the hip" was practically a campaign theme' (Middendorf 2006, xi). The problem was that Goldwater's candour and honesty was central to his image, persona, and appeal as a candidate, but by early-1964

[1] Goldwater appointed close friends, known as the Arizona Mafia, to run his campaign, 'Goldwater for President'. This group included, for example, Denison Kitchelt, Dean Burch, William Baroody and Edward McCade who had no experience of running a national campaign. The Draft Goldwater Committee, which contained seasoned political professionals such as Clifton White, William Rusher, and J. William Middendorf were ignored or sidelined. This included speechwriters. There seems little doubt that a lack of expertise led Goldwater to commit a number of errors with regard to messaging but equally it is clear Goldwater was highly resistant to expert advice.

Goldwater's favourable coverage evaporated as he came under media scrutiny, a great deal of which was unfair. The 1964 Republican convention at the Cow Palace, San Francisco, was critical in fixing Goldwater's image. The silencing of Rockefeller by Goldwater supporters and the perceived extremism of his acceptance speech both of which were broadcast live on tv and did much to fix his extremist image in the public mind (see Skipper 2016 for a recent account). Goldwater came over to many in the electorate as unpleasant and frightening.

Kennedy's assassination and Johnson's emergence meant the prospect of an effective Conservative/GOP electoral challenge faded; Republican divisions at the San Francisco convention and Goldwater's statements gave Democrats all the ammunition they needed for devastating assault (see, for instance, Mann 2011, 83-102, and Johnson 2009, 199-247). Goldwater's objective in 1964 was to re-establish two-party competition with each party representing distinct ideologies and thereby offering voters a clear political choice so laying the foundations for conservative growth (Hess 1967, 39-42). Goldwater had long deprecated the decline of party competition because 'we cannot longer [sic] win elections ... by playing the role of a political Santa Claus? ... The attempt to be all things to all men is a frail admission that, each in our own philosophies of government, has not sufficient substance or competence to serve the Nation well and in accordance with constitutional standards' (Goldwater 1957, 5261). As party competition declined, political choice narrowed and policy degenerated; party politics were now built around an unstable and leftwards-moving 'centre' that ineluctably led to political parties abandoning principle. Southern voters were in the vanguard of political change because 'realizing that they cannot live under a single-party system; that they have to have a two-party system; that there has to be competition between the parties all over this country' they were moving away from the Democrats. Without party and ideological competition government would not be restrained (Goldwater 1961a, 17642). Differentiation was absolutely fundamental because 'If the "out" party cannot or will not grit its teeth and dig in for the long hard fight ... then it will become a non-party. ... Politics, then, ceases to be partisan ... Nothing changes but the players' (Hess 1967, 152). The lack of a distinct ideological choice threatened individual

freedom because it institutionalised one-party rule and ensured the Republican Party became 'an annex of the Democratic Party ... dedicated to the same programs under different personalities' (Hess 1967, 158). By the late-1950s/early-1960s disaffection with the New Deal consensus, social and geographical change and Goldwater's proselytising meant a conservative insurgency was taking-off (see for example Andrew 1997; Schneider 1999; Schoenwald 2011; and Gifford 2009).

The foundation of his rhetoric was a profound hostility to government as *the* threat to individual liberty,

> More and more Americans are beginning to understand that all forms government other than the governments of free men, require central control to become effective. This is a common and an absolutely necessary ingredient of government collectivism. I don't care whether we call it communism, socialism, Fabianism, the welfare state, the planned economy, the New Deal, Fair Deal or the New Frontier (Goldwater 1961a, 17643).

From Goldwater's perspective *all* state intervention promoted collectivism, the enemy of choice and therefore freedom,

> I suggest that if you must choose, it is better to be poor and free than to be snug and a slave.
>
> I suggest that if you must choose, it is better to live in peril, but with justice, than to live on a summit of material power, but unjustly.
>
> I suggest that if you must choose, it is better to stand up as a suffering man than to lie down as a satisfied animal (Goldwater 1962a, 2059).

Republicans would win only if conservative principles offered 'a clear-cut choice' between 'the paternalistic super-state with its ever increasing spending and its ever-increasing taxation and its ever-increasing interference in the life of the individual' with the GOP acting 'as a vehicle through

which the people can assert their sovereignty over government' (Goldwater 1960a,7. See also Annunziata 1980).

Goldwater's vision demanded a new kind of politician, which is captured in the credo in *The Conscience of a Conservative*,

> I have little interest in streamlining government or in making it more efficient, for I mean to reduce its size. I do not undertake to promote welfare, for I propose to extend freedom. My aim is not to pass laws but to repeal them. It is not to inaugurate new programs, but to cancel old ones that do violence to the Constitution, or that have failed in their purpose, or that impose on the people an unwarranted financial burden. I will not attempt to discover whether legislation is 'needed' before I have first determined it is constitutionally permissible. And if I should later be attacked for neglecting my constituents' 'interests,' I shall reply that I was informed their main interest is liberty and that in that cause I am doing the very best I can (Goldwater 2013, 13).

Government was *the* threat to freedom and government's 'only proper role' was protecting the Republic's 'traditions and principles, its institutions of religious liberty, of educational and economic opportunity, of Constitutional rights, of the integrity of the law, [which] are the most precious possession of the human race' (Goldwater 1961b, 9952). The American ideal was not 'to become bigger, fatter, and more luxurious ... Are we really nothing better than materialists?' Goldwater declared, 'I do not believe that any mere standard of living, in itself, is worth dying for'; America, he continued, 'has for its moral object the high dignity of man; and for its political aim, ordered freedom – liberty under God and under the law – with justice for all.' He concluded, 'If it comes to the test we ought to die rather than to submit to a collectivist anthill, no matter how glistening or filled with up-to-date comforts' (Goldwater 1962a, 2059).

The Eisenhower administration's 1957 budget was described by Goldwater as 'a betrayal of the people's trust' and 'government by bribe' that ensured a loss of freedom: 'our people do need to be inspired – inspired in the way of helping themselves unimpeded by Government ... inspired by the conviction that the Federal Government gives to the people nothing which it does not first take from them.' High taxation and budget deficits meant 'the United States can spend itself out of existence as a free and sovereign nation.' The erosion of economic strength meant the erosion of all other defences and individual protections in the face of centralised government whose rise heralded the end of the American constitutional order. The Eisenhower administration 'instead of following its original campaign pledges, simply parrot the antics of its predecessor against which it labored so loud and justly in 1952' (Goldwater 1957, 5259 and 5260). This road would culminate in the demise of American democracy.

His speech to the Republican Women's Convention, *'No Time for Timid Souls'* (Prescott, Arizona 3 May 1958), argued the Depression had brought to power a class of individuals hostile to the American way. The solutions to *all* America's problems would come from 'the small towns ... from the men and women who look up from the toil of their day to day labors toward a better world...' but 'you and I are caught like a shuttlecock in a badmington game between the power plays of ambitious men' (Goldwater 1958a, 8355). Freedom was threatened because government had 'subscribed to that ancient fallacy that a powerful central government could do more for man than man could for himself' and

> after 25 years of meddling and tinkering with the basic concepts of the Constitution with our ancient understandings of the position of a free man in a free society, and with our constant increasing dependence upon a central authority, in business and in labor and in government, the face of America's main street has changed (Goldwater 1958a, 8355).

Americans confronted a 'paternalisitic and collective administrative dictatorship' offering voters the 'pie-in-the-sky of collectivist paternalism in return for a surrender of our individual freedoms and

responsibilities' (Goldwater 1958a, 8356). Speaking at Flint, Michigan, Goldwater warned of 'the constant interference of professional politicians' that 'dulled and demoralized'; these 'demagogs and their Communist allies ... still mouthing the cliches of the thirties' represented the most significant threat to the United States. The conservatives' task was to 'drag them kicking and screaming into the second half of the 20th Century' (Goldwater 1961c, 7593-7594).

An example of Goldwater's ideological consistency and willingness to be be unpopular was his opposition Federal education funding. Responding to a Senate debate, Goldwater declared 'I did not hear anything then, I have not heard anything since, to convince me that the Federal Government should put another one of its meddling fingers into the affairs of the States by sticking it into the educational system, a responsibility of the States' (Goldwater 1958b, 17291-17292). Federal funding was unconstitutional and Federal interference testified to the contempt in which the Constitution was now held:

> Federal aid for schools, for any purpose, is morally and legally wrong because it will lead to Federal control ... Nowhere in the Constitution is Congress given permission to tax and spend for the Nation's schools ... If Federal aid to education is imposed, it eventually will ... make collectivized captives of our children (Goldwater 1958b, 17293).

'I am not', Goldwater lamented, 'very proud of the Republican Party tonight' and concluded that the best thing 'I can do for my community, my State, my country ... is to see to it that Federal aid to education receives a decided setback ...' (Goldwater 1958b, 17294 and 17295).

A similar attitude characterised Goldwater's response to civil rights legislation. Whilst personally opposed to discrimination and segregation, Goldwater interpreted the Civil Rights Act (1964) through the lens of burgeoning Federal power and regulation. Despite conceding a role for Federal legislation in promoting legal equality he believed that Title II (public accommodation) and Title VII (fair employment practices) clashed with the individual right to possess, and liberty to enjoy and

dispose of, private property. This liberty was the foundation of freedom and so Titles II and VII posed 'a grave threat to the very essence of our basic system of government' (Goldwater 1964a, 14319). So radical were Titles II and VII, their objectives ought only to be realised by a constitutional amendment for to do otherwise 'is to act in a manner which could ultimately destroy the freedom of all American citizens, including the freedom of the very persons whose feelings and whose liberties are the major subject of this legislation'. Regulating private property rights to the degree sought by the bill would 'require the creation of a Federal police force of mammoth proportions' relying on an '"informer" psychology' creating a police state (Goldwater 1964a, 14319). The cure was, in Goldwater's view, worse than the disease.

A key feature of Goldwater's politics was his anti-communism and hostility to the USSR. The USA should not shrink from confrontation with the USSR even at the risk of nuclear war because 'our national existence is once again threatened as it was in the early days of the Republic' by 'alien forces'. This had reached the point at which

> American leaders, both political and intellectual, are searching desperately for means of "appeasing" or "accomodating" the Soviet Union as the price of national survival. The American people are being told that, however valuable their freedom may be, it is even more important to live. *A craven fear of death is entering the American consciousness*... (Goldwater 1960b, 5571. Emphasis added).

The USSR, unlike the USA, was determined to win the Cold War; 'We must – as the first step toward saving American freedom – affirm the contrary view and make it the cornerstone of our foreign policy: that *we would rather die than lose our freedom*' (Goldwater 1960b, 5572. Emphasis added).

America's 'ultimate objective' was 'a world in which there is the largest possible measure of freedom and justice and peace and material prosperity' but this was unattainable 'without the prior defeat of world communism' so 'It follows that victory over communism is the ... goal of American policy'

(Goldwater 1961d, 582). America's commitment to winning the Cold War had declined precipitately and would continue to decline to the point where the country was 'isolated and besieged by an entirely hostile world.' Therefore, 'We will have to shed the attitudes of and techniques of the Salvation Army and start behaving like a great power' because 'This sluggish sentimentality, this obsession for pleasing people, has become a matter of grand strategy; has become no less than the guiding principle of American policy'(Goldwater 1961d, 585). One response was to 'encourage the captive peoples to revolt against their Communist rulers. This policy must be pursued with caution and prudence as well as courage' but 'we would invite the Communist leaders to choose between the total destruction of the Soviet Union, and accepting a local defeat' (Goldwater 1961d, 585).

From this brief survey it is clear how radical was Goldwater's rhetoric and how it brought him into conflict with large sections of the political establishment and electorate.

Goldwater's rhetorical strategy

Eisenhower's victory in 1952, made the him the first Republican president since Hoover, but his espousal of Modern Republicanism infuriated conservatives like Goldwater (Donaldson 2014, 120-122). Modern Republicanism sought to combine fiscal conservatism and social liberalism but Goldwater argued Eisenhower's administration was a failure because it preserved the New Deal. However, Republican losses in 1956 and in the 1958 mid-terms and the liberal-Republican stranglehold on the party's nominating process created space for a new articulation of conservatism emerging from the the mid-West, California, and the South. Goldwater's dislike of the Administration's policies was tempered by his party loyalty but he launched his insurgency on 8 April 1957 with a critique of the Administration's budget in the Senate. The Republican and Democrat parties were

> peddlers of the philosophy that the Constitution is outmoded, that States rights are void, and that the only hope for the future of these United States is for our people to be federally born, federally housed, federally clothed, federally educated, federally supported

> in their occupations, and to die a Federal death, thereafter to be buried in a Federal box in a Federal cemetery (Goldwater 1957, 5260).

Republicans were equally culpable,

> we have been so thoroughly saturated with the New Deal doctrine of big, squanderbust government, that, as a party, we Republicans have on more than one occasion shown tendencies to bow to the siren song of socialism and, instead of hurling a challenge against the ravages of the pseudo-liberals amongst us, have accepted their doctrines, lock, stock, and barrel, saying only "we can do it better" (Goldwater 1957, 5261).

Modern Republicanism meant, therefore, that whichever party was in office, the Democrats remained in power. The GOP lost its political distinctiveness and buttressed the status quo ('the socialistic Republicrats', 'dime-store New Dealers', 'me-tooism', 'country club Republicans'). In 1958 Goldwater complained,

> We are putting a Federal crutch under the arms of the people. We are taking away the bootstraps which Americans once grasped firmly and pulled on to make something out of themselves. We are instilling in the American people the desire to rely upon the Federal Government for everything they need and do (Goldwater 1958b, 17924).

Goldwater complained of America's infantilisation and transformation into 'a national wet nurse – dispensing a cockeyed kind of patent medicine labeled "Something for Nothing", passing out soothing syrup and pacifiers in return for grateful votes on election day' (Goldwater 1960a, 6). Contemplating the 1960 presidential election Goldwater wrote in his journal that since 1940 Republicans 'have had nothing but "me-tooism" ' and he feared 'another seizure of "me-tooism" ... *To me this is a certainty* ... what we have offered the people and what the Vice President (Richard Nixon) apparently wants to take as his stock in trade is a dime-store new deal' (Dean and Goldwater 2008, 204 and 210. Emphasis added). Republicans and Democrats 'offered candidates and policies

which were little more than hollow echoes of the siren songs of the welfare staters' (Goldwater 1960a, 6).

These attacks, his 1958 victory in Arizona, his anti-communism , and feud with the UAW's Walter Reuther ("I would rather have Jimmy Hoffa stealing my money than Walter Reuther stealing my Freedom.") on the McLellan Committee, transformed Goldwater into the national advocate of a new conservative vision (see Shermer 2008, 678-709 for the role of labour in Goldwater's rise). This vision and message resonated powerfully and Goldwater, as the chair of the Senate Republican Campaign Committee, travelled the country outlining his conservatism to enraptured audiences (Perlstein 2009, 46; Donaldson 2003, 59-60). From January 1960 Shadegg ghosted Goldwater's thrice weekly column, *'How Do You Stand, Sir?'*, in *The Los Angeles Times*, which became the fastest growing feature in the history of the Time-Mirror Syndicate, eventually appearing in over 150 newspapers across America. Clarence Manion, the former dean of Notre Dame law school and an *uber*-conservative activist, suggested that Goldwater publish a statement of his views. *The Conscience of a Conservative,* was drafted by Brent R. Bozell, a founder and editor of the *National Review* with W.F. Buckley, who was also Buckley's brother-in-law and a Goldwater speech writer. *The Conscience of a Conservative* was written with Goldwater's full collaboration and enjoyed huge sales and massive distribution thanks to wealthy conservative donors. Goldwater became the acknowledged leader of the conservative movement whose ideology emphasised the absolute centrality of freedom and identfied the Constitution as the expression and defence of freedom and from this Goldwater derived his critique of contemporary politics. This critique condemned the New Deal, its successors and its imitators, the decline of laisser-faire, high taxation, federal spending and budget deficits, the erosion of states' rights and burgeoning Federal power, the growth of special interests, the growth of welfarism, and the domestic and international communist threat. With the publication of *Conscience* Goldwater became the embodiment and most forceful advocate of the new conservatism.

Sections of public opinion already dissented from the New Deal-consensus and so Goldwater was both a symptom and cause of 'the growing strength of the conservative mobilization in the 1940s, 1950s, and 1960s' (Phillips-Fein 2011, 726). This was, in part, the product of the shifting geographical and social bases of the 'new' conservatism. This included the prosperous, upwardly mobile, white, Democrats who had moved to the suburbs or growth hubs such as Orange County in California, Goldwater's own Phoenix in Arizona, and the Southwest generally (see, Schuparra 1992; Schuppara 1998; and McGirr 2001); the ex-Democratic voting, white ethnic group backlash (for example Nicolaides 2002; Durr 2007; and Self 2005); and the South, which had been moving Republican since 1952 (see, Crespino 2009; Lowndes 2008; and Lassiter 2006). Stewart Alsop concluded that 'Whereever there is a lot of new money ... the West and Southwest, in Texas, in the newly industrialized South – there is fanatical Goldwater support' (Alsop 1964; also Crespi 1965). Goldwaterism's social and geographic base offered the prospect of a conservative winning in 1964 without the ground-zero of liberal Republicanism, the North-East (Rusher 1963). The central purpose of Goldwater's rhetoric was to draw these people together and mobilise them around his conception of conservatism.

Selecting a relatively small number of speeches from a far larger body of work inevitably raises questions about the reasons for selection and the representativeness of the selected cases. Definitive texts of the many hundreds of speeches given to coutnless audiences do not exist; many speeches were closer to the extemporaneous and Goldwater was not a fan of the fixed-text speech, preferring to draw on themes such as the family, taxation, deficits, the USSR, labour relations, and so on. The speeches analysed here were selected because, first, they deal with themes identified by Goldwater himself as absolutely central to his stance; and second, they are united by a common argumentation and in many cases by style. Their significance is further demonstrated by the fact that many were read into the *Congressional Record* either by Goldwater or sympathetic fellow senators. Others are significant because of where they were given and the audience addressed. Taken together they provide an overview of Goldwater's rhetorical strategy. Of the many speeches

delivered by Goldwater this paper analyses the 1957 Senate speech attacking budget deficits, the *'No Time for Timid Souls'* speech (a peaen to the virtues of small-town America), the 1958 speech opposing federal education funding, the Air War College speech, and the speech opposing the 1964 civil rights act. Of Goldwater's writings I have omitted *Why Not Victory?,* a foreign policy study that repeats at greater length statements and sentiments found elsewhere but include *The Forgotten Americans*. Conceived of as '*A Statement of Proposed Republican Principles, Programs and Objectives'* (also included), which was intended as a 'stem-to-stern Republican legislative agenda for the 1960s' but Goldwater's interest quickly faded away (Perlstein 2009, 138). Goldwater's speech to a Republican Fund Raiser at Flint, Michigan, provides concise statement of Goldwater's views and is included as an instance of his 'standard' speech. '*A Statement of Proposed Republican Principles, Programs and Objectives'* represents, however, an extended statement of a putative Goldwaterite conservative governing project that supplements *The Conscience of a Conservative* (also included), itself a distillation of his years on the Republican rubber chicken circuit and which is of lasting significance (Regnery 2014). The final source used is Goldwater's speech to the 1964 convention accepting the Republican presidential nomination, which represents the summation of Goldwater's rhetorical effort (Goldwater 1964b).

Figure 1 gives the tag cloud for the texts and Table 1 the number and percentage of word usage. The tag cloud is a visual representation of the frequency (and therefore significance) of the ideas and concepts used in the texts that were characteristic of Goldwater's speaking and writing and which enthused so many audiences. What matters, however, is not the words and concepts *per se* but their combination and consequent meaning within the message's structure and objective. Thus, 'federal' and 'government' were presented as a negative by a conservative and a positive by a liberal; everyone favours 'freedom' but (as Isaiah Berlin showed) freedom can be defined as either negative or positive.

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In the frequency count 'government' and 'federal' are the most numerous and are the antithesis of 'people' and 'freedom'; similarly, 'american' and 'states' signal the importance of both unity and diversity in Goldwater's thinking and their antithesis is, of course, 'communism' that represents the regimented other, against which Americans must be 'united' to defeat communism at home and abroad. This also captured the proper distribution of political power. 'Federal', 'freedom' and 'states' is a significant combination in Goldwater's discourse as it is a proxy for states rights, which was itself a proxy for Southern (and increasingly, Northern) hostility to civil rights and support for segregation. An appeal to the South was central to Goldwater's strategy in 1964 (*'hunting where the ducks are'*) and whatever Goldwater's personal convictions about segregation and discrimination this was an appeal addressed to those fearful of civil rights and African-American advancement inside (and outside) the South. A visible and significant word is 'should'. 'Should' is a modal verb expressing duty, identifying (or suggesting) the best or correct thing to do and is related intimately to 'ought', with its strong imputation of moral duty (should = *'do the right thing'*). 'Should' suggests that a situation exists, or could come into existence, and therefore indicates both purpose and response. It is an extremely significant word, indicating a moral imperative, the reason for a conservative insurgency and the urgent need for change, connoting a duty to transform politics, policy and the polity. In the final section we consider how this message was articulated.

The Politics of Goldwater's Oratory

One of the intruiging unknowns of the 1964 election is the effect of Kennedy's assassination on Goldwater's oratory. As senators Kennedy and Goldwater were on friendly terms and Goldwater refers to a proposal to stage a campaign of ideas modelled on the 1858 Lincoln-Douglas debates. This would be 'a direct and decisive confrontation between antagonistic political philosophies – the welfare state, represented by the Democrats, and a society of free independent, responsible individuals to be represented by the Republicans' (Shadegg 1967, 86) and Middendorf reports that

'We knew that Barry was looking forward to challenging Kennedy on the issues' (2006, 61-2). This was ended by the assassination as well as Goldwater's defects as a candidate.

The assassination changed the perception of extremism into a right-wing/conservative problem and triggered a crisis of confidence in Goldwater, who also accepted Johnson could not be defeated. Trapped in, and obligated to, what now seemed failing candidacy his doubts were reinforced as favourable media coverage evaporated. Goldwater believed he had developed an effective method of communication: 'in my contacts with people I am always amazed that a careful study and a decent explanation of my conservative position melts away and rabid opposition that would be there were I merely to attack liberalism without explaining Conservatsim' (Dean and Goldwater 2008, 112). The ideas that fuelled his rhetoric did not change but there were differences between how campaign and non-campaign speeches were put together. Reflecting on addressing myriad Republican audiences, he wrote, 'Most of my speeches are extemporaneous, based on hastily written notes' (often on the back of napkins) and 'I try to guage the interest and temper of my audience and fashion my words accordingly' (Goldwater 1980, 335). For more 'formal' speeches Goldwater would discuss ideas with speechwriters who would then recast these thoughts into Goldwater's idiom who would then rework these in ways that satisfied his purposes and character. Goldwater, however, cared little about rhetorical construction. Perlstein, for example, reports Hess and Goldwater 'fantasied about barnstorming the nation ... Together they wrote speeches that were like bill boards on the road to Damascus ... some few voters who entered the hall seeking just enough info to pull one lever ... were converted in a blinding flash.' There was, however, a downside, 'Many more were just spooked' (2009, 315). There was nothing particularly unusual about the way Goldwater's speeches were developed. Speechwriting 'was neither an individual nor a team effort; it was more like a serial exposition. One or two men would write a draft, another would make changes, et another would bring his own ideas into the mix before the text was turned over to the blue-pencil brothers, Kitchel and Baroody' (Middendorf 2006, 184).

Henry Jaffa, who contributed to Goldwater's 1964 convention speech, was never given the opportunity to discuss the ideas to be covered in a speech. Whilst this introduced an element of uncertainty into speechwriting it allowed Goldwater to alter speeches but his weaknesses as a candidate meant his rhetoric was increasingly reactive and directionless. Thus, 'Barry had no schedule – he just seemed to "poop along" ... There was no plan, no correlation and a lot of wasted opportunity' (Middendorf 2006, 50) with him relying on his reputation for candour. This, however, was a wasting and dangerous asset. This approach worked well in the Senate and with audiences of conservative activists and supporters but less well with reporters and uncommitted voters, and the problem was compounded by Goldwater's hostility to 'Madison Avenue' techniques. One month before November 1964 professional political operatives from the Draft Goldwater Committee argued Goldwater should adopt a more professional approach to speech-writing by putting Stephen Shadegg in charge, a proposal that was blocked by Kitchel and Baroody (members of the Arizona Mafia), and Goldwater showed little interest largely because he was by now convinced defeat was inevitable. In 1963 Middedorf noted Goldwater 'expressed the wish that our movement be not expressly to make him President, but to expand and foster the conservative movemement in the US through the Republican Party' (Middendorf 2006, 30).

Goldwater's aim, remember, was not so much an electoral platform but delivering a stark warning abour growing Federal power. As he told Shadegg in January 1960,

> We can do this in a philosophical way, then we can detach the definitiion and exposition to the concrete subject of legislation. We should constantly bring out in this respect that the liberals of today, using the approach of belly-politics and social welfare, are in effect doing presicely those things that our Constitution and our free enterprise system was designed to prevent (Dean and Goldwater 2008, 111).

As we have seen, central to Goldwater's understanding of rhetoric was a deep conviction that a clear exposition of his and the conservative position would neutralise opposition. Goldwater, in other

words, believed strongly in the power of logos but this is not the case because logos was supplemented by, and usually outflanked by those and pathos, which lay at the heart of his speaking in the GOP and the 1964 campaign. The most visible aspect of Goldwater's rhetoric, however, was pathos. Goldwater's message honed before a variety of audiences was built around five elements: first, the foundational primacy of individual freedom; second, reverence for the Constitution and its heritage; third, stopping the growth of government; fourth, resistance to Communism; and fifth, a conviction that the Republic was in moral decline. Pathos figured prominently in Goldwater's acceptance speech to the 1964 Republican convention,

> Failure proclaim lost leadership obscure purpose, weakening wills, and the risk of inciting our sworn enemies to new aggressions and to new excesses ... We have lost the brisk pace of diversity and the genius of individual creativity. We are plodding at a pace set by centralised planning, red tape, rules without responsibility, and regimentation without recourse ... Tonight there is violence in our streets, corruption in our highest offices, aimlessness among our youth, anxiety among out elders and there is a virtual despair amongt the many who look beyond material success for the inner meaning of their lives (Goldwater 1964b)

Central to pathos was Goldwater's conviction that the crisis confronting the Republic was existential.

Goldwater's 'extreme' language was an attempt to convince through lingustic clarity and so extreme language was used to draw a stark, unequivocal position at the expense of logos. Logos can obscure meaning so 'what is written must be easy to read and easy to speak ... A long sequence of connections does not have this feature ...' (Aristotle 2004, 226). As important as clarity is propriety because a 'fitting style makes the matter persuasive' (Aristotle 2004, 229) by bringing the speaker's argument and character together in the text and its delivery. Goldwater relied on ethos, which combines both the speaker's reputation with a distinct message. Goldwater's ethos was as a man of principle, unconcerned with personal gain, straight-talking and so on, usually captured by 'rugged

individualism' (see Hammerback 1972, 175-183) and his insistence that his ideas, often seemingly complex could be, and should be, understood as common sense. Complex problems, Goldwater insistend, did not require complex solutions. Central to ethos, then, was *propriety* (correct conduct, fitness of purpose, conformity with principle) whereby Goldwater associated himself, and was associated, with virtue and the highest motivations, and his opponents with the opposite. Thus, he told his audience when he announced his candidacy,

> I've been spelling out my position now for 10 years in the Senate and for years before that in myown state. I will spell it out even further in the months to come. I was one asked what kind of Republican I was. I replied that I was not a "me-too" Republican. That still holds. I will not change my beliefs to win votes. I will offer a choice not an echo. This will not be an engagement of personalities. It will be an engagement on principles (Goldwater 1964c).

A notable feature of Goldwater's rhetoric was his reluctance to use personal experiences, such as his war record, rank as a reserve airforce brigadier-general, or his business career because to do so would detract from the emphasis on ideas and philosophy. The difficulty was that Goldwater's character was a double-edged sword. Goldwater saw himself as promoting a conservative revolution. This was reflected in the language and construction of his speeches; his persona sometimes promoted his objectives and sometimes got in the way, which was where a professional campaign and communications team would have helped. His overwhelming desire to articulate and communicate a message of crisis and persuade people of this truth and act accordingly, coupled to his fear of the consequences of not acting meant 'He was often an inept campaigner, irritable and impatient' (Middendorf 2006, ix).

Goldwater's logos stressed the intimate relationship between liberalism, government growth and the loss of individual freedom, which led to the inevitable conclusion that all government culminated in socialism and the dominance of a bureaucratic elite. Attributes such as private property, social pluralism, states rights, budget surpluses, free markets, and rule of law were evidence of this

constitutional order working properly and effectively. Logos, however, was the least important aspect of Goldwater's speeches. For Goldwater, the proof of his arguments were self-evident and did not need to be demonstrated formally and in consequence his style often came across as assertive, with an unclear chain of reasoning that relies on enthymemes. As assertions not relying on proofs, the enthymeme can provoke a powerful response from audiences and points to the significance of self-persuasion by auditors; Goldwater rarely uses evidence or proofs and he depended on his listeners 'filling in the gaps' from their own experiences to validate his argument. Goldwater's speeches, especially the set-piece major ones, avoid the passive voice. Rhetorically the passive voice allows the speaker to state something without specifying who was responsible for the state of affairs being addressed, whereas Goldwater identifies the actors (liberals) and their motivation (socialism), thus specifying cause and effect. In his acceptance speech Goldwater made extensive use of the phrase, 'And I needn't tell you', then immediately reminding the audience of his point. This reinforced the intimacy of the link between Goldwater and his audience and reiterated the route by which the United States reached its current impasse by providing an opportunity to reminds his audiences of his major claims. Goldwater's argumentation is deductive, his premises self-evident. Goldwater's logos rests on enthymemes with the speaker supplying what Aristotle called the *topoi*, the commonplaces, to complete the argument.

Topoi play a critical role in political rhetoric. Aristotle wrote commonplaces were'about the possible and impossible, and try to show ... that something will happen and in others that it has' (Aristotle 2004, 185). A commonplace is a line of argument and categories that identify relationships between ideas and help forge a group identity. Topoi represent shared knowledge, knowledge common to a community, and they assume a large store of common cultural capital and symbols that define and encapsulate a particular understanding of the world. Topoi enable a speaker to make assumptions about the knowledge common to an audience and that enable them to fill in the gaps in the rhetorician's logos. Goldwater's style often placed great demands on his audiences. For example,

> In Charlotte he gave an academic monologue on the great American system of checks and balances – before angrily denouncing the silent crowd for their indifference to their own liberty ... In Memphis and Raleigh Goldwater chastised farmers for even thinking they liked cotton subsidies ... In West Virginia, he called the War on Poverty ... a fraud ... In the land of the tar-paper shack, the gap-toothed smile and the open sewer .. the message just sounded perverse. As he left lines of workmen jeered him (Perlstein 2009, 430-31).

Arguments were often not developed to persuade, but rather to re-state a conclusion. Where audiences were already convinced there was no problem; where they were not Goldwater faced serious problems. Two episodes suggested what Goldwaterism might have achieved rhetorically and, ironically, neither involved Goldwater.

The first grew out of Goldwater's mid-October 1964 speech at the Mormon Tabernacle in Salt Lake City, which led to a made-for-tv documentary, *Choice*, produced by sympathetic Hollywood experts and Mothers for a Moral America, narrated by Raymond Massey and featuring John Wayne. Goldwater had started to develop a morality theme in his speeches in response to events (such as the Bobby Baker and Walter Jenkins scandals) and growing social unrest, and this morality theme was to be central to the culture wars that developed in the late-1960s/early-1970s. This moralistic strand was linked intimately to the theme of national decline. Inspired by F. Clifton White, *Choice* (https://m.youtube.com/watch?v=xniUoMiHm8g) showcased liberal judges, juvenile and other crime, riots, law and order, strippers, drugs, pornography, and the growing lack of personal responsibility as the direct result of liberalism. It also featured an unseen driver speeding and tossing beer-cans from the car, something LBJ was known to do on his ranch. However, no attempt was made to blend these into a rhetorical strategy and *Choice*, due to be broadcast on 22 October, was pulled when journalists obtained a copy and Goldwater, chastened by accustations of racism, vetoed it. Copies were shown to enthusiastic audiences in Republican campaign headquarters across America. *Choice* represented the next phase in the evolution of Goldwaterism but the morality

theme emerged from 'The Forgotten American' (1961) remained underdeveloped in 1964. It was, however, a major bathetic appeal that was picked up by Nixon ('the silent majority') and Reagan in his hostility to the counter-culture as governor of California after his election in 1966.

The second example is Ronald Reagan's, 'Time for Choosing', also known as 'The Speech', delivered on tv in support of Goldwater on 27 October 1964. Its effect on both the campaign and Reagan's political prospects was dramatic (Ritter 1968, 50-58). There was little ideological difference between Reagan and Goldwater but 'The Speech' shows the importance of propriety and ethos and also of effective delivery. 'A Time for Choosing' is the speech Goldwater could not give. The Speech was the subject of a major controversy in the Goldwater campaign that went to the heart of Goldwater's rhetorical strategy between those who wanted him to return to his tried and tested themes and those who felt to do so drew too much attention to his extremist image. Goldwater was initially inclined to ban the speech but he was persuaded to listen to it and concluded, 'What the hell wrong's with that?' (Middendorf 2006, 207). It evoked a massive positive response.

In a sense 'The Speech' signals the demise of Goldwaterism because, contrary to Goldwater's approach, it demonstrated that it did really matter who spoke and how. Ideas and conviction were not enough. Goldwater was perceived to lack positivity and whilst he could identify what conservatives should oppose Ronald Reagan giving is listeners a positive message and something to believe in, as well as conveying the impression of a winner. 1964 and the preceding years had established conservatism's attractiveness, the problem now was to make it acceptable to the wider electorate (Ritter 1999, 340). Goldwater helped create a new Republican audience but his persona and the media blocked its penetration; Reagan added a persuasiveness as well as a positive and attractive political persona to Goldwater's message that translated ideology into behaviour and support. Goldwater's persona worked for conservatives who already endorsed Goldwater's message whereas Reagan was able to extend this deep into the electorate (see, for example, Greenberg 1995, 121-150).

Conclusions

At the 1964 Republican convention Theodore White reported hearing a journalist expostulate during Goldwater's acceptance speech, "My God, he's going to run as Barry Goldwater." In so doing Goldwater seemingly ignored the basic tenets of campaigning, effective rhetoric and spatial theories of politics and these failures 'appeared to be so immense and obvious' (Hammerback 1999, 323).

The impact of Goldwater's oratory suggests that neither the influence of rhetoric nor its effectiveness requires a high level of technical competence or skill as Goldwater was widely acknowledged to be a 'poor' speaker, particularly in the 1964 presidential campaign. Even a cursory study of Goldwater's political rhetoric inevitably draws our attention to the power of ideas and the significance of pathos. From the perspective of campaigning practicalities his rhetoric prompts a further observation: was Goldwater's objective in 1964 movement-building rather than winning office? His campaign rhetoric left a major ideological legacy, which was his intention, which leads to the inevitable question: was Goldwater's campaign one of the most consequential in American electoral history?

Three conclusions followed from Goldwater's thinking: *first*, individuals are unique; *second*, the economic and spiritual cannot be separated; and *third*, human development cannot be externally directed. Human development requires the widest possible freedom of choice, and so *any* form of collectivism should be resisted. The bulwark against tyrrany was the Constitution but this had been under attack for decades and freedom was now seriously circumscribed and liberty jeopardised. Goldwater described freedom to Bozell as 'the one hope and desire of all the people' (Dean and Goldwater 2008, 111; Goldwater 1962b, 17540).

There is nothing particularly unusual about the way in which Goldwater's speeches were composed. As a senator and presidential candidate Goldwater made extensive use of speechwriters and most day-to-day speeches either were variations of speeches made or were extemporaneous and event depepdent. In Goldwater's case repetition was essential given his proselytising objectives; in more

formal set pieces composition was more formal and some of these speeches (notably the 1964 convention speech) had a massive, but not invariably positive, impact. This points to the role of the media in framing.

Goldwater's strategic aim, style, the press's reporting and interpretation of his rhetoric, the radicalism of his ideas, and often amateur scheduling and organisational errors, and the political skills of LBJ and the Democrats located Goldwater's rhetoric in an unusually complex context. This resulted in his crushing electoral defeat but the eventual triumph of his ideas in the mouths of others. Ronald Reagan's ability to transform these ideas into a winning formula and Reagan's success suggests that, first, Goldwater was before his time and that conservatism's success needed events to 'prove' him and his arguments right; and second, that whatever the private personal qualities of the individual, effective political rhetoric depends on the audience's favourable evaluation of the speaker.

Figure 1 Goldwater Texts Tag Cloud

Table 1 Goldwater's rhetoric. Top 30 Words

Word	Count	Weighted Percentage
government	281	0.72
federal	210	0.54
people	206	0.53
freedom	151	0.39
american	139	0.36
states	124	0.32
should	120	0.31
political	117	0.30
communist	114	0.29
united	100	0.26
soviet	90	0.23
economic	89	0.23
rights	88	0.23
national	80	0.21
policy	80	0.21
individual	74	0.19
public	74	0.19
nation	73	0.19
president	72	0.18
against	70	0.18
nations	66	0.17
republican	63	0.16
constitution	62	0.16

education	61	0.16
foreign	61	0.16
senate	59	0.15
spending	59	0.15
cannot	58	0.15
america	57	0.15
country	56	0.14

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